US Government
Innovations in
Peacebuilding and
Conflict Resolution:
Implications for the IPCR Program
Ronald Fisher, Ariana Barth, Sarah Beller, Graig Klein, and Natalia Oyola-Sepulveda,
International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program (IPCR),
School of International Service (SIS), American University,
First Published, November, 2010; Updated, September, 2013.
1
US Government Innovations in Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution:
Implications for IPCR
Executive Summary
Over the last decade, the relationship between the conflict resolution (CR) field and United
States Government (USG) programs and policies in this area has been rapidly changing. This is
in large part due to the development of new USG offices to help manage post-conflict transitions,
reconstruction and stabilization, i.e., peacebuilding, as well as to implement conflict-sensitive
approaches in USG diplomacy and development work. This study was initiated to document
these changing realities to help keep the IPCR program on the cutting edge of the CR field.
This report describes developments in the USG's international conflict resolution activities, and
identifies necessary job competencies and opportunities for IPCR graduates to improve how the
IPCR program prepares graduates for employment. The updated study focuses on three
government units: the US Agency for International Development's Office of Transition
Initiatives (USAID/OTI) and Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID/CMM),
and the US Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (S/CSO). The
initial research consisted of consultations and interviews with twenty individuals, including four
USAID employees and five State Department employees. For the current report, updated desk
research was followed by select interviews with administrators in the offices of interest
OTI was created in 1994 to provide short-term assistance in post-conflict situations or crises in
order to support peaceful and democratic transitions. By promoting reconciliation, jumpstarting
economies and helping democracy take hold, the intent is to lay the foundations for long term
successful development. With a uniquely responsive funding structure, OTI is able to deploy
more rapidly during critical windows of opportunity than other branches of USAID. After 20
years, OTI has built an impressive track record of peacebuilding projects around the globe, with
attention to both the substantive and the human or relationship aspects of the work. OTI uses an
Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) mechanism to contract out most work, and is attuned to small
scale, community level initiatives that result in local actions to bring about immediate changes.
CMM was established in 2002 in order to integrate conflict resolution and peacebuilding into the
implementation of USG development aid. The office provides support and resources, such as
analytical tools, conflict resolution training, and policy recommendations, to existing USAID
missions and other government agencies. CMM has developed a number of tool kits for different
conflict situations and has played a central role in the development and implementation of
conflict assessment frameworks for the USG. Much of the work is contracted out to large
consulting firms, although there is also a direct grants mechanism for reconciliation work.
The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created in 2004
to coordinate USG interagency efforts at reconstruction and stabilization in countries at risk or
emerging from violent conflict. S/CRS was directed to provide the platform for developing the
necessary programs and strategies to coordinate this work among all USG agencies, including
the Department of Defense. Two major accomplishments of CRS were the development of the
Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), in concert with CMM, and the Civilian
2
Response Corps. During its seven year existence, CRS developed structures and procedures for
cooperation, conflict assessment, and project implementation and evaluation.
Developments in USG policy and programming were significantly influenced by the completion
of the State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) completed
in 2010. In the context of a broad policy shift toward conflict prevention and resolution, the
QDDR set in motion the creation of the new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
(S/CSO), which subsumed S/CRS. In essence, the QDDR affirmed and extended efforts to
engage, coordinate and integrate various players in the USG civilian response to crisis and
conflict contexts worldwide.
S/CSO was established in 2011 to enhance civilian capacity for the USG to work effectively in
conflict zones to create stabilization and to further democracy. The mission of CSO is to help
break cycles of violence, thus increasing US national security, and to address the full spectrum of
conflict, from prevention, through response, to stabilization. As such, CSO is working to further
USG coordination efforts, while at the same time fostering short term projects that are focused,
integrated, and empower local stakeholders. In the interests of a lean operation, the Civilian
Response Corps has been transformed into a Civilian Response Network, which will consist of
skilled local individuals who are trained and guided by experts provided by CSO. In addition, the
Bureau will continue to build on CRS’s work in conflict assessment, as exemplified by the
development of the ICAF 2.0.
Each of these innovative agencies has been vigorously engaged in supporting USG conflict
resolution and peacebuilding efforts around the globe. Despite funding and other limitations,
these agencies are creating and spawning career opportunities for IPCR graduates who have
acquired the competencies necessary for active engagement in conflict prevention and resolution.
Interviewees identified a number of competencies that would place IPCR graduates in a
competitive position in relation to job opportunities. First and foremost, IPCR graduates should
possess general conflict literacy in terms of understanding the nature and expression of violent
ethnopolitical conflict, but should also be able to solve practical problems by applying theory on
the ground. Part of this involves the capacity to carry out conflict analysis and assessment
activities, and to be able to manage conflict in organizational settings. Graduates should also
acquire knowledge of reconstruction, stabilization and development work (i.e., peacebuilding),
and should understand how the USG operates in these areas. Graduates are advised to develop
awareness of current trends in analysis and policy as expressed by the major governmental and
nongovernmental institutions. Finally, graduates are advised to acquire significant overseas
experience, including the development of language capacity, and to learn to think outside the
Western cultural framework. The IPCR curriculum and its learning outcomes are already strong
in a number of these areas, and further enhancements will place our graduates in a very
competitive position now and in the future.
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Table of Contents
Glossary of Acronyms……………………………………………………………..….… 5
Section I: Introduction………………………………………………………………….. 6
Section II: USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)…………………………... 9
Introduction & Overview
Funding
Process of Work
Personnel
Job Competencies & Opportunities
Section III: USAID's Office of Conflict Management & Mitigation (CMM)………. 16
Introduction & Overview
Funding
Scope of Conflict Resolution Work
Process of Work
Job Competencies & Opportunities at CMM
Working at USAID
Section IV: US State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization (S/CRS) ……………………….……………………….………......... 24
Introduction
Scope of Conflict Resolution Work
Funding
Section V: US State Departments Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
(CSO) ……………………………………………………………………………………. 27
Introduction
Personnel
Funding
Scope of Conflict Resolution Work
Challenges
The Future
Job Competencies
Section VI: Conclusion and Implications...………………………….………………... 34
4
Glossary of Acronyms
AED
AMEX
APS
ARC
ARD
CAF
CCF
CHF
CMM
CR
CRC
CRC-S
CRC-R
CSO
CVA
DAI
DCHA
DDR
DoD
dTS
ICAF
ICRP
ICC
IMS
IOM
IPCR
IQC
IRG
ISC
NGO
NSPD
OAA
OECD
OFDA
OMB
OTI
PDQ
PPL/LER
PPR
PRT
PSA
QDDR
RFTOP
S/CRS
SAIS
SIS
SWIFT
USAID
USG
USIP
Academy for Educational Development
AMEX International
Annual Program Statement
Active Response Corps
ARD, Inc.
Conflict Assessment Framework
Complex Crisis Fund
CHF International
USAID Office of Conflict Management & Mitigation
Conflict Resolution
Civilian Response Corps
Standby Unit of the Civilian Response Corps
Reserve Unit of the Civilian Response Corps
US Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
Conflict & Vulnerability Assessment
Development Alternatives International
USAID Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration
Department of Defense
Development & Training Services
Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
Instability, Crisis & Recovery Programs
International Criminal Court
Interagency Management System
International Organization for Migration
International Peace and Conflict Resolution
Indefinite Quantity Contract
International Resources Group
Institute for Sustainable Communities
Nongovernmental Organization
National Security Presidential Directive
USAID Office of Acquisition and Assistance
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
Office of Management and Budget
USAID Office of Transition Initiatives
Program Development Quickly
USAID Bureau of Policy, Planning and Learning Office of Learning, Evaluation
and Research
Program Performance Review
Provincial Reconstruction Team
Public Service Announcement
Quadrennial Development and Diplomacy Review
Request for Task Order Proposal
US State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization
Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies
School of International Service, American University
Support Which Implements Fast Transition
United States Agency for International Development
United States Government
United States Institute of Peace
5
Section I: Introduction
Over the last decade, the relationship between the conflict resolution (CR) field and the United
States Government (USG) has been rapidly changing and developing. Proponents have
applauded the USG's increased adoption of conflict-sensitive approaches in its defense,
diplomacy, and development strategies. At the same time, detractors have cautioned against a
loss of agency and neutrality in CR work as a result of the process of “mainstreaming,” meaning
that conflict resolution and peacebuilding work have become a more integral part of government
activities and that the relationship between the two domains has experienced increasing
collaboration. Regardless of one's opinion of these developments, they are a growing reality for
the CR field.
This study was initiated in 2009 to document these changing realities so that the International
Peace and Conflict Resolution Program (IPCR) at American University, and other programs
across the US, could stay on the cutting edge of the CR field. This 2013 version contains revised
analysis through updated interviews and desk research, although the purposes of the report
remain the same. They are: a) to track developments in the USG’s international conflict
resolution activities1 and b) to identify necessary job competencies and opportunities for IPCR
graduates, which in turn informs the continued development of the IPCR program.
The report focuses on three USG offices: the US Agency for International Development's Office
of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) and Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation
(USAID/CMM), and the US Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations (S/CSO), which emerged from the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS). Section II examines the work of OTI, which supports US foreign policy
interests by helping local partners advance peace and democracy in countries in crisis. Section
III details the work of CMM, which works to make all of USAID's activities more conflictsensitive. Section IV provides a brief retrospective on the work of S/CRS, and follows with a
new section (V) on CSO in its first year. Section VI offers overall conclusions and
recommendations for the IPCR program.
