Miners, managers, and machines : industrial accidents and occupational disease in the Butte
underground, 1880-1920
by Brian Lee Shovers
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History
Montana State University
© Copyright by Brian Lee Shovers (1987)
Abstract:
Between 1880 and 1920 Butte, Montana achieved world-class mining status for its copper production.
At the same time, thousands of men succumbed to industrial accidents and contracted occupational
disease in the Butte underground, making Butte mining significantly more dangerous than other
industrial occupations of that era. Three major factors affected working conditions and worker safety in
Butte: new mining technologies, corporate management, and worker attitude.
The introduction of new mining technologies and corporate mine ownership after 1900 combined to
create a sometimes dangerous dynamic between the miner and the work place in Butte. While
technological advances in hoisting, tramming, lighting and ventilation generally improved underground
working conditions, other technological adaptations such as the machine drill, increased the hazard of
respiratory disease. In the end, the operational efficiencies associated with the new technologies could
not alleviate the difficult problems of managing and supervising a highly independent, transient, and
often inexperienced work force.
With the beginning of the twentieth century and the consolidation of most of the major Butte mines
under the corporate entity of Amalgamated Copper Company (later the Anaconda Copper Mining
Company), conflict between worker and management above ground increased. At issue were wages,
conditions, and a corporate reluctance to accept responsibility for occupational hazards. The new
atmosphere of mistrust between miners and their supervisors provoked a defiant attitude towards the
work place by workers which increased the potential for industrial accidents.
Eforts by organized labor to improve underground conditions in Butte through protective legislation,
compensation for work-related accidents and disabilities, and through work stoppages, failed to halt
industrial accidents or to effectively alter a recalcitrant disregard held by miners for the dangers of the
work place, created over a forty year period in which thousands of Butte miners lost their lives on the
job.
This study consists of six chapters: Chapter One is an introduction; Chapter Two offers a profile of the
miner's life above and below ground; Chapter Three examines the impact of new mining technologies
on the dynamics of the work place; Chapter Four explores the high incidence of accidental fatalities
and occupational health hazards in the Butte underground; Chapter Five documents the miners struggle
to improve working conditions; and Chapter Six is a conclusion. MINERS, MANAGERS, AND MACHINES: INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS
AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE IN THE BUTTE UNDERGROUND,
1880-1920
by
Brian Lee Shovers
1 - ,
: ■•
'
A thesis sub m itted in p a rtial fulfillm ent
of th e re q u ire m e n ts for th e degree
of
M aster of A rts
in
History
MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY
Bozeman, M ontana
A pril 1987
Archives
Sh^ S3
Cop. I
I,
APPROVAL
of a thesis subm itted by
Brian Lee Shovers
This thesis has b een re a d b y each m em ber of th e th esis com m ittee
and has b een found to b e satisfactory regarding content, English usage,
fo rm at, citations, bibliographic style, and consistency, and is rea d y for
subm ission to th e College of G raduate Studies.
Siicf /y, /<ry
Date
Chairperson, G raduate Com mittee
A pproved for th e D epartm ent of H istory & Philosophy
'4 ^ 7 /7
Bate
/? ? ?
Head, D e p a rtm ^ n w r^ M o ry
A pproved for th e College of G raduate Studies
Date
Graduate Dean
Ill
STATEMENT OF PERMISSION TO USE
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillm ent of th e req u ire m e n ts for
a m aster's degree a t M ontana State U niversity, I agree th a t th e L ib rary shall
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Signature
D a te ____
Iv
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This th esis could n o t h av e b een com pleted w ith o u t th e guidance
and assistance of th re e individuals. Paula P etrik, m y p rim a ry thesis
advisor d eserv es cred it for steering m e tow ards m y chosen topic and
for providing focus to m y research and encouragem ent to me
throughout. I am also in d eb ted to Robert Rydell for his insightful
criticism and enth u siasm for m y topic from th e outset. Finally j
w ould like to th an k T eresa Jo rd an for h e r helpful critiques of m y
p a p er from s ta rt to finish.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES............ .............................................................................................. v i
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... vii
CHAPTER
1.
In tro d u c tio n ................
I
2. Life Above and Below Ground on th e In d u strial F rontier.................. 11
3. New Technologies And The Dynamics Of The W ork P la c e ................ 29
4. The High Cost Of Mining: U nderground Fatalities And Occupational
Health H azards................................................................................................ 63
5. The Struggle To Im prove U nderground W orking Conditions........... 85
6. C onclusion...................................................................................................... 113
BIBLIOGRAPHY............... ......................... ;............................................. ...................j 19
vi
LIST OF TABLES'
Page
TABLE I: Causes of B utte Mine Fatalities.................... ‘......................................... 57
TABLE 2: Correlation Betw een Price, Productivity, N um ber of W orkers,
And The F atality Rate For Butte, M ontana.......... ............................. 55
ABSTRACT
diffieull problem s of m anaging and supervising a highly '
in d ep en d ent, tran sie n t, and o ften inexperienced w ork force.
mn<!t J tlE
?f lh e tw e n tie th c e n tu ry and th e consolidation of
e m a) or, P u tte p m e s u n d er th e corporate e n tity of A m algam ated
Copper Company (later th e Anaconda Copper Mining Company), conflict
J etJ een wSFjFe r and m anagem ent above ground increased. At issue w e re
th e ir su p ervisors provoked a d efian t a ttitu d e tow ards th e w ork place by
w o rk ers w hich increased th e potential for in d u strial accidents
organized labor to im prove underground conditions in Butte
p ro te^ 1Xf leS1Slation, com pensation for w o rk -re la te d accidents and
eSB SSse-ssa
■M BE
I
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
On May 1 5 ,1 9 1 7 , a coroner's ju ry convened in Butte, M ontana to
in v estig ate th e accidental d e ath of m iner Charles Borlace. Borlace a
th irty -eig h t-y ea r-o ld Cornishm an from Michigan, died in th e Alice Mine
w h en th e cage he w as riding plum m eted tw o h u n d red fe e t to th e bottom of
th e shaft. The bolt connecting th e engine brak e to th e cable drum snapped,
and th e safety devices designed to catch a ru n aw ay cage also failed. During
th e inquest, th e hoist engineer. John Davis, testified th a t e v e ry precaution
had been tak e n to p re v e n t such an accident. Ju st th a t m orning, th e
m achinist, John Campbell, had inspected th e hoisting engine and bolts for
defects. W hen questioned fu rth e r, how ever, th e engineer rev ealed th a t th e
accident m ight n e v e r h av e happ en ed had he followed norm al practices,
brought th e cage in th e adjacent shaft to a com plete stop, and engaged th e
clutch. Yet, th e coroner's ju ry exonerated both th e hoist engineer and the
mining com pany of all blam e for Borlace's death, a v erd ict re p e a te d in
v irtu ally e v e ry fatal mining accident investigated in th e copper mining
district of Butte. M ontana b etw een 1880 and 1920.1
The circum stances surrounding th is case and th e m ore th a n one
thousand o th er fatal mine accidents th a t occurred during this period w ere
m uch m ore complex th a n this coroner's ju ry suggested. They raise
im p o rtan t questions about th e effect of th e industrial mining process on th e
w orker. A sim plistic analysis of Borlace s d eath could lead to an indictm ent
2
of now
Qiinuig technologies,
for m achines—the hoist and safety devices—had
failed. But technology cannot be e v alu ated outside of th e social context in
w hich it w as used. The hoisting device th a t failed Charles Borlace w as p a rt
of a m uch larger process th a t encom passed a politically and economically
pow erful corporation, a p re-in d u strial im m igrant culture, fra te rn a l
associations, and labor unions. The conflict in th e B utte underground among
th ese v arious forces and its im pact on w orking conditions is th e subject of
this stu d y .2
My purpose is to focus on th e dangers w ith in th e B utte underground, a
subject th u s fa r only m entioned parenthetically by o th er mining historians.
T here a re excellent stu d ies of th e struggle for corporate control over Butte
m inerals and on th e evolution of organized labor and radical politics in Butte,
b u t none of th ese a tte m p t to explain th e social and econom ic forces linking
life above ground w ith th e dangers below ground. My stu d y poses th e
hypothesis th a t th e causes of hazardous w orking conditions and in dustrial
accidents cannot be e v alu ated w ith o u t paying a tten tio n to technological
advances in th e mining process, as w ell as political and econom ic
relationships at w ork in th e com m unity at large. The high n u m b er of w o rk er
fatalities th a t occurred in th e B utte m ines resu lte d from a complex set of
technological, economic, environm ental and social circum stances.
Interactions b etw een u n derground m iners and m anagers m irrored the
political cu lture found above ground, often to th e d e trim e n t of th e h ealth
and safety of th e w ork force.
Hardrock mining had alw ays b een a dangerous occupation, fra u g h t
w ith hazards unim agined b y th e w o rk e r above ground, b u t b etw een 1880
3
and 1920 an alarm ing n u m b er of m en died in in d u strial accidents and of
occupational diseases in th e copper m ines of Butte. B utte ran k e d as one of
th e m ost dangerous mining districts in th e w orld, w ith a fatal accident ra te
th re e tim es higher th a n trad itio n al mining districts in Cornwall. The danger
w as directly re la te d to th e large scale mining operation developed in B utte in
th e late n in etee n th and early tw e n tieth centuries. The story of large scale
copper mining in B utte actually begins before 1883 on th e east coast.
The chronology actually sta rts in 1876, thousands of miles from Butte
in Philadelphia, w ith A lexander Graham Bell’s dem onstration of th e
telephone at th e C entennial Exhibition. Bell's new invention req u ire d
copper, as did Thom as Edison's incandescent light bulb, p aten ted in 1880.
These tw o technological advances, along w ith expanded in d u strial and
resid en tial use of electricity, created enorm ous dem and for copper in th e last
tw o decades of th e n in etee n th century.
A se t of fo rtu ito u s geologic, technologic, and econom ic circum stances
coalesced in B utte to cre ate an in d u stry capable of satisfying th is new
dem and. In 1883 M arcus Daly hoisted his first bu ck et of copper ore from
th e Anaconda Mine, w hich w ould u ltim ately becom e one of th e w orld's
rich est copper mines. Copper cannot be m ined and processed w ith o u t a
su b stan tial in v estm en t of capital, w hich M arcus Daly g u a ra n tee d for Butte
w ith th e creation of th e Hearst, Haggin and Tevis Syndicate in 1882. This
v e n tu re ev en tu ally led to th e first in teg rated copper com pany in America.
In 1881 th e U tah and N orthern Railroad arriv ed to c a rry ore for processing
and sale. By 1887, only fo u r y e a rs afte r M arcus Daly began producing ore
from his Anaconda Mine, his corporation led th e w orld in copper production.
4
Sm elting and refining proved another major h u rd le w hich Daly handily
overcam e in 1891 w ith th e construction of th e first electrolytic r e f i n e r y - it
used an electrical process to rem ove all im purities from co p p er— in th e
West, tw e n ty -s ii m iles from Butte, in Anaconda. William A. Q ark and F.
A ugustus Hemze both ow ned im p o rtan t Butte mining in te re sts and rem ained
agressive com petitors of Daly's. Heinze personally w aged an unsuccessful
w a r against consolidation efforts by A m algam ated Copper, a precursor to
ACM and th e in h erito r of Daly's m ineral properties. By 1910, New York and
Boston in vestors consolidated th e individual e n tre p re n e u ria l efforts of Daly,
Clark and Heinze into a m assive corporate e n te rp rise to becom e know n as
th e Anaconda Copper Mining Com pany (ACM). The Anaconda Company
continued to dom inate w orld copper production fo r th e next th irty years.
affecting th e in te rp la y b etw een technology and safety w ith in th e Butte
underground.^
The pow er of mining corporations like th e A naconda Company is not
new to historians, b u t contem porary mining histories hav e m ost often
focused on details of mining cam p life, corporate m aneuvering w ithin th e
in d u stry , descriptions of th e m achinery and processes necessary to extract
m etals, and th e politics of organized labor w ithout paying adequate atten tio n
to th e in teraction of people and th e in d u strial process. Only a sm all group of
historians, led m ost recen tly b y M erritt Roe Smith. Ronald C. Brown, and
M ark W yman, have closely exam ined th e im pact of technological change on
th e w orker. In
Harper's F errv
A rm orv a n d th e N ev Technology Th*
Challenge Of Change. Sm ith explored
th e im pact of w o rk er resistance to
technological changes in A m erica's early arm am ents in d u stry . Brown and
Wyman's books marked a departure from earlier historical studies of the
mining West in that they focused more directly on the impact of industrial
technologies on miners' lives. Although Brown and Wyman both focused on
occupational hazards of the work place, they arrived at very different
assessments of technological innovations. In Hard-Rnck Miners: Thg
Intgrmpvmtain West. 1860-1920, which ignores Butte mining, Brown
carefully documented the life of the industrial work force and concluded that
new mining technologies ultimately made the work place safer and the work
more dependable for the worker. Wyman, on the other hand, in Hard Rock
Epic; Wgstgrn Miners and the Industrial Revolution. I86n-iQjp indicted
both new technologies for creating unforseen hazards underground and mine
owners for failing to accept responsibility for company negligence, citing
specific examples of unsafe conditions and accidents in Butte associated with
new mining techniques. The work of both Brown and Wyman prompted
consideration of some broader questions regarding the relationship between
new mining technologies and worker safety.^
This stu d y of th e B utte m iner and w orking conditions draw s together
several historiographic trad itio n s — th e h isto ry of technology, th e history of
mining in th e W est, and th e h isto ry of business and labor.
My stu d y of
Butte, following Sm ith’s lead, focuses on th e w o rk ers them selves — on how
particular technological innovations affected them and how th e y responded
to new h azards in th e w ork place. W hat I contribute in this approach is th e
use of new source m aterials, as w ell as a fresh in te rp re ta tio n of Butte
mining. No one has looked at th e coroner's in q u est prior to m y research as a
source of inform ation about relationships betw een m iners and supervisors.
6
about th e liabilities in h e re n t in new mining technologies, and about w o rk er
h ab its and attitudes. Evidence of th ese relationships em erges, in part, from
th e voices of m iners and th e ir supervisors recorded in a sam ple of o ver tw o
h u n d red surviving coroner's inquests. This testim ony rev eals th e co m p leiity
of circum stances associated w ith in d u strial mine accidents; th e corporate
dom ination of w o rk ers on th e job and w ithin th e society at large; and th e
im portance of com m unication betw een w o rk ers and m anagem ent. While the
in q u est provided an unusual o p p o rtu n ity to h e ar m iners talk about th eir
w ork, th e facts regarding m anagem ent's com plicity in fa ta l m ine accidents
often rem ained unspoken because of fe a r of reprisal. W itnesses to fata l
accidents testified in th e presence of com pany supervisors during coroner's
inquests, leaving them v u ln erab le to blacklisting and intim idation for
speaking out against com pany negligence, a v e ry real possibility in a city
w h e re a single corporation dom inated th e mining economy. Coroner's
inquests, in short, w ere h a rd ly v a lu e -fre e ." N evertheless, th e y unveil th e
conditions under w hich m iners labored in Butte during th e early p a rt of th e
tw e n tieth cen tu ry and illum inate th e political and econom ic hegem ony
m aintained b y th e A naconda Company over its em ployees.
My stu d y builds on tw o o th er scholarly stu d ies w hich focused on the
social im plications of technological change in th e mining in d u stry .
In
"Im m igrant W orkers and In d u strial Hazards: The Irish M iners of Butte.
1880-1919." h istorian David Emmons described th e e x te n t of industrial
hazards fo r Irish m iners in B utte and th e ir collective resp o n se through
fra te rn a l associations. Emmons concluded th a t th is unified cultural response
helped th e Irish cope w ith th e ir hazardous jobs.
In "Technological
7
Advances, Organizational S tructure, and U nderground Mining Fatalities in the
U pper Michigan Copper Mines, 1860-1929," Michigan scholars L arry Lankton
and Jack M artin used d ata docum enting th e cause of m ine accidents in
Calumet, Michigan to ev alu ate th e im pact of technology on w o rk er safety.
They concluded th a t th e ex trao rd in ary increase in fatalities during this
period w as due to in d u strial expansion and an increase in th e size of th e
w ork force, and th a t th e larger, m ore technologically sophisticated operations
w e re generally safer th a n th e m ore prim itive, sm aller m ines 5
My d ata
from B utte suggests a differen t conclusion, how ever. If th e y e a rs betw een
1915 and 1917 are any indication, it show ed th e sm aller B utte m ines
achieved safer w orking conditions and a low er fata l accident ra te th a n th e
larg er operations.^
Scholarly stu d y of in d u strial hardrock mining is a relativ ely recen t
phenom enon in th e historiography of th e Am erican W est. Although mining
has rep re se n te d a m ajor w e ste rn in d u stry since th e 1860s. historians have
typically em phasized th e rom antic e ra of th e California gold ru sh or labor
violence in Colorado, Idaho and M ontana during th e e a rly p a rt of th e
tw e n tieth cen tu ry . A d ifferen t approach began to characterize th e subject
in i 950 w ith histo rian V ernon Jensen's. Heritage of Conflict- Tahnr
i a th e
Nonferrous M etals
In d u stry Uo to i< n o
Jensen described conflict
b etw een labor and m anagem ent in th e copper and silver in d u stry — paying
particular atten tio n to th e evolution and dem ise of organized labor in Butte
— as a consequence of p articular economic, social, political, psychological and
geographical forces. Accw ding to Jensen, these conflicts o ver issues of
p ro p erty v e rsu s hu m an rig h ts b etw een m anagers and m iners rem ained
8
unresolved. Two overview s of th e gold and silver mining fro n tie r followed
in 1963: The Bonanza W est. 1848-1900 bv Wiliam Greever, and Mining
Frontiers of th e Far W est. 1848-1880 by Rodman Paul. G reever describes
th e progressive advance of th e mining fro n tier culm inating in th e A laskan
gold ru sh . Paul docum ents th e interrelatio n sh ip among w idely divergent
mining fro ntiers, linked to g eth er by elaborate tran sp o rta tio n system s and by
m iners w ho carried new technologies from place to place and adapted
e iistin g m ethods to new circum stances. Otis Young, Jr. describes th e
estab lish m en t of an A m erican mining trad itio n in his tw o books, W estern
Mining, (1970), and Black Pow der and Hand Steel. (1976)
In both w orks.
Young offers elab o rate descriptions of gold and silver mining techniques,
tools, and th e ir origins. H istorian Richard Lingenfelter, in his 1974 study.
The Hardrock M iners; A H istory of th e Mining Labor M ovem ent in the
Am erican W est. 1863 -1 8 9 3 . argued th a t m ilitant labor unions w ere a
n ecessary response to in d u stria l mining and th a t m ost labor relations during
th is period rem ain ed peaceful, and th a t violent labor strife has been
exaggerated.^
The w o rk of th e se five prom inent mining historians provided
my d e p a rtu re point for exam ining th e technological and social forces
im pinging on th e B utte m iner b e tw een 1883 and 1920.
The political and econom ic forces th a t affected those w orking in th e
Butte m ines is th e subject of tw o rec en t books, The Battle for Butte- Mining
and Politics on th e N orthern Frontier. 1864-1906 b y Mirhaml Mainnm and
Copper Mining and M anagem ent b y Thomas Navin. M alone described th e
lengthy individual and corporate struggle for dom inion over Butte's rich
copper mines. He argued th a t th e struggle for control and Anaconda's
9
hegem ony over sta te econom ic affairs engendered w id esp read prejudice
against big business and a legacy of public resignation — a ttitu d e s th a t
ultim ately affected safety w ith in th e B utte underground. Navin's study
em phasized corporate m anagem ent, in an in d u stry in tim ately tied to high
capital in v estm en t and continuous technological innovation. Navin provided
insight in to Anaconda's place in th e w orld m arket, and th e all im p o rtan t
relationship b etw een copper mining m anagem ent and th e worker.®
During th e last ten y e a rs a n u m b er of w e ste rn historians have tu rn ed
th e ir atten tio n to in d u strial hardrock mining and its occupational hazards,
creating a m ore clear picture of th e im pact of industrialization on th e ru ra l
landscape and population. My stu d y of B utte m iners is p a rt of th is rec en t
historical trad itio n and, if it helps illum inate an u n derstanding of th e im pact
of in d u strial technologies and m anagem ent strategies on th e w o rk er and th e
w ork place and sheds light on how th ese changes below ground w ere
reflected in th e cu ltu re of th e com m unity at large, I w ill have accomplished
m y goal.
10
ENDNOTES
1. In q u est No 8164," Charles Borlace," 13 May 1917, Office of I h e Q e r k o f
l ^ i o n w m 'n o T a p p e a r l^ ^ ^ ^ '
M ontana- !h ereafter rep o sito ry
2. Edwin T. Layton, ed., Technology and Social Q ian se in America (New York:
H arper & Row, Publishers, 1973), 1-8. In his introduction to th is collection of
essays LaytOT defines technology as "knowledge a t w ork w ith in a social
context. This definition helps th e histo rian view th e in d u strial accidents in
B utte in a b ro ad er perspective.
3. Michael Malone. The Battle fo r Butte: Mining and Politics on th e Northern
fro n tie r. 1864-1906 (Seattle- IInivprVi t y n fW a
1981), 11-574. Ronald C. Brown, Hard-Rock Miners: The In term o u n tain W est. 1860-1920
(College Station: Texas A & M D iv e r s ity Press. 1979): M ark W vm an Hard
'm
- " 1n
5. David Emmons, "Im m igrant W orkers and In d u strial Hazards: The Irish
M iners of Butte, 18 8 0 -1 9 19." Iournal of American Ethnic History 5 (Fall
1985); L arry L ankton and Jack K. M artin, "Technological Adv an ce,
Organization, S tructure, and U nderground Mining Fatalities in th e U pper
Michigan Copper Mines, 18 6 0 - 1929," Technology and Culture (Forthcoming).
6. The Anode. F e b ru ary 1 9 1 8 ,5 .
7. V ernon
Metals D
G reever
Minim, and Management
Il
Chapter 2
LIFE ABOVE AND BELOW GROUND ON THE INDUSTRIAL FRONTIER
B eneath a craggy ridge of th e continental divide in th e sparsely
v e g etated u p p er reaches of th e Sum m it Valley located in southw estern
M ontana, sizty m illion y e a rs of complex geologic phenom ena produced one of
th e w orld s rich est deposits of nonferrous m etals—gold, silver, m anganese,
zinc, and copper. Tow ard th e en d of th e n in etee n th c en tu ry , m iners exposed
th e m ineral w e alth b e n e a th th e city of Butte, M ontana — a v e ritab le tre a su re
chest of precious and in d u stria l m etals. During th e last c en tu ry m iners
rem oved n e a rly fiv e billion pounds of zinc, seven h u n d re d million ounces of
silver, and n e a rly th re e million ounces of gold from th e granite underlying
th e B utte hill. But copper m ade th e mining district's reputation. I
The search for copper b rought an in d u strial w a y of life to M ontana.
Thousands of B utte m iners, m any of them im m igrants, lost th e ir lives due to
in d u strial accidents and re sp ira to ry diseases contracted working
und erg ro u nd in B utte b e tw e e n 1880 and 1920. Men died from falling rock,
explosions, hoisting m ishaps, fires, and from inhaling th e silica d u st released
from breaking rock w ith th e m achine d r ill The individual m iner becam e
p a rt of a m uch larger, m ore complex, and som etim es m ore dangerous
technological process of ore extraction, over w hich h e o ften exercised little
c o n tro l To u n d e rstan d fu lly th e im pact of new technologies on th e B utte
12
m iner and th e dynam ics th a t developed betw een th e u rb an com m unity th a t
rap id ly em erged around th e m ines and th e w orld below ground req u ire s
investigation.
From its hum ble beginnings as a gold and silver cam p, B utte grew
into a cosm opolitan city eq u al to its burgeoning new in d u stry , m ushroom ing
from a population of 3.363 in 1880 to 30,470 b y 1900.2 B utte s population
increased tenfold during th e last tw o decades of th e nineteenth century.
Copper mining in sp ired a n urban, in d u strial ch aracter in B utte's architecture
th a t w as m ore rem in iscen t of San Francisco, M assachusetts or Pennsylvania
mill tow ns th a n th e n o rth e rn Rockies of M ontana. C ertainly B utte bore no
resem blance to th e neighboring agricultural com m unities of Bozeman and
Missoula. In th e G littering Hill, a novel se t in B utte during th e 1890s, Q yde
M urphy ap tly p o rtray e d th e incongruity of th e spraw ling mining m etropolis
se t against th e backdrop of its p ristine m ountainous surroundingsT hen cam e a cavalcade of m em ories—of snow crowning th e
d istan t Continental Divide; of droves of m en at shift-changing
tim e, coming off th e hill, now in clusters and again in long th in
files; of th e incessant clam or of stre etca r bells, of th e th u n d e r of
steel w heels on steel rails; of th e screeching of m ine w histles; of
th e sh arp clopping of h o rses' hoofs on th e cobblestones; ...3
M arching up th e flanks of th e B utte hill w e re clusters of w o rk ers'
cottages, sm all hip-roofed w oodfram e houses, b u ilt in close proxim ity to th e
over th re e dozen operating m ines spread across th e hill to w ard th e East
Ridge. The m iners and th e ir fam ilies congregated in e th n ic and occupational
enclaves close to th e ir w ork and th e ir fellow countrym en: in W alkerville
13
(site of B utte's m ost prosperous silver m ines, th e Alice and th e Lexington); in
Centerville, a p redom inantly Cornish and Irish neighborhood; in Dublin
Gulch, adjacent to M arcus Daly's Anaconda Mine; and, in Finntow n,
M eaderville and McQueen to th e east, hom e to Finns. Italians, Serbians.
Croatians, and B utte's m ajor sm elters. These neighborhoods w ere linked to
th e m ines and th e com m ercial d istrict b y a stre e t railw ay as early as 1890.4
From th e intersectio n of P ark and Main, th e h e a rt of B utte's com m ercial
district, an o b serv er could clearly view th e fren e tic econom ic and social life
of th is bustling m etropolis.
By 1900 B utte w as in d isp u tab ly th e econom ic capital of M ontana and
th e m ost significant u rb a n c en ter b etw een M inneapolis and Spokane. An
im posing arch itectu re of stone, brick, and cast iron replaced th e w oodfram e
false fro n ts of th e gold and silver cam p. W ithin v iew of th e b u sy stre e t
co rn er of P ark and Main, th e o b se rv er could look n o rth up th e hill and see
mining b aro n W illiam A. Clark's First National Bank; th e H ennessy Building
(the elab o rately detailed six-story brick d e p artm e n t store and h e a d q u a rte rs
of th e Anaconda Company); th e M iner's Union Hall (the h e a d q u a rte rs of th e
W est's m ost pow erful Ia b w union); and th e im posing black steel h eadfram es
looming along th e hill in th e distance. W hen th e m ines changed shifts,
streetcars, h o rse -d raw n w agons, and m iners clogged M ain S tre et going n orth,
m aking th e ir w a y to and from w ork, each m an re -e n te rin g th e above ground
w orld dom inated b y boarding houses, cafes, saloons, th e a te rs, churches, and
a landscape disfigured b y th e spoils of th e city's mining en terp rise.
