Current Research Journal of Social Sciences 2(4): 233-241, 2010
ISSN: 2041-3246
© M axwell Scientific Organization, 2010
Submitted Date: July 06, 2010
Accepted Date: August 09, 2010
Published Date: September 06, 2010
Corruption: The Bane of Democratic Stability in Nigeria
I.S. Ogundiya
Departm ent of Political Science, Usmanu D anfodiyo University, Soko to, Nigeria
Abstract: Nigeria’s dem ocracy has remaine d grossly un stable since the co untry returned to d emoc ratic form
of governance in 1999. The political terrain has been characterised by violent ethno-religious crisis, contract
killing and political assassinations, inter and intra-party fracas and civil disobedience. At the heart of
dem ocratic instability in Nigeria is pande mic bureaucratic and p olitical corruption. This study shows that
political and bureaucratic corruptions have grave implications for dem ocratic stability in N igeria. It is argued
that democratic stability will be difficult to attain as long as corruption remain pandemic and unchecked.
Key w ords: Corruption, democracy, democratic consolidation, instability, legitimacy, violence
John ston, 1991; Obayelu, 2007; HRW , 2007; Fjeldstad
and Isaksen, 2008). These theoretical stance is depicted in
various works and analyses as “amoral politics”, “amoral
f am i li sm ” (Osa gha e, 199 5; O gundiya, 2009),
“prebendalism” (Joseph, 1987), “patrimonialism and
neopatrimonialism”, “clientelism” (S eteolu, 2005 ) to
mention a few. Corrupt ridden states are also captioned by
scholars as “predatory”, “soft state” (Myrdal) and so on.
The problem w ith Nig eria is that all these descriptions are
suitable to analyse Nigerian situation.
Though amorphous, corruption in its popular
conception is define d as the exp loitation of public
position, resources, and pow er for private gain
(Nye, 1967; Dobel, 1978; Amuwo, 2005; Obayelu, 2007;
Fjeldstad and Isaksen, 200 8; Ogundiya, 2009). For
instance Dobel (1978) define corruption as “the betrayal
of public trust for ind ividual or grou p gain ”. In a sim ilar
vein, Obayelu (2007) ide ntifies corruption as “efforts to
secure wealth or power through illegal means for private
gain at public expense; or a misuse of public po wer for
private benefit”. It is important to note that corruption is
neither system specific nor culture bou nd. It is ubiquitous.
Therefore, corruption as a phenomenon, is a global
problem, and exists in varying degrees in different
countries (Agbu, 20 03). C orruption is no t only found in
dem ocratic and d ictatorial politics, but also in feudal,
capitalist and socialist economies. Christian, Muslim,
Hindu, and Buddhist cultures are equally bedevilled by
corruption (Dike, 2005 cf Obayelu, 2007). Corrupt
practices, in all its manifestations are as old as human race
(Lipset and L enz, 2000). However, the nature, form,
dimension, character and the severity of corruption differs
from one nation to the other. W hile corruption is mo re
prevalent in the developing world, the developed world
experience corruption at a minimal level. The important
reason for the low level of corruption in the advanced
democracies is that the control mechanisms are more
INTRODUCTION
Nigeria’s democratic project has been under
perpetual threat since 19 99 w hen the country returned to
dem ocratic governance especially as a result of high
prevalence of corruption. Put differently, corruption is a
major challenge to democratic stability in Nigeria. The
political climate, to say the least has been ho stile to
democracy. The general scepticism has been whether the
current experience will last. This cynicism is justifiable
when one consider the fact that all the factors that
precip itated the collapse of the First and Second
Republics are currently at play. Widespread violence,
electoral frauds, political assassination, politically
inspired ethno-religious conflict, apathy, evitable
econom ic woes and its attendant consequences (abject
poverty, slums etc.,), flagrant disregard for the rule of law,
disrespect for human rights and pandemic corruption
remains the key features of Nigerian political life. These
manifestations of demo cratic instability are the symptoms
and consequence s of basic system pathology, majorly,
political corruption. Corruption has become prevalent and
has not only greatly eroded the basis of the authority of
the state but also challenge the legitimacy of democracy
as the best form of governance. The problem of
democratic instability persists because the political system
has failed to engender, maintain and sustain the belief in
Nigerians that democ racy is the most appropriate system
for the society. This study demonstrates that corruption
has robbed Nigerians, the government which they chose
to represent and pursue their interests and the
consequ ence - dem ocratic instability is inevitable.
