J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2013) 18:223–239
DOI 10.1007/s11366-013-9247-1
R E S E A R C H A RT I C L E
What Matters Most in Selecting top Chinese Leaders?
A Qualitative Comparative Analysis
Jinghan Zeng
Published online: 7 June 2013
# Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2013
Abstract This article analyses the selection criterion of China’s most powerful leading
body—the Politburo Standing Committee—by using Qualitative Comparative Analysis
and the latest data of the 18th Party Congress in 2012. It finds that age, combined with
institutional rules, is one of the dominant factors in deciding the appointment of leaders in
2012, suggesting the significance of institutional rules in today’s elite politics in China. It
also finds that candidates’ patron-client ties with senior leaders did play a role but they are
not always positive in terms of the career advancement of candidates. Moreover, and
perhaps surprisingly, this study finds that powerful family backgrounds do not have positive
impacts on promotion at the highest level.
Keywords Qualitative Comparative Analysis . Elite Politics . Political Mobility .
Patronage . Faction . Performance . Power Succession . Institutionalization . Meritocracy .
Leadership Selection
Introduction
In 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) orderly performed its once-in-a-decade
leadership transition. As the second smooth transition of the authoritarian regime, it
received widespread attention around the world. Enormous academic interest has
been generated by the intense competition of the 18th Politburo Standing Committee
(PSC) seats, especially after the affair of Bo Xilai who had publicly campaigned for a
PSC seat. Before the opening of the 18th Party Congress, competition between the
remaining eight candidates—Yu Zhengsheng, Zhang Dejiang, Wang Qishan, Zhang
J. Zeng (*)
Department of Politics and International Studies, Social Sciences Building, University of Warwick,
Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
e-mail: Jinghan.Zeng@warwick.ac.uk
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J. Zeng
Gaoli, Wang Yang, Liu Yandong, Li Yuanchao, and Liu Yunshan—was widely
reported and predicted by various mass media outlets including the BBC [2], Reuters
[48], the Financial Times [1], the New York Times [74], and The Economist [21].1
Some China analysts also joined in this game of line-up prediction (e.g. [41]).
Not surprisingly, the opaque nature of China’s elite politics has stimulated enormous interests in the selection criteria of the new leadership. These criteria criterion
involve a set of three related on-going intellectual debates over the Chinese politics of
power succession. The first debate is about how to understand the outcome of the
18th Party Congress: whether it is simply a result of informal politics. The second
debate is about whether the Chinese political system is based on meritocratic bureaucracy or factional politics. The third is about the practical significance of increasingly
institutional norms: whether these norms have been changed power succession or
they are simply a political tool for factional struggle.
The purpose of this article is to assess what factors really mattered in selecting
members of the leading body in China. In the fields of political science and economics, a sizeable theoretical and empirical literature has extensively studied the selection
criteria of Chinese cadres.2 To date, however, there is no systematic attempt to
analyse the selection criteria of the most important and powerful level, the PSC. This
article addresses the gap by using the method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(QCA) and the latest data of 2012. The findings of this study make an interesting and
notable addition to the on-going debates. This study also provides a guide to
interpreting the obscure leadership dynamics and updates the understandings of
China’s elite politics.
Several key findings of this study can be highlighted. First, with regards to age,
this article establishes that—whether the candidates are above 62 years old in
2012—plays a key role in the transition of 2012. While many have been questioning
the institutionalization of the political system [29, 64, 79], this finding indicates that
institutional rules of power succession have been shaping elite politics in China, and
that the outcome of the 18th PSC should not be simply considered a failure of Hu
Jintao’s coalition.
Second, this article establishes that political patronage of both Jiang Zemin and Hu
Jintao did matter; however, being aligned with both senior leaders is self-defeating as
it hinders and does not help. It suggests that patron-client ties are not valuable assets
for promotion at all times. Third, “princeling status”3 either did not matter or had
negative effects on the chances of being promoted into the highest level of party
ranks, challenging the widely shared view that princelings’ family ties make them
more likely to win higher party ranks [17, 18, 36, 66, 75, 78]. Also, this finding again
indicates that political connections are not always positive to the career advancement
of Chinese leaders.