Butte, in 1900, bore th e distinctive im p rin t of b o th its in d u strial
14
econom y and its w o rk force. R eports from frien d s and re la tiv e s describing
w ages unequalled in th e mill tow ns along th e E astern seaboard or in th e
Michigan copper m ines lu red European im m igrants to B utte b y th e
.
tho u san d s beginning in 1883. By 1900 over 34 p ercen t of th e Butte
population w as foreign-born, dom inated b y th e Irish, English, and Canadians
w ho com prised a p p ro iim a te ly 64 p ercen t of th e fo reign-born population.^
During th e firs t tw o decades of th e tw e n tie th century, th e ethnic m akeup of
th e population rem ain ed relativ ely constant b u t no t static. By 1910 Finns
constituted 10 p ercen t of B utte's foreign-born; im m igrants from so u th ern
and e a ste rn Europe had increased, w hile Irish and B ritish arriv als had
declined.^
At th e beginning of th e tw e n tieth century, B utte w as a city of m iners;
o v er 60 p ercen t of B utte's ad u lt m ales w orked in th e mines. A t th e sam e
tim e, th o u san d s of m en labored above ground as blacksm iths, ironw orkers,
boilerm akers, c arp en ters, and sm elter m en, in occupations supporting th e
mining in d u stry and in a w ide v a rie ty of oth er businesses th a t supported
B utte's large u rb a n population .7 In addition, th e w ork force in 1900
included 3.000 w om en w orking as teachers, m illiners, clerks, laundresses,
w aitresses, dom estics, p ro stitu tes, and boarding house operators.®
B utte of 1900 b ore little resem blance to th e fro n tie r se ttlem en t
conceived of and described b y Frederick Jackson T u rn er in his
all-encom passing fro n tie r th esis p resen te d in 1893. The thousands of
E uropean im m igrants w ho m ade th e ir w a y to Butte, M ontana betw een 1880
and 1910 bro u g h t w ith th em European religious and social values.
15
T raditional ethnic v alu es p ersisted in th e Irish, Cornish, Finnish, and Italian
com m unities th ro u g h th e religious and fra te rn a l in stitu tio n s th a t w e re
created in th e ir respective neighborhoods b etw een 1880 and 1910. The
in d u strial u rb an ch aracter of B utte resh ap e d th e v alu es of th e second and
th ird generations of th ese im m igrant populations.
These p rim arily ru ra l European im m igrants relied on th e church, and
fra te rn a l and eth n ic organizations and traditions in facing th e perils of
in d u strial em ploym ent and an unfam iliar u rb an w a y of life. Dozens of
churches em erged to serv e B utte’s v a rie d ethnic population: th e Catholic
church predom inated in serving th e large Irish and grow ing Slavic and
Italian com m unities: th e M ethodists follow ed w ith th e ir large Cornish
m em bership; th e Scandinavians continued th e ir L u th eran traditions; and th e
Jew ish com m unity su p p o rted tw o synagogues .10 Dozens of secret societies
also form ed along eth n ic or occupational lines as a m eans of easing th e
tran sitio n into an in d u stria l environm ent. In som e cases, th ese organizations
fulfilled a function beyond m aintaining th e ethnic trad itio n s of th e
hom eland. Such w as th e case w ith th e A ncient O rder of H ibernians (AOH), an
Irish independence organization firs t tra n sp la n te d to A m erica in 1836 and
la ter to Butte. In Butte, th e AOH upheld Irish traditions, b u t m ore im p o rtant,
it sought w ork fo r its m em bers and provided sickness and accident benefits
for its over one thousand m em bers, m ost of w hom w o rk ed in th e m ines .11
Economic o p p o rtu n ity a ttra c te d European im m igrants and
n ativ e-b o rn m iners to th e increasingly dangerous and u n h e alth y conditions
found in th e B utte underground. In 1900 th e single w orking m an
16
p redom inated in Butte. ^^ Clearly, high w ages lu red m any single m en w est.
During th e firs t decade of th e tw e n tie th century, lab o rers in th e steel mills of
Braddock 1Pennsylvania w o rk ed tw elve h o u rs a day for ju st over $2 in w ages
w hile th e B utte m iner, reg ard less of experience, earn ed $3.50 for eight ho u rs
of w ork. *3
W hile th e cost of living w as som ew hat higher in Butte,
relativ ely stable em ploym ent provided o p p o rtu n ity for b o th single m en and
those m en w ith fam ilies. If hom e ow nership re p re se n te d an index of
w orking-class econom ic o p p o rtu n ity and security, th e n B utte in fact did offer
th e im m ig rant m iner p a rt of w h a t prom oters had prom ised. In 1900, o ver 50
p ercen t of th e Irish m iners w ho had lived in Butte fo r b e tw ee n four and
sev en y e a rs ow ned th e ir ow n hom es, and b y 1910 th is percentage w as ev en
greater. *4
R epeatedly, A m erican m en and w om en hav e journeyed w e st for
econom ic o pportunity. Significantly, b y 1900 it w as n o t th e prom ise of gold
or fertile land w hich a ttrac ted thousands to so u th w estern M ontana; it w as
th e possibility of a w eek ly paycheck. B etw een 1873 and 1900, th e United
S tates suffered from periodic econom ic dow nturns, and, a fte r th e Panic of
1893, silver mining in th e W est cam e to a standstill because of th e rep e al of
th e S herm an Silver P urchase Act, m aking good paying jobs in th e Butte
u n derground attrac tiv e to b oth th e native and im m ig ran t w orker. U nder
th ese circum stances, th e prospect of a g u aran teed w age a ttrac ted th e
nations' artisan s and m echanics. 15 But balanced against th e possibilities
p resen te d b y th is n ew life in th e W est w e re th e grim statistics of accidental
d eath und erground and th e e v e r-p re s e n t occupational h azard of m iner's
17
consum ption and debilitating re sp ira to ry ailm ents. Along w ith th e prom ise
of a paycheck, new arriv als from th e g reen hills of W est County Cork,
Ireland, o r from th e fo rested K ew eenaw Penninsula of n o rth e rn M ichigan
encountered a city devoid of vegetation and trees, choked b y th e sulphur
and arsen ic-laden sm oke em itted from th e local sm elters and despoiled by
m ounds of m ine w aste. Confronted b y depressed national economic
conditions B utte's high w ages and th e prom ise of a relativ ely in d ep en d en t
lifestyle initially overshadow ed th ese in d u strial and environm ental
liabilities.
P a rt of th e lu re of underground mining d erived from the
in d ep en d en t n a tu re of th e w ork. Statistics regarding transcience among
B utte m iners b etw een 19 14 and 1920 underscore th is a ttitu d e. During 1914
each job on th e B utte hill w as held b y tw o and on e-h alf m en com pared to
nine m en for each job in 1920, indicating a p e rsisten t m ovem ent from mine
to m ine .1& Dick M atthew , a m an w ho w orked a v a rie ty of jobs underground
in B utte beginning in 1928, described mining as "the m ost in d ep en d en t
laboring job th e re is." According to M atthew , w ho cam e to Butte from a
ran ch in Choteau, M ontana, th e m iner "designs his ow n w o rk and th e re ain 't
nobody looking dow n y o u r collar." ^
The m iners' in d e p e n d e n t n a tu re
d eriv ed p a rtly from th e large n u m b er of job prospects.
An e itre m e ly rich
and extensive mining d istrict and a growing dem and for copper, and la ter
zinc and m anganese, created alm ost unlim ited o p p o rtu n ity for th e
experienced m iner. Endless o p p o rtu n ity tran sla te d in to an occupational
independence th a t often clashed w ith th e complex technological process
18
engineered b y corporate m anagers, creating unforeseen hazards
und erg ro u nd for th e w o rk er. By 1900 th e Butte m iner found his life divided
b etw een tw o v e ry d ifferen t b u t connected w orlds.
The unflagging en erg y in th e stre e ts of B utte in 1 9 0 0 - th e throngs of
m en and w om en freq u en tin g th e shops along East Park, th e clanging
streetcars clim bing up Main, th e new sboys on th e corners haw king papers,
and th e m usic and c h a tte r drifting ou t of th e cafes and saloons on Main
S tre e t— m im icked th e activity day and nig h t in th e can d le-lit passagew ays
tho u san d s of fe e t b e n e a th th e stre e ts of Butte. W hile th e snow fell and
te m p e ra tu re s above ground plum m eted to -20 degrees Fahrenheit, th e
m iners, strip p ed to th e ir w aists, p rep a red fo r a d ay of w o rk in a dim ly lit
stope w h e re te m p e ra tu re s reached 90 degrees F ahrenheit.
More th a n 2,000
fe e t se p arated th ese tw o w orlds: th e w orld above distinguished from th e
one below b y th e w o rk perform ed, th e w ork place itself, and th e language
spoken.
As e a rly as 1890, m iners practiced th e ir tra d e in m ore th a n thirty
mines, v ary in g in size fro m tw e n ty to fo u r h u n d re d em ployees, dispersed
across th e B utte hill. I & R egardless of size, th e p rim a ry task rem ained th e
same: follow th e o re v e in and g et th e ore to th e surface. The size of th e
m ine did, how ever, som etim es a lter th e tools used to accom plish th is task.
Moving larg er volum es of m en and ore to and from th e surface req u ire d th e
aid of m ore com plex tools and m achinery. For exam ple, a sm all mining
operation of tw e n ty to one h u n d red m en m ight re ly on h an d drills for
breaking th e rock and a b u ck et and sm all steam hoist fo r transporting m en
19
and ore to th e surface, w hile a m ine em ploying h u n d re d s of m en w ould
p robably use m achine drills and a system of cages and skips for th e
m ovem ent of m en and ore.
W hile th e size and sophistication of th e mining operation in Butte
v aried enorm ously, th e length of th e w ork day did not. The ten -h o u r day
prevailed until 1905 in th e m ines of th e A m algam ated Copper Company,
w hich controlled approxim ately tw o -th ird s of th e w orking B utte mines,
e v en though th e sta te legislature m andated an eig h t-h o u r day in 19 0 1.19
W hile th e sm aller m ines like th e T ram w ay and th e Belle of B utte w orked a
single shift, th e larger m ines like th e M ountain Con and th e Anaconda
o p erated tw o and som etim es th re e shifts, to am ortize th e ir larg er capital
in v e s tm e n t B utte m iners w orked seven days a w eek, averaging
tw e n ty -sev e n days a m onth, and received tim e off only w h e n th e shaft
n eed ed rep a ir or th e m achines m aintenance. During th e e arly y ears, th e
P arro t w as th e only m ine of a n y size to give its w o rk e rs a Sunday holiday .20
The w o rk d a y o rd in arily began for m iners on th e day shift a t seven
a m- A fter donning w ork clothes in th e "dry" o r change house, m iners
g ath ered around th e sh aft collar (surface opening) to aw ait tran sp o rta tio n in
a b u ck et o r cage dow n th e sh a ft to th e ir assigned level and w ork station.
The bucket, large enough fo r tw o or th re e m en to stand, w as attached to a
m anila - later, w i r e - rope, and descended dow n th e sh a ft b y m eans of a
steam -p o w ered engine. This hoisting engine w as ev en tu ally pow ered by
com pressed air and la te r electricity. The ro p e ra n up o v er a sheave w h eel
(pulley) located a t th e top of th e h eadfram e, a four-legged w ooden and later
20
steel stru c tu re located o ver th e shaft collar, and w as attach ed to a large
cylindrical drum (10 to 20 fe e t in d iam eter) located in th e hoist house. As
th e size of th e operation expanded, th e bu ck et w as u ltim ately replaced b y a
cage, a steel conveyance no t unlike an elev ato r car, w ith in w hich five to
sev en m iners could stand to be hoisted. Eventually skips, large steel boxes
capable of holding from seven to te n tons of rock, carried th e ore to the
surface .21
M iners travelling to and from th e w ork station e n tru ste d th eir
safety to th e sta tio n ary engineer. The engineer raised and low ered th e
cages and skips guided b y e ith e r a n audible bell system or a visible set of
lights linked to a signal a p p aratu s located a t e v e ry level. T here w as a station
te n d e r a t each level (norm ally e v e ry 100 fe e t) w hose job it w as to load m en
and m aterials and signal its d estination to th e engineer. In Hardrock Miners
Ronald C Brown a p tly described th e m iners' sense of helplessness as th e y
descended to th e w o rk place:
As th e w arning bell sounded, th e cage dropped in to th e dark
shaft. The only light cam e from lan tern s affixed to th e cage
itself and from those passed on th e w a y down. L ikened b y
som e m iners to being b u ried alive, th e fall produced only m uted
sounds, th e sm ell of dam p ground, and th e ru sh of air; th e n
from th e p it of th e stom ach cam e th e sinking feeling th a t
accom panied th e rap id fall .22
At an e arly d ate m iners ale rte d th e territo ria l legislature to th e
dangers associated w ith th e b u ck et and th e open cage, such as m en falling
from th ese conveyances from d izzin ess or catching clothing or tools against
th e sh aft walls.
As e a rly as 1887, M ontana passed a law prohibiting w ork in
21
a vertical sh aft below th e 300-foot level w ith o u t an iro n - b onneted safety
cage.^^
By th e e arly p a rt of th e tw e n tie th cen tu ry , en g in eers im proved th e
iro n -b o n n eted cage b y adding on e-h alf inch iron plate on th re e sides and a
four-fo o t safety gate on th e front. Even th ese safety fe a tu re s did no t
elim inate hoisting fatalities or th e apprehension of m iners about dropping as
m uch as 3,000 fe e t in to th e e a rth a t a speed of from 500 to 800 fe e t per
m inute.
Having a rriv e d a t th e ir w o rk level, th e m iners proceeded from th e
statio n (an enlarged a re a adjacent to th e shaft) into th e d rift (a fo u r- to
eight-foot w ide horizontal tu n n e l th a t follow ed th e orebody), th e w a y lit only
b y candle or torch. Electric lights ap p eared in th e W alkerville silver m ines
as e a rly as 1 8 8 1, b u t th e shafts and d rifts in th e m ajority of B utte m ines
w e re n o t lit electrically u ntil th e 1890s. Carbide lam ps replaced candles for
light in th e B utte slopes around 19 12.24
Crosscuts, or horizontal tun n els
connecting orebodies, in tersected th e drifts.
The job com m enced w h e n th e m iner reached his assigned w ork
station. Tasks ran g ed from th e m ost unskilled m ucking (shovelling ore or
w aste into a car or dow n a chute) and tram m ing (pushing an ore car dow n a
track to th e station fo r loading) to th e highly skilled tra d e of blasting and
tim bering. M iners generally w o rk ed in pairs following th e ore v ein e ith er up
(an o v erh ead slope) or dow n (an u n d erh an d slope) from th e level w ith
h am m er and steel and blasting pow der. W ith contract mining, a popular
em p lo y m en t system in B utte, th e am ount of rock rem oved or b ro k en during
a day d eterm in ed a m an's w age. Four m en, w orking as a team on opposite
22
shifts, perform ed all th ese v ario u s tasks. The m iner rem oved th e ore from
th e v e in b y drilling a n u m b e r of s ii- to eig ht-foot-deep holes, one to tw o
inches w ide, into th e B utte granite. T hen he loaded six to tw elve holes w ith
dynam ite arid ignited th e charge, bringing dow n tons of rock in a tim ed
series of blasts. Until th e late 1890s, th is drilling w as done b y tw o m en
w ith o u t pow er tools, one w ielding a sledge and th e o th er holding and tu rn in g
a h an d steel, a skill perfected o v er th e cen tu ries in th e tin m ines of Cornwall
and passed on th ro u g h Cornish im m igrants w orking in th e copper m ines of
Michigan and th e silver m ines of N e v a d a #
A lthough th e labor-saving
m achine drill ev en tu ally replaced th e physically dem anding technique of
hand-drilling, th e p rim a ry task of ore rem oval rem ain ed virtually
unchanged.
The task of ore rem oval could n o t b e accom plished w ith o u t th e
specialized skills of an in d u strial w ork force th a t included pum pm en
(assigned to keeping th e w o rk place fre e of w ater), m ule skinners, and la ter
m otorm en (charged w ith delivering th e ore car from th e d rift to th e station),
sh aftm en (em ployees w h o tim b ered th e descending shaft), and sam plers,
surveyors, and geologists (specialists w ho analyzed th e orebody and ch arted
th e course of developm ent). The underground operations also relied on a
h o st of m en on th e surface including topm en (w orkers responsible for
rem oving th e ore cars and m en from th e cages), saw yers, blacksm iths,
m achinists, electricians, com pressor m en, rope m en (m en charged w ith
m aintaining and replacing th e w ire rope used fo r hoisting), and team sters,
la te r replaced b y locom otive m en. Still, th e m ajority of m en actually
23
w orked underground; th e re w as approxim ately one m an on surface for
e v e ry fo u r underground. Those w orking underground took o rd ers from th e
shift bosses, w ho m ight su p erv ise from tw e n ty to sixty m en, and th e bosses
took th e ir lead from th e m ine fo rem en and th e su p e rin te n d en t on top, and
th e assistan t fo rem en w orking underground.
The B utte m iner m ay hav e b een less closely supervised th a n his
contem poraries toiling in a Pennsylvania steel mill, b u t th e labor w as n e ith er
any less dem anding, nor w e re th e conditions any less trying. For eight to te n
ho u rs a day, th e m en h ired to bring th e copper ore to th e surface perform ed
physically exhausting labor in a confined environm ent, a w orld unto itself.
The m iner typically sp e n t his e n tire day or night in p e rp e tu al underground
darkness, laboring in a slope o r raise ju st high enough for a m an to stand
e re ct a t te m p e ra tu re s as high as 107 degrees F ah ren h eit a t 100 p ercen t
hum idity. At th e 38 0 0 -fo o t level of th e S tew art Mine, n o t only did th e air
te m p e ra tu re s reach th e se extrem es, b u t also th e w a te r pum ped from th e
slopes th e re reached 1 13 degrees Fahrenheit.^ ^
W here th e w ork place w as not h o t and hum id, an o th er potentially
m ore hazardous condition persisted: d u sty air. The silica d u st th a t filled th e
air from th e m achine drill posed an unseen danger to th e m iner: m iners’
consum ption or silicosis, an often fa ta l lung disease. Until 1916 m iners
drilled practically all slopes w ith o u t w ettin g th e surface, creating an
epidem ic of re sp ira to ry diseases underground unm atched in any other
in d u stry .^ ?
John Gillie, g eneral su p e rin te n d e n t of A m algam ated Copper
Company, testified before a fe d e ra l in d u stria l relations com m ission in 1914
24
th a t d u st w as an in h ere n t, unavoidable aspect of mining. In a single y ear,
according to Gillie, m iners d etonated over four million pounds of pow der in
th e Butte underground, filling poorly v en tilated slopes w ith dead ly g ranite
dust.28 The introduction of w e t drilling districtw ide b y 1925 even tu ally
im proved th e d u st problem , b u t failed to elim inate th e d ead ly hazard.
Ju st as th e h e a t and d u st read ily dim inished th e stre n g th of e v en a
young m an w orking underground, so did an atm osphere lad en w ith th e
sm ells of h u m an and anim al excrem ent, pow der, sw eat, and rotting food.
H undreds of m en sh ared th e ir w orkspace w ith th e m ules enlisted to pull ore
cars to th e station. Not until 1923 did ACM com pletely replace th e m ule
w ith electric locom otives.29
Toilet cars did not m ake w idespread
ap p earan ce in th e B utte d istrict u n til afte r 1916, forcing th e m iners to
reliev e th em selv es w h e re v e r convenient and creating an u n san itary and
fertile en v iro n m en t fo r disease and verm ine.
Life u nderground did n o t accom m odate those w eak of h e a rt or mind.
Even th e young and physically ro b u st could b arely e n d u re th e heat, bad air,
noise, darkness, and stren u o u s w o rk of th e underground. In 1915 Jacob
Oliver, an experienced m iner of th irty -fiv e y e a rs and th e Deputy State Mine
Inspector b e tw ee n 1890 and 1892, testified before th e Commons
Commission on In d u strial Relations th a t th e average life of a m iner u n d er
co n tem p o rary conditions w as sixteen y ears.3 0
At $3.50 a day, th e w ages of
a B utte m iner w e re high, in fact alm ost tw ice th a t paid M ichigan copper
m iners.3 1 Yet th e high w ages did no t com pensate fo r a w o rk life cut sh o rt
b y a disabling injury, a fa ta l in d u stria l accident, or th e crippling disease of
25
m iners consum ption. The throngs of European im m igrants w ho m ade th e ir
w ay to B utte to w ork in its copper m ines found a perilous w ork
environm ent, inhabited b y unfam iliar m achines, routines, and unforeseen
hazards.
26
ENDNOTES
4 7 .6 3 5 . and th e city of B utte dom inates th e county.
M urphy. Ihff Olitterm g Hill (New York: W orld Publishing Co..
f
H iZ v n ° ;,^
B utte Rail Connection: Mining and T ransportation,
S[! t . »
:, A,!P urnal ^
"H
M ontana
5. A bstract of t he 12 th Census of th e IJ S 106.
P r i n ^ g ^ f i c e % 3 ^ 2 1 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e U.S,. (W ashington: G overnm ent
Ir A b stract of th e 12th Census of th e US.. Special R eport (Washington;
G overnm ent P rinting Office,1904), 4 3 2.
6
8. M ary M urphy. "W om en's W ork in a M an's W orld," The Speculator A
M im a l Qf ButtC and S outhw est M ontana History I f W i ^ r W a T I Q
According to M urphy, tw e n ty -tw o p e rc en t of B utte's 13.000 w om en w orked
as w age earn ers.
9. Dale M artin and B rian Shavers. "Butte, M ontana: An A rchitectural and
Historical In v en to ry of th e N ational L andm ark District," an unpublished
rep o rt, B utte Historical Society. 19 8 6 .3 1-53.
10. Ibid.
12. A b s t r a c t s tire 12 th Census 131. A bstract of th e 13th Census. 166
m ra w e re maiTied. This n u m b er
In
14. Emmons, "Im m igrant W orkers and In d u strial Hazards," 58. This figure
on hom e ow nership is extracted from th e m anuscript censuses of 1900 and
1910. It is derived from a sam ple of 193 Irish m iners and it includes only
those w ith children, excluding those w ho are single or childless.
economic depressions in A m erica b e tw een 1873 and 1893.
J[6- Paul FuB rissenden, "The Butte M iners and th e Rustling Card." A m erican
Economic Review (December 1920): 770.
17. Dick M atthew , in terv iew w ith author, Butte, M ontana, 24 Jan u ary 1986.
° f M nm m a
<Helena;
19. U.S. Commission on In d u strial Relations. Mining Conditions and
I u^ gl
Senate G m i w n t 4 15764th Congress,
! ! S M
iB S K
J r w
M ,V-
IBMealier
21. Brian Shovers "The Emergence of a W orld-Class Mining District: A
,tS MineyardV unPubtehed
i Rkn^0I1Ivln ?; B row n,H ard-Rock M iners: The In ter m ountain West.
1 8 6 0 -1 9 2 0 (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M U niversity Press, 1979), 67.
W ^ f re
Perils of hoisting m en, see 92 -1 0 2 in Mark
J^S S ^lS^VAde^i&wersrty1o u j l i i S l I m a ^fvflPltinn
23. Mine Inspector R eport 1889 96.
£ I-W y man, Iitrd-Rock Epic. 103, for inform ation on electrification of Butte
mines. Dating of th e introduction of th e carbide lam p from in terv iew w ith
Ed Shea, in terv iew w ith author, Butte, M ontana, 23 Ja n u a ry 1986.
gsaeijM
13' I he exact date th a t th e m achine drill
Mine 97
ntl0ns lh e use of Ingersoll-S ergeant drills a t th e M ountain Con
28
27. Ibid., 12.
28. "Commons Commission Report," 3950.
29. William B. Daly, et. al., "Mining M ethods in th e Butte District,"
24^87tS Qf MlDinR Enginggr? VoL LXXI1*1925
30. "Commons Commission Report," 3916.
31. -Mine Inspector Report 1889 H2.
29
Chapter 3
NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE WORK PLACE
In th e e arly p a rt of th e tw e n tie th century, the U.S. D epartm ent of
Labor considered mining a v e ry dangerous occupation, and for good reason.
The fa ta lity ra te for an A m erican m etal m iner in 1908 w as alm ost th ree
tim es g rea ter th a n th a t of a com bat soldier.* On June 2 0 ,1 9 0 9 , th e Butte
MiflSL rep o rte d th e following gruesom e incident, a trag e d y th a t underscored
th e labor d e p artm e n t's statistics:
Sirois a top m an at th e M oonlight mine, b e tte r know n as Joe
King, m et a ho rrib le d eath b y being hoisted up in to th e sheaves at
the m ine y e ste rd a y m orning. Sirois w as h u rled from the cage
alm ost as soon as it cam e in contact w ith th e sheave w heel and fell
a distance of 1550 fe e t to th e sum p. The body w as reduced to a
^ ssyOf bones p ro truding from th e to rn and bleeding flesh. It w as
unrecognizable.
That v e ry sam e y ear, fo rty -fo u r o th er m iners, m any of them
foreign-born like Sirois. lost th e ir lives b en eath th e B utte hill. In th is case,
like nu m erous o th er accidents th a t occurred during th is e ra in Butte, th e
u n fo rtu n ate French-C anadian m iner had no control o ver his ow n fate; a
m achine caused his death, a m achine im properly o p erated by an apprentice
hoist engineer. A v a rie ty of circum stances, ranging from th e instability of
local orebodies to th e use of complex n ew mining technologies to a reliance
on an u n train ed and fiercely in d e p e n d e n t w ork force, m ade th e Butte mining
district m ore dangerous th a n its E uropean counterparts, particu larly during
th e early p a rt of th e tw e n tie th cen tury.
The w id esp read use of m ore complex m achinery in th e Butte
30
underground b y 1890 created a new, som etim es dangerous dynam ic within
th e w ork place. Beginning in 1890 th e e n tire mining operation becam e
larger, m ore complex, and infinitely m ore difficult to supervise. During a
tim e w h en technological change req u ire d a highly trained and carefully
supervised w ork force, large n u m b ers of untrained, ru ra l European
im m igrants peopled th e B utte underground. A horrific loss of life,
unparalleled in A m erican in d u strial history, m arred th e tran sitio n from
sm all-scale trad itio n al h ardrock m ining to large-scale in d u strial mining in
Butte.
B etw een 1860 and 1910, th e invention and application of new mining
technologies revolutionized hardrock m ining in th e A m erican West.