Defining corruption: The theoretical thinking perceiving
corruption as a m ajor factor that poses serious threat to
dem ocratic stability, sustainab ility and c onso lidation is
not uncommon in the literatures (Osaghae, 1995;
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developed and effective than in the developing countries.
The efficacy of the control mechanisms in the advanced
democracies further accounts for the relative political and
dem ocratic stability tha t these countries enjoy. Before
going on to examine the nexus of corruption and
dem ocratic stability, let us briefly elaborate on the
concept of democratic stability and its connection to
democratic consolidation.
In a similar vein, Mishler and Rose (2001)
maintained that a defining feature of democratic regimes
is that they depend for their survival and effective
functioning on the public’s willing acquiescence and
supp ort. Democratic stability, therefore, presupposes “that
people have, at any given time, the go vernment which
they choose and that, being rational beings, they are most
likely to support a government which represents and
pursues their interests” (Osaghae, 1995). A government
which represents and pursue peoples’ interest must be
responsive, responsible and accountable to the people.
Responsiveness and accou ntability enhance p eople’s
affection and support for the system . This further
enhances the growth and development of democratic
culture, which is a sine qua non for democratic survival.
In essence, a developed democratic culture is a sine qua
non for democratic stability. Here, Linz and Stephan’s
(cited in Um ar, 2002) illustrative phra se that stable
democracy depe nds o n ave rage citizens accep ting it as
“the only game in town” is critically instructive.
Cultural theorists like Almond and Verba (1963) and
Lipset (1994) for instance, clearly recognised that cultural
variables, especially legitimacy , can be critical for the
survival of democratic regimes once they are established.
In his mo re recent work Lipset (19 94) stated that:
“Political stability in democratic systems cannot rely on
force. The alternative to force is legitim acy...” (Lipset
et al., 1993; Lipset, 1994). Seligson (2000) also found an
inextricable connection between levels of support and
tolerance and democratic stability. Seligson (2000)
declared that: ‘in situations of low support and low
tolerance, democracy is clearly at risk and dem ocratic
breakdown seems to be the most likely ultimate outcome”.
The belief in the rightness of the political arrangement or
what Lipse t (1959) called legitimacy is a function of the
cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations of the
citizens. This is also influenced by the nature of politics,
quality of governance, leadership performance, and the
character and nature of the relationship among the
contending elites. Regimes characterized by higher level
of dem ocratic legitimacy are more likely, according to
Fails (2008), “ to c omplete the pro cess of
democratisation”. This process has been described by
Diamond (1999) as “democratic deepening”, reflecting the
continuous ability of democratic institutions to improve
political participation; to become more open and vigorous;
and enhance accountability. The underlying assumption
here is that how average citizens perceive democracy has
an important impact on its stability. B ased on this
assumption, this study shows that political and
bureaucra tic corruption in Nigeria, as experienced in the
past ten years has made nonsense of and threatens
Nigeria’s nascent democracy.
Towards explaining democratic stability theoretical
and conceptual explorations: Research on de moc ratic
stability in the developing countries, cu rrently
experiencing the “third wav e”, is problema tic for a
number of reasons. “Po litical traditions are not yet
developed, party systems are fragile and electoral
formulas are changed, and in addition, one cannot always
separate personal influence of exceptional political
leaders from th eir institutionally capabilities”
(Pugaciauskas, 1999). Another analytical problem stems
from the fact that dem ocratic stability could be confused
with regime stability. However, the term demo cratic
stability is preferred to “regime stability” as the former
carries considerab le normative charge. Rather than define
the essence of democratic stability, some authors have
confined themselves to presenting the criteria of
democratic instability: cancellation o f constitutionally
required democratic elections; usurpation of governmental
powers- usually through fraudulent elections;
unconstitutional impeachments etc. (Pugaciauskas, 1999).
