“Who Controls Whom?”
The Evolving and Complex Relationship of the President, the Media, and the Public
A Case Study Analysis
By: Anna Lusthoff
Submitted on April 28, 2014 to the faculty of the School of Public Affairs and School of
Communication in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
in Political Communication at American University, Washington, DC.
Abstract
The agenda-setting relationship between the president, the media, and the public has been
studied in great detail in the political science and communications disciplines for
decades. This relationship has significantly changed through advancement of new
technologies, growing media landscapes, and increased demand for micro-targeted
messages to the public. As a result, scholars have often misleadingly framed a
deteriorating relationship between the White House and the media as an initiation by the
president who demands greater control over his message and limits his direct interaction
with the press. However, this study presents the changing nature of this relationship as a
responsible structural response to the increased complexity of the media ecosystem. The
structural changes initiated by the White House communications offices do not ignore the
press but are responsive to the evolving and challenging needs of effectively
communicating with the public. This argument is demonstrated through case study
analysis of the Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama Administrations through
the lens of their respective media ecosystems at times of crisis. The analysis concludes
that a successful White House must continuously develop its respective communications
structure to maintain the dynamic relationship inclusive of all three actors: the president,
the media, and the public.
2
Table of Contents
I.
Defining the Media Ecosystem: the President, the Media, and the Public……….…………Page 4
i.
The Era of Television and the Reagan Administration
ii.
The Era of Cable Television and the Clinton Administration
iii.
The Era of New Media and the Obama Administration
II.
Understanding the Media Ecosystem…………………………………………...….……….Page 9
i.
White House Structure
ii.
Crisis Communication Strategies
iii.
Media Coverage through Conflict
iv.
The Relationship between the White House and the Media
v.
Media Framing
vi.
Agenda Setting
vii.
Presidential Rhetoric in the Modern Presidency
viii.
Public Opinion
III.
The Evolving State: Why White House Structure Matters……………………….….…….Page 21
IV.
President Ronald Reagan………………………………………………………...………...Page 26
i.
Case Study: The 1986 Libya Bombing
V.
President William Jefferson (Bill) Clinton………………………………………………...Page 32
i.
Case Study: The 1993 Battle of Mogadishu
VI.
President Barack Obama…………………………………………………………...……...Page 40
i.
Case Study: The 2012 Benghazi Consulate Attack
VII.
Adapting to Complexity………………………………………………………...….……...Page 50
VIII.
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………….Page 55
3
Defining the Media Ecosystem: the President, the Media, and the Public
“I don't know how to explain why [President Reagan] hasn't been as
vulnerable to the onslaught of the American press as some previous
presidents; it is a hard subject for me…I wonder why. It isn't because he
intimidates us. It isn't that he blows us away with logic. So what the hell is
it?"- said ABC News executive vice president David Burke.”1
President Ronald Reagan, in the era of modern presidents, was perhaps the most
successful at shaping his image through media, earning him the nickname, “Great
Communicator,” and his Administration, the “Teflon” presidency.2 He controlled the
media and entered the homes of Americans each and every evening, carrying the predetermined “line of the day.” He was a success, earning high public opinion ratings as
his personal popularity overshadowed his conservative policy positions that frequently
differed from the American public. It was not his former experiences as a Hollywood
actor that led to this success, but rather the combined effort of his skilled White House
communications staff and the new media ecosystem he inherited.
The overall purpose of this study will explore the evolving role of the media in
connecting the president to the public and essentially answer David Burke’s question,
“what the hell is it?” that enabled Reagan to have such success with the media and how
he used his White House to achieve it.
In the era of a modern presidency, media is fundamentally connected to the
president as a conduit of information and access to the American public. It is a multidirectional relationship as the president reaches the public via the media and the public’s
sentiments are carried to the president via the media. Media influences both the public
and the president and reacts to both the public and the president. This relationship will
1
2
David Burke, Quoted in Mark Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency (Farrar Straus & Giroux: 1988)
David Shaw, “Did the Press Apply the Teflon to Reagan’s Presidency?” Los Angeles Times, 27 October 1992.
4
always exist in some capacity. The media, the public, and the president collectively
define this evolving “media ecosystem.”
However, this relationship will also continue to evolve over time as the media
ecosystem simultaneously evolves. At the start of the modern presidency, television and
evening news reports were used as a one-directional flow of information from the
president to the public. With the infiltration of the 24/7 news cycle and cable television,
information demands were limitless as the media carried instantaneous news into
American homes from across the globe; the president no longer initiated news coverage.
Today, new forms of media such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and blogs create
limitless sources of information and misinformation, creating an ever-demanding
reactionary sequence where the president can never truly be first to lead.
Utilizing a “learning curve” from the previous administration’s management of
the media, each president must now assume office and establish a strategic advisory
structure and objectives for his White House Office of Communications and Press Office.
This staff, and the strategic capabilities of each office, is core to the president’s ability to
govern. Collectively, they must communicate to the public, maintain relationships with
the media, respond to crisis, and manage damage to the President’s image and policy
agenda.
This study will not simply generalize the relationship of the media3 and the
president across time because this relationship has significantly changed. As the media
3
For the purpose of consistency, media will be the generic term applied to the White House and media relationship. However, the
nuanced differences between press and media should be acknowledged. “Press” refers specifically to traditional journalists. “Media”
refers to non-traditional journalists and is inclusive of traditional journalism. Starting in the Clinton administration with expanding
cable networks that fueled opinion-based reporting, “media” became the popular term to describe the greater landscape as “press” is
traditionally reserved to describe fact-driven news reporting.
5
ecosystem has evolved, so has the White House’s communication and advisory
structures.
The analytical emphasis of this study will explore the complex relationship
between the president, the media, and the public across three distinct media ecosystems:
The Era of Television, The Era of Cable Television, and The Era of New Media. In order
to best assess the impact of media on a president’s advisory and communications
structures, each era will be analyzed by a president’s management of his White House
Office of Communications and Press Offices, giving particular emphasis to his crisis
response management of foreign policy crises.
The Era of Television and the Reagan Administration
President Reagan was the first president to fully embrace television as a political
tool. At the start of the Reagan Administration, 98 percent of American households had a
television in their home.4 During the “Era of Television,” the President used broadcast
television as a commanding outlet to influence the public and successively manage the
media’s reporting. The president controlled the message and the media relayed the
message to the public.
President Media Public The Era of Cable Television and the Clinton Administration
With the introduction of cable television, the media had the imperative to be first
at the risk of being wrong; the economy was tough and competition within the media
4
“TV Basics,” TVB, last updated June 2012. http://www.tvb.org/media/file/TV_Basics.pdf
6
industry was growing. As a result, media became ferocious and the president often
ignored the instantaneous and inquisitive demands of the media. Similarly as technology
advanced, the media had increased access to international events and the public through
24/7 news networks and instantaneous, global coverage. Often, the media broke a news
story prior to a presidential announcement and influenced the original framing of the
issue. President Clinton could choose to go directly to the public through non-traditional
interviews, public addresses and town hall meetings; however, this led to a bitter and
strained relationship between the president and the media.
Public President Media Public The Era of New Media and the Obama Administration
Today, social media and non-traditional news coverage through citizen journalists
and political pundits dominate the media ecosystem. Consequently, the public can serve
in a similar function as the media and directly influence the political dialogue. The
president must continuously adapt and respond to the media, never quite getting ahead of
the message. In essence, the cyclical relationship between the president and the media
has come full circle. The president may choose to go above the noise through
independent communication strategies, but this message will be competing with the
individual messages of limitless journalists and public voices. Today, the media and the
public directly impact the president’s agenda.
Media Public President Media 7
The overall purpose of this study is twofold. First, it will examine the evolution
of communication strategies, besieged by the media and the public and implemented by
modern presidents at times of crisis. Second, it will determine the extent presidents can
successfully control their political agendas through communication strategies, as
influenced by changes in the media ecosystem. Theoretically, the framework of this study
relies on an interdisciplinary approach using previous research on White House structure,
presidential rhetoric and crisis communication strategies, and agenda framing to best
understand the historical and complex relationships between the president, the media, and
the public. This analysis will be broken into three sections: a literature review, an
analysis of each White House media ecosystem, and an illustrative case study
demonstrating the media environment’s influence on decision-making.
While much has been written about the deteriorating relationship between the
White House and the media from a historical perspective, little has been written about the
reaction of the White House communications structure to the changing media landscape.
The outcome of this analysis will demonstrate that a successful president must
continuously adapt his White House advisory structure and communications engagement
to evolve with the ever-changing media ecosystems. Prior to a crisis, there is very little a
president can do in preventive measures, as the threat is often unknown and
unpredictable. However, having a strong White House communications advisory staff in
place allows the president to quickly and soundly respond to crises and skillfully utilize
the media to control and manage the crisis response.
8
Understanding the Media Ecosystem
The purpose of this literature review is not to systematically analyze previous
research pertaining to White House organization, presidential rhetoric communication
strategies, agenda setting or media framing. Instead, this literature review is organized to
draw dotted lines between these different branches of research. White House structure is
affected by presidential rhetoric, which is affected by media framing, which is ultimately
driven by current events, crisis, and situational factors. Therefore, this literature review
illustrates how each element is interconnected and influences the structural evolution of
White House communications. By providing this contextual orientation, the reader will
understand how each element collectively affects White House communications and
advisory structures.
