Reconciliation in Practice
A Report on Lessons Learned and the Way Forward in
Reconciliation Programming
Alexsandra Canedo, Ashley Law, Justine O’Sullivan, and Sacha Stein
School of International Service Practicum Program
December 2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements
1
Acronyms and Abbreviations
2
Executive Summary
4
Theory of Reconciliation
6
Lessons Learned
7
Assessment of Creative’s Work
15
Human Rights and Reconciliation Program (HRRP) in Guatemala
15
USAID/OTI Community Cohesion Initiative in Afghanistan
18
Ways Forward
19
Donor Identification
19
Countries for Future Engagement
28
Recommendations
34
Bibliography
36
Appendix 1: Approaches to Reconciliation
50
Appendix 2: Reconciliation Methodologies
56
Appendix 3: Considerations for Reconciliation and Development
63
Appendix 4: Case Study Analysis
65
1
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Dr. Hrach Gregorian for his professional and academic
guidance with our project; Paul Turner and Alicia Greenidge for allowing us the
opportunity to conduct this research and providing us with constructive feedback to
hone our practical skills; and the Creative Associates International team for their
hospitality and supportive efforts.
2
Acronyms and Abbreviations
AFD
French Development Agency
APC
All People’s Congress
CIDA
Canadian International Development Agency
CMA
Coordination of Movements for Azawad
CONASCIPAL
Coalition of Civil Society for Peace and the Fight Against the
Proliferation of Light Weapons
CPA
Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CS
Civil Society
DFATD
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
DFID
Department for International Development
ECCC
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
EU
European Union
GPA
Gish, Paz y Asociados
HCC
Historical Clarification Commission
HRRP
Human Rights and Reconciliation Project
ICTY
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDA
International Development Agency
IDO
International Development Organization
IDP
Internally Displaced Persons
IRCL
Interreligious Council of Liberia
INCHR
Independent National Commission for Human Rights
LNP
Liberian National Police
LCC
Liberian Council of Churches
LURD
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
LTI
Liberia Transition Initiative
LTTE
Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam
3
MODEL
Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NCCI
Niger Community Cohesion Initiative
NMCL
National Muslim Council of Liberia
NPF
National Patriotic Front
NGO
Nongovernmental Organization
NVS
Neighborhood Volunteer Scheme
OAS
Organization of American States
OTI
Office of Transition Initiatives
P4DP
Peacebuilding Fund
PBF
Human Rights Ombudsperson
PDH
Platform 4 Dialogue and Peace
PTSD
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
RUF
Revolutionary United Front
SLPP
Sierra Leone People’s Party
SCORE
Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index
SRNHPR
Strategic Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding, and
Reconciliation
TOT
Training of Trainers
TRC
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN
United Nations
UNAMSIL
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNESCO
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF
United Nations Children’s Fund
US
United States
USAID
United States for Agency for International Development
4
Executive Summary
Creative Associates International (Creative) is an international development
organization that employs sustainable solutions to global challenges to support people
and their communities in overcoming hardship and living peaceful lives. Creative is
particularly effective in conflict and post-conflict environments, and uses a community
focused approach, as they believe local partnerships lead to long-term results. Creative
is divided into four divisions: Education, Communities in Transition, Economic Growth
and Cross Functions.
While Creative has engaged in some reconciliation-related projects, they
recognize the need to expand their portfolio in this realm to affect sustainable change in
post-conflict areas. In an effort to provide a foundation of reconciliation knowledge for
Creative, the Transformation, Peacebuilding, and Development Practicum Team sought
to research, analyze, and identify key lessons in the field of post-conflict reconciliation. It
is our hope that this broad examination will assist Creative in developing future business
proposals. As part of our work, we assessed the effectiveness of Creative’s past
activities in this realm, and proposed recommendations for ways forward by linking
potential donors with countries ripe for reconciliation projects. Our objective is to
indicate what types of reconciliation methods would align well with Creative’s portfolio
and where gaps exist in their global reach.
The research was conducted over the fall semester of 2015 by Alexsandra
Canedo, Ashley Law, Sacha Stein, and Justine O’Sullivan, who are all graduate
students at the School of International Service, American University. To address the
research, the team conducted a comprehensive literature review in which multiple
approaches and methodologies were identified, which can be found as an appendix to
this report.
5
Approaches to
Reconciliation:
Top-Down
Bottom-Up
Hybrid Approach
Retributive and
Restorative Justice
Methodologies:
Interfaith Dialogue
Truth Telling
Art and Healing
Sports, Development, and
Peace
Mental Health
To explore reconciliation in practice and further delve into the intricacies of each
methodology, the team conducted a case study analysis consisting of Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Indonesia, and Nicaragua. By researching specific contexts, practitioners will be
better informed of challenges inherent to project implementation, specifically for
reconciliation projects. This also provides a cross-cultural analysis of effective tools of
reconciliation, some culturally specific, and some not.
From this analysis, the team identified key lessons learned, which were
separated into three themes: project design, intervention focus, and community
integration. Understanding the importance of these lessons will help Creative in
overcoming challenges ahead.
Lastly, the team assessed Creative’s past projects, and researched potential
donors who could fund Creative’s future projects as well as countries that would benefit
from them. In this way, the team hopes to fill in the gaps that exist within Creative’s
portfolio to expand the reach of their work. The report concludes with a set of
recommendations for Creative to take under consideration as they expand into the field
of reconciliation. For more information on the theory of reconciliation or for details on the
case studies, please see the appendices.
