JUAN GONZALEZ
TRIBAL POLICE
00067
HISTORY
In a major Indian tribal jurisdiction case the United States
Supreme Court stated most Indian tribes were characterized by a
"want of fixed laws [and] of competent tribunals of justice.
It
should be no less obvious today, even though present day tribal
courts embody dramatic advances over their historical antecedents.
This narrow, racist tinged view is authoritatively disspelled by
Kirk Kickingbird
2
who gives several examples of Indian law systems
in
before and after Europeans arrived/^North America.
The Great Binding
Law of the Five Nations andj^^ague of Iroquois created constitutions
along with basic adversarial forms of justice.
The Menominees had
a form of trial with a "mike-sak who served as investigator and prosecutor while the pipe holder of sukanahowao, who was also a warrior
3
chief, acted as defense attorney."
Police societies played an important role in the tribal administration of justice as evidenced by the fact
they"existed in the
4
majority of the thirty two Plains tribes."
Basically, Indian pol-
ice societies "performed all the duties that white society distributed among police, prosecutors, judges and penal authorities."^
How-
ever, the Indian legal systems, as the Indians themselves, were no
match for the Europeans who soon overran their lands.
"A vast maj-
ority of tribes lost their tradition of legal systems during the
process of repeated physical displacement and exposure to white society."^
"Like a juggernaut, white society trampled on the ever
wakening independence of tribal systems leaving a foreign and hostile
1
00068
2
replacement in it's wake.
This process has continued through the
20th century."7
The next major development concerning Indian police came in
the late 19th century, after the Indians had been forced on reservations, when the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) established the
BIA Indian police to "[cope] with renegades and common criminal elg
ements."
The choice of Indians as reservation police was an intel-
ligent one as the 1881 Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners recognized by stating that "when the Indians themselves are
the recognized agents for the enforcement of the law [Indians] will
9
the more readily learn to be obedient to it's requirements."
How-
ever, this was not the only justification for the Bureau of Indian
Affair's action.
Another purpose of the Indian police was "to serve
as an alternative governmental structure to the traditional chiefs
and tribal cultures."^
"In 1892 Commissioner of Indian Affairs
T.J. Morgan admitted "that the police and judges may be and sometimes
are, merely instrumentalities in the hands of the agent for the
11
enforcement of his power which is now almost absolute."
More
bluntly stated; "the [police force] is a power independent of the
chiefs.
It weakens, and will finally destroy, the power of tribes
12
and bands."
For example, Indian police were used to ship off Ind-
ian children to Bureau of Indian Affair schools in the East, such as
Carlisle, where a large number of the Indian
students would die
13
due to "strange climates and diseases."
Obviously, the Indian police were no longer protectors of the
tribe but a means of control for the agent.
00069
This situation brings
3
up several questions.
How was a force like this successful; is it
not more difficult to rule by terror than by reason?
Have the feel-
ings of Indians changed during the years or do they still view the
police as traitors.
There is no easy answer.
This situation was
probably tolerated by the Indians because it could have been worse.
"As compared with the alternatives of military control, or the extension of state and federal legal codes over the tribesmen, the Indian police and courts afforded a reasonable solution to the problem
14
of providing law and order."
The same rationale makes abundant
sense today as shown in a later section on state jurisdiction.
JURISDICTION
Before embarking on a description of the rights and powers of
tribal police it is appropriate to answer some fundamentally important questions.
First, why do Indian reservations maintain their own
separate police force?
This question can be answered by a line of cases beginning
with Worcester v. Georgia^ which held that Indian tribes are recognized and dealt with as "distinct independent political communities""'"^
qualified to exercise the powers of self government.
Beginning with Worcester, courts have also uniformly held state
laws do not apply on Indian reservations (except in certain circum17
stances as shown later).
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission
held "state laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on
an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that
00070
state law shall apply."
18
While state jurisdiction did not extend to Indians on Indian
reservations, the federal government established in itself a duty and
power to regulate Indian affairs due to a drastic application of the
tribal sovereignty doctrine established by Worcester.