Machines replaced h and labor in drilling, hoisting, and tram m ing, allowing
m iners to reach d ep th s and production levels previously ou t of reach. The
introduction of electricity to th e underground p e rm itte d another surge in
productivity, as w ell as im proved th e m iner's w ork en v iro n m en t through
b e tte r lighting and v entilation.^
As mining h istorian M ark W ym an points
in Ha rd -Rook Epic, how ever, th e new breed of mining machinery also
contributed to an alarm ing increase in underground fatalities. Corporate
industrialists, often geographically rem oved from th e trag ed ies regularly
occurring on th e ir properties, took little tim e to w eigh th e hu m an im pact of
new technologies.^
The tran sitio n from h an d drill to m achine drill h ap p en ed o ver a
fifte en -y e ar period. Trial and e rro r even tu ally produced a tool light enough
to be o p erated b y a single m an and d u rab le enough to w ith stan d th e rigors
of th e underground. It did n o t tak e m ine m anagers long to recognize th e
productive advantages of th e su p e rh u m an m achine drill. At th e Quincy Mine
31
in Michigan, th e Rand drill enabled 50 p ercen t few er m iners to produce 50
percen t m ore copper. By 1895 th e L eyner, and Ingersoll & Rand m achine
drills prevailed on th e B utte hill, alm ost com pletely replacing th e hand
sledge and steel. Som ew hat earlier, dynam ite replaced black pow der, again
increasing th e m iner's productive capabilities w ith its superior
g round-breaking a ttrib u tes.^
W hile m ine su p e rin te n d en ts tallied up m ounting dividends, th e Butte
obituaries recorded th e legacy of th is new m achine technology. The m achine
drill filled th e u n v en tilated slopes w ith silica dust. Inhaled b y m iners, these
sh arp -edged d u st particles scarred th e lungs of unsuspecting w orkers,
creating an epidem ic of tuberculosis and resp ira to ry disease among m iners.
A significant n u m b er of B utte m iners b etw een th e ages of tw en ty -fiv e and
fo rty -fo u r filled th e local cem eteries, and b etw een th e y e a rs 1907 and 1914,
over 50 percent of th e m iners w h o died w ithin th a t age group succum bed to
a resp ira to ry disease.5
A national public ou tcry u ltim ately prom pted a technological solution
to this d evastating h ealth hazard, b u t thousands of B utte m iners died before
m ine ow ners introduced w e t drilling and m echanical v e n tilatio n system s to
ab ate th e dust. By 1914, ACM installed 150 Ram w a te r drills, a drill th a t
h ad proved successful in Arizona m ines in reducing th e d u st level, and by
1925 all th e com pany m ines had converted to w e t drilling.^
In F ebruary of
1918, ACM organized th e firs t ve n tilatio n and hygiene d e p a rtm e n t in the
copper in d u stry , and th e d e p a rtm e n t supervised th e installation of eighteen
rev ersib le surface fan s and an additional one thousand auxiliary fans
u n derground as w ell as fo rty miles of flexible air ducts to c a rry fre sh air into
th e d rifts and s lo p e s / W hile im proved drilling and ven tilatin g technologies
32
g reatly im proved underground w orking conditions, re sp ira to ry disease
rem ained a h e alth th re a t w ell into th e tw e n tieth c en tu ry due in p a rt to a
reluctance among som e m iners to em brace th e safer new techniques.^
The enorm ous increases in ore production in Butte b etw een 1883 and
1900 cannot be a ttrib u te d solely to th e w idespread use of th e m achine drill
and dynam ite. New hoisting and tram m ing technologies proved equally
im portant. Initially, th e steam -p o w ered hoist constituted a danger to th e
'
m iner accustom ed to th e m uch slow er horse-pow ered w him and bucket
system . In 1887 cage-related accidents accounted for 30 percent of th e
’
deaths, and as late as 1896, hoisting accidents still accounted for 35 percent
of th e fatalities. But by th e y e a r 1916, a record y e a r for m ine fatalities,
hoisting accidents constituted only 5 percent of th e know n fatalities. ( See
Table I at end of chapter.)
The invention of various safety devices for hoisting engines and cages
greatly dim inished th e danger of riding th e cage to and from th e surface.
Probably a dozen m en lost th e ir lives in Butte betw een 1887 and 1920 w hen
th e hoist engineer failed to sh u t dow n th e engine, running th e cage into the
sheaves at th e top of th e headfram e. Beginning in 1910, ACM installed th e
Welch Cut-Off—an autom atic braking system th a t stopped th e cage w hen th e
engineer neglected to do so—to p re v e n t overw inding.
As e arly as 1909,
added insurance against engineer e rro r appeared e v en in th e sm aller mines
in th e form of a bell and light signal system .^
Flashing electric lights
com bined w ith th e ringing bells to alert th e hoist engineer to th e cage
location and its desired destination.
Accidents still occurred occasionally w h en th e station te n d e r ignored
th e gate-closing rule or w h e n th e safety device m alfunctioned. In August
33
1898, a hoist engineer at th e Original Mine lifted the cage to th e 300-foot
level from th e 1,000-foot level w h e re th e w ire rope broke and th e safety
dogs failed to catch on th e cage guides. Ironically, another engineer and th e
deceased m iner had inspected th e rope ju st tw o days before th e accident
w ith o u t noting any defects in th e five-m onth-old rope. Deputy Mine
Inspector Frank H unter testified before a coroner's ju ry th a t rope defects
w e re m ore difficult to detect on a ro u n d rope, especially w h en th e rope had
b een covered w ith a protective covering of tar. H unter also rep o rted th a t
tw o -th ird s of th e safety dogs inspected w e re ineffective. The dogs caught
during tests on th e surface but, w h en p u t to th e te s t w ith th e cage in
operation, th e y in v ariab ly failed, putting th e lives of those in th e cage a t
risk .10
W hile m ine o p erato rs clearly benefited from th e use of m achines,
th e m iner w as no t alw ays so fo rtu n ate.
New tram m ing technologies, such as th e und erg ro u n d electric
locomotive, m ade possible th e m ovem ent of tw ice th e ore in half th e tim e.
But again, th e new technology exacted a hum an cost. Until 1907, th e
tram m e r m oved ore from th e stope to th e level statio n w ith a car pulled by
horses and mules, b u t th e horse ultim ately relinquished its role to a 2 5 0 v olt DC m otor capable of pulling a load of tw elve tons. By 1923, a team of
tw o h u n d red fo u r-to n tro lley locom otives hauled ore along th e d rifts of th e
ACM mines, retirin g all b u t tw o m ules on th e B utte h ill.11 W hile electricity
re p re se n te d an inexpensive source of pow er for tram m ing, m iners fell p rey
to certain h azards associated w ith th e new technology. In th e narrow , dim ly
lit drifts, a carelessly suspended tro lley w ire re p re se n te d a d eath tra p for
th e in atten tiv e tram m er.
Even though electricity constituted an invisible danger if used
34
im properly, th e adap tab le new pow er source also g u aran teed v astly
im proved w orking conditions for all those w ho labored underground.
Electrical pow er m eant th e possibility of a b e tte r lit and b e tte r v en tilated
w ork environm ent. Candles had b een th e p rim ary source of lighting in th e
slopes until th e introduction of th e carbide lam p around 1912. Not only did
candlelight h am p er th e m iner s view of unprotected chutes or m anw ays,
occasionally leading to fa ta l falls, b u t a forgotten candle also ignited a tim b er
in th e Pennsylvania Mine in 1916, causing a tragic fire th a t claim ed th e lives
of tw en ty -o n e m iners. A carbide lam p, w hich ignited th e oily insulation on a
lead electrical cable being low ered dow n th e Granite M ountain shaft of th e
Speculator Mine, sta rte d a fire th a t caused th e w o rst hardrock mine d isaster
in th e n ation's history, claim ing 164 lives. The adoption of a
b a ttery -p o w ere d electric m iner's lam p in th e 1930s ev en tu ally elim inated
th e open flam e from th e w ork place. 12
Electricity also p artially solved underground v e n tilatio n p ro b le m s.1
The rep lacem ent of steam -p o w ered engines and pum ps w ith
electric-pow ered appliances reduced w orking te m p e ra tu re s dram atically.
More im portantly, electricity pow ered th e e ite n s iv e m echanical v entilation
system installed across th e B utte hill afte r 1915. The large rev ersib le fan s
located on th e surface cooled th e w ork space w ith a continuous circulation of
fre sh air and could be m anipulated to re d ire ct th e flow of sm oke and gases
in th e e v e n t of fire u n d e rg ro u n d .^
Over th e fo rty y e a rs beginning in th e 1870s th e B utte m iner
w itnessed a m ajor tran sfo rm atio n of th e w ork place. M achines replaced th e
hand drill; electric pow er replaced steam for hoisting; and th e
tro lley —follow ed ev en tu ally b y a b a ttery -p o w ere d locom otive—replaced
35
horsepow er for tram m ing. The introduction of th ese new technologies
coupled w ith a g rea tly expanded w ork force, capital in v estm en ts of major
proportions, and m ore efficient m ethods of sm elting and refining, accelerated
Butte s ascendency to th e ra n k of w orld s largest copper producer by
18 8 7 .14 W hile new technologies proved a mixed blessing in th e w ork place,
a n u m b er of n ew h azard s a p p eared as th e w o rk er profile and m anagem ent
of th e w ork force evolved w ith corporate control of th e B utte mines, fu rth e r
distancing th e u n train ed im m igrant re c ru it from th e skilled v e te ra n of the
underground.
B utte m ine ow ners, large and small, enthusiastically adopted th e use
of new technologies w ith little thought as to th e ir im pact on th e w orker.
During Butte s infancy as an in d u stria l mining cam p, m uch of th e w ork w as
done b y highly skilled Cornish and Irish m iners, b u t beginning in th e 1890s,
th e ethnic tex tu re of th e w ork force changed w ith an infusion of
p redom inantly ru ra l im m igrants from Italy, Croatia, S erbia and B ohem ia.15
These experienced tillers of th e soil a rriv e d in B utte ill-equipped to m eet th e
dem ands of an in d u stria l w ork place in th e process of technological
transform ation. W hile 80 p e rc en t of th e im m igrants from th e British Isles
w orking in A m erican m etal m ines during th is period had previous mining
experience, only 5 p ercen t of th e southern and e a ste rn E uropeans had
w orked u n derground before. 1^
Beyond th e problem of inexperience em erged a p e rsisten t conflict
b etw een tw o v e ry d ifferen t cultures: th e tw e n tieth c e n tu ry w orld of
m achine w ork v e rsu s a n in e te e n th c en tu ry p re-in d u strial, agricultural w orld.
The E uropean im m igrant cam e from a w ork w orld defined b y th e land,
seasons, fam ily, th e church, and village, in w hich tru s t and cooperation
36
p erv ad ed w ork relationships. In th e B utte mines, th e ru ra l im m igrant
confronted a hostile, su b te rra n e a n en v iro n m en t of sm oke, in ten se h e a t and
noise, w ith o u t com m and of th e language or th e skills and experience
n ecessary to do th e w ork safely and efficiently. As labor histo rian H erbert
Gutm an noted in his classic study, W ork. Culture and Society in
In d u stria lizing Am erica, th e ru ra l su b -cu ltu re w ith in th e im m igrant
population p ersisted in th e face of industrialization. The im m igrant
relinquished trad itio n al w ork hab its and ro u tin es reluctantly, especially
since th e new arriv al of peasants, fa rm e rs and a rtisan s from Europe
periodically rev iv e d ru ra l v a lu e s.17 Boarding th e cage each day, th e
im m igrant m iner tra v e lle d from th e fam iliar w orld of neighborhood and
fam ily into an alien u nderground e n v iro n m en t w h e re a b rief m om ent of
in atten tio n could prove fatal.
Inexperienced im m igrants often found th em selv es doing dangerous
w ork th a t th e m ore experienced n o rth e rn Europeans avoided through
seniority. U naw are of p o tential dangers and o ften unable to u n d e rstan d
directions from English-speaking p artn ers, th e im m igrants faced a m uch
higher degree of risk. The novice's firs t u nderground assignm ent w as
norm ally mucking, a ta sk in w hich th e "greenhorn" relied com pletely upon
th e direction and ju d g m en t of his m ore experienced p a rtn e r. A fo rtu n ate
novice m ight be team ed w ith a m an willing to sh are his know ledge of th e
w ork place and its in h e re n t hazards, b u t m ore typically th e experienced
m iner resen te d th e inexperienced m an, p articu larly if th e n ew re c ru it's
in ep tn ess slow ed production.
Frederick Hoffman, w ritin g about th e problem of in d u strial accidents
for th e Bureau of Labor S tatistics in 1915, cited inexperience as a factor
37
contributing to a large n u m b e r of accidents. In both th e m etal m ines of th e
Am erican W est and th e South African T ransvaal, th e w orld's tw o m ost
dangerous regions to w ork underground, im m igrants predom inated. In both
instances th e w ork force consisted of m en im ported from agricultural
com m unities w h e re th e in h ab itan ts w e re ignorant of m achinery and
unaw are of th e potential danger in h e re n t in th e w o rk .18 A young T urkish
im m igrant nam ed M ahm ada Kaki died from a fall of ground in a B utte m ine
after ignoring e ip licit instructions from th e shift boss to drill and blast out
th e w aste rock to m ake room for a tim ber. In stead th e inexperienced m iner
tu rn e d his drill into th e ore w ith com plete disregard fo r w h a t th e shift boss
reg ard ed as com m on-sense p ractice.1^
Knowledge of safe and efficient m ethods d eriv ed p a rtly from
fam iliarity w ith th e task and p a rtly from training. Supervised training w as
not available in an y of th e B utte m ines b etw een 1880 and 1920. The novice
m iner w as typically given a shovel, assigned to a level and a slope, and p u t
to w ork w ith o u t having to dem o n strate his com petence. By contrast, in
Europe a m an did not becom e a m iner w ithout a long apprenticeship u n d er a
m aster.
A good m iner is a skilled craftsm an, like a c arp en te r or smith,"
w ro te ed itor Richard Rothwell in th e S eptem ber 1897 issue of th e
Engineering fr Mining lournal as he
decried th e h azards associated w ith
em ploying th e inexperienced m iner. Rothwell fu rth e r o b serv ed th a t in th e
m etal m ines of w e ste rn United S tates "m en fre sh from th e farm or bench go
to w ork and w ith in a m onth or tw o call them selves m iners." According to
th e editor, th e self-proclaim ed m iners' ignorance of safe mining practices
constituted an e v e r-p re s e n t m enace to them selves and others.^®
M any of Butte's und erg ro u n d tragedies can be linked directly to
38
in ad eq u ate training and an absence of em ploym ent stan d ard s. The forem an
asked only tw o questions of tw e n ty -fo u r-y ea r-o ld R hinehart C hristm an the
day h e w as h i r e d - th e v e ry sam e day h e died from a fall dow n a chute at
th e M ountain View Mine: "Are you a m iner? " and "W here did you w ork
before coming here?" A lthough th e young m an claim ed experience in
Colorado silver m ines, th e fo rem an a t th e M ountain View lacked any m eans
of verification except th e re c ru it's p e rfo rm a n c e .^
By contrast, m iners
coming from th e m ines of G erm any and Cornwall w e re p a rt of a
centuries-old ap p renticeship tradition.
A m iner s training in six tee n th -c en tu ry G erm any and on into th e early
tw en tieth c en tu ry began a t age te n w orking above ground at sorting tables.
Initiation to th e u n derground occurred only a fte r six y e a rs at sorting and
pushing ore cars to th e shaft. At age tw e n ty th e young G erm an silver m iner
apprenticed for seven y e a rs a fte r w hich h e took a journeym an's test. A
journeym an m iner enjoyed a privileged statu s in G erm an society, entitling
him to th e rig h t to b e ar arm s and exem ption from m ilitary service and some
general taxes. Cornish m iners perform ed an equally lengthy apprenticeship,
beginning w ork above ground b e tw ee n th e ages of nine and tw elve, sorting
rock fo r milling before going und erg ro u n d w ith his fa th e r or uncle to learn
th e skills of drilling, blasting and tim bering. The m ine ow ners in Cornwall
w ere w ell aw are of th e skills and experience of th e ir e n tire w ork force, since
individual fam ilies m aintained an occupational h eritag e th a t stretch ed back
in tim e over generations.22
In contrast, B utte m ine ow ners em ployed a
largely ru ra l im m igrant w o rk force a fte r 1900, com posed of m any w ho had
n e v er b een u n derground before. Because of th e trem en d o u s dem and for
copper and th e shortage of experienced m iners, B utte m ine ow ners
39
increasingly relied on m en w ith o u t th e necessary skills.23
Divisiveness b e tw ee n nationalities th a t characterized political and
cultural life above ground increased existing u n d erg ro u n d h azards associated
w ith an u n train ed im m igrant w ork force. Prejudices surfaced b etw een
n o rth ern and so u th ern E uropeans and reflected a visible tension b etw een
th e m ore experienced Cornish and Irish m iners and th e greenhorn Finns,
Serbs, Croats, and Italians. By 1900 m any of th e skilled Cornish and Irish
m iners h ad rise n to m anagerial sta tu s and, as shift bosses and forem en,
reigned o ver hiring and firing in B utte's u n d e rg ro u n d .^
Tension betw een su p erv iso rs and w o rk ers em erged over tim e,
creating a mood of m istru st and spiteful negligence w hich added to th e
intrinsic dangers of mining. W hen an explosion a t th e Cora Mine claim ed th e
lives of seven m iners in 1905, th e Cornish shift boss pointed an accusing
finger at th e dead Finnish m iners. Referring to one of th e m en killed. Nels
W areenpaa, th e shift boss A ndrew W ickey1Jr., testified at th e in q u est th a t
th e m an w as a h a rd w orker... like m ost Finns are, b u t not a com petent
miner... v e ry few Finns are." The shift boss concluded th a t th e deceased
"could do h a rd w ork if som ebody donelsicl th e thinking for him."25 As
m iners congregated in ethnic neighborhoods w ith se p ara te lodges and
churches, anim osities b e tw ee n th e v arious nationalities p ersisted and grew ,
sh atterin g th e trad itio n a l bond b etw een m iners so essential to a safe w ork
place.26
A high ra te of tran sien ce w ith in th e w ork force also w eakened
bonds b etw een w orkers.
U nfam iliarity w ith th e specific geologic h azards of th e w ork
environm ent, caused b y th e v e ry n a tu re of mining and th e m ovem ent of
w o rk ers from m ine to mine, c o n trib u ted to th e safety problem for b o th th e
40
v e te ra n and th e novice. Even for those unusual m iners w ho rem ained a t a
particular mine over a period of m onths, th e w ork en v iro n m en t changed as
the d rift or slope advanced. The fam iliarity of th e w ork e n v iro n m en t found
b y a w o rk er on th e shop floor of a factory or mill did no t exist underground.
The w ork ro u tin e and its location did not v a ry in a facto ry as it did daily in a
mine.
As th e m iner m oved from one slope to another, th e rock consistency
and location of th e v e in v a rie d from one to another, calling for thoughtful
decisions about drilling and tim b erin g .27
In addition, copper m iners in B utte during th e late n in e te e n th and
early tw e n tie th cen tu ries read ily shifted th e ir allegiances from m ine to mine,
m otivated by th e prospect of b e tte r w orking conditions or m ore am iable
bosses up th e hill. Dick M atthew , an Anaconda em ployee w ho began w ork
for th e com pany in th e late 1920s, corroborated th is B utte trad itio n of
tran sien ce by describing his ow n experience of quitting one m ine in th e
m orning over a d isag reem en t w ith th e shift boss and hiring on at a second
mine b y noon th e sam e day.28
A stu d y conducted b y a go v ern m en t mine engineer w orking in South
Africa exam ined th e im pact of w o rk e r transience on th e m ost com m on of
mine accidents, fall-of-ground. In b o th th e T ransvaal and in Butte, falling
ground co nstituted th e m ost com m on cause of fata l injuries. Mines in th e
Rand, like Butte, posted a fa ta lity ra te higher th a n o th er European nations,
and engineer R. N. Kotze a ttrib u te d th e unusually high ra te of 4.14 deaths
per thousand w o rk ers in th e d eep gold m ines of South Africa to th e safety
problem s associated w ith th e e x tra o rd in a ry transience of th e district's
m iners. In 1 9 1 2 ,8 2 p ercen t of th e Rand's 19,582 m iners m oved into new
places of w ork over the y ear; alm ost 30 percent of th ese m iners had b een
41
em ployed in th e sam e mine less th a n tw o m onths. The g o vernm ent mine
engineer concluded th a t a m iner w ell acquainted w ith his w ork place
n atu rally becam e m ore aw are of th e locations of hazardous ground.2^
An in q u est into a B utte m ine fa ta lity illu strated th e connection
betw een transience and fa ta l fall-of-ground accidents.
A fifty -fiv e-y ear-o ld
m iner nam ed George Evans signed on as a m ucker at th e N ever Sw eat Mine
tw o nights before his death. Evans, a m iner w ith y e a rs of experience in
Colorado silver mines, w orked alone th e evening of April 10,1917, w hen
falling rock crushed him. Fellow m iners testified to th e ir know ledge of
unstable ground in Evans' p a rt of th e mine, e v en though th e ir fellow w orker,
Evans, rem ain ed u n aw are of th e hazard. P erhaps this accident could have
been p rev en ted had Evans know n of th e danger. F req u en t m ovem ent from
m ine to mine lim ited th e m iner's know ledge of th e w o rk place, its particular
geologic anom alies, and his ability to gu ard against dangerous rock.30
The geologic landscape of e v e ry mining district d iffe rs.'T h e
orientation and d ep th of th e orebody v a rie s random ly w ith in a particular
district, posing a v a rie ty of potential problem s and h azards to both th e m ine
engineer and th e m iner. According to Q aude T. Rice, a p rom inent mine
engineer and colum nist for Mining and Engineering W orld, ore rem oval w as
m ore problem atic in B utte th a n in o th er copper mining d istricts because of
th e continual e a rth m ovem ent occurring u n d er th e B utte hill and th e tangled
netw ork of veins. Rice added th a t th e technique of underm ining associated
w ith sloping ou t th e ore caused an u n desirable m ovem ent of th e old fa u lt
blocks b e n ea th B u tte d ^ W alter H arvey W eed, a w ell-k n o w n geologist for
the U.S. Geological Survey, noted th a t th e b roken gas and w a te r lines and
fissu res in th e stre ets of B utte w e re fu rth e r proof of th e continual faulting
42
described by Rice.^2
Even arm ed w ith th e m ost u p -to -d a te tim bering and
w aste-filling technologies, th e m iner still faced th e unpredictable hazards of
falling rock indigenous to th e B utte geology.
Because of th e com plexity of th e B utte geologic form ations, th e
stability of th e und erg ro u n d rock w alls v aried from m ine to mine. Certain
mines, such as th e St. L aw rence, gained rep u ta tio n s as dangerous places to
w ork. Deputy Mine Inspector Frank H unter testified about a dangerous
hanging w all— th e w all located above th e ore v e in — in th e St. Law rence
during a coroner's in q u est conducted in 1897: "W hen I w o rk ed th e re seven
or eight y e a rs ago, it used to kill them p re tty lively then."33
T hat v e ry
sam e y e a r Deputy Inspector H unter described a "soapy seam " at th e
1400-foot level of th e Gagnon, w h e re 3,000 pounds of rock slipped off th e
hanging wall, crushing a m ucker n am ed Allen A nderson. The soapy seam , a
lay er of slip p ery talc-like rock th a t H unter re fe rre d to, had becom e
satu rated w ith m oisture, posing a serious hazard to e v en th e m ost cautious
m iner.34
The experienced m iner em ployed tw o techniques for testing th e
stability of th e ground above him before beginning w ork. By "barring
down," th e m iner trie d to p ry loose rocks w ith a long b a r and by "sounding
th e ground," th e m iner ra p p e d th e rock w ith th e b ar, listening for a hollow or
"drum m y" sound. Occasionally B utte's unusual geology challenged th e
reliability of both th ese techniques. Novica Kujunzich, a m ucker at th e St.
Lawrence, died w h e n fifty tons of rock dropped off th e footw all, th e a re a of
th e slope w all located below th e vein, snapping his neck. The assistant
forem an testified th a t sounding th e rock som etim es proved an unreliable
te st of ground stability: "You couldn't tell nothing there," he claim ed, "not by
43
sounding it at a l l . . . th e ground is too soft to b e able to tell, by sound, th a t
it's loose. " The deceased m ucker's p a rtn e r had carefully b a rre d down on th e
fau lty ground just hours before th e accident.35
Accidents occasionally occurred e v en w h en th e m iner recognized
potential danger and tim b e re d as a precaution against falling ground.
Blasting fre q u e n tly knocked tim b ers ou t of place, leaving dangerous ground
exposed w hile th e tim b e rm a n replaced th e tim bers. In F ebruary 1917, a
tim b erm an nam ed M att Erkila, replacing tim b ers u n d er an are a of "heavy
ore" on th e 2600-foot level of th e Speculator Mine, died w h en a slab of ore
slipped off th e hanging wall, crushing th e young im m igrant m iner u nder tons
of rock. N orth B utte Mining Com pany safety engineer R obert J. Cole testified
at th e coroner's in q u est th a t h eav y ore w as h a rd to hold, and th a t sounding
this ty p e of ground often indicated little about its stability.36
Just as th e geology v a rie d from mine to mine across th e hill, w orking
conditions changed over th e y e a rs as th e Butte shafts deepened.
As th e
mine d ep th increased, so did th e occupational hazards associated w ith th e
w ork. In 1889, th e A naconda Mine reached a d e p th of 1,000 feet; by 1897,
shaft sinkers achieved a d e p th of 1400 feet, and b y 1915, th e m am m oth
copper producer ran k e d as one of B utte's d eep est m ines at over 2600 feet.
W orking conditions generally d ete rio ra te d w ith depth: te m p era tu re s
increased by as m uch as th irty degrees; large volum es of w a te r e n te red the
■
:
.
"
■
1
w orkings; and subsidence and settling of ground accelerated.^? All of these
circum stances created a m ore dangerous situation for th e m iner and higher
costs for mine ow ners.
