COMM 744: FINAL CAPSTONE PROJECT
COMM 744: Analysis of the Shared Values Campaign
America’s Attempt at Public Diplomacy in the Arab World
Andrew H. Clay
American University
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This research project examines the way in which the United States implemented strategic
communication measures meant to support public diplomacy efforts through information campaigns. In
particular, it examines the Shared Values information campaign implemented by the Department of State
from late 2001 to early 2003. The brainchild of then Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Charlotte
Beers, the campaign objective was to expose Muslims in the Arab world to Muslim Americans and
illustrate shared values and morals, ultimately leading to a common understanding between to very
disparate cultures in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.
The primary method of analysis includes examination of the conduct of the campaign itself, and
the negative reaction from Arab scholars and those in the actual target demographic. The research draws
attention to the utilization of Western style marketing techniques meant to establish a relationship with
those in the Arab world in the same way a commercial brand establishes a relationship with a consumer.
With a long history of advertising success in several different firms on Madison Avenue, Under Secretary
Beers leveraged her vast experience to organize an information campaign using tactics and techniques
seen only in the most expensive American advertising firms. Upon further investigation, it is obvious
there was a fundamental misunderstanding of effective communication in the Arab world. While Under
Secretary Beers and the Department of State believed Arabs were unfamiliar with our values and simply
needed exposure to different facets of American life to appreciate freedom and democracy, the Arab
world wanted more than a monologue. Arab audiences were insulted by the naïve tone of the campaign
and the lack of symmetrical communication, feedback which resulted in the campaign’s cancellation.
This report identifies cultural cognizance as the most important factor in implementation of
information campaigns. Using the diffusion of innovations theory as a framework for future
communication efforts, the report’s main recommendation is for disseminating information campaigns
through respected and established information conduits. With time this tactic may facilitate honest
dialogue and further opportunity for discussion, aiding in the increase of understanding and appreciation
of American foreign policy initiatives.
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION
4
II.
LITERATURE REVIEW
6
III.
APPLIED RESEARCH APPROACH
13
IV.
CASE PROFILE
15
V.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
22
VI.
CONCLUSION
25
VII.
REFERENCES
28
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
4
INTRODUCTION
Strategic communication and public diplomacy mean a variety of things to many
different U.S. government entities. Ever since the Smith-Mundt Act of 1947, the United States has
sanctioned overt communication with foreign audiences around the globe in order to expose and educate
targeted publics to time honored values of the “free world,” like democracy and freedom. While this
approach of one-way communication was effective in reaching isolated audiences in the Eastern Bloc
during the Cold War, it did not necessarily result in successful communication with alternate audiences in
the recent conflict zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. Designated as the lead agency in America’s hasty
attempt to reach Arab audiences after 9/11, Secretary of State Colin Powell turned to advertising veteran
Charlotte Beers to engage and influence audiences in the Near East who were either hostile toward or
suspicious of United States foreign policy. While many attempts were made through various forms of
media to reach and educate Arab audiences about American ideals and values, the Shared Values
campaign is the focus of this research project.
While well planned and organized in the fashion of the finest advertising campaigns of Madison
Ave, the Shared Values campaign was seen by many within the targeted demographic to be ineffective
and offensive at times. This research paper uses the constructive framework of the diffusion of ideas
theory to determine the way in which the Shared Values campaign expected to reach listeners in the
targeted demographic, what information the campaign was disseminating to the target audience, the
effectiveness of the dissemination methods and the desired behavior for interested publics.
Specifically, this work will examine how an established theory of communication would have
improved the Shared Values broadcasts. Special consideration is given to whether or not the theory could
be tailored to an Arab audience. By using the failures from the Shared Values campaign and the feedback
received from a variety of Arab audiences, this paper proposes a way to improve future attempts to
communicate with the Arab world by focusing on cultural sensitivities. The results of the research paper
will provide a guide to the next generation of strategic communication practitioners during future attempts
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
5
to communicate with the Arab world, and provide examples of past mistakes to potentially influence
American public diplomacy.
This research is important because of the almost visceral reaction caused by the Shared Values
campaign in the Arab community. Vested interests in the region’s energy futures, a propensity to
intervene in conflicts between our allies in the region, and emerging nuclear capabilities in Iran all
indicate a lasting presence of the United States in the region. While there is information available about
the lack of effectiveness of these campaigns, many of these efforts were simply stopped and never
examined further by the Department of State for reasons that remain unclear. In fact, the largest amount
of research available on the topic of the efficacy of our approach to communicating in the Arab world is
from scholars and other academics in the targeted demographic. This alone begs the question of whether
or not we learned from our mistakes, and the most important part of this research is identifying the
significant cultural factors that could streamline the way we frame our communications strategies in the
future. The opportunity to use an established theory like the diffusion of ideas and apply it to a situation
in which we examine how best to take the “idea” of the United States and engage Arab audiences in
meaningful discussion is something that can help in approving our approach in the future. If we could
tailor approaches and recommendations in message content and dissemination through a culturally
appropriate framework, we would at least gain more credibility in the Arab world as opposed to being
completely alienated by entire regions. Consequently, this research would be valuable to those who target
foreign audiences and deliver messages designed to change attitudes and, ultimately, behavior.
Information Operations (IO) practitioners, Military Information Support Operations (MISO) personnel,
and those responsible for strategic communication in the Foreign Service might find information included
here as a valuable tool in shaping future professional pursuits.
The failure of United States information campaigns to influence attitudes and behaviors among
Arab audiences during the height of the Iraq War should be examined. The conclusions gleaned from the
study of our past failures in understanding the correct way to deliver a message in a culturally sensitive
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
6
way could drive us to improve the way in which we address the Arab world—and other unique foreign
audiences—in the future.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Methods to record and evaluate information campaigns in the ambiguous sphere of strategic
communication are rare. The national communication strategy for engaging and influencing foreign
audiences still relies heavily on tactics and techniques learned from advertising executives on Madison
Avenue, an approach which utilizes Western concepts to influence a target audience that is assumed to be
capable of making conscious choices—something not always true with all audiences around the world.
