POWER VS. PRIDE: U.S. POLICY TOWARD
IRAN’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS
Iyanuloluwa Adewuya‡
1.
INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of nuclear weapons among states is widely recognized as
the most serious threat to the national security of the United States. Official
and public attention to nuclear proliferation issues, however, has varied over
the decades from near-hysteria to apathy. Although non-proliferation efforts
have steadily advanced over the past two decades, these advances have never
been easy and never without serious setbacks. While some nations renounced
their nuclear weapons programmes, others started new ones.
One of the most urgent issues confronting the U.S. today is Iran’s nuclear
ambitions. Iran’s recent rejection of a European demand to stop building a
heavy water nuclear reactor indicates a hardening of its position on a key part
of its nuclear facilities that observers claim is part of a weapons program.1 This
announcement comes as the clearest declaration yet of its nuclear intentions.
Furthermore, in recent weeks, Iran’s top leaders have adamantly stated that
Iran won’t entirely abandon its nuclear program.
Historically, U.S. efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons has
focused on keeping countries from getting the technical means for building
and delivering the bomb. Robert Hunter rightly notes that “rarely have U.S.
administrations considered the incentives that countries have to build nuclear
weapons, with a view to helping provide some alternative means for satisfying
such ambitions.”2
This paper will therefore attempt to provide an in-depth view of Iran’s
current domestic configuration and international environment with the goal of
M.Sc. candidate (International Public Policy), School of Public Policy, University College
London (expected November 2005). Contact with questions/comments:
i.adewuya@gmail.com.
1
Ali Akbar Dareni, “Iran Rejects European Demand on Reactor,” Associated Press,
February 13, 2005.
2
Robert Hunter, “Engage, Don’t Isolate, Iran,” San Diego Tribune, June 27, 2004.
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW, vol. I, no. 1 (September 2005): 151-164. [ISSN 1748-5207]
‡
© 2005 by The School of Public Policy, University College London, London, United Kingdom. All rights reserved.
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threshing out its motives and incentives for embarking on a nuclear
programme in the first place. Having mapped out these elements, this paper
will then seek to examine several policy options that are currently being
debated by Washington policymakers and finally lay out an alternative
proposal of what an appropriate U.S. foreign policy would be towards Iran’s
nuclear ambitions.
2.
INSIDE IRAN
Iranian officials have admitted to the United Nations International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) that they have been secretly developing a broad range
of nuclear capabilities for the past 18 years.3 Although the IAEA did not
consider Iran’s many violations of specific nonproliferation rules proof that
Iran had a nuclear weapons program, many international nuclear experts have
agreed that the types of experiments Iran was conducting—such as uranium
enrichment by laser—strongly suggest the existence of a nuclear weapons
program. This suspicion was enhanced by the discovery that Iran’s secret
nuclear program included all the steps needed to make fissile material for a
nuclear bomb. Predictably, Iranian officials insist that their program is
committed to nuclear power and other peaceful commercial uses including
the goal of becoming a major nuclear fuel supplier in 15 years.4 This argument
is swiftly rebutted by those who point out that it is highly economically
inefficient for a country with the world’s sixth largest oil reserves to spend
billions of dollars on developing nuclear power plants.
But beyond these claims and counterclaims, effective non-proliferation
policies must account for the differences in capabilities, intentions, priorities
and incentives between governments. Hence, a clearer understanding of why
the Iranian government chose its current nuclear policies is primordial in the
search for policies that contribute to efforts to halt the spread of nuclear
weapons.
2.1. Internal Elements
Takeyh rightly observes that “as a state unleashes a nuclear program, it
creates political and bureaucratic constituencies and nationalistic pressures
that generate their own momentum. As such, a state can cross the point of no
return years before it assembles a nuclear bomb…As Iran crosses successive
nuclear demarcations, its program becomes a subject of national pride and
3
Council on Foreign Relations, Iran: Nuclear Weapons,
http://www.cfr.org/background/iran_nuclear.php (February 8, 2005).
4
Ali Akbar Dareni, “Iran Rejects European Demand on Reactor,” Associated Press,
February 13, 2005.
