Working Draft: Do Not Cite
CONSTITUTIONALIZING ISLAM:
RELIGION-STATE RELATIONSHIP IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES
Shaheen Mozaffar
Bridgewater State University smozaffar@bridgew.edu
Prepared for presentation at the conference on
The Gap from Parchment to Practice:
Ambivalent Effects of Constitutions in Democratizing Countries
May 28-29, 2013
American University
Washington, DC
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CONSTITUTIONALIZING ISLAM:
RELIGION-STATE RELATIONSHIP IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES
In this paper, I undertake two related tasks. First, I examine the incidence and distribution of four religious clauses in the constitutions of Muslim countries: (1) religious feedom; (2) religious equality; (3) separation of religion and state; and (3) official religion. Second, I test the extent to which the religious freedom and religious equality clauses influence the amount of laws aimed at discriminating against religious minorities, and the extent to which the separation of religion and state clause influence the amount of the religious legislation more broadly.
The two tasks involve nalysis of two types of data, one dealing with the constituional provisions related to the four religious clauses, and the other dealing with the amount, type and the nature of religious laws aimed at regulating the influence of religion on social, economic and political interactions. Both types of data are drawn from the larger
Religion and State (RAS) project ( www.religionandstate.org
).
The analysis presented in this paper is a preliminary attempt aimed to map the pattern of religion-state relationship across 55 countries that are typically classified as Muslim countries. The analysis does not test any theory about religion-state relationship generally, or in Muslim countries in particular. It is, however, motivated by some theoretical intutions that can susbequently inform systematic theorizing abut religionstate relationship generally, and in Msulim countries in particular.
The paper is organized as follows. I begin by clarifyng the criteria I use in selecting the
55 Muslim countries for analysis. I then briefly clarify the theoretical intuitions that motivate the paper. After that, I describe the research design and the datasets from which
I draw the four religious clauses. I then present the data anlysis. I conclude with comments about the broader theoretical and comparatve implications of the analysis.
WHAT IS A MUSLIM COUNTRY?
Analysts typically define a country as Muslim if Muslims comprise at least 50% of its population. This straightforward approach, however, ignores the possibility of other demographic and socal structural factors that might condition the potential political influence of Muslims if they constitute less than half the population. Muslims with plurality population shares of, say, 40%, 30% or even 25%, may exercise considerable political influence, depending on a number of factors. One factor that might enhance the political influence of a plurality Muslim population is the presence and the size of other religions. Thus, a Muslim population with a plurality of 40% of the population may have a numerical advantage in politics if, say, there are three other religions with a population share of 20% each. A second factor that might enhance the political influence of a plurality, or even a minority, Muslim population is the degree of its spatial distribution in the country. A geographically concentrated plurality (or even a minority) Muslim population is likely to wield a greater degree of political influence than one that is dispersed across the country. Finally, a third factor that might also enhance the political
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influence of a plurality Muslim population is the degree of its internal cohesiveness relative to the internal unity of other religions. Members of other religions could very well be divided along sectarian and other ascriptive bases, such as, for example, ethnicity or language. Muslims, of course, can also be divided by these cleavages, but the crucial issue here is the relative degree of intra-group cleavages among Muslims and adherents of other religions. Even if adherents of other religions constitute a majority of the population but are internally divided by other sources of social cleavages, then even a minority Muslim population that is otherwise internally united can exercise considerable political clout.
These criteria suggest that variations in demographic and social structural factors beyond the straightforward 50% population share cut-off may also affect the social salience and political relevance of Muslims. For a variety of historical reasons, these factors have played an important role in shaping the social, economic and political role of Islam as well as other religions in African countries. I suspect that similar situations may prevail in other countries that are conventionally defined as Muslims, including the ones in the
Middle East, but scholars have not systematically analyzed them.
For the purposes of this paper, therefore, I have dispensed with the population share criterion and have relied on membership in the Organization of Islamic States (OIC) as the basis for defining a Muslim country. This decision leads to the classification of 55 countries as Muslim. Table A1 lists these countries classified by reegion. There are 21
Muslim countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
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18 in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA), 7 each in the former USSR and Asia, and 2 in Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC).
[Table A1 goes here]
T HEORETICAL INTUITIONS
The central theoretical intuition that motivates my analysis is that the role of religion in politics is best conceived as a contingent relationship. There are three related sources of this contingency. The first concerns the institutionalization of religion in the politics and governance of a country. The institutionalization of religion refers to the constitutional specification of the relationship between religion and the state. The constitutional specification of religion-state relationship reflect varied patterns. These patterns may vary from one extreme of complete fusion of state and religion, as in a theocracy in which unelected religious elites can constitutionally rule directly or veto the decisions of elected secular elites (e.g Iran), to the other extreme of complete separation in which religion is constitutionally shielded from either state regulation or favoritism (e.g the
United States). Between these two extremes, the state may regulate certain aspects of religion (e.g. religious provisions regulating criminal behavior) while allowing other aspects (e.g. religious provisions regulating marriage, divorce, inheritance, diet or dress).
1
There are actually 22 Muslim countries in SSA, but Somalia is excluded because of data probems.
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The second source of the contingency that mediates the religion-state relationship concerns variations in the social salience of religion relative to other sources of social ceavages, such as, for exampe, ethnicity, language, and class. Variatons in the social salience of religion and other social cleavages (a) attest to their multidimensionality, malleability and strategic activation by rational actors for interest definition, group formation and political mobilization, and for structuring social, economic and political interactions, more generally, and (b) help to map the varied social structural contexts in which they may either overlap, with religion subsuming and suppressing the social salience of other cleavages, or they may cross-cut, enabling their strategic activation separately or jointly.
The third source of the contingency that mediates religion-state relationship concerns the political economy. The political economic variables relate to the standard measures of level of economic development. But in the Muslim world, it also relates to the oil economy and its implications for the organization and outcomes of political interactions, especially democracy (Herb 2005; Ross 2012).
The key theoretical implication of these three sources of contingencies for systematic analysis is to underscore the importance of theoretically informed analysis that is also context-sensitive. Theoretically informed analysis, in other words, must be grounded in systemtaic data that capture the contextual variations in which religion-state relationship is inevitablyembedded.
Motivated by these theoretical considerations, the analysis presented in this paper is grounded in systematic data that measure the contextual variations in the first source of the contingency mentioned above, namely, variations in the institutionalizaton of religion in politics and governance. In the next section, I describe the dataset and the relevant variables I employ to measure the variations in the intitutionalization of religion in politics and governance in Muslim countries.