The initial research for this report was conducted by Graig Klein and Sarah Beller under the
guidance of Dr. Ronald Fisher. The study began with research consultations with knowledgeable
members of the conflict resolution community; then, using the snowball method, selected
administrators within the USG were approached for in-depth interviews. In total, 20 interviews
and consultations were conducted, including with four USAID and five State Department
employees. IPCR and other School of International Service (SIS) alumni in these offices also
provided helpful entry points and valuable advice. In developing the updated report, desk
research conducted by Ariana Barth and Natalia Oyola-Sepulveda was followed by a small
1
Much overlap exists among conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and development activities, and often the
boundaries are fuzzy. For the purposes of this report, we will primarily focus on conflict resolution activities,
defined as communication-based interactions with the purpose of increasing understanding among conflicting
parties and/or achieving mutually beneficial outcomes. This could include mediation, negotiation, problem-solving
workshops, dialogue, conflict resolution training, and some media work. Peacebuilding implies a broader set of
activities and objectives, and is currently defined by the Alliance for Peacebuilding as “the set of initiatives by
diverse actors in government and civil society applied to address the root causes of violence and protect civilians
before, during, and after violent conflict.” (http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org)
6
number of targeted interviews with administrators from each of the agencies, bureaus, and
offices of interest.2
The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
Many of the developments covered in this updated report have been strongly influenced by a
State Department document released in 2010 called the Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review (QDDR). A short narrative describing its development and influence is
therefore provided here.
In 2008, close to the start of her tenure as Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton ordered a
sweeping review of United States development and diplomacy activities, consulting hundreds of
individuals from within the USG and across the world. The result of this initiative— the
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review —was published in 2010.3 It was a strategic
plan akin to the Quadrennial Defense Review published by the Department of Defense., and
answered the basic question how can the Department of State and USAID do better? The
intended outcomes of the QDDR were multiple: to get the most out of taxpayer money, to better
equip the USG to handle complex development and diplomatic challenges, and to protect US
interests while projecting US leadership, to name a few. The QDDR outlines concrete ways to
make agency work more unified, focused, and efficient. The report envisions sweeping
improvements, as is evident in this excerpt from Clinton’s introduction to the QDDR:
We will provide the strategic framework and oversight on the ground to
ensure that America’s civilian power is deployed as effectively as
possible…we will work to break down walls between agencies. We will
eliminate overlap, set priorities, and fund only the work that supports
those priorities. We will empower our people to make decisions and hold
them accountable for the results.
Chapter 4 of the QDDR, Preventing and Responding to Crisis, Conflict and Instability, has had
an especially clear effect on the work of those offices and agencies working in conflict contexts.
In fact, the QDDR impacted the Department of State’s work to the extent that it set in motion the
creation of an entirely new Bureau to subsume the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization. This is now the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, and its
formation and work are covered in this updated report.
Chapter 4 outlines the ways in which the USG is increasingly confronting new conflict-related
challenges abroad as well as old challenges in new conflict contexts. According to the QDDR,
more than a quarter of the Department of State and USAID’s personnel serve in the 30 countries
that are at highest risk for conflict. The report envisions a shift of USG civilian work in conflict
contexts from ‘ad hoc’ and ‘poorly integrated’ to clear and streamlined. This is to be achieved by
embracing conflict prevention and response within fragile states and building an effective
2
The authors of the report express their appreciation to the individuals interviewed in the process of completing the
study, particularly those interviewed for the update who took the time to review portions of the draft in order to
provide clarification and advice. The authors take sole responsibility for the content of the report.
3
United States Department of State Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), 2010.
http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/ Accessed May 2013.
7
capability to reform security and justice sectors. Key informants interviewed for the USG report
revision noted that the QDDR marked an important moment in US foreign policy, reflecting
changes that had been underway for some years, and they were thus asked to comment on the
QDDR as it impacts USG offices and agencies.4All agreed that it marked an important turning
point in US Foreign Policy, though the effect of the QDDR is not always seen as direct.
4
Interview with Dr. Tjip Walker, Deputy Director of USAID /Policy Planning and Learning, January 22, 2013;
Interview with Neil Levine, Director, USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, January 30, 2013.
8
Section II: USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)
U.S. Agency for International Development
The United States Agency for International Development was established in 1961 by an
executive order from President John F. Kennedy. The executive order joined several separate
foreign assistance programs under a single agency. USAID is charged with furthering U.S.
foreign policy, while assisting developing countries to create stability and improve their
economic, health, and governance sectors. Throughout its five decades of existence the agency’s
development focus has evolved from “technical and capital assistance programs” in the 1960s;
assistance in basic human needs in the 1970s; “stabilizing currencies and financial systems” in
the 1980s; sustainability and democracy in the 1990s and in the 20th and 21st century, rebuilding
after war.5 Although, the agency does work at all stages during the conflict cycle—from
prevention to post-conflict peacebuilding—this report centers on the work in peace and conflict
resolution led by the Office of Transition Initiatives and the Office of Conflict Management and
Mitigation.
Introduction & Overview
USAID's institutional culture has not historically been conducive to fast, flexible, overtly
political activities. Upon leaving office, Lawrence Eagleburger, Secretary of State under
President George H. W. Bush, urged USAID to find ways to respond to national security
priorities in the post-Cold War world6. In response, then-incoming USAID Administrator Brian
Atwood proposed the creation of a USAID Office of Crisis and Transition Management.
Congress approved the addition of $10 million into the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance's
(OFDA) budget for “transition” activities, forming the entity now known as OTI. During the
first year of funding, programs were launched in Haiti and Angola.7
OTI was formally created in 1994. Its aims were to lay the foundation for long-term development
in countries of strategic interest to the US by promoting reconciliation, jumpstarting economies,
and helping stable democracy take hold.8 It sought to “provide fast, flexible, short-term
assistance to take advantage of windows of opportunity to build democracy and peace.”9 As
such, OTI instituted a distinctive approach to its work, exemplified in the following ways: First,
OTI specifically encourages a culture of risk-taking, political orientation, and swift response
among its staff and partners. Second, OTI is funded by a separate "Transition Initiatives" budget
account with special authorities that allow immediate spending where it is most needed. In this
way the Office can deploy more rapidly than other branches of USAID10 and is an important part
of the agency’s expeditionary capacity to send people out into the field on short notice.11 Finally,
5
USAID, USAID History, http://usaid.gov/who-we-are/usaid-history Accessed December 2012.
USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, Office of Transition Initiatives: 1994-2009, Washington DC: 2009, p.5.
7
USAID OTI, 2009, 5-6.
8
USAID, Transition Initiatives, http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/transition_initiatives/aboutoti.html Accessed May 2013.
9
USAID, Promoting Peaceful and Political Transitions: Background, http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/workingcrises-and-conflict/promoting-peaceful-political-transitions/background Accessed May 2013.
10
McDonald, Sean, “Developing Peacebuilding: USAID's Institutional Integration of the Foreign Assistance
Framework.” Unpublished Work, 2008.
11
Smith, Dane, “Peace-building and Stabilization: A Look at the Interagency Planning Process.” Presentation to
Peacebuilding and Development Institute, American University, June 3, 2008.
6
9
OTI has an innovative contracting mechanism that preserves the principle of competition while
allowing quick start-up in new countries and direct grants to small, indigenous organizations.12
In the years since its inception, OTI had carried out 45 interventions in 36 countries as of 2009.13
The totality of these projects, which are generally small-scale, has been undertaken with
relatively limited funds—$750 million during its first ten years. Under the Clinton
administration, OTI went to Haiti, Bosnia, Serbia, and Liberia, among other countries. After the
events of September 11th, the Bush administration shifted its focus to Afghanistan and Iraq. An
example of OTI's Iraq projects was to furnish the new government’s ministries in Baghdad in
2003. The Office also supported civil society groups in that country, distributing 5,000 grants in
three years.14
Funding
OTI receives its core funding from the Transition Initiatives account, a budget line in the yearly
Foreign Operations Law. The Office also manages funds transferred from other offices and
departments to support its programs including Development Assistance; and the Economic
Support Fund (which often comes from US embassies or USAID missions). Throughout two
decades of its existence, OTI has seen an overall increase in its budget; at $410 million, FY2010
was the biggest year to date. There has been concern about how and where funds were spent.
For instance, only 2 percent of the FY2010 budget was directed to headquarters for activities
such as Operations, and Monitoring & Evaluation. Jenkins has in recent years advocated for
increased support to the ‘backbone’ of OTI (meaning work done in Washington DC), and
believes more work can be done with less funding. FY2012’s budget decreased to $286
million.15
Scope of Conflict Resolution Work
OTI's activities are part of a larger peacebuilding and stabilization effort on the part of USAID.
In its 15-year report, OTI describes its approach to peacebuilding as follows:
The underlying objective can often be even more important than the actual project. A
rebuilt market's immediate impact is to allow local women to sell agriculture products,
but the longer-term impact is bringing rival ethnic groups to one place to work
productively...While many of its activities can be categorized as traditional development
programs—micro-enterprise, income generation, education, community development,
etc.—OTI designs its activities through the prism of the anticipated positive impact on
resolving or reducing local disputes and conflict.16
12
USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, Strategic Principles, http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crisesand-conflict/promoting-peaceful-political-transitions/strategic-principles Accessed May 2013.
13
Email interview with Sven Lindholm, Program Officer for Outreach & Public Affairs, USAID Office of
Transition Initiatives, August 14, 2009.
14
Smith, 2008.
15
Interview with Robert Jenkins, Director of the Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID, Washington D.C.,
February 19, 2013.
16
USAID OTI, 2009, 21-22.