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popular acclaim.”5 Quite noticeably, the nuclear issue has become
progressively subsumed in Iranian nationalism. Notions of sovereign rights and
national dignity are rapidly displacing calls for adherence to international treaty
commitments. As former President Hashemi Rafsanjani acknowledged in a
sermon June 11, "No official would dare allow himself to defy the people on
such an issue."6 These domestic political imperatives were most recently
reflected in President Mohammed Khatami’s recent statements asserting Iran’s
sovereign right to pursue a nuclear program. Khatami, who is widely
recognized as a leader of a moderate faction in Iran, indicated that the talk of a
possible U.S. invasion was pushing him into a united camp with Tehran's
hard-liners.7
This overall logic is supported by the striking observation that, some of
the most strident critics of Iran's accommodation to the international
community on the nuclear issues have been student organizations. Although
Iran's students have largely been associated with progressive causes since they
have been the most vocal advocates of greater democratization and reform, on
the nuclear issue, Iran's educated youths view disarmament agreements as a
weakening of their national rights and have warned their elders against
relenting to external pressures.8 The effect of these domestic pressures is
reflected in the recent statements of various Iranian officials who have
suggested that any acceptance of a permanent freeze of its nuclear activities
would collapse the government since its program is a matter of national pride
and prestige.9
Complicating matters even further is the emergence of a domestic
establishment with its own parochial considerations. With the patronage of
the Revolutionary Guards, a variety of organizations such as the Defense
Industries Organization, university laboratories and a glut of commercial firms
often owned by hard-line clerics have spearheaded Iran's expanding and
lucrative nuclear efforts.10 Furthermore, the fact that Iran’s nuclear program is
run by the hard-line Revolutionary Guards becomes even more disturbing
when considered in light of Scott Sagan’s seminal argument that “professional
military organizations—because of common biases, inflexible routines and
parochial interests—display organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to
deterrence failures and deliberate and accidental wars.”11
Ray Takeyh, “Nuclear Momentum,” Baltimore Sun, September 1, 2004.
Ibid.
7
Ali Akbar Dareni, “Khatami: Iran Would Be Hell for Attackers,” Associated Press,
February 10, 2005.
8
Ray Takeyh, “Nuclear Momentum,” Baltimore Sun, September 1, 2004.
9
Dareni, “Iran Rejects European Demand on Reactor”
10
Ibid.
11
Scott Sagan & Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2003), p. 47.
5
6
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A vital, yet underanalyzed, factor is the fact that the domestic political
security benefits of a nuclear program can be quite substantial. “On a
commercial scale, nuclear power can centralize government authority, and
extend it throughout the economy, in so far as it is imposed upon businesses
which had relied on their own electric generators. It can enforce popular
dependence upon the leadership, while widening the base for government
revenues to include all buyers of state-generated electricity.”12 Since, by its
own admission, the current regime’s overriding socioeconomic goal of
equitable distribution of wealth has yet to be met, a convincing argument can
be made that one of the prime motivations of the regimes nuclear energy
program is to consolidate and reinforce its domestic hold.
But do the Iranians want to get the bomb regardless of its consequences?
Despite the ominous developments discussed above, it should not be assumed
that the perennially fractious Iranian theocracy has settled on its course of
action. A subtle yet significant debate regarding the strategic utility of nuclear
weapons is going on within the government’s corridors of power. Although all
contending factions are united on the need to sustain a vibrant nuclear
research program, the prospect of actually crossing the nuclear threshold has
generated vigorous disagreement.13
A coalition of pragmatic conservatives and reformers that questions the
strategic value of nuclear weapons has gradually emerged. This coalition has
challenged the hard-liners' reasoning by counter-arguing that the possession of
such arms would actually increase Iran's vulnerabilities. Their logic holds that
“Should Iran cross the nuclear threshold, the Persian Gulf states and the newly
independent Iraq would probably gravitate further toward the American
security umbrella. Moreover, such a brazen act of defiance would probably
trigger debilitating economic sanctions and estrange Iran from its valuable
European and Japanese commercial partners.”14
Although the discussion above is unable fully explore the full scope of all
the vital domestic factors and internal dynamics that are directly affecting the
Iranian government’s calculations, it has adequately demonstrated that the
interplay between public sentiment, parochial politics and domestic political
security presents a far more complex but accurate picture of its motives and
intentions. Furthermore, it hints at the possibility of a peaceful solution
through of a carefully calibrated strategy which wisely harnesses various
competing aspects of Iran’s domestic environment.