The B utte mine ow ners of th e late n in etee n th c e n tu ry w ho had relied
on n a tu ra l air flow for v e n tilatio n even tu ally reso rte d to an expensive
44
m echanical v e n tilatio n system as th e shafts deepened and good air
dim inished. A re p o rt published b y th e Silver Bow County H ealth D epartm ent
in 1912 concerning sa n ita ry conditions above and below ground cited th e
2 5 0 0 -fo o t-d eep M ountain Con Mine fo r its high concentration of carbon
dioxide and poor air quality. Of th e te n m ines teste d , th e L ittle Minah, its
shaft sunk to a d e p th of only 1100 feet, m easured th e low est level of carbon
dioxide.38
Men w orking in a poorly v e n tilated slope fatigued rapidly, and
as a result, th e ir pro d u ctiv ity dim inished. In v estm e n t in v e n tilatio n system s,
how ever, rea p ed im m ediate savings fo r m ine m anagers. According to State
Mine Inspector W illiam W alsh, opening a n air course th ro u g h a crosscut in
th e W est Gray Rock Mine increased p roductivity th ere , w hich resu lted in
daily savings of $250, am ounting to $7500 m onthly.39
As th e B utte m ine sh afts descended, th e dem and fo r m ore efficient
m achinery and mining m ethods increased, resu ltin g in higher production
costs. Higher production costs ultim ately m eant o rd ers from th e m ine
su p erin ten d en t's office to th e fo rem an for higher w o rk e r productivity to
enable B utte to re m a in com petitive w ith o th er copper producers. In 1908
Butte copper cost $4.59 per to n m ore to e x tract and refin e th a n Michigan
copper. A su b stan tial portion of th is added cost could b e a ttrib u te d to labor,
sm elting, and refining. But $.98 a to n d erived from additional tim bering,
exploration and m achinery costs in Butte.*40 Until 1906 th e deep m ines in
th e Michigan d istrict o p e ra ted using m inim al am ounts of tim b e r e v en at
d ep th s of 5,000 feet; B utte m iners, in contrast, se t o ver sev en ty -fiv e million
board fe e t of tim b e r a y e a r in a n e ffo rt to secure th e underground
workings.*4 1
Costs escalated w h e n mining a t depth, as did problem s associated w ith
45
supervising and m anaging th e w ork force. By 1900 new mining m achines
and m ethods effectively solved th e technical difficulties encountered in th e
deep Butte mines. But th ese solutions often neglected critical new
relationships b etw een th e w o rk e rs them selves and th e ir supervisors,
creating new hazards for th e u n derground m iner.
Metal mining resem b led no o th er early tw e n tie th c en tu ry in d u strial
e n te rp rise in its organization and m anagem ent. The operations of large steel
and te itile factories w e re m uch easier for m anagers to ov ersee and regulate.
Frederick Taylor's th e o ry of "scientific m anagem ent" fascinated e a ste rn mill
and factory ow ners w ho ex p erim en ted w ith Taylor's m ethods for w o rk er
supervision in hopes of increased efficiency and expanded production rates.
Enthusiasm for T aylor's system also touched th e corporate boardroom s of th e
mining in d u stry , b u t "tim e-m otion" studies did no t read ily tra n sfe r from th e
shop floor of a te itile mill to th e u n derground stope. In 1913, a colum nist
for the Engineering & Mining lournal noted th e difficulties in applying
"scientific m anagem ent" to an in d u stry like m ining in w hich conditions
changed continually. Differences in th e rock com position and th e orebody
p rev en ted th e estab lish m en t of a sta n d ard drilling r a t e . ^
The author also
described th e difficulty of supervising a w ork force dispersed thro u g h o u t th e
vario u s w orking levels of a mine. The v e ry n a tu re of mining resu lted in a
d ifferen t system of m anagem ent, one potentially hazardous for th e w orker.
Supervising th e design and operation of a m etal m ine req u ire d a
w ell-train ed and synchronized m anagerial staff directed from th e mine
su p erin ten d en t's office. The overall operation of th e m ine cam e under th e
direction of th e m ine su p e rin te n d en t, th e m an ultim ately responsible to th e
stockholders and to th e sta te and fed e ral agencies for overseeing m ine
46
"
safety. The su p e rin te n d en t d elivered production quotas to th e mine
forem en, w ho in tu rn passed directions on to a crew of shift bosses. The
shift boss re p re se n te d th e m ost im p o rtan t link b etw een th e su p e rin te n d e n t’s
office above ground and th e m en w orking below ground. Enormous
responsibility fell upon th e shift boss, th e m an on w hom th e su p e rin te n d en t
depended for enforcem ent of safety regulations, for th e m aintenance of a
contented w ork force, and to m eet production goals.43
The shift boss took
his o rd ers from th e m ine forem an a t a daily m eeting held on th e surface,
although he sp e n t m ost of his tw elv e- to fo u rtee n -h o u r day underground
directing th e m iners. The shift boss often found him self caught b etw een his
m anagerial responsibilities and his d u ty to th e m en w ho w o rk ed u n d er him.
For his added responsibilities and h o u rs—often th e first to a rriv e in the
m orning and th e last to leave at n ig h t—a shift boss received a w age perhap s
one dollar and on e-h alf a day higher th a n a m ucker and often considerably
less th an a good contract m in e r .^
However, th e shift boss avoided the
backbreaking stoop labor of th e m ucker and th e und erg ro u n d dangers of
drill and dynam ite. The prom otion from m iner to shift boss did not elevate
the social statu s of th e m an w ho had b e en a m iner; in fact, shift bosses
freq u e n tly re fe rre d to them selves as m iners and continued to reside in
w orking-class neighborhoods.^^
R esponsibility for th e safety and w ell-being of th e w ork force
in ev itably resid ed w ith th e shift boss, since he had th e m ost in tim ate daily
contact w ith th e operation. Ed McQuirel a shift boss a t th e Bell Mine in 1897,
described his duties as h e saw them : "To f ii w h a te v e r need s filin g and if
one m an w o u ld n 't do it to send another, and to m ake su re everything is
right." As one of a han d fu l of su pervisors responsible for th e activities of up
47
to fifty men, th e shift boss delegated som e of his responsibility to th e m en
doing th e w ork. W hen asked during a coroner's in q u est w h e th e r "every m an
is his own boss in reg ard to tim bering and protecting th e mine," McQuire
responded, Yes. e v e ry m an is supposed to tim b er up if he th in k s it is
necessary."46
Since it w ould h av e b een im possible for th e shift boss to
directly oversee w ork in v arious p a rts of th e m ine th ro u g h o u t th e w orkday,
he accorded a certain am ount of responsibility to th e m iner. Since th e m iner
had m ore experience th a n th e m ucker, th e shift boss assigned him to oversee
his p a rtn e r's safety.
The m iner's p rim a ry d u ty extended to safeguarding th e w ell-being of
th e m ucker shovelling alongside of him by exam ining th e ground and picking
dow n loose ground before perm ittin g th e m ucker to w ork. U nfortunately,
m any a m ucker lost his life to a fellow m iner's fau lty judgem ent. S ituated at
th e bottom of th e occupational h ierarchy, th e m ucker had no altern ativ e b u t
to follow instructions from his w orking p a rtn e r or face possible term in atio n
for not producing
Q aude T. Rice w riting for th e Engineering & Mining foum fll in 1909,
described th e following chain of ev en ts as re p re se n ta tiv e of w e ste rn m ines
th a t he w orked in. The som etim es catastrophic cycle began w ith th e m ine
su p e rin te n d en t giving an o rd e r to his forem an fo r a specific am ount of ore
p er day. The fo rem an called to g eth er his crew of shift bosses, rep eatin g th e
dem and from th e top, and th e shift bosses m ade th e ir daily rounds calling
for m ore rock. The m iners, not w anting to disappoint a m an w ho identified
him self as one of them , piled up th e rock, som etim es neglecting to spend th e
ex tra tim e to tim b e r and m ake th e w ork place safe. During tw o and o ne-half
y e ars w orking in th e W est, Rice recalled only tw o occasions w h en a m iner
48
w as "called down" for failu re to pick dow n som e loose rock.48
Other questionable m anagem ent practices w ere th e re su lt of rivalries
b etw een shift bosses o ver th e am ount of ore hoisted. In his 1900 report,
Deputy Inspector H unter noted th e "disregard for p ru d e n t practices" th a t
this kind of com petition produced. ^9
Testifying before a congressional
com mission investigating w orking conditions in Butte in 1914, Deputy
Inspector Orem blam ed riv a lry among shift bosses for ven tilatio n problem s
caused w hen overanxious bosses raised w aste stored in ch u tes to th e surface
in an effo rt to outdo one another.50
Most ru les w e re b ro k en w ith o u t consequence, b u t som etim es a
m iner s d isregard for safety or fe a r of rep rim an d proved fatal. W orking on
th e 1,200-foot level of th e St. L aw rence Mine, A braham Ninan, an
experienced m iner of tw elve y e ars, had rep e ate d ly w a rn e d a m ucker nam ed
H arrington not to do any shovelling u n d er a suspicious slab of rock. The
young im m igrant disreg ard ed his p a rtn e r's w arnings and w as crushed by an
avalanche of e a rth w hile shovelling ore into a car. P erhaps, as Inspector
H unter suggested, H arrington fe lt m ore th re a te n e d b y th e possibility of
being fired for not w orking h a rd enough th a n by th e danger pointed out by a
fellow m iner. "H arrington w as recen tly from th e old country, " Inspector
H unter rem ark ed , "and h e w as afraid he w ould be discharged if he did not
do a certain am ount of w ork." M uckers often found th em selv es in th e
com prom ising pred icam en t of defying th e judgm ent of fellow m iners in an
effort to protect th e ir som etim es te n ta tiv e relationship w ith th e shift boss.
P eter Shea, th e shift boss on d u ty at th e St. Law rence th e day H arrington
died, told a coroner's ju ry th a t a m ucker w ould n e v er be penalized for failing
to move a specific am ount of dirt. But in 1906, th e M ontana Deputy Mine
49
Inspector, W illiam Orem, corroborated H unter's observations, b y reporting
instances of forem en rep rim an d in g m iners for w asting tim e in taking e it r a
precautions in tim bering 5 1
,
,
Discipline in th e m ines w as inconsistently applied and w as
som etim es ineffective. John C Sm ith, a shift boss a t th e Speculator Mine,
w arn ed his m en about covering chutes w h en not using them , and he had, in
fact, discharged a m an afte r w arning him once about his reckless w ork
habits. Feeling so rry for th e m iner, Sm ith rein sta te d th e m an th e following
night. T hat sam e night, th e careless m iner w as knocked dow n a chute four
floors to his d eath afte r ignoring w arnings from his fellow m iners about
standing u n d er som e bad ground. As th is incident d em onstrated, discipline
did not necessarily a lter dangerous w ork h ab its or create a safer w orking
environ m ent.5 2
First in 1897 and again in 1906, th e state mine inspector m ade
referen ce to a lack of discipline among supervisors in enforcem ent of safety
regulations.
In th e over tw o h u n d re d inquiries into accidental deaths
exam ined only tw o instances of disciplinary action for disobeying safety
procedures appear, sub stan tiatin g claim s m ade b y th e sta te m ine inspector
about lax discipline. W ith som e m ine operators, th e sta te m ine inspector
linked m anagem ent indifference to enforcem ent of safety regulations to a
trad itio n al corporate maxim th a t shifted responsibility from ow ner to
w orker: "The m en should know enough to tak e care of them selves. " The
state m ine inspector refu sed to accept th is point of view , responding th a t th e
su p e rin te n d en t s d u ty to his w o rk e rs’ safety did not cease once he provided
th e tools and instruction for a safe operation 53
According to th e
conclusions of a U.S. B ureau of M ines investigation of responsibilities for
50
Butte mining accidents, each o p e ra to r ought to em ploy a com petent
supervisor for e v e ry tw e n ty to th irty w orkers, and th a t supervisor ought to
inspect each w ork place th re e to fo u r tim es daily in o rd er to decrease
accidents. In Butte, shift bosses typically supervised from fo rty to fifty men,
visiting some w ork stations as in freq u e n tly as once e v e ry tw o days 54
Besides th e shortage of su p erv iso ry staff and th e occasional indifference of
th e m anagem ent to th e safety of th e ir em ployees, th e re w as another
problem w ith supervision: th e m iners' abhorrence of supervision, w hich
derived principally from a system of contract mining ad ap ted from Cornish
traditions.
M iners from Cornwall carried to Michigan and B utte th e ir m etal
mining techniques, a pride in th e ir skilled occupation, and a sp irit of
independence. R ather th a n w orking for daily w ages, m ost Cornish copper
and tin m iners labored u n d er contract, e ith er perform ing tutw ork, a contract
negotiated b e tw een th e sh aftm en and m ine ow ners fo r developing a mine; or
a trib u te, an arra n g em e n t b y w hich th e m iner paid all expenses req u ire d to
get th e ore of th e ground and to th e surface, fo r a sh are of th e profit. In
both cases, th e m iner negotiated th e price to be paid per foot of shaft
developed or am ount p er to n for extracted ore; b oth arran g em en ts
dem anded a k een judgem ent and consum m ate skill on th e p a rt of th e m iner,
for an inaccurate estim ate could cause his fam ily to go hungry. W orking
u n d er this ty p e of w o rk e r/m a n a g e m e n t relationship over th e centuries, th e
Cornish m iner evolved in to a in d ep e n d en t w orker, unaccustom ed to taking
o rd ers or advice from anyone.55
By 1900, contract m iners m ade up th e m ajority of shaftm en and
m iners in th e B utte u n derground, creating a significant segm ent of th e w ork
51
force th a t labored in d ep e n d en t of reg u lar supervision. The Butte m iners
adopted certain aspects of th e Cornish contract system . The m iner
negotiated w ith th e fo rem an for a specific pay ra te for each ton of ore
rem oved, or for foot of shaft or d rift advanced, to be m easured by th e
forem an w eekly. The m iners' union g u aran teed th e contract m iner th e
m inim um daily pay ra te reg ard less of his a d v a n c e d Thus, a contract m iner
received additional com pensation for increased productivity, although th e
fo rem an continually adjusted th e ra te to hold dow n com pany labor costs.
The contract system had a significant im pact on th e enforcem ent of
safety regulations and th e relationship b etw een w o rk e r and m anagem ent.
Je rry Sullivan, an experienced contract m iner of over te n y e ars, died in th e
Bell & Diamond Mine w h e n th e lagging h e had se t his m achine drill on gave
w ay, dropping th e driller and his m achine to th e floor below. Shift boss
Patrick F. Connell testified th a t th e accident could h av e b een p rev e n ted had
Sullivan used th e com m on system of lagging. A lthough th e shift boss
adm itted th a t he h ad not noticed th is irreg u larity in m aking his rounds,
pointing to a problem w ith oversight of em ployees and p erh ap s a shortage of
supervisors, local deference to th e m iner w ould hav e silenced any
acknow ledgem ent of th e m iner's e rro r had he noticed. According to Connell,
bosses rem ain ed re lu c ta n t to tell an experienced m iner about safety ou t of
resp ect for th e m iner's judgm ent and independence.^^ In th is case, th e
deceased e v en d isreg ard ed w arn in g s from his p a rtn e r and proceeded to
w ork u n der unsafe circum stances.
Shift bosses thro u g h o u t th e d istrict v irtu a lly ignored th e m ethods by
w hich contract m iners p erfo rm ed th e ir prescribed tasks. A fter tw o young
Sw edish m iners died in a blasting accident in th e Rarus Mine in 1905, the
52
shift boss Dennis Hines explained his lack of scrutiny in th is w ay: "We do not
pay m uch a tten tio n to those contractors. We see th a t th e y live up to th e
contract, and put in tim b er, and ru n th e d rift according to contract, b u t th a t
is all." As long as th e contract m iner com pleted a specified am ount of w ork,
th e m anagem ent generally ignored th e m anner in w hich th e w ork w as
perform ed .58
At coroners' inquests, th e m iners rep e ate d ly voiced th e ir approval of
this m inim al system of supervision. A contract m iner n am ed Isaac Pakkala
testified during th e in q u est into th e d eath of his p a rtn e r a t th e Leonard Mine
th a t th e shift boss had not v isited th e ir slope for five nights and th a t th e y
did not expect a boss to ov ersee th e safety of th e ir w ork.59
Som etim es th e
contract m iner pushed him self and p a rtn e rs h a rd e r th a n expectations set by
m anagem ent. D riven on by th e incentive of th e bonus paid for increased
productivity, th e contract m iner occasionally took chances th a t resu lted in
disaster. Such w as th e case w ith Antone Barnabo, a contract m iner w ho
w orked at th e P ennsylvania Mine. Anxious to b rea k as m uch ground as
possible, Barnabo and his p a rtn e r loaded each of nine holes, still hot from
earlier blasting, w ith eight tim es m ore pow der th a n necessary to do th e job.
This m istake in judgem ent cost B arnabo his life.^O
W hile a certain am ount of carelessness em erged ou t of th e allure of a
bigger paycheck, th e m iner also encountered increased p ressu re from
corporate m ine ow ners, th ro u g h th e ir subordinates, to increase production in
o rd er to m eet growing production dem ands for copper and th e com petition
from Arizona and abroad. U nseen b u t distinct connections linked th e
u n derground m iner in B utte to th e w orld copper m arket, influencing th e
dynam ic b e tw een w o rk e r and th e w ork place. In th e em erging new
53
en te rp rises of com m unications and electrical pow er generation, copper
assum ed p rim ary significance beginning in th e 1880s. Each y e a r b etw een
1897 and 1919, th e w orld consum ption of copper increased 139 percent,
w hile A m erican use of th e re d m etal increased at an annual ra te of 218
percent. The m anufacture of electric g en erato rs in th e United States
increased at a phenom enal ra te of 730 percent each y e a r b etw een 1899 and
1909.61 During th e early p a rt of th e tw e n tie th c en tu ry th e w orld dem and
for copper su p ersed ed all previous expectations.
Butte m ine ow ners resp o n d ed to this in satiable dem and by expanding
operations and th e size of th e w ork force. The n u m b er of underground
m iners w orking in B utte leaped from approxim ately 2,000 in 1883 to
14,500 in 1916. During th e sam e period, th e am ount of ore extracted grew
from over 24 million pounds to an astronom ic 352 million pounds, and th e
price of A m erican copper jum ped from 16.5$ a pound to 33$ a pound in
1916. The corporate balance sh eets show ed enorm ous profits as new mining
and sm elting technologies steadily w h ittled aw ay at production costs. W hat
th e ACM ledgers did not re v e al w e re th e m ounting d e ath s and debilitating
injuries a ttrib u te d to expanded production: only tw elv e m en died
u n derground in B utte in 1887 com pared to a to tal of sixty-five fatalities in
th e b an n er y e a r of 1916. During those sam e y e a rs th e fata l accident ra te in
B utte jum ped from 3 6 to 4.5 d eath s p er thousand w orkers.
[See Table 2 at
end of chapter.)
W ar in Europe also ste p p ed -u p dem ands on th e B utte m iner.
Beginning in A ugust of 1914, th e w a r initially h alted th e flow of copper to
European consum ers, causing m assive layoffs in th e B utte m ines and a
general disruption of w orking p a tte rn s in place afte r th e last slum p in
54
copper production caused b y th e Panic of 1907.62 Strife w ith in organized
labor, m arked by th e destru ctio n of th e M iners' Union Hall in June of 1914.
increased tension betw een w o rk ers and m anagem ent in th e stre ets of Butte
and d istru st among w o rk ers below ground. By early 1915, th e escalated w ar
in Europe gen erated enorm ous dem and for A m erican m etals, and Butte
producers responded, hiring thousands of m iners, m any of w hom lacked the
experience necessary to create a safe w orking e n v iro n m e n t.^
The cry for
copper, zinc, and m anganese opened new mine shafts as w ell as old w orks
th a t had been abandoned, and pleas from organized labor for safer w orking
conditions fell on deaf ears. B etw een 1916 and 1917, zinc production m ore
th a n doubled in Butte, increasing from tw en ty million to over fifty million
pounds. P ro sp erity b rought w ith it unlim ited opp o rtu n ities for w ork, b u t
often u n d er circum stances ta in te d by th e p ressu re to produce w ithout
reg ard for safety 64
The United S tates's e n try into th e w a r in th e spring of 1917 again
inflated th e dem and for B utte m etals and m arked an o th er episode of
intensified labor struggle, creating intensified m istru st in Butte's
u n derground world.65
W hile 1917 brought h e alth y profits to corporate
mine ow ners, it rem ain ed a y e a r filled w ith tragic m em ories for Butte
m iners. In June 1917 a fire in th e G ranite M ountain shaft of th e Speculator
Mine ignited a series of strik es and com pany rep risals th a t plagued Butte
mining for th e next four y ears.
Betw een 1917 and 1920 w orking conditions did not im prove. W orker
safety took a back se at to th e p e rsiste n t w rangling b e tw ee n labor and
m anagem ent and to th e econom ic crisis created in th e copper in d u stry by
peace and a sagging m ark et caused by bulging surpluses. Betw een 1916 and
55
1920, 410 B utte m iners died underground, accounting for over 37 percent of
all mine fatalities th a t occurred in Butte over th e four decade period
beginning in 1880.^6
The boom and b u st cycle b ro u g h t on b y w a r in
Europe clearly had a d evastating im pact on th e Butte m iner. By 1920 the
w orld price of copper fell from its 1916 high of 3 3 1 a pound to a low of 17$
a pound, putting som e 10,000 copper m iners out of w ork. W hile production
dropped sharply in 1920, th e fata l accident ra te clim bed to 4.4 death s per
thousand w orkers. Unsafe w ork practices th a t preceded th e frenzied w ar
y e a rs p ersisted into th e 1920s, as did th e b itte r strik es and growing
econom ic insecurity, creating an ideal clim ate for accident and injury. [See
Table 2 a t th e end of chapter.)
During th e w a r years, w hile th e price of copper m ade stead y gains,
com petition w ith in th e in d u stry increased, th reaten in g A naconda's
suprem acy over o th er A m erican producers.
Arizona and Utah copper
producers, exploiting low -grade p o rp h y ry orebodies, using o p en -p it m ining
techniques, and im plem enting a m ore efficient concentration process,
m ounted a viable challenge to Butte. In Bingham Canyon, Utah, Daniel
Jackling introduced A m erican copper producers to th e cost-effective
advantages of o p en -p it mining. The technique req u ire d fe w er w o rk ers and
elim inated m any of th e hazards associated w ith und erg ro u n d m ining
To
rem ain com petitive during th e 1920s, ACM em ployed o p e n -p it techniques in
th e ir new ly developed operations in Cananea, Mexico, and Potrerillos and
Chuquicam ata, Chile.67
A fter 1920, B utte n e v e r again dom inated th e A naconda Company
portfolio, b u t e v en as th e n u m b er of m en w orking u n d erg ro u n d in Butte
declined b etw een 19 2 1 and 1931, th e fa ta lity ra te rem ain ed high.&8
W hile
certain aspects of th e mining process becam e safer o ver tim e, due in p a rt to
new m ethods for blasting, hoisting and lighting, those v e ry sam e
technological solutions introduced hazards to th e und erg ro u n d unim agined
b y th eir inventors.
Innovative technology continued to h a u n t both m iner
and m anagem ent w ell into th e tw e n tie th century. W hile e arly tw e n tieth
cen tu ry corporate m ine o p erato rs w illingly m ade large capital in v estm en ts
in new mining technologies for w hich th e y recognized enorm ous profits, th e y
rem ained in d ifferen t to th e ever-grow ing hu m an costs associated w ith
in d u strial accidents and occupational diseases.
T a b le I: C a u se s o f B u tte M ine F a ta litie s
(Percentage caused by)
Year Fall of Ground Explosion Cage Electrocution FalKshaft. chute) Struck Suffocation Total number
1887
50
8
33
0
8
0
0
12
1896
17
" 33
37
0
7
4
0
23
1900
20
40
16
0
12
0
12
23
1903
23
28
18
0
18
10
2
40
1907
32
9
12
2
29
13
0
31
1916
26
I
3
3
11
20
32
63
Note: These years represent pivotal years for either dramatic increases or decreases in production leveli
The year 1920 does not appear because detailed information on fatalities is not available for the last half
of that year.
T a b le 2 : C o rre la tio n b e tw e e n p ric e , p r o d u c tiv ity , n u m b e r of w o r k e r s ,
a n d t h e f a t a l i t y r a t e f o r B u tte , M o n ta n a
Year World Price Amt. Copper Produced No. Underground Workers
Fatality Rate
1883
16.3 c/lb.
24,664,640 lbs.
2,000
4.0/thousand workers
1887
13 8 c/lb.
78,697,920 lbs.
3.390
3.6/thousand workers
1896
10.9 c/lb.
228.938,614 lbs.
7,000
8.3/thousand workers
1899
17.7 c/lb.
237,933,931 lbs.
8,679
2.8/thousand workers
1907
20.0 c/lb.
226,290.873 lbs.
10,000
3.4/thousand workers
1909
13 3 c/lb.
314.858.291 lbs.
8.337
5.3/thousand workers
1916
33 0 c/lb.
352.893,273 lbs.
14,500
4.5/thousand workers
1920
17.0 c/lb.
177.743.747 lbs.
7,000
4.4/thousand workers
Nofe: Figures derived from the Copper Handbook (1903,1918) and Montana Mine Inspector
Reports: 1889-1912.
59
ENDNOTES
I. Frederick L. Hoffman, "In d u strial A ccident Statistics," Bureau of Labor
Statistics Bulletin 157. In d u strial Accident & Hygiene Series No. 5
(Washington: GPO, 1915), 6 .
2. W ym an, Hard-Rock Epic. 3 31. W ym an cites advantages afforded m iner
w ith n ew technologies. "Commons Commission Report" testim o n y of John
Gillie gives exam ples of im proved conditions due to new lighting a n d
v en tilation on th e B utte hill.
3. W vman. Hard-Rock Enic. 84 -1 1 8
4. L arry D. L ankton & Charles K. Hyde, Old Reliable: An Illu stra te d H istory
of th e Quincv Minimt Com pany (Hancock: Quincy Mine Hoist Association,
1982). 59. ^ i n e e n n g & Mining journal 60(28 Decem ber 1 8 9 5 ): 21. The
la tte r journal m akes referen ce to th e ty p e of drills used in Butte.
5. U.S. D epartm ent of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 2 3 1
(W ashington: GPO, 1918), 367.
6. First Biennial Report of M ontana D epartm ent of Labor & In d u stry .
19 13 -1 9 1 4 "(H elen^ In d ep e n d en t PuhH
QlSi, IR2
7
7. Isaac F. M arcosson, A naconda (New York: Dodd, M ead & Co., 1957),
8. Ray Lilley, in terv iew w ith author, Butte, M ontana, 20 Decem ber 1985.
Lilley corroborated sta te m e n ts b y o th er inform ants concerning w o rk er
reluctance to use w a te r in drilling because of discom fort it created in th e
w o rk place.
9. Claude T. Rice, "Recent A dvances in B utte Mining Practice," Mining &
Eneineering W orld 39 (26 Ju ly 1913): 146.
10. In q u est No. 2125, "A ndrew Rosette," 19 A ugust 1898, 3 8 -4 1 , Office of
Clerk of Court, B utte-Silver Bow County, Butte, M ontana, [hereafter
rep o sito ry location w ill n o t appear).
11. William B. Daly, e t al., "Mining M ethods in th e B utte District,"
T rans actions ^of th<^Am erican In stitu te of Mining Engineers LXXII (New York:
12. G.S. Rice & R. R. Sayers, "Review of Safety & H ealth Conditions in th e
Mines of Butte," U.S. B ureau of M ines BuUetin 2S7 f W ashington- GPO, 1925),
13. "Commons Commission Report," 3 9 5 1 -3 9 5 5 .