White House Structure
Early studies conducted by Richard Johnson5 and Alexander George6 argue that
successful leadership and policy-making is a reflection of White House organization;
structural preconditions are the keys to understanding decision outcomes. If structural
conditions such as leadership style and group dynamics are faulty to begin with,
information-processing errors will simultaneously occur. Therefore, addressing the
errors that occur in those critical decision making moments is futile, unless structure is
first corrected.
5
Richard T. Johnson, Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency. (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).
Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1980).
6
9
While the president is inherently the chief arbitrator in White House decisionmaking, he7 must rely on staff to understand all the ramifications of daily decisionmaking. President Eisenhower said an “organization cannot of course make a successful
leader out of a dunce, any more than it should make a decision for its chief. But it is
effective in minimizing the chances of failure and in insuring that the right hand does,
indeed, know what the left hand is doing.”8 Advisory staffs and specialized offices
provide guided structure and divided responsibility to comprehensively address policy
issues for the president.
Johnson’s typology of presidential management9 provides a theoretical framework
to address how organization and management of decision-making groups is dependent on
presidential leadership style. Presidential management models can be classified as
formalistic, competitive, and collegial. Johnson showcases the strengths and weaknesses
of each model and argues that every president since WWII has used one of the three
models to functionally address decision-making processes.
The Truman, Eisenhower, and Nixon Administrations utilized the formalistic
approach. It is characterized by a hierarchical structure with importance placed on order
under a clear chain of command. The competitive approach was used by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and embodies conflict. In this model, differing points of views,
held by different advisors, encourage disagreement. After being informed of all possible
alternatives, the president will act as an arbitrator to accept policy decisions. The conflict
encourages fresh perspectives and new information. Lastly, the collegial approach
focuses on cooperation and consensus in developing acceptable solutions. President John
7
Masculine pronoun is used as all U.S. presidents to date have been males.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961; The White House Years (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965).
9
Richard T. Johnson, Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).
8
10
F. Kennedy best exemplifies this approach. Differing views are welcomed at the start as
they merge with other ideas to create the best possible solution. The group collectively
creates a policy decision with uniformed agreement.
Patrick Haney10 furthers this research into crisis management structures by
combining Johnson’s typology of the ideal types of managerial structures with George’s
model of informal group structures. He proposed that research on management structures
has only focused on behavior during routine policy making. However, in times of crisis,
small decision-making groups are utilized and have a greater impact for rendering
decisions and affecting policy outcomes. In light of the heightened time-pressure, risk,
and threats at stake, structure and management of these groups are critical for sound
policy decisions.11
Crisis Communication Strategies
Crisis management analyzes the practices and beliefs that shape the interaction
with a crisis and attempt to “resolve a dangerous confrontation without fighting, but with
vital interests preserved.”12
The end goal of crisis management is termination of the crisis by one side backing
down. However, this is complicated by the inherent motivation for a country to maximize
on its own national interests under the pre-text of the crisis without becoming militarily
engaged in war. To overcome this political paradox, decision-makers must clarify and
10
Patrick J. Haney, Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, Advisers, and the Management of Decision Making (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press., 1997).
11
Patrick J. Haney, Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, Advisers, and the Management of Decision Making (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press., 1997).
12
Richard L. Clutterbuck, International Crisis and Conflict (New York: St. Martin's Press., 1993) 8.
11
limit their objectives and operationally, maintain strict control over armed forces with a
slow, diplomatic and passive military engagement.13
Under Irving Janis’ Groupthink theory,14 agreement is prioritized over rational
debate. This often results in faulty decision-making outcomes. Within a group of
advisors, individuals typically have previously formed patterns of interactions and
presumptions of each other’s views.15 This creates a strong tendency for collective
decision-making that fails to welcome opposing arguments or new information.
“In complex foreign policy cases involving uncertainty, political controversy, and
conflicting values, members of decision groups become central to the judgment process
by defining the nature of the problem and presenting appropriate options for
discussion.”16 Groupthink theory shows that without dissent or disagreement in decision
making processes, the group will not engage in successful policy-making as consensus
forms over sound policy.17
Stress, time pressures, and flows of communications affect crisis management.
Many failures in decision-making outcomes during foreign policy crises can be attributed
to antiquated decision procedures that limit unbiased and fully informed conversations.
The role of perception and misperception can unintentionally initiate or escalate crisis
situations.18
13
Alexander L. George, “Strategies for Crisis Management.” in Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, edited by Alexander
L. George, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) 377-394.
14
Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin, 1972).
15
Lloyd S. Etheredge, Can Governments Learn? (New York: Pergamon, 1985).
16
Jean A. Garrison, “Foreign Policymaking and Group Dynamics: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going.” Reflection,
Evaluation, Integration: Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20, edited by Jean A. Garrison, (International Studies Review, 2003) 5: 177.
17
Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin, 1972), 395.
18
Robert B. McCalla, Uncertain Perceptions: US Cold War Crisis Decision Making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1992).
12
As seen with the end of Cold War, a fundamental transition in geopolitics (in
particular how the world interacts with nuclear threats) changed the discussion around
crisis management.19 In this era, a mutually destructive nuclear war between the world
superpowers was no longer the primary threat. However, new threats include smaller
regional disputes, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and international terrorism. The
changing global dynamic in the post-Cold War era means states of greater power must
continue to increase not only their military technology and acquisition, but also their
knowledge of nuclear weapons around the globe.20
Media Coverage through Conflict
Robert Entman argues that when the American military is actively engaged and
American safety is a concern, particularly following the loss of life, the media tend to act
more like a “lapdog” rather than a “watchdog.”21 This interaction typically matches the
congruence between military policy and political culture. Congruence and “lapdog
behavior” escalates when there is a villain or identified enemy—as seen in recent wars
with Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden. In contrast, when issues and events that do
not clearly pose a threat against America and is dominantly interpreted that way by the
public, the media will resume the “watchdog” role. The media can use their own
expertise and point of views to insert critiques of foreign policy decisions even when both
parties appear to be in agreement.
19
Arjen Boin, “Lessons from Crisis Research.” The Forum: Managing Crises in the Twenty-First Century. Edited by Bruce W. Dayton
(International Studies Review, 2004) 6, 165-174.
20
Frank P. Harvey, The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War, (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997).
21
Robert Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy, (University of Chicago Press, 2004) 5.
13
During times of foreign policy crisis, when decisions are made quickly and
rapidly, the media strategically wants to be the first to report on the issue. Following a
president’s action, the media takes on a critical role to respond, frame, and critique the
president’s decision.
The Relationship between the White House and the Media
The role of the media includes both senders and receivers that collaborate in
constructing a reality of the political occurrences. Walter Lippmann writes that journalists
function as a flashlight rather than a mirror, providing selective series of glimpses to the
public rather than the entire political picture.22 Reality is defined as the media presents
the issues.
Gaye Tuchman defines news “as an event that is identified by a news
organization, which in turn gathers information and presents that information to the
public, separating the event from the rest of the everyday occurrences in the world.
Although [the news media] claim to be merely a mirror to the world…the news media are
both a cause and effect.”23
Media functions as a gatekeeper, choosing which stories to cover and the
perspective the story is presented. Stories are often selected based on their ability to
have: (1) a strong and emotional impact; (2) familiarity to the audience; (3) proximity of
the story to the audience; (4) presence of violence, conflict, disaster or scandal; and (5)
timeliness and novelty of the story.24
22
Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, (New York: Macmillian, 1922).
Gaye Teuchman, “The Newspaper as a Social Movement’s Resource,” in Home and Hearth: Images of Women in the Mediao edited
by Gaye Tuchman, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977) 187-9.
24
Doris A. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, 8th ed., (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009) 99-116.
23
14
While the president is news by virtue of being the ideological symbol of
American democracy and nationhood, the media has the ability to choose how closely
they align with the White House message. According to Michael Grossman and Martha
Kumar, “the president of the United States ordinarily is brought to you by the news
media.”25 Media is an information channel between the president and the public where
the influence can influence perception. Therefore, presidential power can be undermined
both by a failure of the administration to effectively manage the news and by skepticism
of the media to believe the president’s message.
However, the media can also positively further the functionality of the White
House. Doris Graber outlines four major functions that the media performs for the White
House: (1) information provider of current events; (2) diffuser of public opinion and
concerns; (3) enabler to relay presidential messages to the public and political elites; and
(4) provider of the stage for the president to remain in public view.26
Media Framing
Media framing of presidential decision-making dates back to Gregory Bateson’s
coining of a “frame” by defining it as “metacommunications” where messages are
deployed as cognitive models that allow that person to interpret and evaluate the original
message.27 Most commonly, this is achieved through the mass media. Dissemination of
information through the news media allows the administration’s message to quickly reach
the public. Once this first message is deployed, the media creates new frames around the
25
Grossman and Kumar, Portraying the President: The White House and the News Media (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1981) 3.
26
Doris A. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, 8th ed., (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009) 99-116.
27
Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, (University of Chicago Press, 1973).