12
Daniel Poneman, “Nuclear Policies in Developing Countries”, International Affairs 57,
(Autumn 1981): p. 574.
13
Ray Takeyh, “Wrong Strategy on Iran,” The Washington Post, September 10, 2004.
14
Ibid.
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2.2. External Factors
A strong argument can be made that Iran’s nuclear calculations are not the
products of irrational plans but are rather the result of a purposeful attempt to
create a viable deterrent capability against a range of regional threats. Takeyh
itemizes the primary sources of these calculations:
For the past two decades, Saddam Hussein's Iraq determined Iran's
defense priorities, propelling Tehran toward a nuclear option as a
means of deterring a dictator who had already proved willing to
unleash weapons of mass destruction against Iranian cities.
Given Hussein's demise, America has emerged as Iran's
foremost strategic quandary. The Bush Doctrine, which pledges the
preemptive use of force as a tool of counter-proliferation, along
with the substantial growth in American power along Iran's
periphery, has intensified Tehran's fears that the Islamic Republic
will be the next U.S. target. Borrowing a page from the North
Korean playbook, Iran is now brandishing its nuclear program to
strengthen its leverage vis--vis the American colossus.
Iranian policymakers across the political spectrum agree on the
necessity of maintaining a nuclear program with advocates
propounding the existential threats surrounding Iran.15
It must be pointed out that in the mid-1970s Iran was often referred to as
an example of a state that might be motivated to acquire nuclear weapons by
the desire for national prestige. “This was implied by the Shah’s ambitious
programs of modernization, economic development, and investment in
sophisticated conventional military forces, and the increased acceptance in the
West of Iran as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf area.”16 Although the
Shah’s works are despised by the revolutionaries who overthrew him, it is not
clear that their foreign policies have been far different. What appealed to the
Shah as a means to grandeur appears to now appeal to his successors as a
means toward independence from both Eastern and Western powers.17
Old-fashioned strategic analysis quickly reveals that Iran genuinely feels
insecure in its neighborhood. This is not just because of historic tensions with
neighbors like Iraq but also because it is surrounded by U.S. military power
(present in Afghanistan and Iraq) and a declared U.S. intent on bringing about
regime change. “For years, America supported Iranian exile groups in military
operations within Iran, including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, which was harbored
by Iraq's Saddam Hussein and has only recently been put on the U.S. list of
Ray Takeyh, “Iran’s Nuclear Skeptics,” The Washington Post, April 25, 2003.
Richard K. Betts, “Incentives for Nuclear Weapons: India, Pakistan, Iran,” Asian Survey
19, (November 1979): p. 1063.
17
Ibid.
15
16
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terrorist groups.”18 Having been branded as a member of the infamous "axis of
evil", Iran could reasonably assume it was on the U.S. hit list. It is hard
therefore to be surprised that U.S. statements and actions may actually
reinforce Iranian ambitions to acquire a nuclear capability. Furthermore,
“international sensitivity to the abuse of nuclear technology gives its users
considerable bargaining leverage, which increases the closer a country comes to
nuclear weapons-building capability.”19
The above discussion on Iran’s external environment reveals that the
Iranian government may have legitimate fears that are brought about by the
nature of ‘self-help’ international system and is simply resorting to nuclear
capabilities as a means of satisfying its current security imperative. Whether
these fears are legitimate and whether there may be effective policies to help
alleviate them is a subject will be explored further.