DATA
The analysis below is based on two types of variables. The first type of variables deal with the constitutional specification of four religious clauses: religious freedom, religious equality, SRAS, and official religion. The second type of variables deal with laws aimed specifically at discriminating religious minorities, and with laws regulating the influence of religion generally – that is, all religions, including majority religion – on society, economy and politics.
I draw the two types of variables from two datasets from the Religion and State (RAS).
One dataset codes the clauses on freedom of religion, religious equality, SRAS and official religion in the constitutions of 169 countries. The other dataset codes all the relevant laws dealing with variables that measure the wide-ranging impact of religion on social, economic and political life in 177 countries. The latter dataset is the source for the varaibles measuring discrimination agisnt religious minorities and for variables measuring the regulation of religion more generally.
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Both datasets cover the period 1990- 2008. All anlysis presented in this paper is basd on data in 2008.
For full details on both dataset and the variables, as well as on the analytical (conceptual, theoretical and methodological) foundations of the datasets, see, among others, Fox 2008,
2011; Fox and Flores 2009).
Religious Variables
The religious variables I employ in this paper include four religious clauses in the constitution, and laws aimed at discriminating against religious minorities and laws regulating the role of religion more generally. The four religious clauses in the constitutions are:
1.
Freedom of Religion: clauses mentioning either positive guarantees for freedom of worhsip or freedom of religion, or clauses banning interference with these freedoms.
2.
Equality of Religion: clauses mentioning positive guarantees of equality of religion or banning discrimination based on religion. These are different from freedom of religion clauses more generally, which applies to religion itself, in that they protect groups and indidviduals from discrimination because of their religious affiliations. For example, the clauses would ban members of an ethnic group from discriminating against co-ethnics who belong to a different religion.
3.
Separation of Religion and State (SRAS): clauses specifically mentioning that state and religion are separate, or that the state is secular, or that there is no state religion, or that the state may not establsih a religion, or that the state is autonomous of religious organizations (and vice versa).
4.
Official Religion: Establishment of Religion (EOR) clauses that explictly declare prescribe a religion as the state religion.
Following the research protocol in the RAS project, each of these variables are coded as 0 if the relevant clause is absent and 1 if the relevant clause is present.
I describe the variables measuring religious discrimination and religious regulation in the relevant sections on Data Analysis below.
Control Variables
In addition to the religious variables, I also use a number of control variables to test the extent to which the global pattern of religion-state relationship measured by the incidence and distribution of the four religious clauses and their impact on religious discrimination and religious regulation among the 56 Muslim countries are affected by the social, economic and political context of these countries. Specifically, I focus on eight control variables
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The first control variable concerns the regional breakdown of the Muslim countries. As
Table A1 shows, there are 21 countries in Africa, 18 n MENA, seven in the former
USSR, 7 in Asia and 2 in LAC.
The second control variable I use is a measure of regime-type based on Polity. Because
Polity classifies regimes on a 20-point scale ranging from -10 (strong autocracy) to +10
(strong democracy), I rescaled this measure from 0 (strong autocracy) to 20 (strong democracy), and then, using the standard cut-off points for distinguishing regimes with the conventional categories in Polity, I classified the regimes in Muslim countires as
Autocracy, Anocracy, and Democracy.
The third control variable I use is the widely-use Freedom House ratings of Free, Partly
Free and Not Free.
The fourth control variable I use is a measure of ethnic fractionalization. The fifth is a measure of linguistic fractionalization. And the sixth is a measure of religious fractionalization. The data and the measures for all these three indicators of social frationalization are derived from Alesina et al (2005. To facilitate the mapping exercise presented in the analysis below, I have divided the fractionalization index of each indicator at the mean to distinguish Muslim countrieswith low fractionaization from
Muslim countries with high fractionalizaton.
The seventh conrol variable I use is oil income per capita. I measure tis variable using the data in Ross (2013-02). And using Ross’s methodology, I also use oil income of
$100 per capita as the cut-off point to distinguish between Muslim countries who are non-oil producres (countries earning below $100 per capita from oil) from Muslim countries who are oil producers (countries earning at least $100 per capita from oil)
(Ross, 2008: 16).
Finally, the eighth control variable I use is GDP per capita to measure a country;s overall economic development. I use the data from Penn World Table, Version 6.3 (Heston,
Sumers and Aten 2009). I use the median value of GDP per capita to distinguish between low-income and high income countries.
DATA ANALYSIS
In this section, I present four types of analysis. First, I analyze the incidence of four religious clauses – religious freedom, religious equality, separation of religion and state, and official religion – in the constitutions of Muslim countries. Second, I analyze the impact of the constitutional provision of religious freedom on the amount religious discrimination laws. Third, I analyze examine the impact of the constitutional provision of religious equality on the amount of religious discrimination laws. Finally, I analyze the impact of the constitutional provision of SRAS on the amount of religious legislation.
The principal purpose of these analyses is to map (a) the distribution of religious clauses in the constitutions and their impact on the amount religious discrimination laws specifically, and religious laws generally, across Muslim countries, and (b) the extent to which this distribution and impact are affected by the regional location of Muslim
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countries, their regime types as measured by Polity and Freedom House indicators, degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalizations, whether or not they are oil producers, and their level of economic development.
Religious Clauses in Constitutions of Muslim Countries
Table 1 presents data on the four types of religious clauses in the constitutions of Muslim countries that I examine in the paper -- religious freedom; religious equality; separation of religion and state (SRAS); and official religion. The data show that 89.1% of the constitutions in Muslim countries have freedom of religion clauses. This is a surprisingly high percentage given our conventional view of Musim countries. But Muslim countries in this respect are not all that different from non-Muslim countries, 90% of whom also have a religious freedom clause in their constitutions.
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[Table 1 goes here]
The proporton of Musim countries with a religious freedom clause in their constitutions remains consistently high even when we take into account their regional distribution, regime types, ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalizations, oil income per capita, and
GDP per capita. That 77.8% of the MENA Muslim countries have a religious freedom clause in their constiutions also defies our conventional wisdom about the region. Only
Iran, Morocco, Saudia Arabia and Yemen do not provide for religious freedom. The most theoretically interesting result, however, is the statistically significant relationship between religious fractionalization and the provision of religious freedom. Slightly over three-fourths (77.8%) of Muslim countries with low religious fractionalization and all
(100%) Muslim countries with high religious fractionalization provide for religious freedom in their constitutions. To the extent that religious fractionalization indicates religious pluralism, these results suggests the possibility that in Muslim countres, as elsewhere, a competitive religious marketplace correlates with greater religious freedom than a a monopolistic one.
