The Refugee Crisis
in the Levant
Demographics and Risk Factors for
Conflict in Jordan and Lebanon
Lauren Barnhart, Laura Blackerby, Katherine Close,
Harrison Doyle, Amber Duncan, Maria Eckrich, Wesley Fox,
Ben Fredrickson, Anthony Junta, Shannon Mills, Nicholas Parker,
Angel Sharma, and Mark Tynan
1
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary ......................... 3
VI. When do Refugees Cause Conflict in
Their Host Countries? ................................... 10
II. Introduction .................................... 4
VII. Risk Factors for Refugee-Related
III. Methodology .................................. 4
Conflict in Lebanon and Jordan .......... 14
A. Militarization of Refugees .......... 14
B. Capability of Host Governments to
IV. Overall Demographic Changes ......... 5
A. Syria ......................................... 5
B. Lebanon .................................... 5
Prevent Refugee Militarization ... 15
C. Long-term Alienation of Young Refugees.......................................... 17
C. Jordan ....................................... 6
IX. Conclusions .................................... 19
V. Case Studies of Demographic Change
in the Levant ....................................... 8
A. Aleppo, Syria ............................. 8
B. Shebaa, Lebanon ....................... 9
C. Mafraq, Jordan .......................... 9
2
Executive Summary
T
he aim of this paper is to explore the effects
of the Syrian civil war on the demographics of the
Levant, and to identify risk factors that indicate
refugees may destabilize host countries. Our research
indicates that flows of Syrian refugees are straining
resources in Jordan and Lebanon, but are not yet
contributing to conflict spillover because (A) refugee
communities in these countries are not militarized;
and (B) because the host governments possess the
capacity and willingness to prevent militarization.
We identify three risk factors that may increase
the
likelihood
of
refugee-related
conflict:
militarization of refugees; degradation of the capacity
of security forces in Lebanon and Jordan; and, the
persistence of a young, marginalized refugee
population that is younger than the native populations
in Lebanon and Jordan.
Using case studies of Aleppo in Syria, the town of
Shebaa in Lebanon, and the Mafraq Governorate in
Jordan, we explore the potential challenges associated
with an influx of refugees, while also demonstrating
how the presence of refugees alone is not sufficient to
cause the collapse of public order or state stability.
This paper also draws on past refugee crises to
understand the circumstances under which refugee
flows have been known to spread violence to refugeehosting countries.
Finally, our research finds that refugee flows may
cause changes in the demographic structure of host
countries. Drawing from the “youth bulge” theory, we
find that societies with rapidly growing youth
populations often develop rampant unemployment
and large pools of disaffected youth, who are in turn
more susceptible to recruitment into rebel or extremist
groups. The influx of displaced youth in Jordan and
Lebanon means that the age structures of these
countries are at risk of delayed maturation. If not
integrated into the host society through employment
and educational opportunities, young Syrian refugees
may have destabilizing consequences for Jordan and
Lebanon.
Key Findings
Syrian refugees are straining
resources of host countries, but
refugees are not yet contributing to
conflict spillover in the Levant
because:

Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon
do not appear to be militarized

The governments of Jordan and
Lebanon have the capacity and
willingness to prevent the
militarization of refugees
Risk Factors
Risk factors to monitor for signs of
refugee-related conflict:
1. Militarization of refugees
2. Capability of host governments to
prevent refugee militarization,
recruitment in refugee camps, and
militant infiltration of refugee
communities
3. Long-term alienation of refugee
youth
3
Introduction
Since 2011, a devastating civil war in Syria has
driven nearly 11 million people from their homes, of
which more than four million have fled the country. 1
Most of these refugees have sought shelter in the
neighboring states of Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and
Iraq. The flow of refugees has strained the capacity of
host governments and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to respond to
the crisis, leaving many refugees impoverished and
vulnerable. This, combined with growing sectarian
tensions and terrorist networks in the region, raises
concerns that the massive population displacement
could destabilize Syria’s neighbors, and lead to a
spillover of the civil war.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the
demographic changes occurring in Lebanon, Jordan
and Syria as a result of the refugee crisis and to identify
risk factors for refugee-related conflict and
destabilization.
Our research indicates Syrian refugees are
indeed straining resources of host countries—but
are not yet contributing to conflict spillover in
Lebanon and Jordan because:
international and regional media sources. We also
interviewed
regional
experts,
scholars,
and
humanitarian aid workers. For the second part of our
study – an analysis of the potential implications of the
refugee crisis for Jordan and Lebanon – we drew on the
above sources as well as peer-reviewed academic
literature analyzing the impact of refugees and
demographic changes on political stability and conflict.
At the client’s request, the scope of this paper is
limited to assessing the implications of the refugee
crisis for Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. We recognize
that Iraq and particularly Turkey – which has accepted
nearly half of all Syrian refugees – are also
experiencing significant demographic change as a
result of the crisis; however we do not address them in
this paper. The migration of refugees to countries
outside of the Levant falls outside of the scope of this
paper.
Figure 1. Movements of Syrian Refugees
(A) Refugee communities in those countries do
not appear to be militarized; and
(B) Host governments possess the capacity and
willingness to prevent militarization of
refugees.
However, there are signs that the refugee
population is at risk of becoming militant and that the
young, marginalized refugee population may pose long
-term challenges to their host countries. The longer the
refugee crisis continues, the higher the likelihood that
refugees in Jordan and Lebanon will engage in crossborder attacks with Syria, challenge host governments,
and clash with local populations.
Methodology
To identify demographic changes resulting from
refugee flows, we examined data from a variety of
publicly-available sources, including reports from
international organizations such as the UNHCR and the
International Labour Organization (ILO), and
Syria’s neighbors have borne the brunt of the refugee crisis,
with Turkey taking in more than 2 million refugees, Lebanon
accepting over a million, and Jordan taking in over 600,000.
(Data source: UNHCR)
4
Overall Demographic Changes
in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon
The civil war in Syria has generated a population of
10.6 million displaced persons and refugees that is
characterized by youth, poverty and low education. As
a result of these population movements, people are now
concentrated in camps and urban areas in northern and
western Syria, eastern Lebanon and northern Jordan. In
the following section, we detail the key changes in
settlement patterns, age structure, and socioeconomic
status in each country. These three factors are critical
to assessing the potential implications of population
movements on the countries of the Levant.
Half of Syria’s Population is Displaced
More than 50 percent of Syria’s population of 21.1
million has been displaced internally or fled the
country as a result of the civil war that began in 2011.
Since January 2014, there has been a steady growth in
the number of refugees registering with UNHCR in
neighboring countries. The most concentrated outflow
of refugees occurred in December 2014, when 500,000
UNHCR-registered refugees fled the country.2
There are nearly twice as many internally displaced
persons (IDPs) within Syria as there are refugees
outside the country. This is significant because if
fighting in Syria worsens or spreads, millions more
Figure 2. Population of Syria
Syrians may attempt to flee the country. Nearly all IDP
camps are located near borders with Turkey, Jordan
and Lebanon, further compounding this risk.3
Currently, four million of the total 6.5 million IDPs
within Syria are located in three governorates –
Aleppo, Damascus and Idlib – all of which border
neighboring countries.4
The civil war has pushed millions of Syrians into
poverty, which further catalyzes migration out of the
country and increases suffering among those who
remain. In 2014, more than 80 percent of people
remaining in Syria were estimated to be living in
poverty, and 65 percent were living in extreme poverty,
unable to meet their basic needs.5 The Syrian Center
for Policy Research estimates unemployment in Syria
increased from 15 percent to 58 percent between 2011
and the end of 2014.6 Not only does this drive
migration, it may also pose challenges for rebuilding
the Syrian economy after the war.
Displaced Syrians tend to be very young. Children
under 18 make up more than half of the Syrian
population, and this age structure is also reflected in
the population of registered Syrian refugees in the
Levant.7 This youthful age structure means that many
displaced Syrians are children who are growing up in
poverty and have limited access to education. If this
situation continues, these refugee children may grow to
feel marginalized within their host communities and
underprepared to contribute to the rebuilding of Syria.