3. THE POLICY OPTIONS
On both sides of the political spectrum, it already seems to be a settled
political question in Washington that Iran cannot be permitted to acquire a
nuclear weapon. Analysts assert that even if Tehran did not threaten to use
them against its neighbors or give aide to terrorists, Iran’s becoming a “nuclear
power,” however fledgling, would radically alter regional politics and
relationships in the Middle East and significantly complicate the problems
facing the U.S. and others.20
Although a full investigation of the pros and cons of all the policy options
available to the current U.S. administration is beyond the scope of this paper,
this section will analyze the most vital elements which will play a significant
role in the analysis of the both the efficacy and feasibility of several policy
options which are currently being debated. Finally, an alternative policy
proposal will be laid out.
3.1. Preemptive Strike
On June 7, 1981, the Israeli Air force used a surprise air attack to destroy
the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor which was located 30 kilometers South of
Baghdad. Although the Bush administration has not made any definitive
statements about the possibility of a lightning strike similar to Israel’s which
would destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities, this option has increasingly been on the
front burner of recent public discourse with Vice President Dick Cheney even
Robert Hunter, “Engage, Don’t Isolate, Iran,” San Diego Tribune, June 27, 2004.
Daniel Poneman, “Nuclear Policies in Developing Countries,” 574.
20
Robert Hunter, “Talk it Out Before It’s Too Late: Engagement Now Could Defuse a
Nuclear Crisis,” Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2004.
18
19
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hinting at the possibility of another Israeli-type operation.21 Such an option
must first be examined in light of its feasibility and policy implications.
David Sanger’s New York Times article reveals that U.S. military planners
are almost unanimous in their assessment that there are no effective military
ways to wipe out a nuclear program that has been well hidden and broadly
dispersed across the country, including in crowded cities.22 Analysts argue that
a preemptive strike against Iran's missile or nuclear assets is problematic
because the targets are too far away, too numerous and dispersed, and too well
protected with some of them in deep underground installations.
It is vital for policymakers not to draw uninformed parallels between
Israel’s relatively successful strike on Osirak and the possible outcomes of a
U.S. strike on Iran’s facilities. Producing a valid estimate on the likely extent of
damage to Iranian installations will be inherently problematic, given that the
more sensitive portions of these facilities were built underground specifically
to guard against a destructive attack. A preemptive strike is further
complicated by the fact that Iran has purchased and deployed advanced
Russian air defense systems to guard these nuclear facilities.23
American and European intelligence officials say Iran has taken the lessons
of Osirak to heart, spreading its nuclear facilities around the country, burying
some underground and putting others in the middle of crowded urban areas.
Sanger’s article reveals that the IAEA last year found centrifuges, which are
used to enrich uranium, behind a false wall at the Kalaye Electric Company in
a densely populated corner of Tehran, where there would be no way to
conduct a military strike without causing major civilian casualties. The
military options therefore “range from the bad to the unimaginable.”24
Finally, the political and diplomatic ramifications of such an endeavor
must be thoroughly scrutinized. In the absence of an Iranian nuclear weapons
program, which IAEA inspectors have yet to find, a preemptive attack by the
United States would provide Iran hardliners with the justification they sorely
need to pursue a full blown covert nuclear deterrent program, without the
inconvenience of current IAEA inspections. Such an attack would therefore be
likely to weaken any diplomatic coalition to back stringent sanctions against
Iran. Without intrusive inspections or threat of UN Security Council
sanctions, the only way to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons
capability would therefore be to occupy Iran. Given the gargantuan challenges
Stan Crock, “Why Iran Can Thumb its Nose at Washington”, BusinessWeek Online,
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_09/b3922091_mz015.htm, February 24, 2005.
22
David E. Sanger, “The U.S. vs. A Nuclear Iran,” The New York Times, December 12, 2004.
23
Sammy Salama, Karen Ruster, A Preemptive Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: Possible
Consequences, Monterey Institute of International Studies,
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040812.htm, February 8, 2005.
24
David E. Sanger, “The U.S. vs. A Nuclear Iran”
21
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currently being faced by the United States in Iraq, the possibility of such an
occurrence is largely in doubt.