In Ex Parte
19
Crow Dog
an Indian assassinated another Indian while on an Indian
reservation.
The alleged murderer, Crow Dog was convicted in a lower
federal court but the United States Supreme Court overturned the
decision on the grounds federal courts were without jurisdiction
because of the lack of a specific statute covering murder on Indian
reservations and Crow Dog was released.
20
Congress passed the Major Crimes Act
As a result of Crow Dog,
which established federal
jurisdiction over major crimes committed by Indians on Indian land,
including murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, assault with intent
to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, robbery
21
and larceny.
22
In United States v. Kagama
the United States Sup-
reme Court provided a rationale for concurrent federal jurisdiction
on Indian land:
These Indian tribes are the wards
of the nation... From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely
due to the course of dealing of
the federal government with them
and the treaties in which it has
been promised, there arised the duty2^
of protection and with it the power.
The historical justification for Indian police no longer exists
since control c^ Indians on reservations is no longer a m^jor problem.
However, Indian police still exist today because of an available void
in reservation jurisdiction created by the tribal sovereignty doctrine.
While these early cases established the basic confines of Ind-
ian tribal jurisdiction, more detail is needed to set up the spe-
00071
cific limits under which tribal police operate today.
Our second fundamental question i ^ r e federal and state police
agencies involved in reservation law and order?
State and federal
police agencies are involved in reservation law and order but they
are also under jurisdictional limits which have turned criminal jurisdiction over Indian land into a maze of federal, state, and tribal
jurisdiction.
Suggesting a tribal police officer has jurisdiction wherever a
tribal organization has jurisdiction presents some problems.
However,
this is the realistic situation tribal police are forced to work in.
This paper will try to set apart specific situations where tribal
police jurisdiction gives way to state jurisdiction and in a seperate
section will describe the specific areas where federal police authority is exclusive or concurrent.
STATE JURISDICTION
Due to Worcester and it's progeny state laws generally were not
applicable on Indian land.
Courts quickly began to erode this prin24
ciple with cases such as United States v. McBratney
which held a
state, not an Indian tribe, has jurisdiction over a crime committed
by a non-Indian over another
non-Indian while on an Indian reser25
vation.
Williams v. Lee
, a 1959 case, held "states have juris-
diction over reservation Indians 2
if6 the jurisdiction does not inringe on tribal self government."
Due to a thoroughly muddled state
jurisdictional picture on Indian reservations Congress in 1953 decided to simplify the problem by enacting Public Law 280 (P.L. 2 8 0 ) ^
"which was purported to be the most general surrender of jurisdiction
00072
over Indian country from the federal government to the states."
The purpose of Public Law 280 was:
To make the Indians within the
territorial limits of the United
States subject to the same laws and
entitled to the same privileges and
responsiblilities as are applicable
to other citizens of the United States,
to end their status as wards of the
United States, and to grant them all the
rights and prerogative pertaining to
American citizenship.
Public Law 280 contained three mechanisms for assumption of federal
jurisdiction by states which resulted in a large number of Indian
reservations being subjected to state jurisdiction.
The effect of Public Law 280 on tribal police (where it applied)
was to end any semblence of Indian tribal government, which in turn
meant the demise of tribal police.
Tribal police were sorely missed
by reservation Indians especially due to the fact state police now
had exclusive jurisdiction over a large number of Indian reservations.
Richard Balsinger, Assistant Area Director of the BIA in Portland,
Oregon stated "police services to reservations generally diminished
30
after the assumption of jurisdiction by states. '
Besides poor po-
lice service many Indians complained about discriminatory treatment.
Marvin Sargent of the White Earth Chippewas Reservation states:
It is basically the community attitude,
county attorneys, sheriffs, deputy sheriffs,
the attitude that they carry around on
the reservation, you know, that its open
house on any Indians at any time that Indian people walk in to the streets you
might say of Menominee, Detroit Lakes,
Bagley...We have a very difficult time
getting ^ y fair treatment in the court
systems.
00073
Fortunately for Indians, the 1968 Indian CHril Rights Act contained amendments to P.L.280 which provided a mechanism for tribal
governments to rid themselves of state jurisdiction.
