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Citation: 12 Franchise L.J. 99 1992-1993
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Standing Issues Related to Franchisee Associations
by William B. Steele III and A. Darby Dickerson*
Dallas, Texas
William B. Steele III
A. Darby Dickerson
I. Introduction
A franchisee association is a collection of individual franchisees who join together to address common problems in
the franchise system. As the number of franchise systems
has expanded, so too has the number of franchisee associations. One way that franchisee associations may serve their
members is to file suit against the franchisor to address
alleged wrongs suffered by individual franchisees. When a
franchisee association files suit in its own name, one of the
first questions that a court may be forced to answer is
whether the association has standing to sue on behalf of its
members. This article explains the concept of associational
standing, and then analyzes the application of associational
standing in the franchise context.
II. General Principles of Associational Standing
An association is "a collection or organization of persons
who have joined together for a certain or common object."'
An association may achieve standing in one of three ways:
(1) direct standing to seek redress for its own injuries, (2)
third-party, or representational, standing to seek redress of
injuries suffered by some or all of its members, or (3) standing as a representative of a class of franchisees. This article
focuses on the issue of representational standing, with a
brief discussion of direct standing. The issue of franchisee
associations as class representatives is reserved for future
discussion.
A. Direct Standing
An association has direct standing if it seeks relief from
an injury to the association itself or to vindicate its own
rights. 2 Direct injury to the association may be established
by showing that the organization will suffer diminished financial support or membership, 3 or by showing that the
*Mr. Steele and Ms. Dickerson are attorneys at the Dallas law firm of
Locke Purnell Rain Harrell (A Professional Association).
challenged action or restriction affects the activities of the
association.4 Direct injury has also been found when the
association alleges that (1) the defendant has hindered the
association's effort to obtain or enforce constitutional or
statutory rights for its members, or (2) the association has
been forced to devote significant resources to counteract a
defendant's actions.'
The authors have not located any reported decisions in
which a franchisee association has sued for harm suffered
by the association itself due to a franchisor's interference
with the association's activities or due to the franchisor's
attempts to thwart the association's ability to provide services to its members. 6 The more problematic issue for franchisors arises when a franchisee association files suit for
alleged grievances suffered by members of the group. It is
in such instances that courts must grapple with the issue of
third-party, or representational, standing.
B. RepresentationalStanding
According to the United States Supreme Court in Warth
v. Seldin, even in the absence of an injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of
its members when:
(1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in
their own right;
(2) the interests that the association seeks to protect are
germane to the association's purpose; and
(3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires individual members of the association to
participate in the lawsuit.7
Under this three-pronged test, an association's standing
depends in large measure on the nature of the relief sought.'
Typically, representational standing is permitted only when
the issues presented are "properly resolved in a group context." 9 For example, representational standing is generally
permitted when injunctive, declaratory, or some other type
of prospective relief is sought because "it can reasonably be
supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured,"',
and because proof of individualized damage is not required.
On the other hand, when the participation of individual
association members is required to resolve the matters at
issue, such as when money damages are sought, representational standing is frequently denied.' Thus, the determination of whether representational standing will be
permitted frequently hinges on the third prong of the Warth
test (i.e., whether the relief requested requires individualized proof). I2
1. Representational standing in cases involving challenges
to statutes and regulations. Courts have permitted represen-
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Franchise Law Journal
99
tational standing when an association challenges the constitutionality of a statute or a government agency's
interpretation of a statute or regulation. 3 In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 4 for example,
the Court granted standing to a state commission representing apple growers who alleged that a North Carolina
statute prohibiting the display of state quality grades on
apple containers shipped into North Carolina unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce and
should be invalidated. The Supreme Court permitted the
association to represent its members in the lawsuit because
neither the interstate commerce claim nor the request for
injunctive and declaratory relief required individualized
proof and were thus "properly resolved in a group context." 5
Similarly, in Automobile Workers Union v. Brock,' 6 a labor union sued on behalf of its members to invalidate a
Department of Labor policy that affected its members' rates
of pay. Although the Court recognized that "[t]he statutory
challenges raised here will no doubt affect the outcome of
individual entitlement determinations if petitioners are
successful on the merits of their suit," the Court held that
the union had standing because "this action does not directly seek [money] benefits,"'17 and that the participation
of individual union members was not required because the
suit raised a pure question of law concerning statutory interpretation.II
Despite the general rule, associational standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute or regulation is not
granted in every circumstance. In Warth v. Seldin, 9 an association of homebuilders challenged as unconstitutional
certain zoning regulations and decisions on grounds that
they improperly excluded construction of low- and moderate-income housing. In denying the association's standing
to seek money damages on behalf of its members, the Court
found that the damages claims were neither common to the
entire membership nor equally shared:
Whatever injury may have been suffered is peculiar to the individual member concerned, and both the fact and extent of
injury would require individualized proof. Thus, to obtain relief
and damages, each member of [association] who claims injury
as a result of respondent's practices must be a party to the suit,
and [association] has no standing to claim damages on his behalf.2 0
The Supreme Court has also refused to permit representational standing when an association of women sued under
the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits Medicaid funding
of abortions, claiming that the statute inhibited the rights
of its members under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. 21 The Court held that individual participation
was necessary to establish that the challenged conduct constituted infringement of the member's rights, because it is
necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive
effect of the enactment as it operates against her in the
22
practice of her religion.