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The high proportion of constitutional provision of religious freedom in Muslim countries, however, does not automatically translate into constitutional provisions for either religious equality or SRAS. Only 47.3% of Muslim countries provide for religious equality, and 45.5% provide for SRAS. However, Muslim countries register considerable and statistically significant variations on both constitutional religious clauses when they are compared within the relevant control variables. Susbtantially high proportion of
Muslim countries in SSA provide for both religious equality (71.4%) and SRAS (76.2%).
Only 42.9% of the Muslim countries in the former USSR provide for religious equality, while all of them (100.0%) include SRAS clauses in their constitutions. Only 28.6% of
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Interestingly, Indonesia is the only Muslim where constitutional change in 2000 replaced the previous absence of religious freedom with a clause providing for religious freedom. On the larger constitutional changes that has fostered a robust democracy in Indonesia, see Horowitz (2013, esp, pp. 120-122, and 132 on the provision of religion freedom in the Indonesian Constitution).
3
On the relationship between a competitive religious marketplace and religious freedom, see Iannaccone
(1991).
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Asian Muslim countries provide for religious equality and none include an SRAS clause in their constitutions. Among the MENA countries, 27.8% provide for religious equality, and only Turkey (5.6% ) has an SRAS clause in its constitution. Among the Latin
American countries, only Suriname includes both clauses in its constitution, and Guyana includes neither.
Both Polity and Freedom House measures register statistically significant correlations with the proportion of religious equality and SRAS clauses in the constitutions of Muslim countries. These correlations are also generally in the expected directions. Countries classified as autocracies in Polity, and not free by Freedom House, register lower percentages of both clauses, while countries classified as anocracies and democracies in
Polity, and partly free and free by Freedom House, register higher precentages of both types of religious clauses. What is interesting, however, is that while countries classified as democracies in Polity and free by Freedom House register significantly higher perentages of religious equality and SRAS clauses (60% and 70%, respectively, for democracies, and 50% and 75% for free countries), these precentages are argubaly lower than our conventional expectations and understandings of the provisions of religious equality and separation of religion and state in the constitutions of democratic countries.
This is, however, not very surprising. Muslim countries reflect a global trend, evident especially in some emerging democracies, toward some degree of constitutional limits on religious equality even as states have expanded provisions of more general religious freedom. And as the data in Tables 3-4 below will show, Muslim countries also reflect a second global trend, evident most conspicuously in established Western democracies
(with the sole exception of the United States), toward increased regulation of religion in the public sphere through legislation even in the context of strong constitutional provisions of religious freedom (e.g. France).
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With respect to the three social fractionalizations measures, ethnic and linguistic fractionalizations are significantly correlated with both religious equality and SRAS clauses. In Muslim countries with low ethnic divisions, 28.6% of the constitutions contain religious equality clauses and an equal percentage of 28.6% contain SRAS clauses, while the corresponding percentages for the two religious clauses in Muslim countries with high ethnic divisions are 58.8% and 55.9%, respectively. Similarly, in
Muslim countries with high linguistic divsions, 32.1% of the constitutions provide for religious equality and 21.4% provided for SRAS, while the corresponding percentages for the two religious clauses in Muslim countries with high linguistic divisions are 63.0% and 70.4%, respectively. While the correlations between religious fractionalization and religious equality and SRAS clauses are not statistically significant, the relative distributions of the two clauses across different levels of religious fractionalizations are consistent with their relative distributions across ethnic and linguistic fractionalizations.
Thus, in Muslim countries with low religious divisions, 37.0% of the constitutions contain religious equality clauses and 33.3% contain SRAS clauses, while the corresponding percentages for the two religious clauses in Muslim countries with high
4
On these two related global trends, see, among other Fox 2008, 2011; Fox and Flores 2009; and Kuru
2006, 2009.
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religious divisions are 57.1% and 57.1%, respectively. I will elaborate further on the theoretical implications of these results in the discussion of the results in Tables 2-4.
There is no statistically significant correlations between the two economy variables – oil income per capita and GDP per capita – and the religious equality clauses. But the correlations between the two economy variables and the SRAS clause is statistically significant. While 60.0% of non-oil producing Muslim countries provide for SRAS in their constitutions, only 33.0% of oil-producing Muslim countries do so. Similarly, twothird (66.7%) of low-income Muslim countries provide for SRAS in their constitutions, but only a quarter of high income Muslim countries do so.
Finally, the data in Table 1 show that 40.0% Muslim countries have a constitutionally prescribed offical religion. Regional breakdown shows that Muslim countries in the former USSR and LAC do not have an official religion, but 85.7% of Asian and 83.3% of
MENA Muslim countries do. Indonesia is the only Asian country, and Lebanon, Syria and Turkey are the only MENA countries, without an official religion. Sub-Saharan
Africa is the only region where the overwhelming majority of Muslim countries do not have an official religion. Mauritania is the only SSA Muslim country with an official religion.
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The Impact of Religious Freedom Clause on the Amount Religious Discrimination
To what extent do constitutional provisions of religious freedom and religious equality affect the amount of religious discrimination in Muslim countries? Tables 2 and 3 present data that help to answer this question. Table 2 presents two types of data on the amount of religious discrimination controlling for the presence or absence religious freedom clause in the constitution: (a) mean religious discrimination laws; and (b) the percentage of countries in which religious discrimination laws exceeds zero. The latter information helps to test the notion that the constitutional provision of religious freedom deter states from passing laws that discriminate against groups and individual on the basis of religion. Both types of information are mapped across the 56 Muslim countries globally and also by taking into account regime types, three types of social fractionalization (ethnic, linguistic and religious), oil income and economic development.
[Table 2 goes here]
The mean religious discrimination is calculated from a composite measure of discrimination laws aimed at regulating minority religions. The laws cover 30 variables dealing with both non-coercive restrictions on minority religions, such as observance, organization prosleytizing and conversion, sermons, writings and speeches, to coercicve measures, such as arrests, surveillance, harrassments, and declaring some minority religions as dangerous and extremists (Pinkus and Meyer 2008).
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Each variable is
5
Somalia’s new constitution declares Islam as the official religion. Because of data constraints Somalia is excluded in this paper.