While this strategy was successful in attracting the attention of our rivals during the Cold War through
diligent work from those at the United States Information Agency (USIA) (Snyder, 1995), budget cuts
and bureaucratic realignment disbanded the USIA and rolled it into an obscure and underfunded bureau in
the Department of State (Lim, 2015). After gaining and maintaining information dominance over
countries within with the former Soviet sphere of influence, the primary agency responsible for the
majority of foreign engagement and influence at a strategic level was scrapped in favor of realignment
within the interagency. The newly minted organization did not maintain the most successful
communication strategies used by the USIA, nor record the best practices within the field of international
communication (Zaharna, 2014).
ORIGINS OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
Research into the origins of strategic communication dates back to the earliest governments of the
ancient Near East, with far reaching audiences spread across large distances. As communication became
more and more important to aid in controlling large subjugated populations spread over great distances,
governments were tasked with formulating a strategy for communication (Moore, 2010). As governments
could no longer trust spontaneity, reacting to various populations within each part of their expansive
empires, they needed to prepare, manage and control what is said to different audiences. Citing several
difficulties in the standardization and dissemination of information throughout an empire, Moore
examines the way in which nation states were forced to build an imperial system of structures and
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
7
dependencies in diverse regions and cultural traditions. This cultural fluency was a key to success within
expanding empires, as it allowed the presiding imperial power to best convey information to the target
audience using the appropriate language and delivery method for the culture, maximizing the probability
of successful receipt of the message as well as achieving the desired behavioral change. While advances
in technology have mitigated many concerns associated with primitive communication methods involved
with dissemination, many of the same problems of reaching a target audience still remain. Moore
continues to address the way in which early nation states used established institutions like religion to aid
in governance and population control.
In stark contrast to Moore is the work of Y.J. Lim, Theorizing Strategic Communication in
Parsimony from the U.S. Government perspective (2015). Lim chronicles the rise of the importance of
international engagement during the 20th Century; in particular, Lim denotes how various elements of the
interagency—particularly the Department of State (DoS) its subordinate agency USAID, the Department
of Defense (DoD), and the other agencies associated with strategic communication activity—share
responsibility for the execution of strategic communication objectives, but rarely communicate and
synchronize efforts between each respective element. The author also conveys the similarity between the
official definitions of strategic communication for each of the entities mentioned previously, which are
written in such ambiguous language that each separate department could ostensibly conduct the mission
of the others with no real necessity for serious deviation from its original mission.
Lim is one of many scholars who points toward the danger in the existing situation of gross
mission overlap to the elimination and subsequent appropriation of the USIA, and how the reclassification
of the agency into the DoS stunted the evolution of our national communication strategy. The agency was
built to counter Communist propaganda while at the same time espousing the superiority and desirability
of American values of liberty and freedom. To some, the USIA was a “one-trick pony,” unsuitable to
operate in the new post-Soviet reality of the new world order after the fall of the Berlin wall and the
insolvency of the Soviet Union. While in some respects this may be true, Lim argues the experience
offered by decades of engaging and influencing foreign audiences—albeit a small number of people with
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
8
radios in isolated portions of the Soviet Union—offered a baseline of information regarding the changing
of attitudes and behavior that the DoS could have used to develop a strategy to communicate with foreign
audiences in a post-Soviet world. Instead, the agency was disbanded and then seen as an unwelcome and
misunderstood addition to the Department of State, existing as the newly formed Bureau of Strategic
Communication. Through extensive research, Lim cites the directive appointing the State Department as
the agency officially responsible for America’s strategic communication initiatives. After 9/11, this
authority resulted in the formation of the Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Coordinating
Committee, with the assigned task of promoting the national interest and national security of the United
States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue
between American citizens and institutions as well as counterparts abroad. Lim re-emphasizes the
conundrum of ambiguity here, with assigned missions of the interagency giving way to confusion for
defined responsibilities. This lack of hard delineation has yet to be solved, but for research and discussion
purposes, Lim portrays the DoS as the agency primarily responsible for the area of strategic
communication known as public diplomacy. Overall, Lim’s research paints a very obscure picture of how
the interagency executes the national strategic communication strategy, but ultimately establishes the DoS
as the primary institution responsible for open engagement with foreign audiences.
Lim continues to depict the general but transformative evolution of foreign engagement away
from the militarily derived processes of strategic communication to the more tactful rhetoric associated
with diplomacy. This indicates a significant shift in the framing of strategic engagement, shifting the
focus to a realm more commonly associated with higher intellectual pursuits than the more primal
objectives associated with martial action. While seemingly insignificant, this denotes a change in rhetoric
that is extremely misleading. To think that strategic communication and public diplomacy take place only
at the highest levels of government negotiation is a false notion, as many times the implementation of
policy measures constructed at the highest of levels is carried out by the lowliest soldier or Marine. This
lofty and false notion of public diplomacy taking place only at the highest levels of government is
something examined by Plowman (2013) in his review of the role of relationship management and the
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
9
varying definitions of strategic communication. Plowman also takes issue with the methods used to
measure effectiveness in global communications campaigns, an issue central to this particular research
project and communications campaigns in general.
In regards to public diplomacy, in the research there is virtually nothing to differentiate this
approach from strategic communication beyond the vocabulary and verbiage. Advertising and market
approaches are paramount here, with emphasis on success in a Western context like those used by the
USIA during the Cold War (Izadi, 2009). While this one-way type of communication may work in the
world of advertising and marketing, it is perceived as extremely impersonal and superficial by many in
collectivist cultures like those found in the Arab world (Kruckeberg, 2005). These monologues breed
distrust among Arab populations who are already skeptical of American outreach, an inconvenient
variable omitted by those who initially crafted these campaigns. Dabbous and Nasser (2009) argue the
efficacy of these well-intentioned approaches was questionable at best, and something that was never
fully analyzed by the designers of the campaigns immediately after they were discontinued. For many in
the Arab world these campaigns resulted in the exact opposite of the desired effect, offending sensibilities
and driving communities to defend the most salient values of their own cultures. These attempts to
socialize American foreign policy through exposure to American-style values were a complete and utter
failure, alienating many Arabs in the region (Fitzpatrick, Kendrick & Fullerton, 2011). The work of
Fitzpatrick, Kendrick and Fullerton is unique in the capacity that it features uncensored critiques of these
communication approaches from many who work directly in international affairs, to include Foreign
Service Officers who were responsible for carrying out the flawed policy. This type of honesty is rarely
seen in the evaluation of strategic communication campaigns, and gives the reader unique insight
otherwise unseen in diplomatic matters, suggesting a feasible approach to the way ahead.