190
Pyanc~e Law Journa
-
Courts have also denied standing when individualized
proof is required to establish that the conduct challenged
constitutes an infringement of the right asserted. For example, the MOVE Organization was denied representational standing in its suit against the Justice Department
because
the complaint related incidents where one or several MOVE
members suffered harm. There is no statute, ordinance or other
official action affecting all members. It would require individual
testimony to establish the constitutional violations set forth in
the complaint.... 23
The Seventh Circuit, moreover, denied representational
standing to a group that challenged a regulation because it
allegedly discouraged the association's members from applying for government assistance.2 4 Although prospective
relief was sought, standing was denied because individual
members' participation would be required in determining
whether any individual member was actually discouraged
from applying for assistance, thus requiring individualized
25
proof of each member's state of mind.
2. Representational standing in the commercial context. The
few courts that have addressed the issue of representational
standing in a commercial context have denied standing to
the association, primarily because the association could not
satisfy the third prong of the Warth test. For example, in
Terre du lac Association, Inc. v. Terre du lac, Inc.,26 a property owners' association sued the developer of a subdivision
on its own behalf and on behalf of homeowners in the subdivision for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the
developer's failure to fulfill various promises regarding construction of the subdivision, such as paving roads and installing water and sewage systems. The causes of action
alleged included breach of contract, fraud, RICO, and violation of the federal antitrust laws. The developer moved
to dismiss on grounds of lack of standing, which motion
was granted because the issues of damages and reliance
required individualized proof from each affected member
of the association.
As a general rule, when the relief sought requires the
calculation of money damages regarding the harm allegedly
suffered by members of the association, the association typically cannot meet the third prong of the standing test. In
Reid v. Department of Commerce,2 a union sought reinstatement and back pay for its members' claims that the
defendant's reduction-in-force improperly altered the levels
of the members' positions. The Fifth Circuit held that the
union lacked standing because the relief required particularized proof dependent on the individual circumstances of
28
each union member.
In Vietnam Veterans of America, Inc. v. Guerdon Industries, Inc.,29 a veterans' association sued a mobile home
manufacturer for violation of the federal RICO statute and
various common law causes of action, alleging that the manufacturer had falsified the wholesale price of mobile homes
sold to association members. Associational standing was
Spring 1993
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denied on the grounds that "proof unique to each individual
will be required to establish these allegations" because proof
of mobile home purchases by individual members would
be required, and not every member had purchased homes,30
thus not every member would be benefitted by the action.
In Rockford Principals& SupervisorsAssociation v. Board
of Education of Rockford School District No. 205,31 an association of school administrators sued a school board alleging wrongful rescission of a salary increase. The school
board argued that the association lacked standing because
the participation of individual members would be required.
The court agreed with this argument on grounds that individualized proof would be necessary to establish the existence of the parties' contractual obligation and the extent
of any money damages to which a member might be entitled:
The plaintiffs make much of the fact that the monetary relief
could be arrived at based on straightforward mathematical calculations. The plaintiffs miss the point. The form of the individualized proof, be it in-court testimony, affidavits or
mathematical calculations, is not dispositive; rather, the existence of such proof is.32
Accordingly, the association's suit was dismissed.
