15
The 1989 Changes in Central and
Eastern Europe: Lessons for the
Arab Nations?
Anthony Jones
Popular uprisings are not unusual, including those in favour of
democratic goals, but it is when they occur in waves that they
attract widespread attention. It is these multiple uprisings that also
give rise to expectations of major change in a region, and the sense
that we are witnessing the fall of regimes like collapsing
dominoes; it is this that gives a sense of the world being changed
in some significant way, well beyond any significance for the
individual societies. So it was with the astonishing events of what
came to be called the Arab Spring of 2011, and it is not surprising
that it gave rise to comparisons with the anti-communist uprisings
in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, and the collapse of the
Soviet Union two years later. It was this comparison that bolstered
a sense of the world’s geo-political map being redrawn, and that a
new era of relations within and with the Arab nations was
beginning.
By the summer of 2011, this heady excitement and high level
of expectations had already given way to more sober assessments,
as it became clear that fewer dominoes were falling than expected,
and that regime change was probably going to be the exception not
the rule. In spite of this, however, it is worthwhile to consider
more closely the idea of comparing 1989 with 2011, and asking if
in fact there are lessons to be learned. After all, in both cases it
was not just popular rejection of a particular government or set of
leaders, but a rejection of a type of system that was seen as
illegitimate and against the interests of the population at large.
Although participants varied in the precise agendas they were
following, in addition to specific local issues there seems to have
been a dominant desire to integrate the society with the outside
world, to allow people to truly participate in what the rest of the
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world was experiencing. In that sense, they were modernizing
upheavals in favour of individual rights, fairness, and greater
opportunity. This said, it is important to understand the experience
of the post-Communist societies so far and its relevance in
anticipating what to expect in the Arab nations.
In the two decades since the 1989 revolutions and the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, there has been a sorting of the
newly independent countries into three main groups. The most
successful consists of those Central European countries that have
become stable democracies, market economies, and members of
the European Union. These nations made both political and
economic transitions, rapidly and simultaneously. The second
group is those societies further to the East that have made the
transition to a more democratic polity, but that also remain
economically underdeveloped and mixed in the ability of the
political system to operate in a fully constitutional manner; this
group has yet to consolidate its democracies. The final group
consists of twelve of the fifteen former republics of the Soviet
Union (excluding Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, all of which have
joined the European Union and have been successful in their
transitions). In all of these countries, democracy is weak and
unstable; authoritarian rulers and high levels of corruption are the
rule rather than the exception, and there are no reliable legal
protections in place for the respective populations. To some
degree, one can see Ukraine and Georgia as having made the most
progress towards democracy, in that their elections are less
interfered with. These two countries are, however, riven with
internal divisions that have not yet been accommodated for
institutionally, and that threaten to weaken democratic rule. In
Central Asia, dictatorships of greater or lesser degree dominate the
area, and in Russia (where the trappings of a free democracy are
continually put on display) the trend is currently towards more and
more control by the central authorities and an absence of the rule
of law. In all of these former Soviet republics, the economies are
undeveloped and in many cases are dependent on the sale of oil,
gas, and other natural resources for survival. Thus, less than half
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of the societies, that were sovereign nations following the collapse
of Soviet communism, have made transitions to liberal democracy.
So, what can account for these very different paths since the
end of the communist period? This has recently been called “the
fundamental puzzle of post-communist politics”. 1 While research
has, so far, produced no definite answer to this, 2 there are four
broad sets of factors associated with success or failure in creating
a democratic political system: a country’s prior history and
experience; its geographic position; the actions of external agents;
and the general global situation.
First, prior history can be a significant factor. As Gyula Horn,
former prime Minister of Hungary once put it, the countries that
became democracies did not have to invent anything, they just
returned to what they had had earlier, though obviously not in
exactly the same form. But his point is well taken; the foundations
were already there in the minds of many of the population. Among
the many prior conditions, we can distinguish such factors as
previous democratic elements or experiences, the degree of
repression exercised by the authoritarian regime, the length of
time this was experienced, the existence of dissident groups and
individuals with organizing or propaganda skills, the aspirations
and resources of the new elites, the kinds of leaders who emerge
from the uprisings, the mix of identities and loyalties (national,
geographic, tribal, and so forth), educational levels, percentage of
the population in rural and urban areas, and (importantly) the
1
Ekiert, Grzegorz; Kubik, Jan; Vachudova, Milada Anna, 2007: “Democracy in
the Post-Communist World: An Unending Quest?”, in: East European Politics
and Societies, 21,1 (Winter): 7-30.