Legal considerations are another obstacle to creating a product that can be appreciated by those in
the domestic audience. Visibility for American efforts at foreign engagement is limited and is regulated
by the outdated Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, a document that served as the cornerstone of American
strategic communication policy (Berkowitz, 2009). While the document was paramount in the
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
10
establishment of the USIA and American efforts at engagement of foreign audiences, it is also one of the
main reasons foreign broadcasting programs are continuously underfunded and ignored. Broadcasts meant
for foreign audiences are not meant for domestic consumption, and therefore limit the opportunities for
appropriations committees and other funding agencies to recognize efforts abroad. However, beyond this,
the desperate need to establish two-way, symmetrical communication with those in the Arab world is
something universally agreed upon by all prominent scholars (Dutta-Bergman, 2006). This paper will
examine past efforts at information campaigns in support of public diplomacy and suggest a new way
forward which emphasizes discourse with Arab audiences to further international engagement and mutual
interests.
ORIGINS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
While there is no definitive difference between strategic communication and public diplomacy,
each is the evolution of an aggressive communication strategy implemented by the USIA during the Cold
War with the Soviet Union (Wang, 2007). The USIA was designed to reach foreign audiences and
convince them that the United States acts with the best interests of the free world in mind, and represents
the vanguard in pursuit of the highly desirable ideals of freedom and liberty. After this, the mission
expanded to influencing public attitudes of foreign audiences and advising the President and his staff of
foreign opinion of the United States abroad. Used primarily as a tool of the Reagan administration to
vehemently combat Communism, it became obsolete after the fall of the Berlin Wall and was eventually
rolled into the Bureau of Strategic Communication in the Department of State, failing to chronicle the
majority of the best communication practices and success stories gleaned from decades in the practice of
foreign engagement. Unable to fund exploratory efforts at advancing communication, the spirit of the
agency was lost in the bureaucratic shuffle at the DoS, languishing in exile until a need for
communicating with foreign audiences was identified after the events of 9/11.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN A POST-9/11 WORLD
In the aftermath of 9/11 and in an effort to implement an immediate response to a dire need for
public diplomacy in the Arab world, strategies straight from the Cold War era of operations in Eastern
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
11
Europe were relied upon to communicate with Arab audiences at the beginning of the Iraq War (Zaharna,
2014, p. 3). As the development of new forms of public diplomacy stalled after the disbanding of the US
Information Agency, the United States was caught wholly unprepared for engagement and influence of
foreign audiences (Dabbous & Nasser, 2009, p. 104). In an attempt to amend this colossal gap, processes
from the civilian world (read Western advertising and marketing) were used to bridge the communication
divide without thought to the second and third order effects of these actions.
From a cultural perspective, these approaches were much less than desirable. Without a venue for
two-way dialogue and discourse, those in the Arab world saw these attempts at influence as childish and
insulting. The research shows the United States was operating from a false understanding of how to
interact with foreign audiences, especially those in the Arab world who relied on very intimate personal
relationships to gauge trust and credibility. Mackay and Tatham (2011) argue that we, as Westerners,
operate on the intuitive assumption that the communication process will always be successful, and that
what we say will always be heard and understood. A very dangerous paradigm to use as a model, it is the
one used for the majority of our foreign outreach in Iraq.
Zaharna (2014) argues that many of our problems with public diplomacy stem from a deep
misunderstanding of the Arab world (p. 3). In our attempts to educate Arab audiences about the superior
nature of American values, our messages were seen as patronizing, condescending and insulting, possibly
even responsible for driving Arab audiences to embrace and protect their own culture in response to our
attempts to inundate them with communication from mass media full of self-promotional strategies
(Zaharna, 2014, p. 3). From a cultural perspective, we were dismissive of target audience considerations
and were obsessed with promoting America like a consumable, without illustrating any real tangible
benefits to consumption. In addition, much of the time in Iraq we appeared dismissive or ignorant of
cultural and religious distinctions that are incredibly important to those whom we were trying to engage
and influence. Much of our focus was sourced based: we were far too concerned with what we wanted to
say about our values than how those values would be perceived by interested publics.
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
12
A prime example of this was the “shared values” campaign instituted by Charlotte Beers, the
veteran advertising guru who was appointed as the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy by then
Secretary of State Colin Powell. Her attempt at “re-branding” America went horribly wrong, as many in
the Arab world perceived the campaign in a very negative way. A large part of the US effort was AlHurra satellite TV channel and Radio Sawa (each of which failed to gain resonance) failed to gain
resonance), suggesting that simple advertisement and image control is not enough to influence an Arab
audience.
AMENDMENTS TO THE STRATEGY
Through the scholarly works examined here, it is obvious a new approach is needed to remedy
past failures at strategic communication and public diplomacy. While there are obstacles in the
information environment that are beyond our control, we can still improve the process. Paul (2011) argues
that the United States—and especially the DoD—is at a disadvantage in the realm of supporting public
diplomacy due to a myriad of factors. Many of these are external, including the fact that many of our
adversaries operate with fewer restraints and therefore have a faster decision making cycle and the fact
that there is no clear and identifiable national communication strategy. Identifiable and realistic national
objectives are necessary measures for directing a cogent response, but should not be the end of the
amendment process. In addition to educating military commanders and politicians of the importance of
the proper conduct of influence operations, the United States should be cognizant of its approach to public
diplomacy. Fitzpatrick, Kendrick and Fullerton (2011) suggest that fighting terrorism with propaganda is
difficult to sustain, much less gain effective results when not culturally specific. An approach that puts
culture in perspective is needed for successful and meaningful engagement in the Arab world, as well as
one that contextualizes themes and messages. This should be best exemplified through the use of smartly
crafted messages of the correct tone, with meaningful content so as to avoid offense of cultural
sensibilities (Plaisance, 2005). Izadi (2009) goes on to suggest a need for understanding two-way
conversations, and posits that balance in the conversation is key to engaging publics in the Arab world.
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
13
His advocacy for continued dialogue, allowing for an exchange of ideas, is something that must be
allowed to work and progress for a long period of time to have a chance at success.