1
The other predictions of the 18th PSC line-up include American Voice [12], Sing Tao Daily[16], South
China Morning Post [65], Boxun News [8, 9], Duowei News [19], Fanhua News [24], The Epoch
Times[32], Chosun Daily [15], Mirror Books [30].
2
For empirical studies, please see [5–7, 13, 14, 33, 47, 50, 61, 66]. For qualitative analysis, see [3, 41, 42,
58, 59, 77].
3
In this study, princeling refers to state/party/military leaders who come from families of senior party
leaders (vice minister or vice governor level or above) or military generals (deputy military region level or
above).
What Matters Most in Selecting top Chinese Leaders?
225
Finally, while many argue that educational qualifications boosted the chance of
promotion [34, 66, 69], this study finds that they did not play a role at the highest
level. Last, as the only female candidate failed to be promoted, the line-up of the 18th
PSC suggests that politics is still a game of men at the top.
The On-Going Intellectual Debates
The Outcome of the 18th Party Congress: Factional Conflicts Versus Seniority
The first debate is about how to understand the outcome of the 18th Party Congress.
On the one hand, many interpret the line-up of new leadership from a perspective of
factional conflicts. A widely accepted theory is that Jiang Zemin successfully
defeated Hu Jintao to put Jiang’s protégés—Yu Zhengsheng, Wang Qishan, Zhang
Dejiang, and Zhang Gaoli—into the PSC [17, 29, 40, 72, 74, 75]. According to some,
Jiang Zemin’s camp—princelings in particular—became the biggest winners of the
18th Party Congress at the expense of Hu Jintao’s coalition [17, 40, 72, 74].
On the other hand, however, some argue that the factional view overestimates the
influence of Jiang Zemin, who was 86 years old [68]. They argue that seniority, rather
than factional politics, is the key in deciding the appointment of the 18th PSC [52,
68]. The logic of this view is that Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang—who are Hu Jintao’s
protégés and failed to be promoted in 2012—are still young enough to compete for
the 19th PSC, while others are not under the institutional rules of retirement age [52,
63, 68]. Therefore, in the words of Miller [52], “it is just arithmetic.” In this sense, Hu
Jintao’s coalition was not simply defeated in the 18th Party Congress and the outcome
of the 18th PSC is a kind of factional bargain, because Hu’s coalition has reserved
two seats in the 19th PSC for his protégés Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang.
Selection Criteria: Meritocratic Bureaucracy Versus Factional Politics
On the second issue, there are two main clusters of opinions, which can be labelled as
the meritocratic bureaucracy school and the factional politics school.
Meritocratic Bureaucracy
The meritocratic bureaucracy school emphasizes the role of merit—candidates’
performance and quality in particular—in the selection criteria of Chinese leaders.
It is important to clarify the definition of “meritocracy” here because there is a slight
but important dispute over its meaning. Meritocracy can be translated in Chinese as
“任人唯贤” “贤能” “选贤任能”, etc.4 Some refer to meritocracy as an identical standard
that is “judged superior according to an objective standard of ability (like an examination of philosophical knowledge and literary skill)” [22]. Others consider meritocracy as selecting intelligent and capable officials; however, it lacks a unified
standard to measure this intelligence and capability. In this article, meritocracy refers
4
This article will not go into details of regarding the accuracy of and differences between each translation
because of the topic.
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J. Zeng
to employing people based on a set of measurable criteria, including educational
qualifications, leadership experience and economic performance.
Needless to say, the primary foundation of this school is China’s economic prosperity.
Many consider the cadres’ evaluation system as a key causal factor of economic prosperity
in China. It is argued that officials’ economic performance is the key to deciding their
promotions, which has provided strong political incentives for Chinese cadres to promote
economic growth [4, 13, 47, 73]. Many empirical studies also find that the economic
performance of provinces substantially impacts upon the promotion or demotion of provincial leaders [5, 7, 13, 14, 47, 50]. Some studies also find that the performance of revenue
collections plays a more important role than growth performance in cadres’ promotion [7,
66]. In addition to economic performance, other aspects of performance also matter. Qiao’s
study [61] finds that demotions of local leaders are closely associated with power-abusing,
corruption and mishandlings of accidents in post-Deng era (1997–2010).