This retroces-
sion provision "excludes the major affected party in the process—
32
the Indian tribe."
Retrocession has occurred in only five instances
but at least a mechanism for ousting worthless state jurisdiction
from Indian reservations now exists.
P.L.280 implies some interesting points about tribal police.
First, while tribal police were historically used as instruments of
the reservation agent, this statute is proof of the fact reservations
are better off with Indian police.
Obviously, there are problems
with any police force but the passage of P.L. 280 showed reservation
Indians how much worse state jurisdiction could be.
Second, Indian
police being Indians themselves would certainly show more respect
and sensitivity to Indian law enforcement needs.
It might be pos-
sible there are some Indian police with the same view as that attributed to state law officials by Marvin Sargent, however the incidence
of this type of view is certainly cut down when the police force is
comprised of Indians.
P.L. 280 has generally been unsuccesful in curing the ills which
prompted itjs passage.
Due to case law and other factors the juris-
dictional morass is still in place.
To the tribes whom it is avail-
able to^retrocession would allow tribal self-determination, which
would mean better services for Indians, in terms of law enforcement
and in judicial adjudication.
00074
On reservations where P.L. 280 does not apply
(due to
P
retrocession or exertion from first Act) police jurisdiction is still
a muddled issue due to case law that has been decided so far.
McBratney
is still good law as evidenced by New York ex. rel. Ray v. Martin.^^
United States v. Big Crow^and United States v.
C l e v e l a n d 3 6
stand for
the rule that there is no| state jurisdiction for crimes by non-Indians
37
charged with comitting crimes against Indians.
Morris v. Hitchcock
held Indian tribes have authority to regulate non-Indians with respect
to their reservation activities.
This case insured Indian tribes civil
jurisdiction over non-Indian tribes.
Criminal jurisdiction,
although not
Some,
explicitly provided for, was also claimed and used by^INdian tribal
organizations.
Oliphant v. Suquamish38 decided March 6, J978, put a
definitive end to this practice.
Oliphant held Indian tribal courts do not have inherent criminal
jurisdiction to try non-Indians committing crimes on Indian reservations
and do not have such jurisdiction unless Congress gives them specific
congressional authorization.
The United States Supreme Court stated
that since Indian tribes are dependent on the United States and are
in United States territory, they cannot exercise sovereign power that
conflicts with United States interests.
Tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians, they held, conflicts with the United States interest.
This decision has created a jurisdictional void on Indian reservations
but more importantly for this paper, it has severe implicationsfor
tribal police.
"The morale of tribal police officers was immediately
imparted by the decision.
duty.
They felt stymied in the performance of their
The problem was exacerbated by the resident Indian population,
00075
9
which blamed them for the inequity that now places non-Indians beyond
on
the law."
Oliphant also created financial problems for tribal police.
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA) funds to tribal police department
were cut back under the theory that they would
be reducing their services. This has not
been the case. Tribal law enforcement and
court systems are doing progressively more
business as they become further developed.40
Oliphant also leaves many questions.
fill in the void left by Oliphant?
Which police agency will
Obviously, no one:
"neither the
federal system, not the state or local courts have assumed responsiility for prosecuting these o f f e n s e s . W i l l
tribal jurisdiction continue?
the trend toward eroding
There seems to be an indication it will.
/
^
Trans CAnada Enterprised Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe
applied
Oliphant to restrict tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians in a civil
matter while the United States Supreme Court explicitly limited
43
Oliphant to criminal jurisdiction.
United States v. City of Poison
used the Trans Canada case as precedent for denying an Indian tribe
the right to impose land use laws on non-Indians.
government cope with all these problems?
How will tribal
This problem and others
will be attacked after federal jurisdiction is explained since the
problems created by Oliphant are also extended to the federal area.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
In Worcester
the United STates Supreme Court stated:
"The constitution confers on Congress
the powers...of making treaties, and of
regulating commerce with foreign nations,
00078
and among the several states and with the
general Indian tribes. These powers comprehend that all is required for the
^
regulation of our intercourse with the Indians."