10
Director Robert Jenkins explains that OTI focuses on action items to make concrete, immediate
changes.17. The Office is inclined toward small grants, community-focused initiatives, bottom-up
approaches, and finding change agents at the local level. The goal of a micro-level focus is to
allow indigenous capacities to develop and eventually take charge, so that projects are more
sustainable and also reduce the US’ direct involvement over time. Many of OTI's efforts are lowkey in order to avoid placing local stakeholders at risk. This can occur when locals are seen as
cooperating with the USG. Although OTI’s projects have been primarily in rural areas, the focus
has recently shifted to urban environments.18
OTI engages in countries only when the situation meets four criteria: (1) The country is
important to U.S. national interests; (2) There is a viable window of opportunity for engagement;
(3) OTI's involvement can significantly increase the chances of a successful transition; (4) The
operating environment is sufficiently stable.19
Process of the Work
How does OTI decide what type of intervention to implement? The strategy and project design
is an iterative process. When OTI is considering whether to work in a country, it first sends a
team to conduct an assessment for two weeks. Then the Office discusses whether the situation
meets the four criteria mentioned above and decides whether to go into the country. The
intervention approach is then formed from the assessment. Next, OTI writes a Request For Task
Order Proposal (RFTOP), and partner organizations write proposals, in which they may further
shape the approach. The winning proposal is then approved by OTI and the Office of
Acquisition and Assistance (OAA), USAID's contracts office. This process usually takes about
six weeks from sending out the RFTOP to having an approved proposal.
Once the initiative is launched, local staff design and implement specific projects, which are
entirely field-driven. OTI and its partners assess the project and send a team from OTI for a peer
review every few months. The approach is entrepreneurial and flexible, especially because the
context can shift. Consequently, the initiatives are assessed on a rolling basis so they may be
adjusted as necessary. Lindholm explained:
The Program Performance Review (PPR) is an objective, internal process of assessment
and review of an OTI country program’s performance at all levels of implementation
undertaken at key points in the life of the OTI program. The PPR is done annually, but
also may be done after a major structural event changes the policy and operational
environment.20
The following are examples of OTI's programming that fall under this report’s working
definition of conflict resolution:
Libya, 2012: Working under a grant from USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives,
Phoenix Libya, a Tripoli-based women's group originally formed in Tunisia to assist
17
Interview with Jenkins, 2013.
Interview with Jenkins, 2013.
19
USAID OTI, 2009.
20
Interview with Lindholm, 2009.
18
11
Libyan refugees during the revolution, developed and promoted a national awareness
campaign which focused on reconciliation, unity, and forgiveness. The activity
employed television, radio, Internet public service announcements, billboards, posters,
and flyers to call on Libyans to accept their differences, let go of the past, and work
together to rebuild. USAID/OTI supported the printing and distribution of 5,000 posters
and 23,000 flyers, and the placement of 18 billboards in the cities of Tripoli, Misrata,
Benghazi, and Zawiya.21
Kenya, 2008: After the post-election violence, OTI projects were "designed to engage
and build bridges among Kenya's ethnic groups."22 At dialogues, community members
came together to air their grievances and eventually, generated joint project ideas. OTI
worked through a local Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) and the Catholic Justice
and Peace Commission.
Lebanon, 2006: After the Cedar Revolution in 2005 and the Lebanon/Israel War in 2006,
OTI encouraged cooperation between hostile local groups by bringing together farmers
from different identity groups (Shia, Sunni, Christian). Farmers shared stories of
agricultural successes and challenges.
Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003: After the Sun City Peace Accords, OTI aimed to
increase accessibility of "balanced, accurate information."23 To do so, they supported
Radio Okapi, run by a UN peacekeeping operation, which disseminated information
about humanitarian assistance, the peace process, demobilization and reintegration. OTI
supported a radio show focusing on the effects of war on youth, which was broadcast in
the war-torn eastern provinces. The show was written and produced by an ethnically
diverse group of youth, including former child soldiers. The show received a
UNICEF/One World award.24
While OTI senior management would have liked to build on the number of staff, countries, and
efforts of OTI, following the mandate of the QDDR, doing so would have infringed upon the
Office’s culture of being fast and flexible. The focus has been instead on boosting OTI’s already
existing support structure.25
Contracting Mechanisms
OTI has several contracting processes. The primary one is their series of SWIFT (Support
Which Implements Fast Transition) indefinite quantity contracts (IQC). The IQC was precompeted, and six partners were selected. When projects come up, these partners are available to
quickly jump into action. SWIFT III is a five-year contract with a cap of $1.5 billion that has
been active since 2008 and has been extended through 2014. SWIFT III partners are AECOM,
Casals & Associates, Chemonics, Creative Associates International, Development Alternatives
21
USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID/OTI Libya Snapshot, http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/libya/topic0412.html, Accessed May 2013
22
USAID OTI, USAID/OTI Libya Snapshot
23
USAID OTI, 2009, p.23.
24
USAID OTI, 2009, p.23
25
Interview with Jenkins, 2013.
12
Inc. (DAI), Development & Training Services (dTS), and the International Resources Group
(IRG).
Another contracting mechanism is the Program Development Quickly (PDQ). The primary
partner on the contract, Training Resources Group (TRG), is mandated to provide services for
OTI under the broad categories of monitoring and evaluation, personnel development, and shortterm technical assistance.26 OTI views contractors as if they are part of their own, and seeks to
work with them as such. Although OTI is in charge, the ideal is to work as a seamless team.
Internal Evaluation
According to its ten-year report, OTI learned the following lessons about working on political
transitions:








Coordinate within USAID and with other government agencies.
Go beyond capital cities to regions of conflict.
Be aware that the country must have political will for transition.
Plan for long-term development to continue momentum after OTI leaves.
Insure funding flexibility and staff deployment-readiness.
Engage grassroots leadership.
Expect setbacks; steady progress is often elusive.
Make democratic principles part of the process, not just the product. Each project is an
opportunity to influence public perceptions of democratic political transition.27
The 15-year report added the following lessons learned:






Employ dynamic and adaptive performance management processes.
Support “action research” and constantly adapt the strategic course.
“Look beyond the 'usual suspects' for local partnerships, including spontaneous groups of
active citizens.”28
Pair quick intervention with sustained effort and support, in order to be most effective.
Empower field personnel to make quick program decisions.
Use a “venture capitalist” approach by starting small, taking risks, and growing good
ideas.29
One way in which the Office has increased its dedication to staying at the forefront of innovation
at USAID is the creation of the Knowledge Management Platform. This platform is a searchable
server that allows OTI employees in the field and in Washington DC to connect to one another in
real time to seek advice on and compare projects currently and previously implemented. This
represents a shift in resources toward Monitoring & Evaluation and learning & training.30
26
Interview with Jenkins, 2013
USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, OTI Special Tenth-Year Edition: A Decade of Transition, 1994-2004,
Washington, DC, 2004.
28
USAID OTI, 2009, p. 3.
29
USAID OTI, 2009, p. 3.
30
Interview with Jenkins, 2013.
27
13
Challenges
External evaluations of OTI have praised the office for its civil society focus, its work in rural
areas despite strong incentives for urban development work, and its ability to act quickly,
flexibly, and in an innovative manner on a relatively low budget. Though a relatively small
office, OTI does some of the most cutting-edge peacebuilding and conflict resolution work at
USAID.31 In a 2005 assessment of OTI's first ten years, Robert Rotberg identified which of the
Office’s activities have been most and least effective. His study was based on a sample of six
countries: East Timor, Indonesia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, and Peru.
Rotberg found the main strengths of OTI to be:

Civil society focus. OTI's strongest legacy is what it has done to empower stakeholders
and civil society. In all the sample countries, OTI initiated inter-communal dialogue.
Though intangible, the effects of dialogue are important and contribute to the goal of
societies being politically self-sufficient after OTI leaves.

Overcoming urban bias. OTI pays attention to non-metropolitan areas, which is crucial.

Ability to act quickly, flexibility, and innovatively on a relatively low budget. Outside
of its work in Iraq and Afghanistan, OTI only spent $500 million in ten years. The Office
has been able to accomplish a lot because it is bound by fewer bureaucratic constraints
than most US overseas operations.32
Although OTI has done commendable work, sources have pointed out some of OTI's limitations
and challenges. OTI is bound by many of the same constraints as USAID, including inadequate
funding, a shortage of talented and energetic personnel, bureaucratic inefficiency, late adoption
of new technologies, and falling into a procurement role rather than carrying out its own projects.
Any change in these areas would likely take time to occur.33 In 2009, Lindholm emphasized that
OTI continued to address and grapple with the issues outlined by Rotberg.34
Rotberg offered the following critiques on OTI: spread too thin; its period of engagement period
is too short to embed changes into society; tendency to hand out small, in-kind grants may be
hindering effectiveness; may not be suited to work in large, complex countries like Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Nigeria; not enough attention was being given to improve governance and train
emerging political leaders; respond time lagged.35
The relevant areas Rotberg considered were sustainable peace and conflict resolution; media;
demobilization, disarmament, and youth reintegration; and justice and reconciliation. Examples
of successful initiatives included the facilitation of community dialogue sessions, problem31
McDonald, 2008.
Robert Rotberg, The First Ten Years: An Assessment of the Office of Transition Initiatives, report for the Program
on Intrastate Conflict, Belfer Center, J. F. Kennedy School, Harvard University. Cambridge, MA, 2005.
33
McDonald, 2008.
34
Interview with Lindholm, 2009.
35
Rotberg, 2005.
32
14
solving workshops, and negotiations; strengthening of political institutions and the rule of law;
increased citizen participation and access to information; creation of a civil society radio station
with the goal of promoting reconciliation; job training.