Additionally, the Syrian population is younger than the
populations of Lebanon and Jordan, meaning that the
influx of Syrian refugees has made the populations of
those countries more youthful.
In Lebanon, refugees disrupt the
transition to a more stable society
Nearly half of Syria’s prewar population of 22 million people has
been displaced by the war, either as refugees or Internally Displaced Persons (iDPs). (Data sources: UNHCR, World Bank)
Lebanon has accepted the greatest number of
refugees in proportion to its population. With over one
million Syrian refugees now residing in Lebanon, one
in five people in the country is a Syrian refugee.8 This
influx of overwhelmingly young and impoverished
refugees has increased competition for resources such
as housing, but the biggest challenges are likely to
come in the future if refugees remain in Lebanon longterm without the ability to work or integrate into
Lebanese society.
5
Initially, Syrian refugees entering Lebanon settled
in areas near the Syrian border, such as the Bekaa
Valley. While Syrian refugees are predominantly
Sunni, the areas in which they initially settled were
largely Shia and Christian. As Syrians continued to
arrive and border areas reached their absorption
capacity, refugees began to move deeper into Lebanon,
settling throughout the country’s Sunni, Shia and
Christian communities.9 Today, the largest numbers of
refugees in Lebanon are in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley
and in the north near Tripoli.
The relative youth of Syrian refugees compared to
the native Lebanese population has fundamentally
altered the age structure of Lebanon by lowering the
median age of the population. Lebanon has been
transitioning from a youthful to a more mature
population age structure, which may have benefits for
the stability of the country. The influx of young Syrian
Figure 4: Total population of Lebanon, 2015
Approximately 1 in 5 people living in Lebanon today is a Syrian
refugee. (Data sources: UNHCR, World Bank)
refugees has disrupted this maturation process. If the
refugees are not repatriated or resettled, Lebanon may
take longer to complete the demographic transition to a
more mature population.
Figure 3: Syrian Refugee Populations in Lebanese
Syrian refugees also tend to be poorer than
Districts, October 2015
the native Lebanese population. Without
sufficient humanitarian aid or the ability to
work, refugees tend to adopt negative coping
strategies like child labor and crime in order to
survive economically. The UNHCR’s
Lebanon Response Plan estimates that 37.5
percent of all Lebanese live below the poverty
line.10 Meanwhile, the poverty rate of Syrian
refugees is estimated at 70 percent, up from 50
percent in 2014.11 The most economically
vulnerable refugee populations are in the
Bekaa, Hermel, and Akkar districts.12
In Jordan, refugees settle in
northern cities
Refugees have settled throughout Lebanon, with the largest populations in
the Bekaa Valley, Beirut, and northern Lebanon. (Data source: UNHCR)
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has
taken in fewer refugees than Lebanon –
630,176 registered refugees as of November
2015. Syrian refugees in Jordan are more
likely to be separated from the Jordanian
population by living in large refugee camps or
poor urban areas.13 The flow of Syrian
refugees into Jordan has increased Jordan’s
population by at least 8 percent, a much
smaller percentage than in Lebanon.14 The
greatest influx of refugees into Jordan
6
now accepted nearly 60 percent of the refugee
population.20
Figure 5: Population of Jordan
Jordan also has several refugee camps, which serve
17.9 percent of the refugee population in the country. 21
The largest of these camps, Zaatari, was opened in
2012 and with nearly 80,000 inhabitants it has
effectively become the fourth most populous city in
Jordan.22 Syrian refugees and the native Jordanian
population are both predominantly Sunni, so refugee
settlement has not affected sectarian divisions in
Jordan.
Syrian refugees make up about eight percent of the population
of Jordan. (Data sources: UNHCR, World Bank)
occurred in 2013, when more than 300,000 refugees
entered the country. The decline in the number of
refugees entering the country in 2014 and 2015 is
attributed to border restrictions implemented by the
Jordanian government.15
As with the refugee population overall, more than
half of Syrian refugees in Jordan are under the age of
18. The refugee population is younger than the native
Jordanian population.23 This poses challenges for
Jordan’s educational system, slows the country’s
demographic transition, and means that more than
300,000 Syrian children are growing up in refugee
camps and poor urban communities.
In May 2015, the UNHCR found that 86 percent of
Syrian refugees in Jordan were living below the
In addition to registered refugees, Jordan’s
government estimates that more than
600,000 unregistered Syrian migrants live Figure 6: Refugee settlement in Jordan
in Jordan, bringing the total number of
Syrians in Jordan to approximately 1.3
million.16 There is little data currently
available about the population of
unregistered refugees. However, in
February 2016, the Jordanian government
will release results of a nationwide census
that officials have indicated will include
data on all residents of the country,
including refugees and other foreign
nationals.17
The influx of refugees has placed the
greatest stress on already poor areas in
northern Jordan, where the majority of
refugees have settled. Over 80 percent of
Syrian refugees in Jordan have settled in
cities, with Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa
hosting the greatest numbers.18 Before the
influx of refugees, the north of Jordan
already contained 57 percent of the
population living below the poverty line.19
Already suffering from high levels of
poverty and vulnerability, the governorates
of Amman, Irbid, Mafraq and Zarqa have
The largest refugee populations in Jordan are in the country’s northernmost
governorates. (Data source: UNHCR)
7
poverty line and 10 percent were living in extreme
poverty, meaning they cannot meet basic needs.24 The
poverty rate of Syrian refugees is significantly higher
than that of the native Jordanian population; only 14.4
percent of Jordanians live below the poverty line.25
Refugees are not authorized to work in Jordan, so
most are reliant on international assistance, savings,
and work in the informal sector for income. Poverty
among refugees in Jordan is not distributed evenly
throughout settlement areas. Refugees living in
northern Jordan are more likely to live in poverty,
compared with those living in the center, south, or east
of the country.26
Case Studies of Demographic
Change in the Levant
The following section explores how demographic
changes are playing out on the ground in three subnational areas: the city of Aleppo in Syria, the town of
Shebaa in Lebanon, and the Mafraq Governorate in
Jordan. These localities showcase some of the
potential challenges associated with the influx of
refugees, while also demonstrating that refugees alone
are not sufficient to cause the large-scale collapse of
public order or ultimately threaten state stability.