15
crisis based on public response. The media can effectively elevate the perceived threat or
downplay the significance of the threat.28
The theoretical foundations of framing are dependent on the individual cognitive
processes and interpretations. The combination of Weiner’s Attribution Theory, where
people search for the causes of events to attribute responsibility,29 and framing show that
individuals rely on primary frameworks and social shared categorical systems to classify
new information. The impact of framing may influence one’s beliefs, attitudes, and
behaviors following a news event.
Sensationalism is a framing tool that the media often uses to attract and encourage
an emotional response. This is achieved through the use of exciting and shocking stories,
images, or language to generate heightened awareness and connection. Once emotionally
attached to a news story, scholars argue that through affect, viewers are emotionally
guided to respond or behave in a certain way.30 Empathy theory argues that, “bad news
that reveals mishaps, setbacks, endangerments, victimizations, or tragic losses for specific
agendas or groups will prompt distress and genuine sadness.”31
The media can play a significant role in shaping how the audience interacts with
the content by how they angle the story. Through a frame, an emotional tone is set which
alters the saliency of the message. Emotional triggers and relevancy to an audience
increase interest. And as interest increases, the likelihood that the audience will retain the
message and interpret the message rises. What is included in the media’s framing will
alter the tone of the message. Robert Entman said, “frames select and call attention to
28
M.E. McCombs, M.E., and David Shaw, D., “The agenda setting function of the mass media.” Public Opinion Quarterly, 36 (1972)
176-187.
29
Anthony B. Weiner, “An Attributional Theory of Achievement Motivation and Emotion” Psychology Review, 1985.
30
James P. Dillard, “The role of affect in communication, biology, and social relationships,” Edited by P. Anderson & L. Guerrero
Handbook of communication and emotion, (San Diego: Academic Press, 1998).
31
D. Zillmann, K Tarlor, and K Lewis, “News as nonfiction theatre: How disposition towards the public cast of characters affect
reactions,” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 42 (1998) 153-169.
16
particular aspects of the reality described, which logically means that frames
simultaneously direct attention away from other aspects.”32
Agenda Setting
Agenda setting is the “ability of the media to influence the salience of events in
the public mind. While the media may not be able to tell people what to think, it can tell
them what to think about.”33 Information penetrates from the White House’s framing of
an event or an issue down through the media ecosystem to the public. How the message
is received by the public and portrayed by the media creates an illusion of public opinion.
The White House uses this interpretation of public opinion to gauge their administrative
actions and decisions. Different news frames activate different thoughts and feelings.
Therefore, some frames might succeed better than others as not all political agendas will
be accepted by the media.
Robert Entman’s “cascading network activation model” explains this different
flow of news hierarchically from the White House to Washington elites to the media to
the public. Within this cascade model, a variety of frames are applied to each message
with various interactions, feedback, and loops that adjust the position. In this perception,
news framing is “the process of selecting and enhancing some aspects of a perceived
reality, and enhancing the salience of an interpretation and evaluation of that reality.”34
As these frames are applied, influence is applied on the message, often resulting in new
challenges, promises, and opportunities.
32
Robert Entman, “Framing Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication, 43, 4 (1993) 54.
Donald L. Shaw and Maxwell E. McCombs, The Emergence of American Political Issues: The Agenda-Setting Function of the
Press (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1977).
34
Robert Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy (University of Chicago Press, 2004) 5.
33
17
Presidential Rhetoric in the Modern Presidency
Richard Neustadt argues that “presidential power is the power to persuade.”
Through words, a president can exercise informal powers to influence public policy.35
With advancements in technology, the president has growing influence over the
national agenda by his ability to rapidly reach the public. Samuel Kernell described this
ability of the president to garner public support by “going public.” In this fashion, the
president sells his programs directly to the American people.36 Addresses to the nation,
press conferences, and other public appearances are a president’s attempt to sell his
agenda to the public and influence political actors. As technology expands, this ability
to directly reach the public also expands.
However, critics have questioned whether the rhetorical presidency, a 20th century
creation, is a constitutional abuse. Roderick Hart asserts that the “popular president” uses
his rhetoric as a “tool of barter rather than a means of informing or challenging a
citizenry.”37 Mary Stuckey has similarly referred to the president as “interpreter-inchief” and the “nation’s chief storyteller.”38 As a result, it is seen more important for a
president to promote himself rather than specific policy proposals. Presidents will use
ceremonial, rather than deliberative speech as a means to gather public support and
protect a public image.
Media have a choice to accept or ignore the president’s rhetorical message.
Entman suggests that this decision depends on a continuum of four variables: cultural
35
Richard Neustadt, President Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York:
Macmillian, 1990).
36
Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quaterly, Inc.,
1993) 2-3.
37
Roderick P. Hart, The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1987) 212.
38
Mary E. Stuckey, The President as Interpreter-in-Chief (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1991).
18
congruence, power, strategy, and motivation. When assessing the influence of media
over public opinion, cultural congruence is the most important variable.
The more closely an event or issue fits with established thoughts that are
dominant in culture, the more closely the media will align with the White House frame.
Under high cultural congruence, the media does not challenge the White House.
However, under low congruence where events and issues are more ambiguous, the media
often breaks from White House frames to assert their independent assessment. In the
post-Cold War international system, there was great cultural ambiguity as leaders tried to
define the new world order. As a result, the late Bush and early Clinton Administrations
had a difficult time managing the media framing.
Public Opinion
Public opinion is often shaped by how the media reports the news of the day.
Pollster Richard Wirthlin said, "There's no question that how the press reports [on] the
president influences how people feel about the president. People make up their minds on
the basis of what they see and hear about him, and the press is the conduit through which
they get a lot of their information."39
Historically, presidents have used public opinion to guide their policies and
influence Congress. Today, public opinion is no longer limited to polls as public opinion
surfaces through crowd-sourcing and trending analysis. News reports about policies in
the media shape how citizens evaluate a president. Brody argues that it is the media who
39
Richard Wirthlin as quoted in Mark Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency (Farrar Straus & Giroux:
1988).
19
can control and influence the outcome of these polls.40 However, the framing and
interpretation of a poll can generate data to support both sides. Often, very strong
majorities of the public have support for both sides of the argument, as seen in the debate
between Pro-Choice vs. Pro-Life. It is difficult for the President to confidently determine
what the public really thinks as the media can shape this appearance public opinion.
The more skillfully the White House can apply power, strategy, and motivation
over the media, the more successful it will have in managing news and public opinion.
Ultimately, the Whites House ability to successfully manage the news and control the
information will lead to supportive public opinion and news framing supportive of the
administration. Cyclically, this reinforces the White House message as it is aligned with
public opinion.
40
Richard A. Brody, Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support (Standford, CA: Standford University
Press, 1991).
20
The Evolving State: Why White House Structure Matters
As evidenced in this literature review, the relationship between the White House,
the public, and the media is complex and offers a variety of entry points to analyze. The
theories and tactics discussed in previous literature remain true and collectively influence
the evolving White House communications structure. White House structure changes as
this relationship changes. However, the players - the White House, the media, and the
public - are consistent. By focusing on the collective structure and evolving media
ecosystems, this study can systematically demonstrate why this complex relationship
matters to a president and how he can manage the ensuing tensions.
The traditional relationship model between the White House, the media, and the
public follows Entman’s cascading activation network: the White House exchanges
dialogue with the media; the media informs the public and frames the issues; the public
responds to the media and participates in public opinion polling; the media adjusts their
news agenda; the White House monitors and President adjusts.
The Traditional Flow of Information
White House Message White House Monitors & Adjusts Media Adjusts Agenda Media Frames Message to Public Public Responds to Message and Engages/Public Opinion Data 21
While present throughout all modern presidencies, nuanced structural and
substantive changes within the White House have fundamentally evolved with this
relationship. For example, responsibilities that were originally assigned to external
executive departments (e.g. Department of Defense, Department of Education, CIA, etc.)
are now represented internally within the White House through a plethora of internal
policy advisors. “Ultimately, the modern presidency has moved towards creating all
policy at the White House, overseeing the operations of government from the White
House staff to operate programs of high presidential priority, and representing in the
White House all interests that are demographically separable.”41
With policymaking centralized within the White House rather than delegated to
outside agencies, external communications from the White House are expected on every
key policy decision. However, with internal policy advisors, managing a consistent and
unified message from the White House is increasingly difficult. Direct policy attention
from the president is prioritized by significance and impact, despite the instantaneous
demands from the media and public for informed policy responses on every issue.
This communication agenda is guided by two primary variables, outgoing
communication messages through presidential rhetoric, and management of incoming
media messages and relationships. These two operations collectively influence the
political agenda and are primarily driven from operations within the White House Office
of Communications and White House Press Office.42
41
Stephen Hess. Organizing the Presidency, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1988) 6.
The growth of the broadcast media during the Kennedy Administration fueled a specific need for a communications
office, separate from the Press Office. The Nixon Administration established the first White House Office of
Communications. After Nixon’s resignation, the Press Office was placed under the Office of Communications.