Personnel
OTI's Washington, D.C.-based staff is divided into the following teams: Field Operations,
Africa, Asia and Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Latin American and Caribbean, Applied
Best Practices and Coordination, Operations and Management, and the Program Office. Each
country where OTI is currently involved has a Program Manager in Washington, DC, and staff in
this office work collaboratively across program areas.36 Worldwide, OTI comprises about 200
employees. These numbers do not include “bullpen” personnel, a group of development and
conflict specialists on intermittent contracts who assist in all aspects of OTI's work. “The
bullpen and the unique staffing pattern allow OTI to rapidly ramp up or scale down staff and
program resources to respond to urgent USG priorities.”37
Job Competencies & Opportunities
Most of the 200 people who work for OTI are Personal Services Contractors, employed by the
USG on a one- to five-year contract. The jobs are competed, and can be found on
Globalcorps.com, as well as the USAID website. Job seekers can sign up to be alerted when
new jobs are posted. Another place to look for jobs is OTI’s contractors, such as the SWIFT III
partners. Additionally, job seekers should consider looking at other contracting organizations
such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM).38
OTI’s qualifications and competencies are different for field and Washington jobs. Field officers
are required to have previous field experience, while it is not essential for Washington-based
officers. Jenkins suggests acquiring exposure in the field sooner rather than later and for at least
2-3 years.39 Furthermore, experience in transition environments is an advantage. OTI looks for
hires with general experience in designing, implementing, managing, and evaluating political,
development, human rights and/or peacebuilding projects. On rare occasions, they are also
looking for a country expert. In terms of character, Director Jenkins says an individual who is
challenge-driven, highly motivated and can motivate others will make a more sought-after
applicant.40 Given the Office’s unique culture as well as hiring process, many positions are not
meant for a life-long career at OTI.
36
Interview with Jenkins, 2013
USAID OTI, 2009, p.15
38
Interview with Jenkins, 2013.
39
Interview with Jenkins, 2013.
40
Interview with Jenkins, 2013.
37
15
Section III: USAID Office of Conflict Management & Mitigation (CMM)
Introduction & Overview
Since its creation in 2002 under the leadership of USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios, the
Office of Conflict Management & Mitigation (CMM) has come to represent the USG’s shift
from working in conflict contexts to directly addressing conflict issues. At the highest policy
levels, USG officials have embraced the notion that development and conflict management are
highly interdependent processes requiring coordination of expert staff in both fields. CMM
works precisely to this end. As an office within USAID's Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and
Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), CMM aims to influence the institutional culture of the
agency by promoting awareness of conflict, instability, and extremism into everything that
USAID does. Through the provision of analytical and operational support— including technical
tools, research, trainings, and policy recommendations, CMM enables USAID missions (and
other government agencies) to better address the causes and consequences of violent conflict.41
Of all the government offices addressing conflict internationally, CMM is the office most
focused on prevention.42 CMM advocates for the prioritization of peacebuilding in development
programming.
In recent years CMM has particularly focused on providing technical leadership at the nexus of
conflict, security, and development. Key tools developed at CMM include the Conflict
Assessment Framework (CAF) as well as a series of toolkits that provide missions with concrete
and practical ways to strengthen programs. CMM also trains USAID officers on how to use the
CAF and how to apply the principles of Mary Anderson’s Do No Harm approach. Additionally,
through research and a speaker series, CMM is challenging conventional wisdom about how the
USG handles sensitive topics such as religion, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.
CMM is a relatively small office with a modest budget but wide-reaching scope. CMM's central
asset is, therefore its employees. Director Neil Levine describes CMM as being a ‘victim of its
own success,’ in that the greater CMM’s impact, the more demand for services from a small staff
of 16 officers. CMM’s response has been to make strategic choices about the topics and
countries on which it works.43
Funding
CMM’s core activities are financed through the Development Assistance funds within the
USAID budget. The range of funding for CMM has averaged $3.5 million in recent years.
Additionally, the office manages grants for reconciliation programs under a Congressional
earmark, which in 2012 amounted to $26 million.
41
Smith, 2008.
Dane Smith, Amy Frumin, James Kunder, and Frederick Barton, moderator, “U.S. Peacefare: Organizing
American Peace-Building Operations.” Panel discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC. May 26, 2009. See also, Smith, D. U.S Peacefare: Organizing American Peace-Building
Operations. Oxford, UK: Praeger Security International, 2010.
43
Email correspondence with Neil Levine, Director, USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, May
2013.
42
16
As in any branch of the government, CMM’s budget is determined by a multi-step process. At
the beginning of the fiscal year, CMM makes a proposal that is then considered by DCHA. The
proposal then goes to the Bureau of Foreign Assistance, to USAID, and to the White House’s
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The proposal is then subject to the congressional
appropriation process, where USAID’s final appropriation affects the ultimate size of the CMM
budget.
Scope of Conflict Resolution Work
CMM’s work has five pillars that provide a framework for the office’s activities. These are:
Technical Leadership; Field Support; Training; Interagency Coordination; and Outreach. The
five functions are not all equally weighted, with technical leadership and field support being the
two biggest areas of CMM's work.
Technical Leadership
In the last half-decade, CMM has focused a large portion (as much as one third) of its budget and
resources on demonstrating its value-added to the USG through technical leadership. Specifically
it has developed and refined a body of knowledge on conflict prevention and post-conflict
reconstruction and stabilization. The primary audience for the Office’s technical guidance are
USAID officers in the field, who are not usually conflict experts but often work in conflict zones.
These products are also used by USAID’s implementing partners, peacebuilding organizations,
and other donors. CMM’s primary goal is to provide its field officers with knowledge and tools
to help them work more effectively in conflict situations. The Office continues to work and
provide guidance on traditional conflict issues, but has also focused on emerging challenges such
as climate change, demographic shifts, and urbanization.44
The Conflict Assessment Framework
The Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) is a practical tool that was developed at USAID in
2002 to allow missions to identify the causes and consequences of violence and instability in a
given context, to understand how existing development programs interact with these factors, and
to determine where development and humanitarian assistance can support local efforts to manage
conflict and build peace.45 CMM staff member Sharon Morris pioneered the creation of the CAF
under the leadership of Elisabeth Kvitashvili, CMM’s Director at that time. The CAF’s
conceptual predecessor was the Conflict Vulnerabilty Assessment (CVA), which had been
commissioned by USAID’s Africa Bureau. The foundational principle of the CAF is taken from
the OECD’s fragile states principles, which promotes “taking the context as the starting point.”46
In 2012, ten years after its creation, the CAF was revised and updated to reflect learning from
previous assessments and to refine the process of moving from analysis to recommendations.47
44
Interview with Neil Levine, Director, USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, January 30, 2013.
USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for
Strategy and Program Development., April 2005. http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/conflict/publications/docs/CMM_ConflAssessFrmwrk_May_05.pdf
Accessed May 2013.
46
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Fragile States Principles.
http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/aboutthefragilestatesprinciples.htm. Accessed May 2013.
47
USAID, Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0., Washington, DC, June 2012; Email correspondence with Levine,
2013.
45
17
The new CAF provides more guidance on conducting assessments and generating
recommendations that both mitigate conflict drivers and “bolster social and institutional
resilience, effectiveness, and legitimacy.”48 The CAF 2.0 reflects the institutionalization of
conflict assessment in the USG as well as the ‘3D’ approach as outlined by QDDR.
Within the updated framework, an assessment consists of two phases:
1. Diagnosis: an analysis of political, economic, social and security factors at work within a
given country context. Within this analysis there is a particular focus on the patterns and
practices that give a society resilience and also on key mobilizers to violence.
2. Key Response Recommendations: based on prioritization of activities and issues, points
of leverage, and existing projects and options for integrating a response,
The CAF 2.0 also offers four approaches to identify and weigh responses to conflict dynamics
identified in the assessment:
1. Connecting responses directly to conflict diagnosis, building on the analysis generated by
the CAF.
2. Ensuring responses are based on credible theories of change, an explicit logic that
connects proposed interventions with intended results.
3. Testing theories of change and exploring alternative strategies for effective
peacebuilding. This links change at the individual and personal levels to change at the
sociopolitical levels.
4. Identifying and supporting “bright spots,” areas where individuals and groups are using
uncommon practices to take on challenges and barriers. These are changes worth
emulating.
Over 40 assessments were undertaken between 2004 and 2009 using the CAF 1.0, and over 60
have been taken in total (using the CAF 1.0 and 2.0). Assessments using the updated framework
have been done in Nigeria, Rwanda, Kenya, Georgia, and Iraq.49
Conducting a full-fledged conflict assessment is a large engagement for CMM and for the
country mission. There has been a varying level of interest in participating in assessments over
time. Before and during Natsios’ term, USAID had a stipulation that conflict assessments would
be necessary components of any strategic plan. The requirement was lifted in 2005, around the
time USAID's and State Department's planning functions were merged, and interest in
conducting assessments declined. CMM continued to advocate for conflict assessments,
however, in part because it was an effective way for the nascent CMM to develop relationships
with the missions. The return by USAID to developing five-year Country Development
Cooperation Strategies (CDCS) has heightened interest in the CAF, and CMM recently proposed
assessments for six countries.50
48
USAID, 2012, p.i.
Neil Levine, “USAID Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) 2.0,” Presentation at the Conflict Prevention and
Resolution Forum, “Conflict Assessment: Comparing Research Methods and Conceptual Frameworks.” Washington
DC. May 14, 2013.
50
Email correspondence with Levine, 2013.
49
18
The CAF 2.0 is complementary to the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), an
analytical tool designed for a variety of USG agencies to work collaboratively to assess conflict
situations and design interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization.51
(See sections IV and V for more information on the ICAF).
Toolkits
Another important aspect of the technical function of CMM is its toolkits. These toolkits provide
USAID missions with access to concrete, practical program options, lessons learned, and
monitoring and evaluation frameworks for implementing more effective conflict programs.52 The
nine toolkits published as of October 2012 are: Peace Processes, Religion, Conflict and
Peacebuilding, Community-Based Development in Conflict-Affected Areas, Forests and Conflict,
Land and Conflict, Livelihoods and Conflict, Minerals and Conflict, Youth and Conflict, Women
and Conflict. The topics for toolkits are determined by a combination of demand from the field
and priorities identified by staff. The newest toolkits cover Water & Conflict and Oil & Conflict.
Dr. Walker noted that toolkits are very time-consuming to produce.
Research
For many years CMM maintained a four-part research agenda: (1) understanding conflict risk in
short, medium and long terms and maintaining an “alert list” of countries for conflict early
warning; (2) assessing the potential for development program work in volatile environments; (3)
with USAID’s Office of Democracy & Governance, understanding State-Building by
researching the relationships between government and civil society in post-conflict contexts; (4)
developing analytical tools, including theories of change and other indicators.