6
Theory of Reconciliation
The theory of reconciliation “generally refers to the process of developing a
mutual conciliatory accommodation between antagonistic or formerly antagonistic
persons or groups.”1 It can be applied individually and between groups, as well as
privately and publicly. Furthermore, it is practiced in all facets of life and takes many
shapes.2 Thus, reconciliation is a form of peacebuilding that aims to address deep
structural injustices and build long-term relationships.3 Because of its multi-directional
approach, focused on ending direct violence by negotiating interests and needs,
building relationships by acknowledging harms and healing, and transforming structural
violence by challenging institutional injustices, peace scholars deem reconciliation as
the core of peacebuilding.4
Reconciliation can be seen throughout history in customs such as dialogue with
one’s self in Indian cultures, the sulha ritual in Arab cultures, and alienation in Christian
doctrine.5 The field has grown rapidly over the last thirty years, emerging in response to
the ineffective conflict resolution practices applied to The Cold War.6 Academics, such
as John Burton and Joseph Montville, argue conflict resolution failed because traditional
efforts lacked tools to address the subjective and relational dynamics inherent in
conflict. They explain effective reconciliation should prioritize human needs, “as security,
identity and social bonding...”7 Furthermore, aspects of re-humanizing the other and
healing on the individual and group level are necessary to transform deep-rooted
conflicts into cultures of peace.8
1
Lerche, “Peace Building Through Reconciliation,” The International Journal of Peace Studies.
Lerche, “Peace Building Through Reconciliation,” The International Journal of Peace Studies.
3 Hugh; Ramsbotham; Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 32.
4 Hugh; Ramsbotham; Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 246.
5 Komesaroff, “Pathways to Reconciliation: Bringing Diverse Voices into Conversation,” in Pathways to Reconciliation
Between Theory and Practice.
6 Lerche, “Peace Building Through Reconciliation,” The International Journal of Peace Studies.
7 Lerche, “Peace Building Through Reconciliation,” The International Journal of Peace Studies.
8 Lerche, “Peace Building Through Reconciliation,” The International Journal of Peace Studies.
2
7
Lessons Learned
This section identifies ten lessons across three themes that will help it develop
and implement effective reconciliation programs. The identified lessons are specific to
external practitioners interested in pursuing reconciliation projects. They strongly
emphasize the need for a holistic approach that considers non-linear designs, as well as
short and long-term solutions. Additionally, the importance of integrating local culture
and knowledge, along with the active participation of all members of society cannot be
overstated. Knowing these lessons will help practitioners navigate new reconciliation
projects by giving them the tools and guidance to avoid common pitfalls of overly
prescriptive reconciliation programs that further alienate divided communities. Ignoring
these lessons could create intrusive programs that exacerbate divisions, and ignore
culturally relevant methods and definitions of reconciliation. Further, these lessons show
that reconciliation is unique to each community, and that there is no definitive formula
that will work to bridge every divided society - an assumption that hinders the
effectiveness of reconciliation programming.
The lessons align with indicators from the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation
Index (SCORE).9 The SCORE Index measures the potential for harmonious community
relationships and successful reconciliation efforts by gauging a society’s willingness to
coexist, work with others, and rebuild societal rifts. The Index uses five indicators to
measure social cohesion: trust in and representativeness of institutions, human security,
civic life satisfaction, personal life satisfaction, and in-group identification, and five
indicators to measure a community’s transition toward reconciliation: negative
stereotypes, intergroup anxiety, social distance, social threat perceptions, and cultural
distance. The indicator(s) that each lesson addresses is specified on the side.
9
Ioannou, “Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE): Methodology.” 2. http://scoreforpeace.org/app/
webroot/files/general/files/SCORE%20Methodology%20Final%20share(1).pdf.
8
…
9
Project Design
Draw upon local tools and traditions
Reconciliation practices are more successful
when efforts incorporate
traditional
tools
and local
Forum for Peace Across
The Nicaraguan
government
partnered
d Groups uses interfaith
understandings of
justice
and healing.
By drawing
with
the Organization
of American
o transform conflicts into
States
to
institute
a
land
redistribution
upon local knowledge, reconciliation becomes
ace. Participants include
and cash incentive program. The plan
more
integrative
and elicitive.
This increases
slamist paramilitary
group
included
housing construction
projects tothe
k as peace activists
and
unite communities
by co-building
likelihood for sustainable
and positive
peace
nitarian workers.
integrated
housing
developments.
once practitioners leave the community.
Furthermore, communities
will feel more
In 2007, the Commission for Verification,
ings now include more
represented
by
culturally Peace
relevant
institutions
and
Reconciliation,
and Justice
increased
ps who work together
on
pensions, which
improved
f efforts, dialogues,
and
processes,
andbeneficiaries’
will subsequently
find them
Nicaraguans’ personal life satisfaction by
activities, showing that
the
trustworthier.
Thus,
the shared values of a
alleviating some of the poverty caused by
lence is not a prerequisite
basis
of peacebuilding
the the
war and
subsequent
earthquakes.
mplementation. community inform
activities, strengthening in-group identification.
…
…
In Sierra Leone, Catalyst for Peace
implemented Fambul Tok, a truth telling
mechanism based on Leonean communal
circles, which offered a familiar space for
victims and perpetrators to freely express
their truths and grievances.
…
While Fambul Tok is a Catalyst method,
local communities are encouraged to adjust
the process to fit their needs. This
adaptability makes Fambul Tok a dynamic,
rather than static reconciliation process.
Indonesia exemplifies this lesson in practice with the use of interfaith
dialogue. In the Moluccas,
leaders
useLeone
the by
local custom of
Play 31religious
begins its work
in Sierra
pela, an alliance system
that brings
people
together
2010, there was only one
asking permission
to enter
communities.
If to help members
or every 300,000 Liberians. In
their
presence
is
wanted,
then
Play
31
during times of crisis. Additionally, religious leaders in Solo, Central
rter Center partnered with the
organizes football games and trains locals
SCORE
Indicator:
Java collaborated with members
of extremist groups to facilitate
overnment to train 150 local
as Peace Ambassadors.