14. Malone, B attle for B utte 34-56.
60
15. M artin and Shovers, "Butte A rchitecture," 31-34.
16. A lbert H. Fay, "Mine Accidents," Engineering & Mining Tournal I ORf I
Novem ber 1919): 728.
17. H erbert G. Gutm an. W ork. Culture, and Society in Industrializing America
(NewYork: V in ta g e BooksTl97 / I l 5 ;4 7 ^ 2 63 ; 2 / 2 .
18. Hoffman, "In d u strial A ccident Statistics," 102-103.
19. In q u est No. 8 2 9 0 ," M ahm ada Kaki," 11 F eb ru ary 1 9 1 8 ,3 1 .
20. Engineering & Mining journal 64 (4 S eptem ber 1897): 273.
21. In q u est No. 8281," R hinehart Christman," 25 Jan u ary 1 9 1 8 , 32.
22. Richard Dietrich, "U ntersuchungen zum F ruhkapitalism us im M ittel
deutschen E rzbergban und M etalihandel," Iahrbuch fu r die Geschichte
M ittel-und O stdeutschlands (10 S ep tem b er 1 9 6 1): 168. I am in d eb ted to Dr.
George W aring of M ontana College of M ineral Science and Technology, w ho is
c u rre n tly studying 14 t h - 18 th c e n tu ry European mining, for calling m y
a tten tio n to th is inform ation on th e European apprenticeship system .
23. M artin and Shovers, "Butte A rchitecture," 3 1-34.
24. The nam es of Irish and Cornish shift bosses and fo rem en appear
rep e ate d ly thoughout th e over tw o h u n d re d coroner's in q u ests e ia m in e d .
25.
In q u est No. 3 8 1 4 ," Nels W areenpaa 1e t al.,“ 12 M ay 1 9 0 5 ,4 2 -4 4 .
26. M artin and Shovers, "Butte A rchitecture," 37-44.
27. W ym an, Hard-Rock Epic. 109. The changing n a tu re of th e w ork routine
and e n v iro n m en t is e v id e n t in n e a rly e v e ry in q u est exam ined.
28. Dick M atthew , in te rv ie w w ith author, Butte, M ontana, 24 Ja n u ary 1986.
(H ereafter cited as Dick M atthew , interview .)
29. A.W. Rogers, "M igration of M iners and Accidents on th e Rand,"
Engineering & Mining lournal 93 (8 June 1912V 1141
30. In q u est No. 8 1 5 2 ." George Evans," 10 April 1 9 1 7 ,1 0 .
31. Rice, "Advances in Butte," 147.
32. W alter H. W eed, "Geology & Ore Deposits of th e B utte District, M ontana
U.S. Geological S urvey Professional P aper 74 (W ashington: G P 0 ,1912), 50.
33. In q u est No. 1 7 0 6 ," P e ter D. Harrington," I A ugust 1897.
34. In q u est No. 1662," Allen Anderson." 8 May 1897.
35. In q u est No. 8 2 0 9 ," Novice Kujunzich," I A ugust 1 9 1 7 ,3 0 .
61
36. In q u est No. 8106, "M att Erkila," 14 F eb ru ary 1 9 1 7 ,2 1 .
37. M ontana Mine Inspector Reports. 188 9 :1 8 9 7 : and 191S (Helena:
In d ep en d en t Publishing Co.) Each m ine inspector re p o rt cites th e d e p th and
conditions found in th e m ajor B utte m ines.
38. Silver Bow County H ealth D epartm ent, "Report on th e Investigation of
S anitary Conditions in th e Mines, and Conditions U nder W hich M iners Live in
Silver Bow County," 1912, Small Collections 89, M ontana Historical Society,
Helena, M ontana, [h ereafter MHSl
39. "Commons Commission Report," 3969.
40. Jam es R. Finley, "Cost of Lake S uperior and M ontana Copper,"
Engineering & Mining journal 85 (25 A pril 1908): 859.
41. Lankton and Hyde, Old Reliable. 107. Figure regarding th e n u m b er of
fe e t tim b er se t in B utte m ines from Con Kelley s testim ony, "Commons
Commission Report," 3862.
42. Engineering & Mining Journal 96 (13 S eptem ber 1913): 514.
43. Claude I . Rice, "Prevention of A ccidents in M etal Mines," Engineering &
Mining Iournal 87 (6 F eb ru ary 1 9 0 9 ): 302.
44. Dick M atthew , in te rv ie w w ith author, Butte, M ontana, 24 Ja n u ary 1986.
According to M atthew , in th e 1930s a shift boss m ade $65 a w eek. A m in er’s
w eek ly paycheck ran g ed from $45 to $90 a w e e k —th e la tte r figure e arn ed
b y some contract m iners. According to th e October 6 ,1 9 1 7 , Engineering &
Mining journal, th e following w ages p revailed based on copper a t 19 cents
per pound: und erg ro u n d m iners, $4.50 p er day; blacksm iths, m achinists,
electricians, $5.25; hoist engineers, $5.75; and shift bosses, $ 6.00 .
45. The residence of shift bosses is ascertained from nam es d raw n from th e
over tw o h u n d re d in q u ests exam ined and cro ss-referen ced through th e R.L.
Polk, Butte Citv Directories.
46.
In q u est No. 1 6 1 3 ," Frank Upton," 9 Jan u ary 1897.
47. In q u est No. 1706, "Peter H arrington," I A ugust 1897. In th e course of
this in q u est P eter Shea, th e sh ift boss, established th e heirarchical
relationship b e tw ee n th e m iner and m ucker.
'
48. Rice, "Prevention of Accidents," 302.
49. A nnual R eport of th e Inspector of Mines of th e State of M ontana. 1900
(Helena: In d ep e n d en t Publishing Co7,1901), 14.
..........
50. "Commons Commission Report," 3978.
51. In q u est No. 1706, "Peter Harrington," I A ugust 1897. Biennial Report of
th e Inspector of Mines of th e S tate of M ontana. 1905-06 (Helena:
In d ep en d en t Publishing Co., 1906), 28.
62
52. In q u est No. 3998, "Fred Axtell," 27 October 1906, 24.
53. Mine Inspector Report. 1900 13.
54. Daniel Harrington, "Some Phases of th e Relative R esponsibility of
M anagem ent and W orkers for Accidents in Mines, U S. Bureau of Min,
me;
Report of Investigation 2993 (Washington: GPO1 1930)72.
55. AX. Ham ilton Jenkin, The C w nish Miner (London: George Allen & Unwin
Ltd., 1948), 204; and A rth u r Cecil Todd f h e Cornish M iner in Am erica
(Truro, Cornwall: D. B radford B arton Ltd., 1967)723.
56. Dick M atthew , in terv iew w ith author, Butte, M ontana, 24 Jan u ary 1986;
H enry Hull, in te rv ie w w ith author, Butte, M ontana, 22 Decem ber 1985; Ed
Shea, in terv iew w ith author, Butte, M ontana, 23 Ja n u ary 1986. Details about
th e contract system w e re acquired from th ese interview s. The absence of
Anaconda Com pany em ploym ent and personnel records prohibits m ore
specific docum entation of th e n u m b ers of Butte m iners w orking u n d er th e
contract system .
57.
In q u est No. 2998, "Jerry Sullivan," 11 April 1 9 0 1 ,1 0 .
58. In q u est No. 3 8 6 6 ," Frank EUisson & Oscar Matti," 6 October 1 9 0 5 ,3 .
59. In q u est No. 7 3 6 2 ," KaUe Jantunen," I Jan u ary 1 9 1 2 ,1 8 -1 9 .
60. In q u est No. 3 7 7 9 ," A ntone Barnabo," 11 Ja n u ary 1 9 0 5 ,3 2 -3 3 .
61. Engineering & Mining lournal 96 (6 Decem ber 1913): 1062-63.
62. D epartm ent of Labor & In d u stry Report. 1913-14 308-09
63. Emmons, "Irish M iners of Butte," 59-61.
64. Marcosson. Anaconda. 156
65. For a discussion of B utte during W w ld W ar I see M ichael Malone and
W a sh in g to n P r' M ontana: A H isto rv of Two C enturies (Seattle: U niversity of
191 6*\920 un<*e r 8ro u n d fatalities d eriv ed from Mine Inspector Reports.
67. Thom as Navin, Copper Mining and M anagem ent (Tucson: U niversity of
Arizona Press, 19781, 29-32; 2 1 0 -2 1 5 .
r
68 . IIS, Bureau of M ines BuUetin 264 (W ashington, DC.: G overnm ent
Printing Office, 1926); U.S. Bureau of M ines BuUetin 310 W ashington, D C.:
G overnm ent P rinting Office. 1929): U.S. Bureau trf M ines Bulletin 374
(W ashington, D C.: G overnm ent P rinting Office, 1933L T hese fataU ty figures
are fo r copper m ines in M ontana. T here a re no specific figures for B utte
fatalities.
63
Chapter 4
THE HIGH COST OF MINING: UNDERGROUND FATALITIES AND
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH HAZARDS
B etw een l8 8 0 a n d l9 2 0 , m ore th a n tw o thousand m iners lost th eir
lives to accidents and occupational disease w orking underground in Butte.
From 1880 until a t least 1915, mining in dustrialists view ed w o rk ers as an
expendable com m odity and reg ard ed m ine-related accidents,
occupationally-induced diseases, and disabilities as necessary costs of doing
business. W hile this a ttitu d e prevailed among m any A m erican industrialists
during the Gilded Age, it did not go unchallenged b y w o rk ers and th eir
P ro g ressive-era sym pathizers in th e press and politics. Social com m entators
of the tim e, like G ilbert Roe, decried corporate disregard for th e w o rk e rs’
w elfare and advocated legislative action to protect th e w orker. "These tim es
are d ark ages w h en th e hu m an m achine is driv en to th e lim it w ithout
lubrication or re p a ir or sim ply scrapped" w hen disease, often th e direct
resu lt of th e occupation, robbed it of fu rth e r usefulness, " Roe declared .1
During Butte s rapid grow th as copper producer, mine o p erato rs followed the
lead of oth er A m erican industrialists, sidestepping responsibility for the
growing n u m b er of w o rk -re la te d accidents and ignoring b o th th e evidence
for the relationship b e tw ee n re sp ira to ry disease and d ry drilling and readily
available solutions to this devastating occupational disease. By 1915,
how ever, public o u tcry o ver th e enorm ous loss of hu m an life coupled w ith a
challenge to corporate im m u n ity in th e courts led to a series of laws to
64
com pensate th e m iner and his fam ily for injuries sustained on the job and to
dem and a m ore responsible corporate a ttitu d e tow ard w o rk er safety and
w ell-being.
Before 1915 m ine m anagers avoided accepting responsibility for the
fate of th eir em ployees by shifting th e blam e for accidents and occupational
diseases to th e m iner, accusing him of carelessness and a disregard for
p ru d en t mining practices. The coroner's j urie s - -convene d to investigate
mine fata litie s—and th e courts invariab ly sided w ith m anagem ent on the
liability issue. Legal precedence and the econom ic v u ln erab ility of th e
n in etee n th -ce n tu ry hardrock m iner com bined to su p p o rt th e corporations'
position of innocence in reg a rd to m in e-related fatalities and to silence
w o rk er resistance to charges of carelessness.
M iners w ho w itnessed the
accident and testified in a coroner's inquest along w ith th e ir im m ediate
supervisors consistently ad h ered to th e com pany line, blam ing th e dead
m iner for carelessness in all b u t a han d fu l of inquests. A coroner's jury,
appointed b y th e county coroner, questioned w itn esses to th e accident and
m anagem ent personnel, in an effo rt to d eterm in e th e cause of th e fatal
accident and th e p a rty at fault. The sta te mine inspector, th e public
w atchdog assigned to investigate all mine fatalities and to answ er questions
posed b y th e coroner's jury, also acted ou t of deference to corporate in te re sts
and com m on law in terp retatio n s, finding th e m iner guilty of in atten tiv en ess
and disregard for estab lish ed practices in at least on e-h alf of th e accidents
rep o rted . P rotected in th e courtroom by w o rk ers' fe a r of reprisal, th e mine
o p erato rs efffectively shifted responsibility fo r occupational injuries and
d eath onto th e m iner and his alleged "carelessness."
65
W ithout a doubt, w o rk e r carelessness am ong both v e te ra n s and
inexperienced m iners led to som e fata l mine accidents. W hen w orking
underground, a brief in sta n t of inatten tio n or disregard for safe w orking
procedures could be fatal, and long hours and trying physical circum stances
taxed th e w ariness of ev en th e m ost diligent m iner. Safe and p ru d e n t
practice req u ire d m iners to cover all ore chutes not in use, b u t m iners
occasionally ignored such precautions to save tim e, resu ltin g in unnecessary
accidents. For instance, a fte r eating his dinner, m iner Sam A dam ovitch
w alked into an u n protected chute in th e P ittsm ont Mine and fell eighty fe e t
to his death. The deceased m iner's p a rtn e r, M ark Simonich, testified th a t
both m iners w e re fully aw are of th e 20 x 14-inch un p ro tected hole, b u t th ey
ignored th e danger of an open chute. Had th e se m en ta k e n th e tim e to se t
dow n the 2 x 12-inch lagging as instructed, th is u nnecessary accident
probably could have b een p rev en ted .^
Ignoring safety regulations w hen riding th e cage to and from th e
surface occasionally resu lte d in tragedy. Philip H arrington h u rrie d ly left th e
1,600-foot level of th e Pilot B utte Mine to re trie v e som e blasting pow der
stored on th e 9 0 0 -foot level. In his ru sh to com plete th is task. H arrington
jum ped off th e deck four fe e t before reaching th e level platform , trapping
him self betw een th e deck and th e w all plate. Had th e m iner observed th e
districtw ide regulation req u irin g th e closure of th e cage safety gate, this
accident w ould not hav e occurred. Travelling a t an average speed of 800
fee t p er m inute, th e cage constituted a serious hazard to th e unw ary,
particularly to th e m an w ho ignored safe operating procedures.
Sim ilarly, th e n ip p er, th e person assigned to bring dull drill steel to
66
the surface for sharpening, assum ed responsiblity for securing any loose
tools before ascending. The com pany provided the n ip p er w ith a steel b o i
covered by a b ar and fasten e d to th e cage for safe tra n sp o rta tio n of tools to
th e surface. N ipper Thom as Houston, w orking in th e Gray Rock Mine,
ignored th e practice of securing tools before hoisting. He lost his life w hen a
loose drill steel caught in th e cage guide, knocking him off th e top deck.
Exam ination of th e cage afte r th e accident indicated th a t th e safety gate had
n ev er b een closed.^
Carelessness killed and in ju red both th e experienced m an and the
"greenhorn"; in fact, th e v e te ra n occasionally took chances th a t an
inexperienced m an cautiously avoided. For reasons unknow n. Thomas
R utter, a te n -y e a r v e te ra n of th e underground, craw led into th e bottom of a
chute in an a tte m p t to p ry loose som e d irt ra th e r th a n w orking the obstacle
loose from th e top. The d irt cam e loose, burying and suffocating th e
im p ru d en t m iner. W illiam Clyme. th e deceased m iner's p artn er, testified at
the coroner s in q u est th a t th is sort of indiscretion w as no t infrequent: "Men
som etim es risk a good deal w ith o u t thinking of th e danger attached to it ."4
Some experienced m iners fell victim to "battle fatigue" after fre q u e n t
confrontations w ith danger and developed an in sen sitiv ity to th e perils of
th eir w ork environm ent. P ete Novakovich w orked for fifteen y e ars
underg ro und in B utte before falling p rey to a m om ent of in atten tio n w hile
w orking at th e P ittsm ont Mine one w in te r evening in 1916. Novakovich and
his p a rtn e r Johnson noticed a dangerously loose hanging w all w h ere th ey
drilled on th e 1,200-foot level, and b y th e tim e Johnson re tu rn e d w ith some
stulls to shore up th e wall, Novakovich lay crushed by sev eral tons of rock,
67
pick in hand. According to Johnson, a b ar, not a pick, w as the pro p er tool to
use w h en picking dow n loose rock on a hanging wall. W ith a bar, th e
deceased could hav e accom plished his task from a safe distance, b u t he
ap p aren tly decided on th e pick as a m atter of convenience, ignoring p ru d en t
practices .5
Accidental falls and falling ground accounted for th e largest
percentage of m ine fatalities in Butte and oth er w e ste rn mining districts,
oftentim es caused b y w o rk e r in atten tiv en ess to hazards. Routine task s often
in sp ired carelessness, p articu larly among th e seasoned v eteran s. For th irty
years, E nglish-born Frank Upton w orked as a m iner, firs t in Nevada and th en
in Butte. Upton fell fo rty -fiv e fe e t dow n a m anw ay a fte r being knocked off
th e tw o-inch lagging he stood on by a falling rock. W ith his y e a rs of
experience underground, U pton ought have know n b e tte r th a n to stand over
an open m anw ay w hile prying dow n som e loose ground overhead. Perhaps
th e cold and dizziness th a t had b o th ered th e deceased for several w eeks
prior to th e accident clouded his judgem ent in Jan u ary 1897 at the High Ore
Mine. W hen asked b y th e shift boss Duggan if he w ould no t like to lay off
until he felt b e tter, Upton rep lied th a t h e "would w e a r it out" and th a t he did
not need anyone to give him orders. In th e inquest th a t follow ed Upton's
death, th e ju ry questioned his p a rtn e r Fitzgerald regarding th e w ork habits
of experienced m en and those of th e deceased in particular. Fitzgerald
testified th a t his p a rtn e r generally took m ore chances th a n a "greenhorn"
and th a t a good n u m b er of th e fata l accidents th a t occurred in th e High Ore
Mine could be a ttrib u te d to th e careless actions of v e te ran s.^ H undreds of
Butte m iners, v e te ra n s and new rec ru its alike, ap p eared as statistics along
68
w ith Frank Upton. In th e instances cited w o rk er carelessness contributed to
th ese fatal accidents, b u t th e re is evidence th a t op erato r negligence also
created dangers th a t led to accidents.
Butte m ine m anagers follow ed th e precedent set in oth er A m erican
industries: blam e th e w o rk e r for jo b -related injuries. A stu d y conducted in
a Lawrence, M assachusetts mill in 1905 a ttrib u te d 93 percent of th e
accidents th e re to w o rk e r carelessness, and th e courts' rulings in personal
in ju ry cases consistently upheld this contention in th e W est .7 The comm on
law dictum of "assumed risk," w hich stated th a t em ployees relinquished any
legal rig h t to com pensation fo r jo b -related injuries w h en th e y enlisted to
w ork in a dangerous occupation like mining: "contributory negligence" —any
negligence on th e p a rt of th e w o rk e r relieves th e ow ner from lia b ility -a n d
th e fellow servant" d o ctrin e— th e ow ner is n o t responsible for in ju ry of one
em ployee caused by th e carelessness of a n o th e r—shielded mining com panies
from th e personal in ju ry claim s filed b y th e fam ilies of m iners killed on th e
job. The m iner w as guilty of co n trib u to ry negligence "if he did not use th e
safest m eans, tim e and m ethods of accom plishing th e w o rk ."8 Given th ese
legal b arriers, it is not surprising th a t e v en p ru d e n t m iners seldom looked to
th e courts for com pensation concerning com pany negligence and com plicity
in fatal accidents and, instead, placed th e ir hope for recom pense in th e
collective action of organized labor.
While a few m iners cam e fo rth w ith testim o n y indicting the
com pany, th e ir pleas fo r ju st com pensation and prosecution of th e guilty
parties fell on deaf ears. Roy Rose, th e p a rtn e r of a tim b erm an w ho died
falling dow n a tw isted lad d e r th e th e Speculator Mine, accused th e N orth
69
Butte Mining Company of b la ta n t disregard for its w o rk e rs in his testim ony
before a coroner’s jury. Several tim es during th e w eek prior to th e fatal
accident, Rose and his p a rtn e r, a single Irishm an nam ed Nicholls, had w arn ed
th e shift boss about th e hazardous condition of th e lad d e r in th e m anw ay
th ey used for hoisting tim bers. The tim b e rm a n ’s w ork req u ire d th e use of
this fau lty la d d e r, b u t th e com pany did nothing to im prove conditions in the
m anw ay. The shift boss, W illiam McGuire, a ttrib u te d th e accident to th e
unavoidable circum stances caused b y copper w a te r dripping on th e ladder,
denying any previous know ledge of dam aged lad d e r rungs. In this case, as
in all b u t one of th e over tw o h u n d re d cases, th e coroner's ju ry judged th e
m iner guilty of carelessness, absolving mine m anagem ent of all
responsibility for em ployee safety. Roy Rose qu it th e Speculator Mine soon
after testifying against th e com pany, b u t th e m en w ho rem ained had to
ad ap t to th e com pany's obvious d isregard for em ployee w elfare. The w eek
following Nicholls s fata l fall, an o th er m iner sustained injuries w orking in the
sam e m anw ay.^
A lthough th e mining com panies rem ained v irtu a lly im m une from
liability for w o rk -re la te d accidents, it becam e m ore difficult to ignore th e
rising costs associated w ith m ine accidents. In 1918, ACM calculated th e loss
of 21,325 shifts during th e course of one y e a r due to personal injuries on the
job. T hat am ount of lost w ork tim e resu lte d in the production of tw o million
few er pounds of copper w hich tran sla te d into over $ 120,000 in lost profits.
Taken together, th e tim e lost to accidents w as eq u iv alen t to closing th e
largest Anaconda Company m ine for an e n tire m onth, w hich in tu rn affected
th e total am ount of m oney injected into th e local econom y, hurting m iners,
70
m erchants, and corporate investors alike. ^
Recognition of th ese financial
losses how ever, did little to rev e rse lax su pervisory habits th a t had
developed over th e y ears.
Expedience ra th e r th a n safety often dictated decisions concerning
mine developm ent and safety m anagem ent. Mine engineers often layed out
th e drifts w ith little consideration of potential hazards, such as protruding
electric trolley lines. A young ore car ten d e r n am ed M oran pushed an em p ty
ore tra in into a four-foot w ide d rift at th e 2,000-foot level of th e Speculator
w h en th e carbide lam p on top of his cap struck th e w ire at th e top of th e
drift, electrocuting him. Only five fe e t se p arated th e track from th e live
electric w ire carrying 500 volts, w hich re q u ire d th a t th e sw am per stoop
w h en he w alked directly u n d e rn e a th th e w ire. The mining com panies in
Butte norm ally installed side boards to protect th e m iner from electrocution,
b u t in this case, one side board w as missing. Had th e m ine engineer b een
considering th e safety of th e m en w orking underground, he w ould have
provided for a w id er and ta lle r d rift in o rd er to p re v e n t sim ilar accidents.
In this case, th e coroner’s ju ry found th e young im m igrant m iner guilty of
carelessness, relieving th e com pany of all responsibility for im proving
conditions and elim inating h a z a rd s .^
Even in th e ra re case of th e coroner’s ju ry pointing a finger at th e
com pany for negligence, nothing occurred in th e w ay of a re p rim an d of th e
guilty party. A m iner n am ed Earl Clayton died in th e Speculator from
asphyxiation after en terin g a slope w h ere th e air rem ain ed gaseous due to
blasting. In this case, th e ju ry found th e shift boss negligent for his failure
to ascertain w h e th e r th e previous crew had tu rn e d on th e air com pressor to
71
m ake th e w ork area safe a fte r blasting. According to w itnesses, th e shift
boss, Charles Erb 1failed to in vestigate th e air com pressor line after being
inform ed of its breakdow n, b u t his om ission ap p aren tly w e n t unpunished by
his superiors. I %
The d eath of Earl Clayton w as n e ith er th e first nor th e last fatal mine
accident th a t occurred a t th e Speculator Mine because of Ia i supervision and
in atten tio n to p ru d e n t m ining practices. On th e evening of June 8th, 1917,
ten m en w orked to low er 1,200 fe e t of lead -arm o red electrical cable dow n
th e Granite M ountain shaft of th e Speculator. The cable finally reached its
destination at th e 2,600-foot level, b u t not before som e arm or to re off,
leaving oily insulation exposed u n d e rn e a th th e lead arm or. A fter putting in
an eig h teen -h o u r shift, th e m en rep o rte d th e incident to th e assistant
fo rem an and head ed hom e, com pletely un aw are of th e im pending tragedy.
The carbide light of a shift boss w ho inspected th e dam aged cable ignited th e
oily insulation at approxim ately 11:30 p.m. W ithin fifteen m inutes, th e fire
ro ared dow n th e shaft, trap p in g h u n d red s of men. The deadly sm oke and
gases rapidly spread into th e adjacent Speculator sh aft and th e connected
w orkings of th e Diamond and th e Badger State Mines. One h u n d red and
sixty-four m iners suffocated in th e Speculator fire, a trag e d y th a t could have
b een av erted through g re a te r vigilance b y m a n a g e m e n t.