In Dalworth Oil Co. v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co.,3 an
association of wholesale motor fuels distributors sued an
oil company (on behalf of certain members who were "similarly situated" to a distributor/co-plaintiff in the action)
for, inter alia,breach of contract, breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, and breach of warranty. The oil company
moved to dismiss the association's claims on grounds that
the association lacked standing to sue for contractual causes
of action, especially when the association did not have a
contract with the oil distributor and could not prove that
it was a third-party beneficiary under any of its members'
contracts with the oil company. The district court granted
the oil company's motion to dismiss because "the contractual claims that are asserted by [the association] on behalf
of its members obviously would require individualized participation and proof by such members allegedly injured by
' 34
[the oil company's] conduct.
In sum, when money damages are sought, associational
standing is generally denied on the theory that whatever
injury may have been suffered by the members is peculiar
to each individual member and would require individualized proof of both the fact and extent of any injury suffered.
In fact, the Ninth Circuit has opined that "no federal court
has allowed an association standing to seek monetary relief
on behalf of its members."35
3. Attempts to circumvent the "no individualized proof" requirement. Some associations have attempted to circumvent the third prong in Warth, which requires an absence
of individualized proof, by seeking a declaration of its members' entitlement to money damages, characterizing the declaration as one for equitable relief rather than money
damages. In PesticidePublicPolicy Foundation v. Village of
Wauconda,36 for example, a nonprofit corporation comprised of professional lawn care and pest control operators
sued a municipality challenging an ordinance requiring "users of pesticides" to register and obtain a twenty-five-dollar
permit from the municipality. Among the relief sought was
a claim that the municipality was liable for the members'
expenses incurred in complying with the challenged ordinance. The court rejected the association's argument that
the suit was not for money damages but for declaratory
relief, explaining as follows:
Such a [declaratory judgment action] cannot be characterized as
prospective relief, because its purpose is to compensate plaintiffs members for the past effects of an invalid ordinance. It
would not, however, require the participation of individual
members in this lawsuit.
[The association] has not cited, and this court has not found,
a single case where an association has sought this hybrid form
of relief. In essence, plaintiff has fashioned its request for relief
in a novel manner in order to circumvent the associational
standing requirements of Warth v. Seldin to assert a claim for
damages. If this court were to issue a declaration of defendants'
liability, plaintiffs members would be in a position where they
would be entitled to receive damages from defendants upon the
production of individualized proof. That the members would be
required to go into another court to actually obtain the money
judgment is a distinction that violates the spirit of...
Warth.... This Court therefore holds that [the association] may
not circumvent the standing requirements by seeking a declaration of entitlement to money damages. [The association] has
standing to sue only for prospective relief; it lacks standing to
37
sue for a declaration that its members are entitled to damages.
In another case, an association concerned with promoting
fair and nondiscriminatory telecommunications rates sued
on behalf of its members to recover money damages from
a utility, alleging that the utility had implemented an unlawful dual rate structure. 38 In upholding the district court's
dismissal for lack of associational standing, the circuit court
rejected the association's argument that the injury to its
members would not require individualized proof, but could
instead be "calculated by applying a simple formula to the
39
telephone calling data residing in Allnet's computers.III. Application of Warth to Franchisee Associations
There is a paucity of reported decisions in which an association has sought to enforce the private contractual rights
of its members. The authors could not locate any reported
opinions in which a franchisee association was granted
standing to assert claims on behalf of its member franchisees based upon the franchisees' rights arising under their
respective franchise agreements. 40 Perhaps one reason for
the lack of published authority arises from the basic tenet
that privity of contract is an essential element for recovery
based on a contract. 4' An exception to the general rule allows a party who is not in privity of contract to recover if
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Franchise Law Journal
101
that party can demonstrate that the contract was made for
his benefit and that the contracting parties intended that
he benefit from the contract (i.e., a third-party beneficiary
theory). 42 It is doubtful that a franchisee association can
demonstrate that it was an intended beneficiary of the
agreement between a franchisor and franchisee, especially
where many such associations did not exist when the agreements were executed. Moreover, in a contract suit, all par43
ties to the contract are indispensable.