Social Threat
dialogue across the country and encourage conversation and
ntal health clinicians.
Perception
cooperation. Because of these local partnerships, communities
plagued by political, religious, and collective violence have benefited
Carter Center reported at least
In addition to sport, Play 31 teaches
from the use of theirlocals
localconflict
tool of
pela as
a platform
health clinicians in every county,
resolution
tools
and humanfor interfaith
tes 70% of the population will
rights education to prevent future conflict
dialogue.
…
…
o mental health care within the
ears, increasing mental health
ess and reducing negative
stereotypes. Be adaptable
to build a more sustainable peaceful
environment.
Practitioners interested in supporting country stability and development should
create adaptable reconciliation programs. As reconciliation moves forward, objectives
will shift and expand to include different goals, especially for countries focused on
democracy building and bolstering the economy. Initially, efforts will be focused on
bringing together divided communities, but will change once relationships are mended.
Therefore, a new focus of reconstructing just institutions and development will occur.
Furthermore, as power actors change so too will national and local interests.
Flexible programs grant practitioners the necessary adaptability to change with
these on the ground realities. Therefore, programs should be sensitive to the fluidity of
reconciliation. Consequently, practitioners should be aware of opportunities for growth
10
and adaptation such as ripe moments to implement new programs,
which may mitigate challenges and setbacks.
This can be seen in the adaptable approach taken by Play 31
in Sierra Leone. After establishing trust and building relationships
between perpetrators and victims over sport, they started to offer
workshops on human rights education and conflict resolution
skills. This secondary programming built upon the new rapport
between locals and signified that communities were ready to work
towards conflict prevention.
SCORE Indicator:
Trust in institutions
…
Begin during violence if there is existing interest for peace
Reconciliation is a non-linear process in that
The Nicaraguan government partnered
In Sierra Leone, Cata
efforts with
will the
face
challenges
and maybe stalls at
Organization
of American
implemented Fambul To
times.States
However,
practitioners
should realize mechanism based on Le
to institute
a land redistribution
cash incentive
The plan Therefore,
circles, which offered a f
theseand
challenges
canprogram.
be overcome.
included housing construction projects to
perpetrators
programs
should not be contingent upon thevictims and
unite communities by co-building
their truths and g
completion
of previous
steps. If there is an
integrated
housing developments.
existing willingness and interest to initiate a
In 2007,
the Commission
for Verification,
These meetings now include more
peace
process,
practitioners
do not need to wait
Reconciliation, Peace and Justice increased
While Fambul Tok is a C
extremist groups who work together on
for
violence
to
end
before
implementing
a
project.
beneficiaries’
pensions,
which
improved
local
communities are enc
disaster relief efforts, dialogues, and
Moreover,
programs
more efficient
in timethe process to fit the
Nicaraguans’
personalwill
lifebe
satisfaction
by
peacemaking activities, showing that the
someCapitalizing
of the povertyon
caused
adaptability makes Famb
cessation of violence is not a prerequisite
andalleviating
resources.
ripe by
moments
the war and subsequent earthquakes.
rather than static reconc
to implementation.
allows practitioners to address negative
stereotypes and intergroup anxiety as they arise,
providing more time to transform deeply-rooted perceptions of other groups.
In Indonesia, Forum for Peace Across
Religions and Groups uses interfaith
gatherings to transform conflicts into
productive peace. Participants include
members of an Islamist paramilitary group
who now work as peace activists and
humanitarian workers.
…
…
…
In Nicaragua and Indonesia, the path to reconciliation lacked aPlay 31 begins its work in Sierra Leone by
Prior to 2010, there was only one
asking permission to enter communities. If
linear
implementation.
The Nicaraguan
psychiatrist
for every 300,000
Liberians. In peace process had
their presence is wanted, then Play 31
numerous
stops
over with
a five-year
period before
2010, thestarts
Carterand
Center
partnered
the
organizesSCORE
football games and trains locals
Liberian in
government
train 150 local
as Peace Ambassadors.
Indicator:
culminating
a lastingtoceasefire.
In Indonesia, state-led efforts
mental health clinicians.
Human Security
initiated a TRC
law to reconcile. Yet, locals perceived the
Intergroup Anxiety
proposed TRC as lacking true justice and healing. In response
to the
concerns
of human
rights organizations
and activists, the
In 2015,
the Carter
Center reported
at least
In addition to sport, Play 31 teaches
three mentalnullified
health clinicians
in every
locals conflict resolution tools and human
government
the initial
lawcounty,
in 2006. While the national
and anticipates 70% of the population will
education to prevent future conflict
government
did recognize the need for an updated law, it has not rights
have access to mental health care within the
to build a more sustainable peaceful
established
newincreasing
law.
next few a
years,
mental health
environment.
…
awareness and reducing negative
stereotypes.
…
11
Partner with national institutions to increase project scope
There is no doubt that community-led initiatives are valuable, and can provide
practitioners with important models from which they can base future work off of.
However, if efforts remain localized within their specific contexts, their effect at the
national level is limited. As such, when efforts lack support from supplementary actors
like INGOs or governments, they are less effective in reaching multiple groups of
people. Additionally, partnerships can build trust between locals and
governmental actors creating a more cohesive identity. Furthermore, this
strengthens trust in institutions and the representation that they offer.
SCORE
In Totota County, Liberia, local women employed Palava Peace Huts
Indicator:
immediately after the civil war to air their grievances and speak their
Trust in institutions
truth. Today, the replication of the Peace Huts by national and
Civil life
international actors has encouraged local actors to take a more
satisfaction
proactive role and has led to increased reconciliation and social
cohesion across the country.
