Questions: Do contemporary work arrangements and family organisations disadvantage women? If so, how? What should be done about this? Should the Family be abolished? Should employers offer free time off for child caring?
Download Slides [there are two videos in this presentation, see the first, Lauren's story, here , and the second, regarding stereotypes and their effects, here ]
Required Reading:
Saul, Feminism, chapter 1.
Additional Reading
Susan Moller Okin (1994). Justice Gender, and the Family. Esp. chapter 6-8
Will Kymlicka (2002). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Second Edition).
Oxford: OUP. pp. 377-398
Debra Satz (2013). ‘Feminist Perspectives on Reproduction and the Family’. Stanford Encylopedia of
Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-family/
Joan Williams (2001). Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict. Oxford: OUP.
Jennifer Saul (2013). ‘Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat and Women in Philosophy’. In Fiona Jenkins and Katrina Hutchinson (eds.), Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change? Oxford University
Press. Draft
Available here: http://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.300979!/file/BiasAndPhilosophyRevised-Clean.doc
Helen Beebee (2013). ‘Women and Deviance in Philosophy’. In Fiona Jenkins and Katrina
Hutchinson
(eds.), Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change? Oxford University Press. Available here: http://philosophy.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Women%20and%20Deviance%20in%20Philosoph y_Beebee.pdf
Cheshire Calhoun (2009). ‘The Undergraduate Pipeline Problem’. In Hypatia 24, 2: pp. 216-223
Sally Haslanger (2008). ‘Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone).
Hypatia 23, 2: pp. 210-223.
British Philosophical Association and Society for Women in Philosophy UK (2011). ‘Women in
Philosophy in the UK: A Report by the British Philosophical Association and the Society for Women in Philosophy UK’. Available at: http://swipuk.org/notices/2011-09-
08/Women%20in%20Philosophy%20in%20the%20UK%20(BPA-SWIPUK%20Report).pdf
Ann Garry (2012). ‘Analytic Feminism’. Stanford Enclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/femapproach-analytic/
Other links http://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com

http://swipuk.org http://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com
Questions: What types of things does Sexual Harassment cover? Does sexual harassment law perpetuate the idea that women are particularly weak and in particular need of protection? What makes sexual harassment wrong? Should we accept the dominance, difference, or stereotype approach?
Download Lecture Slides
Required Reading:
Saul, Feminism, chapter 2.
Additional Readings
Elizabeth Anderson (2006). ‘Recent Thinking about Sexual Harassment: A Review Essay’.
Philosophy & Public Affairs 34, 3: pp. 284-312.
Jan Crosthwaite and Graham Priest (1996). ‘The definition of sexual harassment’. Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 74, 1: pp. 66-82
Jennifer Saul (draft). ‘Stop Thinking About “Sexual Harassment”’. Draft available at: www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.263832!/file/V3StopThinking.docx
James Rocha (2011). ‘The Sexual Harassment Coercive Offer’. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28, 2: pp. 203-216
Suggestions for further reading in Saul, chapter 2
Questions: Does pornography subordinate and silence women? Should pornography be banned?
Should pornography be protected as a form of free speech? Does pornography cause harm to women? Can pornography empower women? Is all pornography rape? Is there something wrong with prostitution? Is there something wrong with all prostitution? Is there a special harm or wrong in prostitution? Should some forms of prostitution be legalized? Why?
Download Lecture Slides
[There are two breaks for videos in the presentation. The first is for selections of interviews with people who work in the porn industry here & here and is for interviews with sex workers here ]
Required Reading:
Saul, Feminism, chapter 3
Laurie Shrage (2012). ‘Feminist Perspectives on Sex Markets’, §2. Stanford Encylopedia of
Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-sex-markets/