42
22
The Office of Communications oversees the Press Office, media affairs, research,
and speechwriting. Particularly, the White House Office of Communications executes
strategic communications plans. While presidents have different speaking styles and
preferences, all are forced to make imagery a cornerstone to their office. Using public
engagements and photo opportunities, the president crafts his image and provides content
for daily news coverage. Providing deeper and specific attention to media-relations, the
Press Office engages and responds to traditional press by providing official statements,
responding to information requests, and providing access to the White House.
The press was the primary vehicle that enabled the president to develop successful
strategies to deliver a message to the public. However, as the complexity between the
president and the media increases, driven by changes in the media ecosystem, the
president’s ability to control his political agenda has proven more difficult. Through
modern information technology, this flow of communication often breaks from Entman’s
traditional activation theory where the White House initiated the exchange. Today, the
media and the public can start this cascading effect as they frame issues and place them
on the national agenda. As evidenced in the following case studies, cascading activation
and the traditional flow of information is no longer a continuous cycle but rather a multidirectional flow of information.
The New Flow of Information
The White House The Public The Media 23
One example of these strategic changes can be seen in the daily briefing between
White House reporters and the White House press secretary. Beginning with the Herbert
Hoover Administration, the daily press briefing was an informal meeting in the Press
Lobby between the press secretary and reporters. Hoover’s Press Secretary, George
Edward Akerson typically provided a few announcements related to the president’s
schedule and then answered a few additional questions. The purpose of this briefing was
to provide a regular forum for the White House and the press to talk to each other, rather
than drive actual news content.
Under President Reagan, the formality of the press briefing changed, as reporters
were asked to sit under a theater seating set-up and questions were formally directed to
the press secretary. Under President Clinton, Press Secretary Mike McCurry
implemented televised press briefings. This change increased formality and discouraged
more casual candor.
Within administrations, strategy can also quickly change as a result of staff
change. For example, in President Obama’s Administration, Press Secretary Robert
Gibbs consistently ignored talking points as a hope to build a better relationship with the
press, while his successor, Jay Carney, used them incessantly without ever directly
answering a question. Both situations had benefits and consequences in taking the
President’s message to the media. These structural procedures were intentionally
executed to better manage the White House message under a changing media
environment.
By comparing the White House communication structures in the Reagan, Clinton,
and Obama Administrations, the subsequent analysis and case studies illustrate the
24
impact of the media ecosystem on a president’s ability to manage the political message
and communicate with the public. As a result of the changes in the media ecosystem,
each Administration adapted new communication structures and communication
mechanisms. While the relationship between the White House and the media has
fundamentally changed, this is an unavoidable structural response as the president
manages his message and communicates with the public in the ever-evolving media
ecosystems.
25
President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989)
President Ronald Reagan was known as the “Great Communicator” and his
Administration was considered one of the most successful presidential Administrations at
effectively orchestrating press coverage to focus on the President’s agenda. Key staff
members included Michael Deaver, Larry Speakes, and David Gergen.
During the Reagan Administration, David Gergen ran the White House Office of
Communications and was instrumental in controlling the agenda, tailoring
communication strategies across a range of time, and deflecting criticism from the
president. Gergen created the “Reagan Image” and emphasized the visual, which
ultimately allowed the message to circumvent the media’s frames and take it directly to
the people. Public appearances were carefully staged and controlled to accommodate
television. Reagan had a staff of 600, including department employees that managed
public relations. This was more than any other president to date.43 Illustrative of this
manipulative effort, Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes ironically kept a sign on his
desk that read: “You don’t tell us how to stage the news, and we don’t tell you how to
cover it.”44
Unlike later administrations, Reagan was successful in “feeding the beast” by
issuing a particular White House policy statement each day, called a “line of the day.”
Each release typically was included in the evening news with a photo and sound byte
selected by the White House.
Leslie Janka, Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs said, "They've got to
write their story every day. You give them their story, they'll go away. As long as you
43
John Tebbel and Sarah Miles Watts, The Press and the Presidency: From George Washington to Ronald Reagan (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1985) 535-7.
44
Mary E. Stuckey, Playing the Game: The Presidential Rheotrical of Ronald Reagan (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1990) 15.
26
come in there every day, hand them a well-packaged, pre-masticated story in the format
they want, they'll go away. The phrase is 'manipulation by inundation.' You give them the
line of the day, you give them press briefings, you give them facts, access to people who
will speak on the record.... And you do that long enough, they're going to stop bringing
their own stories, and stop investigative reporters of any kind, even modestly so."45
Reagan used television as his “instrument of governing.”46 Using this pre-scripted
message, he directly accessed the American public each evening through sound-bytes and
imagery of his day’s activities. Photos were illustrative and coupled with simple and
idealistic messages that related to the American public. As Michael Deaver commented,
“You get only forty to eighty seconds on any given night on the network news, and
unless you can find a visual that explains your message you can’t make it stick.”47 The
message was also positive despite less than positive policy actions. For example, an
image of President Reagan with grade school children would dominate the newsreels
while budget cuts were discretely made to school systems nationwide.
While Reagan and the press had a tenacious relationship, he still received
favorable coverage by them, especially through television. With limited information
available, the press was forced to use the “line of the days” and images provided to them
by the White House at risk of not having the same coverage of their competitors.
At the start of Reagan’s first term, the Press Room was remodeled with permanent
seats and seating assignments. Television correspondents received priority seats.
Following the President’s or Press Secretary’s announcements, the press was advised to
45
Leslie Janka as quoted in Mark Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency. (Farrar Straus & Giroux:
1988) 52
46
Robert E. Denton, Jr., The Primetime Presidency of Ronald Reagan: The Era of the Television Presidency (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1988) 10.
47
Michael K. Deaver, Behind the Scenes, (New York: William Morrow, 1987) 139.
27
raise their hands for their question to be answered. Bias was given to “supportive”
reporters and their questions were more frequently addressed. During his press
conferences, Ronald Reagan still fundamentally avoided the press. Reagan rarely
provided a direct answer to questions by reporters. His responses revealed his mastery at
avoiding questions through rhetorical tactics such as delaying, discrediting the
opposition, blaming the media, personal or historical references, use of humor and
anecdotes, and symbolic references.48
Through a combined effort of Deaver and Speakes, news control was micromanaged to every line, scheduled movement, and lighting. Reporters were vetted prior to
attending press conferences and interactions limited with inquisitive reporters. Prior to a
major press conference, President Reagan would spend the weekend at Camp David
preparing. Speakes argued, “Press conferences are one of the primary ways in which a
president communicates directly with the American people, and there’s nothing wrong
with trying to make sure you’re properly prepared.”49
Deaver and Speakes, two of Reagan’s closest advisers controlled all
communications between the President and the media, including passage between
interviews and press appearances. During Reagan’s second term, Speakes arranged for
new exit doors to be placed right behind the podium so that following any addresses,
Reagan would directly avoid engaging with the press.50
In a White House memorandum, the Reagan Administration applied seven basic
principles to all news generated from the White House: (1) plan ahead; (2) stay on the
offensive; (3) talk about the issues the White House wants to talk about (4) speak in one
48
Mary E. Stucky, Playing the Game: The Presidential Rhetoric of Ronald Reagan (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990).
Larry Speakes, Speaking Out: The Reagan Presidency from Inside the White House (New York, Charles Scriber’s Sons, 1988) 220.
50
Larry Speakes, Speaking Out: The Reagan Presidency from Inside the White House (New York, Charles Scriber’s Sons, 1988) 237.
49
28
voice; (5) control the flow of information; (6) limit reporters’ access to Reagan; and (7)
repeat the same message.51
In order to maintain strict adherence to these principles, the Administration placed
particular emphasis on mitigating “leaks” to the press. In 1982, President Reagan issued
an order forbidding all staff to speak to reporters on background, unless it was cleared by
him or one of his senior advisors. This environment shut down all flow of information
from the lower levels of the Administration to the media.
In addition, any “misconception” written in the press was immediately corrected
before it became fact in the public’s mind. Consequently, Speakes suggested that a
research arm be added to the White House communications staff to challenge “each and
every error” by writing to the reporter with corrected facts.52
New and sophisticated polling was available to the Reagan Administration. This
fundamentally allowed the Administration to avoid direct engagement with the media for
a pulse of the public. The poll data was meticulous reviewed by the President and his
advisors and informed the White House policy agenda.
Foreign policy scandals, such as the Iran-Contra scandal, certainly affected the
Administration. However, the White House communications staff managed to continue
orchestrating the news by providing little access to the press corps, forcing them to be
dependent on the staged public relations strategies. Reagan was in control.
51
52
Mark Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1988) 33.
White House Memo from Larry Speakes to David Gergen, 1/25/82, Box 13880, Larry Speakes Files, Ronald Reagan Library.
29
Case Study: The 1986 Libya Bombing
Operation El Dorado Canyon was the name of the military operation ordered by
President Reagan against Libya on April 15, 1986, in retaliation for a terrorist bombing at
a Berlin discotheque on April 5, 1986. That bombing, which the Reagan Administration
attributed to Libya's Muammar el Qaddafi, killed three people - a Turkish woman and
two American soldiers. Of the 200 injured, 63 were American soldiers.