6
The complete list of these 30 variables is available in the RAS2 dataset at www.religionandstate.org
.
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measured on a 4-point scale: 0 = not significantly restricted for any activity or minority religion; 1 = the activity is slightly restricted for some minorities; 2 = the activity is slightly restricted for most or all minorities, or sharply restricted for some minorities; 3 = the activity is prohibted or sharply restricted for most or all minorities. Since each variable can take on a value from 0 to 3, the values of the 30 variables can be combined to create a composite measure of religious discrimination that can potentially range from
0 to 90. This method yields a composite measure of religious discrimination laws in the
55 Muslim countries that ranges from zero (10 countries,) to 71 (Saudi Arabia), with a mean of 17.15 (sd = 16.1). Using the mean of 17.15 as the cut-off point yields 30 countries (54.5%) with low amounts of religious discrimination, and 25 countries
(45.5%) with high amounts of religious discrimination.
Table 2 (left column panel), shows that the mean religious discrimination among Muslim countries globally register a mean of 17.15, those with religious freedom clause in their constitutions register a mean of 14.96, and those without a religious discriminatin clause in their constitutions register a mean of 35.00. Thus, Muslim countries with no religious freedom clause in their constitutions are about twice as likely as countries with such a clause in their constitutions to pass laws that discriminate against religious minorities.
With some notable exceptions, these differences in the amount of religious discrimination between Muslim countries globally and Muslim countries distinguished by the presence or absence of religious freedom clauses in their constitutions are also repeated in almost all catgeories of each of the control variables.
Turning to the notable exceptions, first, all Muslim countries in the former USSR and
Asia, all of whom also have religious freedom clauses in their constitutions, discriminate against religious minorities. Of the two LAC countries classified as Muslim, both of which also have religious freedom clauses in their constitutions, Guyana discriminates against religious minorities but Suriname does not. Of the four Muslim countries classified as free by Freedom House, Guyana and Mali discriminate against religious minorities, but Benin and Suriname do not. Finally, all 28 Muslim countries with high religious fractionalization, all of whom also have religious freedom clauses in their constitutions (see Table 1) engage in religious discrimination. However, six of these countries – Azerbaijan, Brunei, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Sudan – register high amounts of religious discrimination, with the individual country mean values ranging from 22 (Azerbaijan) to 39 (Brunei) and the combined mean value of 32 (sd = 6.0). By contrast, remaining 22 countries that register low amounts religious discrimination, the individual country mean value ranges from 0 (Benin, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Guinea-
Bissau, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Suriname) to 18 (Nigeria), with a combined mean value of 5.95 (sd =6.0).
Turning to the control variables, next, regional breakdown shows that the mean religious discrimination value in the MENA Muslim countries is not only higher than the global mean (25.26 compared to 17.15), but MENA Muslim countries without religious freedom clauses in their constitutions are twice as likely as those with a religious freedom clauses in their constitutions to discrimiante against religious minorties (40.25 compared to
21.36). The Muslim countries in Africa and in Latin America register mean religious
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discrimination values (6.38 and 0.50, respectively) that are lower than the global mean.
Only two African Muslim countries – Comoros and Mauritania – do not have a religious freedom clauses in their constitutions and together they comprise the 24.50 mean religious discrimination value.
The regime classification of Muslim coutries by Polity and Freedom House yields results that are generally consistent with expectations. Autocracies and Not Free countries register higher mean values for religious discrimination (28.82 and 24.04, respectively) than the global mean of 17.15. Within each of these regime categories, countries with no religious freedom clauses in their constitutions engage in substantially higher amounts of religious discrimination (39.00 and 45.33, respectively) than countries with religious clasues in their constitutions (25.69 and 20.85, respectively. Similar patterns hold for countries classified as Anocracies and Partly Free, as well as for countries classified as
Democracy and Free. I should point out, however, that of the 10 countries clasifed as
Democracy by Polity, Comoros is the only one without a religious freedom clause in its constitution, which is reflected in the mean religious value 30.00. The other 9 countries classified in this catgeory all have religious clauses in their constitutions, which is refelected in the low mean religious discrimination value of 7.44. These data, however, obscure the enigmatic role of Indonesia and Turkey, two of the largest and vibrant democracies in the Muslim world, in discriminating against religious minorities, which is reflected in their high (above-average) individual country mean religious discrimintion values of 25.00 and 27.00, respectively, and a combined mean value of 26.00.
With respect to ethnic, linguistic and religious frationalizations, low fractionalization on al three indicators correlate with higher (24.67, 23.89, 22.96, respectively) than the global mean religious discrimination of 17.25. Conversely, high fractionalization on all three measures correlate (12.50, 10.15, 11.54, respectively) with lower than the global mean. I have already discused above the differences in religious discrimination among the 28 countries with high religious fractionalization that also have religious freedom clauses in their constitutions.
Finally, non-oil producing and low-income Muslim countries, with mean religious discrimination values of 10.64 and 10.30, respectively, engage in lower religious discrimination than the global mean. Conversely, oil-prodcuing and high-income Muslim countries, with mean religious discrimination values of 22.57 and 23.75, respectively, enagage in higher amount of religious discrimination than the global mean. In both control variables, moreover, Muslim countries with no religious clauses in their constitutions are about twice as likely than countries with such clauses to discriminate against religious minorities.
Table 2 also shows that slightly over four-fifths (82%) of Muslim countries engage in some form of legal religious discrimination (the right column panel). Moreover, in the absence of a religious freedom clause in the constitution, almost all Muslim countries globally and across all catgeories of the control variables, enagage in some form of religious discrimination. The exceptions to this general pattern are the seven Muslim countries in the former USSR and the seven Muslim countries in Asia, all of whom have religious freedom clauses in their constitutions.
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The presence of a religious freedom clause in the constitution helps to reduce the amount of legal religious discrimination, both globally and, with some exceptions, across the categories of the control variables. Globally, the percentage of religious discrimination laws in countries with a religious freedom clause in the constitution is lower than in countries without such a clause by 20%. Across the categories of the control variables, the presence of religious freedom clause in the constitution helps to reduce the amount of legal religious discrimination, with Muslim countries in SSA and Latin America, and those classified as free by Freedom House representing the lowest percentages around
50%. In most of the Muslim countries across most of the categories of the control variables, as well, the presence of a religious freedom clause in the constitution also helps to reduce the amount of religious discrimination, although the percentages are substantially higher than our conventional intuition about the limiting effects of religious freedom clause in the constitiution on religious discrimination would lead us to expect.