Intervention Focus
Address individual and collective healing
It is important to recognize that conflict and
violence harms individuals and the collective
community. Therefore, reconciliation efforts should be
implemented in a way that addresses personal and
interpersonal healing. To change the way in which
people interact, it is necessary to transform negative
beliefs and perceptions. As a result, intergroup anxiety
and negative stereotypes are reduced, mending
broken relationships and creating longer-term
reconciliation. Practitioners who keep this
in mind find that societies will experience
a stronger sense of social cohesion and that peace is more
SCORE
sustainable.
Indicator:
Personal Life
Satisfaction
Social Distance
The Palava Peace Huts in Liberia allowed for internal healing,
especially for women who suffered sexual and mental abuse. Also,
plays in Indonesia and Sierra Leone, provided the space for audiences
to reconcile their own feelings about conflict. At the same time, audience
members were faced with actors who were previously perpetrators. This
12
offered a safe space for stereotypes and perceptions to be transformed collectively, as
well.
Address economic grievances
Often, economic grievances are central to conflict; thus, it is important to implement
programs that bolster economic development. Economic disparities
are likely to be push factors in warring factions that recruit
members into a false sense of security. Therefore, reconciliation
SCORE
that lacks a focus on economic issues has great potential to
Indicator:
Personal Life
undermine its own efforts. Projects that consider this element
Satisfaction
will experience increased sustainability and longevity of
Negative
personal and civic life satisfaction.
Stereotypes
In Sierra Leone, Fambul Tok implemented communal activities
that followed truth telling ceremonies and signified the community
becoming one again. Often, these took the form of development activities. For example,
some communities cultivated Peace Farms. In this way, communities learned to work
together while addressing and overcoming one of the drivers of their internal conflict. Utilize short-term and long-term objectives
Building relationships and creating social cohesion in
divided societies requires both immediate and longterm solutions. By increasing the scope of
reconciliation, programs can broadly target root
causes and outcomes of conflict. Short-term
objectives should encompass methods that
end direct violence and begin the
process of rebuilding trust in
institutions and strengthening
SCORE
citizen security. Long-term
Indicator:
solutions should complement
Civic Life
Satisfaction
short-term initiatives, focusing on
Human Security
stability and sustainability. This
dual approach will support human
security and improve civic life satisfaction.
Although violence ceased and the nation remained politically stable in Nicaragua,
only recently has reconciliation shifted to address the broader issues of development
and economic empowerment. It was not until 2007 that the government established the
13
Commission for Verification, Reconciliation, Peace, and Justice to address victim issues
like a lack of healthcare, education, housing, and employment services. This lack of
long-term planning has contributed to Nicaragua’s delayed development, making
Nicaragua the poorest country in Central America, and the second poorest country in
the Western Hemisphere.
Community Integration
Include local stakeholders
Exclusionary practices can potentially undermine peace processes, and derail
the mending of relationships. Inclusive efforts are integral for communities to
develop a stronger sense of ownership and build local capacity, which are
particularly important once practitioners have left the community.
Therefore, it is imperative that reconciliation efforts be sensitive to the
needs of all people, and incorporate the voices of marginalized groups.
SCORE Indicator:
A failure to include groups such as youth, women, and minorities may
Trust in institutions
cause a resurgence in conflict. Furthermore, inclusive processes
contribute to reconciliation by reducing negative stereotypes and
perceptions of others, and intergroup anxiety.
Liberia provides a great example of inclusive programming with their
Palava Peace Huts, which include spaces for all marginalized groups. This hybrid effort
has led to a united country. However, in Sierra Leone, the government and civil society
are still experiencing a gap in their relationship. This is due to a less than inclusionary
TRC.
Coordinate between local and national actors
Each actor brings their own tools and models to reconciliation programs. This
includes financial and non-financial resources, such as staff and time.
Therefore, to make efforts more robust, and to leverage each other’s
assets, all actors must communicate openly and share information
widely. This approach will avoid overlap and a disjointed process
SCORE Indicator:
while creating a more well-rounded sense of reconciliation. This will
Intergroup Anxiety
Trust in
not only build trust among local and external actors, but will also
institutions
increase sustainability as actors share resources.
The case of Liberia exemplifies this coordination. Liberia’s Strategic
Roadmap coordinated their efforts between government and local
stakeholders. Before this coordination, actors remained disconnected. Recognizing the
success of their combined efforts, the Liberian government is collaborating with civil
…
…
…
integrated housing developments.
In 2007, the Commission for Verification,
These meetings now include more
Reconciliation, Peace and Justice increased
While Fambul Tok is a Catalyst method,
extremist groups who work together on
beneficiaries’ pensions, which improved
local communities are14
encouraged to adju
disaster relief efforts, dialogues, and
Nicaraguans’ personal life satisfaction by
the process to fit their needs. This
peacemaking activities, showing that the
alleviating some of the poverty caused by
adaptability makes Fambul Tok a dynamic
cessation of violence is not a prerequisite
actors, such as the Interreligious
Liberia (IRCL), to continue
the war and Council
subsequentofearthquakes.
rather than static reconciliation process.
to society
implementation.
reconciliation in the form of dialogue and trust building.
Ensure presence is wanted
Prior to 2010, there was only one
psychiatrist for every
Liberians.
It 300,000
is beneficial
for Inpractitioners to ensures
2010, the Carter Center partnered with the
their presence
wanted before introducing a
Liberian that
government
to train 150 is
local
mental
health clinicians.
new project.
By asking for permission,
…
Play 31 begins its work in Sierra Leone by
asking permission to enter communities. If
their presence is wanted, then Play 31
organizes football games and trains locals
as Peace Ambassadors.
…
practitioners avoid imposing programs in
communities where they are not welcome.