2
Bunce, Valerie, 2003: “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the
Postcommunist Experience”, in: World Politics, 55,2: 167-192; Bunce, Valerie,
2009: “Reflections on 1989 and Authoritarianism”, in: Problems of PostCommunism, 56,5 (September/October): 19-24; King, Charles, 2000: “Postcommunism: Transition, Comparison, and the End of ‘Eastern Europe”, in:
World Politics, 53,1: 143-172 ; Linden, Ronald, 2009: “Reflections on 1989 –
and After”, in: Problems of Post-Communism, 56, 5: 3-10; Wolchik, Sharon,
2009: “1989: the Greatest Surprises”, in: Problems of Post-Communism, 56, 5
(September/October):25-29.
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relationship between state and society. The latter is of special
significance since a state that is severely divorced from the
population and has weakened support and legitimacy, will not be
able to carry out the transition policies necessary for democratic
development. 3 In the case of Arab societies, there is no democratic
past to return to, and the mix of social and political forces will
make it difficult for these societies to find sufficient common
ground to move ahead with a political system that would have
widespread support and move the countries firmly in a democratic
direction. A comparison with 1989, therefore, does not provide
much room for optimism regarding this first factor.
Second, geographic factors were important in that each of the
countries had neighbours who were going through the same
process, and this subsequently served as a reinforcing element for
reformers and for populations. In a sense, this made them part of a
larger family of reformers, not isolated actors. Additionally, the
closer the countries were to already developed democracies, the
more of a demonstration effect there seemed to be. The further
from Europe a country was, the less certain was its transition.
Again, in the Arab case those societies closest to making a
transition (mainly Tunisia and Egypt at this point) do not have
neighbours that are going through the same changes; therefore, the
demonstration effect and the psychological encouragement this
can provide are absent. Arab nations will proceed alone and in
relative isolation.
Third, external factors were important in the case of the postSoviet states, and possibly decisive. Future membership in the EU
was a constant aspiration for Central Europe, as well as for the
fringes (but not for the former USSR save for the Baltic nations),
and also a source of aid and support that offered tangible and
realistically achievable outcomes. As a result, despite a coming
3
Eckart; Kubik; Vachudova, 2007, art.cit., see also: McFaul, Michael 2002: “The
Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship”, in: World Politics, 54, 2: 212244; Matveeva, Anna, 2008: “Exporting Civil Society: The Post-Communist
Experience”, in: Problems of Post- Communism, 55,2 (March-April): 3-13.
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and going of governments of very different political colours, there
was continuity in the commitment to democratic development and
meeting the requirements of the EU Acquis. The importance this
had with respect to long-term development cannot be
overestimated. In the case of Arab nations, there is no such
external force, and it will need to be created.
The general global situation is less easily identified, but it is
worth noting that the post-1989 cases occurred during a period of
relative calm internationally and stable economic conditions. The
global economy was moving ahead quickly, but the emerging
nations had not yet posed a high level of competition on the more
developed economies. The opportunities were therefore greater for
the post-Soviet nations to enter the global marketplace. The
contrast with the global situation facing the Arab nations is stark.
The global economy is weaker than it was in post-Soviet societies,
and Europe is focused on its own economic and political
problems. Both financial and political capital is unlikely to be
available to Arab countries in the form and on the scale that was
provided for in post-Soviet nations. It will, therefore, be more
difficult for them to find support and opportunities from the
regional and global economies.
Making progress on democratic reforms is no guarantee that
the process will be successful. In fact, from the 140 or so
democracies in the world, at most two out of three of them could
be considered fully democratic. Not only do many democratically
elected governments use undemocratic means to stay in power, but
they intervene in what should be independent actions of legislative
and judicial branches, and may go as far as to change the rules to
stay in power beyond their legal mandate. Meanwhile, in many
democracies, continuing problems of high inequality, poverty,
corruption, and lack of accountability alienate important segments
of the population and threaten both the stability and legitimacy of
democratic rule. For Arab nations these are factors that are already
significant, and are likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. It
is economic and social problems such as these that frequently pose
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a threat in both fragile and consolidated democracies, and the data
on Latin America reveal this clearly.