That our conventional intuition in this respect is misleading is confirmed by the Muslim countries in the former USSR and Asia, all of whom have religious freedom clauses in their constitutions, but all of whom engage in some form of religious discrimination.
Finally, all MENA Muslim countries, irrespective of whether they have a religious freedom clause in their constitutions, engage in religious discrimination.
The Impact of Religious Equality Clause on the Amount Religious Discrimination
Table 3 presents two types of data on the amount of religious discrimination controlling for the presence or absence religious equality clause in the constitution: (a) mean religious discrimination laws; and (b) the percentage of countries in which religious discrimination laws exceeds zero. The latter information helps to test the notion that the constitutional provision of religious equality help to deter states from passing laws that discriminate against groups and individuals on the basis of religion. Both types of information are mapped across the 56 Muslim countries globally and also by taking into account regime types, three types of social fractionalization (ethnic, linguistic and religious), oil income and economic development.
[Table 3 goes here]
Table 3 (left column panel) shows that the mean religious discrimination for all Muslim countries is 17.15, for countries with constitutional clauses prohibiting religious discrimination it is 11.46, and for countries without such clauses it is 22.24. Thus, globally, Muslim countries without religious equality clauses in their constitutions are twice as likely as Muslim countries with such clauses to discriminate against religious minorities.
Turning to the control variables, the regional mean values of religious discrimination show that Muslim countires in the former USSR are slightly more, and Asian and MENA
Muslim countries are significantly more, likely to discriminate against religious minorities in Muslim countries gobally. But SSA and LAC Muslim countries are substantially less likely than other Muslim countries to engage in such religious discrimination. Muslim countries that are classified as Autocracy by Polity and Not Free
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by Freedom House, that feature low levels of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalizations, and that are oil producers and are rich engage in religious discrimination by substantially higher margins than both Muslim countries in the other categories of the same control variables and Muslim countries globally.
However, paired comparisons of Muslim countries with and without constitutional provisions of religious equality reveals mixed influence of such clauses on the practice of religious discrimination. In 5 of 21 paired comparison, constitutional provision of religious equality correlates with higher mean religious discrimination. Three of these comparisions are counter-intuitive. While higher mean religious discrimination in
MENA Muslim countries and Muslim countries classified as Autocracy by Polity is perhaps expected, the higher means in SSA Muslim countries is surprising, given the low mean of 6.38 for the continent as a whole, and in Muslim countires classified as
Democracy by Polity and Free by Freedom House, given our conventional wisdom about religious toleration in democracies. However, as noted above, Muslim countires in this respect reflect a global trend toward increased religious discrimination in the context of general political freedom (including religious freedom) in the past two decades, especially in the wake of 9/11.
Across all other catgeories of each control variable, constitutional provision of religious equality helps to reduce the amount of religious discrimination. Particularly notable is that all countries with high levels of ethnic, lingusitic and religious fractionalizations not only register mean religious discrimination values well below the global mean, but paired comparisons reveal significant influence of the constitutional provision of religious equality in helping to reduce the amount of discrimination against religious minorities.
The data on the proportion of Muslim countries that engage in religious discrimination
(right column panel in Table 3) parallels the data on the mean religious discrimination.
They show that a substantially majority of Muslim countries, both globally and irrespective of whether or not they have a religious equality clause in their constitutions, engage in some form of discrimination against religious minorities. Globally, slightly over four-fifths (82%) of Muslim countries engage in some form of legal discrimination against religious minorities. Moreover, 86.2% do so in the absence of a religious equality clause in their constitution, but 80% also do so even in the presence of such a clause.
All Muslim countries (100%) that are located in the former USSR, Asia and MENA, that are classified as Autocracy by Polity, and that feature low ethnic frationalization discriminate against religious minorities. Over half (57.1%) of Muslim countries in SSA and 50% in Latin America, and 50% of Muslim countries classified as Democracy by
Polity and Free by Freedom House also engage in religious discrimination. But paired comparsions also reveals that constitutional clauses prohibiting religious discrimination does not dampen the prospects of such discrimination in two thirds (66.7%) of Muslim countries in SSA and 50% in Latin America, in Muslim countries classified as
Democracy by Polity (83%) and Partly Free by Freedom House (77.8%), and Muslim countries with high linguistic fractionalization (70.6%) and low religious fractionalization
(90%).
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The Impact of SRAS Clause on the Amount Religious Legislation
Table 4 presents two types of data on the amount of religious legislation in Muslim countries controlling for whether or not they have an SRAS clause in their constitutions.
The first type of data (left column panel) measures the mean religious legislation. This measure is derived from a composite aggregated index of 51 discrete types of legislation regulating the influence of religion on wide range of a wide range of social, economic and political interactions. These legislations are not specifically directed at minority religions at all religion, including the majority religion.
7 The composite index ranges from 0 to 51. The second type of data (right column panel) measures the proportion of
Muslim countries in which religious legislation exceeds zero. This measure helps to test the extent to which the presence or absence of SRAS clause in the constitutions reduces the likelihood of legislation regulating the role and influence of reigion social, economic and political interactions in Muslim countries.
Turning, first, to the data on the right column panel, all Muslim countries, both globally and across each category of all control variables, have passed legislation regulating some aspect of religion. The frequency of these legislations range from 1 to 41 with a mean of
13.91. Using the mean as the cut-off point to distinguish between Muslim countries with low amounts religious legislation from Muslim countries with high amounts of religious legislation shows that 54.5% (N = 30) of the countries fall in the low catgeory, while
45.5% (N = 25) fall in the high category.
As noted, mean value of religious legislation for Muslim countries globally is 3.91.
However, the presence of SRAS clauses results in a substantial reduction in the amount of religious legislation (5.84) compared to the absence of an SRAS clause (20.63).
Muslim countries that are located in the former USSR, SSA and Latin America, that are classified as Anocracy and Democracy by Polity, and Partly Free and Free by Freedom
House, that feature high ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalizations, are non-oil producers, and have low GDP per capita all register mean religious legislation vlaues that are below the global mean.
Paired comparion of Muslim countries with and with SRAS clauses reveal expected patterns. The presence of SRAS clause tends to diminish the likelihood of religious legislation in Muslim countries, often by substantial margins, across all 19 of the 21 paired comparisions across the categories in each of the control variables. The two rather puzzling exceptions are (1) the Muslim countries in the former USSR, none of which have SRAS clauses in their constitutions, and (2) the Asian countries, all of which have
SRAS clauses in their constitutions.
SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
7
The complete list of these 51 variables is available in the RAS2 dataset at www.religionandstate.org
.
14

I have suggested that the relationship between religion and state in Muslim countries, as elswhere, is best conceived as a contingent relationship. In this paper, I have undertaken a preliminary examination of one source of this contingency, namely, the institutionalization of religion-state relationship as measured by the the constitutional provisions of religious freedom, religious equality, separaion of religion and state, and an offical religion.
The preliminary data analysis presented above revealed, for example, that a substantial majority of Muslim countries globally provide for religious freedom, and that the provision of reigious freedom tends to reduce the amount of religious discrimiantion. On both counts, however, Muslim countries reflect significant variations when they are disggregated by region, regime type, ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization, oil income, and level of development. Africa and Latin America contain the highest propotion of Muslim countries with religious freedom clauses with correspondingly lowest amount of religious discrimination. The presence of religious freedom clauses also tends to reduce religious discrimination in MENA, Asia and the former USSR, but the magnitude are not as substantial as in the SSA and LAC Muslim countries.
The proportion of of Muslim countries with religious equality and SRAS clauses are almost half that of Muslim countries with religious freedom clauses. Reflecting a global trend over the past decade of increased religious discriminiaton in the context of more general and abstract, catch-all religious freedom clauses, a higher proportion of Muslim countries with religious equality clauses engage in legal religious discrimination compared to countries with religious freedom clauses. This is the case in paired comparision of countries with and without religious equality clauses in both Africa and in countries classified as Democracy by Polity and Free by Freedom House, despite the fact that both groups of countries register the lowest mean values for religious discrimination in global comparison.
The most revealing and theoretically most interesting results in the data analysis are found in the Muslim countries with high levels of social fractionalizations generally, and high levels of religious fractionalizations in particular. These countries, in global comparision as well as paired comparisons of the presence and absence of religious freedom, the presence and absence of religious equality, and the presence and absence of
SRAS, tend to register low amounts of religious disrimination and low amounts of religious legislation. Simply put, high social fractionalization, and especially high religious fractionalization, correlate with higher amount of religious freedom and religious equality, as well as lower amount of religious regulation.
One possible explanation for these counter-intuitive findings is that the contextually specific combination of high ethnic and lingustic fractionalizations helps to mitigate the otherwise deleterious effect of high institutionalization of religion. In particular, language and ethnicity typically interact and cross-cut each other and with religion to dissipate the prospect of any one source of cleavage becoming dominant. This type of social and political dynamics, especially in sustaining democracy is best seen in
Indonesia, the world largest Muslim country, where ethnic and lingusitic, as well as regional disvisions, not only cross-cut each other, but cross-cut through Islam, producing
15

a secular democracy in an overwhelmingly Muslim country (Horowitz 2013; Mujani and
Liddle 2009; Pepinsky, Liddle and Mujani 2013).
In the MENA Muslim countries, on the other hand, the contextually distinct combination of social fractionalization and institutionalization of religion has a different political effect, especially on the propsects for democracy. Data reported elsewhere (Mozaffar
2011) indicate that ethnic fractionlization exceeds religious divisions by 21% and linguistic divisions by 18% in the MENA countries. Embedded in the religious and linguistic homogeneity of the MENA Muslim countries, therefore, is considerable amount of ethnic heterogeneity that could potentially mitigate the dominant effects of religion and language, but especially of religion, in politics and governance.
8
But it is precsiely here that the institutionalization of religion in politics and governance becomes crucial in diminishing the propects for democracy in these countries. In contrast to the low institutionalization of religion coupled with a complex and malleable relationship between ethnicity, language and religion in African Muslim countries, the high institutionalization of religion in the Arab countries indicates that even when alternative sources of social cleavages, such as ethnicity, exists for group formation, interest definition and collective political action, the significance of religion as the dominant basis for defining groups and social relations is enhanced by its entrenchment in the state.
Herein, then, lies at least a partial but crucial source of the Arab democracy deficit.
The strategic malleability of social cleavages in identity construction, group formation, interest definition and the organization of collective political action, and their complex and varied relationship with the institutionalization of religion in enhancing the propsects for democracy is best exemplified by African Muslim countries. First, notwithstanding the grossly erroneous popular perception of African Muslim countries as riven by bloody religious (and ethnic) conflicts, including, especially, of Nigeria, the continent’s largest
Muslim country, religion is not a dominant source of social division on the continent.
For a variety of complex historical and political reasons, religion remains the least politicized of all sources of social cleavage in African countries (Laitin 1986; Mozaffar
2007; Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999). Second, like religion, language is also not a major source of politicized social cleavage, despite (or because of) the tremendous diversity of languages across the continent (Laitin 1992, 1994; Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999).
Third, in the absence of religious and lingustic divisions, ethnicity remains the dominant source of social cleavage. But the pattern of ethnic cleavages is such that no ethnic group in Africa even approaches a 50% share of the population that would give it a numerical advantage for political domination by itself. And when a group does reach 50% or more, such as the Wolof, which constitutes 80% of the population in a country that is 90%
Muslim, it is subdivided into several smaller nested sub-groups that (Scarritt and
Mozaffar 1999). The result is a complex combination of inter-group and intra-group cleavages that encourages shifting political coalitions and facilitates the process of
8
Lebanon offers a useful lesson for the importance of multidimensional cross-cutting cleavages in sustaining democracy. But Lebanon also offers evidence of the malleability of ethnicity, language and religion in constructing and sustaining group idenities. Lebanon, as well as Sudan, further exemplify the tragic consequences of sculpting deeply-divided societies out of multi-ethnic ones. On the distinction between multiethnic and deeply-divided societies, see Mozaffar (2007).
16

peaceful democratic competition in what are otherwise socially fractionalized countries
(Mozaffar, Scarrit and Galaich 2003).
Fourth, closely linked to this complex and politically malleable social structural context is the low level of institutionalization of religion in Africa countries. Any attempt at increasing the level institutionalization of religion, especially, by favoring one religion over another will almost certainly upset the delicate political balance grounded in the complex and shifting relationship among the varied bases of social divisions, including, especially religion. Few African political leaders are strategically irrational enough to take this risk !