The United States is required to have "high standards of fair
dealings" in the authority it has over Indians due to the "dependency
status ascr#bed tp tribes resulting from the cause of dealing with
the Federal Government.
46
i**
Congress has never been sparing^using
it's plenary powers as evidenced by the large amount of federal legislation concerning Indians through the years.
However, the high
standard of good faith dealings has never been a hallmark of any of
47
this legislation.
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock
the United States
Supreme Court refused to interfere when Congress brazenly abrogated a
treaty without a scintilla of "good faith" to the Indians.
Before going on to a detailed study of major Congressional
legislation concerning Indian tribal jurisdiction it is necessary
to make a distinction between tribal police and Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) police.
by Federal Regulations.
The
48 BIA police force is established and governed
25 CFR §|J.304(b) requires BIA police to
"report and investigate all violations of any law or regulation coming
to his notice or reported for attention."
This regulation gives BIA
police "jurisdiction over not only tribal offenses, but state and
49
50
federal offenses as well."
Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe
held this authority extends to both Indians and non-Indians on the
reservation.
The tribal police force is distinguished from BIA police by the
fact that they are set up by tribal authority and approved by the
00077
11
Secretary of Interior as set out in 25 CFR § 11.1 (d) (1976).
This
section provides that tribal police will be subject to federal regulation*
"as long as the ... Indian police are paid from appropriations made by
the United States or until otherwise directed."
and Dodge v. Nakai
52
Settler v. Lemeer"'"'"
stand for the view that "(tribal police) authority
over non-Indians apparently stems from the tribe's inherent authority
to restrict or control access to Indian lands and to exclude unwelcome
nonmembers."
53
However, a tribal officer "is not a federal officer
54
for any purpose when engaged in the lawful performance of his duties."
Under this system in non P.L. 280 state BIA and tribal police must
work together on the reservation.
1. MAJOR CRIMES ACT 5 5
The first major bill concerning tribal law enforcement was the
Major Crimes Act which is still in effect today.
This Act eliminated
tribal jurisdiction over a number of enumerated offenses.
of this Act is still felt today.
The impact
Say for example a murder is com-
mitted by an Indian against an Indian on an Indian reservation.
bal police have no jurisdiction but:
Since local BIA officers, police or
tribal police are much closer, FBI
agents are not often the first officers on the scene of a crime. Thus the
scene often has to be preserved until
an agent can arrive, in which case
they usually end up redoing work already done by a more cj-gsely situated
BIA or tribal officer.
This is not the only major problem associated with federal
00078
Tri-
12
jurisdiction over Indian reservations.
"Prosecutors of [major cr-
imes] by the United States attorney seems sporadic and inconsistent.
Policies to determine which cases "go federal" are very unclear and
often not adhered to."
57
Eighty % of all Indian cases presented are declined by the United
58
States Attorney's office.
Obviously, the Act has not been effect-
ive in reservation law enforcement.
However it has been on the books
for ninety-seven years.
INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 5 9
The 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) was prompted in part
by situations created by case law and by flagrant abuses of Indian's
constitutional rights.
An 1896 United States Supreme Court case,
Talton v. Mayes ^ held the United States Bill of Rights
ply to Indian tribal governments in federal courts.
did not ap-
Therefore there
were practically no restraints on tribal governments when dealing
with defendants.
Another reason for the ICRA was "congressional concern
that under the law,individual Indians appeared to have no constitutional rights vis-a-vis their tribal governments.
Individual Indians
had been subjected to actions of tribal governments which would be
illegal if civil rights provisions in the United States Constitution
were applicable."^"'"
The ICRA imposed on "Indian tribes exercising powers of self
62
government"
restraints similar to those in the Bill of Rights,
but altered to fit the special circumstances of Indian tribes.
00079
For
13
example, paying deference to the tribal sovereignty doctrine "non-Ind63
ians are excluded from Suquamish tribal court juries."
Tom v.
64
Sutton
made the point moot by holding that the ICRA does not req-
uire its provisions be judicially interpreted identically to the Bill
of Rights.