CMM has begun work on a second generation of technical leadership products.53 Rather than
developing the topics internally, CMM identified broad categories (such as resource conflicts,
youth, and violent extremism) and then issued a public solicitation to allow interested academic
and implementer organizations to identify the most compelling topics. Grant funding for work in
these areas has been made available and work will be executed over the next two to three years.54
Field Support
Most USAID country missions do not have dedicated conflict staff, so CMM aims to support the
missions in conflict sensitive programming. Since it does not have the capacity to support all US
missions, CMM focuses on countries considered to be at risk of or currently experiencing
conflict. CMM prioritizes its field engagements based on the following criteria: conflict risk, US
foreign policy priority, learning opportunity for CMM, and request from a USAID field mission.
The goal is to improve the sensitivity of missions to conflict dynamics, and depending on the
country and issues this might entail assisting with strategic planning, conflict assessment,
program design, or evaluation. If CMM cannot carry out the assessment or evaluation internally,
staff members help the mission find consultants to do so.
51
USAID, 2012, p. 3.
USAID, The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, http://www.usaid.gov/who-weare/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflict-and-humanitarian-assistance/office-0 Accessed May 2013.
53
Interview with Levine, 2013.
54
Email correspondence with Levine, 2013.
52
19
In the past two years CMM has initiated a forward deployment of staff to regional USAID
hubs—Nairobi and Bangkok—to serve as in-house conflict advisors. This program is known as
CMM Outbound. The goal of this program is to bring all of CMM services closer to the field.
CMM funds the initial deployment of staff, and then encourages the USAID field mission to
absorb the position into its permanent staff. This is one way that CMM is working to mainstream
the conflict function into USAID’s field operations. CMM is now exploring this pilot to
additional regions.
Training
Based upon what materials are ready from the technical leadership agenda, CMM conducts
trainings for USAID employees and others. Training is generally delivered to countries that are
prioritized for field support, and often missions will request trainings on specific topics. CMM's
flagship course is Conflict 102: Intro to Conflict Assessment & Programming, a two-day course
offered at USAID between four and eight times per year. CMM also offers a course entitled
Advanced Conflict Assessment to follow Conflict 102. CMM recently developed a one-day
conference on Gender and Conflict and will partner with the Center of Excellence for
Democracy, Human Rights and Conflict to develop a distance-learning course on atrocities
prevention.55
Outreach
CMM reaches out to other communities of interest, such as other donor organizations (for
example, the World Bank and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC)), NGOs and universities. The
OECD/DAC’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility is the principal donor forum for
exchange of policy and best practice among donors working on conflict. CMM currently coleads the INCAF Task Team on Policy and Learning. The Office also participated in negotiations
leading to the creation of the New Deal for Fragile States under the International Dialogue on
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.
CMM has also experimented with using staff secondments, professional development
opportunities and rotations to foster collaboration with outside organizations while building inhouse staff capabilities. These include a staff exchange between CMM and the International
Peace Institute where staff members from each organization spent six months working with the
other organization. CMM has hosted recent rotations from the Congressional Research Service
(CRS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and an internal rotation from a
Foreign Service National from the USAID Mission in Colombia. CMM also regularly sends
staff for rotation with other federal agencies with staff assigned this year to the State Department.
Process of the Work
While CMM’s work is usually done internally, the Office also shares work with outside
organizations. In the last decade, many for-profit government contractors such as Chemonics and
DAI, and NGOs such as Mercy Corps and World Vision have opened conflict units, and CMM
has strong relationships with these.
55
Email communication with Levine, May 2013.
20
USAID supports conflict-related work through three mechanisms: contracts, grants, and
cooperative agreements. The main difference among the three arrangements is the origin of the
scope and nature of the work. The following is a brief explanation of the three types of
arrangements:
Contracts
In contracting process, CMM defines the scope and nature of the work and then seeks an
implementing partner to carry it out. This scope may be very specific: for example, CMM will
detail the exact number of personnel needed, their GS level, and how many days they will serve
on a program; in this way the budget is quite clear from the start.
The IQC is one mechanism by which CMM's work is contracted out. Until March 2013, CMM
had its own IQC known as the Instability, Crisis and Recovery Programs, or ICRP. In the
competitive process in 2005, five consortia became implementing partners under this IQC.
These were Development Alternatives International (DAI), Academy for Educational
Development (AED), Associates for Rural Development (ARD), Management Systems
International (MSI), and AMEX International, Inc. A new IQC mechanism will be awarded later
in 2013.56
Other forms of contracting include research contracts and purchase orders. When CMM decides
to have research done externally, staff members create an initial idea and then contract the work
out through a competitive process.
Grants
In this processes, the beneficiary organization defines the scope and nature of the work. The
grantee has already planned or launched a program, and seeks associated funding from USAID.
Grants are often used for humanitarian assistance, as organizations engaged in this area generally
prefer to not be associated with government entities.
CMM's principal granting mechanism is the Annual Program Statement (APS) for reconciliation
programs, to support a Congressional directive. According to the APS solicitation statement, this
is intended for ‘people-to-people’ reconciliation work that brings together individuals from
different ethnic, religious, or political backgrounds from areas of civil conflict and war. There
are two different competitions, one for the Middle East and one for a specific set of countries that
varies depending on the APS year. Examples of the kinds of work eligible for funding under the
APS are mediation of disputes across religious, ethnic, and political divides; restorative justice
processes; dialogue and training activities; and programs that build grassroots support for peace
processes.
Though an important source of major funds for the Office, this grants mechanism has proved
challenging for CMM due to the relatively narrow focus that Congress has placed on people-topeople programming.57 As both Walker and Levine have noted, the term ’people-to-people’ is
56
Email correspondence with Levine, 2013.
Interview with Dr. Tjip Walker, then Senior Conflict Advisor, USAID Office of Conflict Management and
Mitigation, Washington, DC. May 12, 2009; Interview with Levine, 2013.
57
21
quite ambiguous and represents only one potential response to conflict and may not be
appropriate and effective in all cases.58
Cooperative Agreements
These agreements fall somewhere in between contracts and grants. They are essentially grants
with provisions that give USAID greater involvement in the implementation. CMM awards
cooperative agreements on a case-by-case basis.
These different mechanisms are the subject of debate in the peacebuilding field. Some
organizations may refuse to accept contracts, but do take grants, while other organizations do not
appear to be selective in their funding sources. There is also variation in types of funding
solicited by universities.
Job Competencies & Opportunities at CMM
There are three integral job competencies for those interested in working at USAID/CMM,
particularly recent graduates of MA programs in Conflict Resolution, Development and related
fields. First, international experience is highly desirable, as it is an indicator of facility in foreign
cultures and flexibility of personality. A candidate for employment at CMM should be able to
demonstrate that he or she is able to work in high-risk conflict contexts. Second, work at CMM
requires strong communication skills. Competencies under this heading include exceptional
analytical and writing abilities as well as facility of written and oral persuasion. Essentially,
employees must have the ability to “make or break an argument.”59 Finally, as is the case
throughout USAID, work in teams is an integral part of CMM’s process. Those wishing to work
at CMM must be able to work well in a group setting and will have had experience doing so in
the past.
Furthermore, possession of ‘tradecraft’ such as conflict analysis, trends analysis, program design,
and conflict theory is an additional asset for any potential candidate. Knowledge in these areas is
particularly valued by CMM because trainings take place in-house, and candidates who are
already able to conduct trainings in specific areas make useful additions to the Office.
As for seeking jobs directly with CMM, the opportunities are quite limited at the present time.
Most of the positions are at the GS 12 or 13 level, i.e., Masters or Doctorate with 5-8 years of
development experience. Most current members of the office are in their early to mid 30s. Often
individuals with less experience are brought into CMM through the Presidential Management
Fellows (PMF) Program, which serves as a fast track to federal jobs for entry-level candidates.
Working at USAID
Since CMM's goal is creating officers who can deal with conflict throughout USAID, CR
graduates are encouraged to think of the agency as a whole, rather than only looking to CMM for
jobs. Because the approach to conflict work at USAID is about mainstreaming conflict-sensitive
approaches, sought-after candidates have a broad range of competencies but a special
understanding of conflict resolution. A typical USAID officer could switch from working in El
58
59
Email correspondence with Levine, 2013.
Interview with Levine, 2013.
22
Salvador to Afghanistan and still succeed. Therefore, conflict resolution graduates interested in
international work should also consider work as a development officer.
Contractors
Furthermore, job opportunities exist in the organizations with whom CMM contracts, including
both large consulting firms and the IQC consortia. A few of the large contractors have dedicated
conflict and peacebuilding units. MSI, DAI, Creative Associates, Chemonics, Casals and
Associates and Tetra Tech (formerly ARD) are examples of contractors that have positions
specializing in conflict.60 However, contractors often engage conflict specialists on a project-byproject basis61 and many companies maintain databases of consultants, through which graduates
might find work opportunities.
60
Interview with Jennifer Ulman, Conflict and Evaluation Specialist, Management Systems International (MSI).
Alexandria, VA, February 23, 2009
61
Interview with Walker, 2009.
23
Section IV: US State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
Introduction
In 2004, Senators Joseph Biden and Richard Lugar introduced the first of many bills that
envisioned the creation of a civilian partnership—ideally within the State Department—to work
with the Department of Defense.62 The bill responded to calls for the improvement of US civilian
capabilities in post-conflict state-building operations,63 especially as the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan were evolving. Then Secretary of State, Colin Powell created the Office for the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in July of 2004. In December 2005,
President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 with the subject line
“Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.” 64 The
directive formalized S/CRS to coordinate peacebuilding, reconstruction and conflict resolution
activities among various USG agencies: the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Central
Intelligence Agency, other State Department bureaus and offices, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Joint Forces Command, Department of Justice, Army Corps of Engineers, Department of
Treasury and USAID (including OTI and CMM). S/CRS was thus mandated to build strong
civilian-military partnerships among USG agencies.