The conc ept of demo cratic stability is synonymous
with legitimacy, especially if legitimacy is conceived as
the belief in the moral rights of a regime to govern.
Therefore, the ingredien ts of these mo ral rights that a
regime enjoys are inherent in the concept of dem ocratic
stability. According to Osaghae (1995) “the premise of
dem ocratic stability is that what sustains government and
ensures stability is voluntary support or consent of the
citizens rather than reliance on coercion”. In the words of
Diamond (1999) “it is by now a central tenet of empirical
theory that stable democracy also requires a belief in the
legitimacy
of
dem ocrac y”.
Th ese
demo cratic
ingred ients of stability have been well summarized by
Diamond et al. (1987 cf Osaghae, 1995) thu s:
All governments rest on some kind of mixture of
coercion and conse nt, but democracies are unique in
the degree to which their stability depends on the
consent of a majority of those governed. Almost as a
given, theories of dem ocrac y stress that democ ratic
stability requires a widespread b elief am ong both
elites and masses that democracy is the best form of
government for their society, and hence that the
democratic regime is morally entitled to rule.
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Other writers argue that the choice of institutional
model is central to democratic stability. Pugaciauskas
(1999) argue s that “the cho ice of institutional model
matters- and matters, first and foremost, from the
viewpoint of democratic stability”. Bernhard et al. (2001)
also relate the survival of democracies to econ omic
performance and institutional design. If this view is right
one can conclude that the failure of the First and Second
Nigerian Republics were caused by the wrong choice of
institutional frameworks/models. Though this assertion
may be plausible, it is important to note that, one major
flaw of this theory is that it failed to appreciate the role of
the operators. There is no perfect institutional frameworkeven a perfect institution in the hand of political scoundrel
is nothin g but a misguided missile. For example,
dem ocratic instability in Nigeria, as shall be argued later,
is exacerbated not only by institutional flaw s but mos tly
by deviations from institutional prescriptions- tested and
stable mode ls of presidentialism. W hile some sc holars
paid considerable attention to the role of culture,
institutional model, and the econo mic w ell-being of a
state, others emphasize the nature and character of elite,
the nature of and role of ethnicity to m ention a few .
Przeworski and h is colleagues have shown that once
democracy is stable, the level of economic development
has a great deal to do with its ability to survive. The
Przeworski et ál study, limits itself to macro-level
econ omic and institutional data (Cited in Seligson 20 00).
Since the publication of the L ipset’s early sem inal, it has
been demonstrated that macro-level variables such as
GNP, literacy, and regime type all play very important
role in creating the necessary conditions for the
emergence and survival of democracy. Huntington (1991)
concludes that econom ic developm ent is far more
important than culture, and points to the contradictions in
the argument that suggest that Confucianism and Islam
present obstacles to democratisation.
The existing emp irical research o n dem ocratic
consolidation typically follows one of two strategies
which are called “substantive” and “prospective”
(Svolik, 2007). According to Svolik (2007), “The
substantive approach focuses on a set of ideal outcomes
that we should be observed in a mature democracy and
then evaluates to what extent a polity approaches them”.
Such ideal outcomes frequently concern the functioning
of political institutions (Grzyma la-Busse, 2007); respect
for the democratic “rules of the game” (Diamond, 1999;
Levitsky and Way, 2002 cf Slovik, 2007); as well as
popular and elite attitudes towards democracy (Almond
and Verba, 1963; Guillermo and Schmitter, 1986;
Putnam, 1993; Bermeo, 2003; Cleary and Stokes, 2006;
Bernh ard and Karakoc, 2007). The second, prospective
approach associates consolidation with the durability of
democracy. According to Schedler (1998, 95 cf Svolik,
2007), for instance, “consolidating democracy means
reducing the probability of its breakdown to the point
whe re [we] can feel reasonably confident that democracy
will persist”. There fore, democ ratic consolidation is
about regime maintenance and about regarding the key
political institutions as the only legitimate framew ork for
political contestation and ad heren ce to the dem ocratic
rules of the game. Consolidation, according to Diamond
“is the process of achieving broad (and) deep legitimation
such that all significant political actors, at both elite and
mass level believe that the democratic system is better for
their society than any other realistic alternative they can
imagine”. Schedler (1998) in a related argu men t,
describes democratic consolidation as the challenge of
making new demo cracies secure, of extending their life
expectancy... of making them immune against the threat
of autho ritarian reg ression , of building da ms against the
eventual reverse waves”. Suffice to say that this cannot be
achieved except stability is attained.