In 2015, the Carter Center reported at least
In addition to sport, Play 31 teaches
trustcounty,
from the beginning will
three mentalEstablishing
health cliniciansthis
in every
locals conflict resolution tools and human
and anticipates
70%
of practitioners
the population will
rights education to prevent future conflict
show
that
are interested in assisting
have accesscommunities
to mental healthrather
care within
the
to build a more sustainable peaceful
than changing them.
next few years, increasing mental health
environment.
Therefore,
this negative
elicitive model encourages local
awareness
and reducing
stereotypes.and ownership, and increases the
participation
likelihood of a program’s success. Play 31 utilized this consultative approach with their efforts in
Sierra Leone. This initial consultation allowed for locals to truly
understand what the organization could offer their community and
SCORE Indicator:
if these resources would accommodate their needs thereby
Trust in institutions
ensuring programs aligned with local communities wants and
needs. Without such an approach, practitioners gamble with
implementing programs of a prescriptive nature that misalign with
communities needs.
15
Assessment of Creative’s Work
This section will assess projects that occurred in Guatemala and Afghanistan by
Creative Associates International to develop recommendations for future endeavors in
the field of reconciliation. While the projects in these two countries were not geared to
specifically address reconciliation, they can provide practitioners with valuable insights
for the future.
Human Rights and Reconciliation Program (HRRP) in Guatemala
The overall result of the HRRP was the “advancement of reconciliation and
increased respect for human rights.”10 According to external monitors, Gish, Paz y
Asociados (GPA), the program did not result in national reconciliation. However, HRRP
efficaciously encouraged civilians to start the process for reconciliation. Therefore, the
activities implemented in Guatemala can serve as a foundation for future reconciliation
efforts. In particular, three actions from the HRRP should be referenced prior to
designing projects to support the process of reconciliation.11
First, HRRP utilized stakeholder analyses to ensure that initiatives matched and
complemented local realities. Following the conflict, the majority of the population
deemed the term “human rights” as leftist political propaganda, thus, the topic was
widely denounced. Before HRRP, previous efforts to increase education of human rights
were largely unsuccessful as they were grounded in traditional legal discourse. It is
important to note that all HRRP projects benefited from consultations in Guatemala.12
After stakeholder analyses, Creative identified a mass following for radio soap
operas, thus allowing HRRP to reframe the human rights conversation to mirror this
popular pastime. GPA observed that despite discussing the taboo topic of human rights,
the radio program was well received. The use of entertainment or popular pass times to
promote reconciliation can be beneficial in communities that are not ready to engage in
10
Human Rights and Reconciliation Project. 36.
Human Rights and Reconciliation Project. 3.
12 Human Rights and Reconciliation Project. 17.
11
16
conversations or for individuals who may not be open to different opinions.13 As
evidenced in Indonesia, where participants were unaware that they were partaking in
reconciliation projects while they attended plays. As demonstrated in the case studies,
popular pastimes such as football in Sierra Leone or plays in Indonesia can create
provide the necessary foundation or the initial push for post-conflict reconciliation work.
Based on the local success of the radio program throughout the region, HRRP
unveiled the radio soap opera in 99 local schools. In general, when efforts were well
received by the public, HRRP replicated the actions to take place in schools. Despite
the heavy impact of violence and the toll that conflict has on the young minds of
children, the dialogue programs developed by Interpeace, mental health awareness
campaigns by the Carter Center, and programs by Catalyst for Peace were not available
at schools. Instead, access was limited to select communities and individuals, making it
more difficult to access platforms for reconciliation. Therefore, it is crucial that
reconciliation be easily accessible like the efforts in Guatemala.
Second, in response to the continuation of significant human rights violations
throughout Guatemala, HRRP created the Training of Trainers (TOT) program. The TOT
program provided 119 civil society representatives with the skills necessary to work with
local authorities to prevent and resolve human rights violations. After completing the
program, the civil society (CS) representatives taught thousands more across the
region. Despite the short time frame for this project, the TOT program results were
impressive; the CS representatives trained 350 promoters and 5,926 community leaders
who then taught 10,048 participants in replica workshops across the region.14 After
coordinating with local authorities such as the Judiciary, Public Ministry, National Civilian
Police, and the Human Rights Ombudsperson (PDH), 264 human rights violations were
prevented.15
A similar cascading approach was utilized in the Liberia Transition Initiative (LTI)
for the Yes Training Modules. After receiving training, “master trainers” from Mercy
13
Human Rights and Reconciliation Project. 16.
Human Rights and Reconciliation Project. 23.
15 Human Rights and Reconciliation Project. 23.
14
17
Corps and Action Aid proceeded to train local “learning facilitators.”16 In spite of the high
dropout in participation, the final LTI report concluded, “there is little doubt that YES
training reached a much larger audience in the communities, as interest and time
warranted.”17 While the TOT program was used to prepare civil society actors to work
with local authorities, future efforts can focus on strengthening local mediation tools or
mediation and conflict resolution training. In response to a lack of mental health care
after the Liberian Civil War, external actors like the Carter Center bolstered local
capacity and trained over 160 mental health care clinicians. However, without a ‘training
of trainers’ approach, the Carter Center missed the opportunity to have a far reaching
and long-term impact. Thus, since it was not part of the goal, any mental health training
that occurs will be haphazard. Whereas, TOT increases the possibility for long-term
change after program completion because it places emphasis on supporting local
capacity in the long-term. Therefore, Creative Associates should continue variations of
this training program to ensure that knowledge is transferred as it requires minimal initial
input.18
Third, discussions regarding the conflict were considered taboo by many
Guatemalans, therefore it was widely avoided. Based on this, the projects implemented
by Creative Associates were tailored and gradual. After identifying different groups,
HRRP partnered with organizations to approach civilians in two distinct ways. To
address individuals who considered themselves directly affected by conflict, HRRP
partnered with six local organizations to disseminate the Historical Clarification
Commission (HCC) report. On the other hand, the HRRP developed a media campaign
(less intense) with international and state organizations for populations that did not
perceive themselves to be directly affected by the conflict.19 Developing these alliances
required more time, however, this approach made the dissemination campaign more
effective amongst groups that were initially unwilling to discuss the findings of the HCC.