During its seven years, the Office led and oversaw a government wide effort to “develop the
knowledge, capacity, and procedures” that prevent conflict and assist nations in civil strife to
move toward peace, democracy and stability.65 However, S/CRS faced two major challenges in
carrying out its functions and building its capabilities: first was gaining acceptance as
coordinator, as several USG agencies and offices were already the lead in conflict response
abroad. Second, although President Bush designated S/CRS as the overarching policy
development office for foreign reconstruction and stabilization, the NSPD-44 (National Security
Presidential Directive) did not provide a means of funding the assigned tasks and goals.
Scope of Conflict Resolution Work
During its existence S/CRS was instrumental in developing frameworks for interagency
cooperation, conflict assessment, and project evaluation. The Office developed the Interagency
Management System (IMS), which established operational procedures for a ‘whole of
government’ approach for stabilization and conflict resolution, and which was adopted by the
National Security Council in 2007. It also worked with USAID’s CMM to develop the ICAF in
order to facilitate interagency coordination. The U.S. Government Policy Coordinating
Committee officially approved the framework in 2008. Now in a second version, the framework
continues to be used by various departments and agencies to develop a shared understanding of
conflict dynamics and potential entry points for additional USG efforts.
62
Smith, 2008.
Serafino, Nina, In Brief: State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), Washington
DC: Congressional Research Service, October 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42775.pdf, p. 4.
64
The White House, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, December 7, 2005,
https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf
65
Serafino, 2012, p.12
63
24
S/CRS also established, managed, and deployed the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), whose task
was to help fragile states restore stability and the rule of law and to achieve economic recovery
and sustainable growth. The CRC was composed of three levels of duty: an Active Response
Corps (ARC), whose members could deploy within 48 hours; a standby component (CRC-S),
whose members could deploy within 30 days; and finally a reserve corps (CRC-R), made up of
experts from government, NGOs, and the private sector, who would be able to deploy in 45-60
days. The ARC was developed quickly, but the Office faced limitations from the outset—
primarily related to funding—in developing the other two components.
“S/CRS took a lead in planning, developing, and implementing many small conflict response
programs.”66 The following is an outline of some major CRC deployments. Only basic details of
each project are described, because several aspects remain classified:
Africa: In 2006, S/CRS began investigating the causes of unrest and conflict in Chad and
created the Mission Strategic Plan for the U.S. Embassy in Chad in 2008. In 2007, the Office
devoted $25 million in funds to implement the Somalia Reconciliation and Stabilization
Program to work on Security Sector Reform, strengthen youth employment opportunities,
and work on pressing border issues. In 2010, S/CRS planners, accompanied by USAID staff,
supported preparatory work for the January 2011 referendum on self-determination in
Southern Sudan.67
Asia: In FY 2007, the Southeast Asia Tri-border Initiative was established to reduce terrorist
recruitment and safe havens in the border areas shared by Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia.
The same year, the Local Stabilization Initiative in Nepal aimed to expand and “build the
capacity of local authorities, including elected officials, civil society, and service providers,
to address the needs and grievances of marginalized groups” in four conflict-affected
districts.
Near East & Middle East: In FY 2006, S/CRS received $10 million in 1207 funding (see
below), which it used to clear unexploded devices and enhance the Lebanese Internal
Security forces to replace the Army who needed to enforce for the Israeli-Hezbollah
ceasefire. S/CRS also worked in Afghanistan in 2009, with staff members coordinating
civilian efforts with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and improving overall
civilian-military coordination.
Europe: CRC Members worked in Kosovo to provide assistance in staffing shortages at the
U.S. Embassy, and in 2008 assisted in establishing the U.S. Department of State’s Kosovo
Monitoring Group.
Americas: S/CRS was tasked with implementing the Haiti Stabilization Initiative, a $20
million project intended to enhance security and stability, expand the judicial sector, and
provide infrastructure development, among other activities. In FY 2007, $4 million was
approved for the Colombia Initial Governance Response Program to provide basic education
and health needs and to develop local infrastructure recently reclaimed from insurgents.
66
67
Serafino, 2012, p. 13.
Serafino, 2012, p. 14.
25
Funding
S/CRS received funding through a confusing multi-track monetary flow. As described above,
NSPD-44 neither mentioned nor authorized a budget for the newly tasked S/CRS. The Office
was therefore funded by a variety of sources. Originally, funding for S/CRS projects came from
DoD transfers through Section 1207 of the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act. This
act enabled the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $100 million per year for two years to the
State Department for use by S/CRS, but DoD maintained the authority to amend, veto or approve
any project funded under section 1207. This process meant that the directive of NSPD-44 for
State and Defense to coordinate efforts was fulfilled, although at the expense of S/CRS’
autonomy. The 1207 transfers were eventually replaced by the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (in
2009), the Stabilization Bridge Fund (in 2010), plus a contingency account called the Complex
Crisis Fund (CCF) under USAID. These provided responsibility to both State and USAID for
civilian elements of stabilization and reconstruction activities.68
68
Gordon Adams, “The End of Section 1207? Boosting State/USAID Contingency Capabilities,” The Stimson
Center, December 14, 2009.
26
Section V: US State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations (S/CSO)
Introduction
In November 2011, the US Department of State announced the establishment of the new Bureau
of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (S/CSO), to subsume S/CRS. CSO was placed in the ‘J’
family of Bureaus under the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human
Rights, Maria Otero. In April 2012, Ambassador Frederick “Rick” Barton was sworn in as the
Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations.
CSO was created to improve the way in which the United States works in conflict and crisis
areas. The mission of CSO is twofold: first, to advance national security by breaking cycles of
violent conflict worldwide and by mitigating crisis in priority countries; second, to devise
sustainable solutions to address the spectrum of conflict—prevention, crisis response, and
stabilization.69
Toward this mission, according to the 2012 Congressional Research Service Report, CSO
created a five-step approach to work in a given country:
1. Establish an understanding of who is leading the US effort the country. This ‘center of
gravity’ is the authority on the wide-reaching efforts of the many actors on the ground.
2. At the onset of an intervention, undertake a fast, rigorous, joint analysis that is grounded
in local realities.
3. Based on this analysis, create a single integrated strategy in the country.
4. Within each strategy, focus on empowering local stakeholders.
5. Continually measure and adjust work and prepare for handover of activities to
stakeholders and partners.
CSO is thus described as representing “an evolution in the development of US civilian
capabilities to prevent and manage conflict, to stabilize transitions from conflict, and to create
the bases for lasting peace in post-conflict situations.”70
CSO works within a short time frame, seeking to accomplish the majority of its work in 12 to 18
months. This represents an intentional movement away from the broad and expensive nationbuilding of its predecessor—as represented by US activity in Iraq and Afghanistan—toward a
localized model of matching USG resources with local capacity to address conflict issues in a
sustainable manner. CSO seeks to make its impact during the period when other government
agencies working on conflict are preparing to enter a country for the long-term, which normally
takes one-to-two years of preparation.
Transition: S/CRS to CSO
CSO in many ways represents an explicit paradigmatic culture shift from the work of S/CRS,
though there are nonetheless important ties between the two. In its inception, S/CRS was
69
United States Department of State, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, http://www.state.gov/j/cso/
Accessed May 2013.
70
Serafino, 2012, p.1.
27
intended to be a coordinator of US efforts in conflict-affected countries, while also having a
strong strategic and policy influence. However, as some interviewees noted, over the years it
moved away from its original intent and instead became a consultant and supplier of civilians for
military stabilization operations. Furthermore, by the time the QDDR was published, it appeared
that S/CRS had lost the confidence of key players on Capitol Hill and in the USG.71 This is likely
in part because it worked within the expansive state-building framework of which the US public
was quickly growing tired, and it took much effort, expense, and time to undertake its missions.
With the explicit support of Secretary Clinton via the QDDR, CSO has worked in its first year to
regain this confidence and demonstrate its value added in the USG. Concerning its first year of
operation, CSO provides evidence toward achieving its three primary goals of making an impact
in three or four locations of strategic significance, building a respected team and trusted
partnerships, and being innovative and agile.72 In some ways these goals represent a return to the
original S/CRS aspiration: to be a driver of policy and strategic thinking for USG work in
conflict-affected countries. As Assistant Secretary Barton has noted, CSO now seeks to be an
aggressive supplier of new ideas and innovative, unconventional thinking.73 CSO looks to join
high-level policy- and decision-making processes by “getting issues into the right conversations
at the right time.”74
Personnel
According to the 2012 Congressional Research Service Report, “CSO is one of five bureaus and
two offices reporting to the Under Secretary of Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human
Rights,” and is of “average size for a State Department bureau.”75 According to the CSO Office
of Partnerships and Strategic Communications, the Bureau had a staff of 176 as of April, 2013,
including 17 Foreign Service Officers, 85 other government employees, and 50 contractors. The
various offices are organized under four pillars: (1) Integration and Programs, (2) Overseas
Operations, (3) Management and Civilian Response Network, and (4) Policy, Partnerships and
Learning and Training.76
The Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization is assigned five key functions to
promote interagency cooperation by: (1) collaborating with relevant partners such as other
Department of State bureaus, the Department of Defense, and NATO; (2) working with other
agencies to strengthen USG capacity to plan and conduct conflict prevention, crisis response, and
stabilization operations; (3) to lead the development of CSO as the home bureau for Department
of State expertise on conflict prevention, crisis response, and stabilization; (4) to formulate and
implement policies and proposals and to provide policy counsel on conflict prevention, crisis
response, and stabilization; and (5) to assume leadership in developing a strong civilian response
capability.77
71
Council on Foreign Relations, A Conversation with Ambassador Frederick Barton, February 20, 2013.
http://www.cfr.org/united-states/conversation-ambassador-frederick-barton/p30035 Accessed May 2013.