Aleppo, Syria: Accepted many IDPs,
but did not collapse until attacked
from the outside
Aleppo, Syria’s commercial center and most
populous city, was largely spared the violence that
spread throughout the country in the early years of the
civil war.27 In 2011 and 2012, the city of Aleppo, with
a population of 2.1 million, absorbed an estimated
100,000 or more IDPs from other regions in Syria. This
influx strained local resources and contributed to the
rise of large informal settlements with poor access to
basic sanitation and infrastructure.28 The increased
burden of IDPs came after years of drought and
disruption had already driven nearly half of Aleppo’s
population into informal settlements.29
However, this population influx and the scarcity of
resources to support IDPs did not spark conflict in the
city. Aleppo’s robust business environment, significant
Figure 7: Aleppo at night before and after
the civil war spread to the city
The civil war took over a year to reach Aleppo, despite the arrival
of more than 100,000 IDPs. When fighting did come to Aleppo,
the effects were devastating. (Image source: New York Times)
police presence, and prominent clerics discouraging
violence, worked to placate the city’s residents –
including the largely Sunni merchant class – and
maintained relative calm for over a year of fighting
throughout the rest of the country.30 Even as fighting
raged throughout the country, Aleppo itself did not see
major violence in 2011 and much of 2012.31
Furthermore, fighting did not break out in Aleppo until
the Free Syrian Army and al-Tawhid Battalion stormed
the city in July and August 2012.32 According to one
rebel commander who stormed the city: “We waited
and waited for Aleppo to rise, and it didn't. We couldn't
rely on them to do it for themselves so we had to bring
the revolution to them.”33
“We waited and waited
for Aleppo to rise, and it
didn't. We couldn't rely on
them to do it for
themselves so we had to
bring the revolution to
them.” -Syrian rebel commander
Today, Aleppo is scarcely recognizable as the
commercial center it once was. Previously a refuge for
many IDPs in the early days of the Syrian conflict, by
8
March 2013, more than one million Syrians had fled
the Aleppo governorate itself, displaced by intense
fighting between the Syrian government and Free
Syrian Army that has damaged nearly a third of all
structures in the city.34
Shebaa, Lebanon: Refugees cause
resource shortages, but not conflict
In Shebaa, Lebanon, a largely Sunni town in a
region known for strong support of Hezbollah, violence
between refugees and native Lebanese has been
minimal despite an influx of Sunni refugees and
increased strain on local services.35 Located in
southeastern Lebanon, bordering Syria, Shebaa hosts
nearly 3,000 registered Syrian refugees according to
UNHCR, however local officials estimate the number
to be as high as 4,500.36 Despite electricity, water, and
housing shortages, the residents of Shebaa have largely
refused to turn away refugees, most of whom are
women and children, opting to shelter the Syrians in
local schools, mosques, and private residences.37
Though some residents complain about declining
wages, the mayor of Shebaa insists the town has a duty
to take in those who might otherwise be killed in their
home country.38
Residents of Shebaa - Shia, Sunni, and Druze alike
- report that they are committed to preventing spillover
from Syria, and they praise the Lebanese Army for
enforcing border controls that prevent Syrian fighters
from crossing into Lebanon with legitimate
refugees.41 Pointing to the town’s military presence,
careful monitoring of refugees, and the noninflammatory messaging of local preachers, residents
insist the town remains secure despite intense clashes
between rebel groups just across the border.40
Lebanon, with its delicate political balance, history
of civil war, and the highest per capita rate of refugees
in the world, has faced dire predictions of impending
instability since the early days of the Syrian crisis. 41
Yet, violent clashes between refugees and citizens are
rare, even in some of the country’s most vulnerable
communities, such as Shebaa. As fighting in Syria
moves beyond its fifth year, spillover to Lebanon
remains localized and short-lived. This is not to say
that Lebanon is politically stable. Though the recent
bombings targeting Shia communities in Beirut
prompted displays of unity from the city’s residents,
continued infiltration of Lebanon by militants and
attacks of a sectarian nature could undermine
stability.42
Community policing in
Zaatari has helped
Jordanian police have
more frequent positive
interactions with refugees.
Mafraq, Jordan: Security forces and
community policing quell violence
Located north of Amman, the population of the
Mafraq governorate in Jordan has doubled as a result of
hosting Zaatari, the country’s largest refugee camp.
While Mafraq illustrates some of the challenges
associated with a burgeoning youth population, the
area is another example of relative stability in the face
of large refugee flows.
Mafraq has received 154,744 Syrian refugees since
the beginning of the conflict, two-thirds of whom live
below the poverty line.43 Refugees in Mafraq
experience the highest levels of vulnerability among
refugees in Jordan, as they lack basic needs and
frequently resort to the use of emergency coping
strategies to secure income.44
Despite harsh living conditions and aid shortfalls,
Jordanian security forces have been able to quell
violence within Mafraq’s refugee communities – such
as the Zaatari camp – relatively quickly. In April 2014,
riots and clashes with police resulted in the death of a
single refugee, before calm was restored within days. 45
Learning from incidents such as the April riots,
Jordanian authorities have stepped up patrols,
implemented new community policing initiatives with
the help of UK advisors, and launched investigations
into those responsible for inciting the violence.46 Early
indications from the community policing initiatives
have been positive, as residents have become more
comfortable reporting crimes to the authorities, and the
9
Jordanian police have increased their
interactions with the refugee population.47
positive
While the situation in Mafraq appears to pose little
threat to Jordan’s stability in the short term, the Zaatari
camp also illustrates the potentially destabilizing
effects on Jordan’s demographics in the coming years.
Thirty-five percent of the Syrian refugee population in
Jordan is between 5 and 17 years of age, and the
Jordanian school system is already overcrowded and
overstretched.48 Even as Jordanian schools implement a
double-shift system, one in three children in the Zaatari
camp do not attend school.49 This severe underenrollment has led aid agencies and officials to warn of
a “lost generation” of refugee children. Without quality
education for these children, the long-term economic
and social stability of individuals, families, and
communities may be at risk.50 The effect on Jordan,
should these refugees fail to return to Syria, could be
destabilizing, straining social services and exacerbating
the “youth bulge,” discussed in detail below.
When Do Refugees Cause Violent
Conflict in Their Host Countries?
Syrian refugees have not yet destabilized Lebanon
and Jordan, but there is concern that they might do so
in the future. To assess this issue, we looked at past
refugee crises to identify the circumstances in which
refugees might cause conflict in their host countries.
Although the vast majority of individual refugees are
innocent victims of conflict, studies have shown that
refugee flows are statistically significant contributors
to the eruption of civil wars in host countries.51 One
key way that refugee flows can create conflict is by
facilitating the spread of rebel networks from a
neighboring civil war – a scenario that is of great
concern in the Syrian case.52 The spread of rebel
networks through refugee flows occurs when
combatants flee a civil war as part of a group of
refugees, or when civilians mobilize politically and
militarily after arriving as refugees in their host
country.
When refugees are politically mobilized and
armed – either from the start or over time – they
may use refugee camps and communities as bases
for political and military activity.53 Most frequently,
these “refugee-warriors” launch cross-border attacks
against their home country, but they can also challenge
host country authorities or clash with local
populations.54 Either activity threatens to destabilize
the countries in which refugees find sanctuary.
Examples of refugees provoking conflict spillover
include the Hutu refugees in Zaire in the mid-1990s
and the Palestinian refugees in Jordan in the late 1960s.
In both cases, militant leaders among the refugees used
the sanctuary of their host country to re-engage in the
conflict in their home country. In 1994, following the
genocide in Rwanda and the takeover of the Rwandan
government by a Tutsi force, Hutu refugees fled to
refugee camps in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic
of Congo). Some of these refugees had been leaders of
the former government and the militias that organized
the genocide, and they used the refugee camps as bases
to launch cross-border attacks against Rwanda.
Retaliation by the Rwandan government against the
camps escalated to war between Rwanda and Zaire.55
In another example, a group of highly politicized
Palestinian refugees operating through the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) challenged the
authority of the Jordanian government in 1970. In
defiance of the orders of King Hussein, the PLO
launched cross-border attacks against Israel, formed
police forces, collected taxes in refugee camps,
hijacked airplanes and landed them in Jordanian
territory, and even tried to kill the King himself. The
subsequent crackdown by the Jordanian government,
known as Black September, led to the deaths of an
estimated 1,000 people.56
While it is possible for refugee flows to cause
conflict spillover in host states, it is not inevitable.
Three factors affect the likelihood of refugee-related
conflict:
1.The cause of the refugees’ flight;
2.The response of the receiving country;
3.The ability of militants to control aid
intended for refugees.57
The likelihood that refugees will engage in militant
activity depends in part on their reasons for fleeing
their home country.58 Whether refugees are situational,
persecuted, or state-in-exile determines their “political
cohesion” and readiness to militarize.59 These can be
broken down into three general types:
10

Situational refugees are the least likely to
become violent: they flee their homes to escape
the general chaos of war and they want to
return home as soon as fighting ends. Many
Syrians fit the profile of situational refugees.
was the case with Zaire and the Hutu refugees who
attacked Rwanda.63 In contrast, Tanzania also took in
Hutu refugees in 1994 but was willing and able to
manage security in the camps so that they did not serve
as safe havens for combatants.64

Persecuted refugees flee because parties to the
civil war directly target them, whether for
ethnic, political, or other reasons. The
experience of persecution can motivate these
refugees to organize themselves in pursuit of
political goals like retribution against their
persecutors or political rights in their host
country. This political mobilization, which is
more likely to occur the longer a refugee crisis
lasts, may increase the chances that refugees
will attack their home state or challenge their
host government.60

State-in-exile refugees have the highest
propensity for violence. State-in-exile refugees
flee due to defeat in war, and they seek the
sanctuary of a neighboring country in order to
plan their re-engagement in the civil war.61 The
Hutu refugees fleeing Rwanda after the
genocide fit this profile, as many were military
and political leaders who sought to recapture
their country from the Tutsi forces that had
stopped the genocide and taken over the
government.