The difference in application can best be shown by using the
Fourth Amendment as an example.
ONe of the judicial basis for the
exclusionary rule is to protect
the expectation of privacy a person
65
constitutionally enjoys.
A tribe trying to avoid application of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule could argue that Indian society
did not place as much weight on privacy as Americans do and to^orce
^exclusion of relevant evidence would add to the difficulty of maintaining the Indian reservation's communal atmosphere.
However, case
law shows courts have been giving the ICRA a very narrow traditional
Fourth Amendment reading.
"In light of the legislative history of the
ICRA and its striking similarity to the language of the Fourth Amendment, we consider the problem before us under Fourth Amendment standards." 66
What is the impact of the ICRA on Indian tribal police?
Had
the courts given the ICRA a more Indian based application, undoubtedly the tribal police would have their own seperate standards for
search and seizure and self incrimination^Ln light of Indian societal and cultural differences.
However, as evidenced by the Lester
case the trend seems to be toward applying the same standards as applied to federal and state police agencies.
For example, it has not
been expressly held that an Indian defendant has a right to the
00080
14
Miranda warning, however, to be on the saffe side and taking Lester
and others into account it would seem to make good sense to use
exactly the same standards as federal and state police do.
There has been litigation which has answered some very important
questions about the effect of the ICRA.
For example, what if an
Indian is arrested by a tribal officer for a misdemeanor violation
(tribal jurisdiction) and is also arrested for a separate federal
offense?
What applies:
Amendment or the ICRA.
tfc|»United States Constitution's Fourth
This occurred in United States v. Leeds^7
where an Indian alleged that Indian police and federal officers
conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights by using ICRA
standards in a federal arrest.
The court held that "absent some
working arrangement between tribal and federal investigators...Leeds
incarceration was tribal in character"^ due to the fact Leeds was
initially arrested by a tribal officer for a tribal offense and thus
the ICRA applied.
64
Another interesting case involves United States v. Antelope
where the question presented is whether
"disparate treatment of an
Indian and a Non-Indian committing the same crime in Indian country
against a non-Indian constitutes impermissable discrimination based
on race,"7^
The circuit court struck down the conviction of the
Indian defendant on the grounds that the "Indian ...was subject to
prosecution under the felony murder rule while the non-Indian in a
state proceeding was not subjected to a felony murder prosecution."7
Obviously the ICRA has provided some unthought of problems.
00081
15
SOLUTIONS
Even though financing and morale are M0B problems for tribal
police as with any other police force, far and away the most difficult obstacle is jurisdiction.
There are as many proposed solutions
for the jurisdictional morass as there are problems.
Some comment-
ators suggest the key as being a closer working relationship between
tribal governments and state and federal police agencies through
wW'lf
cross-deputization.^Some see tribal police as needing to be more
independent from non-Indian police forces in order to have effective
law enforcement on reservations.
Cross Deputization
Cross deputization, the deputization of tribal and BIA police
by state agencies to give reservation police jurisdiction over any
occurrance of crime by an Indian or non-Indian on a reservation is
an interesting approach to the tribal police problem, but in the long
run it falls short.
A hybrid model suggested is the cross deputization of state officials as tribal officers with no corresponding deputization of
Indian police.
This ploy, while attractive on the surface is only
one more example of the state trying to make inroads on tribal sovereignty.
"[The] BIA could have encouraged greater use of existing
cooperative agreements between the tribes and state law enforcement
officials which permitted the states to make arrests for the most
72
widespread and troublesome Indian crimes."
First, what exactly
would be classified as "widespread and troublesome" Indian crimes?
00082
16
This term can be used as a justification for state officials to target certain troublesome Indians or to harass Indians as a class.
Second, as the section on P.L. 280 showed, state jurisdiction results
in inferior law enforcement services, if any services are provided at
all.
Even when services are provided there is always the problem
of discrimination which is shown to flourish on Indian reservations
when state P.L. 280 jurisdiction exists.
