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HPSCGA28
Knowledge Explanation and
Classification
Syllabus
Session
2014-2015 Term 2
Web site
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/sts/study
Moodle site
https://moodle.ucl.ac.uk/course/view.php?id=22881#section-0
Timetable
www.ucl.ac.uk/timetable
Description
In this course, students will examine some of the core topics in contemporary philosophy of
science. There are 3 core themes: (1) What counts as scientific knowledge. (2) What counts as
a scientific explanation? (3) What role does classification play in science? These themes will be
examined in the context of some working examples from scientific practice. These topics will be
integrated with some of the other topics discussed in other courses, including models,
representations, mechanisms, causality and evidence.
Key Information
Assessment
%20
Essay Review 1,000 words
%80
Essay 4,000 words
%
Prerequisites
none
Required texts
All readings on moodle
HPSCG028 Title
2014-15 syllabus
Module tutors
Module tutor
Dr Emma Tobin
Contact
e.tobin@ucl.ac.uk | t: 020 7679 1321
Web
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/sts/staff/tobin
Office location
22 Gordon Square, Room 2.3
Office hours:
12-2 on Thursdays
and by appointment
Aims and objectives
aims
•
To provide knowledge of the 3 core topics; knowledge, explanation and classification.
•
To provide some foundational philosophy of science material.
•
The theoretical concepts will be grounded in case studies from scientific practice. Students will be
encouraged to think about other case studies.
•
Integrate these topics with related theoretical concepts from other courses (e.g. models,
representations, causation, mechanism and evidence)
objectives
By the end of this module students should be able to:
•
A grounding in key concepts in history of philosophy of science.
•
A grounding in the core conceptual accounts of knowledge, explanation and classification in
contemporary philosophy of science
•
A grounding in some case studies in scientific practice, from a range of scientific disciplines e.g.
biochemistry, medicine, astronomy
•
A grounding in some case studies from the history of science and how they illuminate these 3
philosophical topics.
•
Students will be encouraged to think about other case studies and how the theoretical accounts
would apply to them
•
Students will be able to think philosophically, analyse arguments critically
•
Students will be able to integrate the philosophical concepts learnt on this course with other HPS
and STS courses.
2
HPSCG028 Title
2014-15 syllabus
Module plan
Students are expected to attend weekly lectures and seminars. The first hour of each week will
consist of a lecture. The second hour will consist of student presentations, close reading and class
discussion.
There is no particular set text for this course. Required reading will be posted on moodle along
with some additional further reading. Students are expected to do independent research and find
relevant additional material.
Schedule
UCL Wk
Date
Topic
Activity
1
21
15-01-15
Introduction
Read essential reading 2
22
22-01-15
Inference to the best
explanation
Read essential reading
3
23
29-01-15
Values in Science and
Objectivity
Read essential reading
4
24
05-02-15
Novel Prediction and
Evidence
Read essential reading
5
25
12-02-15
Data
Read essential reading
26
19-02-15
Reading Week
no lectures
6
27
26-02-15
Testimony
Read essential reading
7
28
05-03-15
Natural Kind Realism
Read essential reading
8
29
12-03-15
Realism Undermined? The
Species Problem
Read essential reading
9
30
19-03-15
Natural Kinds and
Conceptual Change
Read essential reading
10
31
26-03-15
Classification in Practice
Read essential reading
Reading list
TOPIC 1: Explanation Week 1: Introduction: Background Lecture Reading: Woodward, Jim. (2009), “Scientific Explanation”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Seminar Reading: Van Fraassen, B.V. (1981), “The Pragmatics of Explanation”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 14: 143 – 150. 3
HPSCG028 Title
2014-15 syllabus