NEW CONSIDERATIONS FOR ENGAGEMENT
There is evidence of success in other countries through technologically advanced engagement,
specifically through social media engagement in South America (Hayden, 2013). This suggestion of
success is mirrored in case studies in Japan and Korea, where through sound web and social media
practices companies managed to develop relationships with publics of interest (Park, 2014). The
advancement of communication technology goes well beyond that which is seen in Hayden’s writings and
observations, but those of foreign scholars as well. An examination of exchanges on the Chinese micro
blogging website Tencent with elements of the DoS point toward successful discussion of shared
experiences and general relationship building (Zhong, 2013), exemplifying the exact type of two-way
discourse suggested by other scholars in this field.
Alternate approaches, like focusing on narratives to encapsulate and facilitate understanding of
cultural worldviews, along with updated technological features that can help disseminate information of
the positive things being done on the battlefield through access to more portable and advanced recording
devices (Dimitriu, 2012). In a separate work evaluating the power of narratives in U.S. public diplomacy
efforts, Hayden (2013) advocates for the revision of American soft power objectives with a renewed focus
on narratives. Countries like Turkey also offer an excellent model to follow, as they have reconciled
maintaining Islamic ideals while balancing Western influence, all while relying heavily on engaging
internal and external publics through social media (International Communication Association, 2012).
APPLIED RESEARCH APPROACH
The Shared Values campaign will be the featured case study used here for analysis. It sought to
expose listeners in the Arab world to the similarities between Arab Americans and those who were
abroad. While well intentioned and brilliantly executed in the fashion of the most successful Western
marketing campaigns, the campaign fell well short of the designated goals of improving perceptions of
American values of equality, freedom and respect. Culturally insensitive and inappropriate for the desired
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
14
target audience, much of the campaign focused on changing attitudes and beliefs about Americans
without offering an opportunity for discussion or other forms of symmetrical communication. This
failure, among many others, will be the focus of the case study. Using the diffusion of innovation theory
the research will focus on how the campaign could have been improved if certain changes were made to
accommodate for differences in the way Arab culture receives and understands messages.
The campaign was one of high importance. An immediate response to what was seen as a
disconnect between Americans and Arabs abroad, it was geared to convince the Arab world America was
an accepting place through the use of Arab American spokespeople. This research project’s analytical
framework will use the two-step flow theory to highlight the incredible naiveté associated with this
approach, why the ignorance of such an approach offended so many in the Arab world, and why it should
have utilized very specific culturally sensitive information to encourage honest and forthright discussion
with Arab audiences. Therefore, the main goal of this research is to examine a recent information
campaign and denote the reasons why the target audience so poorly received it. Also, examined here will
be the reasons why the campaign took shape as it did in the first place, using a Western based approach as
opposed to one appropriate for the target audience.
Answering the original research question of which strategic communication campaigns are most
effective in support of public diplomacy will prove much more extensive and difficult. It is far beyond the
scope of this project, and should be looked at in a more thorough and serious capacity as to compose a
more complete answer to a complicated question. It needs to be addressed through more dedicated
research than the eight weeks offered by this class. Ideally, a researcher with a grant would analyze this
issue full time and have complete and total access to the scripts utilized during the campaign, as well as
uninhibited access to the former Undersecretary of Public Diplomacy Charlotte Beers. While this research
project will not serve as a total and complete answer for those looking to fully examine United States
government strategic communication approaches to foreign audiences abroad, it does raise some serious
questions about the way in which our campaigns are structured and how they can be improved in future
iterations. The results of this research will yield a very clear signal to those involved with foreign
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
15
engagement and influence activity: ensure all efforts pointed toward at communicating with a foreign
audience is geared toward culturally appropriate objectives, and ensure the way in which the target
audience prefers to communicate be incorporated into the campaign.
CASE PROFILE
When analyzing the actual Shared Values campaign designed by Charlotte Beers, from a Western
standpoint it seems honest and forthright, with the best of American values on display through the
seemingly credible conduit of Muslims living in the United States. While each of the campaign spots
seeks to deliver a message of American egalitarianism, many in the Arab world saw the adverts as
insulting and extremely elementary, with some even calling them the “happy Muslim” commercials
(Dabbous and Nasser, 2009). For reference, a chart with a brief description of each video clip is included
below. During the conduct of research, almost all of the information about the advertising campaigns is
included in the cited works of academic literature of Plaisance, Fitzpatrick, Fullerton and Kendrick. The
following is a summary of all pertinent research related to the campaign.
The testimonial-style commercials feature "slice-of-life" treatments of happy and prosperous
Muslim Americans in various personal and professional roles. Each features Muslim Americans actively
practicing their religion and commenting positively on the tolerance Americans have toward the Muslim
faith in an effort to aid in facilitating understanding.
Name
Farooq Muhammad
Raiwa Ismail
Elias Zerhouni
Devianti Farid
Occupation
Male New York City Firefighter/Paramedic
Female Ohio school teacher
Head of the National Institutes for Health
Indonesian born female TV journalist in
Columbia, Missouri
Activity


Message
Highlighting the fair treatment he received as a
In America, we are all “brothers and
Muslim American
sisters”
Bantering with school children in a hijab at a Little
Muslims can assimilate into American
League game
society and still keep their cultural

Teaching her own children in a Muslim school
identities

Featured in lab coat chatting with colleagues and
Some of the most accomplished male
sharing a podium with President Bush
Americans are Muslim
Reports the news alongside her Anglo-American
Female Muslims are allowed great
colleagues
freedom and represent an influential

portion of the American media
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
Abdul Malik
Islamic Chaplain for MTA police department
16

in New York City
Offers counsel to all members of the police force,
Muslim clerics are seen as spiritual
Islamic or not
leaders to the entire population they
serve, Muslim or not
Abdul Hammuda
Male owner and operator of Tiger Bakery in
Toledo, Ohio

Praying in front of a Ferris wheel after interacting
I was never singled out or persecuted
with fellow citizens at a carnival
in America for my religious beliefs
The Shared Values videos provide repeated verbal and visual representations of the American
ideology of universal egalitarianism. The view is no less ideological for the high degree of the
transparency of its discourse—both in the way Beers discussed the campaign (Plaisance, 2005) and in the
video presentations of the selected Muslim Americans. “I’ve never gotten disrespected because I’m a
Muslim,” says Farooq Muhammad, a New York Fire Department paramedic. “We’re all brothers and
sisters. Here I am as one human, taking care of another.” Ohio schoolteacher Rawia Ismail, wearing a
hajib, is shown bantering with White children in that most American of settings, the weekend Little
League baseball game. Such imagery reinforces Jowett and O’Donnell’s (1999) claim that “resonance of
symbols of the past encourages people to apply previously agreed-upon ideas to the current and future
goals of the propagandist”. Such scenes also serve to “maintain the legitimacy of the institution or
organization it represents and thereby to ensure the legitimacy of its activities” (Plaisance, 2005).