The tiny gap b etween stability and con solidation is
that stability begets consolidation. Indeed democracy
must be stable for it to be consolidated. By implication
dem ocrac y mu st mak e sense to the people fo r it to enjoy
considerable support required for its consolidation. In this
work, demo cratic stability is seen as a step tow ard
dem ocratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation is as
earlier discussed is also a function of so many factors,
including enhanced economic development, developed
dem ocratic culture, stable party system etc.
Corruption and dem ocratic instability in Nigeria 19992009: Events in N igeria since 1999 have shown that the
tidal waves of reversal have been con tending with
Nigeria’s demo cratic project. Consequently, democracy
has remained g rossly unstable and the future seems to be
very bleak because of rampant systemic bureaucratic and
political corruption. Corruption has reached a high
crescendo such that an average N igerian now possibly
associates dem ocrac y with corruption. The consequences
of political corruption are patently manifest: cyclica l crisis
of legitimacy, fragile party structure, institutional decay,
chronic economic problem and underdevelopment and,
above all, general democratic volatility. Then, what are
the effects of corruption on de moc ratic stability? This
shall be discussed paying attention to the effects of
corruption on the economy and the socio-psychological
and political behav iour of b oth the politicians and the
electorates. Let us briefly examine some o f these linkages.
Corruption, economic developm ent and d em ocra tic
stability: The effects of corruption on a nation’s economy
are damaging. Indeed a nation inundated with corruption
cannot be viable economically neither can the system
generate enough support/affection required for the
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survival of democratic system. This is the situation in
Nigeria where corruption has become part and parcel of
the political culture. Corruption has indeed robbed
Nigerians the benefit of economic development because
scarce availab le resources that should have been deployed
to execute developmental projects have gone into private
foreign accounts. For instance in 2006, the head of
Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission,
Nuhu Ribadu, estimated that Nigeria lost some US$380
billion to corruption between independence in 1960 and
the end of military rule in 1999 (BBC, 2007). According
to Tony Blair (2005 cf Ogundiya, 2008), the former Prime
Minister of Britain, this amount is equivalent to all the
western aid given to Africa in almost four decades and
also equivalent to 300 years of British aid for the
continent. It is also said to be six times the A merican aid
given to post-war Europe under the Marshall plan.
Nigeria’s corruption epidemic has continued since then.
Some western diplomats estimated that Nige ria lost a
minimum average of $4 billion to $8 billion per y ear to
corruption over the eight years of the Obasanjo
administration (HRW , 2007). That figure would equal
between 4.25% and 9.5% of Nigeria’s total GDP in 2006.
To put those numbe rs in perspective, a loss of 9.5% of the
United States’ GDP to corruption in 2006 would have
translated into $1.25 trillion in stolen funds or $222
billion (GBP 108.6 billion) in the case of the United
Kingd om’s econom y (HR W , 2007). Though these figures
may not be very reliable, it is incontestable that corruption
has assumed a ludicrous dimension in Nigeria. Nigerian
situation aptly fit into what Myrdal (cf Amuwo, 2005)
described as the “folklore of corruption”. Expectedly, this
has had a debilitating impact on the nation’s socioecon omic and p olitical development. Significantly, the
levels of economic development and d emo cratic stability
have been found to be mutually supporting. The bulk of
liberal demo cratic theory establishes a close relationship
between the economies, refers to as development, and a
stable dem ocratic rule (Lip set et al., 1993; Ak e, 2001).
How ever, the link betw een d emo cracy and economic
prosperity is not as simple as it has been taken to be,
because the democratic process and the fortunes of the
economy have a cybernetic feedback interaction.