Notably, the selection bias of cadres varies significantly at different levels and time
periods. Landry’s study [33] on the level of mayors between 1990 and 2000 and the
study of Shih, Adolph and Liu [66] on the level of the CCP Central Committee
between 1982 and 2002 find that there is no evidence to prove that the strong
economic performance of political elites would lead to their promotion or demotion.
In addition to performance, some also argues that educational qualification matters in
selecting Chinese leaders [34, 66, 69]. This view is supported by empirical evidence [66].
Indeed, educational qualifications have become increasingly important since the CCP
launched the “four modernizations (四化)” project of Chinese cadres. My recent study on
the institutionalization of power succession finds that, in 1982 when this project had just
launched, only 4 % of Politburo members had received a college education, but in 2012
only 4 % of them did not attend colleges[76]. In 2012, over 68 % of the 18th Politburo
members held masters or PhD degrees including Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang [76].
Chinese culture and history have also been linked with meritocratic bureaucracy.
Some argue that the Chinese political culture’s emphasis on the ideal of political
meritocracy and an imperial examination system (科举制度) was institutionalized to
practice it in ancient times[3, 77]. The imperial examination system has been an
examination mechanism of ancient China in selecting civil servants since the Sui (隋)
Dynasty in 605. This system mainly examines students’ philosophical knowledge and
literary skills, such as writing eight-legged essays (八股文).5 Zhang [77] considers the
imperial examination system an effective way of facilitating social mobility. On the
contrary, Elman ([23]: 17) argues that “over 90 %” of the Chinese population are not
eligible to take the test because of the unequal distribution of social and educational
resources. Elliott [22] argues that “family connections and material resources” rather
than merit are the keys to political success for “a majority” of Chinese imperial
political elites.6
5
Eight-legged essay is a special writing style for the imperial examination system.
An important dimension of the examination system which is not pointed out in the debate is whether those
who succeed in this examination because of their better literary skills are capable of managing the nation.
Excellent writing skills do not necessarily mean management expertise. The old method of writing eightlegged essays, in particular, is very pedantic. Similarly, a PhD degree indicates expertise in specific areas
rather than general administration or management skills. Despite the many problems of the imperial
examination system, it is better considered as a critical way to co-opt educated elites and build an image—if
not a channel—of social mobility, rather than a search for governing talents.
6
What Matters Most in Selecting top Chinese Leaders?
227
Factional Politics
The factional politics school argues that patron-client ties are more important than
merit in the selection mechanism of Chinese leaders [43, 44, 58, 59, 66]. Some even
consider patron-client ties as the most influential factor [43, 44, 53, 59, 75]. Some
empirical evidence also demonstrates the importance of political allegiance[14, 66].
Notably, princelings’ powerful family ties have been considered crucial for them to
win higher party ranks. Princelings tend to have more political resources in terms of
networks and connections because of their families [17, 18, 35, 75]. Some argue that
senior leaders might benefit from princelings’ families by promoting their children [66].
Princelings also know more about various informal and formal rules of the party [35,
78]. In addition, princelings are considered more loyal and reliable to the regime [17, 18,
20, 35, 78, 79], not only because this regime was founded by their parents, but also to
ensure that they and their families continue to enjoy the privileges of “red nobility.”
The impact of family ties varies at different levels and times. The study of Shih,
Adolph and Liu [66] finds that princeling status has substantial impacts on political
elites’ party rank at the level of the CCP Central Committee based on the data from
1982 to 2002; however, Choi [14] finds that princelings status did not matter at the
level of provincial leaders based on the data from 1989 to 2009.
The main assumption of the factional politics school is that Chinese leaders have to
select loyal followers in order to survive the intense factional struggles. Indeed, many
factional studies suggest that selecting loyal followers rather than the most capable
ones is the key to maintaining their leadership [49, 60]. Shih, Adolph and Liu [66]
argue that less clever followers tend to be more loyal; therefore, promoting these
kinds of subordinates can help leaders to prevent a coup and stay in power. Li Cheng
[43] argues that political groups might attempt to support their members to get into
the PSC in order to “protect their interests and exert their influence”.