Operation El Dorado Canyon was launched around 2 a.m. local time when planes
struck Qaddafi's military headquarters, a naval academy, air bases in Tripoli and
Benghazi, and the residential neighborhood of Bin Ashur in Tripoli. As a result, fifteen
people were killed, and sixty injured. This included Qaddafi’s 15-month old daughter.
The bombs dropped on the neighborhood were intended for the nearby headquarters of
the Libyan intelligence agency.
As the White House spokesman, Larry Speakes immediately went before the
press, just as the American warplanes were still returning from Libya, to begin framing
the attack. ''The United States has chosen to exercise its right of self-defense,'' Speakes
said, "U.S. forces have executed a series of carefully planned air strikes against terrorist
targets in Libya….Every effort has been made to avoid hitting civilian targets." 53
Reagan delivered a TV address to the American people two hours after the attack,
showing both leadership and control over the message:
“Today we have done what we had to do. If necessary we shall do it again.
When our citizens are attacked or abused anywhere in the world on the
direct orders of hostile regimes, we will respond so long as I'm in this
office….[The bombing] was the latest act in Colonel Qaddafi's reign of
terror…The evidence is now conclusive that the terrorist bombing of
53
Larry Speakes, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the
United States Air Strike Against Libya, April 14, 1986.”
30
LaBelle discotheque was planned and executed under the direct orders of
the Libyan regime….Our evidence is direct, is precise. It is irrefutable.”54
Through direct access to the American public through television and ability to
singly control the message without media influence, Reagan framed the attack as a
necessary action for the safety and security of all Americans. Moreover, Reagan made the
necessary preparations in advance of the attack to immediately address the nation, preempting any message influence by the media.
While the 1986 attack was not well received in the Arab world, in the United
States, Reagan's approval of the raid registered 77 percent in a New York Times/CBS
News poll, and support for Reagan's handling of foreign affairs briefly surged, from 51
percent to 76 percent.55 International coverage of the attack did not reach Americans
through the major television networks.
54
William Clinton, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against
Libya,” April 14, 1986, Accessed on March 4, 2014. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/41486g.htm
55
As reported in The New York Times, 4 May 1968, “Poll Finds Approval Rating for Reagan is as High as Ever.”
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/05/04/world/poll-finds-approval-rating-for-reagan-is-high-as-ever.html
31
President William Jefferson (Bill) Clinton (1993-2001)
President William (Bill) Clinton used many of the same tactics as the Reagan
Administration, including restricting access of the White House press, holding press
conferences infrequently, and using town hall meetings and talk shows as means of
communications. However, the advent of cable networks and 24/7 international press
coverage brought a new invasive and attentive media. Journalists had increased flexibility
to cover policy and criticize the government for a president’s decisions.
The “CNN effect” was coined to describe the impact of real-time communications
technology on provoking responses from a president by increasing awareness of the issue
and providing access to the public. The underlying assumption held that the media could
make or influence policy from covering stories with the angles most interesting to the
public. Cable networks increased the pressure on politicians to respond to new accounts
often leading to incomplete, rash, and wrong decisions.56
During this time, the media industry was also experiencing the early 1990s
economic recession. Consequently, budget cuts and diffused audiences made reporters
more competitive with each other, seeking to be first over right. Reporters often asked
outlandish questions for a unique “newsworthy” angle. A negative story on Clinton
drove more news coverage than the positive light. Journalists had their own agenda
outside of the citizen’s agenda. Journalists wanted to sell controversial policies and
negative political interactions.
Mismatched to this environment, Clinton preferred a slower and more deliberative
policy process. During the first few months of his presidency, Clinton’s White House was
viewed as slow and ineffective. While campaigning on an aggressive domestic policy
56
Jame Hoge.,“Media Pervasiveness” Foreign Affairs, 73 (1994).
32
agenda, his political agenda in his first term was messy and disjointed. Newspaper
headlines described the new Administration as unorganized and inexperienced. Clinton
did not have the leadership strength, political capital, or advisory structure to successfully
tackle his policy agenda with such ferocity at the start. Additionally, Clinton named
George Stephanopoulous to be his chief spokesman. Stephanopoulous was a policy
specialist and congressional strategist, not a press expert. He did not have experience or
desire to work with the press.
A study by the Center for Media and Public Affairs found that nearly two-thirds
of coverage on Clinton during his first 18-months was negative. Clinton did not receive
the traditional honeymoon afforded to presidents in their first year.57 He was hurt by his
lack of control over external issues and subsequent need to place effort on damage
control.
As Eleanor Clift of Newsweek wrote, “The White House press room has never
been as relentlessly petty and mean as it is today. It’s hard to know who deserves the
blame - the reporters or their handlers - but the impact on Clinton is clear: he gets even
worse press coverage than he deserves.”58
The coin “feeding of the beast” was developed under the Clinton Administration
to describe the mandatory attention the media required to suppress their incessant desire
for information. However, the Clinton Administration often starved the media of
information, causing anxiousness, restlessness, and impatience. This began at the very
beginning of his term when he delayed any announcement of his transition team and
57
58
Dean E. Alger, The Media and Politics, 2nd ed (Belmont, CA. Wadsworth Publishing, 1996).
Eleanor Clift, “Don’t Mess With the Media,” Newsweek, 7 June 1993. 23.
33
physically closed the press room door. Without direct access to information, the press
began to construe incomplete and self-serving stories.
For example, the media dramatized and politicized a $200 haircut Clinton had
arranged onboard Air Force One. As reported in The New York Times, the Los Angeles
Airport shut down four runways for an hour, delaying numerous flights, in order for
Clinton to have this haircut before returning to Washington, DC.59 As David Shaw of the
Los Angeles Times wrote, “Clinton received no free shave from the nation’s news media;
he was nicked, cut, sliced and slashed by the barbers of the Fourth Estate—and instead of
a honeymoon, he got an autopsy.”60
However, the shaky start of his first few months rescinded a bit with the hiring of
David Gergen, former communications adviser to Reagan, to head the communications
team in May 1993. While significantly older than the younger Clinton staffers, his
traditional perspective on how to play the press game in Washington, DC, amended the
relationship with the media. Gergen provided a more courteous attitude to the press and
refined the tone of Clinton’s public addresses. As a result, stories were less negative and
Clinton witnessed a 60 percent boost in approval rating by December 1993.61
Deeply engaged in the details of his legislative proposals, Clinton could articulate
the exact nuances of his policy agenda. His personal style led to longer speeches, filled
with detailed discussions. He had a vast memory for facts and figures. For example,
during his national address on healthcare in August 1993, the TelePrompTer in the House
59
Thomas Friedman, “Haircut Grounded Clinton While the Price Took Off.” The New York Times, 21 May 1993.
David Shaw, “Not Even Getting a First Chance.” Los Angeles Times. 15 September 1993.
61
Martha Joyce Kumar, “President Clinton Meets the Media: Communications Shaped by Predictable Patterns” in The Clinton
Presidency: Campaigning, Governing, and the Psychology of Leadership, edited by Stanley A. Renshon (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1995) 167.
60
34
Chamber had the wrong remarks. Despite this, Clinton spoke for seven minutes, word
for word on planned remarks, before his aides recognized the error.
These speeches involved a large number of advisors and staff with diverse
perspectives, seeking to avoid groupthink consequences. Clinton often built a “war room”
where a large handful of advisors gathered for a group effort at preparing the speech.
Staffers were often asked to work through the night on speeches—ensuring details were
accurate and pertinent. First Lady Hilary Clinton often read aloud drafts to aides as they
worked to refine the voice to be more like the President’s style. Clinton enjoyed this
process and contributed his own revisions throughout the entire effort.62
Clinton effectively used a variety of formats to access a wide variety of audiences.
Informal town halls provided direct access to citizens, allowing him to connect with the
public and discuss his policy agenda. Appearances on specific cable networks reached
targeted demographics and increased access to audiences that did not traditionally follow
the news of the day.63 He was not timid to take his agenda directly to the public and
discuss his agenda in a direct manner, rather than utilizing the media to simplify the
message to the public.
At a radio and television correspondents’ dinner, President Clinton said, “You
know why I can stiff you on the press conferences? Because Larry King liberated me by
giving me to the American people directly.” Other shows he typically used to access the
public directly included Phil Donahue and appearances on MTV.
Despite the tumultuous relationship with the press, Clinton’s favorability and
approval ratings continued to rise above average, staying above 50 percent in 1995.
62
Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon & Schuster. 1994) 54.
Robert E. Denton, Jr. and Rachel L. Holloway, The Clinton Presidency: Images, Issues, and Communication Strategies (Westport,
CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996) 30.
63
35
However, while Clinton gained traction with the public, the media lost support
from the public through their distorted reporting practices, which favored negative
coverage. At this time, 71 percent of Americans believed the media got in the way of
society solving its problems64 while “journalists believed that the easiest way to stand out
is not through more and better reporting, but by inserting attitude into their stories.”65
Through this vicious cycle, the public gained access to new and constantly
updated information sources; the press continuously tried to fill content in the 24/7 news
environment and attract large audiences; and President Clinton decided to go directly to
the public, who already had ample and conflicting sources of information. As a result, the
public did not trust the media; the media did not trust the President to provide access to
factual information; and the President went directly to the public.