Additional Readings:
Rae Langton (1993). ’Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22: pp.
293-330.
Catherine MacKinnon (1989). ‘Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: 'Pleasure Under Patriarchy’.
Ethics 99: pp. 314-346.
Jennifer Saul (2006). 'Pornography, Speech Acts and Context’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 106, 2: pp. 61-80.
Jeffrey Gauthier (2010), “Prostitution, Sexual Autonomy, and Sex Discrimination” Hypatia 25 (3).
Debra Satz (1995). Markets in Women's Sexual Labor. Ethics 106 (1):63-85.
Martha Nussbaum (1999). Sex and Social Justice. Chapter 11. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lars O. Ericsson (1980). ‘Charges Against Prostitution: An Attempt at a Philosophical Assessment’.
Ethics 90, 3: pp. 335-366.
Carole Pateman (1983). Defending Prostitution: Charges Against Ericsson. Ethics 93 (3):561-565.
Scott A. Anderson (2002). Prostitution and Sexual Autonomy: Making Sense of the Prohibition of
Prostitution. Ethics 112 (4):748-780
Hallie Rose Liberto (2009). ‘Normalizing Prostitution Versus Normalizing the Alienability of Sexual
Rights: A Response to Scott A. Anderson’. Ethics 120, 1: pp. 138-145.
Questions: Can one be a feminist and strive to live-up to ideals of feminine appearance? Is there a problem here? Does the fact that many women feel that they try to look a certain way for themselves show that norms of appearance are self-imposed and not other-imposed? Should we alter norms of appearance?
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Required Reading:
Saul, Feminism, chapter 5.
Feminine Appearance Additional Readings:
Ann Cahill (2003). 'Feminist Pleasure and Female Beautification'. Hypatia 18, 4: pp. 42-64.
Suggestions for Further Reading in Saul Chapter 5.
Evangelia Papadaki (2011). ‘Feminist Perspectives on Objectification’. Stanford Enclopedia of
Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-objectification/#KanSexObj (and the references in section 3).
Kathryn Paul Morgan, ‘Women and the Knife: Cosmetic Surgery and the Colonization of Women’s
Bodies’. Hypatia 6 (3): pp. 25-53
Anne Barnhill (2013). ‘Modesty as a Feminist Sexual Virtue’. In Sharon L. Crasnow and Anita M
Superson (eds.), Out from the shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional
Philosophy. Oxford Scholarship Online.
Legalisation Additional Readings:
Caroline West (2012). 'Pornography and Censorship'. Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy .

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pornography-censorship/
Peter de Marneffe (2010). Liberalism and Prostitution. Oxford University Press.
Laurie Shrage (1996). ‘Prostitution and the Case for Decriminalization’. Dissent 43: pp. 41-45.
Available online here: http://myweb.dal.ca/mgoodyea/Documents/Philosophy%20and%20morality/Prostitution%20and%
20the%20case%20for%20decriminalization%20Shrage%201996%20Dissent%20Spring%2041.pdf
Questions: What Counts as Rape? Can there be degrees of rape? Did defenders of Julian Assange wrong anyone or wrong women in general by defending what they defended? Are there several types of consent? What are the arguments against enthusiastic consent? Are any of them convincing? Is ‘yes’ sufficient for consent? Are there other ways of consenting?
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Required Reading:
Rebecca Whisnant (2009). ‘Feminist Perspectives on Rape’. Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-rape/
Additional Readings:
David Archard (1998). Sexual Consent. Boulder: Westview. Chapters 1-2.
Pineau, L. (1989). 'Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis.' Law and Philosophy , 8(2): 217–243.
Husak, D. and G. Thomas (1992). 'Date Rape, Social Convention, and Reasonable Mistakes'. Law and Philosophy , 11: 95–126.
Catherine MacKinnon (1989) Towards a Feminist Theory of the State. Chapter 9.
M. Anderson (2005), “Negotiating Sex”, Southern California Law Review , 78: 1401–1438.
M. Anderson (2005a). “All-American Rape”, St. John's Law Review , 79: 625–644.
Keith Burgess-Jackson (2000). ‘A Crime Against Women: Calhoun on the Wrongness of Rape”,
Journal of Social Philosophy, 31(3): 286–293.
Ann Cahill (2001). Rethinking Rape, Cornell, pp. 154-166.
Ann Cahil (2009). 'In Defense of Self-Defense' Philosophical Papers 38, 3 : pp. 363-380.
Questions: What is the difference between sex and gender? Is there a distinction? What is essentialism or biological determinism? Is this view defensible? Is ‘woman’ a normative or a descriptive term? What is gender performativity? Are any of the arguments against excluding trans-women from women-only spaces defensible?
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Required Reading:
Mari Mikkola (2011). ‘Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender’. Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (2011). http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-gender/
Additional Reading
Judith Butler (1990). Gender Trouble. New York: Routledge. Chapter 1.
Mari Mikkola (2006). 'Elizabeth Spelman, Gender Realism, and Women', Hypatia, 21: pp. 77–96.
Mari Mikkola (2011). 'Ontological Commitments, Sex and Gender', in Feminist Metaphysics , C. Witt
(ed.), Dordrecht: Springer.
Natalie Stoljar (2011). 'Different Women. Gender and the Realism-Nominalism Debate', in Feminist
Metaphysics, C. Witt (ed.), Dordrecht: Springer.
Sally Haslanger (2000). 'Gender and Race: (What) are They? (What) Do We Want Them To
Be?', Noûs , 34: 31–55.
Theodore Bach (2012). 'Gender is a Natural Kind with a Historical Essence'. Ethics 122, 2: pp. 231-
272.
Questions: What is Care Ethics? Is care ethics a distinct approach to ethics? Is it a good approach to ethics? Is Care Ethics a distinctively female approach to ethics?
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Required Reading:
Saul, Feminism, chapter 7.
Maureen Sander-Staudt. 'Care Ethics'. Internet Encylopedia of
Philosophy . http://www.iep.utm.edu/care-eth/
Additional Reading
Michael Slote (2007). The Ethics of Care and Empathy . Abingdon: Routledge. [Fantastic book, less than a 100 pages really, no need to read the last chapter. Do email me if you have trouble getting hold of it.] (Slote's chapter in Copp's Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory and the OUP collection, Working Virtue covers similar material but not in the comprehensive way pertinent to the ethics of care discussed in this book.)
Virginia Held (2006). The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global . Part 1, especially chapter
1. Oxford Scholarship Online
Will Kymlicka (2002). ‘An Ethic of Care’. In his Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 398-430.
Suggestions for further reading in Saul, chapter 7
Nel Noddings (1982).
Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education . Berkeley:
University of CA Press
Carol Gilligan (1982). In A Different Voice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press