3.2. Economic Sanctions
Since the seizure of the U.S. hostages in Tehran in 1979, economic
sanctions have formed a major part of U.S. policy toward Iran. To date, few, if
any, other countries have followed the U.S. lead by imposing sanctions, and no
U.N. sanctions on Iran currently exist. A number of these U.S. sanctions have
been specifically tailored for Iran:
The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 102-484) requires
denial of license applications for exports to Iran of dual use items,
and imposes sanctions on foreign countries that transfer to Iran
“destabilizing numbers and types of conventional weapons,” as well
as WMD technology. The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178)
authorizes sanctions on foreign entities that assist Iran’s WMD
programs. It bans U.S. extraordinary payments to the Russian
Aviation and Space Agency in connection with the international
space station unless the President can certify that the agency or
entities under the Agency’s control had not transferred any WMD
or missile-related technology to Iran within the year prior.25
While some experts believe that U.S. sanctions have hindered Iran’s
economy, forcing it to curb spending on conventional arms purchases, others
argue that sanctions have only had a marginal effect, and that foreign
investment has continued to flow in spite of U.S. sanctions. The latter view is
supported by the observation that Iran’s economic performance fluctuates
according to the price of oil, and far less so from other factors. Because oil
prices remain relatively high, Iran’s economy grew about 4% in 2003, and the
economy continued its gains in 2004 with oil prices exceeding $40 per barrel.26
What is abundantly clear is that sanctions would have had a far greater
effect on Iran if they were multilateral or international. Reflecting this line of
thinking, the Bush Administration has declared its readiness to seek major
sanctions against Iran through the U.N. if the ongoing talks with the Europeans
fall apart.
If international sanctions are considered, some options that have been used
in similar cases in the past could be “imposing an international ban or
limitations on purchases of Iranian oil or other trade, mandating reductions in
diplomatic exchanges with Iran or flight travel to and from Iran, and limiting
Kenneth Katzman, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, CRS Report for Congress,
http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32048.pdf, February 17, 2005.
26
Ibid.
25
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further lending to Iran by international financial institutions.”27 What remains
uncertain is whether the Security Council or directors of international
financial institutions would back such proposals.
3.3. Strategic Engagement
The final option presented here—termed ‘bilateral strategic
engagement’—represents this paper’s choice of the most adequate policy tool
that will achieve Washington’s goal of a nuclear-free Iran. Although hardly
original in its totality and far more complex than can be adequately defended
within this paper’s constraints, in my view this proposal provides the most
potent ‘policy mix’ which addresses Iran’s external vulnerability, unique
domestic dynamics and economic rationales, while holding the highest
possibility of a peaceful and permanent resolution to both current tensions and
long-term U.S.-Iran relations.
On a general level, the concept of ‘bilateral strategic engagement’ calls for
direct dialogue approached candidly and without restrictions on issues of
mutual concern. This is a response to the fact that the United States’ long lack
of direct contact with, and presence in, Iran has systematically impeded its
grasp of Iran’s internal and external dynamics. This, in turn, has reduced
Washington’s influence in Iran. Hence, dialogue between the United States
and Iran need not wait until total harmony between the two governments can
be established.
Security
At present, the U.S. has focused almost exclusively on finding measures to
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities while paying little
attention to why Tehran is pursuing this course in the first place. Given that it
has become abundantly clear that Iran's nuclear ambitions stem from the
perception of threat from the United States, this paper is of the view that the
most effective U.S. approach would be to try to diminish Iran's strategic
security anxieties. Iran must therefore be convinced that it has something vital
to gain by renouncing its nuclear ambitions. The major flaw in the European
diplomatic initiative to resolve this issue is its failure to account for the key
security motivations that drive Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Neither the
unilateralism of the Bush administration nor the multilateralism espoused by
the EU will provide a durable solution. Bilateralism, a deal between the
United States and Iran, is what is urgently needed.
Simply stated, Iran needs to understand that it would not be attacked if it
gave up the bomb, that regime change is not a U.S. precondition for a changed
27
Ibid.