In the context of franchisee associations bringing an action against a franchisor on behalf of their members arising
from their relationship with the franchisor, a determination
of the rights and obligations of the parties as set forth in
their franchise agreements would require the participation
of all the parties to those agreements. At the very least, proof
of the existence of contractual rights requires the offer of
evidence of each individual agreement, which necessarily
requires individualized proof. Moreover, if a contractual
provision was found to be vague or ambiguous, requiring
proof of the parties' intent, participation by the individual
franchisee regarding the circumstances surrounding the
making of a particular contract would be indispensable to
determine the parties' intent. Finally, a franchisor may have
defenses to contractual-based claims, as well as counter-
claims, against certain franchisees arising out of their course
of dealing. Defenses available to a franchisor, such as waiver,
estoppel, laches or prior material breach, each require individualized proof regarding the circumstances of the franchisee and the franchisor.
IV. Conclusion
In sum, contract-based or contract-related claims involving the rights of parties in a commercial context are not
appropriate claims for an association to bring on behalf of
its contracting members. Such claims are unlike a constitutional challenge to a statutory enactment, where the court
is faced with a "pure question of law," and no individualized proof regarding the enactment's effect on the association's members is required. By their very nature, contractrelated claims require a court to inquire into the particular
circumstances of the parties to the contract in order first to
determine the existence of the contractual rights and then
to determine both the fact and extent of any harm suffered
as a result of any alleged breach of such rights. Because the
franchisor-franchisee relationship is based on the parties'
agreement, a franchisee association suing a franchisor on
behalf of its members will inevitably face the same diffi(continued on page 116)
Join Us at the
ABA
ANNUAL MEETING
The Editorial Board of the Forum on Franchising is sponsoring a working editorial breakfast meeting
at the ABA Annual Meeting in New York in August. Anyone who is interested in the workings of
the Franchise Law Journal or who would like to share ideas with the Editorial Board is invited.
Date:
Monday, August 9, 1993
Place:
Sheraton New York, Riverside Ballroom, Third Floor
Time:
7:30
A.M. to 9:00 A.M.
So that we have an accurate count for breakfast, you must complete the form below and return it
to Barbara Barnes at ABA Headquarters in Chicago if you are planning to attend the editorial
breakfast meeting.
EDITORIAL BREAKFAST RESERVATION
Return to:
Barbara Barnes
American Bar Association
Forum on Franchising
750 North Lake Shore Drive
Chicago, IL 60611
I wish to attend the Editorial Board breakfast of the Franchise Law Journal at 7:30
on Monday, August 9, 1993, at the Sheraton New York.
Name
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Address
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102
Franchise Law Journal
State
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Spring 1993
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Zip
A.M.
(CCH) 10,142 (7th Cir. 1993), the court has held that a
"commitment agreement" with Embassy Suites to build and
license a hotel in Milwaukee did not give rise to a "dealership" under Wisconsin law.
FiduciaryDuty. The federal district court in the Eastern
chair's column
(continuedfrom page 98)
October 21 and 22, 1993, at Loews Anatole Hotel in Dallas.
Programs will address hot topics such as whether there is a
need for new franchise legislation and how to comply with
the new UFOC Guidelines, as well as a variety of other
plenary and workshop sessions on the issues faced every
day by counsel for franchisors and franchisees. Several standalone programs on Franchising in Mexico, Corporate Counsel Issues, and Fundamentals of Franchising will be held on
Wednesday, October 20. Ancillary events, including several
breakfast meetings, will abound as well.
* Monographs-The monograph Covenants Against
Competition in FranchiseAgreements continues to sell well.
Other monographs (Mergers and Acquisitions and Trademarks) are nearing completion, and those in development
are inching forward. If you are interested in volunteering
to work on a monograph, please contact me regarding the
newly approved monograph, Common Law Principles in
Franchising.
* Divisions-Notingthe success of the Corporate Counsel Division, the Governing Committee has authorized the
formation of a new Litigation and Dispute Resolution Division. A steering committee for this new division has been
appointed, and both divisions will hold breakfast meetings
this October at the Annual Forum. The possibility of forming an International Franchise Law Division remains under
consideration.
* ABA Annual Meeting-We are most pleased to have
received the ABA President's "Showcase" designation for
the Fundamentals of Franchising program to be conducted
from 2:00 P.M. to 5:00 P.M. on August 9, 1993, at the ABA
Annual Meeting in New York. From among the hundreds
of programs to be held at the ABA Annual Meeting, only a
dozen were chosen for Showcase designation. We are most
gratified and honored to have joint sponsorship of this program with the Franchising Committees of the Antitrust,
Business Law, General Practice, and Intellectual Property
District of Pennsylvania has reinforced a long line of cases
holding that the franchise relationship does not create a
fiduciary duty. MAACO Enterprises, Inc. v. Bill B. Cross
and Wapiti, Inc., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)
10,144
(E.D. Pa. 1992).