In 2004, the UNDP published a report on the state of
democracy in Latin America 4 , from which it was clear that in spite
of the spread of democratic regimes during the previous couple of
decades, support for democracy was not deep or unconditional.
Thus, even where the majority (albeit a small one) of the
population claims to be in favour of democracy as a political
system, it is the problems of daily life that drive choices. When
given a choice between respect for democratic rules and
limitations on the power of leaders on the one hand, and greater
economic growth and a higher standard of living on the other, it is
the latter that tends to win, even among the self-defined
democratic. It is this phenomenon that opens the way for would-be
rulers to come to power or to extend their powers, by promising to
deliver improvements in daily life in exchange for more power for
themselves. In 2011, almost three decades after Latin America’s
democratic revolutions, only a handful could be said to be
relatively safe from increasing authoritarianism. In most of Latin
America, political parties are distrusted, ethnic tensions remain
high, inequality remains extreme, and governments are seen as
unmindful of the problems facing the majority of the population.
While these phenomena can be found even in fully developed
democracies, it is in the new democracies that they are most
troublesome, because the institutions that can protect a democracy
in times of stress are weakly developed, are unable to ward off
interference, have little experience of operating independently, and
have weak support from the population at large. 5 Looking ahead,
and bearing in mind the situations found in Arab societies, it is the
4
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2004: Report on Democracy
in Latin America. Available at: http: www.un-ngls.org/orf/engexecutivesummary.doc.
5
For an account of the Latin American patterns see Smith, Peter; Kearney,
Matthew, 2010: “Transitions, Interrupted: Routes Toward Democracy in Latin
America”, in: Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 6,1 (July): 137-163.
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experience of Latin America that may be of most relevance to the
Arab world, rather than that of the former communist nations.
The Arab uprisings have shown the world that the desire for
democracy among large sections of the Arab populations is strong,
and that there is a willingness to take huge personal risks in order
to achieve it. What is not so obvious, however, is what exactly
people mean by democracy and the form it should take, for views
on this differ from one part of the world to another. In particular,
the Latin American situation shows that expressed support for
democracy may not mean what people in the developed
democracies might think, since it is outcomes (especially
economic ones) that are of greatest importance. In the Arab case, a
similar chance for misunderstanding exists regarding the role of
religion in politics. Thus, “Many Arab citizens express support for
the influence of Islam in government and politics. This is not the
view of all citizens, however. In contrast to support for
democracy, which is expressed by the overwhelming majority of
the respondents in the Arab Barometer and other recent surveys,
men and women in every country where surveys have been
conducted are divided on the question of whether Islam should
play an important political role. For example, whereas 56 percent
of the respondents in the Arab Barometer surveys agree with the
statement that men of religion should have influence over
government decisions, 44 percent disagree, indicating that they
believe Islam should not play an important political role. Further,
the division of opinion observed among all respondents is present
to the same degree among those who express support for
democracy”. 6
As Munck has argued persuasively, defining and measuring
“democracy” has always been a difficult task, made more complex
by the fact that actions and policies are linked with whether
6
Jamal, Amaney; Tessler, Mark, 2008: “Attitudes in the Arab World”, in:
Journal of Politics, 19,1 (January): 102. See also Fattah, Moataz, 2010:
“Muslims’ Particular Affinity with Autocracy: A Myth or Reality?”, in: Taiwan
Journal of Democracy, 6,1 (July): 55-79.