Questions: What do feminists think is wrong with traditional epistemology? How should epistemology be changed to overcome these problems? Is epistemic injustice an important concept? Is epistemic injustice a distinct wrong?
Download Lecture Slides
Required Reading:
Saul, Feminism, chapter 8.
Additional Readings:
Elizabeth Anderson (2011). 'Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science'. Stanford
Encylopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/
Miranda Fricker (2007). ‘Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. (Oxford Scholarship
Online). Introduction and Chapter 1.
Elizabeth Anderson (1995). 'Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense.' Hypatia 10
(3): pp. 50 - 84.
Helen E. Longino (1997). Feminist Epistemology as a Local Epistemology: Helen E.
Longino. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1): pp. 19–36.
Helen Longino (1998). 'Feminist Epistemology'. In John Greco and Ernest Sosa, The Blackwell
Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell.
Elizabeth Anderson (2012). Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions. Social Epistemology
26 (2):163-173.
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Questions: Why think that gender is the main fault line of difference and disadvantage? How should feminism acknowledge overlapping and intersecting cumulative disadvantage? Is feminism intersectional or bullshit? What does this mean?
Required Reading:
Saul, Feminism, chapter 9
Naomi Zack (2007). ‘Can Third Wave Feminism Be Inclusive? Intersectionality, Its Problems and
New Directions’. In Linda Martin Alcoff and Eva Feder Kittay
(eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Feminist Philosophy, pp. 193-210. Oxford: Blackwell. Click here to download
Additional Readings: Intersectionality
Kimberle Crenshaw (1989), 'Demarginalizing the Intersecton of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics'. University of
Chicago Legal Forum : pp. 139-167. Also here: http://web.calstatela.edu/faculty/tbettch/Crenshaw%20Demarginalizing%20Intersection%20Race
%20Sex.pdf
Karen Jones (2013). Intersectionality and Ameliorative Analyses of Race and Gender. Philosophical

Studies (online first).
Sally Haslanger (2013). 'Race, intersectionality, and method: a reply to critics'. Philosophical
Studies (online first).
Some very relevant not-really-philosophical material on intersectionality:
Flavia Dzodan (2011), 'My Feminism will be Intersectional or it will be Bullshit!' http://tigerbeatdown.com/2011/10/10/my-feminism-will-be-intersectional-or-it-will-be-bullshit/ http://thefeministwire.com/2013/11/lily-allen-peddling-the-same-racist-tropes-through-whiteprivilege-narrative/ http://libcom.org/library/1-2-777p-gender-disability-violence-pay-gaps
Additional Readings: Respect for other Cultures
Martha Nussbaum (1999). Sex and Social Justice . (OUP). Chapters 1-4.
Serene J. Khader (2013). 'Introduction: Adaptive Preferences and Global Justice' in her Adaptive
Preferences and Women's Empowerment . Oxford Scholarship Online
Sandrine Berges (2011). Why Women Hug their Chains: Wollstonecraft and Adaptive
Preferences'. Utilitas 23, 1: pp. 72-8