Finally, the approach to providing humanitarian aid
can affect whether militant groups are able to take
advantage of refugee camps as sanctuaries. From the
perspective of militants, one of the key benefits of
refugee camps is the access they provide to the food,
housing, and money provided by international aid
agencies. Collecting these resources frees militants
from having to provide these goods for themselves and
their families. As refugees become politically and
militarily mobilized, leaders sometimes attempt to
divert humanitarian aid through “taxes” on other
refugees or other interference with the distribution of
aid in camps in order to fund militant activities. The
policies of aid organizations on who receives aid, and
how it is distributed, affect whether militants can take
advantage of these resources.65
The policies of the refugee-receiving country also
affect whether refugees become militarized and
generate violent conflict. A host government must be
both capable and willing to prevent combatants from
infiltrating refugee camps.62 Capability is a function of
the intelligence, technology, personnel, and political
will of the host government. Weak states may simply
be unable to identify and separate militants from
civilians within the refugee population, allowing
militants to exploit refugee camps as bases for crossborder attacks, recruitment, and stealing of
humanitarian aid.
More commonly, the host government is unwilling
to maintain the civilian character of refugee camps
because the government tacitly or overtly supports one
side in the neighboring civil war. For example, if a host
country government is a rival of the sending country
government, the host government may encourage
refugees to use camps as sanctuaries for fighters. This
Political mobilization,
which is more likely to
occur the longer a
refugee crisis lasts, may
increase the chances
that refugees will attack
their home state or host
government.
Malawi is an example of a country that successfully
managed an enormous influx of refugees when
observers worried the nation would be unable to
cope.66 In the late 1980s, Malawi took in approximately
one million refugees fleeing the civil war in
Mozambique. With refugees making up nearly 10
percent of its already struggling population, Malawi
initially struggled to provide for the refugees.
However, in cooperation with the UNHCR and the
World Food Program, Malawi focused on integrating
11
refugees into local communities by providing refugees
with access to land and employment.67
When the civil war in Mozambique ended, the
refugees returned home. Malawi had several key
factors in its favor for preventing the spread of conflict:
the refugees fled their homes for situational reasons,
and sought to return as soon as it was peaceful;
Malawi’s government was highly motivated to prevent
the civil war in Mozambique from spreading into its
borders; and extensive cooperation with international
partners enabled Malawi to manage the provision of
aid in a way that did not support militants.68
A youthful, marginalized refugee
population may present long-term
challenges
In addition to facilitating the spread of rebel
networks, refugee flows may cause changes in birth,
death, and migration rates in host countries that can
have destabilizing effects over the next 10-15 years.
The “youth bulge” thesis, developed over the past four
decades through the successive efforts of political
demographers, asserts that states with youthful age
structures face an elevated risk of experiencing armed
intrastate conflict and other types of political
violence.69 According to a 2007 report by Population
Action International, 80 percent of civil conflicts
between 1970 and the end of the millennium took place
in nations where more than half of the population had
not reached the age of 30.70 Today, there are 67
countries worldwide that have youth bulges, or
youthful age structures, and 60 of these are
experiencing social unrest and violence with at least 25
battle deaths per year.71
For a modern state, a median age of 25 years
appears as a milestone. When the median age rises
above 25 and the youth population begins to shrink,
the incidence of civil conflict declines measurably,
and the chance of being a stable, liberal democracy
increases markedly.72
If, however, a country’s youth population increases
in size, the quantity of available job prospects,
resources and opportunity for social mobility fall. This
may lead to social discontent, followed by unrest. In
turn, this gives governments the excuse to implement
campaigns of oppression – and the cycle continues.73
Further, this theory argues that societies with rapidly
growing youth populations often develop rampant
unemployment and large pools of disaffected youths
who are more susceptible to recruitment into rebel
or extremist groups. This process may be exacerbated
in countries with weak political institutions, which are
the most vulnerable to youth-bulge-related violence
and social unrest. 74
“...if young people are left
with no alternative but
unemployment and
poverty, they are
increasingly likely to join
a rebellion as an
alternative way of
generating an income.”
- Henrik Urdal, demographer
While youth bulges are an important demographic
indicator, it is important to note that they do not alone
cause civil conflict or violence. The key variable is a
lack of societal integration of the youth population. As
demographer Henrik Urdal puts it, “if young people are
left with no alternative but unemployment and poverty,
they are increasingly likely to join a rebellion as an
alternative way of generating an income.” 75 Studies
have shown a direct relationship between cohort size
and unemployment: large youth cohorts are associated
with an increase in youth unemployment rates. These
studies have also shown that youths belonging to larger
cohorts generally have lower opportunity costs relative
to those born into smaller cohorts.76 High
unemployment, a mismatch of jobs and skills, and
political insecurity have made it difficult for youth to
stimulate economic growth and makes the youth bulge
a net drain on resources rather than a bonus to
economic and social development.77
Richard Cincotta, a political demographer with the
Stimson Center, has conducted extensive research on
12
youth bulge theory and, in particular, has refined the
theory to represent a demographic arrangement known
as “persistent minority youth bulge.” In coining this
term, Cincotta refers to “a rapidly growing, agestructurally youthful minority that is politically
dissonant and regionally or residentially segregated
within a more mature country-level population.”78
Cincotta concludes that in youthful, economically
depressed, politically embittered geographic corners of
otherwise developed states, conflicts involving a
youthful minority can grind on for decades, extracting
debilitating political, social, and economic costs.79
This is concerning because it is precisely what is
occurring in Jordan and Lebanon. Young Syrian
refugees are entering these countries where they are
minorities, segregated, unable to work, living in
impoverished conditions, and rapidly changing the age
structure of their host nations. Unless Syrian refugees
are properly integrated into Lebanese and Jordanian
society, there is a risk of a persistent minority youth
bulge with the repercussions Cincotta predicts.
Figure 8: Syrian Population Pyramid, 2014
The age structure of the Syrian population shows a significant
youth bulge. (Image source: CIA World Factbook)
Figure 9: Lebanese Population Pyramid, 2014
The silver lining of the youth bulge
A youthful age structure does not necessarily have
only negative repercussions. Countries with aging
populations, including Lebanon, could reap long-term
benefits from the refugee influx, as it has the potential
to renew the supply of young workers on whom these
countries’ economies depend. In fact, many European
countries are experiencing a youth-drain situation;
Italy, Greece, Germany, Portugal, Finland and Bulgaria
are countries where at least 20 percent of the
population is age 65 or older.80 Coping with rising
numbers of dependents and concomitant declines in the
working-age population is already posing considerable
social, economic and political challenges in these
countries, and likely will do so in other societies as
they age, including the U.S., where 14.8 percent of the
population now is 65 or older.81 If given the
opportunity to work and integrate into society, refugees
could bring tangible benefits to their host countries.
Lebanon’s age structure has been maturing and the youth population has been shrinking. (Image source: CIA World Factbook)
Figure 10: Jordanian Population Pyramid, 2014
The population age structure in Jordan is skewed younger than
that of Lebanon. (Image source: CIA World Factbook)
13
Risk Factors for Refugee-related
Conflict in Lebanon and Jordan
As previously discussed, the likelihood that refugee
flows will lead to violence in the host country in the
short-term is low, based on the characteristics of the
refugee population and the policies of the receiving
state. In the next 10-15 years, refugees may change the
age structure of a country to make it more youthful. If
the refugee crisis persists and refugees are not
integrated, countries may experience civil unrest and
violence.
In the following section, we discuss risk factors for
conflict and assess the extent to which they are present
in Lebanon and Jordan. We identify three risk factors
that may indicate impending conflict stemming from
refugee flows:
1. Militarization of Syrian refugees;
2. Lack of capability or willingness by the
Lebanese and Jordanian governments to
prevent refugee militarization;
3. A persistent population of young, marginalized
Syrian refugees.