This study emphasizes patron-client ties and family ties instead of factional
background for two reasons. First, personal relationships among a relatively small
group of leaders are clearly important, but it is not the same as trying to identify firm,
coherent and stable factional groupings. It is very important to make the distinction
between the importance of patronage and the formation of factions.7 Political faction
implies ties between members including horizontal ones, but patronage is more based
on hierarchical relationships with loose or no contacts horizontally at lower levels.
Factionalism also implies that people are aware that they are in a group together.
Many elite studies fail to notice this significant distinction and they mostly tend to
use the language of factions to refer to loose sets of relationships. Nathan’s factional
models [54], for example, was not describing about political factions at all. He was
actually describing the network of patron-client relationships that created vertical
links rather than horizontal ones. In the study of Shih, Adolph and Liu [66], they also
use the language of factions when they actually refer to what might be captured under
patronage.
Second, we should be wary of placing our trust in certain inside stories of the CCP.
Politics at the very top of the Chinese system is mysterious and the state never
responds to or denies the existence of factional politics. The opaque nature of China’s
7
I owe this idea to Professor Shaun Breslin.
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J. Zeng
elite politics has cultivated various rumours, hearsay and myth. Ascertaining who
belongs to which factions is subjective, and China does not have party factional
politics like western democratic parties which show clearly who belongs to which
faction. Some elite studies actually rest their arguments on the grounds of rumours,
hearsay and sometimes guesswork, instead of building on credible evidences [10, 46].
The community of Chinese political studies has been tolerating questionable sources
of factional studies for a long time.
The Divergence Over Institutionalization
Since the 1980s, the CCP has taken impressive efforts to institutionalize its political
system, in particular power succession. Various institutional rules, such as age and
term limits, have been increasingly enforced to ensure the rapid circulation of
political elites[76]. In the intellectual discourse of institutionalization, the core of
divergence lies over the impacts of institutionalization. While many recognized that
power succession in China has been increasingly institutionalized [31, 51, 52, 71],
others focus on the limits of institutionalization [25, 29, 79].
The two debates previously outlined are both central to the third. From the
perspectives of factional politics, institutional rules are nothing but a tool of power
struggle. Specifically, the retirement age limit has been considered by many as a tool
to force Jiang Zemin’s political rivalry out of the game [26, 28, 29, 57, 67, 79]. The
proponents of institutional rules, however, argue that the increasingly institutionalized power transition has been changing China’s elite politics [31, 45, 55, 71]. These
kinds of view suggest that institutional rules have become a key factor in reshaping
power succession. The above competing views leave opposing interpretations over
the deciding-pattern of the 18th Party Congress. The factional approach argues that
informal politics dominates the decision-making of the transition in 2012 [29]. The
institutional approach argues that “the seniority principle” is the dominating factor
[52, 68]. Miller [52], for example, argues that the 18th Party Congress marked a
remarkable progress in the institutionalization of China’s elite politics.
By linking institutional rules—step-by-step promotion in particular—with political
meritocracy, some argue that selected Chinese top leaders are well-trained and experienced before they assume power [3, 77]. Step-by-step promotion means that leaders are
usually promoted level-by-level. For instance, a candidate should usually be a regular or
alternate member of the Central Committee or a minister level official in order to be
eligible for Politburo membership. This promotion mode helps the Chinese leaders to
broaden their visions, increase their leadership experiences and hone their skills.
Theoretically, this institutional rule also provides a way of filtering out incapable
leaders as there are many chances to test their capability. Provincial administration is an
important ground upon which to examine leaders’ capability and skills. With China’s
rapid economic growth, many Chinese provinces are now much bigger than many
countries in terms of not only population but also total economic output [39, 77]. Thus,
Zhang [77], an advocate of the meritocratic bureaucracy school, argues that “it takes
extraordinary talent and skills to govern a typical Chinese province, which is on average
the size of four to five European states. Indeed, with the Chinese system of meritocracy
in place, it is inconceivable that people as weak and incompetent as George W. Bush or
Yoshihiko Noda of Japan could ever get to the top leadership position.”
What Matters Most in Selecting top Chinese Leaders?
229
Nowadays, the provincial experience has become increasingly crucial for national
leadership.8 59.1 % of the 15th Politburo, 66.7 % of the 16th Politburo, and 76 % of
the 17th Politburo members have worked as provincial chief before [39]. Most top
Chinese leaders have served as head of (at fewest two) local provinces. Arguably,
provincial leadership is “the most pivotal stepping stone to top national leadership
offices in post-Deng China” [39].