16
Liberia Transition Initiative. 21.
Liberia Transition Initiative. 21.
18 Human Rights and Reconciliation Project. 15.
19 Human Rights and Reconciliation Project. 10.
17
18
By recognizing that reconciliation is a voluntary choice that cannot be imposed,
Creative’s gradual and distinct approach was crucial. Although developing multiple
alliances and coordinating with multiple actors takes more time, developing various
approaches to target populations based on their diverse needs is necessary to avoid
alienating one group or making individuals feel more uncomfortable. While these three
initiatives did not produce immense immediate change, they served as a catalyst for
reconciliation in Guatemala. Thus, the lessons from the Human Rights and
Reconciliation Project can serve as a valuable reference for practitioners in the future.20
USAID/OTI Community Cohesion Initiative in Afghanistan
For security and privacy reasons this section has been
removed from the public document
20
Human Rights and Reconciliation Project. 23.
19
Ways Forward
This section outlines the way forward for Creative’s reconciliation programming.
The first part includes a list of donors from around the world who have demonstrated an
interest in these types of projects. The second portion contains a list of countries ripe for
reconciliation programs. These countries were selected using the case study criteria,
and are of interest to at least one of the donors identified.
Donor Identification
Please note this list is not exhaustive of reconciliation activities and projects.
However, it is a sampling of donors supporting reconciliation work throughout the world.
Projects were selected with Creative’s purview in mind.
USA
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of Transition
Initiatives (OTI)
OTI, part of USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian
Assistance supports US foreign policy objectives through the assistance of local
partners in advancing peace and democracy. Their projects are generally focused on
short-term needs that become the building blocks for long-term development. OTI’s
work promotes reconciliation, stimulates local economies, supports independent media,
and fosters positive peace and democracy.21
Niger Community Cohesion Initiative (NCCI)
Niger is plagued with threats of violent extremism and conflict. NCCI is an active
program that aims to reduce such threats by increasing social cohesion among
Nigerians and decreasing youth interest in joining extremists. OTI partners with
21
United States Agency for International Development, “Office of Transition Initiatives.”
20
local CSOs, governments, and community members to implement dialogue
opportunities, brush-clearing, and hosting community information sessions which
focus on making locals aware of Niger’s efforts to promote stability and security
in their country.22
Fair Play, Fair Childhood: Bringing Children Together Through Sports in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (April 2014 - September 2016)
Through the mechanism of sports events, this project aims to bring together
children from different ethnic backgrounds as well as their families and other
spectators in an effort to ease ethnic tensions that have persisted since the end
of the war. In addition to annual basketball leagues during the school year, Youth
Sports Games are implemented each summer, which includes 10 different sports
and education and social networking events to increase dialogue and
reconciliation efforts.23 Qualitative data reports positive outcomes as evidenced
through the team leader of the European Under-16 Championship team, who
stated he viewed his teammates as brothers and family.24
Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)
The State Department created the Bureau of CSO, formerly the Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, to support conflict and crisis response
efforts through locally grounded analysis, strategic planning, and operational support for
local partners. CSO uses civilian responders, such as nonprofits, state officials,
international partners, and start-up funding to prevent and respond to conflicts.25
22
United States Agency for International Development, “Niger.”
United States Agency for International Development, “Fair play fair childhood bringing children together
through sports in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
24 United States Agency for International Development, Youth Basketball Unites the People of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
25 United States Department of State, “What We Do, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.”
23
21
Major Engagements
While no specific activities are listed, the CSO has current major engagements in
Burma, Syria, and Honduras.26
Past Projects
Projects in Kenya have worked to better civilian and police relations, and prevent
future violence. Afghanistan projects focused on military-civilian coordination,
integrating Americans and Afghans, and promoting women’s rights. CSO’s
engagement in Belize worked to build community dialogues and activists groups,
while reducing gang crime.27 In 2011, CSO employees performed Interagency
Conflict Framework analyses in Liberia during the election season. These
findings helped the government launch a criminal investigation of violence that
had occurred during this period.28
International Donors
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD)
DFATD is a conglomerate of the former Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). These
government branches merged in 2013. Past projects will likely be under the label of
CIDA, but will still be relevant to evaluating the work and potential for donor funding
from DFATD. DFATD’s development projects have five goals: increasing food security,
securing the future of children and youth, stimulating sustainable economic growth,
advancing democracy, and promoting security and stability. Additionally, all projects
consist of three main themes: increasing environmental sustainability, advancing gender
equality, and helping to strengthen governance institutions and practices.29
26
27
28
29
United States Department of State, “What We Do, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.”
United States Department of State, “What We Do, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.”
United States Department of State, “Liberia.”
Global Affairs Canada, “Thematic Priorities.”