Risk factor #1: Militarization of
refugees
When refugees take up arms, they can cause
conflict in both their host country and their country of
origin. Based on past refugee crises, we identify three
indicators to determine whether Syrian refugees are
mobilizing militarily and politically in ways that could
lead to cross-border attacks or host country conflict.
First, the presence of militant leadership in
refugee communities may to lead to refugee camps
being used as staging grounds for violence. Militant
leaders can control the information that reaches the
refugees and the distribution of humanitarian aid. This
may cause other refugees to mobilize because they
believe their safety is in jeopardy.82 Furthermore, when
militants lead refugee camps, they are likely to allow
rebel groups from the home country to operate in the
refugee camps and communities.83 As the militant
group’s base of operations expands in the refugee
camps, the local population may also aid or be
compelled to aid the militants.
This can lead to a second important indicator of
militarization: military recruitment in refugee camps.
Syrian refugees who are dependent on foreign
assistance have very few productive alternatives to
joining rebel organizations, which may offer vulnerable
young people an income and a sense of purpose.84
Persistent recruitment in refugee camps by Syrian rebel
groups may lead to the spread of conflict.
Third, militant infiltration of refugee communities
can serve to support a war economy, relieve
combatants of the need to secure food and resources in
other ways, and compel refugees to join the militant
group that controls their aid. Approaches to capturing
aid money and food include stealing it at the source,
controlling the distribution of aid, and levying taxes on
refugee populations. If militant groups are found to be
intercepting aid intended for refugees, it may provoke
and prolong conflict.
The presence of militant
leadership in refugee
communities may lead to
refugee camps being used
as staging grounds for
violence.
Using these three indicators of militarization, we
can assess the current situation in Jordan and Lebanon
to determine the plausibility that refugees will take up
arms. In Jordan, the Zaatari refugee camp operates
under the formal authority of the Jordanian government
and the UNHCR. The camp has an informal leadership
structure consisting of street leaders, district leaders,
and imams. We find little evidence that combatants in
the civil war are controlling the camp. Operating with
informal authority in the localities they occupy, the
Zaatari street leaders closely coordinate with the more
formal authorities of the UNHCR, which manages
relief operations in the camp, and with the Jordanian
security forces. While these community leaders fill a
vital role in managing day-to-day life within the
refugee camp and providing a source of information for
relief and security organizations, their power within the
14
camp is checked by the more formal authorities of the
UNHCR and, most importantly, the Jordanian security
forces.85 The continued authority of these organizations
reduces the risk of militant leadership taking control.
Syrian refugees are overwhelmingly Sunni, a group
that has been the backbone of the Syrian rebellion, and
most refugees fled from rebel-dominated areas bearing
the brunt of the Syrian military’s crackdown on the
uprising.86 However, refugee recruitment in camps
does not appear to be a major problem. In 2012 and
2013, there were reports that the Free Syrian Army
(FSA) recruited dozens of refugees in Jordan’s
camps.87 After 2013, however, we find few, if any,
credible reports of widespread recruitment in Jordan’s
refugee camps.
Community leaders fill a
vital role in managing day
-to-day life in the refugee
camps, but their power is
checked by the more
formal authorities of the
UNHCR and the
Jordanian security forces.
Perhaps most importantly, there has been little
indication of infiltration by extremist groups such as
ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra.88 Jordan has been careful not
to take a hard stance for or against the Assad regime
and the government has sought to avoid militarization
of rebel groups within its borders because of the
internal security risk.89 Jordan has also increased
border security to prevent militants entering Jordan
disguised as refugees. Jordanian commanders report
that would-be entrants are carefully screened and
suspected militants detained or denied access.90
Lebanon may be at greater risk than Jordan of
refugee-related violence due to its weaker security
forces and the presence of Syrian rebel groups in
border areas. The situation in the Baalbak town of
Arsal, on the border with Syria, illustrates this danger.
ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra are active near Arsal and
have carried out bombings and attacks, most notably in
August 2014 when Islamist groups killed three and
captured more than two dozen members of the
Lebanese security forces.91 Arsal is host to almost
100,000 Syrian refugees, and Lebanese security forces
have conducted frequent raids looking for militants
hidden among the refugees.92
There have been scattered reports of Syrian
refugees aligning with groups like ISIS and Jabhat alNusra. In one case, local news media reported that
Syrian refugees raised an ISIS flag in front of the
municipal building in Arsal in protest of a crackdown
on refugees by the Lebanese army.93 Other reports
indicated that this may have been done in protest after
the army burned down a refugee camp. The credibility
of these reports and the extent of the problem is
difficult to ascertain with publicly-available sources,
but this case highlights the danger that grievances
against the Lebanese government may spur refugees to
align with militant groups.94
Terrorist attacks and instances of conflict spillover
in Lebanon are not necessarily attributable to the
presence of refugees. Politics in Syria and Lebanon
have long been intimately connected, and Syrian rebel
groups view Lebanon as a target independent of the
refugee situation. While some Syrian refugees in
Lebanon may be involved with militant groups, there is
little, if any, indication of widespread militarization of
refugees.95
Risk factor #2: Capability of host
governments to prevent militarization
Jordanian and Lebanese security forces have the
military capacity to conduct effective counterinsurgency and policing operations. These activities
have helped mitigate any emerging militant activity in
refugee communities. As long as Lebanese and
Jordanian security forces continue to demonstrate
capacity to conduct effective counterterrorism and
policing of refugees without resorting to
indiscriminate, lethal violence against civilians,
refugees are not likely to cause violent conflict.
15
Under direct control of the King, Jordan’s military,
known as the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), is among
the most professional in the region. While small
compared to other regional militaries, JAF benefits
from high levels of defense spending relative to GDP,
and strong relations with their US and UK
counterparts, who help with training. The
responsibilities of Jordan’s military forces, including
its well-trained air force and special operations crews,
include border and internal security. These forces are
more than capable of combat and assisting in
international expeditionary missions. Further, Jordan
has developed a highly sophisticated Special Forces
training center, which has enhanced its 14,000-member
Special Forces division.96
In addition to the JAF, the Kingdom also boasts an
excellent intelligence service, the General Intelligence
Directorate (GID). The agency is known for its
exceptional collection capabilities, and it has a strong
history of success against top al-Qaeda and the Islamic
State leaders within Iraq. Moreover, GID also has close
ties to many Sunni groups throughout the region, which
proved successful at weeding out key al-Qaeda
members, and is currently a critical player in efforts to
defeat the Islamic State.97
On the other hand, the Lebanese Armed
Forces’ (LAF) main role has been the containment and
mitigation of localized violence within Lebanon.
Moreover, it has also served as a mediator between
warring groups in the region. Despite such efforts,
Lebanon continues to experience periodic terrorist
attacks. For example, in November 2013, an “al-Qaeda
-inspired” militant group carried out a bombing of the
Iranian embassy in Beirut, which killed 25 people. 98
Two years later, on November 12, 2015, Beirut was
struck by a pair of suicide bombings that killed 41,
with another 200 people wounded in a Hezbollahcontrolled area.99 It is important to note that the Syrian
civil war has had political and security implications for
Lebanon beyond the refugee influx. The existence of
terrorist attacks in Lebanon should not necessarily be
considered a result of refugee movements unless those
attacks can be traced to refugee communities.
In September 2013, Lebanon began implementing a
five-year plan to modernize LAF’s capabilities and
draw up a strategy to determine force requirements,
including the potential incorporation of Hezbollah into
the LAF.100 This shift in policy is a result of the
fragility of the LAF, which has frequently relied on
Hezbollah to help address security issues in Lebanon.
The ability of security
forces to undertake
targeted, measured, and
effective actions that do
not escalate tensions is
just as important as sheer
power.