The standard form of cross deputization, deputizing tribal officers by state agencies to give Indian police jurisdiction over
non-Indian offenders on the reservation, while an improvement over the
hybrid model is still not a sufficient solution.
Although this attempt to resolve the
jurisdictional problem has the advantage of certifying tribal officers to
arrest non-Indians as well as Indian
offenders, the tribes have expressed
concern over the long range implications of such arrangements. There are
fears that the need for a... tribal
police force may be eliminated if t r i b ^
police serve as officers of the state.
Cross deputization agreements in some instances may temporarily
solve the problem.
However, the agreements will be at the mercy of
current county or state officeholders.
While a certain administration
may have meaningful agreements with Indian tribes fcB* every time
county or state elections occurr the tribes may have to deal with a
whole new point of view, which may not include a proper sensitivity
to Indian problems.
Another fault is that "state and county per soring
00083
have often
17
refused to enter into cross deputization agreements with tribes on the
74
grounds that tribal officers do not have the necessary training."
This claim is unfounded.
Most tribal police officers "are almo9^p
exclusively trained at the Indian Academy at Brigham City, Utah."^
Obviously cross deputization would be only a temporary solution,
if a solution at all, which cannot be depended on to solve the juris"*
dicational problem.
One commentator suggests the problem is with the tribal police
themselves:
[The] confusion stems from role confusion on the part of the Indian police
officers. THe non-Indian officer
sees his role as protector of the community [and does] not differentiate between offenders based on where they reside.
It can be said that the professioi^'nonIndian officer approaches his job in an
objective, value free context. Depending on the residence of the offender and
his racial category the officer will respond in either the stereotypical, legalistic manner of his non-Indian counterpart or he may respond in the "gatekeeper"
role. That is, the officer may respond as
his academy taught him to whffen the offender
is a non-Indian but he may feel pressure to
handle the^gase differently when the offender
is Indian.
Every police force has problems similar to the ones attributed
to the tribal officers, however making generalizations such as these
to justify jurisdictional problems only cloutds the issue.
It is
simply foolish to base a criticism of a whole system of law 'enforceon
"role confusion."
This is exactly the type of subtle legalese couched
00084
view which tries to justify the trend towards eliminating tribal police.
CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
The most promising argument so far is that Congress should use
it's plenary authority to create legislation which will definitively
end the tribal jurisdiction morass.
While Congress has never had the
proper sensitivity or inclination to provide a workable solution to any
Indian problem as evidenced by P.L. 280 which has only succeeded in
worsening the situation, meaningful legislation is the only palatable solution at this point which is in keeping with previous case
law guaranteeing tribal sovereignty and which conforms to the good
faith standard of dealing the federal government is required to show
towards it's Indian wards.
Congress should guarantee complete tribal autonomy by revoking
P.L. 280 and the Major Crimes Act while at the same time requiring
tribes to conform to a model tribal code which would include punishment for major crimes.
This legislation should also overturn old
case law such as McBratney and Oliphant which serve only to further
muddle the jurisdictional view.
The most important feature of this bill would be that it guarantees tribal self-determination.
Indian reservation residents will
have Indian police officers to fulfill their law enforcement needs.
Non-Indians need not go unpunished as before under Oliphant and Indians would have more faith in their tribal police.
00085
Coupled with
should be a guarantee of sufficient funding to enable the tribal
police to function effectively without financial constraints.
The ICRA should be retained in order to guarantee Indians constitutional protection from their own police force.
According to
Gerald Wilkinson, Executive Director of the National Indian Youth
Council, "it is axiomatic that every Indian is opposed to the [ICRA]
...until he has been screwed by his tribal council.
Realistically it is probable the jurisdictional morass will continue and that Congress will not step in to solve the problem.
How-
ever unlikely it is tkak action will occurf, the most important thing
^ bill j m k m W ^ j
'"^fUtc
to remember is that^tribal autonomy will put the problem of jurisdiction in the place where it should be V M h M L . .. the hands of the Indians
themselves.
00086
FOOTNOTES
1. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210(1978).
2. Kickingbird, "In Our Image..., After Our Likeness:" The Drive for the
Assimilation of Indian Court Systems, 13 American Criminal L.R. 675,
(Spring 1976).