72
CSO: One-Year Progress Report, March 11, 2013. http://www.state.gov/j/cso/releases/other/2013/206410.htm.
73
Council on Foreign Relations, 2013.
74
Interview with Jason Ladnier, Director, Office of Learning and Training, CSO, April 2, 2013.
75
Serafino, 2012, p.3
76
Email correspondence with Raphael Carland, Director, CSO Office of Partnerships and Strategic
Communications, July 1, 2013.
77
Serafino, 2012, p.4.
28
Funding
Previous to FY2013, CSO operated on funds appropriated for S/CRS (described above). In its
first 10 months, CSO was appropriated money from the Department of State’s Diplomatic and
Consular Programs account as well as Overseas Contingency Operations funding, totaling about
$30.3 million. As funds were carried over from previous years, total funds for S/CRS and CSO
for FY 2012 totaled $60.9 million.78 In addition to these operating funds, CSO also manages
funds for specific country engagements, and this amounted to $30 million in FY 2012 and $35
million in FY 2013.79
Scope of Conflict Resolution Work
One of the central aims of CSO has been to prioritize its engagements, focusing on strategic and
targeted interventions where there is a core US national interest, where assistance is needed, and
the possibility of a successful outcome is high.
More specifically, the Bureau maintains a five point criteria for targeted engagement. It will
undertake work in a country if: (1) CSO can fulfill an urgent, unmet need through the
comparative advantages it offers; (2) there is an opportunity for strategic impact within 12 to 18
months; (3) the work can advance US national security priorities; (4) the work can integrate
crosscutting issues such as preventing mass atrocities and empowering youth and women; and
(5) CSO can leverage local ownership and partnership. In addition, the Bureau takes into
consideration whether there are adequate means to evaluate its approaches when considering
points of intervention. 80
According to Assistant Secretary Barton, choosing where and how to work is both a science and
an art: there is a systemic process of locating Ambassadors and finding support from the White
House one hand, and a need to engage at the right moment.81
In its first year, CSO focused on four priority countries. The following is a basic outline of work
undertaken in these areas:82
Syria: In 2012, CSO worked from Turkey to provide skills, knowledge, networks and
equipment to the unarmed opposition. With $23 million in allocated funds, it helped the
opposition to improve internal and external communication networks and to develop
civilian leadership capacity for governance transition. CSO co-funded the Syrian-run
Office of Syrian Opposition support, which serves as a connection point for activists,
administrators and journalists.
Kenya: In the last year, CSO partnered with USAID, the United States Embassy, the
Kenyan government, and civil society organizations to develop plans that promoted
78
Serafino, 2012, p. 8.
Email correspondence with Carland, July 1, 2013.
80
United States Department of State, Creative Solutions for Stabilizing Conflict,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/2013/206639.htm
81
Council on Foreign Relations, 2013.
82
Serafino, 2012; Council on Foreign Relations, 2012; United States Department of State, Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations: Where We Work. http://www.state.gov/j/cso/where/
79
29
peaceful and credible elections in 2013. It worked to strengthen partnerships with Kenyan
groups at the provincial and local levels, increasing involvement of existing entities in
promoting peaceful elections, including by establishing a violence early-warning
network.
Honduras: CSO has worked toward two major goals in Honduras. First, to support
efforts toward an immediate and measurable decrease in violent crime, Bureau officials
have provided assistance for locally-created Public Service Announcements (PSAs) and a
community homicide-reduction initiative. Additionally, CSO has provided support for
government and NGO efforts toward public security reform and an increase in judicial
and investigative capacity.
Burma: CSO has integrated its work into the greater USG strategy for Burma, which
includes work on political reconciliation between the ethnic minorities and the Burmese
Government. CSO has broached this issue by supporting these groups, as well as
international partners, in jointly addressing the issue of landmines, in hopes that this will
be a confidence-building measure and that broader political dialogue will follow.
Since its inception, CSO has also worked in Afghanistan, Belize, the Central African Republic,
The Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan.
Civilian Response
Perhaps the most prominent evidence of CSO’s movement toward supporting local capacity is
the dramatic restructuring of the CRC, an effort initiated by Assistant Secretary Barton at the
start of his tenure.
Initially, the CRC was envisioned to be a corps of skilled civilians who would accompany US
troops on military interventions and work to stabilize countries during transition from conflict.
As US foreign policy shifted away from large-scale military interventions the CRC moved
beyond serving in primarily post-conflict stabilization missions and began participating in
conflict prevention work.
However, as the resources required to maintain a large member corps mounted, and as the
balance of intervention tipped in favor of supporting local capacity, the CRC has been
transformed into a new entity called the Civilian Response Network. Rather than training and
employing a network of hundreds of USG civilians to lead prevention and stabilization efforts,
CSO turns to its network of skilled local individuals. They are trained and led by a small corps of
supervisors and subject matter experts from the US, thus representing a vastly reduced and
transformed version of the Civilian Response Corps. The transfer to the Civilian Response
Network is intended to create a more flexible response capacity while reducing overhead and
increasing sustainability of projects.83
Training
83
Interview with Dr. Charles Call, Senior Adviser, Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations, March 26, 2013.
30
CSO supports training of its personnel both in Washington DC and in the field. Early in his
tenure, Assistant Secretary Barton indicated his hope that every employee undergo at least two
weeks of professional development per year, including participation in both the Foreign Service
Institute’s then available survey course on conflict prevention and response, as well as issuespecific trainings. In addition, Assistant Secretary Barton envisions expanded field mentoring by
seasoned State Department leadership of CSO staff members, especially in contexts that pose
security challenges and possibility of physical danger.
Conflict Analysis and Evaluation
CSO leadership has prioritized two additional essential functions—analysis and evaluation—in
order to improve the overall impact of the State Department’s work in conflict contexts.
CSO seeks to increase its creativity in analysis and operations using data analytic models such as
the Crisis Early Warning System, social networking platforms, and tabletop exercises. One staff
member described the process as “leveraging local change agents to increase speed,
sustainability, and impact.”84
CSO inherited the work of designing and undertaking conflict assessments from its predecessor
and continues to develop these mechanisms as part of its core work. In 2013, CSO introduced the
ICAF 2.0, a revised version of the ICAF created in 2008.85 The original ICAF was designed to
enable a team of USG agency representatives to collaboratively assess conflict situations and
prepare for interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation and stabilization.86 While
this remains the goal of the second ICAF, it has also been significantly rethought. The ICAF 2.0
is no longer intended to be a rigid methodological framework that dictates the creation of a
specific report, but instead it is now only a conceptual framework. The actual conflict assessment
work done on a country level is now known as “CSO analytics,” a process guided by ‘classic’
tools such as surveys, focus groups, literature reviews, and also cutting edge data gathering
software used for sentiment analysis and network mapping. The following are three examples of
how the ICAF has shifted to address new understandings of conflict:
1. Where analysis of key actors only included their means and motivations, it has now
expanded to include their strategic interactions and incentive structures.
2. Whereas in the earlier ICAF looked only at identity groups, now assessments stress the
need to understand social groups and social patterns.
3. The object of study of the ICAF 2.0 is now known as “conflict dynamics” rather than
conflict drivers and instigators.
Following the wider trend in the peacebuilding and development fields, CSO is also working to
develop a robust culture of evaluation. This is in part in response to what one interviewee called
the ‘culture of secretiveness’ in the USG, in which lessons learned and best practices are often
guarded due largely to competition for funding across government agencies. The scope of CSO’s
84
Interview with Call, 2013.
All information in this report pertaining to the ICAF 2.0 taken from Bruce Hammer and Paul Turner, presentation
at the Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum, Conflict Assessments: Comparing Research Methods and
Conceptual Frameworks, May 14, 2013.
86
USAID, ICAF
85
31
evaluation process includes building theories of change into all areas of work and incorporating
best practices from a wide variety of actors into the Bureau’s program planning and execution.
CSO staff concerned with monitoring and evaluation to continually seek to have a presence when
design decisions are made in order to implement effective monitoring and evaluation processes.
The overall goal, according to CSO’s Director of the Office of Learning and Training, Jason
Ladnier, is to “reduce the space between doing and learning.”87
As Serafino notes, CSO officials acknowledge that there is still a need to prove to those in and
outside of government that a conflict management approach can enhance diplomacy and
development programs significantly.88 Evaluation is an important tool by which CSO can
demonstrate its value-added to the USG.
Challenges
The two most prominent challenges identified by most CSO staff and affiliates interviewed are
interagency coordination and funding structures, which are highly interrelated.
Much as S/CRS faced skepticism from members of Congress and long-established US agencies,
who believed that the intended work of the Office was already being done, CSO has worked to
carve out its niche in locations where either DoD, USAID, or both are also present. The work of
CSO overlaps in particular with that of OTI (Assistant Secretary Barton was its first Director),
and the agencies sometimes compete for room to work in a figuratively narrow conflict space.
There was a consensus among many interviewees that this has been particularly evident in
Honduras.89 As the Congressional Research Service Report notes, relevant agencies are working
to locate the appropriate divisions of labor.
Interagency cooperation is in some ways implicitly discouraged within the structures of the USG.
Because there is no single body that will encourage cross-pollination of ideas, agencies do not
actively collaborate and exchange resources when preparing to enter a conflict and stabilization
operation. Instead they individually submit program proposals, meaning there is often either
overlap or gaps in work. One interviewee pointed out that US Congress’ appropriation of funds
further encourages competition for resources, and therefore for opportunities for recognition.90
The Future
Interviewees were hesitant to define possible future areas of intervention for CSO, perhaps
because the Bureau is still relatively new and has much work to do in fulfilling its mission and
mandate. In addition, the Budget sequester of January 2013 has created a sense of uncertainty
about the future.