Key Hypotheses
For the purposes of this study, this section summarizes several key hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Candidates whose family members are high-level party leaders have a
distinct advantage in competing for promotion.
Hypothesis 2: Political patronage matters in selecting top leaders.
Hypothesis 2a: Patron-client ties with Hu Jintao play a positive role in influencing
promotion.
Hypothesis 2b: Patron-client ties with Jiang Zemin have positive impacts on promotion.
Hypothesis 3: Senior leaders who are under the age limit are more likely to be
promoted. Seniority (论资排辈) as an important element of Chinese
political culture might be a significant factor in the selection mechanism. Senior leaders tend to accumulate more political capitals and
experiences of political struggle, which makes them more competitive
[66]. Of course, their age should not exceed the retirement age limit.
Hypothesis 4: Higher education qualifications facilitate the likelihood of promotion.
Hypothesis 5: Experiences in being provincial leaders (governors) have a positive
impact on promotion.
Hypothesis 6: Gender does matter in selecting Chinese leaders. Some argue that the
current selection mechanism in China tends to discriminate against
women [3, 66]. As a higher representation of women helps to eliminate
gender discrimination and enhance the legitimacy of leadership, the
CCP Organization Department has ruled that there ought to be a certain
proportion of female cadres in leading posts and the state should give
priority to female cadres in the same conditions. Yet, these kinds of rules
have not been applied at the top level. As the first systematic attempt to
study political competition at the highest level, it would be interesting to
examine the significance of gender.
Data
To analyse the selection criteria of the PSC, it is important to find a pool of eligible
candidates and winners. No data before 2002 can be used because various institutional rules, such as age limits and step-by-step promotion, were not well-developed
or adhered to before 2002. Thus, we have no clear idea about the list of candidates.
8
For studies on provincial leadership, please see [6, 37, 39].
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J. Zeng
Neither the 16th nor the 17th PSCs form appropriate data. This is because the retirement
age was changed at the 16th Party Congress in 2002. In addition, all eligible candidates
for the 16th PSC were promoted and thus it was a kind of “uncontested election” that
lacked competition. The selection of the 17th PSC includes the consideration of
establishing heirs apparent in order to prepare for taking over the top power. Thus, the
18th PSC is the only remaining and latest valuable research object.
In 2012, 11 of the 17th Politburo members were eligible for the 18th PSC membership according to the age limit of 68 and the practice of step-by-step promotion. Those
candidates were Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Li Yuanchao, Liu Yandong,
Wang Qishan, Zhang Dejiang, Liu Yunshan, Wangyang, Bo Xilai and Zhang Gaoli.
Because of the institutionalized system of power succession, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang
who were the 17th PSC members would certainly maintain their PSC seats. Bo Xilai was
removed in early 2012, so there are actually five seats available for the real competition
among these eight candidates. As discussed, the line-up predictions of various mass
media and China experts were based on the competition between these eight candidates.
Table 1 lists the backgrounds of all eight candidates.9 Information of the personal
qualifications and working experience is summarized by the author from the Xinhua
News Agency.10 The eligibility of the 19th PSC is based on the retirement age limit of
68. If the age of a candidate is under 68 at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, then he or
she is eligible for the competition of the 19th PSC. Only Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang
are eligible for the next PSC membership. Among all candidates, Liu Yunshan and
Liu Yandong are the only two who have not worked as provincial heads.
Five candidates are princelings: Yu Zhengsheng’s father is Yu Qiwei (more often
called Huang Jing), who was the first mayor of Tianjin and the former Minister of
Machinery Industry; Wang Qishan’s father-in-law is the former Vice Premier Yao Yilin;
Zhang Dejiang’s father is the Major General of PLA Zhang Zhiyi; Li Yuanchao’s father
Li Gancheng was the former deputy Mayor of Shanghai (vice-minister level); and Liu
Yundong’s father Liu Ruilong was the former deputy Minister of Agriculture.