Structurally, Clinton’s long-tailed policy approach, use of public appearances and
non-traditional media, and careful consideration of his message allowed him to maintain
control over his political agenda and access to the public. While the media often
disrupted the message and provided information not rooted in fact, the President’s ability
to use his staff to solve the issues and (eventually) communicate the facts to the public in
a direct and honest way allowed him to stay in control.
Case Study: The 1993 Battle of Mogadishu
On October 3, 1993, President Clinton order Army Rangers into south Mogadishu
in Somalia with the intention of capturing deputies of warlord and intelligence chief,
General Mohamed Farrah Aidid. This mission turned into a tragic firefight after militia
64
65
Stephen Budiansky. “Seventy-one percent of Americans,” US News and World Report. January 9, 1995.
Kenneth Walsh, Feeding the Beast (Random House,1996) 297.
36
and armed civilian fighters shot down two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. Army
Rangers proceeded to secure and recover the crews of both helicopters, which ultimately
lasted seventeen hours, left eighteen Americans dead and eighty-four wounded.
Upon failure of this mission, Clinton continued his daily media appearances and
events. On October 4, 1993, during a speech at the A.F.L.-C.I.O. in San Francisco,
Clinton answered a handful of press questions related to the attack. In his response, he
focused attention on protecting the U.S. soldiers, rather than responding to the foreign
policy implications of this failed attack and ensuing brutality.
“The only thing that I have authorized so far - and I want to say I'll be
doing a lot more work on this today, later today, when I've got some time
set aside to go back to work on it - the only thing I have done so far is to
authorize the Rangers that are there who are wounded or exhausted or
done more than their fair share to be replaced, to roll over that group and
then to send some more people there with some armored support so that
we can have some more protection on the ground for our people.”66
In an attempt to buy time for a thoughtful policy response, Clinton acknowledged
that work would have to be done and a response would be given within the next two days.
Within this time period, Clinton did not offer any White House official statements on the
current situation. Rather, he continued business as normal, including giving a White
House statement on “The Retirement of Michael Jordan From the Chicago Bulls.”67
“I will have more to say about this in the next few days. I am going, as
soon as I leave here, immediately to Los Angeles, where I will spend a
few more hours working on this during the day. And then tomorrow when
I get back to Washington, we're going to spend several more hours on it.
So I will have more to say about this in the next 48 hours, but I think that's
all I should say at this time.”68
66
William Clinton, The White House.,“Exchange with Reporters in San Francisco,” October 4, 1993. Accessed on March 20, 2014.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47157
67
William Clinton, The White House, “ Statement on the Retirement of Michael Jordan From the Chicago Bulls,” October 6, 1993.
Accessed on March 20, 2014. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=47175&st=&st1=
68
William Clinton, The White House, “Exchange with Reporters in San Francisco,” October 4, 1993, Accessed on March 18, 2014.
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book2/pdf/PPP-1993-book2-doc-pg1677-2.pdf
37
Ultimately, this impacted Clinton’s ability to manage the message. As the public
waited for Clinton’s response, cable network coverage of the attack drove speculation
and set the agenda for the questions Clinton had to answer.
Press reports depicted gruesome photos of U.S. soldiers killed and held captive.
On October 4th, the New York Times headline read, “5 G.I.’s Are Killed as Somalis
Down 2 U.S. Helicopters” and included images of a killed American soldier on the street.
Television footage on CNN showed a frightened, wounded Blackhawk helicopter pilot,
identified by military officials as “Army Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, 32,
under interrogation by his Somali captors.” 69
Moreover, the media negatively portrayed Clinton’s inaction and foreign policy
decision-making. Another New York Times article wrote, “last week the Administration
said it wanted to focus on building a viable political structure in Somalia, not on
capturing General Aidid and his lieutenants. But Sunday's operation did just the opposite,
creating the impression that the Somalis and not Washington were setting the agenda.”70
However, work on the policy response was being accomplished behind closed
doors and shielded from the media. On October 7th President Clinton addressed the nation
and announced his new policy response to Somalia, declaring American troops to be fully
withdrawn from Somalia by March 31. With this policy decision in place, President
Clinton acknowledged the gruesome photos and outlined his response.
69
John H. Cushman, Jr., “5 GIs are Killed as Somalis Down 2 US Helicopters,” The New York Times, October 4, 1993, Accessed on
March 10, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/04/world/5-gi-s-are-killed-as-somalis-down-2-us-
helicopters.html?action=click&module=Search&region=searchResults%230&version=&url=http%3A%2F%2Fquer
y.nytimes.com%2Fsearch%2Fsitesearch%2F%23%2Fsomalia%2Ffrom19931004to19931005%2F
70
John H. Cushman, Jr. “5 GIs are Killed as Somalis Down 2 US Helicopters,” The New York Times. October 4, 1993, Accessed on
March 10, 2014http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/04/world/5-gi-s-are-killed-as-somalis-down-2-us-
helicopters.html?action=click&module=Search&region=searchResults%230&version=&url=http%3A%2F%2Fquer
y.nytimes.com%2Fsearch%2Fsitesearch%2F%23%2Fsomalia%2Ffrom19931004to19931005%2F
38
“Today I want to talk with you about our Nation's military involvement in
Somalia. A year ago, we all watched with horror as Somali children and
their families lay dying by the tens of thousands, dying the slow,
agonizing death of starvation, a starvation brought on not only by drought,
but also by the anarchy that then prevailed in that country. This past
weekend we all reacted with anger and horror as an armed Somali gang
desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers and displayed a captured
American pilot, all of them soldiers who were taking part in an
international effort to end the starvation of the Somali people
themselves… I am proposing this plan because it will let us finish leaving
Somalia on our own terms and without destroying all that two
administrations have accomplished there.… It is my judgment and that of
my military advisers that we may need up to 6 months to complete these
steps and to conduct an orderly withdrawal. We'll do what we can to
complete the mission before then. All American troops will be out of
Somalia no later than March the 31st, except for a few hundred support
personnel in noncombat roles.”71
At the October 7th press conference, a Time/CNN poll showed that 60 percent
of Americans opposed U.S. presence in Somalia and 37 percent approved of Clinton's
foreign policy action.72 While the images lingered with the American public, the
thoughtful work accomplished without media influence led to successful policy results.
Two weeks later, Somalian General Garrison accepted full responsibility for the
disastrous consequences of that battle.
71
William Clinton, The White House, “Address to the Nation on Somalia and Withdrawl of Troops,” October 7, 1993, Accessed on
March 18, 2014. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47180
72
Time/C.N.N., October 4-7, 1993 Poll questions retrieved March 21, 2014 from LexisNexis Academic database.
39
President Barack Obama (2009 to present73)
Following the success of the 2008 campaign, President Barack Obama brought
new media into the White House as a way to stay connected to his base. Recognizing the
impact of reaching voters through social media and targeted approaches, Obama carried
that same operation internally to his White House by adding a New Media Office.
Announcing this new department, Macon Phillips, the Director of New Media,
wrote in a blog post: “One of the first changes is the White House's new website, which
will serve as a place for the President and his Administration to connect with the rest of
the nation and the world. Millions of Americans have powered President Obama's
journey to the White House, many taking advantage of the Internet to play a role in
shaping our country's future. WhiteHouse.gov is just the beginning of the new
Administration's efforts to expand and deepen this online engagement. Just like your new
government, WhiteHouse.gov and the rest of the Administration's online programs will
put citizens first. Our initial new media efforts will center around three priorities:
Communication, Transparency, and Participation.”74
However, unlike an election, which demands a constant call-to-action for one
ultimate goal, Obama had to communicate a range of thoughtful policy positions and
issue responses to a diverse audience that was not gathered around one central goal. In
this media ecosystem, each audience and demographic had choices on how to receive
their news through targeted micro-media systems. In order to be successful, the White
House had to adapt its communication approach to this media ecosystem or risk getting
lost in the noise.
73
At the time of writing this study, Barack Obama was in his second term as President of the United States.
Macon Phillips, “Change Has Come to Whitehous.gov,” The White House Blog, January 20, 2009, Accessed on March 18, 2014.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/change_has_come_to_whitehouse-gov
74
40
The Obama Administration notably used social media, videos, and its own
sophisticated websites to provide the public with self-generated information about its
activities, along with considerable government data useful for consumers and businesses.
Obama’s White House consisted of an entire staff dedicated to operating a YouTube
channel, filtering photos on Instagram, crowdsourcing petitions on “We The People,”
hosting Q&As through Twitter and hang outs with voters on Google+.
“You can find more success getting information to where the American
people are as opposed to forcing them to come to where you are in order
to get it,” said Bill Burton, a deputy White House press secretary. “Given
that less and less folks get their information through the traditional news
media, this is a unique opportunity for a participatory exchange that is
directly with the American people.”75
In February 2010, Obama held an unprecedented group interview, answering
questions by YouTube users in a live webcast. As Phillips described it, “It’s a way to give
people access to the president that feels more participatory… This is the 21st-century
equivalent of Roosevelt’s fireside chats.”76
On YouTube, “West Wing Week” offered an update on the President’s weekly
activities and meetings. "The White House White Board" provided an in depth look at
policy issues on the President’s agendas. These innovative strategies tried to bypass
news filtering and “go public” through presidential rhetoric. Heather LaMarre, a
University of Minnesota journalism professor described it as “the Costco version of
politics…cutting the middle man out to go straight to the people.”77
75
Bill Burton, Quoted in “Obama to Field Questions by YouTube Users,” New York Times, January 31, 2010, Accessed on March 25,
2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/us/politics/01youtube.html?_r=0
76
Macon Phillips, Quoted in “Obama to Field Questions by YouTube Users,” New York Times, January 31, 2010, Accessed on March
25, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/us/politics/01youtube.html?_r=0
77
Heather LaMarre, Quoted in “White House Uses Social Media as “Costco Version of Politics,” Poynter, November 29, 2010.