On th e m orning of June 9th, n ew sp ap er headlines bew ailed the
enorm ous loss of life and h e ra ld ed th e courage of m ine rescu e rs and
survivors. O verw helm ed b y grief, n e ith e r ob serv ers nor com m entators
tackled th e m ore difficult task of investigating th e causes of th e disaster. An
in q u iry conducted by th e U S. Bureau of Mines som e fo u r y e a rs later pointed
72
to a m ultiplicity of problem s. W hile th e study's author, Daniel Harrington,
acknow ledged th e skill and efficiency of m ine rescue crew s, he also pointed
o u t th e inadequacy of th e fo u r signal system s w hich all failed w ithin fifteen
m inutes of th e fire's ignition. It ap p eared th a t although th e m en low ering
th e cable had ta k e n p ro p er precautions, th e su p erv iso r w ho allowed them to
w ork for eighteen hours (ten hours beyond a sta n d ard shift) dem o n strated
poor judgem ent. W hile th e fed e ra l g o v ernm ent-authorized investigation
rev ealed th e need for concrete-lined shafts, a fire-p ro o f signal system , and a
b e tte r m eans of regulating air flow b e tw een connecting m ines, it totally
ignored th e overriding problem of supervision and a tten tio n to proper
p ro c e d u re s .^
A d isaster th e m agnitude of th e Speculator fire particularly
w ren ch ed th e B utte com m unity, b u t less d ram atic accidents occurred
reg u larly w ith o u t fan fare. In 1916 ACM re p o rte d th e in ju ry of over 2,300
men. T hat sam e y ear, th irty -se v e n m en suffered p e rm a n en t disabilities
such as th e loss of an eye, finger, arm , or leg. W ith th e passage of W orkm en's
Com pensation in 1915, th e am ount of com pensation paid by th e state v aried
w ith th e injury: loss of a th u m b paid $150 and loss of an ey e paid $ 2,750 ,
eq u iv alent to less th a n tw o y e a r's w ages .14 Prior to th e ad v en t of sta te
com pensation, th e p erm a n en tly disabled m iner and his fam ily faced a grim
fu tu re; if he w as fo rtu n a te or w ell-connected or loyal, th e com pany m ight
offer him a position as w atch m an or tim ek eep er. W ith th e passage of
W orkm en's Com pensation, a disabled m iner m ight be re tra in e d as a
bookkeeper or clerk. The av ailablity of those positions, how ever, v a rie d and
a clerk's salary am ounted to only about o ne-half of th a t paid to a m iner. As
73
graphic evidence of th e freq u e n cy and e x ten t of p erm an en tly disabling
injuries an ad for th e A lbert B oettcher Artificial Limb M anufacturer
ap p eared in th e 1916 B utte City Directory. A m putees on th e stre ets of Butte
provided th e city s citizens a vivid rem in d er of m ining's dangers, b u t victim s
of th e most serious occupational hazard, silica dust, rem ain ed invisible.15
A re sp ira to ry epidem ic of m ajor proportions afflicted Butte m iners,
w ith o u t reg ard for th e ir experience or th e care w ith w hich th ey perform ed
th e ir w ork. Over 40 p ercen t of th e 1,000 m iners exam ined in 1914 had
im paired h ealth due to a v a rie ty of re sp ira to ry diseases: silicosis,
tuberculosis, or a condition know n as "m iners' consum ption." W hile mine
fires and pow der explosions c ap tu red th e local headlines, th e m iner faced a
m uch m ore severe and subtle danger in th e silica d u st th a t filled th e air
u n derground and th e ir lungs. B etw een 1907 and 1913 only 279 m en died
from m ine-related accidents w hile 675 m iners succum bed to some form of
lung disease .16 The causes of and cures for m iners' consum ption had long
b een know n and studied in o th e r mining districts, b u t th e problem grew to
disastrous proportions in B utte before th e legislature enacted regulations to
contain th e disease.
According to B utte surgeon Dr. Edward McGinn, m iners' consum ption
w as caused by a scarification of th e lungs, w hich red u ced a m an's resistance
and vitality, leaving him susceptible to tuberculosis .1^
In o th er w ords, th e
silica d u st g en erated b y drilling, blasting, and loading th e ore not only
clogged th e m iners lungs, b u t it also dam aged th e ir lung tissue, creating a
fertile e n v iro n m en t for pneum onia and tuberculosis. Long before th e Butte
surgeon s o b serv atio n s— as e a rly as 1850— th e English no ted problem s w ith
74
mine d u st and silicosis. T hirty y e a rs before th e w id esp read A m erican use of
th e m achine drill, over h alf th e m iners in Cornwall succum bed to silicosis
and by 1887, th e English S an itary Congress publicly recognized th e
problem . I & A stu d y conducted on A ustralian m iners using th e m achine
drill in th e Bendigo d istrict b etw een 1875 and 1906 cited an alarm ing
increase in lu n g -related fatalities, an increase from 77 p er 10,000
in h ab itan ts to 191 p er 10,000 in h a b ita n ts .^
R espiratory diseases also
plagued th e gold m iners of South Africa and, as early as 1912, th e
governm ent enacted a law to com pensate w hite m iners disabled by
occupational diseases such as m iners' consum ption and silicosis.
In terestingly enough, m iners and m ine ow ners sh ared th e cost of th e
program .20
B utte mine ow ners' resp o n se to th e dangers of mine dust
lagged fa r behind th e ir p eers in Europe and Africa.
The e arliest g o v ern m en t studies of A m erican m ines revealed a
serious h ealth problem m uch b ro ad er th a n officials anticipated. The Public
Health Service, u n d e r th e direction of A.J. Lanza, first exam ined lead m iners
in Joplin, Missouri, in 1914. An unusually high tu b ercu lin d eath
r a te —237.45 per 100,000 for th e y e a rs 1911 to 1916, or tw ice th e national
av erag e—led resea rch e rs to B utte afte r th e Joplin study.
In occurrence of
fatal re sp ira to ry disease, B utte ra n k e d above N ew ark, New Jersey; Gary,
Indiana; and all oth er cities in M ontana including th e sm elter city of
Anaconda.^ * T hree d ifferen t stu d ie s—th e firs t conducted b y th e Silver Bow
County H ealth D epartm ent in 1912 and th e last tw o p erfo rm ed by fed eral
in v estig ato rs—focused on th e B utte m iner and his predisposition to
re sp ira to ry disease.
All th re e concurred: conditions und erg ro u n d coupled
75
w ith u n san itary living conditions above ground had created an epidem ic of
pulm onary fatalities am ong m iners betw een th e ages of th irty and
sixty 22
Significantly, th e m iner had no control over th e conditions th a t p recipitated
this u nforseen hazard in th e B utte mines, and for y e a rs m anagem ent refu sed
to acknowledge th e source of th e problem .
A debate e n su ed am ong doctors, com pany officials, and union m en
over th e source of th e debilitating resp ira to ry diseases. Mine m anagers
seem ed anxious to point to th e overcrow ded boarding houses and th e
u n san itary "foreign elem ent" w ho occupied them . The m ajority of th e
doctors stood behind ACM in th is regard, linking disease w ith th e squalor
found in w orking-class neighborhoods. According to th e m edical
practitioners w ho w e re led b y Dr. T.D. T uttle of th e S tate Tuberculosis
Hospital at Deer Lodge, th e m iner contracted tuberculosis because of
excessive drinking and th e u n sa n ita ry condition of his hom e environm ent.
But re le v a n t statistics challenged th ese conclusions. B etw een 1907 and 1913
housew ives, living in th e w orking-class neighborhoods h a rd e st h it by
tuberculosis, accounted for only four percent of th e fatalities, indicating th a t
circum stances beyond th e hom e en v iro n m en t lay at th e root of th e
tuberculosis
epicemic.23
M iners, no t store clerks, contracted th e dread
disease; its origins w e re occupational ra th e r th a n dom estic.
The Silver Bow County H ealth D epartm ent stu d y plotted th e 526
tu b ercu lin death s th a t occurred b etw een 1908 and 1912 on a city m ap
w hich show ed th a t 7 1 p e rc en t of th ese deaths occurred in an are a outlined
b y a M altese cross, coincidentally a neighborhood populated principally b y
Irish m iners and th e ir fam ilies. The Irish m iner bore th e b u rd e n of this
76
occupational disease, incurring over 50 percent of th e death s as com pared to
only 2 p ercent for th e Italian com m unity and 8 percent for those of Finnish
descent. This graphic illu stratio n of th e disease’s origins led county h ealth
inspectors to a m ore careful exam ination of und erg ro u n d conditions. The
inspectors m onitored air and w a te r a t each w orking level of te n different
mines, and th ey concluded th a t tu b ercu lin germ s existed in g reatest
n u m b ers in th e m ine tu n n els w h ere d ry air persisted. Germs prospered in
mines, like th e M ountain Con Mine, w h e re in ad eq u ate v entilation allowed
silica dust to rem ain in th e air. The absence of to ilet cars and covered m etal
w a te r containers thro u g h o u t alm ost all of th e B utte und erg ro u n d provided
another conduit for tu b ercu lin germ s. The resu lts of th e stu d y p o rtray ed th e
M ountain Con Mine as th e m ost dangerous w ork e n v iro n m en t and, since th e
M ountain Con had alw ays h ired th e Irish to th e exclusion of oth er
nationalities, th e high tu b ercu lin m o rtality ra te am ong Irish m iners bore out
th e stu d y's conclusion
Scientific evidence, how ever, did not d a u n t ACM efforts to shift th e
blam e to th e m iners them selves. According to th e testim o n y offered by th e
Anaconda Company's Con Kelley to a congressional com m ittee on in d u strial
relations convened in B utte in 1914, th e m iner did not contract th e often
deadly tuberculosis in th e A naconda m ines because th e hygienic pro p erties
of th e sulphuric acid in th e m ine w a te rs actually d estroyed tuberculin
germ s. Kelley pointed to th e m iner's w ay of life as th e p rim a ry cause of
tuberculosis.^^
The h e alth d e p a rtm e n t's graphic depiction of w orking-class
neighborhoods th ro u g h photographs and description len t som e credence to
Kelley's indictm ent of living conditions. Ironically, successful com pany
77
lobbying efforts to exclude th ese neighborhoods and adjacent m ineyards
from th e city lim its, depriving m iners' fam ilies of m unicipal services such as
sewage and garbage rem oval, c o n trib u ted to th e squalor th a t Kelley
abhorred in his testim ony. Clearly, tuberculin m icrobes m ultiplied in
Centerville and Dublin Gulch w h e re single m iners crow ded into poorly
v en tilated room s w ith o u t ad eq u ate toilet or food p rep a ratio n facilities. For
exam ple, te n people sh ared one sleeping room and an outside toilet at 1817
S. Dakota, disposing of slops and d ish w ater th ro u g h a hole in th e floor. Cows
and chickens free ly w a n d ere d th e backyards in th ese neighborhoods; cases
of tuberculosis w e n t u n reported; and landlords n e v e r p ro p erly disinfected
th e room s contam inated by c a rriers of th e infectious disease .26 While
in ad eq u ate sanitation co n trib u ted to th e sp read of tuberculosis in Butte's
w orking-class neighborhoods, th e origins of th e disease d eriv ed from th e
lung-dam aging d u st g en erated b e n ea th th e stre e ts of Butte.
Both European and A m erican m edical studies conclusively linked
resp ira to ry tro u b les w ith d ry drilling, a practice th a t p ersisted in th e
A m erican W est e v en afte r 1916. Controlling d u st re p re se n te d th e k ey to
arresting th e crippling re sp ira to ry diseases th a t ravaged B utte m iners ev en
prior to th e introduction of th e m achine drill. In 1890, several y e a rs before
m achines replaced h a n d drills, six ty -th re e B utte m iners succum bed to
re sp ira to ry disease, approxim ately eight tim es th e n u m b er w ho died
accidentally underground. Despite th e direct connection b e tw ee n d ry
drilling and lung dam age and th e availability of altern ativ es. ACM did not
in stitu te a system of w e t drilling thro u g h o u t its m ines u n til 1925.2^
And
once th a t technology becam e available, some m iners refu sed to w ork in th e
78
muck and dam p c reated by th e m achine, sw itching off th e w a te r sp ray
w h en ev er possible.
R esearchers identified o th er m eans in addition to w e t drilling for
controlling th e sp read of debilitating pulm onary ailm ents.
Mining
com panies in A ustralia, South Africa, and Great Britain dem o n strated
reasonable success using a series of physical e ia m s as a p rereq u isite to
hiring in o rd er to determ in e a m iner's predisposition to silicosis or
tuberculosis. Studies had show n th a t a m iner w ith tuberculosis becam e a
prim e candidate for silicosis. Outside America, m iners received physicals at
in terv als of s ii and tw elve m onths. The mining com panies tre a te d those
w ith sym ptom s of tuberculosis for th e disease and reliev ed them of th eir
duties until no longer contagious. The system of p re-em p lo y m en t physicals
m et unified resistance in A m erican m ines from both labor and m anagem ent.
M iners unions called th e plan discrim inatory, and m ine m anagers resen te d a
policy th a t gave an unfair com petitive advantage to those w ho did not
particip ate .28 W ith th e introduction of a "rustling card " system , a
m echanism designed to w eed o u t labor radicals b y granting th e com pany
e itr a o r din ary discretion in hiring, m iners raised v e h e m e n t objections to any
additional system th a t em pow ered th e com pany to link hiring and firing
w ith an em ployee's h e a lth or political associations. Rejection of this new
plan for disease identification and prev en tio n left Butte m iners w ith o u t a
m eans of stopping th e sp read of disease.
Even w ith o u t p re-em p lo y m en t screening and w et-drilling, a good
n u m b er of d eath s could hav e b een p re v e n ted w ith p ro p er medical care.
County h e alth official Dr. C. H. H orst a ttrib u te d th e sp read of tuberculosis
79
w ith in th e mining com m unity to in ad eq u ate tre a tm e n t. Even w h en early
signs of tuberculosis d rew th e atten tio n of doctors serving th e m iners,
tre a tm e n t did not follow. In fact, th e tw o hospitals serving injured or sick
m iners sent all m en w ith contagious diseases hom e fo r care. Doctors in Butte
n ev er recom m ended tre a tm e n t on initial diagnosis b u t w aited until the
disease gained enough of a foothold th a t th e afflicted m an could be sent to
th e state tuberculosis s a n ita r iu m .^
The M ontana S tate Tuberculosis
Sanitarium , established at W arm Springs in 1912 after y e a rs of p e rsisten t
lobbying from th e B utte legislative delegation, provided th e b est tre a tm e n t
possible w ith its m eager budget, sm all staff, and large caseload of tu b ercu lar
Butte m iners. The A naconda Com pany contributed $25,000 to sanitarium
building construction, b u t it w ould be 1946 before th e com pany agreed to
com pensate th e victim s of occupationally-caused silicosis
-
In an effo rt to h a lt th e rising n u m b er of fatalities, th e Silver Bow
County H ealth D epartm ent cam e fo rth w ith a series of recom m endations for
change in local w orking and living conditions as w ell as care of those
afflicted w ith re sp ira to ry diseases. Suggestions included installation and
reg u lar inspection of toilet cars and m etal-covered drinking containers in all
mines; e ia m in a tio n of all em ployees for tuberculosis and dism issal of all
those carrying th e disease; and e n actm en t of law s to g u aran tee sanitary
living conditions and strict en forcem ent of ru les regarding th e reporting of
tu b ercu lin cases. The local rep o rt, how ever, ignored th e issues of m ine d u st
and pro per ventilation, v irtu a lly excusing th e com pany from any obligation
for th e elim ination of th e m ost sev ere occupational h a z a rd .3 1 According to a
rep o rt b y Bureau of M ines Inspector Lanza, technological solutions to B utte's
80
problem s w ith m ine d u st existed. Lanza pointed to B ritish success w ith w e t
drilling and th e advances m ade b y Am erican coal mining com panies w ith
ventilation 32
W hile im proved sanitation b oth above and below ground
beginning in 1916 and p re v e n tativ e medical procedures v irtu a lly elim inated
tuberculosis as an occupational hazard, problem s w ith silicosis prevailed as
long as m en w o rk ed und erg ro u n d in Butte.
B etw een 1880 and 1920, th e cost of producing a ton of copper ore
declined w hile th e h u m an costs tallied in extracting th a t o re soared. Until
1915. th e mining com panies successfully used th e courts, th e legislature, and
economic intim idation to avoid sharing responsibility for m ine fatalities and
injuries. The passage of th e M ontana State W orkm en’s Com pensation Act in
1915 signalled a change in th e public a ttitu d e to w ard w o rk e rs and their
corporate em ployers. As th e public becam e m ore sy m p ath etic to th e plight
of in d u strial w orkers, corporate mine m anagers looked to w ard conciliation
ra th e r th an confrontation as a m eans of enhancing th e ir public im age and
protecting th e ir capital in v estm en ts from costly w o rk stoppages and
personal in ju ry suits. In 1917, a fte r several y e a rs of in ten se labor strife
b etw een m iners and m anagers over w orking conditions and w ages, th e
editor of A naconda's safety magazine, The Anode, described th e changing
corporate a ttitu d e w ith an editorial reprim anding m ine m anagers for
continually blam ing th e m iner for accidents in th e absence of proper
supervision. According to th e editor, A S. Richardson, accidents reflected on
th e mine forem an's know ledge of mining and his skill as an in stru cto r and
exam ple to his employees.33
Jn 1890, mine m anagers refu sed to
acknow ledge any com plicity for diseases or injuries contracted in th e w ork
81
place. Richardson's rem a rk s signalled change. At th e sam e tim e, change did
not occur w ith o u t struggle. The origins of legislation to protect the m iner at
w ork and his fam ily in th e e v e n t of an accident cam e only through the
concerted efforts b y organized labor. W orkm en's Com pensation legislation
re p re se n te d a significant step to w ard s g rea ter corporate responsibility for
im proving u n derground w orking conditions, b y m aking th e mining com pany
liable for th e costs associated w ith w o rk e r com pensation.
82
ENDNOTES
1. Carl Gersuny, W ork H azards and In d u strial Conflict (Hanover: U niversity
P ress of New EnglandV 1981), 20 .
2. In q u est No. 8 0 9 8 ," Sam Adam ovitch," 31 Ja n u ary 1 9 1 7 ,11 and 12.
3. In q u est No. 8246, "Thomas Houston," 31 October 1917,13-19.
4. In q u est No. 2174, "Thomas Rutter," 12 N ovem ber 1 8 9 8 ,1 2 and 19.
5. In q u est No. 8065. "Pete Novakovich," 2 Decem ber 1 9 1 6 ,7 -8 .
6 . In q u est No. 1 6 13," Frank Upton," 9 Jan u ary 1897.
7. Gersuny, W ork Hazards. 25.
8 . M ark W ym an, Hard Rock E pic W estern M iners and th e In d u strial
Revolution. 18 6 0 -1 9 1 0 (Berkeley: U niversity nf Califr^rnia P tpsV I QTQl
120-123.
9. In q u est No. 8593. "Robert Nicholls," 31 D ecem ber 1 9 1 9 ,9 and 52.
10. The Anode. S eptem ber 1918 I
11. In q u est No. 7 9 8 5 ," A rm idis Moran," 6 June 1 9 1 6 ,1 6 -2 0 .
12. In q u est No. 3 9 5 4 ," Earl Clayton," 20 July 1 9 0 6 ,3 1 .
13. Daniel H arrington, "Lessons From th e Granite M ountain Shaft Fire, Butte,"
US. B ureau of M ines BuHetin 188 (W ashington: GPO, 1922), 15-16; 32.
14. Second An nual Report. M ontana In d u strial Accident Board (Helena:
In d ep e n d en t Pubhshing Co., 19 17), 109-113.
15. G.S. Rice & R.R. Sayers, "Review of Safety and H ealth Conditions in th e
Mines a t Butte," U.S. B ureau of M ines BuUetm 2S7 (W ashington: GPO, 1925),
16. U.S. Commission on In d u strial Relations, Mining Conditions and
In d u strial Relations at B utte. M ontana. Senate Docum ent 41 5 , 64th Congress,
1st session, 1915, Final R eport & Testim ony, VoL IV, 3960. [H ereafter cited
as Commons Commission Report.")
83
17
A rthur Cecil Todd, The Cornish M iner in Am erica (Truro, Cornwall: D
Bradford Barton Ltd., 1967), 17.
'
18. Frederick L. Hoffman, M ortality From R espiratory Diseases in Dusty
Trades, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 231. Hygiene Series 17
(W ashington: GPO, 1918), 336^
•
19. Ibid., 332.
0^ 1aI 101Ld eriv ed from th e US. Bureau of Census.
4 2 % % - 9 7 ^ ^ * ' 9 ^' 17lh A nnual ReP°rt. (W ashington: GPO11918),
f ^' S ta tistic a l inform ation is available on m in e-related re sp ira to ry fatalities
fOr 1Butte in th e Commons Commission Report of 1914." w hich show s a high
of 190 tu b ercu lin deaths in 1913, of w hich 72 p ercen t could be a ttrib u te d to
m iners. According to th e stu d y conducted by Lanza and H arrington for the
Bureau of Mines and published in U.S. Bureau of M ines Bulletin 7%7 th e y e a r
1919 recorded a high of 223 d eath s a ttrib u te d to re sp ira to ry disease.
22. "Commons Commission Report," 3838-3841.
23. Silver Bow County Health D epartm ent, "Report on Investigation of
S am tanr Conditions in Mines, and of Conditions u n d er w hich M iners L iv e "
Silver Bow County, 1908-12" Small Collections 89, M ontana State Historical
Condition^ f n 3’ ^ o ntana
(H ereafter cited as "Report on Sanitary
24. Ibid., 3; 11-15.
25. "Commons Commission Report," 3719.
26. "Report on S anitary Conditions," 1- 4 .
2 7 v . in f?rm a tion on re sp ira to ry disease fatalities g a th e red from death
certificates for 1890 located in th e B utte-Silver Bow Clerk & Recorder's
Office. Inform ation on th e a d v en t of w et-drilling in th e B utte underground
derived from Rice & Sayers, "Review of Safety and H ealth Conditions."
28. Rice & Sayers, 20.
29. "Commons Commission Report," 3849-50.
30. Engineering & Minine lournal 93 (29 June 1912): 1289.
3 1. "Report on S anitary Conditions," 2 1.
84
32 A.J. Lanza, "Prevention of Illness Among Employees in Mines,"
In stitu te of Minina Engineers Bulletin 147 (I M arch 1919), 436-7.
33. The Anode. M arch 1 9 1 7 ,1.
85
Chapter 5
THE STRUGGLE TO IMPROVE UNDERGROUND WORKING CONDITIONS
Early tw e n tie th -c e n tu ry Butte m iners faced num erous dangers
underground and grave financial fu tu re s if th e y w ere injured on th e job.
The Iaissez faire a ttitu d e tow ards corporate negligence in th e w ork place
adopted b y the M ontana courts left the disabled m iner, or in th e case of a
fatal accident, th e w idow and h e r children, to fen d for them selves. To
protect them selves from econom ic h ardship caused b y accidents
underground th e m iners joined together u n d er th e union b a n n er to provide
for one another b y responding to fam ily needs in th e e v e n t of an accident.
The Butte M iners’ Union also petitioned the state legislature for laws to
im prove w orking conditions and to provide financial assistance to m iners
injured on the job. Over a period of tw en ty -six y e a rs lobbying from Butte
m in ers’ unions p rom pted passage of m ore strin g en t law s governing
u n derground conditions, culm inating in 1915 in a w o rk m en s com pensation
law. providing b en efits for those h u rt in in d u strial accidents.
While
w o rkm en's com pensation im proved the econom ic circum stances of some
injured m iners, and new regulations pertaining to v e n tilatio n and sanitation
helped im prove som e w orking conditions, enlightened legislation did not halt
underground injuries or fatalities. The new com pensation law provided at
least a m easure of relief to th e m iner ab sen t in previous M ontana legal
■i
■
-
opinions th a t d epended on p reced en t established b y n in etee n th cen tu ry
English com m on law.
From th e v an tag e point of th e courts, th e plight of th e injured Butte
86
copper m iner in th e 1880s resem b led th a t of th e English in d u strial w o rk er of
fifty y e ars earlier. In 1837, an English railroad w o rk e r sued his em ployer
for a job-related injury, accusing his boss of negligence. The judge blam ed
the m an's in ju ry on a fellow w o rk e r's negligence, th e re b y exonerating th e
railroad and establishing a legal preced en t im itated in A m erican courts for
th e next sixty y ears. During th e early y e a rs of industrialization legislators
sought to protect in d u strialists from any litigation w hich m ight h a lt the
fo rw ard m om entum of th e national economy. C onsequently, legislators
assum ed th a t if railroads had to pay for all dam ages caused "by accident, '
th e in d u stry and su b seq u en tly th e national econom y, could be p erm an en tly
crippled. I The M ontana courts follow ed precedent, ignoring pleas for
com pensation from injured B utte m iners out of deference to th e state's m ajor
in d u stry . The injured m iner, left w ith o u t th e m eans to e a rn his livelihood,
tu rn e d to fellow m iners fo r financial aid and support.
B utte m iners organized b oth to dem and higher w ages and to protect
them selves from th e h azard s of th e w ork place and th e econom ic pitfalls of
in d u strial accidents. At first, m iners w alked off th e job to protest w age cuts.
On June 13, 1878, th e B utte W orkingm en's Union staged a w alkout over
w age cuts at M arcus Daly's Alice Mine and a t A.J. Davis' n e a rb y Lexington.
Union leaders, m en w ho m ade th e ir w ay to th e B utte silver m ines from the
w ell-organized N evada Comstock, reasoned th a t all w o rk ers, m iners, and
laborers ought to organize to g u aran tee a united fro n t in disputes over w ages
and conditions. Twice, in 1882, in a sta te m e n t of purpose for th e Butte
M iners Union, and in 1893, w ith th e form ation of th e W estern Federation of
M iners, union organizers recognized th e hazardous n a tu re of th e ir occupation
and upheld th e doctrine of eq u al pay for all und erg ro u n d w orkers, both th e
87
unskilled m ucker and th e experienced d riller .2 Unions played on the them es
of brotherhood and w o rk e r solidarity in th eir struggles to secure a safe w ork
place. The Knights of Labor, a national organization of w o rk e rs th a t included
m iners, cham pioned a slogan th a t appealed to m en doing hazardous w ork
like mining: "Injury to one is th e concern of all."3
In recognizing the h e alth and safety hazards in h e re n t in th eir w ork
and th e indifference show n b y m ine ow ners and th e gov ern m en t to th eir
situation, m iners' unions in stitu ted benefit program s to aid th e sick, the
injured, and fam ilies of th e deceased. The B utte M iners' Union paid the
injured or sick m iner $10 a w eek. To fam ilies of w o rk ers killed on th e job,
th e union paid up to $90 in fu n era l expenses. In 1896, th e B utte M iners'
Union paid out a total of $ 2 9 ,0 0 0 .: In one fifte en -m o n th period betw een
1910 and 1912 th e union co n trib u ted $114,000 in b en efits to m em bers.^
In
contrast, mine ow ners ignored sick or injured em ployees, except to in stitu te
a m onthly pay deduction of one dollar from m iners to cover hospital care in
th e e v en t of an accident.^
Local fra te rn a l organizations also offered b en efits to care for th eir
m em bers. The A ncient O rder of H ibernians (AOH)1an Irish organization
com posed of large n u m b ers of m iners, paid its in ju red or sick m em bers $8
w eek ly for a total of th irte e n w eeks. Fifty cents covered th e m onthly
m em bership fee. T hat th e H ibernians cared for th e ir ow n is clear from th e
exam ple of Jerem iah H urley. H urley died in th e m ines, leaving his w ife and
children to provide for them selves.
In addition to th e reg u lar AOH d eath
benefits, th e H ibernians m ade a cash donation to th e w idow and th e n offered
h e r a janitorial job at th e H ibernian Hall.* The G erm an Benevolent Society,
th e Scandinavian B rotherhood, th e Sons of Croatia, th e Italian Benevolent
88
Society, and the A ustrian St. Joseph Society also offered th e ir m em bers
h ealth b e n e f its /
The stead y rise in fatalities, disabling injuries, and
occupational diseases in th e e a rly tw e n tieth c en tu ry taxed th e lim ited
financial resources of th e m iners' union and fra te rn a l organizations, creating
a dem and for governm ent com pensation for in d u strial accidents and
providing an im petus to im prove hazardous w orking conditions. Cutting the
n u m b er of hours sp en t in th e inhospitable underground constituted th e first
step to w ards im proving conditions.