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societies are ranked as democratic or not. Also, he shows that
since people hold multiple, often conflicting, values they engage
in trade-offs; in many cases economic and social values can trump
those of a democratic polity. And what theorists see as a set of
mutually reinforcing values that constitute “democracy”, may not
be what populations think or adhere to. A key puzzle, he notes, is
that “the significant gains with regard to electoral democracy over
the last twenty-five years have not been accompanied by positive
comparative changes with regard to other desired goals, such as
the rule of law and economic equality. Politics seems to involve
inescapable choices that require weighing complex trade-offs.” 7
Among the most frequently cited factors that can be expected
to contribute to the development of democracy are economic
development and education, and in many studies there is a
correlation between them. However, since correlation does not
amount to causation, it is hard to know in which direction the
influence runs. These factors can be seen as both a result of and a
contributor to democratic systems, and researchers have yet to
show decisively what their significance is. In addition, these
factors have different effects depending on the situation, including
the nature of the authoritarian system that precedes an attempted
move to democracy. 8 In the case of education, while there is a
correlation between the level of education and a nation’s
democracy rating, there are many outliers. Moreover, in some
countries an increase in education can lead to less support for
democracy, since it results in greater identification with ethnic and
tribal origins and more tolerance for conflict. 9 As an article in The
7
Munck, Gerardo L., 2009: Measuring Democracy: A Bridge between
Scholarship and Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press):130.
8
Hadenius, Axel; Teorell, Jan, 2005: “Cutural and Economic Prerequsites of
Democracy: Reassessing Recent Evidence”, in: Studies in Comparative
International Development, 39,4: 87-106.
Hadenius, Axel; Teorell, Jan, 2007: “Pathways from Authoritarianism”, in:
Journal of Democracy, 18,1 (January): 143-156.
9
Friedman, Willa; Kremer, Michael; Miguel, Edward; Thornton, Rebecca, 2011:
“Education as Liberation?”, NBER Working Paper 16939 (April). National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
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Economist has recently put it, education “may make people more
interested in improving their own lives but they may not
necessarily see democracy as the way to do it. Even in established
democracies, more education does not always mean either more
active political participation or greater faith in democracy. In
India, for example, poorer and less educated people vote in larger
numbers than their more educated compatriots. Indeed, the latter
often express disdain for, and impatience with, the messiness of
democracy. Many yearn instead for the kind of government that
would execute the corrupt and build highways, railway lines and
bridges at the dizzying pace of authoritarian China.” 10 If this
pattern of rural voting holds in the case of the upcoming elections
in Tunisia and Egypt, the consequences for democratic transition
will not be good, especially if economic problems are foremost in
people’s minds; this is, of course, in addition to any effect that
differences in religious values may have.
The complicated relationship between economic and political
goals can frequently make it difficult to achieve one without
relinquishing the other, and this is always a problem for countries
attempting democratic transitions. The most successful postcommunist societies were able to achieve both political and
economic goals, and in the longer term economic growth enabled
this to be a mutually reinforcing process. In contrast, apart from
revenue from natural resources, the former Soviet republics have
had neither political nor economic progress in any real sense. The
challenge facing Arab transitions is essentially economic; since if
growth that provides opportunities for employment is not achieved
the creation and protection of democratic rule will be difficult. It
has been economic failure (for example, from 1980 to 2010 the
average annual growth in per capita GDP was about 0,5 percent,
compared to more than 4 percent for Asia, and about 1 percent for
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa) and isolation from the
global market that were major contributors to the revolts. Arab
countries do not have to invent a market economy (as the post10
“Degrees of Democracy”, The Economist, 339, 8739 (25 June – 1 July 2011):
88.
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Soviet ones have had to do), but their private sectors are weak and
patriarchal. These economies are characterized by “a dominant
state, kleptocratic monopolies, heavy regulation, and massive
subsidies. This has fuelled corruption, stunted growth and left
millions without jobs”. 11 State involvement in the economy and
the lack of economic growth sufficient to raise living standards in
the face of rapidly growing population, means that the state has
had to resort to massive subsidies to buy stability in addition to
that provided by authoritarian controls. As part of the economic
reforms that are crucially necessary, subsidies will have to be
drastically reduced and budgets brought more into balance, but
this cuts across attempts to create a democracy, since the pain of
change could well weaken support for reform. This certainly
happened after the 1989 revolutions, and it was only the lure of
membership in the European Union that kept successive
governments (and they came and went in fairly rapid succession)
on track with reforms. In the former republics of the USSR (save
for the three Baltic nations), this factor was absent, and there was
nothing even remotely similar that could have prevented the
regression to authoritarian rule.