In an effort to crack down on violence within the
country, the LAF undertook a series of security
measures (as yet undisclosed) throughout the country
during the month of October 2015. According to a
press release from Lebanon’s Ministry of Defense’s on
November 10, 2015, these new security measures led
to the arrest of over 1,000 individuals involved in
terrorist operations, assaulting citizens using lethal
force, and narcotics trafficking.101 The LAF has also
erected monitoring towers in sensitive areas along the
Lebanese-Syrian border.102
According to Basem Shabb, a member of the
Lebanese parliamentary Committee for National
Defense and Interior, the LAF’s elite units, most
notably the rangers, commandos and navy seals, “were
specifically trained in urban warfare and in confronting
irregular forces and counterinsurgency.”103 In an effort
to strengthen its capacity, the LAF has accepted $5
billion worth of military aid from the US and Saudi
Arabia over the past eight years. This has resulted in a
sizable increase in the firepower of the LAF, which has
doubled its arsenal of M198 howitzer guns. These
guns, in conjunction with M-60A3 and M48A5
armored tanks, have contributed to the LAF’s efforts to
suppress insurgency with “continuous and accurate
firepower.”104 Equally important, Lebanon’s recent
receipt of Cessna aircraft from the US has provided the
LAF with advanced surveillance and reconnaissance
abilities.105 Saudi Arabia most recently funded the
16
purchase of $3 billion worth of French weapons and
military equipment to bolster the LAF’s capabilities.106
While the military aid bolsters the LAF’s
capabilities to be an adequate security force, military
capacity cannot be assessed solely in terms of troop
numbers and military material. As the Syrian civil war
demonstrates, the ability of security forces to undertake
targeted, measured, and effective actions that do not
escalate tensions is just as important as sheer power.
For example, before the war, the Syrian military
enjoyed a reputation as a relatively competent and
professional security force.107 However, the security
forces were ineffective in containing conflict because
they could not consistently and accurately distinguish
between adversaries and civilians. The military used
indiscriminate violence to quash early revolts, sparking
uprisings and army defections that became the core of
the opposition to the Assad regime. In early 2011,
regime forces arrested and reportedly tortured 14 or 15
school children, prompting a demonstration on March
18, in which security forces opened fire and killed four
people.108 Regime forces further targeted innocent
civilians by open firing at people attending the funeral
of those killed during the demonstration.109 The regime
again fired upon protesters in Dara’a on March 20 and
March 25, and killed even more civilians during a raid
on a hospital on March 22.110
According to the Congressional Research Service,
“violent government response to an isolated incident in
the southern town of Dara’a in March provided a
decisive spark for the emergence of protest
movements.”111 The first official opposition group, the
Free Syrian Army, was spearheaded by Syrian army
defectors and local militiamen disgusted by the actions
of government forces.112 The Syrian case study
demonstrates that brutal and indiscriminate action
against restive populations can contribute to the
eruption of widespread violence.
Risk factor #3: Long-term
marginalization of young refugees
Because Syrian refugees are making the
populations of Jordan and Lebanon younger, these
countries are at risk for future political instability if the
Syrian refugees are not repatriated, relocated, or
integrated. For a modern state, a median age of 25
years appears as a milestone; around that timeframe,
the incidence of civil conflict declines dramatically,
and the chance of being a stable, liberal democracy
increases markedly.113 The current median age of the
Lebanese population is 29.4 years, excluding the influx
of Syrian refugees, while the current median age of
Syrians is 20.8 and 22.5 for Jordanians.114 This concern
is relevant for Lebanon and Jordan because the Syrian
refugee population tends to be younger than the native
population. If the crisis continues and refugees are not
repatriated or integrated, Syrian refugees could
constitute a rapidly growing youthful minority that is
politically marginalized and regionally or residentially
segregated within an older host country population.115
Prior to the Syrian civil war and resulting refugee
influx, Lebanon’s population was headed towards
maturation, which promised increased prospects for
internal security and stability. However, with the
enormous influxes of displaced youth, the country
instead faces an enormous population of foreign
children who, as they progress to teenagers and young
adults, will create a youth bulge that is likely to pose
serious threats to Lebanon’s security and stability.
For a modern state, a
median age of 25 years
appears as a milestone;
around that timeframe,
the incidence of civil
conflict declines
dramatically.
Similarly, Jordan is experiencing a massive influx
of child refugees into its predominantly young
population. In 2025, the median age of Jordan is
expected to be roughly 24.9 years old. This indicates
that Jordan may have more time before a youth bulge
poses a threat to its internal political stability.
However, as the median age of the population moves
closer to 25, there is greater risk of this occurring. It is
important to recognize that all of the risk factors are
present for this youth bulge to become a legitimate
17
problem for Jordan in the future, if refugees are not
resettled or integrated into society.
If the refugee-driven youth bulge persists, Syrian
refugees could be at the center of a “demographic
security dilemma.” This dilemma is a situation in
which a state (such as Lebanon or Jordan) “permits or
promotes the political, economic, and social
marginalization of an ethno-religious minority.”116
Syrian refugees could fit the profile of this ethnoreligious minority. Under conditions of being denied
education, economic opportunity, and social services,
ethno-religious minorities are likely to have higher
fertility rates than the more privileged majority. 117 This
can be because the oppressed minority group retains
more traditional gender relationships and because they
are confined to low-income urban neighborhoods and
neglected rural regions.118 Without proactive policies to
bring youthful communities into the economic, social,
and political mainstream, we see many turn towards
radical
and
traditionalist
religious
political
organizations. Thus the demographic security dilemma:
the more states marginalize a minority group, the more
those youthful minorities tend to grow as a proportion
of the state’s population. In turn, the growth in the
minority population further
exacerbates the
circumstances for political discontent and revolution.119
Syrian refugees could be
at the center of a
“demographic security
dilemma.”
This has ramifications for the Middle East,
especially in Jordan and Lebanon, which have taken in
large refugee populations that are younger than their
native populations. If young refugees are not
repatriated or integrated and are instead marginalized
within their host countries, Jordan and Lebanon may
experience an elevated risk of the demographic security
dilemma and other civil conflict.
Figure 11: Risk assessment framework for population age structure
Countries like Jordan and Lebanon that have intermediate and maturing majority populations but young minority populations run a
higher risk of experiencing a demographic security dilemma and eventual ethnoreligious conflict (Image source: Richard Cincotta,
“Minority Youth Bulges and the Future of Intrastate Conflict.”)
18
Conclusions
The influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon and
Jordan creates a fragile situation in both countries, but
the refugees themselves are not yet provoking conflict
in their host countries. The key reasons for this are that
the Syrian refugees are not militant and that the host
governments possess the capability and willingness to
prevent refugees from taking up arms. However, the
risk that Syrian refugees will spark conflict in Lebanon
and Jordan increases if the refugees begin to mobilize
militarily and politically.
Risk factors to look for include: a pattern of
refugee participation in cross-border attacks or attacks
within the host countries, militant leaders taking
control of refugee camps and communities, and
degraded capacity of Lebanese and Jordanian security
forces. In the medium- to long-term, the young age
structure of the refugee population worsens the youth
bulge phenomenon in Lebanon and Jordan, threatening
to create a large population of marginalized young
people who may spark conflict.
As a key partner, the United States can support
Lebanon and Jordan in successfully managing the
refugee crisis in several ways:
First, it is important to maintain the civilian
character of refugee camps and communities. The U.S.
can support Lebanon and Jordan by ensuring that
their security forces continue to receive the
hardware needed to maintain their military
capacity. In conjunction, the U.S. can provide training
programs
to
increase
effectiveness
and
professionalism. Sustaining or increasing military aid
and training programs may be critical for building
Jordanian and Lebanese military capacity. The ability
to identify militant activity and flows of weapons into
refugee communities can lead to early identification of
militant activity, which will be critical to mounting an
effective response.
Second, the U.S. should support Lebanon and
Jordan in planning for the eventual integration of
refugees who are not able to return to Syria. Even if
the civil war ends and many refugees return home, the
level of destruction and destitution in Syria means that
thousands of Syrians will inevitably stay in Lebanon
and Jordan. Enabling these refugees to integrate
economically and socially into their communities
through education, employment, and access to social
services can limit the refugees’ sense of
marginalization. This can circumvent the dangerous
potential of the youth bulge.