Accessed on March 25, 2014. http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/making-sense-of-news/108492/white-house-uses-social-media-ascostco-version-of-politics/
41
In this media ecosystem, each message was targeted to micro-communities. As a
result, the traditional interaction with media decreased. In Obama’s first four years in
office, he gave more interviews to entertainment news channels and digital media than
Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton did in their respective first terms combined.
Even the most traditional announcements were announced through non-traditional
venues, such as brief news alerts to the 4.6 million followers on Twitter @whitehouse.
Recognizing this evolution, President Obama joked at the annual Gridiron Dinner
in March 2013, “Some of you have said that I’m ignoring the Washington press corps—
that we’re too controlling…Well, you know what? You were right. I was wrong, and I
want to apologize in a video you can watch exclusively at whitehouse.gov.”78
Between June 2009 and January 2010, Obama did not hold a formal news
conference at the White House for six months between June 2009 and January 2010.79
This drove frustration from the Press Corps, deepening the division in the White HousePress relationship.
In a tweet by National Journal’s Ron Fournier, a former Associated Press chief
White House correspondent, he wrote, “If WH journos boycotted briefings for week
would 1) readers/viewers miss news? 2) the WH get the message?”80 This tweet summed
up the diminishing value of the daily press briefing for reporters and Administration staff.
The value of information that the White House Press Secretary provided to the press
corps decreased and the disinterest from the press corps to write solely on the
Administration’s talking points increased.
78
Barack Obama, The White House, “Remarks by The President at the Gridiron Dinner,” March 9, 2013, Accessed on March 25,
2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/10/remarks-president-gridiron-dinner
79
The White House. Press Briefings. http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings
80
Ron Fournier, Twitter message on Mary 29, 2013. https://twitter.com/ron_fournier/status/339771645650665474
42
Peter Baker of the New York Times claimed these press briefings did not provide
answers but rather pre-calculated replies. “The White House decided a long time ago that
it’s not about candor, its about deflection and survival. The press decided it’s about
preening.”81
Press Secretary Jay Carney, sticking strictly to talking points, illustrated this
tension point at the July 8, 2013, press briefing following the outing of Egyptian
President Modamed Morsi. Medra Pickler, an AP reporter, directly asked if the Obama
Administration planned to cut-off all aid to Egypt by viewing the removal a coup.
Carney vaguely replied, “I would say that we are going to take the time necessary to
review what has taken place and to monitor efforts by Egyptian authorities to forge an
inclusive and democratic way forward.” Following a subsequent effort by Reuters’
Steve Hollands, “are you trying to find a way not to cut off aid,” Carney replied, “I think
I would say on the question of aid, the relationship between the United States and Egypt
goes beyond a provision of assistance, and it is based on decades of partnership and our
commitment, this country’s commitment to the Egyptian people82.” Ultimately, it
resulted in Yahoo News creating a spoof story, “The Top 9,486 Ways Jay Carney Won’t
Answer Your Questions.”83
Additionally, government officials were increasingly afraid to talk to the press.
An “Insider Threat Program” was implemented in every government department and
required all federal employees to help prevent unauthorized disclosures of information by
81
Peter Baker, Quoted in “”End the White House Press Briefing,” New Republic, Accessed on March 25, 2014.
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113949/end-white-house-press-briefing
82
Jay Carney, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 07/08/2013,” Retrieved
from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/08/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-07082013
83
Rachel Rose Hartman and Chris Wilson, “The top 9,486 ways Jay Carney won’t answer your questions (interactive),” Yahoo News,
June 21, 2013, Accessed: March 21, 2014.
http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/top-9-486-ways-jay-carney-won-t-104907191.html
43
monitoring their colleagues’ behaviors. Those suspected of discussing with reporters
anything that the government had classified as secret were subject to investigation.
“I think we have a real problem,” said New York Times national security reporter
Scott Shane. “Most people are deterred by those leaks prosecutions. They’re scared to
death.”84
Obama’s Administration often provided exclusive stories to one of the major
news outlets, such as the New York Times, Associated Press, or Wall Street Journal.
While the President had individual relationships with select “confidants,” in the media, it
was impossible for him to maintain direct access with all news outlets. For the Obama
White House, this tended to be a better way to relay news. The articles that resulted were
often more thorough and nuanced, providing the White House perspective and credible
reporting. Moreover, this kept traditional press included in his communication strategy.
Obama used a wide variability of advisors to help make his decisions, gathering
input from multiple departments for different perspectives and considerations. New
media was also monitored to inform policy decisions and actions. Dan Pfeiffer, Senior
Advisor to the President for Strategy and Communications said, “We found out a lot of
what was happening in the Arab Spring by folks on the ground doing individual reporting
of the social media or Skype.”85
Recognizing that there was a difference between tactically smart and strategically
smart, Obama frequently delayed policy decisions, despite press demands for continuous
updates. “It used to be that you'd read the story about the baseball game that night or the
next day. Now, the political equivalent would be: We're not just writing the story about it
84
Scott Shane, Quoted in “The Obama Administration and the Press,” Committee to Protect Journalists Special Report, Accessed on
March 25, 2014. http://cpj.org/reports/2013/10/obama-and-the-press-us-leaks-surveillance-post-911.php
85
Dan Pfeiffer, Interview on March 7, 2014 with Politico, Politico Playbook.
http://www.politico.com/playbook/0314/playbook13229.html
44
every inning, we're writing it every pitch."86
In this modern media ecosystem, Obama has a continuous uphill battle to reach
the audience, manage the message, and continuously respond to new press developments.
The collective media has expanded to include more communication channels - through
traditional press, new media, and public participation, and did not simply replace the
previous actors. However, new media did not replace traditional media; the White House
press corps is just as relevant as a Twitter account. Through structural changes, control
of the content was placed internally at the White House in an effort to fight the noise,
manage the multiplying communication channels, reach the audiences, and lead the
conversations.
Case Study: The 2012 Benghazi Consulate Attack
On the evening of September 11, 2012, a heavily armed group of terrorists
attacked a U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, killing the U.S. Ambassador to
Libya, Christopher Stevens and Foreign Service Officer, Sean Smith. Within hours,
media speculation and interpretation of the event began to agitate the situation.
Using presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s statement accusing President Obama
of “sympathizing” with the attacks, other media pundits further politicized the incident,
accusing President Obama immediately for not only his “sympathetic apology” but for
the premise of the attack. Initially, the presumed cause was an angry mob responding to
a video made in the U.S., which mocked Islam and the Prophet Mohammed.
86
Dan Pfeiffer, Interview on March 7, 2014 with Politico, Politico Playbook.
http://www.politico.com/playbook/0314/playbook13229.html
45
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued the first public statement from the
Administration when she announced the death of Stevens and Smith via a press release,
followed by a video conference with the entire embassy staff in Tripoli and remarks from
the Treaty Room of the U.S. State Department. Shortly thereafter, Obama followed with
a public address from the Rose Garden.
“The United States condemns in the strongest terms this outrageous and
shocking attack. We're working with the government of Libya to secure
our diplomats. I've also directed my administration to increase our security
at diplomatic posts around the world. And make no mistake, we will work
with the Libyan government to bring to justice the killers who attacked our
people….No acts of terror will ever shake the resolve of this great nation,
alter that character, or eclipse the light of the values that we stand for.
Today we mourn four more Americans who represent the very best of the
United States of America. We will not waver in our commitment to see
that justice is done for this terrible act. And make no mistake, justice will
be done.”87
Framing the incident as an “act of terror,” the immediate feelings associated with
the post-9/11 world enthralled the public and heightened the stakes. An act of terror drew
significant media attention because of its mere occurrence and loss of American life,
future policy implications, and past emotional frames.
While President Obama responded to the situation within 24-hours, media
pundits, right wing conservative vocalists, and general public reaction had already
created a deafening noise machine around the circumstance, never allowing President
Obama to lead the messaging and set the frame.
All of this stands in stark contrast with White House’s handling of the Navy
SEAL Team Six raid that killed Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011. That night, the White
House released images of President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
87
Barack Obama, The White House, “Remarks by the President on the Deaths of U.S. Embassy Staff in Libya,” September 12, 2012,
Accessed on March 25, 2014.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/remarks-president-deaths-us-embassy-staff-libya
46
huddled in the White House situation room with the national security staff watching live
images of the nighttime raid. The mission was hardly concluding before Obama went on
national television to announce the death of Osama bin Laden, the enemy of the
American people. However, unlike the attack on Benghazi, Obama knew all the answers
and could confidently address the situation.