3. Id. at 679.
4. Id. at 678.
5. Id. at 678.
6. Brakel, American Indian Tribal Courts: Separate? "Yes", Equal? "Probably
Not", 62 A.B.A.J. 1002, 1004(1976).
7. Kickingbird, supra, note 2, at 767.
8. Thomas Hagan, Indian Police and Judges, 69 (1966).
9. Barsh, Henderson, Tribal Courts, The Model Code, and the Police Idea in
American Indian Policy, 40 Law and Contemp. Probs. 25, 36 (Winter 1976).
10. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands:
A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 19 Ariz. L. Rev., 573 (1976).
11. Thomas Hagan, supra note 8, at 173.
12. Barsh, Henderson, supra note 9, at 36.
13. Thomas Hagan, supra note 8, at 74.
14. Id. at 174.
15. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
16. Id. at 174.
17. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
18. Id. at 171.
19. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
20. Major Crimes Act of 1885, Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, §9, 23 Stat. 385,
as amended, 18 U.S.C. §1153, 3242 (1970).
21
• Id.
22. 118 U.S. 357 (1886).
23. Id. at 3§3 - 384.
24. 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
25. 385 U.S. 217 (1959).
26. Id. at 220.
00087
27. 25 U.S.C. §1321, gt. seq. as amended.
28. Monroe E. Price, Law and the American Indian, 221 (1973).
29. American Indian Policy Review Commission, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.,
Report on Federal, State, and Tribal Jurisdiction 4 (Comm. Print 1976).
30. Id. at 17.
31. Id. at 18.
32. Id at 13.
33. McBratney, supra note 24.
34. 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
35. 523 F2d. 955 (1976).
36. 503 F2d. 1067 (1974).
37. 194 U.S. 384 (1904).
38. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
39. Oliveiro, Skibine, The Supreme Court Decision That Jolted Tribal
Jurisdiction, 6. American Indian Journal 2, 7 (May 1980).
40. Id. at 7.
41. Id. at 11.
42. No. c77-882m (W.D. Wash., July 27, 1978).
43. No. 77-70m (D. Mont., Sept. 20, 1979).
44. 31 U.S. 515, (1832).
45. 31 U.S. 515, 519 (1832).
46. American Indian Policy Review Committee, supra note 29, at 34.
47. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
48. 25 C.F.R. §11-301 - .306 (1976).
49. Clinton, supra note 10, at 573.
50. 531 F2d. 408 (9th Cir. 1976).
51. 507 F2d. 231 (9th Cir. 1974).
52. 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz., 1969).
53. Clinton, supra note 10, at 574.
54. Cf. Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F2d. 1176 (9th Cir. 1975).
55. Major Crimes Act of 1885, Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, §9, 23 Stat. 385
as amended, 18 U.S.C. §1153, 3242 (1970).
00088
56. American Indian Policy Review Commission, supra note 29, at 38.
57. American Indian Policy Review Commission, supra note 29, at 37.
58. American Indian Policy Review Commission, supra note 29, at 37.
59. 25 U.S.C. §1301-41 (1970).
-60. 103 U.S. 376 (1896).
61. Ziontz, "In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Judical
Error in Contruction of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 20 S.D.L.R. (Winter 1975)
62. 49 Indian Law Journal 721.
63. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978).
64. 533 F2d. 1101 (9th Cir. 1976).
65. Katz v. United States, 425 F2d, 928, (2d Cir. 1970).
66. United States v. Lester, F2d. 868, 872 footnote 2 I
\
67. 505 F2j. 161 (1974).
68. Id. at 163, footnote 2.
69. 523 F2d. 400 (1976).
70. American Indian Policy Review Commission, supra note 29, at 39.
71. American Indian Policy Review Commission, supra note 29, at 39 footnote 22.
72. Goldberg, Public Law 280:
The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over
Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L.R. 1 (Winter 1975).
73. Oliveiro, Skibine, supra note
at 542.
74. Id. at 8.
75. Id. at 8.
74. WacK\c\
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