22
Support for Peace and Democracy, Democratic Republic of Congo (September
2001 - June 2010)
This project aimed at supporting civil society organizations in the DRC, “in an
effort to achieve reconciliation, peace and democracy in the country. The project
supported local Congolese organizations to increase the participation and
influence of citizens in the DRC's political, economic and social decision-making
processes.”30
Peacebuilding and Reconciliation, Sudan (September 2002 - March 2011)
CIDA implemented this project to support peace initiatives and agreements
during the Sudan conflict. The activities involved civic participation, and
improving government skills and abilities with expected outcomes of “a peace
agreement that would end the longest lasting conflict in Africa; a return for the
Sudanese to a normal and productive life; and providing an opportunity for the
donors to concentrate their efforts towards sustainable development.”31
French Development Agency (AFD)
AFD provides economic and social development through various operational
sectors. In relation to reconciliation work, the crises and conflict sector focuses on the
following: assisting countries in current or recent armed conflict, countries encountering
a natural disaster or health crisis, countries with failing states, and divided societies
marked by instability and violence.32
Farmers in Sahel
In the Sahel region of Africa, local conflicts arise over land disputes which are
mainly driven by climate change and population growth. AFD addresses these
30
Canada Foreign Affairs, “Project Profile: Support for Peace and Democracy.”
Canada Foreign Affairs, “Project Profile: Peacebuilding and Reconciliation.”
32 French Development Agency, “Taking Action in Situations of Fragility, Crisis and Violence.”
31
23
root causes and mitigates local conflict by implementing programs to ease
tensions and prevent future conflict between herders and farmers. In Chad, AFD
has been partnering with organizations in the region to establish and maintain
pastoral water programs, which have proven successful for the last 15 years in
reducing conflicts and building sustainable systems in Chad.33
Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan: Preventing tensions between refugees and host
communities
Due to the arrival of Syrian refugees, Jordan and Lebanon are experiencing a
depletion of public service resources such as health, education, and sanitation.
AFD has partnered with international and local NGOs, and government
institutions to supplement public services including mental health services for
individuals and families to prevent tensions and violence thereby increasing
social cohesion.34
International Development Agency (IDA), The World Bank
The IDA provides funds to support health, education, infrastructure, agriculture,
economic, and institutional development to the world’s poorest countries to assist them
in creating stable countries after conflict and disasters. Their main focuses are Africa,
gender, conflict and fragility, climate change, and institutional strengthening.35
Community Development Project, Macedonia (May 2002 - June 2006)
The main objective of the project was to support the post-conflict government in
reconciliation efforts, reducing social tensions, and building socio-economic
capital. Funding supported small-scale micro projects that prioritized social
needs. These projects helped to build local capacity and were inclusive of civic
33
French Development Agency, “Taking Action in Situations of Fragility, Crisis, and Violence.”
Development Agency, “Taking action in situations of fragility, crisis and violence.”
35 International Development Association, “Ending Poverty through IDA.”
34French
24
participation and in line with community needs. Through working together, social
conflicts were eased and relationships were built among local Macedonians to
increase national reconciliation.36
Bridges for Peace, Bosnia and Herzegovina (1999-2004)
By building upon their common heritage of Mostar, this pilot project was
implemented to foster reconciliation between the people of Bosnia and
Herzegovina by rebuilding Stari Most bridge and its towers. IDA partnered with
local communities, the national governments, and other donors such as
UNESCO, the World Monuments Fund, and other countries like Italy and the
Netherlands to fund this project. Increased social cohesion and reconciliation are
noted as outcomes as well as increase to the local economies.37
United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID)
DFID is the leader in the UK’s work to help end poverty and eliminate the need
for aid through job creation, inclusion of girls and women, and providing emergency
assistance. There are 22 main policies that guide their development assistance, but of
particular interest are: economic growth in developing countries, governance in
developing countries, health in developing countries, women and girls in developing
countries, and peace and stability in the Middle East and North Africa.38
Rwanda Multi-Donor Civil Society Support Programme (August 2014 - ongoing)
This program aims to increase civil society participation and engagement on
issues of social cohesion, reconciliation, and governance in Rwanda. DFID is
providing and will continue to provide financial resources and operational support
to Rwandan civil society organizations to assist in achieving project goals.39
36
World Bank, Macedonia - Community Development Project.
IDA, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bridges for Peace.”
38 United Kingdom, “Department for International Development.”
39 Department for International Development, “Development Tracker, Rwanda.”
37
25
Rwanda Aegis Trust Community Education on Genocide (November 2008 March 2010)
DFID provided financial support for the Aegis Trust, a British NGO based out of
Rwanda, that works toward genocide prevention. 75% of this budget was spent
toward civilian peacebuilding efforts focusing on tolerance and inclusion and
used for conflict prevention efforts to prevent divisive attitudes.40
Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (November 2012 - September
2017)
This project has two main goals: bolster collective efforts to recognize and handle
violent conflict, and to protect vulnerable Nigerians from negative impact of
conflict. Roughly 50 percent of the funds in this project are allocated toward
civilian peacebuilding.41
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)
The PBF supports activities, actions, programs and organizations that seek to
build a lasting peace in countries emerging from conflict with four priority areas: projects
supporting peace-sustaining processes, projects enhancing good governance and
promoting national dialogue and reconciliation, projects stimulating economic
revitalization, and projects rebuilding basic infrastructure. Priority area two focuses
specifically on reconciliation efforts placing particular importance on human rights,
ending impunity and corruption, and increasing women’s participation in
peacebuilding.42 More information about the broad scope of initiatives under priority
area two can be found on pages 18-23 in the 2013 Annual Report of the Administrative
Agent of the Peacebuilding Fund.
40
Department for International Development, “Rwanda Aegis Trust Community Education on Genocide.”
Department for International Development, “Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme.”