The fight for an eig h t-h o u r day constituted a m ajor issue in the
union’s cam paign to im prove underground w orking conditions. As early as
1867, hardrock m iners in th e Comstock gained th e concession of an
eight-hour day from mine m anagers at a daily w age of $4. The cam paign in
M ontana began at th e sta te constitutional convention in 1889, w h en th e
Butte M iners’ Union dem anded a sh o rter w ork day on th e basis of higher
productivity. Although initial effo rts failed, th e m iners continued to press
th e ir case. During th e 1 8 9 1 legislative session, a bill to in stitu te an
eig h t-hour day failed by a v o te of th irty -o n e to tw en ty -o n e, largely because
of a w arning delivered on th e legislative floor by William Penrose, ed ito r of
The Mining lournal and a re p re se n ta tiv e from Silver Bow County, th a t a
sh o rter w ork day w ould ultim ately lead to m ine closures th a t w ould p u t
tho u sands of m iners ou t of w ork.* The issue re a p p e a re d in a bill introduced
by a Socialist sm elter w o rk e r n am ed M G. O’M alley in 1897. The A ttorney
General drew up a bill calling for an eig h t-h o u r day; it passed th e House th e
last day of th e session b u t failed afte r ending up in th e w rong Senate
com m ittee. For his efforts, th e A naconda Com pany fired O’M a lle y /
William
A. Clark, a candidate for th e United States Senate and m ajor B utte copper
89
mine ow ner, w ho w as anxious to gain th e su p p o rt of organized labor, joined
w ith A ugustus F. Heinze, an in d ep e n d en t m ine ow ner of prom inence, to
in stitu te th e eig h t-h o u r day in th e ir Butte mines. This action actually
affected only a sm all portion of B utte m iners, since th e larg est local mine
operator, A m algam ated, refu sed to cooperate. Even though th e 1901
legislature passed a bill introduced by Silver Bow County m iner J.J. Quinn,
th e law rem ained unenforced until 1905 w hen A m algam ated finally adopted
an eig ht-hour w ork day in all of its m ines .10
The m iners assum ed th a t a sh o rter w ork day u nderground w ould
lead to a h ealth ier w ork force, b u t as th e te n -y e a r struggle for an eig h t-h o u r
day advanced, so did th e d e p th of th e m ines and th e n u m b er of m iners
w orking underground, creating associated v e n tilatio n and sanitation
problem s. R espiratory ailm ents increased dram atically w ith th e expanded
use of th e m achine drill, th e increasing heat, and th e lack of fre sh air in th e
deep Butte slopes. During a tw o -y ea r period beginning in 1906, alm ost th re e
tim es as m any m en died of re sp ira to ry disease as of fa ta l accidents. By
1911, th e shocking n u m b er of B utte m iners succum bing to tuberculosis and
m iners' consum ption cam e to th e atten tio n of G overnor Edwin Norris. The
governor selected a legislative com m ittee to in vestigate conditions in Butte
and to enact law s to p rotect th e safety and w ell-being of m iners .11 A fter
inspecting th e Leonard, W est Colusa, and Pennsylvania M ines as guests of
ACM, Senator LA. Leighton of Jefferson County generally defended com pany
practices:
I can say th a t in our inspection to d ay w e found no place w h e re a
m an could not w ork in com parative ease and safety. Of course, in view of
th e w ork th e re m ust n ecessarily be som e places th a t are not altogether
desirable ."12 In th e language of th e ir re p o rt to th e w hole, th e com m ittee
90
avoided an y condem nation of conditions in ACM m ines. The com m ittee
rep o rted : "We find th e com panies of B utte are doing all in th e ir pow er to
p erfect th e ir v e n tilatio n a n d sa n ita ry conditions and a re n o t sp arin g expense
in doing so." In F e b ru ary , P.J. Duffy of Silver Bow County in tro d u c ed a
m easure th a t u ltim ately did little to a lter conditions. House Bill 3 9 2 m ade it
th e d u ty of th e m ine o p e ra to r "to provide w h e re necessary, feasible, and
practicable, a suitable an d practical m ethod for v e n tila tin g .. . The sam e
policy applied to providing to ile t arran g em e n ts and protecting m anw ays,
chutes, and w inzes w ith g u a rd ra ils. A ny corporation failing to com ply w ith
th ese new regulations w a s g u ilty of a m isdem eanor, p u n ish ab le b y a
m axim um fin e of $ 250.13
A lthough som e o p e ra to rs saw v e n tila tio n as
im proving w o rk e rs' p ro d u c tiv ity and v o lu n ta rily chose to install large
rev ersib le fans, th e v a g u e n e ss of th e language and th e triv ia l fin e m ade th is
n ew law v irtu a lly u n enforceable.
As struggles o v e r th e e ig h t-h o u r d ay and v e n tila tio n an d san itatio n
practices d e m o n stra te d , legislation alone could n o t a lte r w orking conditions.
Mining com panies ignored law s as long as g o v e rn m e n t e n fo rc em e n t and
oversight rem a in e d w e ak .
As e a rly as 1888, m iners p etitio n e d th e
territo ria l leg islatu re fo r a public agency to o v ersee m ine o p eratio n s. Mine
su p e rin te n d en ts re siste d th e cre atio n of such a n agency. Finally, in 1889, th e
legislature e stab lish ed th e s ta te m ine insp ecto r's office. But fro m th e o u tse t
th e office w as u n d e r-s ta ffe d and w ith o u t sufficient a u th o rity to p ro secu te
offenders of sta te m ining law . For exam ple, as D eputy M ine In sp ecto r
T rev a rth e n re p o rte d in 1889, getting o p e ra to rs to com ply w ith law s
regarding v e n tilatio n w a s n e a rly im possible in light of existing law s:
91
A com pany m ay ru n a d rift one thousand feet from th e
shaft w ith no air except com pressed air w hich escapes from
a drilling m achine. Men w ith fam ilies are placed h e re to
w ork and m any are bro u g h t to th e surface insensible, and all
th a t can be done according to law is to in stru ct th e agent to
secure b e tte r v e n tilatio n and tru s t to th e ir generous h e arts
to get th e w ork done. If no one is suffocated to d eath by the
poor a i r .. . th e n th e y are fre e from th e Iawjt and y e t it is
daily bringing m en to a p re m a tu re g ra v e .14
While state law re q u ire d th e sta te inspector to v isit each mining p ro p erty
y e arly and re p o rt on its condition, th e legislature authorized a staff of tw o to
oversee 13,000 mining claim s statew ide. According to th e sta te 's first
inspector, G.C. Swallow, e v en if only one in tw e n ty of th ese claim s req u ire d
inspection, th e task w ould still be im possible. F urtherm ore, Swallow
com plained in his firs t rep o rt, y e a rly inspection did nothing to p rotect th e
m iner from hazards. The u n realistic w orkload m eant he and his d ep u ty could
only tak e th e tim e to inspect an operation afte r an
accident.
For exam ple, during his y e a rly v isit th e in sp ecto r— appointed to his
post by th e g o v ern o r—w as expected to note any unsafe conditions and
re p o rt those, in w riting, to th e m ine ow ner. If he w e re notified through a
w ritte n com plaint by th re e or m ore em ployees of a dangerous situation in
th e w ork place, th e sta tu te re q u ire d th e mine inspector to investigate the
com plaint and notify th e su p e rin te n d e n t of th e problem and its rem edy.
Charges of negligence could th e n only be brought against th e m ine ow ner if
som eone w e re th e n in ju red as a re su lt of th e previously identified
problem .1^
The sta te m ine inspector often found m ine o p erato rs re sista n t
to suggestion and his pow ers to enforce change lim ited by existing law.
Mine o p erato rs and th e ir em ployees occasionally defied th e law and
enforcem ent effo rts by th e m ine inspector. In 1887, th e legislature passed a
law prohibiting th e d evelopm ent of a v ertical sh aft below 300 fe e t w ith o u t
92
an iron-bonneted safety cage and a closing and locking gate to p rev e n t
passengers from being knocked out of th e cage. In N ovem ber 1897, th e
mine inspector notified ACM s general m anager th a t unless th e com pany
obeyed this law a com plaint w ould b e filed w ith th e county atto rn ey . In
Jan u ary 1898. th e mine inspector v isited th e Silver Bow county atto rn ey and
received assurance from him th a t action w ould be ta k e n against th e
com pany. But five m onths later, action had n o t b een ta k e n because th e
county atto rn ey refu sed to cooperate.
A sh o rt tim e later, Mine Inspector
Byrne received a petition signed by 450 m iners of th e A naconda Company
protesting th e use of safety doors as a danger to th e ir sa fe ty .17
On several occasions, th e sta te m ine inspector petitioned the
legislature for increased enfo rcem en t au thority, and each tim e th e
legislature reb u ffed new propositions on th e grounds th a t too m uch pow er in
th e h ands of th e mine inspector could h a lt th e h e alth y progress of th e state
mining in d u stry .1& But in 1907, th e legislature rev ised th e state codes to
increase th e en forcem ent pow ers of th e state m ine inspectors. According to
th e n ew mining law s of M ontana, th e inspector gained th e rig h t to prosecute
any mine ow ners w ho refu sed to m ake such re p a irs as req u e ste d by th e
mine inspector. Even w h e n e n tru s te d w ith new enforcem ent powers,
how ever, th e state m ine inspector refu sed to tak e action against negligent
mine ow ners. 1^
For instance, th e rev ised codes of 1907 allow ed for crim inal
prosecution of any ow ner, lessor, o r lessee guilty of negligence, provided th a t
th e em ployee could be show n to b e blam eless in th e accident .20
B etw een
1909 and 1912, th e m ine inspector abstained from assigning blam e in an y of
th e Butte m ine fatalities. Prior to and afte r this tim e, coroner's juries
93
typically assigned blam e e ith e r to th e deceased m iner's carelessness or
unavoidable circum stances." A lthough juries occasionally cited m anagem ent
for negligence no evidence of prosecution exists for any of th ese cases. The
mine inspector failed to exercise his new ly w on pow ers of prosecution,
leaving th e w o rk er to plead on his ow n for im proved safety in th e w ork
Place.
T here are a n u m b er of reasons for th e m ine inspector s reluctance to
prosecute o p erato r safety infractions. In his annual re p o rt to th e governor,
th e mine inspector could cite safety violations and cast aspersions upon th e
state legislators for th e ir refu sal to d ra ft m ore strin g en t regulations, b u t
filing crim inal charges against m ine op erato rs en tailed a m uch risk ier
endeavor for th e governm ent agent. To find th e mining com pany guilty of
negligence in court re q u ire d an unusual com bination of circum stances:
w inning th e cooperation of th e county attorney; securing testim ony from
econom ically v u ln era b le m iners; and o v ertu rn in g decades of legal preceden t
protecting corporate in te rests. These obstacles w e re enough to d e te r even
th e most stalw art cham pion of w o rk e rs' rights. At th e sam e tim e, th e courts
continued to find m anagem ent innocent in reg a rd to in d u stria l accidents.
Unsuccessful a ttem p ts at retrib u tio n b y th e injured m iner in the
district courts and in th e sta te suprem e court gave th e sta te m ine inspector
reaso n to be cautious in taking up th e w o rk e rs' cause in th e courts. In 1914,
Lowndes M aury, a B utte a tto rn e y w ith w o rk e r sym pathies, testified before a
congressional com m ission on in d u stria l relations convened in B utte th a t no
m iner had w on a single personal in ju ry se ttlem en t in th e B utte courts
against e ith e r ACM or N orth B utte Mining Com pany in th e p ast seven years,
although th e historical record contradicts this assertion.
U ltim ately,
94
how ever, the M ontana Suprem e Court o v e rtu rn e d those isolated w orker
victories w on in th e low er courts 2 1
Although the M ontana courts and the Silver Bow coroner's juries
continued to abide by th e com m on law dictum of "contributory negligence,"
courts elsew here began to re in te rp re t this legal precedent in favor of the
injured m iner. The Illinois case of Himrod Coal Co. v. Adack (1901) d ented
th e corporate arm or by separating negligence of the in ju red w orker from
w illful violation of th e mining sta tu tes by th e m ine ow ner. In th e past,
disregard for safety by the mine op erato r did not concern th e courts as long
as th e m iner could be show n to be careless or in atten tiv e. A nother
im p o rtan t shift in a ttitu d e to w ard corporate responsibility occurred in th e
Illinois A ppellate Court in Consolidated Coal Co. v. Lundak (1902). The court
ru led th a t posting notice of occupational dangers did not exem pt the
em ployer from liability for injuries sustained th ro u g h th e mine ow ner's
negligence 22
it took longer for th e public and judicial sen tim en t tow ard
corporate irresponsibility to shift in M ontana, p erh ap s because of th e mining
in d u stry 's econom ic predom inance in th e state.
In 1 9 1 1, th e fo rm er Progressive district a tto rn ey of Butte, Burton K.
W heeler, u sh ered the Em ployer's Liability Act through th e house in th e state
legislature, b u t th e bill died in th e sen ate w h ere Republican John E. Edw ards
of Rosebud County argued th a t W heeler's bill w ould unfairly penalize
M ontana in d u stry by forcing m ine o perators to accept liability for accidents
occurring on th e ir prem ises. W heeler's bill w ould have denied in d u stry its
' use of th e doctrines of "assum ed risk," "fellow servant," and "contributory
negligence " th a t had so fre q u e n tly dism issed em ployer responsibility for
occupational injuries in th e
past.23
The defeat of W heeler's bill g ran ted a
95
te m p o rary re p rie v e to m ine ow ners, b u t a t th e sam e tim e it signalled
growing dissatisfaction w ith a legal sy stem th a t placed th e e n tire b u rd e n of
in d u strial accidents on th e sh o u ld ers of th e w o rk er. For th e n e i t fo u r y e a rs
corporate m ine m anagers m oved to h e a d off g o v e rn m e n t in te rv en tio n in •
th eir affairs and to pro m o te a u n ite d fro n t against agitation b y organized
labor for im p ro v ed w orking conditions and financial p rotection for those
injured on th e job. In 1912 ACM in stitu te d a new hiring policy, th e "rustling
card" system , as a m eans of id en tify in g ou tsp o k en critics of corporate
m anagem ent policy affecting th e w o rk e r.
As of D ecem ber 1912, any o n e w ishing to w o rk in th e ACM m ines had
to pro cure a "rustling card" fro m th e com pany e m p lo y m en t office. A fter
being h ired , th e m ine fo re m a n re tu rn e d th e card to th e em plo y m en t office
w h ere it rem a in e d u n til th e m in er e ith e r q u it or w as discharged. Much
co n tro versy su rro u n d e d th is n e w h irin g practice. ACM, th e em ployer of o v er
te n th o u san d u n d e rg ro u n d m iners, claim ed th e size an d tra n s ie n t c h aracter
of th e w o rk force n e ce ssitated a sy ste m fo r tracking th e em ployee's w ork
record. O rganized labor ch arg ed th a t th e sy ste m w a s discrim inatory,
allowing th e com pany to b lack b all tro u b le m a k e rs a n d agitators. The rustlin g
card application included in fo rm a tio n ab o u t th e pro sp ectiv e w o rk e r's place
of b irth , citizenship, fam ily resid en ce, literacy , occupation, and la st place of
em ploym ent. W hat th e ru stlin g card sy stem did w as m erely form alize hiring
practices th a t h a d p rev io u sly b e e n u n d e r th e p u rv iew of th e m ine fo rem en 's
subjective ju dgm ent.24
For th e n e x t eig h t y e a rs, o u tsp o k en m em bers of th e
W estern F ed eratio n of M iners and la te r th e M etal M ine W orkers Union
attacked th e ru stlin g card sy ste m as a c o rp o rate tool to silence those critical
of w orking conditions.
96
W hether th e new hiring system actually quieted those m iners critical
of conditions is a m atter of speculation, since docum entation of specific
instances of discrim ination in hiring cannot be found. An econom ist w ho
studied ACM em ploym ent practices in 1920 could no t docum ent any cases of
blacklisting b u t found apprehension among m iners about criticizing unsafe
conditions. William W alsh, a sta te mine inspector of m any y ears, testified
before th e Commons Commission in 1914 th a t he n ev er received a form al
com plaint about w orking conditions from th e B utte M iners' Union.2^
P erhaps m iners fe a re d com pany reprisals against "troublem akers;"
w h a te v e r th e cause, m iners did not openly criticize com pany policies. W ith
th e su p p o rt from o th er w orkers, how ever, m iners did clam or for protection
against th e financial trau m as associated w ith in d u strial accidents.
By th e e a rly tw e n tie th cen tu ry politicians and labor lead ers across
th e W est called for a governm ent system to protect th e w o rk e r from the
econom ic effects of unsafe in d u strial practices.
In July of 1 9 1 1, th e W estern
F ederation of M iners held its annual convention in B utte and th e president,
Charles M oyer, called for political action to prom ote a governm ent system of
com pensation for in ju red w orkers. In his speech, M oyer contrasted the
corporate tre a tm e n t of w o rk ers w ith th a t of m achines; th e ow ner re p a irs the
m achine w h en it breaks down, b u t th e bro k en dow n w o rk er is m erely
replaced.2^
Organized labor asked the governm ent to in te rv e n e on behalf
of injured m iners. T hat sam e y e a r mine operators m oved to neutralize
labor s vitriolic rhetoric. The A m erican Mining Congress—an association of
mine o perators and engineers including e n tre p re n e u ria l mining lum inaries
such as John Hays Ham m ond and Jam es Douglas—recom m ended th e adoption
of w orkm en s com pensation in coal-m ining states to be paid for b y a sm all
97
tax on coal production.^? B utte m ine ow ners w ould continue to oppose
w orkm en's com pensation until its passage in 19 15, b u t in 19 14 ACM
resp o n ded to labor's dem ands fo r a safer w ork place b y initiating a "Safety
First" cam paign in all of its B utte mines.
At th e beginning of 1914, ACM becam e th e firs t A m erican copper
producer to prom ote u n derground m ine safety. Mine sa fety had becom e a
topic of national in te re s t during th e e arly p a rt of th e tw e n tieth c en tu ry w ith
u n derground fatalities topping 35,000 and serious injuries reaching
2,OOO1OOO.28 Anaconda actually follow ed th e lead of E uropean
industrialists, w ho by 1913 h ad successfully cu t occupational fatalities in
h alf th rough safety cam paigns.2 ^ Beginning in 1914, A naconda approached
th e problem of m ine accidents from a n u m b er of d ifferen t avenues:
education, regulation, enforcem ent, m onetary incentives, and contests.
The com pany appointed C.W. Good ale, an ACM m ine su p erin ten d en t,
to organize and oversee th e safety program . GoodaIe selected a safety
engineer w hose job included inspecting e v e ry m ine once a m onth and
discussing unsafe mining practices and eq u ip m en t w ith th e forem an. The
safety engineer could only m ake recom m endations to th e fo rem en and shift
bosses and had no au th o rity to rep rim an d th e m iners directly. If, how ever,
th e shift boss ignored th e second notice of a safety infraction, he could be
laid off or discharged. The safety engineer convened m onthly safety
m eetings for th e shift bosses and fo rem en to discuss safety problem s and th e
m eans for avoiding accidents. Incentives for obeying safety regulations
v aried from te m p o ra ry discharges for ru le violation to a $750 cash bonus
paid to th e forem an w ith th e b e st annual accident record. B etw een Jan u ary
and M arch of 1915, A naconda discharged tw elve m en for safety
98
infractions 3°
The Anaconda Company used a m ulti-m edia approach to bring the
safety m essage to its em ployees. The com pany published a m onthly
magazine, Thg
AflQd?. in w hich
th ey described th e m ost u p -to -d ate safety
devices and techniques, a tally of the m onth's accidents w ith th e location of
th e forem an in charge, and em ployee testim onials on th e subject of safety,
for w hich the author received a
$15
bonus. During th e w ar. The Anode
linked safety w ith patriotism ; and associated accidents w ith curtailed
production of copper, w hich in tu rn crippled th e Allies' effort to p reserv e
w orld dem ocracy. An
Anode article of June 1918 called
upon aliens to learn
th e n ativ e language and to adopt th e Am erican w a y of life as a m eans of
increasing production and avoiding unnecessary accidents.^ ^ The com pany
ev en produced a series of safety film s dem onstrating th e pro p er w ay to
perform specific tasks such as setting a dynam ite charge or tim bering a
slope. In addition to using th ese film s for training n ew em ployees, local
th e a te rs provided fre e screenings of safety film s fo r th e m iners and th eir
fam ilies.32
The com pany, in effect, tu rn e d safety into a spectator sport. The
Anaconda Company also used com petition to tra in its und erg ro u n d m iners in
first aid and m ine rescue. Individual m ines sponsored team s. Sixteen
d ifferen t team s com peted against one another in a series of ev en ts in w hich
individuals vied for a
$30 first
prize and team s com peted for a
$120
cash
aw ard. The first mine rescue com petition and su b seq u en t contests took
place at Columbia Gardens, a large com pany-ow ned am usem ent p ark east of
Butte. The A naconda team s also trav elled to com petitions sponsored by th e
U.S. B ureau of Mines in Arizona and Colorado. A M iner's Field Day held in
99
July of 1918 at Columbia G ardens attracted th irty -th re e first aid team s and
tw e n ty thousand sp ectato rs.33
Betw een 19 15 and 1920, th e Anaconda
Company train ed over tw o thousand em ployees in first aid and mine rescue,
w hich according to th e com pany led to a substantial decrease in serious
accidents and fatalities.
In 1916, tw o and one-half tim es m ore serious accidents occurred in
o th er Am erican m etal m ines th a n in Anaconda mines. The Butte mine
o p erato rs a ttrib u te d th is achievem ent to th e new "safety first" cam paign.
One y e a r after th e initiation of th e safety cam paign Anaconda boasted an
overall 35 percent reduction in mine fatalities from th e previous year. It
should be noted th a t p a rt of this reduction in fatalities in 1914 m ight be
a ttrib u te d to a d rastic reduction in Butte production and th e w ork force w ith
th e o u tb reak of w orld w ar and a tem p o rary c u rtailm en t of shipping. In
addition, b etw een 1915 and 1916 ACM actually w itn essed an increase in
mine fata litie s.34 W hile periodic reductions in accidents m ay have bolstered
w o rk er m orale, it did nothing to provide financial assistance for those w ho
continued to be m aim ed or killed on th e job. The underground m iner looked
to g o v ernm ent for financial protection from in dustrial accidents.
Failing to w in protection against th e economic tra u m a of in d u strial
accidents in th e courts, th e Butte m iner re tu rn e d to th e legislative aren a to
fight his b attle for com pensation for injuries in cu rred on th e job. On M arch
8 ,1 9 1 5 . M ontana becam e th e tw e n ty -se v e n th sta te to g ra n t its w o rk ers th e
protection of w orkm en s com pensation. The reaso n fo r th e governm ent's
action is stated clearly in th e First Annual Report of th e In d u strial Accident
Board, w hich had been created to adm inister th e law:
Accidents are incidental to in d u strial en terp rises, and
100
rirHiEEEE ‘Hrd
E— EEEEEF2
r o e state legislature finally recognized ,h e em ployer as a responsible p a rty
m the m ju ry of an em ployee, bu t passage of protective legislation did not
occur w ith o u t a long, b itte r struggle on th e p a rt of w orkingm en and their
allies in Helena.
As w as the case w ith m ine safety, the United S tates lagged behind the
Europeans m enacting law s to aid ,h e m iner in th e e v en t of an accident. By
1814, G erm any passed a law to com pensate the in ju re d w o rk e r fo r lost
work tim e, and th e English follow ed suit in 1897. The firs t A m erican law did
not gam legislative approval until 1911.36
The ^ a t e th a t preceded the
passage of an A m erican law found som e em ployers supporting th e protection
of w o rk ers 'p ro v id ed it did no t cost a n y m ore th a n t h e . . . w asteful liability
system , an d som e labor unions reacting coolly to a com pensation system
th a t elim inated the possibility of cash aw ard s from the courts. These
seem ingly contradictory positions can b e ezplained b y a new a ttitu d e in the
courtroom w here sym pathetic juries increasingly found in fav o r of the
in ju red w orkm an. In forfeiting his right to litigation, th e w o rk e r gained
tem p o rary b en efits am ounting to on e-h alf to tw o -th ird s of his lost pay.
A lthough sh o rt of an equitable settlem ent, the M ontana W orkm en s
Com pensation law w as a v a st im p ro v em en t over ,h e fo rm er system w h ere
85 percent of those in ju red received no com pensation.37
In 1910, M ontana s G overnor Norris appointed a com miss,on to
P rep are legislation to protect th e injured w orker, b u t each tim e legislation
101
w as introduced during th e tw o sessions following Norris' initiative it failed to
gain th e necessary votes for
passaged
John Wallace, th e industrial
insurance com m issioner for W ashington, speaking before an Am erican
Federation of Labor convention, re ite ra te d th e need for a com pensation law
in M ontana. W allace calculated th a t th e sta te of W ashington had already lost
a total of 13,817 m an -y ears of labor to industrial disabilities and fatalities,
and he looked to a com pensation act as a m eans to encourage operators to
elim inate w ork place h a z a r d s E a r l y in 1914, a group identified as th e
People s Pow er League took up th e M ontana crusade for w orkm en's
com pensation by placing an initiative on th e N ovem ber ballot calling for a
m an d atory system of com pensation in th e ev en t of a disabling or fatal
injury.
From th e outset, th e initiative m et organized opposition from a group
calling itself th e M ontana A dvancem ent Association. The opposition, led by
individuals from th e Anaconda Company, w arned th e electorate in large
n ew sp aper ads th a t passage of th e proposed in itiativ e w ould increase taxes
$2 million, curtail in d u strial expansion, increase the cost of living, reduce the
n u m b er of available jobs, encourage th e hiring of foreigners, and force
farm e rs to share th e cost of th e system intended for hazardous in d u strie s .40
The oppositon fiercely objected to th e am ount of th e aw ard given to the
fam ilies of those killed on th e job. The initiative proposed a pension of $30 a
m onth for th e w idow and $7.50 a m onth for each child (up to th re e children)
to be paid until th e w ife rem arried . The opposition p ro teste d th a t such a
pension am ounted to tw ice th e aw ard provided for u n d er W ashington and
Idaho law. A M ontana Progressive editorial pointed ou t th a t Idaho did not
ev en have a binding law, only a proposal for legislation .4 1
102
Critics of Initiative No. 7 quickly o utnum bered supporters, draw ing
su p p o rt from both farm e rs and railroaders. Beginning in th e m id -1890s, th e
Populists had united fa rm e rs and organized labor on th e issue of political
reform , b u t th e ir support failed to m aterialize on w orkm en's com pensation.