In this regard, the U.S. can support Lebanon and
Jordan by funding development and social cohesion
projects that benefit both refugees and native
communities, encouraging government planning for
refugee integration, and promoting employment
opportunities for refugees. For example, corporate
partnerships could allow private companies to work
with host countries to establish job placement schemes,
which allow refugees to secure work. This in turn
allows the refugees to legally contribute to the
economy of their host country, thereby elevating their
status as valued members of society, and enhancing
their relationship with the local population.120
In the meantime, the U.S. should support adequate
funding for the UNHCR, World Food Programme,
and other organizations tasked with providing aid
to refugees. If refugees feel marginalized and unable to
meet their basic needs, they may perceive a lower
threshold for taking up arms and engaging in the civil
war.
Recommendations

Support security forces to
maintain the civilian character of
refugee camps and communities

Encourage host governments
to integrate refugees by
offering opportunities for
employment and education

Fund economic development
and social cohesion projects

Maintain adequate funding for
refugee aid organizations

Increase options for
resettlement of refugees

Achieve a peaceful resolution
to the Syrian civil war
19
Third, the resettlement of Syrian refugees in other
countries can lessen the burden on Syria’s neighbors.
The U.S. can contribute by increasing and expediting
its refugee acceptance program. Other countries,
including in Europe, should also be encouraged and
supported in accepting additional refugees to provide
relief for Lebanon and Jordan. In fact, countries with
aging populations can actually benefit from the
injection of youthful refugee populations into their
workforces.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the U.S.
should continue to seek a peaceful resolution to the
Syrian Civil War. Only an end to the war will enable
the large-scale repatriation of refugees and dramatically
reduce the burden on Lebanon and Jordan. Although
some refugees will stay on after the war, the vast
majority can be expected to return home.
20
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
“Syria Regional Refugee Response: Interagency
Information Sharing Portal,” UNHCR, accessed November
17, 2015, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/
regional.php#_ga=1.182256495.91437624.1441377489.
Ibid.
“Syria: Conflict Without Borders. Number and Location of
Refugees and IDPs,” Humanitarian Information Unit,
Department of State, August 27, 2015, https://hiu.state.gov/
Products/
Syria_ConflictWithoutBorders_Displacement_2015Aug27
_HIU_U1283.pdf.
“Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 30
November 2015),” ReliefWeb, November 30, 2015, http://
reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
syr_humsnap_a4l_november2015.pdf .
“Alienation and Violence: Impact of Syria Crisis Report
2014,” Syrian Center for Policy Research, March 2015, 46.
Ibid.
“Syria Regional Refugee Response.”
Michael Pizzi, “In Syria’s War Refugees, Lebanon Sees
Echoes of Palestinian Crisis,” Al Jazeera, January 6, 2015,
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/6/lebanonsyria-refugees.html and Rana Ksaifi, “SYRIA REFUGEE
RESPONSE: LEBANON Syrian Refugees Registered,”
UNHCR, September 30, 2015.
“Syrian refugees head to Lebanon’s Shia south,” IRIN,
January 29, 2013, http://www.irinnews.org/report/97355/
syrian-refugees-head-to-lebanon-s-shia-south.
“Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016,” UNOCHA,
December 15, 2014, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/2015-2016_Lebanon_CRP_EN.pdf.
“Greater support in countries of first asylum needed to
stem refugee outflows,” UNHCR, August 26, 2015,
www.unhcr.org/55ddd2c86.html.
Ibid.
“Registered Syrians in Jordan: External Statistical
Report ,” UNHCR, October 31, 2015, http://data.unhcr.org/
syrianrefugees/download.php?id=9702.
Doris Carrion, “Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Confronting
Difficult Truths,” Chatham House, September 2015,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/
field/
field_document/20150921SyrianRefugeesCarrion.pdf.
Luigi Achilli, “Syrian Refugees in Jordan: a Reality
Check,” Migration Policy Centre, February 2015, http://
cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34904/MPC_201502_PB.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
“For Many Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan, Now is the
Time to Go,” Washington Post, 21 September 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/for-many-syriansin-lebanon-and-jordan-now-is-the-time-togo/2015/09/21/513dfc9a-5d4a-11e5-8475781cc9851652_story.html
“Census includes all people on Jordanian soil, PM,” Jordan
News Agency, 28 November 2015. http://petranews.gov.jo/
nepras/2015/Nov/28/9000.htm
18. “Registered Syrians in Jordan: External Statistical Report,”
UNHCR, November 15, 2015, http://data.unhcr.org/
syrianrefugees/download.php?id=9792.
19. Omar Dahi, “The Refugee Crisis in Lebanon and Jordan:
The Need for Economic Development Spending,” Forced
Migration Review, September 2014, http://
www.fmreview.org/syria/dahi#sthash.ID04cywZ.dpuf.
20. Ibid.
21. “Registered Syrians in Jordan.”
22. Phoebe Weston, “Inside Zaatari refugee camp: the fourth
largest city in Jordan,” The Telegraph, August 5, 2015.,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/
jordan/11782770/What-is-life-like-inside-the-largestSyrian-refugee-camp-Zaatari-in-Jordan.html.
23. “Registered Syrians in Jordan.”
24. “Jordan Refugee Response: Vulnerability Assessment
Framework Baseline Survey,” UNHCR, May 2015, 14,
http://www.medbox.org/jordan-refugee-responsevulnerability-assessment-framework-baseline-survey-may2015/download.pdf.
25. “Jordan Poverty Reduction Strategy: Final Report,”
UNDP, January 28 2013, 31, http://www.jo.undp.org/
content/dam/jordan/docs/Poverty/
Jordanpovertyreductionstrategy.pdf
26. “Jordan Refugee Response,” 15.
27. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Uprising Finally Hits Syria’s ‘Silk
Road’ City,” Reuters, February 4, 2012, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/04/us-syria-aleppoidUSTRE81213720120204.
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29. “ALEPPO - Governorate Profile,” 8.
30. Oweis,“Uprising Finally Hits Syria’s ‘Silk Road’ City.”
31. “Security forces storm Syrian city of Aleppo, activist group
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Erika Solomon, “Pro-Assad Gun, Knife Attack Kills Four
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32. Luke Harding and Martin Churov, “Syrian Rebels Fight
Assad Troops in Aleppo,” The Guardian, July 22, 2011,
Accessed October 27, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2012/jul/22/syrian-rebels-fight-aleppo.
33. Erika Solomon, “Rural Fighters Pour into Syria's Aleppo
for Battle,” Reuters, July 29, 2012, Accessed October 27,
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34. “ALEPPO - Governorate Profile,” ACAPS, March 2013,
14.
35. Mohamed Zaatari, “Hezbollah prepares for Liberation Day
21
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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43.
44.
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46.
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Rana Ksaifi, “Syria Refugee Response: Lebanon Syrian
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Samya Kullab and Ghinwa Obeidi, “Shebaa, the Town
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Scott Simon, “Places Transformed: Syrian Refugees
Overwhelm Camps, Towns,” NPR, May 4, 2013, http://
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Strange Case of Lebanon’s Shebaa.”
Simon, “Places Transformed.”
Mohamed Zaatari, “Shebaa Residents Back Syrian Rebel
Ban,” The Daily Star, November 10, 2014.
Ibid.
David Schenker, “Why Refugee Influx Threatens Lebanon,
Jordan Stability,” The Washington Institute, April 10, 2014,
Accessed October 10, 2015, http://
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“Syrian Refugee Crisis Threatens Lebanon’s Stability:
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John Owens, “Squabbling Politicians Find Unity in Wake
of Beirut Bombings,” VOA, November 19, 2015, http://
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“Mafraq Governorate Fact Sheet,” UNHCR, April 26,
2015, 2, http://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/mafraqgovernorate-factsheet-april-2015 and “UNHCR Syria
Regional Refugee Response,” UNHCR Syria Regional
Refugee Response, December 2, 2015, http://
data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/region.php?id=77&.
“Mafraq Governorate Factsheet,” UNHCR, August 18,
2015, 1, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/
resources/MafraqFactSheetJULY.pdf.