Further Reading: Bird, A. (1998), Philosophy of Science, London & New York: Routledge, Ch. 2. Bromberger, S., (1966), “Why Questions”, in Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, R. Colodny, (ed), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Curd & Cover (eds.) Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, Norton & Company, 1998, Ch. 6. Hempel, C. (1965), Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York, The Free Press. Kitcher, P. (1981), “Explanatory Unification”, Philosophy of Science, 48: 507-­‐531. Ladyman, J Understanding Philosophy of Science Chapter 7. Psillos, S. (2002), Causation & Explanation, Acumen, 215-­‐ 293, Ch. 3. Salmon, W., (1989), Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Week 2: Inference to the Best Explanation Lecture Reading: Lipton, P. W.H. Newton-­‐Smith (ed) A Companion to the Philosophy of Science (Blackwell, 2000) 184-­‐193. Seminar Reading: Wouldn’t it be lovely: Explanation and Scientific Realism Metascience (2005) 14:331–361. Bird, A. Inference to the Only Explanation, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007) 424–32. Further Reading: Bird, A. (2010) ‘Eliminative Abduction: Examples from Medicine’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A, 41(4): 345-­‐352. Day, T & Kincaid H. (1994), Putting Inference to the Best Explanation in its Place, Synthese 98(2): 271-­‐295. Glass, H. (2007) Coherence Measures and Inference to the Best Explanation, Synthese 157 (3): 275-­‐296. Lipton, P.(1991) Inference to the Best Explanation, London: Routledge. Lipton, P. (1996) ‘Is the Best Good Enough?’, in D. Papineau (ed.), The Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 93–106. Lipton, P. (2001) What Good is an Explanation?', in G. Hon & S. Rackover (eds.), Explanation: Theoretical Approaches, Kluwer, 2001, 43-­‐59. Reprinted in J. Cornwell (ed.)Understanding Explanation, Oxford University Press, 2004, 1-­‐22. Makonis, A (2013). Inference to the Best Explanation, Coherence and Other Explanatory Virtues. Synthese 190(6): 975-­‐995. Okasha, S. (2000) "Van Fraassen's Critique of Inference to the Best Explanation", Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 31: 691-­‐710. 4
HPSCG028 Title
2014-15 syllabus
Week 3: Values in Science & Objectivity Lecture Reading: Longino, H. (2013) The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Seminar Reading: Longino, H. E. (1990). Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific enquiry, CH 4. Douglas H. (2000) ‘Inductive Risk and Values in Science’, Philosophy of Science, 67(4). Further Reading: Kitcher, P. Science, Truth and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Longino, H. E. (1990). ‘Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific enquiry’ Machamer, P. & Wolters, G. (2004) Science, Values and Objectivity, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press. TOPIC 2: Knowledge Week 4: Novel Prediction & Evidence Lecture Reading: ‘Prediction’, The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, eds. Jessica Pfeifer and Sahotra Sarkar. New York: Routledge, Inc Seminar Reading: Scerri, E and Worrall, J. (2001) ‘Prediction and the Periodic Table’. In Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 32, 407-­‐452. Lipton, Peter. (1990) ‘Prediction and Prejudice’. In International Studies in the Philosophy of science, 4 (1): 51 – 65 (1990) Further Reading: Akeroyd, Michael, (2003) F. Prediction and the periodic table: A Response to Scerri and Worrall. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 34 (2): 337-­‐355. Cronyn, M. W. (2003) The Proper Place for Hydrogen in the Periodic Table. In Journal of Chemical Education, 80, 947-­‐951. Scerri, E. The Periodic Table: Its Story and Significance, Oxford University Press, Chapters 4 and 5. Scerri, E. (1998) ‘Has the Periodic Table Been Successfully Axiomatized?’ In Erkentnnis, 47: 229-­‐243. 5
HPSCG028 Title
2014-15 syllabus
Week 5: Data Lecture Reading: Woodward & Bogen, (1988) ‘Saving the Phenomena ’ The Philosophical Review, 97(3), pp. 303-­‐352. Seminar Reading: Leonelli, S. (2014) ‘Data Interpretation in the Digital Age’, Perspective on Science (eds. Henk de Regt and Wendy Parker. Further Readings: Woodward, J.F. (2011) ‘Data and Phenomena: A Restatement and Defense’. Synthese 182 (1): 165-­‐179 McAllister, W. (2011) ‘What do Patterns in Empirical Data Tell us About the Structure of the World?’ Synthese, 182 (1): 73-­‐87. Massimi, M. (2011). From Data to Phenomena: A Kantian Stance, Synthese 182(1): 101-­‐116. Week 6: Testimony Lecture Reading: Lipton, P. (1998) ‘The Epistemology of Testimony’ Stud. His. Phil. Sci., Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 1-­‐31. Seminar Reading: Haack, S. (2005) ‘Trial and Error: The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science’, The American Journal of Public Health. Further Readings: Graham, P.J. (2000) ‘The Reliability of Testimony’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 61, No. 3. (Nov., 2000), pp. 695-­‐709. Fricker, Elizabeth (1987) "The Epistemology of Testimony." Proceedings of the Aristotlian Socieo Supplementary Volume 61, pp. 59-­‐83. Fricker, Elizabeth (1994) "Against Gullibility" in Matilal and Chakrabarti (1994), pp. 125-­‐61. Graham, Peter J. (1997) "What is Testimony'?" The Philosophical Quarterly, 47, pp. 227-­‐32. TOPIC 3: Classification Week 7: Natural Kind Realism Lecture Reading: Bird A. and Tobin E. Natural Kinds, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Seminar Reading: Boyd, R. N. (1991). “Realism, Anti-­‐foundationalism, and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds.” Philosophical Studies 61: 127–48. Further Reading: 6
HPSCG028 Title
2014-15 syllabus
Ellis, B., (2001), Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ellis, B., (2002), The Philosophy of Nature. Chesham: Acumen. Ellis, B., (2005), “Physical Realism”, Ratio 18: 371–384. Reprinted in Metaphysics in Science, A. Drewery (ed.), (2006), Oxford: Blackwell: 1–13. Kripke, S., (1980), Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Week 8: Realism Undermined: The Species Problem Lecture Reading: Wilson, R.A. Barker, M. Brigandt, I. (2007), ‘When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds’, PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS, VOL. 35, NOS. 1 & 2. Seminar Reading: Dupré, J., (2001), “In Defence of Classification”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 32(2): 203–219. Ereshefsky, M. (1998). “Species Pluralism and Anti-­‐Realism.” Philosophy of Science 65: 103–20. Further Reading: Beatty, J., (1997), “Why do biologists argue like they do?”, Philosophy of Science 64: 432–443. Ereshefsky, M. (2001). The Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy: A Philosophical Study of Biological Taxonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ghiselin, M. T., 1974, “A Radical Solution to the Species Problem”, Systematic Zoology 23: 536–544. Ghiselin, M. T., 1987, “Species Concepts, Individuality and Objectivity”, Biology and Philosophy 2: 127–
144. Hull, D. L., (1965), “The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy: 2,000 Years of Stasis”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 15: 314–326. Hull, D. L., 1976, “Are Species Really Individuals”, Systematic Zoology 25: 174–191. Kitts, D. B. and Kitts, D. J., 1979, “Biological Species as Natural Kinds”, Philosophy of Science 46: 613–622. Wilson, R. A., 1996, “Promiscuous Realism”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47: 303–316. 7
HPSCG028 Title
2014-15 syllabus
Week 9: Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change Lecture Reading: Sankey, H. “Taxanomic Incommensurability” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12:1 (1998), 7-­‐16. Seminar Reading: LaPorte, J., 1996, “Chemical Kind Term Reference and the Discovery of Essence”, Noûs, 30: 112–132. Further Reading: Kuhn (2000a) ‘The road since Structure’, in T. S. Kuhn, eds. J. Conant and J. Haugeland, The Road Since Structure, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 90-­‐104. Kuhn (2000b) ‘Afterwords’, in T. S. Kuhn, eds. J. Conant and J. Haugeland, The Road Since Structure, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 224-­‐52. LaPorte, J., 1997, “Essential Membership”, Philosophy of Science 64: 96–112. LaPorte, J., 2004, Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Khalidi, M. A. (1998) ‘Natural kinds and crosscutting categories’, Journal of Philosophy 95: 33-­‐50 Tobin E. ‘Crosscutting Natural Kinds and the Hierarchy Thesis’, The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, Helen Beebee and Nigel Leary (eds.), Routledge Studies in Metaphysics, 2010. Week 10: Classification in Practice: Some Case Studies Lecture Reading: Slater, M. H. (2009) Macromolecular Pluralism, Philosophy of Science 76 (5): 851-­‐863. Seminar Reading: NO Reading Assessment
summary
Description
Deadline
Word limit
1
Essay Review
19.02.15
1,000 words
2
Long Essay
16.03.15
4,000 words
8
HPSCG028 Title
2014-15 syllabus
Coursework
All of the above assessments are coursework. The exact nature of each piece will be explained in class. Both essays must be submitted via Moodle. In order to be deemed ‘complete’ on this module students must attempt both assessments. The departmental marking guidelines for individual items of assessment can be found in the STS Student Handbook. 9