W.K. H arber, editor of th e Daily River Press in Fort Benton and a m em ber of
th e People s Pow er League, railed against the initiative cam paign for
"lumping th e com pensation act w ith a farm loan act w h en th ey deserved
sep arate consideration by the voters." He also w orried th a t farm labor could
be labelled a hazardous occupation," bringing u nnecessary financial
h ard sh ip to M ontana fa rm e rs .42 Ju st one w eek before th e election, Colonel
Sam Gordon, editor of th e Yellowstone Daily lournal in Miles City and a
pro m in ent lead er of th e Progressive P a rty in M ontana, spoke out in
opposition to th e initiative because of th e proposal’s com plexity and its lack
of consideration for th e em ployer.4^
On Novem ber I , th e Great Falls
f r i bvne, th e only major in d ep e n d en t daily n ew sp ap er in th e state, published
an editorial recom m ending against passage of In itiative 7 . On election day,
M ontana v o ters rejected a bill to com pensate injured w o rk ers b y four
thousand votes, tossing th e controversial issue back into th e hands of
M ontana's elected re p re se n ta tiv e s .44
Legislators a rriv e d in Helena in January of 1915, p rep ared to debate
th e issue of w orkm en's com pensation. On Jan u ary 20, th e House heard
testim ony on tw o bills: one m odelled afte r a Michigan law th a t allowed for a
v o lu n tary system th a t excluded dom estic, agricultural and railroad w orkers
from coverage and th e o th er a com pulsory system th a t req u ire d all
em ployers in hazardous in d u stries to participate. Much of the d eb ate in
com m ittee cen tered upon th e constitutionality of th e com pulsory bill. The
103
rights of aliens and th e ir survivors em erged as another critical issue. On
F ebruary 16, Cornelius Kelley, vice p resid en t and m anaging director of the
Anaconda Company, testified before a joint legislative com m ittee th a t his
com pany p re fe rre d a "just com pensation act o ver th e c u rre n t system w here
th e am bulance-chasing law yer beats th e body of the in ju red to his home."
Kelley added th a t th e com pany w ould like to see a bill th a t w as
non-com pulsory w ith ra te s reasonable enough to allow M ontana m ines and
in d u stries to com pete w ith o th er states. Kelley em phatically opposed
com pensation for foreign d ep en d en ts residing in nations w ithout eq uivalent
com pensation law s.^5
W hen th e final bill incorporated all of Kelley's concerns, Butte Socialist
legislator, Alex Mackel, charged th a t th e com m ittee m em bers w ere "a set of
servile corporate tools" w ho v o ted for th e m easure because th e y "were told
to do so" w ith o u t know ledge of th e im plications of w h a t th e y vo ted f o r . ^
Even though th e new law left participation in th e com pensation system up to
th e discretion of th e em ployer, th e provisions of th e law elim inating th e
corporate courtroom defenses of "assum ed risk," "contributory negligence,"
and th e "fellow servant" doctrine encouraged em ployer participation. During
th e first y e a r of enforcem ent in M ontana, 1,518 em ployers signed up to
participate, covering 43,769 em ployees, or 96 percent of those w orking in
hazardous o c c u p a tio n s.^
But th e p rim ary question re m a in e d —did th e new
law effectively accomplish th e goal of protecting th e in ju red w o rk er?
While th e provisions of th e new law protected a large n u m b er of Butte
m iners, th e com pensation paid ou t did not ad eq u ately m eet m iners' needs.
A fter a tw o-w eek w aiting period, th e injured person received 50 p ercen t of
his wage or a m axim um of $10 a w eek for 300 w eeks, and in the e v en t of a
104
p erm an en t disability, th e paym ent extended for an additonal 100 w eeks,
and $5 w eekly t h e r e a f t e r .^
Even after th e w eekly b enefit increased to
$12.50 per w eek in 1919, M ontana still m aintained th e low est benefits in all
of th e fo rty -tw o states offering w orkm en's com pensation. The $54 a m onth
paid to th e injured m iner did not m eet fam ily expenses in Butte. M ontana.
The w idow of a m an killed underground could not collect m ore th an a total
of $4,000 over an eig h t-y ear period. The fam ilies of those w ho succum bed
to occupational diseases such a m iners' consum ption, silicosis, or tuberculosis
received no com pensation, since th e law did not recognize them as vocational
diseases u ntil th e 1 9 4 0 s I n addition, large n u m b ers of Butte m iners
w orking underground after 1915 rem ained un p ro tected b y th e new law
w hich excluded both single and m arried alien im m igrants. N onresident alien
d ep en d en ts could not collect benefits if a son, husband, or b ro th er m et w ith
an accidental d eath in th e Butte m ines.50
According to a labor union
bulletin published in 1917, no claim s w ere filed in o n e-th ird of fatal
accidents because the deceased e ith er had no d ep en d en ts or those
d ep en d en ts lived in Europe. A radical labor paper, The Butte Bulletin.
rep o rte d in 1918 th a t only 41 of th e descendants of th e 164 m en killed in
th e Speculator fire of th e previous y e a r actually collected com pensation .^1 The fram e rs of th e M ontana W orkm en's Com pensation Act had
in ten d ed to create a law th a t w ould not only financially aid those injured on
th e job b u t w ould also m ake th e w ork place safer by providing an incentive
for em ployers to im prove conditions and elim inate th e h azards associated
w ith costly in d u strial accidents. Accident statistics for B utte's tw o major
mining com panies seem to defy th e legislature's good intentions. Even
though ACM m ines counted half th e nu m b er of serious accidents rep o rte d in
105
o th er U.S. m etal m ines in 1916, th e n u m b ers occurring in Butte mines
continued to climb. In 1916, one y e a r afte r th e adoption of w orkm en's
com pensation, th e Anaconda Company rep o rte d 3,176 accidents in its mining
and sm elting operations, and th e N orth Butte Mining Company recorded 260.
One y e a r later, th e n u m b er of accidents at th e Anaconda operations doubled
and those at th e North Butte m ines jum ped to 901. During those tw o years,
Anaconda paid out n early $500,000 in com pensation benefits to injured
em ployees, w hich seem ed to do little to elicit m ore vigilant supervision
underground 52
Years after passage of a w orkm en's com pensation act th e
Butte m ines rem ained h a u n ted b y accidents: in 1924, th e mine fatality rate
clim bed to 4.8 death s per thousand w orkers, com pared w ith 3.16 per
thousand in Arizona and 3 1 5 per thousand in und erg ro u n d Michigan copper
mines. The first significant reduction in th e n u m b er of mine fatalities did
not occur until 1942 w h en th e ra te dropped to 2.5 death s per thousand
workers.53
W orkm en’s com pensation did not significantly alter
und erg ro und hazards in Butte, ev en if it did relieve som e of th e financial
d istress suffered by those injured.
W hen legislative reform proved inad eq u ate in altering underground
w orking conditions, th e w o rk ers shifted th e battle fro n t to th e picket line. It
took a m ajor mine d isaster to galvanize an organized p ro te st against unsafe
w orking conditions. The Speculator Mine fire precipitated a w alkout led by
th e new ly form ed M etal Mine W orkers' Union (MMWU). The issues th a t
prom pted a unified response from labor included obvious negligence on th e
p a rt of m anagem ent in preparing for a mine fire, low w ages, and a general
fru stra tio n among union m iners over com pany blacklisting and d eteriorating
conditions. By th e end of June 1917, th e MMWU successfully shut dow n all
106
mining operations on the Butte hill. The circular d istrib u ted by the fledgling
union cited fo u r basic dem ands: th e abolition of th e "rustling card" system ,
th e strict observance of state mining laws, the dism issal of the state mine
inspector, and an increase in w ages to m atch th e inflated cost of living .54
W orking conditions em erged as a p rim ary concern of labor in th e w ake
of th e nation's w orst hardrock mining disaster. The union blam ed th e large
loss of life in th e Speculator fire on th e absence of m anholes in th e concrete
b ulkheads separating drifts. At th e sam e tim e, organized labor pointed to
th e rustling card system as a re le v an t factor in com pany intim idation of
w o rk ers and th e silencing of those w ho w ould hav e spoken out about safety
infractions .55
In July, John Powers, th e state chairm an of th e M ontana
Socialist P arty, w ro te to Governor S tew art calling for th e dism issal of Mine
Inspectors Orem and McGrath fo r failure to act on know ledge of unsafe
conditions in th e Speculator. According to Powers, th e m ine inspectors knew
th a t m iners w e re w orking below th e 3.000 -foot level w ith no m eans of
escape through raises or through solidly bulkheaded d rifts 56 The new
re p re se n ta tiv e of a large segm ent of m iners, th e MMWUf also dem anded th a t
m onthly inspections of th e underground be m ade by a b ip artisan com m ittee
com posed of w o rk ers and m anagem ent, th a t m anholes be b uilt in all
bulkheads, and th a t all new m en be show n escape ro u tes as an initiation to
th e u n derground.5^
The mine op erato rs rallied in opposition to the new union dem ands
and issued a joint sta te m e n t in th e nam e of William A. Clark, th e only
in d ep en d en t m ine e n tre p re n e u r am idst a handful of co rporate entities.
Clark th re a te n e d th e w orkers: "I will close them down, flood them and not
raise a pound of copper before I will recognize th e anarchistic leaders of the
107
union."58
On June 27, Clark announced to th e press th a t Butte m iners w ere
th e highest paid in th e w orld and th a t th e conditions th a t th e y labored under
com pared favorably to any mining district. Even if Butte m iners' w ages
ran k ed high w h en m easured against o th er districts as claim ed by Clark, the
daily w age of $4.75 did not m eet expenses in 1917. B utte m iners w orked for
$3 50 a day from 1878 until 1907, a tim e w hen the price of copper increased
from $.16 to $.20 a pound, and th e volum e of m etal produced jum ped from
24 to 226 million
pounds.59
At $4.75 a day, th e Butte m iner earn ed alm ost
$1400 a y e a r w hile th e average living expenses for a fam ily of four
am ounted to about $1800, resulting in indeb ted n ess for over 80 percent of
th e w age e a r n e r s .^
In th e end th e Butte mine o p erato rs overw helm ed th e organized
resistance of th e mine w orkers. The Butte m iners w e n t back to w ork for a
$.50 a day pay raise in S eptem ber of 1917, forgoing th e ir dem ands for a $6 a
day w age and safer w orking conditions. Organized labor in Butte w ould
n ev er again regain th e unified stren g th it exhibited prior to 1914. A w are of
continuing dissension w ith in labor s ranks, th e mine o p erato rs ignored
w o rk er dem ands for an end to th e rustling card system and pleas for
im proved w orking conditions. Periodic strikes e ru p te d during th e next th ree
y e a rs w ith o u t consequence to th e m iner and th e conditions u n d er w hich he
labored.
Since 1883, th e Butte m iner had struggled tirelessly to elim inate th e
m ore a p p aren t dangers in th e w ork place and to secure financial benefits for
those crippled or killed on th e job. In tim e, th e public took notice of the
m iner's plight. The legislature responded to th e high incidence of injury and
d eath in th e B utte underground by passing law s to reg u late conditions in th e
108
mining industry, b u t accidents persisted w ell into the tw e n tieth century.
Even th e best in tentioned law s could not alter th e defiant attitu d e tow ards
dangers in th e w ork place ingrained in both w o rk er and m anagem ent over
fo rty years.
109
ENDNOTES
S d iu s ^ W j) M g j T ^
ist0 rv ° f A m erican Law (New York: Sim on &
4. Emm ons, "Irish M iners of Butte," 53 .
5. Daniel H arrington "Accident P rev en tio n in th e M ines of Butte, M ontana,"
U S,.B ureau of M ines Technical P aper 229 fW ashm gtntv n o n 1070)
6. Emm ons, "Irish M iners of Butte," 51.
7. A ccident In su ran ce Policies, 1898-1905, A naconda Copper Mining
Records Collection 169, Box 91, File 153. M ontana S tate Historical
R fleP I-M o n ta n a . T hese organizations p ro v id ed b en efits to
$ SO ^o^S^m onthly^
t0
w eek ly and to m em b ers paying dues of from
8. R ichard L ingenfelter, The H ardrock M iners: A H istory of th e Mining
L abor Movgmg p t in th e Am erican W est.
V iflffk ity
of C alifornia P ress, 1974), 190-92.
?; V ernon H. Jensen. H eritage of Conflict: Labor Relations in th e Nnnferrn,,*
Melglg In d u s try Up to 1930 ( Ithaca- CnrnPll lln tvpr iVty
I Q3 QJ 100.
Battle^for B Stte
$ position on lh e e ig h t-h o u r d ay cited in Malone, J M
11. A naconda S tandard. 4 Ja n u a ry 1 9 1 1 ,1 1 .
12. A naconda S tan d ard 7 Ja n u a ry 1Q n . 7
13.
Anaconda Standard.
23 F e b ru ary 1 9 1 1 .8 ; 5 M arch 1 9 1 1, 11.
R eports of th e Inspector of Mine s & D eoutv In sp ecto r of M ines for th e
Si I J^ o n th S Ending Novem berJ i i L L M i ( W e n a : Jo u rn al P u b H s l%
Com pany, 1890), 123.
HO
srnfM
om
ari"editedby
} 7 - f t m h A pnMil Rgport of th e Inspector of Mines of th e State of Montana
M>V9Qlb?r 3Q. 1$9S (Helena: In d ep e n d en t Publishing
}?;-. T - B y y g n th Annual Report of th e Inspector of Mines. State of Montana
12flZ (Helena: In d ep e n d en t Publishing Company, 1903J, 10-11.
I.?-. Mining ja w ? of th e State of M ontana. Revised Codes of 1907 and 1911
(Helena: in d e p e n d e n t Publishing Company, 19 11), 5 / ----20. Ibid., 6.
2 1. US. Commission on In d u strial Relations, Mining Conditions and
as Commons Commission Report. I Montana Reports. 40 Montana SOR
PH N M K
!!?!;!?,*$ ^ " " o v e rtu rn e d a ruling b y Judge M cQ ernan in B utte for th e
plaintiff, in w hich a m iner w ho w as killed w hile w orking o v e rtim e in
fhe*safety of*d ieir ^8
e^^d
a g a K e m S n p e %
M
S j ^ ' ^ " BulteC0UrlS alw a^ s ruled
2 2 - Engineering & Mining lournal 8 M arch 1902, 353; 5 July 1902, 51.
23. A naconda Standard, 27 Jan u ary 1911,8; 18 F ebruary 1911, 10.
24- Engineering & Mining lournal. 15 September 1917, 466.
“ iiy S i ' W f P l Il g i l f e T
27^ Enginggring &
Mining journal,
IIlII M iM f m r n r a
24 S eptem ber 1910, 601; I April 1911,
Ul
28. Friedm an, History of American Tf^
29
Ensineermg & Mining Journal,
47?
13 S eptem ber 1913, 513; 2 August 1913,
31. The Anode. !(J u n e 1915). 8.
32. Ihg_Aaad£J 1( November 1915), 3.
33- The
Anode,
KM ay 1915), I; 4 (August 1918), I.
toDEEBe®ssa
,
g o m p a ^ l^ lH ^
i j e n t B° a rd ' 191
36. Ibid
37. Carl Gersunv. Work Hazards 100-04.
39. The M ontana Socialist. 4 January i Q m 3
40. Anaconda Standard. I N ovem ber 1914, 10.
4 1. M ontana Progressive. 15 October 1914, 3 .
42. Great Falls Trihunp 77 Hrtnhpr 1014 3
43. Great Falls T ribune. 31 October 1 9 1 4 ,3 .
44. Engineering & Mining journal- 14 Novem ber 1914, 890.
45. Anaconda Standard. 17 F ebruary 1915, I.
46. Anaconda Standapdi 77 P»hr,„ry
1
47. "In dustrial Accident Board Report of 1916," 63.
48. Ibid., 26-7.
,Helena:
112
^
,H e ,e n a :
( H e ,e n a :
S ^ p tem b T ? b ]n d ^ l9 ? 8 0LBh!seSour4ceEmm0r‘SCiteS the ^
^ llgtin-
52. “In d u strial Accident Board Report of 1916," 1 18-20.
53. William W. Adams,"M etal-M ine Accidents in the U.S.", U.S. Bureau of
Mines Bulletin No.264 (W ashington: GPO1 1924), 12-17; Bulletins No.310; 374
54. I h e M ontana Socialist 16 jim p 1Q17 ]
55. The M ontana Socialist
ji.no i o f ? |
56. The M ontana ^oria)i«;f 7 Jnty i Q | 7 4
57. U S. D epartm ent of Justice, "Glasser File," record Group 60, microfilm.
58. Ibid.
59. Jensen, H eritage of C o n flirt, 302
60. Glasser, "Butte M iners' Strikes," U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Glasser
File, 8 - 13.
C hapter 6
CONCLUSION
By 1920 accidental d e a th or in ju ry h a d becom e a daily th re a t to th e
B utte m iner. N early e v e ry o th e r w eek th e B utte Miner c arried a sto ry about
som e u n fo rtu n a te m in er cru sh ed b y a falling rock or crip p led b y a fall dow n
a chute.
But know ledge of th e d an g ers of th e occupation did no t k e e p m en
o u t of th e m ines or p re v e n t th e onslaught of accidents. N either increased
vigilance on th e p a rt of m ine o p e ra to rs nor th e passage of n ew safety
reg u latio n s seem ed to a lte r th e high ra te of m ine fatalities. A com plex se t of
social, econom ic and technological circum stances com bined in th e B utte
u n d e rg ro u n d to c re a te occupational h a za rd s u n k n o w n in o th e r M ontana
in d u strie s.
D ivergent fac to rs affecting lab o r and m an ag em en t c o n trib u te d to th e
high n u m b e r of in d u stria l accidents in th e B utte m ines. Beginning in th e
1880s a n in creased w o rld d em an d fo r copper g re a tly ex p an d ed th e scale of
o p e ra tio n an d th e n u m b e r of m in ers em ployed. The n u m b e r of u n d erg ro u n d
w o rk e rs in creased se v e n tim e s b e tw e e n 1883 and 1916, fro m 2,000 to
14,500. A sh o rtag e of w e ll-tra in e d , exp erien ced m iners re su lte d . W hile th e
e a rly B utte m iner claim ed g e n eratio n s of ex p erien ce in th e copper m ines of
Cornwall, Irela n d , an d m ore re c e n tly in M ichigan and th e N evada Comstock,
th e n e w re c ru it cam e fro m a g ricu ltu ral com m unities in Italy , S erbia and
Croatia. By 1916 th o u sa n d s of th e se re c e n t r u ra l im m ig ran ts, w ith o u t
m ining experience or com m and of th e English language, p o p u lated th e B utte
114
u n d erground. These "greenhorns" w orked alongside v e te ra n s n o ted fo r th eir
tra n s ie n t and in d e p e n d e n t w o rk habits, d eriv ed in p a rt fro m a "contract"
system of Cornish origins. The co n tract m iner w o rk e d v irtu a lly in d e p e n d e n t
of supervision, m otivated solely b y th e am ount of ore re m o v e d or d rift
advanced. The conditions of th e w o rk place—long hours, in te n se h e a t and
im p u re a ir-c o u p le d w ith a w illingness to ta k e risk s fo r th e bonus prom ised
b y filling an e x tra ore car m ade e v e n th e m ost careful m in er susceptible to a
m om ent of fa ta l in atten tio n .
A poten tially vo latile situ atio n existed in th e
B utte u n d erg ro u n d w ith a w o rk force th a t claim ed im m u n ity to th e h azard s
of th e occupation, e ith e r th ro u g h ignorance o r arrogance.
As in o th e r in d u stries, technological change h ad a d ram a tic im pact on
th e w o rk er. The in tro d u ctio n of n e w m achinery and m ining tech n iq u es
altered th e w orking en v iro n m en t, som etim es to th e d e trim e n t of th e m in ers'
h e a lth and safety.
In tro d u ced in th e 1880s, d y n am ite an d ste am -p o w e re d
hoisting, and la te r electrical appliances, c o n trib u ted to th e grow ing n u m b e rs
of fa ta l m ine accidents. By 1907 th e m iner a p p a re n tly a d a p te d to th e se n e w
technologies, because d e ath s a ttrib u te d to explosions, cage m ishaps, and
electrocution w e re o verw helm ingly o u tn u m b e red b y th o se caused by
f all-of-rock and accidental fa lls.1 The use of e lectricity fo r lighting,
v e n tilatio n and hoisting g en erally im proved w orking conditions and
elim inated som e h azard s of th e und erg ro u n d . A t th e sam e tim e, o th e r n ew
technologies c reated u n fo rseen hazards. The m achine drill, alth o u g h no t
d irectly resp o n sib le fo r an y accidental fatalities, m aim ed a n d killed
h u n d re d s of B utte m iners each y e a r b y p e rp e tu atin g a n e p id em ic of
re s p ira to ry diseases.
W hile a p p ro x im ately th re e o u t of e v e ry o n e -th o u sa n d m iners
115
succum bed to a fatal accident w orking, approxim ately 40 percent of the one
thousand m iners exam ined in 1914 suffered from som e form of resp ira to ry
disease.2 By th e first decade of th e tw en tieth c en tu ry B ritish and A ustralian
medical research ers linked th e freq u en cy of tuberculosis, silicosis and
miners* consum ption in hardrock m iners to th e silica d u st generated by d ry
drilling w ith a m achine drill. Shortly th ere after, European m ine operators
in stitu ted a system of w et-drilling and p re -em ploym ent physicals to com bat
th is devastating occupational disease. Butte mine ow ners chose to ignore
medical evidence of th e problem and technological solutions until 1925.
C orporate resistance to change ultim ately affected all relations betw een
w o rk e r and m anagem ent in Butte, w hich w hen coupled w ith pow erful social,
econom ic and political forces acting upon th e new technologies, created a
v a rie ty of new hazards in th e B utte underground.
B etw een 1883 and 1920 m ine m anagem ent u n d e rw en t changes th at
created tensions b etw een m iners and supervisors th a t affected th e safety of
th e w ork place. W hile th e consolidation of th e B utte m ines u n d er a single
corporate entity, th e Anaconda Copper Mining Company, im proved the
efficiency of th e mining process, it also distanced m anagem ent from th e
e v e ry d ay problem s of th e w ork force and created a conflict b etw een the
priorities of th e corporate board m em bers in New York and th e supervisory
staff in Butte. By 1915 only one m ajor com petitor of th e Anaconda rem ained
on th e B utte hill, leaving th e w o rk er little choice in em ployers, th ere b y
granting th e Anaconda Com pany enorm ous econom ic and political au thority
in negotiating conditions and w ages. W orker fe a r of econom ic intim idation
and rep risa l silenced m any of those w ho m ight hav e spoken out against
unsafe w orking conditions. Resigned to th e sta tu s quo, th e B utte m iner
116
developed a defiant a ttitu d e tow ards m anagem ent’s efforts at supervision
and th e dangers in h ere n t in in d u strial hardrock mining.
At th e sam e tim e th a t hazards of the w ork place increased because of
th e unresolved conflict betw een w o rk ers and m anagem ent and the
expanding d ep th of th e Butte m ines, and w orldw ide com petition stim ulated a
dem and for g re a te r w o rk er productivity and a reduction in production costs.
These p ressu res on m anagem ent to produce overshadow ed concerns about
w o rk er safety, contributing to an increase in in d u strial accidents. These
circum stances did not d e te r th e efforts of organized labor to change th e
conditions u n d er w hich th ey labored.
At each tu rn in th e struggle to im prove w orking conditions, the
political and economic hegem ony of th e Anaconda Com pany over m iners
b lu n ted la b o r’s efforts. W hen th e m iner sought re d re ss in th e courts from
th e financial hard sh ip s caused by in d u strial accidents, h e faced an
u n sy m pathetic legal system unwilling to acknow ledge corporate negligence.
A ppeals to th e state legislature for protective and enforceable mining
regulations generally w e n t unheeded, due to fe a r of corporate rep risals th a t
m ight cripple th e state economy. The agent appointed to oversee mine
safety and th e enforcem ent of safety laws, th e sta te m ine inspector, often
ignored infractions out of deference to th e economic and political m ight of
th e mine operators. The m iners, u nited u n d er union affiliation, finally
tu rn e d to th e picket line to im prove conditions, b u t th a t tactic proved
ineffectual against th e im position of m artial law and com pany rep risals
against organizers. Even th e passage of a w orkm en's com pensation law in
1915 proved a p y rrh ic victory, leaving thousands of alien im m igrants
unprotected and thousands of o th ers inad eq u ately com pensated for
117
disabilities encountered on the job.
The y e a r 1920 m arked over fo rty y e ars of mining in B utte and, more
significantly, th e end of th e district's reign as th e w orld s leading producer of
copper. Even as an enorm ous copper surplus created b y overproduction
during th e w a r forced half of B utte's m iners out of w ork, th e fatal accident
ra te rem ained higher th a n it had been during y e ars of high productivity. It
seem ed as though n e ith e r legislation nor production ra te s had any noticeable
im pact on th e h ealth and safety of th e w orker. None of th e changes m ade in
m ine v en tilatio n and sanitation, m ine rescue, or in new techniques for
w et-drilling, could overcom e th e contem ptuous a ttitu d e of m anagem ent
to w ard s labor and th e m iner's enm ity tow ards his em ployer and th e w ork
place. Years of labor strife had engendered m istru st b etw een ow ners and
m iners, w hich m anifested itself in a com bative tension b etw een factions.
The m iner, e m b itte red by y e a rs of unsuccessful b attles and in u red to loss of
life, adopted a recalcitran t a ttitu d e tow ards th e w ork and its accom panying
hazards. N either regulation nor technology could change th e habits of mind
and w ork developed over fo rty years; only moving th e mining operation
above ground proved a successful rem e d y against th e hazards of th e
underground.
118
ENDNOTES
1. See T able I in C hapter 3 on page 57.
2. Rice an d Sayers, "Review of Safety and H ealth Conditions," 13.
119
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Edw ards v. Butte & Superior. 83 Mont. 122.
Goodwin v. Elm Orlu. 83 Mont. 152.
Hollingsworth v. Davis-Dalv Estates Coooer Co 38 Mont. 143
Melville v. B utte- Balaklava Coooer Co 4 7 Mont. I.
Osterholm v. Boston M ontana Co . 40 Mont. 508.
W irta v. N orth Butte Mining Co 64 Mont. 279.
Mining Company and Union Records
A naconda Copper Mining Company. Accident Insurance Policies. 18 9 8 - 19 0 S
M ontana State Historical Society, Collection 169, Box 91, File 153. Helena,
Montana.
W? s,t e rP ^ e1dI ratio n of Miners. Proceedings of 19th Annual Convention Butte
M y J 911 Denver: W estern Federation of M iners, 1912.
U npublished Reports
Dale M artin and Brian Shovers, "Butte, M ontana: An A rchitectural and
Historical In v en to ry of the National L andm ark District," An unpublished
rep o rt, Butte Historical Society, 1986.
Shovers, Brian. "The Emergence of a W orld-Class Mining District," An
unpublished rep o rt, Butte Historical Society, 1984.
125
Interviews
Hull, Henry. P hilipsburg1M ontana. 22 December 1985.
M atthew, Dick. Butte, Montana. 24 Jan u ary 1986.
Shea, Ed. Butte, M ontana. 23 Jan u ary 1986.