Democracy facilitates economic develo pme nt, wh ile
econ omic backwardness and decline impedes
democratisation. The contention here is that the level of
corruption in Nigeria has adversely affected the
performance of economy in that the resources which
would have been deployed to facilitate development have
found their ways into private pockets and individual
accounts in foreign countries. This is indeed the reason
for high level of poverty, insecurity, widespread diseases,
and high unemployment rate. All these provide unsu itable
ground for dem ocrac y to thrive. Observing the trends in
the development of the Nigerian democratic project, the
Hum an Right W atch (2007) comments:
Despite record-setting, government reven ues in
recent years, corruption and m ismanageme nt remain
a major cause of Nigeria’s failure to make
meaningful progress in improving the lot of ordinary
Nigerians. These finan cial facto rs are clo sely
entw ined with the rampant political violence in
Nigeria. Public revenues are not only stolen and
misused, but often pay for the services and weapons
behind the political violence. Because violence and
corruption mak e political competition a very
expensive endeav our in Nigeria, many p oliticians are
far more accountable to powerful and violent political
godfathers who spo nsor them than they are to their
constituents
Therefore, in the face of economic hardship, believed
to have been propelled by widespread corruption, it is an
herculean task to convince an averag e Nigerian to
continue to make unending sacrifices and swallow
without a limit, the b itter econ omic pills wh ich is no t a
natural consequence but an inevitab le effect of a corrupt
system. Therefore, to say that support for democ racy is
weakly strong in Nigeria is not an ov erstatem ent. W eakly
strong is deliberately used to describe a situation whereby
Nigerians though prefer civilian to military rule, have a
cold affection for democracy. This is indeed a problematic
situation, created by the glaring and prevalent corruption
that has pervaded Nigeria’s democracy in the past ten
years.
Corruption, political violence and democratic stability:
Political violence is the bane of dem ocratic stability in
Nigeria and its major cause is the over-permissiveness of
corruption by the Nigerian state. In Nigeria, political
power guarantees unlimited and uncontrolled access to the
resources of the state and society that are then
appropriated for personal and parochial use and
advantages. Nigerian brand of civilian politicking is
therefore no more than a prebe ndal enterprise eng aged in
largely for the crude appropriation of national resources
(Joseph, 198 7; Fawole, 2005; Ibeanu, 2007).
Consequently, contestants deploy terror tactics and
violence to intimida te out or elimina te the opponents in
what Ibeanu (2007) conceived as ‘machine politics”.
Therefore, there is a direct relationship between
corruption and political violence-many public officials use
stolen public revenues to pay for p olitical violence in
support of their ambitions (HRW , 2007). Since 1999
when the country returned to democracy, it is estimated
that more than ten thousan d lives h ave b een lost in
politically motivated violence and properties w orth
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billions of naira have been destroyed. There is little doubt
that there is an inextricable nexus between corruption and
the crises in the Nigerian state. Nigeria provides a fertile
ground for political corruption. Political corruption in a
dem ocratic context refers to the problem of agency
between citizen and elected official, and the w ay it is
affected by institutions that define the electoral process,
such as division of powers between different branches of
and levels of government, the role of the legal system
med ia and civil society in influe ncing public policy and
its implementation. In short, it deals with the policy
formulation process and high level of corruption among
politicians. Political corruption is evident when
governmental power is abused for illegitimate private,
group, or sectional ad vantage. T his is the trading of
influence and authority by political leaders and may
extend to granting favours, irregularities in campaign
financing and electoral fraud. It is an effort to secure
wealth for private benefit at public expense (Lipset and
Lenz, 2000). Forms of political corruption includes,
rigging, vote buying , vote selling, cancellation of votes,
ballot stuffing, manipulation of electoral registers,
inflation of electoral votes and the employment of
political offices for personal advantage at the expense of
the pu blic interest.