Data on political patronage are drawn from the existing literature. Among the
eight candidates, many argue that Jiang Zemin’s protégés include Wang Qishan[41,
63], Yu Zhengsheng[42, 63], Zhang Gaoli [39, 42, 63, 78], and Zhang Dejiang
([27]:81; [41, 63, 78]:13). Wang Yang, Liu Yunshan, and Li Yuanchao are considered by many to be Hu Jintao’s protégés [38, 42, 63]. According to Li ([42]:8), Liu
Yandong is “widely” considered as the protégé of both Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin
because of her family ties with Jiang and her work experience with Hu.
Research Method
As the data of this study only include eight cases, conventional quantitative methods are
difficult to apply in such a small N research design. QCA, however, offers an alternative
approach to investigating the research question of this study. QCA is a case-oriented
9
Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang are not included as they would certainly maintain their PSC seats: they did not
need to compete for the PSC seats. As their heir apparent status is dominating, other variables have almost
no effect.
10
Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-07/14/content_1600008.htm on 20 December,
2012.
What Matters Most in Selecting top Chinese Leaders?
231
Table 1 Background of the 18th PSC candidates
Outcome Candidates
Personal Qualification
Age Eligible for Education
the 19th
PSC?
Winners
Losers
Political Patronage
Working
Experience
Gender Princeling Jiang
Hu
Provincial
Zemin’s Jintao’s leaders
Protégé Protégé (Governors)
Zhang Dejiang
66
No
Bachelor
Male
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yu Zhengsheng
67
No
Bachelor
Male
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Wang Qishan
64
No
Bachelor
Male
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Zhang Gaoli
66
No
Bachelor
Male
No
Yes
No
Yes
Liu Yunshan
65
No
Bachelor
Male
No
No
Yes
No
Li Yuanchao
62
Yes
PhD in law Male
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Liu Yandong
67
No
PhD in law Female Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Wang Yang
57
Yes
Master
No
Yes
Yes
Male
No
analytic technique that can systemically deal with small numbers of cases (i.e. 5–50) by
applying “Boolean algebra to implement principles of comparison used by scholars
engaged in the qualitative study of macro social phenomena”.11 It is proposed by Ragin
[62] and has gradually developed into a widely applied method in various research
fields.12 In the field of political science, there are not many studies using QCA.13
As the same outcome can be produced by multiple causal mechanisms, one feature of
QCA is that it considers the outcome a result of the combination of several conditions.
Using the survival of mankind as an example, air, water and food are necessary
conditions and the lack of any of these is sufficient for a person to die. The regression
model can only tell that the higher the frequency of such conditions’ absence, the more
likely it is that a person will die; however, QCA treats these conditions equally and pays
more attentions to the absence or presence of such conditions instead of their frequency.
Moreover, QCA can detect conditioning effects of independent variables and specify
different paths to the outcome. The limitation of QCA is that in many cases it is better to use
binary, nominal-scale variables (assigned as 0 and 1) in order to preserve the accuracy. With
the development of the methodology, there are several software programs available for
QCA, including fs/QCA, Tosmana, Stata’s fuzzy, etc.14 In order to avoid software errors, this
study employs both fs/QCA and Tosmana to run QCA.
Outcome
The outcome is whether the candidate wins a seat in the 18th PSC. Winners in Table 1
are assigned as 1 and losers are assigned as 0.
11
For more information about QCA, see http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/.
For more literature that applies QCA, see http://www.compasss.org/index.htm;
13
My thanks to the anonymous reviewer for this information. For political science studies that have been
conducted with QCA, please see Chan, S. [11]. Explaining war termination: A Boolean analysis of Causes.
Journal of Peace Research 40(1), pp. 49–66. Osa, M. and Corduneanu-Huci, C. [56]. Running uphill:
political opportunity in non-democracies. Comparative Sociology 2(4), pp. 605–629.
14
For fs/QCA, see http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/links.shtml; for Tosmana, see http://
www.tosmana.net/.