Counterintuitively, therefore, the very complexity and malleability of African social structure defined by the shifting interaction and social salience of varied sources of social cleavages, and bolstered by low institutionalization of religion, enhances the prospects for democracy. Herein, then, lies the source of the democratic exceptionalism of African
Muslim countries.
9
The analysis presented in this paper is an initial and preliminary attempt to elaborate these larger theoretical issues derived from the theoretical intuitions about the varied contingencies that surround religion-state relations in Muslim countries and elsewhere.
9
This also accounts for the high levels of religious tolerance in Africa. The recent Pew Trust study on religious tolerance worldwide reports that African countries register the second highest level of religion tolerance after Western Europe (Pew Trust 2009).
17

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Romain Wacziarg. 2003. “Fractionalization,” J ournal of Economic Growth, 8: 155-194.
Fox, Jonathan. 2008. A World Survey of Religion and the State . New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Fox, Jonathan. 2011. “Out of Sync: The Disconnect Between Constitutional Clauses and State legislation on Religion,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 44: 59-81.
Fox, Jonathan, and Deborah Flores. 2009. “Religions, Constitutions, and the State: A
Cross-National Study,” Journal of Politics 71: 1499-1513.
Herb, Michael. 2005. “No Representation Without Taxation: Rents, Development and
Democracy,” Comparative Politics 37: 297-317.
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten. 2009. Penn World Table , Verison
6.3. Philadelphia,: University of Pennsylvania.
Horowitz, Donald L. 2013. Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia . New
Yor: Cambridge University Press.
Iannacone, Laurence. 1988. “The Consequences of Religious Market Regulation: Adam
Smith and the Economics of Religion,” Rationality and Society 3:156-177.
Kuru, Ahmet T. 2006. “Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions,
Ideological Struggles, and State Policies Toward Religion,” World Politics 59: 568-594
Kuru, Ahmet T. 2009. Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United State,
France and Turkey Cambridge University Press.
Laitin, David D. 1986. Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Laitin , David D. 1992. Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa . New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Laitin, David D. 1994. “the Tower of Babel as a Coordination Game: Political
Linguistics in Ghana,” American Political Science Review 88 (3): 622-634.
Mozaffar, Shaheen. 2007. “Are Multiethnic Societies and Deeply-Divided Societies
Different?” Paper presented at the 12th Annual World Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Columbia University, New York City April 12-14.
18

Mozaffar, Shaheen, and James R. Scarritt. 1999. “Why Territorial Autonomy is not a
Viable Option for Managing Ethnic Conflicts in African Plural Societies,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics , vol. 5: 230-253. Reprinted in Identity and Territorial Autonomy in
Plural Societies , pp. 230-253. Edited by William Safran and Ramón Máiz. London:
Frank Cass.
Mozaffar, Shaheen, James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich. 2003. “Electoral Institutions,
Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa’s Emerging Democracies,”
American Political Science Review 97 (August): 379-90.
Mujan, Saiful and R. William Liddle. 2009. "Muslim Indonesia's Secular Democracy,"
Asian Survey 49: 575-590
Pew Trust. 2009b. Global Restrictions on Religion . Washington, DC: Pew Forum on
Religion & Public Life.
Pepinksy, Thomas B., R. William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani. 2012. “testing Islam’s
Political Advantage: Evidence from Indonesia,” American Journal of Political Science
56: 584-600.
Pinkus, Lauren E. and Katherine Meyer. 2008. “Religious Noncoercive and Coercive
Regulations,” International Journal of Sociology 38: 82-107.
Ross, Michael. 2012. The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of
Nations . Princeton: Princeton Universoty Press.
Ross, Michael. 2013-2. "Oil and Gas Data, 1932-2011", http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/20369 UNF:5:dc22RlDasveOTAJvwIjBTA== V2 [Version]
19

All Countries
Region
Former USSR
Asia
Middle East & North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Latin America
Polity
Autocracy
Anocracy
Democracy
Freedom House
Not Free
Partly Free
Free
Ethnic Fractionalization
Low
High
Linguistic Fractionalization
Low
High
Religious Fractionalization
Low
High
Oil Income Per Capita
No
Yes
GDP Per Capita
Low
High
*** Χ
2 significance is ≤ . 001
** Χ
2 significance is ≤ .01
* Χ
2 s ignificance is ≤ ..05
27
28
25
30
27
28
21
34
28
27
23
28
4
17
22
10
N
55
7
7
18
21
2
Table 1 Religious Clauses in Constitutions of Muslim Countries, 2008
Religious
Freedom
89.1%
100.0%
100.0%
77.8%
90.5%
100.0%
76.5%
95.5%
90.0%
87.0%
89.3%
100.0%
81.0%
94.1%
82.1%
96.3%
77.8%**
100.0%
92.0%
86.7%
88.9%
89.3%
Separation of Religion and State
45.5%
100.0%***
0.0%
5.6%
76.2%
50.0%
23.5%*
63.6%
70.0%
30.4%
53.6%
75.0%
28.6%*
55.9%
21.4%***
70.4%
33.3%
57.1%
3.92%*
33.0%
66.7%**
25.0%
Religious
Equality
47.3%
42.9%
28.6%
27.8%
71.4%
50.0%
23.5%*
63.6%
60.0%
26.1%*
64.3%
50.0%
28.6%*
58.8%
32.1%*
63.0%
37.0%