It is impo rtant to point ou t that the lev el of political
corruption has affected the cognitive perception of
Nigerians, first about the ability of the state to organise a
free and fair electoral contest; and second, perception that
political appointments are one sure way to wealth and
elevation of social status; and third, perception that the
political office holders cannot be responsive and
acco untab le to the citizens. T he impact of this on
dem ocratic stability is clear. Electoral contest has become
a do or d ie affair, turning Nigeria’s political milieu to a
Hobbesian state of nature- w ar of all ag ainst allcharacterised by what Ibeanu (2007) aptly described as
the “primitive accumulation of votes” or “machine
politics”. This, according to Ibeanu (2007) is to sustain
the belief tha t a legitimate way of securing political office
is to steal the peoples’ mandate. This has produced
several consequences with serious implication for
democratic stability: Contract killings, political
assassination, electoral violence resulting in the general
destruction of lives and properties. Moreover, on the part
of the Nigerian voters and the politicians, the
consequences are very apparent. Ibeanu (2007)
trenchantly summarised the consequences:
voters and politicians alike know that votes are
unequal and that the ac tions of corrup t electoral
official, party leaders, security agents and the
presidency do count more in determining electoral
outcomes than votes... the bulk of N igerian voters
have no illusions about the importance of their votes
and there is no psychological satisfaction in voting
because they know that either the votes will not be
counted o r the votes will not cou nt.
Consequently, as the p hilosophica l basis and
fundamental ethos of democracy are been swept under the
carpe t, the Nigerian electorates expectedly lost fate not
only in the electoral process, but fundamentally on the
government which a fraudulent process produced. Such
fraudulent electoral process with the benefit of hindsight
has produced irresponsible and unaccountable governance
in Nigeria. Impliedly, the legitimacy of democracy as the
best form of g overnance has been seriously corroded.
M ore distressing to demo cratic stability is the
godfatherism in Nigerian politics. One of the major
damaging consequences of corruption in Nigeria in the
recent time is the emergence of political “kingmakers”
and gladiators commonly known as the political
godfathers. A ccording to H uman Right W atch (2007 ):
Godfathe rism is both a symptom and a cause of the
violence and corruption that together permeate the
political proce ss in N igeria. Public officials who owe
their position to the efforts of a political godfather
incur a debt that they are expected to repay without
end throug hout their tenure in office. Godfathers are
only relevant because politicians are able to deploy
violence and corruption w ith impu nity to compete for
office in contests that often effectively, and
sometimes actually, exclude Nigeria’s voters’
altogether. But their activities also help to reinforce
the central role of violence and corrup tion in politics
by making it even more difficult to w in elected office
without resorting to the illegal tactics they represent.
Political corrup tion and the politics of godfatherism
and the attendant political violence pose more dang er to
demo cracy than any other factor. The con tention here is
that, the state of contemporary electoral compe tition in
Nigeria is far from mak ing de moc racy m eanin gful,
sensible and far from been durable.
Corruption, legitimacy and democratic stability:
Legitimacy is the moral rights of a government to be
obeyed. It is also seen as the belief by the majority of
citizens that the regime, defined as the constitutional order
is the most appropriate one fo r the society (L ipset, 1959).
W ith legitimacy the business of governance is made
On their part Nigerians voters do not attach great
promissory, content or psychological values to their
votes. The vote is grossly devalued and the mandates
claimed by politicians are effectively dubiou s... In
term of the content value of their votes, Nigerian
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simple. Democracy provides the ingredients through
which the moral basis of au thority is justified. Therefore,
the essence of demo cracy is to lay a solid moral
foundation for the authority of the state, the incumbent
political head and other state institutions. Democracy
therefore, not only prescribes how political pow er should
be acqu ired bu t also w hat to do with it and h ow it must be
exercised (Ogundiya, 2008). One of the hallowed
procedures of dem ocrac y is the electoral contest to
determine who will be allow ed to hold p ublic offices at all
levels (Fawole, 2005). An impo rtant ingredien t of this
procedure, as Diamond (Cited in Faw ole, 2005) w ould
have us believe, is the strict adherence to the rules of the
electoral system. Therefore, when power is acquired and
exercised contrary to democ ratic prescriptions and norms,
the moral basis of authority becomes questionable and
unjustifiable. This is the situation in Nigeria since 1999
when the country returned to democratic governance
because fairness and objectivity, which are irreduc ible
prerequisites for democratic stability, have been thrown
overboard. Thus, elections have failed to produce a
legitima te and acceptable government in Nigeria. As
discussed earlier this has frustrated dem ocratic stability in
the country.
The 1999, 20 03 and 2007 general elections w ere
adjudged to be worse than the previous general elections.