Regarding the context of the messages, any propaganda campaign must be considered in the
world cultural and social milieu in which it occurs—the “expected states of the world social system (e.g.,
war, peace, human rights, healthy people),” as Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) described it. In the post-9/11
video campaign, the United States, with its egalitarian culture, is presented as the wronged—and hence
blameless—victim of misguided terrorists. Such a portrayal of victimhood may be seen as a rhetorical
device to respond to anger at U.S. multilateralism and sole superpower status. Beers and others were clear
in characterizing the video campaign as being a direct response to Muslim perceptions and misperceptions
that may have cultivated individuals such as those who orchestrated the 9/11 attacks (Plaisance, 2005)
The messages attain credibility for a skeptical Muslim audience by evoking a sense of
authenticity: Real Muslims are featured praying, making music, and socializing. The messages, as a
result, appear to be “resonant, for they seem to be coming from within the audience rather than from
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
17
without” (Plaisance, 2005). With this credibility, the message then links traditions of the past with
acceptance of a desired opinion or way of thinking. Once the messages gain credibility by establishing
fundamental connections between Middle Eastern Muslims and their American brethren, the message
makers can then hope to “canalize” the religious beliefs of the target audience into a new direction: in this
case, suggesting that American religious pluralism is compatible with the value systems of Muslims
around the world (Plasiance, 2005).
Rather than emphasize the social or cultural power of the individual Muslims, however, the
images serve to underscore individual Muslim successes by suggesting how they have been embraced and
honored by American culture. Elias Zerhouni, director of the National Institutes of Health, is the most
impressive of the group. He is shown interacting with colleagues, wearing his medical lab coat while
leading a meeting at which he receives a standing ovation, and finally, sharing a podium with President
Bush. New York City paramedic Farooq Muhammad is shown handling ambulance equipment alongside
white coworkers while wearing a New York fire department uniform. Ohio school teacher Rawia Ismail
also is shown teaching a class of largely white American children. All of these, as well as Ohio bakery
owner Abdul Hammuda, are portrayed in ways that suggest that Muslim culture has been embraced in all
walks of American life (Plaisance, 2005).
Overlaid on the videos is a subtle but buoyant sound track of Middle Eastern music, suggesting
how naturally Muslims fit into the American melting pot (Plaisance, 2005).
The emotional language of brotherhood and universal acceptance pervades the videos. “We’re all
brothers and sisters,” says Farooq Muhammad, the New York City paramedic. “Here I am as one human,
taking care of another.” Elias Zerhouni, the National Institutes of Health director, said he has always been
impressed by how he has been embraced in American culture: “I was totally embraced by the people here,
my professors. Everybody told me, ‘Well, we’re all immigrants here, we’re all from different places, and
we meld together,’ and I loved that” (Plaisance, 262).
The presentation of “truth” in the Shared Values campaign, consequently, is a critical ethical
question. The American Muslims featured in the Shared Values videos certainly may be truthful in their
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
18
claims about American egalitarianism as they have experienced it. The videos offer these claims as proof
of a larger truth: that persecution does not exist in this country. A less blatant “instrumentalization” of
truth, however, might directly address the simultaneous realities of the post-9/11 incarcerations of more
than 700 uncharged Muslims and the new, controversial policy of the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (renamed the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services) that requires
Middle Easterners to register with the government (Immigration and Naturalization Service News
Release, 2003). This is not to criticize administration anti-terror policy, but to point out the selective
depiction of reality in a message campaign. This depiction should not be surprising, since the ultimate
goal of the information campaign is to establish message credibility, not to provide a comprehensive
picture of the contested notion of American egalitarianism. The campaign producers have exempted
“themselves” from the value system of truth by discouraging “higher epistemic values such as reflection,
understanding and reasoning” (Plaisance, 2005).
Nancy Snow, a communications professor at California State University at Fullerton and author
of Information War, addressed the question during a news interview on the topic of Beers’ campaign and
other U.S. propaganda efforts with National Public Radio’s Neal Conan: “The real rub is the ethics of
propaganda. For instance, if your intentions are good—that is, if the end result is to get people to engage
in some type of multilateral initiative, then is it OK, for instance, to do something that is misinformation
on the front end? … If you’re really presenting yourself as a free society, then you’ve got to be really
careful how the ends and the means work together” (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, and Kendrick, 2011). The
moral imperative to treat other human beings as ends and not only as means is rooted in Augustinian and
Kantian thought. To fail to do so, according to Kant (1964), is to fail as moral agents. Beers’ strategy can
be described as treating people as means rather than as ends—of pursuing a goal of changing the opinions
that Muslims have of the United States because it benefits the United States to do so rather than seeking
genuine, more comprehensive mutual understanding (Plaisance, 2005). Several columnists and scholars
raised this point in news accounts of the information campaign (Plaisance, 2005). Beers’ language of
branding and business strategizing posed a fundamental conflict with the notion of mutual engagement.
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
19
The Beers campaign certainly can be seen as designed to effect the “evaluative narrowing” of its
receivers. Although the Shared Values videos obviously has as its purpose the “expansion” of Muslim
viewers’ perceptions of American egalitarianism, the campaign certainly “narrows” and oversimplifies
the reality of that ideal, presenting an unargued and idyllic vision that ignores fundamental truths of
historical and continuing inequality and discrimination. (Plaisance, 2005)
The Shared Values campaign’s utilization of truth, its treatment of Muslim audiences as means to
achieve broader policy objectives rather than as a population to be engaged on its own terms, and its use
of palaver all suggest that, as an example of mass communication, the Shared Values videos had serious
ethical shortcomings. This is not to say that such ethical issues caused or contributed to the perceived
failure of the campaign. The decision to abandon the public-diplomacy campaign undoubtedly was based
on several administrative and policy variables, including accessibility to Muslim media outlets and a
largely negative reception by news commentators. The failure of the campaign could also be a reflection
of the argument by Black (2001) that “persuasive media that are propagandistic … would seem to be less
likely to attract and convince open-minded media consumers than to reinforce the biases of the closed
minded true believers” (Plaisance, 2005).