The pain of transition, when the economy will worsen for a
while just as the government pulls back and reduces or eliminates
subsidies, will be tolerated for a short period if the new leaders
move quickly to do the things that cause most pain; there is a
window of opportunity for a period of time immediately following
the revolution. But soon the daily stresses become too much to
accept quietly, and people can turn on their new leaders and
accuse them of failing to address the needs of the population. This
was dramatically seen in Poland, where Lech Walesa went from
universal adulation before 1989, to a widely hated figure when he
was President of Poland and pursuing painful reforms.
Attempts to buy peace by increasing subsidies and raising
salaries of public employees, as has already been done in Egypt,
only postpone the problems and waste a valuable opportunity for
11
“Open for Business”, The Economist, 339, 8739 (25 June – 1 July 2011): 16.
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real reforms when the public would accept them. The bloated
ranks of government employees will need to be drastically
reduced, before the economy is capable of absorbing the costs, the
inefficient firms in the private sector will need to rationalize their
operations and increase productivity (again adding to
unemployment, and potential unrest), and long-term strategies will
need to be put in place to enable survival in an extremely
competitive and sophisticated global economy.
The latter will be one of the most difficult tasks of future
governments, since the relative isolation of the Arab world from
the global economy for many decades must be abolished, before
this part of the world falls even further behind in competitiveness
and opportunity for its people. In short, the problems of the past
do not vanish merely because there is a different kind of political
system; in fact, they may become even more salient, as they are
brought into the open and the costs of dealing with them are faced.
During the perestroika period in the Soviet Union, the new
openness in cataloging the nation’s problems and the extent of its
backwardness was a very destabilizing factor.
Past experience shows that creating and consolidating a
democratic polity is a very uneven and, at times, unsuccessful
activity. Often, the results are difficult to categorize
unambiguously, and even where the outcomes can be defined as
democratic, they may take many forms. In addition to the factors
at work in all transitions, in the Arab case a special place has to be
given to the development of more transparency in government and
a significant reduction in corruption. As the events in India
demonstrate, this is a matter people feel strongly about since it
touches on all aspects of life, in addition to the issue of unfairness
and cost. And these reforms will have to be pursued quickly. The
literature on democracy creation shows that delays in change,
partial reforms, and a sense of social and economic injustice can
jeopardize any attempt at transition. Populations can tolerate pain
for a while, as long as the emotional investment in an uprising
lasts, but there is a definite limit, beyond which disillusionment
and withdrawal of support set in.
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One way in which the pain can be, if not alleviated, beneficial
is to have an external force that reinforces domestic dreams of a
better life. This was clearly the case after 1989 in Central Europe,
where the desire to join the European Union kept regimes on
track. But where is such an external factor to be found for the
Arab states? They are as isolated from each other, as they are from
the wider world; 12 thus, the prospects for some kind of regional
Arab union are considered as remote. Some observers are already
suggesting such a role for the Union for the MediterraneanBarcelona Process, but this is so dysfunctional that it is hard to see
how it can succeed in the new situation. 13 In addition, it is merely
a vague promise with no tangible benefits, beyond environmental
improvements and better transportation. This is not enough. The
Barcelona experience is also tainted with perceptions of European
ulterior motives (whether true or not), and so suspicions would be
hard to overcome. What is needed, and quickly, is a new plan of
action that has real and realistic benefits for those countries
making progress on democratic issues, including financial support.
Such a plan would require a strong sense of Arab ownership, and
would have to be in a form that successive governments would
find attractive enough to trump other agendas. Such a plan does
not yet exist, but it would be worth developing and doing it fast.
Without it, the domestic problems facing reformers can easily
derail their efforts.
As parts of the Arab world attempt to move away from
authoritarian systems, it is likely that there will be a long period
during which both the participants and the observers will have
their optimism shaken. During such times, we should not forget
that all democracies are in fact flawed, and are, as yet, a work in
progress; the issue is whether or not the flaws eventually
undermine the democratic foundations. What the Arab nations
12
Lewis, Bernard, 2009: “Free at Last?”, in: Foreign Affairs, 89,2 (March/April):
77-88.
13
Youngs, Richard, 2011: “What Not to Do in the Middle East and North
Africa”, Policy Brief 70 (March), FRIDE, Madrid Spain.
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have in their favour, however, are populations willing to struggle
and to risk their lives for a better future, and a wealth of
information based on best practices from other societies that have
already experienced successful transitions. There is no need for
Arab reformers to feel they are alone; the lessons of history are on
their side.
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