12
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J. Zeng
Five Conditions
Considering the small number of cases, the appropriate number of variables should be
four to six. This study selects five key variables as conditions for outcome.
a. 19th PSC/eligibility of the 19th PSC (age): candidates who are under 63 in 2012
are assigned 1 and those who are not are assigned 0.
b. Princeling: candidates who have a princeling background are assigned 1 and
those who do not are assigned 0
c. Jiangzemin/Jiang Zemin’s Protégé: those who are Jiang Zemin’s protégés are
assigned 1 and those who are not are assigned 0
d. Hujintao/Hu Jintao’s Protégé: those who are Hu Jintao’s protégés are assigned 1
and those who are not are assigned 0.
e. Governors : those who have worked as a governor in local provinces are assigned
1 and those who have not are assigned 0
Other Variables
To maintain the accuracy of this study, it is important to select the most important
factors. As indicated in Table 1, the following variables do not have much variation
across the outcome, thus they are not selected as conditions for QCA.
Gender
As indicated in Table 1, there is only one female among eight candidates and she
failed to be promoted. Although we cannot test this variable, the line-up of the 18th
PSC did suggest that politics is still a men’s game at the high level of party rank.
Education
All candidates with postgraduate degrees failed to be promoted, but it is not reasonable to conclude that higher educational qualifications are negative assets for candidates to seek for promotion. It is notable here that both heirs apparent, Xi Jinping and
Li Keqiang, have PhD degrees. Therefore, this study considers this result a coincidence, which means educational qualifications do not play a role in this selection.
Interpretation of Results
This study runs a Crip-Set Analysis using the software fs/QCA and Tosmana. They
provide exactly the same results, as follows (see Appendix):
&
&
Solution 1: “~19th PSC * Jiangzemin *~Hujintao *Governors”
Solution 2: “~19th PSC *~princeling*~Jiangzemin *Hujintao*~Governors”
The solution of QCA uncovers different paths to achieving the outcome. For this
study, it provides two solutions to achieving the outcome (membership of the 18th
PSC). The major solution includes four conditions: that the candidates should not be
What Matters Most in Selecting top Chinese Leaders?
233
eligible for 19th PSC membership (Condition 1) AND being a protégé of Jiang Zemin
(Condition 3) AND not being a protégé of Hu Jintao (Condition 4) AND having
worked as governors in local provinces (Condition 5). The second solution is that the
candidates are not eligible for the 19th PSC membership (Condition 1) AND not
being a princeling (Condition 2) AND not being a protégé of Jiang Zemin (Condition
3) AND being a protégé of Hu Jintao (Condition 4) AND have not worked as
governors in local provinces (Condition 5).
Among all variables, not being eligible for the 19th PSC membership (Condition
1) is the only condition shared by both solutions, suggesting its significance in the
selection. This finding is not surprising as the only two candidates who are eligible
for the 19th PSC—Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang—failed to be promoted into the 18th
PSC. Political patronage matters as well, but they are not always helpful. This
condition only helps to win PSC seats when the candidate is close either to Jiang
Zemin or to Hu Jintao. When the candidate is close to both or neither Jiang and Hu,
he or she is not likely to be promoted into the 18th PSC. In the case of Liu Yandong,
she is not selected into the 18th PSC, although she is close to both Jiang and Hu.
The variable of princeling is particularly notable. It disappears in the first solution,
suggesting that it does not play a role in this solution. This variable appears in the second
solution, however, and the output shows that the condition not to have princeling
background is necessary for the candidate to achieve the outcome (18th PSC membership). In other words, princeling status is a burden on the second solution. This finding
indicates that princeling background either does not matter or has a negative impact
upon promotion. Either way, it can be argued that princeling background is not a
valuable asset in selecting Chinese leaders at the highest level. As indicated in Table 1,
two out of three losers, Li Yuanchao and Liu Yandong, were princelings.
In terms of the governor variable, the outputs show that provincial experience
matters to Jiang Zemin’s protégé but not to Hu Jintao’s. This is perhaps because most
of Hu Jintao’s protégés rose from the Communist Youth League, who are experts in
propaganda, while Jiang Zemin’s protégés usually lack the relevant experience [43].
As the CCP has been keen on propaganda and ideology, the capability of coordinating ideological campaigns and guiding public opinions are highly valuable and
irreplaceable. Thus, it perhaps offsets their inadequate provincial experience.
Concluding Remarks
By using QCA, this study analyzes the selection criteria of Chinese leaders at the
highest party rank. The key finding is that seniority plays a significant role in the
leadership transition of 2012. The personnel arrangement of seniority perhaps attempts to maximize power-sharing among all eligible candidates, as seven out of
eight candidates would be PSC members eventually under this arrangement. Thus, it
is the most efficient solution in terms of distributing positions to as many candidates as
possible without breaking any of the existing institutional rules. To a certain extent, it is
also an effort to prevent individuals’ excessive power by widening power-sharing.