A fraudu lent election can produce n othing except a
fraudulent government, unacceptable to the people.
Expectedly, the advent of civilian rule in Nigeria in 1999
after a decade and half of military rule has not
autom atically translated into dem ocratic governance, in a
strict sense. Rather than put the blame on the prolonged
military rule and the authoritarian imprints it left on the
psyche of Nigerians, the fault should be properly placed
at the corridor of the kleptomaniac political and
bureaucra tic elites (Ogundiya, 2009). Indeed, rather than
authoritarian imprints (Fawole, 2005), the insa tiable taste
for stealing among the political elites has dulled the
democ ratic sensib ilities of Nigerians, thereb y posing a
serious threat to democratic stability.
the nature of the party system, party formation,
composition (ethnic and religious) and geographical
spread, others stressed the conflictual interparty and intraparty relationships. One major development in the recent
years is that political parties in Nigeria have become a
liability to democratic stability instead of asset. Party
procedures for the appointm ent of candidates are usually
scuttled and n on-transparent, as political godfathers have
taken over the affairs of the parties. Corrupt political
financing has adversely affected democracy in two
fundamental ways. First, it has generated serious intra
party feuds between and among the followers and
loyalists of the competing political godfathers resulting in
political assassinations and contract killings. Intra party
feuds since 1999 have assumed alarming and ludicrous
dimension. Between 1999 and 2009 over 10 0 party
stalwarts and thousands of party supporters have been
assassinated including: Odunayo Olagbaju (AC party
stalwarts in Osun state), M arshal Harry , Dikib o, Funso
W illiams (PDP Gubernatorial aspiran t in Lagos state), Dr.
Ayodeji Daramola (PDP stalwarts and Gubernatorial
aspirant in Ekiti state) among others. Secondly, corrupt
political financing has made ruling political parties at all
level of governance reluctant to pass strict laws on
political party financing, since some of the funds on
which they rely for their survival are obtained from
dubious so urces and corrupt practice s.
This further explains the weak support for
anticorruption posture of the Federal government by the
political parties. In a study in Kenya, Akivaga (2001)
found that the ineffectiveness of the political parties in the
crusade against corruption can be attributed to: first, lack
of com mitment to a national agenda even when it is
formulated; second, the pursuit of short term personal
interest as opposed to the long term interest of the nation;
third, obsession with ethnic considerations as the basis of
politics; fourth, lack of leadership with vision, that is , an
absence of leaders w hose word is their bond, who po ssess
principles and w ill, and who put integrity and character
above wealth. While this is true in the case of N igeria, it
needs be reiterated that political parties in Nigeria are
corruptly constituted and as well managed by corrupt past
military, burea ucratic and p olitical class. In such situation,
political parties, as a demo cratic institution cannot afford
to be an agent of democratic stability but rather an agent
of decay.
Corruption, political party (ies) and d em ocra tic
instability: Political parties are central to demo cratic
stability. It is one of the indispensable institutions of
democracy. It is perhaps incontrovertible to argue that
political parties constitute one of the major clog in the
wheel of dem ocratisa tion and dem ocratic stability in
Nigeria since th e cou ntry re-d emo cratise in 1999. Indeed
a bulk of literatures on Nigerian government and politics
rightly associated the demise of the First and Second
Republics to the Party system (Adamolekun, 1985;
Agbaje, 1990, 1996; Suberu, 1990; Fawole, 2005;
Ogundiya and B aba, 2007). However, various authors
differ in terms of emphasis. Some writers lay emphasis on
Corruption, the legislature and dem ocrati c
breakdown: Nigeria presents a typical case of failed
democracy in Africa due largely to corruption
(Maduagwu, 1996). Another institution of democracy that
has been ravaged by corruption is the legislatures (both at
the state and the F edera l levels). Indeed Ogbam O gban
Iyam’s trenchant hypothetical statements are to a large
238
Curr. Res. J. Soc. Sci., 2(4): 233-241, 2010
extent valid from the experience of Nigeria since the
return of the country to civilian rule in 1999. Ogban-Iyam
(1996) propositions which are considered relevant for the
understanding of the defective functionalities of the
legislatures to demo cratic stability are:
C W hen the few co ntrol the governance of a polity and
have the preponderance of force to continue to
maintain such control, the National Assembly that
emerges from the dictation of such a grou p is likely
to be more corrupt and subversive of democracy and
democratisation than the one that emerges from the
dictates of the popular forces.