El
Law Sections, and the Young Lawyers Division.
* Forum Governance-To implement new powers given
to the Forum, the Governing Committee approved new
bylaws at its winter meeting. Among the expected changes
is a gradual increase in the size of the Governing Committee
from seven members to nine members. Also, pursuant to
the bylaws, the first business meeting of the Forum and
election of new Governing Committee members will take
place at the Dallas Forum this October. Recommendations
for the election will be made by a Nominating Committee
to be chaired by Rupert Barkoff, Immediate Past Chair.
* Governing Committee Changes-At the winter meeting, three new members were elected to serve on the Governing Committee. The new members are: Michael Garner
(who has served as editor of this Journal for many years),
Kathleen Anderson (who has served as the Forum's Women
and Minority Participation Coordinator and as chair of the
Corporate Counsel Division since its inception), and Tom
Pitegoff (an Associate Editor of the Journalwho has written,
spoken, and otherwise long-labored for the Forum). These
new members will take office following the ABA Annual
Meeting in August, at which time Paul Walter and Joyce
Mazero will have completed their terms. Both have made
invaluable contributions to the activities of the Forum, and
will leave with our gratitude for their service and their accomplishments.
The preceding highlights do not address all that is underway with the Forum. Numerous other initiatives are in
progress, including those related to membership, the Forum
Directory, women and minority participation, policies and
procedures, the Divisions, the Journal, programming,
publications, and more.
I encourage you to become involved in the activities of
the Forum. The Governing Committee is doing all that it
can to provide opportunities to those who wish to participate. If you would like to do more, please drop me a line
and apprise me of your interests.
[]
standing issues
Footnotes
(continuedfrom page 102)
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 111 (5th ed. 1979).
culties of other associations that have been denied standing
for failure to meet the third prong of Warth's three-pronged
2. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
3. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1958).
test, namely, that neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires participation of the members of the association in the suit.
ED
116
Franchise Law Journal
•
4. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
5. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (holding
that the association had standing to sue on its own behalf and on behalf of
its members because the defendant had impaired the association's ability
Spring 1993
HeinOnline -- 12 Franchise L.J. 103 1992-1993
to provide services to its members).
6. The lack of cases in this area may be attributable to the fact that
courts recognize a franchisee's First Amendment right to associate with
other franchisees, as long as the association does not engage in anticompetitive conduct. A franchisor may not restrict the right of a franchisee to
join an association of franchisees in order to act together to deal with
common problems. See, e.g., McApline v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1232, 1273-74 (E.D. Mich. 1973). Perhaps more
and more franchisors are acknowledging their franchisees' associational
rights and have elected not to interfere with the lawful activities of these
organizations.
7. 422 U.S. at 511; accord Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976).
8. Warth, 422 U.S. at 515.
9. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344.
10. Warth, 422 U.S. at 515.
11. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321 (1980).
12. 422 U.S. at 515-16.
13. California Ass'n of Bioanalysts v. Rank, 577 F. Supp. 1342 (C.D.
Cal. 1983) (holding that associations of owners and operators of clinical
laboratories had standing to challenge the enactment and implementation
of a statute which mandated the reduction of Medicaid reimbursement
rates for laboratory services by an average of 25 percent); see also Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(challenging certain EPA regulations); Colorado Taxpayers Union, Inc. v.
Romer, 750 F. Supp. 1041 (D. Colo. 1990). But cf Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,
U.S. -. , 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (denying standing to association because third party, as opposed to plaintiff, was the object of the
challenged regulation).
14. 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
15. Id. at 344.
16. 477 U.S. 274 (1986).
17. Id. at 284.
18. Id. at 287; see also New York State Club Ass'n v. New York City,
487 U.S. 1, 10 n.4 (1988) (permitting facial challenge to constitutionality
of city ordinance by association of private clubs "since there is a complete
identity between the interests of the consortium and some of its member
associations with respect to the issue raised in this suit, and the necessary
proof could be presented in a group context").