“Syria Crisis: Deadly Clash in Jordan’s Zaatari Camp,”
BBC, April 6, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-26908587 and Tamer al-Samadi, “Jordan Fears
Pro-Syrian Regime ‘Sleeper Cells’ in Zaatari,” Al-Monitor,
April 9, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
security/2014/04/jordan-zaatari-camp-syria-refugees-riotssleeper-cells.htm and “On the Beat in Zaatari: How UK
Aid Is Helping Keep Syrians Safe in the World’s Second
Largest Refugee Camp,” Medium, September 15, 2015,
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“On the Beat in Zaatari.”
47. Rana F. Sweis, “Jordan’s Schools Buckle Under Weight of
Syrian Refugees,” The New York Times, October 6, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/world/middleeast/
jordans-schools-buckle-under-weight-of-syrianrefugees.html?_r=0.
48. “Jordan’s Zaatari Refugee Camp Turns 3, Challenges for
the Future of the Thousands Living There,” UNHCR, July
28, 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/55b89a1a9.html
49. Amy R. West, “Syrian Refugees Need More Than Food,”
Al Jazeera America, March 9, 2014, http://
america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/education-forsyrianrefugeesinsufficient.html.
50. Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugees
and the Spread of Civil War,” International Organization
60, no. 02 (2006), 338.
51. Ibid.
52. Fiona B. Adamson, “Crossing Borders: International
Migration and National Security,” International Security
31, no. 1 (2006), 192.
53. Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee
Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid,
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 15.
54. Ibid., 23.
55. Ibid., 26-27.
56. Ibid., 10.
57. Edward O. Mogire. Victims as Security Threats: Refugee
Impact on Host State Security in Africa. (Surrey: Ashgate
Publishing, Ltd. 2011), 15.
58. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, 19.
59. Ibid., 10.
60. Ibid., 19.
61. Salehyan and Gleditsch, "Refugees and the spread of civil
war," 10-11.
62. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, 23.
63. Ibid., 30.
64. Adamson, Crossing Borders. 191-192.
65. Sheila Rule, “600,000 Mozambique Refugees Tax an
Already Desperate Malawi,” The New York Times, July 18,
1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/18/world/600000mozambique-refugees-tax-an-already-desperatemalawi.html.
66. Salehyan and Gleditsch, “Refugees and the spread of civil
war,” 361.
67. Ibid.
68. Richard Cincotta, “Life Begins After 25: Demography and
the Societal Timing of the Arab Spring,” Foreign Policy
Research Institute, January 2012, http://www.fpri.org/
articles/2012/01/life-begins-after-25-demography-societaltiming-arab-spring.
69. Lionel Beehner, “The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge’ on Civil
Conflicts,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 27, 2007,
http://www.cfr.org/world/effects-youth-bulge-civilconflicts/p13093.
70. Katherine Carter, “Is Youth Bulge a ‘Magic Indicator’ for
the Failed States Index?” New Security Beat, October 17,
2013, http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2013/10/youth22
bulge-magic-indicator-failed-states-index.
71. Cincotta, “Life Begins After 25.”
72. Beehner, “The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge’ on Civil
Conflicts.”
73. Ibid.
74. Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and
Political Violence,” International Studies Quarterly 50, no.
3 (2006): 610.
75. Ibid., 610-611.
76. “The Implications of the Youth Bulge in Middle East and
North African Populations,” NATO Parliamentary
Assembly, January 25, 2011, http://www.nato-pa.int/
default.asp?SHORTCUT=2342.
77. Richard Cincotta, “Minority Youth Bulges and the Future
of Intrastate Conflict,” New Security Beat, October 13,
2011, http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2011/10/minorityyouth-bulges-and-the-future-of-intrastate-conflict/.
78. Ibid.
79. Drew Desilver, “Refugee Surge Brings Youth to an Aging
Europe,” Pew Research Center, October 8, 2015, http://
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80. Ibid.
81. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, 25.
82. Ibid., 10.
83. Salehyan and Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil
War,” 401.
84. Denis Sullivan and Sarah Tobin, “Security and Resilience
among Syrian Refugees in Jordan,” Middle East Research
and Information Project, October 14, 2014, accessed
October 22, 2014, http://merip.org/mero/mero101414.
85. Associated Press, “Syria Rebels Recruit at Refugee Camp,”
KTAR News, November 11, 2013.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Marwan Muasher, “Jordan’s Ambiguous Syria Policy,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 9,
2014, accessed October 22, 2015, http://
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89. Karin Laub, “AP Interview: Jordan Says Syria Militants
Try to Sneak in,” Business Insider, August 16, 2015,
accessed November 13, 2015, http://
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90. Laila Bassam, “Lebanon Arrests Five Syrians, One
Palestinian Suspect in Beirut Bombings: Security Source,”
Reuters, November 14, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2015/11/14/us-mideast-crisis-lebanonidUSKCN0T314120151114#E3e2FKJIhx7ZSvWu.97.
91. “Lebanon: Arsal Border Town Tocked by Bomb,” BBC
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92. Atassi, Basma, “A Voice of Horror from Lebanon’s Arsal,”
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Sohl, Nidal, “Army Raids Arsal Refugee Camp,” May 28,
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94. Carrion, Doris, “Are Syrian Refugees a Security Threat to
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95. Mencutek, Zeynep Şahin, “The Impact of the Syrian
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96. “Chapter 7: Middle East and North Africa,” The Military
Balance 115, no. 1 (2015): 335.
97. Shane Harris, “The Mouse that Roars,” Foreign Policy,
September 12, 2014, accessed November 14, 2015, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/12/the-mouse-that-roars/.
98. Martin Chulov, “Lebanon ‘captures Iranian embassy
bombing mastermind,” The Guardian, January 1, 2014,
accessed December 1, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/jan/01/lebanon-captures-iranian-embassybombing-mastermind.
99. “Lebanon holds day of mourning after deadly Beirut
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100. “Chapter 7: Middle East and North Africa,” The Military
Balance 115, no. 1 (2015): 338.
101. “Results of the Security Measures During October,”
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102. Basem Shabb, “The Syrian Conflict and the Ascendency of
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103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Awad Mustafa, “Saudi, US Aid Boost Lebanese
Firepower,” DefenseNews, July 11, 2015, accessed
November 14, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/
defense/land/weapons/2015/07/11/lebanon-firepower-saudi
-us-increases/29913841/.
106. Oliver Holmes, “French Weapons Arrive in Lebanon in $3
Billion Saudi-funded Deal,” Reuters, April 20, 2015,
accessed November 21, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/
article/2015/04/20/uk-mideast-crisis-lebanon-armyidUKKBN0NB0GE20150420.
107. Joseph Holliday, “The Syrian Army: Doctrinal Order of
Battle,” Institute for the Study of War, February 2013, 5,
23
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/
SyrianArmy-DocOOB.pdf.
108. Hugh Macleod and Other, “Inside Deraa,” Al Jazeera,
April 19, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
features/2011/04/201141918352728300.html and “In
Syria, Crackdown After Protests,” New York Times, March
18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/
middleeast/19syria.html.
109. “Guide: Syria Crisis,” BBC News, April 9, 2012, http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13855203.
110. Jeremy M. Sharp, “Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions
Against the Assad Regime,” Congressional Research
Service, August 9, 2011, 3, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/171370.pdf.
111. Ibid., 1.
112. Joseph Holliday, “Middle East Security Report 3: Syria’s
Armed Opposition,” Institute for the Study of War, March
2012, 9, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/
files/Syrias_Armed_Opposition.pdf. and “Defecting
Troops from 'Free Syrian Army', Target Assad Security
Forces,” World Tribune, August 3, 2011, http://
www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2011/
me_syria0973_08_03.asp and Sharp, “Unrest in Syria and
U.S. Sanctions Against the Assad Regime,” 8.
113. Cincotta, “Life Begins After 25.”
114. “World Population Prospects: Key Findings and Advance
Tables,” United Nations, 2015, 34-35, http://esa.un.org/
unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf.
115. Cincotta, “Minority Youth Bulges and the Future of
Intrastate Conflict.”
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. “The Benefits of Belonging: Local Integration Options and
Opportunities for Host Countries, Communities, and
Refugees,” UNHCR, July 29, 2011, 7, http://
www.refworld.org/docid/4e56170b2.html.
24
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