The use of social media was a driving force in the rapid spread of communication
and miscommunication. Without all the facts, the White House was forced to
immediately respond and manage the political assumptions drawn from the media. One
of the starkest factual errors was the initial connection of the attacks to an anti-Islam film.
This stemmed from a retweet of a Russia Today story that was not posted until
September 12th at 9:12 a.m. local time. The translation read, “U.S. ambassador killed in
Libya during his country's consulate in Benghazi - Russia today http://t.co/SvAV0o7T
response to the film abuser.”88
In an interview with Obama the same day, "60 Minutes" correspondent Steve
Kroft pressed the president on early accounts that the attack stemmed from a spontaneous
protest, saying it didn't "sound like your normal demonstration."
"We're still investigating exactly what happened," Mr. Obama said. "I
don't want to jump the gun on this. But you're right that this is not a
situation that was exactly the same as what happened in Egypt. And my
suspicion is, is that there are folks involved in this, who were looking to
target Americans from the start."89
On CBS’ “Face the Nation” with Bob Schieffer, U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Susan Rice spoke on behalf of the Administration. This, and a series of fateful
88
Russia Today, Twitter Message posted on September 12, 2012, as reported in “Analysis of Social Media in Libya Finds No
Reference to Anti-Islam Film on Day of Attack” Fox News. December 18, 2012, Accessed on March 4, 2014.
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/12/18/no-reference-to-anti-islam-film-on-social-media-in-libya-day-attack-analysis/
89
Barack Obama. Interview with Bob Scheiffer. CBS News, “Face the Nation.” September 12, 2012. Accessed on March 3, 2014.
http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/obama-suspects-libya-attack-targeted-americans-50134495/
47
interviews haunted the Obama Administration in the face of allegations that it
deliberately attempted to play down suspicions of terrorist involvement and avoided
direct communication.
“But based on the best information we have to date, what our assessment
is as of the present is in fact what began spontaneously in Benghazi as a
reaction to what had transpired some hours earlier in Cairo where, of
course, as you know, there was a violent protest outside of our embassy ...
sparked by this hateful video. But soon after that spontaneous protest
began outside of our consulate in Benghazi, we believe that it looks like
extremist elements, individuals, joined in that - in that effort with heavy
weapons of the sort that are, unfortunately, readily now available in Libya
post-revolution. And that it spun from there into something much, much
more violent...We do not have information at present that leads us to
conclude that this was premeditated or preplanned.”90
Obama allowed social media allegations, vocal political allegations, lack of
complete information, and inconsistent media statements to weaken his leadership and
ability to control the message.
U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham summarized the American public’s frustration in a
statement: "Enough already, Mr. President. You need to address the American people and
account for your leadership in the attack on our Consulate in Benghazi, Libya. You
should explain to the American people what you knew, when you knew it, and what you
did about it before, during and after the attack.”91
While talking points were issued to help manage the message, they were not
effectively implemented and their credibility questioned. Obama’s lack of vocal
leadership, inconsistent messaging, and critical attacks by both political pundits and
90
Susan Rice. Interview with Bob Scheiffer on CBS “Face the Nation.” September 16, 2012
Lindsey Graham. Statement from Senator Graham Press Room. “The Time for Stonewalling, Delaying, and Denying are Over..”
November 2, 2012. Accessed on March 3, 2014.
http://www.lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=c1299d68-fe95-2337d124-169d3536432b
91
48
social media presence created too much noise. Inconsistencies across all communication
channels furthered his loss of leadership and opportunity to manage this crisis.
49
Adapting to Complexity
Traditionally, scholars argue that three elements shape the communication
strategies that affect the president’s attitude towards the media: (1) the president’s
personality and style; (2) the party in control of the White House; (3) and the goals of the
administration. However, this leaves out the other players - the public and the media - as
they collectively define a media ecosystem.
Each President must utilize his strengths within his administration to build a
successful communication strategy aimed at managing the complex relationship with the
public and the media. For example, while Reagan and Clinton shared a communications
advisor, David Gergen, each built a communication strategy that reflected his
Administration’s strengths and their respective media ecosystem. Reagan was at his best
during well-staged, scripted, and made for TV events where the media used this image on
their news coverage. Clinton was at his best during informal town-hall meetings with the
public, which directly avoided the media and allowed him direct access to the public.
Reagan sold his national agenda to the public vis-a-via the media. Clinton directly
bartered with the public and used the media to respond to his personally directed
message.
Communication strategy is both more important and more complex today than
ever before. With the advent of the rhetorical president, the American presidency is
highly institutionalized and politicized as the president takes greater control over his
image and public message. Additionally, the media, holding the president accountable
and responsive, responds to the public’s information needs and contributes to the rise of
50
the executive branch as an all-inclusive institution. The White House now responds to
every single policy and news event through its internal communications and press offices.
Beginning with the Reagan Administration, imagery has fundamentally grown
more important as a direct tool to influence the public. Policy decisions are always
coupled with a public event that can be translated into a TV or media hit. The visual
element of a policy change engages the public. Media uses these events to drive news
coverage.
The media ecosystem is the driving force of change in the president’s relationship
with the media. No longer is the news cycle 24-hours. Media does not pause and the
White House is expected to provide answers instantaneously. The media will continue to
probe the White House for answers that cannot yet be given. Therefore, while the
answers are discussed and formalized, the media will frame its own answers and set its
own agenda based on a mixture of pundits’ analysis and premature frames.
New media technologies and access points for communication flow encourages
the president to directly engage with the public. Moreover, media habits of Americans
today are vastly different than only a decade ago. According to a PEW research study,
50-percent of the public now cites the Internet as a main source for national and
international news.92 A highly organized White House communication structure is
essential to manage this complex relationship across the media ecosystem. While having
the influence to directly reach the public, the public now similarly has the ability to
directly reach the president. The president can no longer maintain control over his
message, as the public demands a response on every policy issue, both on and off the
92
Andrea Caumont, “12 Trends Shaping Digital News,” PEW Research, October 16, 2013, Accessed on March 3, 2014.
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/10/16/12-trends-shaping-digital-news/
51
president’s political agenda. Despite having a large and resourceful staff designated to
respond to specific policy areas, it is impossible for the entire White House staff to be
informed of every policy nuance on a day-to-day basis. Failure to effectively
communicate a position across the administration can have detrimental outcomes.
Through the passage of time, media still maintains it original purpose to be a
conduit of information to the public. Therefore, the media will always have an
advantageous purpose to both the public and the president. For the public, the media
keeps them informed and serves a democratic purpose of holding the president
accountable. For the president, the media provides a channel to reach the public, while
keeping him informed of public sentiment through crowd-sourcing and opinion polling.
It is the job of the White House staff, specifically the communication team, to manage
this relationship by facilitating the two-directional flows of information to both the public
and the media, simultaneously as the public and the media communicate to each other.
Of course, every U.S. administration in modern times has tried, with varying
degrees of success, to control its message and manage contacts with the media and the
public. “When I’m asked what is the most manipulative and secretive administration I’ve
covered, I always say it’s the one in office now,” Bob Schieffer, the veteran CBS
television news anchor and chief Washington correspondent, stated, “Every
administration learns from the previous administration. They become more secretive and
put tighter clamps on information. This administration exercises more control than
George W. Bush’s did, and his before that.”93
93
Bob Schieffer, Quoted in “The Obama Administration and the Press,” Committee to Protect Journalists Special Report, Accessed
on March 25, 2014. http://cpj.org/reports/2013/10/obama-and-the-press-us-leaks-surveillance-post-911.php
52
In the long term, a president’s attempt to sequester the media will be destructive.
Unlike the Reagan years, presidents do not have principal control over the message and
are at the mercy of the cascading flow of communications that often begins with both the
media and the public. Therefore, evolving structural changes are a responsible reaction
and direct reflection of the changing media ecosystem. The White House must continue
to “feed the beast” and engage the media to fulfill its information function for the public,
while simultaneously responding to the public and granting direct access to the president.
On April 2, 2014, following the tragic shooting at the Fort Hood Military Base in
Texas, which resulted in four deaths and numerous injuries, President Obama addressed
the travelling White House Press Corps in a closed ballroom in Chicago. Despite
providing no new details on the incident in these brief, unprepared remarks as the
investigation was just unfolding, the press corps live-tweeted Obama’s statement,
provided a full transcript to the major networks, and released a video of his comments, in
front of a strategically placed American flag. This quick response succeeded because of
his Administration’s prioritization of creating a media opportunity, structural capabilities
to quickly respond and execute a press conference, and technological ability to
instantaneously reach the American public.
In this brief statement, Obama occupied every media outlet and commanded the
attention of the American public. While certainly not of equal magnitude as previously
discussed foreign policy crises, Obama successfully engaged all actors in a pivotal crisis
communications moment. At a time of great uncertainty and concern, he efficaciously
utilized media to manage the message, directly connect with the American public, and
present a position of leadership and strength.
53
Today, a successful White House must continuously develop the communications
structure to maintain the dynamic relationship inclusive of all three actors: the president,
the media, and the public. Media will always be part of this relationship. Today, it is
just much more complex.
54
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