"experienced franchisor" exemption
(continuedfrom page 108)
be, perhaps even as it should be. But until a court, a franchise administrator or some other authority embraces our
normative desires, the "mature" franchisor that is sold in
the course of a merger, acquisition, or LBO, and thereafter
displaces its entire management team should proceed with
great caution before assuming that it remains entitled to
the "experienced" franchisor exemption from registration.
Footnotes
1. California: State Water Resources Cotrol Board v. Office of Administrative Law, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25, 12 Cal. App. 4th 697 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (great weight) and City of Huntington Beach v. Board of Administration of the Public Employees' Retirement Sys., 4 Cal. 4th 462, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 514 (In Bank) (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1992) (great weight); Indiana: Indiana
Dep't of Public Welfare v. Hupp, 605 N.E.2d 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
(great deference) and Natural Resources Comm'n of the Indiana Department of Natural Resources v. Porter County Drainage Board, 576 N.E.2d
587 (Ind. 1991) (great weight); Maryland: Insurance Commissioner v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Corp., 89 Md. App. 114, 597 A.2d 992 (Md.
19. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
20. Id. at 515-16.
21. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
22. Id. at 321.
23. MOVE v. United States Dep't of Justice, 565 F. Supp. 684, 687
(E.D. Pa. 1983).
24. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 682 (7th Cir. 1981).
25. Id.
26. 772 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986).
27. 793 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1986).
28. Id.
29. 644 F. Supp. 951 (D. Del. 1986).
30. Id. at 966.
31. 721 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
32. Id. at 950-51.
33. 758 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
34. Id. at 413.
35. United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers & Allied Traders No. 40
v. Insurance Corp. of America, 919 F.2d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir. 1990).
36. 622 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd without opinion, 826 F.2d
1968 (7th Cir. 1987).
37. Id. at 434.
38. Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. Allnet Communications Servs., Inc., 806 F.2d 1903 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
39. Id. at 1095.
40. The authors are aware of one unreported decision in which the court
denied a franchisee association standing to sue a franchisor for a variety
of alleged wrongs and in which the association requested modification or
rescission of a number of provisions in the franchise agreements. Independent Popeyes Franchise Group v. Al Copeland Enterprises, Inc., No. 904572 (E.D. La. 1991).
41. See Scaringe v. J.C.C. Enter., Inc., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1256, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 344 (1988); see also Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. National Bankers Life Ins., 427 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ refd
n.r.e.).
42. Ramos v. Valley Vista Hosp., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1244, 234 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1987); see also Brunerv. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 752 S.W.2d 679, 683
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
43. Texas Util. Co. v. Santa Fe Indus., 553 F. Supp. 106, 110-11 (N.D.
Tex. 1982).
Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (great weight) and Jackson Marine Sales, Inc. v. State
Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 32 Md. App. 213, 359 A.2d 228 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (great weight); North Dakota: Delorme v. North Dakota Department of Human Serv., 492 N.W.2d 585 (N.D. 1992) (controlling weight) and Thompson v. North Dakota Department of Agriculture,
482 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1992) ("Supreme Court normally defers" to agency);
Rhode Island: Defenders of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Management, 553 A.2d 541 (R.I. 1989) (great weight) and Gryguc v. Bendick, 510 A.2d 937 (R.I. 1986) (great weight); South Dakota: In re State
Sales and Use Tax Liability of Pam Oil, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 251 (S.D. 1990)
(great weight) and South Dakota Department of Public Safety, ex rel. James
Melgaard v. Donald N. Haddenham, 339 N.W.2d 786 (S.D. 1983) (great
weight); Washington: Eastlake Community Council and Floating Homes
Ass'n v. City of Seattle, Wash. App. 273, 823 P.2d 1132 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992) (great weight); and Hama Hama Company v. Shorelines Hearings
Board (Wash. 1975) (great weight) and, Wisconsin: Kelley Co., Inc. v.
Marquardt, 172 Wis.2d 234,61 U.S.L.W. 2383, 493 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. 1992)
(great weight) and Jicha v. State of Wisconsin Dep't of Industry, Labor and
Human Relations, Equal Rights Division, 169 Wis.2d 284, 485 N.W.2d
256 (Wis. 1992) (great weight).
2. United States v. Larionoff, 97 S. Ct. 2150, 431 U.S. 864, 53 L.Ed. 48
(1977); see Baltimore & Ohio RR Co. v. Bowen, 60 Md. App. 29, 482 A.2d
921 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (a court will defer to the interpretation an
agency gives to its own rules and regulations).
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