Before sequestration, Assistant Secretary Barton outlined in an interview two potential types of
regions in which CSO may become involved. In the nearer term, CSO might engage in places of
major transition, such as North Korea. In the more distant future, cases Barton calls
‘longstanding’ or ‘nearly-forgotten’ such as Kashmir and the Kurds might become ripe for
87
Interview with Ladnier, 2013.
Serafino, 2012.
89
Interview with Call, 2013; Interview with Ladnier, 2013.
90
Interview with Ladnier, 2013.
88
32
intervention.91 Understandably, locations of engagement will change due to a combination of real
world demands and internal planning processes.
Job Competencies
Job competencies outlined by CSO staff are very much in line with how the Bureau approaches
its work. Candidates must possess strong strategic thinking and problem-solving skills, and
demonstrate adeptness for delivering practical and usable analyses. Because the work of CSO is
increasingly locally driven, job seekers must also have the skills to navigate among multiple
cultures and have an intuitive ability to locate and cultivate talent. Likewise, as CSO’s work is
cross-cutting, jobs seekers must also be able to adapt to multiple organizational cultures (e.g.
military and defense, diplomatic, NGO). Finally, excellent writing skills and technical areas of
expertise such as assessment, security sector reform, or conflict prevention strategies are highly
valued by the Bureau.
91
The Brookings Institution, Conflict and Stabilization Operations: A Conversation with U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State Rick Barton, Washington DC, April 17, 2012. Unofficial transcript available at
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2012/04/17-conflict-stabilization Accessed May 2013.
33
Section VI: Conclusion and Implications
Conclusion
International peace and conflict resolution is a dynamic and continuously evolving academic and
applied field, which the IPCR Program strives to reflect. Due to their relatively new emergence
into the social science and political arena, ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘peacebuilding’ are used
interchangeably to include a multitude of activities and practices. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars
made clear to the USG, and its implementing partners, the necessity to integrate people-focused
activities into their work in order for peace to take root and be durable. Undeniably, the
administrative and technical approach to social and political change that was in place required
revision. For instance, much more is needed to increase the level of transparent civic law than
simply building a new courthouse. Civilians must be trained to operate the courthouse, police
must be trained to ensure the rule of law, but above all mindsets must be altered, and people from
distinct backgrounds must move beyond their differences and come together to successfully
implement a new legal system. These changes in orientation and relationship require “humanlevel” peacebuilding efforts—dialogue, negotiation, mediation, conflict resolution training,
etc.—not just institutional and technical developments.
When assessing the innovations in USG conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts, the lack of
funding continuously comes to the forefront, and as such is the greatest strain to the field’s
expansion in the USG. Despite budgetary limitations, the related agencies have achieved many
of their goals and are striving to maintain a high degree of influence and involvement around the
world. In particular, President Obama’s Administration intends to re-establish USAID as the
world’s premier development agency92 and has expressed increased support for the Agency’s
peacebuilding efforts by pledging, “to elevate development alongside diplomacy and defense as
an equal pillar of American foreign policy”.93 Furthermore, the Administration recognizes the
need to embrace a new approach to peace and conflict in fragile states and establishes that the
mission of State and USAID in those areas will encompass a spectrum of operations from
prevention to recovery.94
In the 2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development (PPD), President Obama also
acknowledges, “no one nation can do everything everywhere and still do it well. To meet our
goals, we must be more selective and focus our efforts where we have the best partners and
where we can have the greatest impact.”95 The ‘best partners’ are local implementers such as the
host government, organizations, and individual experts who are key drivers, and can better
identify the underlying grievances. This approach relies on existing local capacities, which
allows for a greater chance of resolving grievances and creating long term, sustainable peace.
Clearly, the current US administration has revised its previous approach and has every intention
to integrate human-level activities into its peacebuilding activities, as well as conflict prevention
and resolution efforts. While the future appears bright, it remains to be seen to what extent
rhetoric and policy will translate into real transformation.
92
QDDR 2010.
QDDR 2010, p. 75.
94
QDDR 2010, p. 127.
95
QDDR 2010, p. 87.
93
34
Implications for the IPCR program
As noted earlier, the objectives of this report are to a) track developments in the USG's
international conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities, and b) to identify job opportunities
for IPCR graduates and ways the IPCR program can better prepare graduates to work in these
areas. The underlying assumption is that the USG is a potentially fruitful and appropriate place
for emerging conflict resolution professionals to apply their skills and passions. Therefore, the
following implications should be seen as related to the program’s goals. Given that the IPCR
program wishes to prepare graduate students for employment in the State Department, USAID,
and related organizations, then the following implications should be given strong consideration.
When asked what competencies graduates should have in order to be excellent candidates for
employment in their field, interviewees from government agencies and contracting companies
offered the following recommendations, which are summarized here and supported by example
comments:
1) IPCR should prepare students with general conflict literacy. For example, Dr. Walker
spoke on a panel at a conference presented by One Studentry (a network of conflict
resolution and international development students in the DC area) and asked the audience
basic questions like, "Since the end of the Cold War, have conflicts increased, declined,
or stayed the same?" He was disappointed that their knowledge did not seem to exceed
that of the average USAID officer. In his opinion, conflict resolution students should
know what the main conflicts are now, what are main the risk factors, etc.
2) IPCR should ensure that graduates have significant overseas experience. Graduates
are more marketable if they have significant international exposure, whether it is
specifically conflict-related or not (e.g., Peace Corps or similar experience). Such
experience demonstrates that they can operate in a different cultural, political and
economic environment, which is very important to employers. For OTI and similar types
of employment, preferably the experience would be in the same region or type of
environment they would like to work in later.
3) IPCR should take advantage of its location in Washington DC to connect students to a
variety of sources in order to provide leading edge information about what is happening
in the peacebuilding and conflict resolution field. For example, a) engage students with
adjunct professors; b) make sure students are connected to leading think tanks, and other
organizations in the field, so that they are up to date with the current trends in policy and
understand what going on “inside the beltway.”
4) IPCR should prepare students to solve real-life problems. For example, Elisabeth
Kvitashvili, former Deputy Assistant Administrator of USAID Bureau of Democracy,
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, said that while the academic community is doing
a good job teaching theory, students are not getting enough practical hands-on
application. “What happens on the ground is not what you learn in the books,” she noted,
so students should learn to adapt what they learn in the classroom to operational realities
on the ground. To develop these complex problem-solving skills, Kvitashvili suggested
35
working through problem scenarios similar to the ones USG agencies and contractors
face when designing country strategies and activities.
5) IPCR should prepare students to think outside the Western cultural framework. The
solutions to conflict-related problems need to be less like “ours” and more like “theirs,”
according to Kvitashvili. Conflict professionals need to be aware of local culture,
history, and dynamics, so as to develop an anthropological understanding of the situation.
Kvitashvili works with her colleagues on implementing this culturally sensitive approach,
asking hard questions such as: What do people actually want out of a democracy? Is a
"tolerable" amount of corruption okay? Maybe sending war criminals to the ICC is not
likely to lead to reconciliation in a particular country, but world leaders want to send a
strong message about the consequences of committing war crimes—who should make
that decision, the country, or the international community? These are complex dilemmas
that effective practitioners must grapple with.96
6) IPCR should prepare students with general knowledge of development,
reconstruction, and government work. Graduates interested in this type of work should
have familiarity with USAID's development approach. Ulman said that while it is not
possible to do development in a conflict country without conflict knowledge, a person
who specializes only in conflict has difficulty contributing to other aspects of
development work. She also noted that different graduate programs compete with each
other and focus on different aspects, e.g., SAIS specializes in the economic development
angle.97 One implication is that IPCR should maintain its broad peace and conflict
resolution scope, which allows for receptivity to development and other domains of
activity.
7) The School of International Service (SIS) and IPCR should offer students more
opportunities to develop language skills. For example, IPCR could a) advocate for
American University to offer the national FLAS scholarship through the US Department
of Education;98 b) allow students to audit language classes at the university for free (as
Georgetown's CR program does); c) provide stipends for language study outside the
university; d) allow students to replace an elective with a language class; or e) organize
language tables and language exchanges among students.
8) IPCR should help students develop conflict mapping and assessment skills as well as
skills for managing and facilitating in the workplace. The USG’s emphasis on conflict
assessment calls for the annual offering of IPCR’s new course in Conflict Prevention and
Assessment to complement the conflict mapping and analysis work that is done in the
core course on Conflict Analysis and Resolution. The IPCR Skills Institutes should
continue to provide practical skills for managing conflict in various settings.
96
Interview with Elisabeth Kvitashvili, Deputy Assistant Administrator, USAID Bureau of Democracy, Conflict,
and Humanitarian Assistance, Washington, DC, March 12, 2009.
97
Interview with Ulman, 2009.
98
For more information, see: http://www.ed.gov/programs/iegpsflasf/index.html
36
As the IPCR Program has continued to assess and enhance its curriculum offerings, it has
improved its capacity to provide graduates with the competencies (knowledge, skills and
attitudes) identified in this report. Learning outcomes have been developed for all courses, most
importantly the core requirements, that identify the competencies which graduates are expected
to take away from their educational experience in the program. Many of these learning outcomes
relate to skills in conflict analysis, conflict assessment, cross-cultural awareness, and methods of
conflict intervention and peacebuilding that are identified above. In addition, the capstone
options for the MA in IPCR have been expanded to include a team-based practicum, where a
group of students with faculty supervision provide a research service to a client organization in
the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Some of the initial practica have been in
international settings (e.g., Liberia, Rwanda) and this will continue to be the case. Overall, the
IPCR Program continues to increase its capacity to train scholar-practitioners at the Master’s
level, who can work from a strong theoretical base using research methods and practical skills to
address the causes and symptoms of destructive conflict and to contribute to effective conflict
resolution and peacebuilding in its aftermath.
37