57.1%
60.0%
36.7%
51.9%
42.9%
Official
Religion
40.0%
0.0%***
85.7%
83.3%
4.8%
0.0%
64.7%**
27.3%
10.0%
60.9%*
28.6%
0.0%
57.1%*
29.4%
64.3%***
14.8%
55.6%*
25.0%
24.0%*
53.3%
18.5%***
60.7%
20

Table 2 Amount of Religious Discrimination Controlling for Religious Freedom Clause in
Constitutions of Muslim Countries, 2008
N
All Countries 55
Region
Former USSR
Asia
7
7
Middle East & North Africa 18
Sub-Saharan Africa
Polity
Latin America
21
2
Autocracy
Anocracy
Democracy
17
22
10
Freedom House
Not Free
Partly Free
Free
Ethnic Fractionalization
Low
High
Linguistic Fractionalization
21
34
23
28
4
28
27
Low
High
Religious Fractionalization
Low
High
Oil Income Per Capita
No
Yes
27
28
25
30
GDP Per Capita
Low 27
High 28
** Eta significance is ≤ .001
* Eta significance is ≤ .01
35.00
---
25.00
40.00
24.33
45.67
30.00
45.33
24.67
---
36.25
32.50
32.80
46.00
Mean Religious Discrimination
No
Religious
Freedom
Clause
Religious
Freedom
Clause
All
Cases
35.00 14.96
% of Cases With Religious
Discrimination Greater Than 0
No
Religious
Freedom
Clause
17.15** 100.0%
Religious
Freedom
Clause
80.0%
All Cases
82.0%
---
---
40.25
19.00
30.71
21.36
19.00**
30.71
---
---
25.56 100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.00
100.0%
24.50
---
39.00
24.00
4.47
0.50
25.69
9.33
6.38
0.50
100.0%
---
28.82** 100.0%
10.00 100.0%
53%
50.0%
100.0%
71.5%
57.1%
50.0%
100.0%
72.7%
7.44
20.85
12.52
0.75
21.94
11.25
21.96
8.77
9.70 100.0%
24.04* 100.0%
13.82 100.0%
0.75 ---
24.67* 100.0%
12.50 100.0%
23.89** 100.0%
10.15 100.0%
67.0%
72.0%
50.0%
100.0%
68.8%
95.7%
65.4%
95.0%
70.0%
95.7%
75.0%
50.0%
100.0%
70.6%
96.4%
66.7%
19.52
11.54
9.39
19.88
8.54
21.12
22.96* 100.0%
11.54 ---
10.64* 100.0%
22.57 100.0%
10.30** 100.0%
23.75 100.0%
85.7%
75.0%
69.6%
88.5%
62.5%
96.0%
88.9%
75.0%
72.0%
90.0%
66.7%
96.4%
21

Table 3 Amount of Religious Discrimination Controlling for Religious Equality Clause in
Constitutions of Muslim Countries, 2008
N
All Countries 55
Region
Former USSR
Asia
7
7
Middle East & North Africa 18
Sub-Saharan Africa 21
Latin America 2
Polity
Autocracy
Anocracy
Democracy
Freedom House
Not Free
Partly Free
Free
17
22
10
23
28
4
Ethnic Fractionalization
Low
High
Linguistic Fractionalization
Low
High
Religious Fractionalization
Low
High
Oil Income Per Capita
No
Yes
21
34
28
27
27
28
25
30
GDP Per Capita
Low 27
High 28
***Eta significance is ≤ .001
**Eta significance is ≤ .01
*Eta significance is ≤ .05
0.50
27.00
17.14
26.16
14.80
26.82
15.75
15.00
26.05
13.31
29.50
Mean Religious Discrimination
No
Religious
Equality
Clause
Religious
Equality
Clause
All
Cases
22.24 11.46 17.15**
26.75
35.60
25.38
4.83
1.00
8.67
18.50
26.00
7.00
0.00
19.00***
30.71
25.56
6.38
0.50
Discrimination Greater Than 0
No
Religious
Equality
Clause
86.2%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
33.3%
100%
% of Cases With Religious
Religious
Equality
Clause
80.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
66.7%
100%
All Cases
82.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
57.1%
50.0%
28.62
15.00
7.00
25.88
20.40
29.50
7.14
11.50
18.83
10.17
28.82***
10.00
9.70
24.04** 100.0%
13.82
100.0%
75.0%
50.0%
70.0%
100.0%
71.4%
83.3%
83.3%
77.8%
100.0%
72.7%
50.0%
95.7%
75.0%
1.00
18.83
9.25
19.11
7.41
16.40
8.38
7.73
16.55
7.50
16.08
0.75 50.0%
24.67** 100.0%
12.50 71.4%
23.89*** 100.0%
10.15
22.96**
11.54
10.64**
60.0%
88.2%
83.3%
70.0%
22.57 94.7%
10.30*** 69.2%
23.75 100.0%
50.0%
100.0%
70.0%
88.9%
70.6%
90.0%
68.8%
73.3%
81.8%
64.3%
91.7%
50.0%
100.0%
70.6%
96.4%
66.7%
88.9%
75.0%
72.0%
90.0%
66.7%
96.4%
22

Table 4 Amount of Religious Legislation Controlling for Separation of Religion and State Clause in
Constitutions of Muslim Countries, 2008
All Countries
N
55
Mean Religious Legislation
No SRAS
Clause
SRAS
Clause
All Cases
20.63 5.84
% of Cases With Religious Legislation
No SRAS
Clause
13.91*** 100.0%
Greater Than 0
SRAS
Clause
100.0%
All Cases
100.0%
Region
Former USSR
Asia
7
7
Middle East & North Africa 18
Sub-Saharan Africa 21
Latin America 2
Polity
Autocracy
Anocracy
Democracy
Freedom House
Not Free
Partly Free
Free
Ethnic Fractionalization
Low
High
Linguistic Fractionalization
Low
High
Religious Fractionalization
Low
High
Oil Income Per Capita
No
Yes
GDP Per Capita
Low
17
22
10
23
28
4
21
34
28
27
27
28
25
30
27
High 28
***Eta significance is ≤ .001
**Eta significance is ≤ .01
*Eta significance is ≤ .05
5.67
5.89
7.00
5.19
5.50
6.20
4.00
5.83
5.84
4.47
7.90
6.11
5.14
4.43
---
11.00
6.31
3.00
5.50
6.07
5.57
22.06
20.15
4.00
20.67
20.60
19.91
22.63
21.11
19.92
---
26.86
21.18
13.40
4.00
22.46
19.25
18.33
18.30
21.80
18.78
21.43
4.43*** 100.0%
26.86 100.0%
20.61
8.00
3.50
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
18.47** 100.0%
10.86 100.0%
9.40 100.0%
18.47** 100.0%
12.68 100.0%
4.00 100.0%
16.43
12.35
100.0%
100.0%
16.86* 100.0%
10.85 100.0%
16.41
11.50
100.0%
100.0%
10.00** 100.0%
17.17 100.0%
10.33** 100.0%
17.36 100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
23

Africa (N=21)
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Cote d’Ivoire
Djibouti
Gabon
Gambia
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Togo
Uganda
Table A1 Muslim Countries Classified By Region (N = 55)
MENA (N=18)
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
Turkey
UAE
Yemen
Former USSR (N=7)
Albania
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Asia (N=7) LAC (N=2)
Afghanistan Guyana
Bangladesh
Brunei
Suriname
Indonesia
Malaysia
Maldives
Pakistan
24