Most importantly, this arrangement, based on seniority, helps to maintain political
stability by reducing the risks of cruel political struggles over the most powerful
positions [68]. As demonstrated by the history, the dangers of authoritarian regimes
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J. Zeng
usually come from the inside. The majority of authoritarian leaders are overthrown by
the ruling elites rather than the masses ([70]:5). The CCP learned a lesson with
enormous cost from the protests of 1989 about the risks of a split leadership; Bo
Xilai’s affairs in early 2012 perhaps evoked this memory. The regime knows its
weakness during the transfer of power very well—therefore, they choose to use the
seniority principle to reduce the discontent of losers by minimizing their numbers. In
this way, political stability during the transition is maintained at the expense of
selecting the most capable leaders and practicing intra-party democracy [68].
The role of age-related promotion in 2012 indicates the significance of institutional
rules, which resulted from the incremental institutionalization of the political system,
and has been changing leadership dynamics. Arguably, the 18th Party Congress actually
“advanced rather than retarded the progress of institutionalization” [52]. Telling who
belongs to which faction is subjective, and China does not have party factional politics
like western democratic parties which show clearly who belongs to which faction.
Therefore, using “factions” as criteria for evaluation and determining who will be
selected to top leaders in a power transition is always uncertain, unpredictable, and
even wrong. Age is a factor of selection in the institutional rule, which rules out people
for selection, regardless of who you are or to which faction you belong. In this sense, the
outcome of the 18th PSC should be better understood as a product of institutional rules
rather than simply a failure of Hu Jintao and his coalition.
Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that princeling status is helpful to winning
the highest party rank. Interestingly, it either did not matter or had negative effects.
This finding challenges a widely accepted sense that princelings have distinct advantages when competing for promotion. It is valid to a certain point that princelings
might benefit greatly from their family connections and understand more about
various informal rules of the CCP than non- princelings; however, public resistance
to nepotism and favouritism, institutional restraints and other powerful networks
might restrict their political career [36]. Therefore, princeling status might be a
burden to promotion, in particular at the highest level of authority. A leadership filled
with princelings would undoubtedly harm the legitimacy of not only the leadership,
but the entire regime. Thus, in 2012, a relatively positive public image of new
leadership is built perhaps at the expense of the failure of two princelings, Li Yuanchao
and Liu Yandong.
In addition, while the factional politics school argues that leaders are able to stay in
power because of their active engagement in factions [49, 60, 66], the findings of this
study suggests that it is not always the case. The self-defeating effects of senior leaders’
patronage as well as the negative impacts of princeling status indicate that patron-client
ties are not valuable assets in seeking promotion at all times.15 Many argue that Xi
Jinping is selected as the first leader because of his factional neutrality [10, 78], which
indicates that factional neutrality sometimes can be crucial.
Acknowledgments I am very grateful to Dr. Clive Gray for helping me with QCA. I also would like to
thank Professor Shaun Breslin, Professor Sujian Guo, and two anonymous referees for their valuable
comments. My special thanks go to Dr. Renske Doorenspleet for suggesting that I apply QCA. Of course,
all mistakes are my own. Replication data are available at https://sites.google.com/site/zengjinghan/data.
15
Of course, this is not to say that patron-client ties are not important.
What Matters Most in Selecting top Chinese Leaders?
235
Appendix
Fig. 1 Output of fs/QCA
Fig. 2 Output 1 of Tosmana. Note: If a condition is present (1) for the outcome, it is indicated by UPPERCASE notations. If it is absent (0) for the outcome, it is indicated by lower-case.
236
J. Zeng
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Jinghan Zeng is a doctoral student in the Department of Politics and International Studies (PaIS) at the
University of Warwick. His research focuses on legitimacy, institutional change, ideology, and elite politics of
contemporary China. This article is based on a chapter of his PhD thesis The Communist Party’s Right to Rule:
Political Legitimacy in contemporary China. For more information, please see https://sites.google.com/site/
zengjinghan/home