In an article by Goldberg (2002), Christopher Simpson, a communications professor at American
University and author of Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare,
1945–1960, said Beers’ campaign was based on two fundamental misconceptions. The first was that
selling a product simply is not the same as promoting a belief. “Advertising and propaganda are well
known to have an impact on short-term decisions—are they going to buy Tide detergent or Cheer, vote
Gore or Bush,” Simpson said. “It’s also well known to have very little impact on more fundamental
beliefs.” The second problem is that Beers operated on the belief that anti-American sentiment is based on
a misunderstanding of America—that to know America is to love it. “The central illusion here is that the
U.S. is somehow not getting its message across,” Simpson said. “The large majority of people in the
Middle East understand pretty well what the United States is actually saying and doing, and no amount of
propaganda is really going to change that.”
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
20
Even if the ethical shortcomings explored in this study were not directly related to the demise of
the Beers campaign, this analysis of the Shared Values initiative provides important affirmation for
contemporary theorists who have insisted that propagandistic techniques do indeed have significant
ethical implications that cannot be ignored. Communicative acts, whether by individuals, corporations, or
governments, are subject to notions of assessment, accountability, and efficacy that transcend what we
normally conceive of as monetary or policy success. The ethical dimension of all communicative acts
encompasses both the means and the ends of message transmission, and our behavior in both regards has
an impact on our accountability as moral beings (Plaisance, 2005).
Shortly after joining the State Department, Beers began applying consumer marketing principles
and theories to her new work (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton and Kendrick, 2011). She relied upon opinion
research to help understand her audience and formulate the campaign. Specifically, she cited a Roper poll
(2002) conducted in 35 countries, which showed vast differences between the United States and
predominantly Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and Indonesia on qualities such as modesty,
obedience, duty, perseverance, and freedom. The same pull revealed significant agreement among people
of these nations regarding the values of faith, family, and learning. Additional data presented by Beers
showed that the "Western values system" was considered a negative influence by more than half of those
polled in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Morocco, and Jordan (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton and Kendrick, 2011).
On January 16 the Wall Street Journal (O'Connell, 2003) purported that the Shared Values Initiative
advertising campaign was discontinued by the DoS because it failed to register with Muslim audiences
and had been prevented from being aired by host governments. That same night Beers appeared on CNN
and told anchor Aaron Brown that the campaign had not been suspended and would continue (Fitzpatrick,
Fullerton and Kendrick, 2011). On February 3, 2003, the DoS said that the spots had stopped running in
December as planned and that they would be revised to remove mentions of Ramadan before airing again.
In early March 2003, Charlotte Beers unexpectedly resigned her post, citing health reasons. This
development prompted the French newspaper Le Monde to speculate that her resignation was brought on
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
21
by the enormous difficulties of communicating the U.S. message overseas (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton and
Kendrick, 2011).
Immediately after the mini documentaries aired in October 2002, U.S. media reported that the
campaign was not well received. The chief complaint by those who viewed the spots in the targeted
countries was that the commentaries did not explain U.S. foreign policy (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton and
Kendrick, 2011).
The U.S. government and others (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton and Kendrick, 2011) have determined that
the most critical people to reach in fighting the war on terrorism are young men—a group that is often
angry and most likely to take action. Although Beers suggested that the target for the SVI campaign was
women, it was her hope that through their individual and collective "soft power" that these women would
influence their husbands, brothers, and sons (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton and Kendrick, 2011).
Fewer than half of those who viewed the State Department videos considered them believable,
and an even greater number expressed doubt that those living in the targeted countries would consider the
videos believable or credible. Among the 64 percent who found elements of the videos either confusing or
hard to believe, the basis of their concern focused on the one-sided nature of the video segments. More
than half of those who viewed the videos said they either did not believe the factual content or found them
unrealistically positive in light of recent events (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton and Kendrick, 2011).
By far the most disliked aspect of the videos was their lack of believability, whether they were
perceived to be blatantly false or just "biased" or "one-sided" (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton and Kendrick, 2011).
The one-sided nature of the video played a critical role in the believability of the videos. Scene
after scene of happy Muslims living in the United States was in direct contradiction to memories of news
reports of Muslims as the objects of derision and sometimes violence in the aftermath of 9/11, all with
controversial U.S. policies in the Middle East. It would have been interesting to gauge international
evaluation of the videos if the State Department had made the content two sided, addressing the issues of
highly publicized but relatively isolated incidents of Muslim mistreatment and providing some
explanation of U.S. policy regarding Israel and Palestine. Propaganda literature suggests that a two-sided
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
22
message serves to inoculate the recipient against future counterarguments and is more likely to persuade
an educated audience (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton and Kendrick, 2011).
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
After extensive research into the subject of the most effective types of messages used in support
of public diplomacy and strategic communication, it is abundantly clear that there is not a significant
research forum in academia in which these types of information campaigns are recorded, much less
scrutinized. Considerable amounts of the content featured in academic works relating to the subject is
almost exclusively from a third person perspective, and with rare exception, is never critiqued by the
authors of the campaigns themselves. The closest to this type of honest, first person systematic evaluation
found throughout the research process coming from those at the source of messages used in support of
strategic communication was in a piece of literature written by James F. Brown, a veteran of Radio Free
Europe (RFE) during the Cold War. In his book Radio Free Europe: An Insider’s View, he elaborates on a
few of the most famous information campaigns of all time, along with the internal politics of Cold War
broadcasts from Radio Free Europe and how those broadcasts influenced the individual perceptions and
overall perspective of each select target audience. That being said, even though his work provided a way
to evaluate the success of messages crafted by a team within the large bureaucracy of Radio Free Europe,
much of the text was used to highlight the importance of broadcasts into Russia during the Cold War,
almost displaying an unbridled bias toward the significant contributions of an agency in which the author
played a central role. While far from objective in many respects, it was the singular work that highlighted
some semblance of personal accountability in the conduct of information campaigns.