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relationship, and that Iran's rejoining the international community is possible if
it takes a series of clear, precise and reasonable steps towards nuclear
disarmament. “From Iran's point of view, it currently has no assurance on any
of these points. Even North Korea has been given a U.S. guarantee of ‘nonattack’ — even though (or perhaps because) it has indicated it already has the
bomb…Even now, the carrot offered to Iran regarding its nuclear programs,
through European intermediation, is not a non-attack commitment or
economic reintegration in the outside world. Instead, it is limited to help with
its civilian nuclear programs and some relief from economic sanctions.”28 This
approach is clearly insufficient.
Economic Integration
The concept of ‘bilateral strategic engagement’ further calls for the U.S. to
subtly integrate Iran in the international economy and global society. The
inherent dynamics of such measures are bound to pressure Iran toward the
decentralization, accountability and transparency which have been long
resisted by the extreme right.29 The report by an Independent Task Force of
the Council on Foreign Relations provides the operational details of this
particular concept:
In engaging with Iran, the United States must be prepared to utilize
incentives as well as punitive measures. Given Iran’s pressing
economic challenges, the most powerful inducements for Tehran
would be economic measures: particularly steps that rescind the
comprehensive U.S. embargo on trade and investment in Iran. Used
judiciously, such incentives could enhance U.S. leverage vis-à-vis
Tehran…
Commercial relations represent a diplomatic tool that should
not be underestimated or cynically disregarded. Ultimately, the
return of U.S. businesses to Tehran could help undermine the
clerics’ monopoly on power by strengthening the nonstate sector,
improving the plight of Iran’s beleaguered middle class, and offering
new opportunities to transmit American values.30
Regional Stability
In the end, it can be argued that the key to a lasting solution lies in
building a new security architecture in the Persian Gulf. A policy of ‘bilateral
Hunter, “Talk it Out Before It’s Too Late”
Ray Takeyh, Iran: The New Reformists, Center for American Progress,
http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=33716, February 8, 2005.
30
Report of an Independent Task Force, Iran: Time for A New Approach, Council on
Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Iran_TF.pdf, February 17, 2005.
28
29
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strategic engagement’ would therefore pursue an engagement between the
U.S., Iran and each of its neighbors in a dialogue which aims to establish an
effective organization to promote regional security and cooperation. Given the
Gulf's central role in Iran's nuclear calculations, this regional security
framework would not only alleviate Iran's anxieties but potentially usher in a
more rational relationship between Washington and Tehran.
The driving logic behind this proposal is the argument that such
interlocking security arrangements would give Iran a stake in upholding a
status quo compatible with its national interests. This network could evolve
gradually into a full-scale security system that resembles institutions such as
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.31 With favorable
ties with its neighbors, peaceful relations with its longstanding Iraqi foe and
better links with the West, the U.S. would stand a far better chance of having
a nuclear-free Iran.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Formulating U.S. policy toward Iran has never been simple or
straightforward. This paper set out to determine what would be an
appropriate U.S. policy toward Iran’s alleged development of nuclear weapons
based on the fundamental premise that such a policy must comprehensively
address the underlying motives and incentives that drive Iran’s current nuclear
policies. Although this paper cannot claim to have unmasked all of Iran’s costbenefit calculations, an examination of its domestic setting and international
environment proved fruitful in both explaining some of its rationales and
discrediting some purely ideological policy options which may appear to
provide a ‘quick fix’ to the crisis.
The fundamental premise of the alternative policy offered here is driven
home by Scott Sagan’s excellent argument: “Decision makers in potential
nuclear powers do not need to be told that proliferation is not in the United
State’s interests. They need to be convinced that it is not in their interest.”32
The proposal that has been presented clearly shifts the focus of policy towards
to the goal of substantively addressing Iran’s domestic concerns and external
strategic interests.
Clearly, Iran’s political leaders and general public will refuse to give up
their nuclear program unless they have something vital to gain from
forswearing the nuclear option. As this paper demonstrates, this “something”
goes far beyond the economics of civilian nuclear power as misconstrued by
the current European efforts. A paradigm shift is therefore needed in the way
Ray Takeyh, “America Has a Golden Chance to Tame Iran,” Financial Times, October
14, 2004.
32
Sagan & Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), p. 85.
31
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we think about managing nuclear proliferation among potential members of
the nuclear club.
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