C A National Assembly which is recruited and
constituted through corrupt and anti-democ ratic
mea ns tends to be corru pt.
C A corruptly recruited National Assembly tend s to
subvert democracy, and hinders democratisation.
C A citizenry that is essentially corrupt tends to have
and tolerate a corrupt National Assembly.
naira from Professor Osuji (the former Education
Minister) to inflate the budgetary allocation to education
ministry. Senator Chimaroke Nnamani also faced about
124 count charges of fraud, conspiracy, concealment and
money laund ering totaling ab out 5.4 billion na ira
(Vang uard newspaper Saturday February 16, 2008).
Madam Patricia Etteh, the first female Speaker of the
House of Representatives, resigned following her
indictment over the misa ppropriation of pub lic funds in
multiple contracts of N 628m (US$5 million) for the
renovation of her official residence and the purchase of 12
official cars. Suffice to say that many legislators bought
their ways into the legislative house. Corruption has also
had debilitating impacts on the rule of law , hum an righ ts
and other supportive ingredients of democracy. The
implication for dem ocratic stability is apparently
detrimental.
CONCLUSION
W ith the benefit of observation of the practices and
legislative activities from 1999 to date one can conclude,
without fear of contradiction that first, the few powerful
individuals popularly known as godfathers have forced
mem bers of the various houses of assemblies on Nigerians
through dubious and fraudulent electoral process. Hence,
the Legislatures existing since 1999 does not have its
source in the popular will. Therefore, members of
National and State Houses of Assemblies were recruited
through corrup t and antidemocratic means. Third, the
leaders of the National and State H ouses of Assemblies
have, as various revelations have shown, embarked on
stealing spree instead of legislating for good governance
and development of the country. Fourth, National and
State Houses of Assem blies are undoubtedly products of
a corrupt society. For example, questions bordering on
corruption have created serious instability in the upper
and lower legislative Houses. From 1999 when the
country returned to electoral democracy, the lead ership in
the Senate and the House of Representative have not been
stable. Chief Evans Enwerem, Chuba Okadigbo and
Adolphos Nwabara were impeached on account of
mismanagement and corrupt enrichmen t. For instance,
Senator Idris Kuta led panel that investigated the
allegation of corruption against Senator Chuba Okadigbo
found out among others that he was involved in the
inflation of the street light project to the tune of 173
million naira; authorized the payment of 37.2 million
naira to furnish the Senate president’s residence, an
amount above the approved 25 million; installed and
commissioned a 100 KV A genera ting set at the Senate
President’s residence at an inflated price of 15million
naira. Adolphu s W abara , also an impeache d Senate
President was also guilty of receiving bribe of 55 million
Democracy cannot be predicated on a fragile and
unstable political base. Corruption, the paper argues has
been responsible for the fragility and volatility of
democracy in Nigeria. Corruption has greatly eroded the
fundamental values of democracy and the essential
princip le that government should be representative and
accou ntable to the citize ns. Invariably, the Nigerian
political leaders as it is presently constituted lack the
moral fibres to champion the cause of the Nigerian
society. W hen political leaders are perceived to be
pursuing their persona l interests excessively, citizens
become disenchanted, questioning the legitimacy of
leaders and the state, and even the legitimacy of the
process and system that produced them. This is what
constitutes democratic instability. Democratic stability
simply presupposes “that a people have, at any given
time, the government which they choose and that, being
rational beings, they are most likely to support a
government which represents and pursues their interests.
Though this is not to suggest that corruption explains
everything- ethnicity, religious bigotry, recycling nature
of the political elites, bad governan ce, fragile party
structure, deteriorating economy etc- are o ther variables
that accoun t for democratic instability in Nigeria.
Importantly, all the above factors are both symptoms and
consequences of political corruption. Therefore, to en sure
stable demo cracy anticorrup tion policies devo id of mere
speechifying must be put in place.
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