However, the aforementioned work was written from a formal historical perspective regarding
very specific and established methods of communicating a message to a select target audience through a
heavily utilized medium. In fact, the majority of research material relating to this specific subject is
singular in focus, with many examples emphasizing the importance of Cold War broadcasts and how
those broadcasts were seen as successful due to an elicitation of a strong response from the Soviet Union,
measured through diplomatic channels in addition to activity within the electromagnetic spectrum itself.
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
23
With such a singular focus on a specific target audience for a log period of time, there is not much
variance in techniques and best practices. Often times, the mere fact a message reached broadcast status
constituted success within personal memoirs or official records. This proved to be extremely problematic
as the Soviet Union dissolved and the agency responsible for the majority of the Radio Free Europe
broadcasts, the USIA, was dissolved and rolled into a much smaller bureau within the DoS. This selfimposed hiatus in established practices of public diplomacy resulted in a nadir in research and
development of new and innovative techniques, as well as stagnation in developing relationships with
countries in the new post-Cold War sphere of expanding U.S. influence. The research itself seemingly
ends with broadcasts conducted during the Cold War—with a few mentions of broadcast activity in
Kosovo—and begins again around the timeframe of a post-9/11 world, where the focus was now the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan. The lack of interest in the history and record of support to public diplomacy
resulted in a significant void in knowledgeable practitioners when the DoS was assigned to engage and
influence foreign audiences in the Arab world, with no independent research or development results to
use as a framework for this new and somewhat unfamiliar endeavor.
SPECIFIC FOCUS: SHARED VALUES
The specific campaign chosen for the subject of this research project was the Shared Values
campaign, authored by then Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy at the Department of State, Charlotte
Beers, in late 2001. Her credibility in advertising circles was unquestioned: as a successful advertising
executive, she is credited with the corporate turn around of what was then considered a second-tier
advertising agency in Ogilvy and Mather. With a renewed interest in reaching foreign audiences—with
special emphasis on those in the Arab world—she utilized DoS resources to implement the best practices
from her successful stint as an advertising executive in a well-organized but futile attempt to establish a
relationship with Arab target audiences. While classically effective and respected techniques like focus
groups were used to craft a campaign worthy of influencing a Muslim world confused and cynical of U.S.
presence in the region, the commentary through Arab scholarship denotes an extreme dissatisfaction with
the tone of all facets of the Shared Values campaign. The research denotes a specific aversion to the one-
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
24
way monologue associated with the campaign, with the overall assumption that those in the Arab world
did not know America or its values: once they did, it was assumed they would immediately favor
American foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East due to the mutual nature of these values. During
the conduct of research, few formal and published studies were found to denote exact sentiment and
perception from the Arab world based on this initiative, save two that use reaction from respected
scholars in the Arab world, to include well-known leaders in the entertainment industry and purely Arab
focus groups within the most desirable demographic indicated by the campaign. Using these studies (the
most objective of those found during the research process) makes it easier to define the problem with the
campaign, and its mostly negative reception within the Arab world. The false assumption that Arabs have
no idea what morals and ethics are valued in the United States—and therefore are suspicious of American
activity—was a repeated factor in these studies of anti-American sentiment. In reality, many Arabs have
an excellent idea of the results of American foreign policy in the Middle East, starting with the creation of
Israel and the disenfranchisement of Palestinians. This is but one example of American activity that fails
to be formally addressed through explanation and is received poorly by Arabs. Until the United States is
willing to facilitate an honest conversation about American foreign policy, Arab suspicion of American
foreign policy will linger until it is addressed.
The academic literature regarding strategic communication and support to public diplomacy
evaluates the effectiveness of the campaigns in many different ways. No matter what the evaluation
criteria, it almost always leaves the reader with a skeptical feeling about the way in which an internal
inventory of measured effectiveness was first achieved and then maintained by the broadcasting
organization. Even though the Shared Values campaign was received poorly in the Arab world, it was
quite surprising to find that internal evaluation was very positive, with focus mostly on the innovative
nature of the campaign or how messages and TV spots were delivered in a “revolutionary” way, via
numerous forms of media for an extended period of time. Not once during the research process did a
single article or formal academic paper question the effectiveness of the campaign from a first person
perspective, i.e. from someone involved in crafting the actual message. This brings into question the
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
25
measured effectiveness of all information campaigns in the realm of public diplomacy, and the need for
transparent evaluation methods instead of incredibly subjective measures, which eventually somehow
equate to “unqualified” communication successes. What is abundantly clear is that the effectiveness of the
campaign can be subjected to rigorous and opinionated argument about tone and delivery methods
through multimedia conduits, but the intent of the campaign itself shed light on an often forgotten facet of
new American foreign policy directives: public diplomacy. While the objectives of the campaign may not
have been achieved, and the way in which the campaign bypassed Arab opinion leaders by attempting to
influence the populous directly was incredibly misguided, the initiative itself stood as a renewed attempt
by the United States to re-engage a program of public diplomacy through messaging and other important
forms of strategic communication. In the near future, perhaps prospective practitioners of the diplomatic
arts may be able to use this campaign as at least a case study from which to learn about the need for a
holistic and forthright effort at engaging foreign audiences. It may in fact bridge the gap between the
well-defined information campaigns of the Cold War and the new public diplomacy initiatives of a United
States with an expanded global reach.
CONCLUSION
Through research and dedicated analysis of specific information campaigns and other strategic
communication efforts implemented throughout the recorded history of American public diplomacy, there
is an undeniable and continued lack of interest in USIA was seen as successful in its efforts to limit Soviet
influence in Europe through a series of overt and covert broadcasting efforts, there were ultimately
additional and separate circumstances which were much more influential in the outcome of the Cold War.
In many ways, scholarly recollections of the specific time period serve as mechanisms for validation
rather than honest and forthright critiques of overall strategy. While positive feedback about consistent
broadcast strategy is available from sources after the fact, it can be argued this proves nothing more than
correlation as opposed to legitimate causation. The links connecting influence activity to the Western
world’s victory over the Soviet Union are tenuous at best, as the research shows those who were able to
make decisions in the Kremlin were more annoyed by the broadcasts than influenced by them. Even so,
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
26
we continue to use this as the basis for almost all of our efforts to engage foreign audiences in the
dynamic information environment in a post-9/11 world. Despite a dramatic increase in access to
information since the Cold War, our national communication strategy continues to make the false
assumption that the United States is the supreme source of information for the rest of the world, and that
the world is eagerly listening to our broadcasts with bated breath.
In the example of the Shared Values campaign, we bypassed opinion leaders in the Iraqi
communities we were trying to reach and attempted to influence target audience perceptions without the
benefit of validation from credible conduits. Many of these established relationships were overlooked in
favor of attempting to establish a direct connection with the focused demographic, omitting a significant
step in the communication process. The University of Twente features a website which denotes many
theories within the field of communication from around the world, and it is one of the many sources
where the diffusion of innovations theory is defined. The University of Twente suggests that information,
and the adoption of an innovation (in the case of the Shared Values campaign, innovations were
represented by American ideals of freedom and democracy), is heavily dependent on endorsement
through one’s social network. Time is also a vital and necessary component of this theory, as opportunity
for discussion must be allowed to facilitate positive and negative views of the innovation itself. In
addition to these factors, we tend to forget that every message travels through a cultural filter or “schema”
which helps determine our perception of that message (Zaharna, 2014). These cultural filters will always
lead native populations to be suspicious of outside influences, offering a credible explanation as to why
the indigenous news networks within the Arab world enjoy a much more extensive and dedicated
following than those paid for and constructed with American money. As we continued to shout toward the
Arab world and emphasize the values that make our country so great, we failed to realize our already
suspect credibility. We did not account for the cultural nuance associated with communication in the Arab
world, and as we omitted opportunity for limiting symmetrical communication with the target audience
we continued to illustrate our ignorance. As stated in the results of the research, we were obsessed with
exposing the Arab world to the cherished American ideas. We never took into account the Arab world
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
27
was well aware of our activity in the form of the creation of Israel, the subjugation of the Palestinian
people, the installment of the Shah in Iran and other regional endeavors. These activities represent a
tangible reality for those in the Arab world. While the ideas of democracy or liberty may seem ethereal
and ambiguous, Israeli military dominance in the Levant and the Palestinian refugee crisis are things Arab
audiences can refer to immediately without vague interpretation.
Until we are willing to discuss United States foreign policy with Arab listeners in extremely
honest and forthright terms, we will never have the credibility to influence regional inhabitants through
espousing ideas people in the region barely understand. In the end, information campaigns and other
facets of strategic communication are only complementary capabilities that may contribute (along with
military and economic efforts) to the achievement of national level policy objectives, and must therefore
be fully integrated with other facets of American foreign policy and constructed with a long-term outlook
in mind. In future communication endeavors, we must first be willing to tell the entire truth—not simply
select portions favorable to American policy—and facilitate dialogue through venues that encourage
discussion and exchange of ideas. While we may never gain significant positive sentiment among Arab
populations, we may gain respect for the more authentic attempt to address America’s foreign policy,
finally obtaining that elusive shred of credibility among select audiences in the Arab world.
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
28
WORKS CITED
Berkowitz, J. (2009). Raising the Iron Curtain on Twitter: why the United States Must Revise
the Smith-Mundt Act to Improve Public Diplomacy. CommLaw conspectus, 18 (1), p. 269 – 309.
Christopher, P. (2012). Challenges facing U.S. government and Department of Defense efforts
in strategic communication. Public relations review. , 38 (2), p. 188 - 194.
Dabbous, Y., Nasser, K. (2009). A Waste of Public Diplomacy? The Performance of Al-Hurra
TV among Lebanon’s University Students. Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication,
2: 100–114.
Dimitriu, G. (2012) Winning the story war: Strategic Communication and the Conflict in
Afghanistan, Public Relations Review, 38 (2), p. 195-207
Dutta-Bergman, M. J. (2006). U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East: A Critical Cultural
Approach. The Journal of communication inquiry, 30 (2), p. 102 - 124.
Fitzpatrick, K.,R. Kendrick, A., Fullerton, J. (2011). Factors Contributing to Anti-Americanism
Among People Abroad: A Retrospective View from the Frontlines of U.S. Public Diplomacy.
International Journal of Strategic Communication, 5: 154–170, 2011.
Hayden, C. (2013). Engaging Technologies: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Venezuelan
Strategies of Influence and Public Diplomacy. International Journal of Communication 7, p. 1–
25.
Hayden, C. (2013) Logics of narrative and networks in US public diplomacy: Communication
power and US strategic engagement, The Journal of International Communication, 19 (2),
p.196-218
Izadi, F. (2009). U.S. Public Diplomacy: A Theoretical Treatise. Conference Papers
International Communication Association. 2009 Annual Meeting. p. 1-58.
Kruckeberg, D. (2005). Public relations, not propaganda, for US public diplomacy in a post-9/11
world: Challenges and opportunities. Journal of communication management (London, England).
9 (4), p. 296 - 304.
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
29
Lim, Y.J. (2015) Theorizing Strategic Communication in Parsimony from the U.S. government
perspective, KOME, 3:1, p. 1-15
Mackay, A. & Tatham, S. (2011) Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding People and Their
Motivations Will Prove Decisive in Future Conflict. Essex, UK: Military Studies Press.
Moore, S. (2010) The Origins of Strategic Communication: Precedents and Parallels in Ancient
States, Atlantic Journal of Communication, 18, p. 227–240
Park, Se Jung; Lim, Yon Soo. Asian Journal of Communication. Feb2014, Vol. 24 Issue
1, p. 79-98
Plaisance, P.L. (2005) The Propaganda War on Terrorism: An Analysis of the United States’
“Shared Values” Public-Diplomacy Campaign After September 11, 2001. Journal of Mass Media
Ethics, 20(4), 250–268.
Plowman, K. D. (2013) Creating a model to measure relationships: U.S. Army strategic
communication, Public Relations Review, 39 (5), p. 549-557
Social Media in Public Diplomacy: Communicating a National Image one Tweet @ a
Time. 2012. Conference Papers—International Communication Association, 1-33.
Wang, J. (2007). Telling the American story to the world: The purpose of U.S. public
diplomacy in historical perspective. Public relations review, 33 (1), p. 21 - 30.
Zaharna, R.S. (2014) Battles to Bridges: U.S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy
after 9/11. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Zhong, Xin (2013). Public diplomacy meets social media: A study of the U.S. Embassy's
blogs and micro-blogs. Public relations review, 39 (5), p. 542-548.
COMM 744: CLAY CAPSTONE
30