42 United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, “What We Fund.”
41
26
Neighborhood Volunteer Scheme, Kenya (2008 - 2010)
In 2008, the PBF funded an emergency initiative after electoral violence in
Kenya, the Neighborhood Volunteer Scheme (NVS), with the assistance of UN
Kenya, the Kenyan government, civil society organizations, political parties,
NGOs, and other key stakeholders. The NVS aimed to restore peace through
communal healing, reconciliation peace building and relief service . By utilizing
locals, such as youth leaders, retired professionals, and community opinion
leaders, the NVS empowered communities to initiate peace campaigns and
practices on their own, and, as a result, transform attitudes and perceptions to
bring about reconciliation. Africa Development Alternative, Nairobi (2010)
evaluated this project and deemed its community-based reconciliation
successful, specifically highlighting volunteerism as a cornerstone to inclusive
efforts.43
Reconciliation in Kyrgyzstan (2010 - ongoing)
Since 2010, the PBF has provided funds to Kyrgyzstan to overcome ethnic
violence. This support has expanded to include multiple focuses on, “(a) the rule
of law, justice and human rights; (b) local self-governance and peacebuilding;
and (c) multilingual education and civic identity.” Outcomes aim to promote
reconciliation and peacebuilding activities by partnering with state and local
institutions and civil society to mend relationships and ease tensions. Activities
varied in practice, but included methods of youth engagement to change national
curriculum in schools and community engagement to create local tools of conflict
resolution that were familiar to all and would be effective in reducing tensions.
Additionally, the media integrated messages promoting reconciliation.44
43 Africa
44
Development Alternatives, Participatory Project Review Neighborhood Volunteer Scheme.
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, “Kyrgyzstan.”
27
Asian Development Bank
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) promotes the economic and social progress
of developing member countries (DMCs) in the Asian and Pacific region. During the past
40 years, the ADB has given special attention to the needs of smaller and lessdeveloped countries as well as prioritized programs that aim to promote regional
cooperation as well as economic growth.45 It is important to highlight that the Bank has
supported post-conflict efforts in Sri Lanka and Cambodia.
Sri Lanka: A Partnership for Prosperity (2001-2011)
Since 2001, ADB’s assistance to Sri Lanka has gradually shifted from agricultural
to infrastructure and post-conflict rehabilitation, with overwhelming support to the
finance sector and education. The Bank works with the government of Sri Lanka
by supporting post-conflict reconstruction in the eastern and northern provinces.
Interventions in Sri Lanka focus on “transport, energy, water supply and
sanitation, education, and public sector management.”46 ADB has been working
in Sri Lanka since 1968. In total, ADB provided 157 loans amounting to $5.3
billion and supported 245 technical assistance projects amounting to $115 million
in Sri Lanka.47
Microfinance Project in Indonesia
In response to the 2004 natural disaster, ADB started the Earthquake and
Tsunami Emergency Support Project in Indonesia. To promote the restoration of
livelihoods in disaster-stricken communities, ADB partnered with governmentowned bank, Bank Sumut, to provide microfinance loans to small business
owners throughout Aceh and North Sumatra. Although ADB’s Earthquake and
Tsunami Emergency Support Project ended, Bank Sumut continues to provide
45
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “Guide to Archives of
International Organizations.”
46 Asian Development Bank, “Sri Lanka A Partnership for Prosperity.”
47 Asian Development Bank, “Sri Lanka A Partnership for Prosperity.”19.
28
microfinance loans. Moreover, ADB provides technical assistance to help local
banks develop microfinance products and educate individuals about financial
literacy. This support is vital as many individuals, particularly women, need
resources to provide for their families.48
Cambodia: Commune Council Development Project (2002-2007)
President Haruhiko Kuroda of the Asian Development Bank describes Cambodia
“as one of the region’s most successful post-conflict economies.”49 The
Commune Council Development Project was mandated to support the commune
councils as they oversaw democratic development of communes. At the time, it
addressed the basic and immediate administrative needs of post-conflict society
as it embarked on a path for national reconstruction. Over 20,000 civilians have
received training through the Commune Council Development Projects in “local
development, conflict resolution, gender equity, civil registration, financial
management, and the D&D laws and regulations.”50
Countries for Future Engagement
Indonesia
As this project has illustrated, reconciliation efforts in Indonesia have been
localized to the communities that have taken it upon
themselves to initiate them, resulting in a disjointed sense
of reconciliation. The methods that have emerged have
been effective, particularly in the context of interfaith
dialogue between Christian and Muslim communities. As
such, there is reason to believe that such methods could
potentially be successful if implemented in other parts of
Donors:
Asian Development Bank
DFATD, Canada
DFID, UK
UN Peacebuilding Fund
World Bank, IDA
the country. Thus, Indonesia serves as a potential place
48 Asian
Development Bank, “Microfinance in Indonesia: Bringing Banks into the Community.”
Development Bank, “From Rehabilitation to Inclusive Growth.” ii.
50 Asian Development Bank, “From Rehabilitation to Inclusive Growth.” 38.
49 Asian
29
for practitioners to initiate new projects in the field of reconciliation. The grassroots
efforts that have appeared provide practitioners with a solid model to base their own
programs off of.
Nicaragua
Similar to the case of Indonesia, the government of Nicaragua initiated a process
for reconciliation at the national level, however countrywide access to reconciliation has
been limited due to a lack of successful coordination. While the holistic approach of the
government did not produce the desired results, grassroots actors proved that faith
based, art and healing, and mental health reform were efficacious in various parts
across Nicaragua. When collaborations with external
actors occurred, the prospect for reconciliation became
Donors:
DFATD, Canada
DFID, UK
UN Peacebuilding Fund
World Bank, IDA
most feasible. Given Nicaragua’s need for economic
development and infrastructure rebuilding, the United
Nations Peacebuilding Fund and the World Bank would
be good donors to solicit, due to their strong interest in
projects that enhance good governance stimulate
economic revitalization, and rebuild basic infrastructure.
Cambodia
Between 1975 and 1979, Cambodia was under the control of the Khmer Rouge,
a communist faction that sought to create the ultimate “agrarian utopia.” In reality, they
emptied the country’s cities and implemented extremely harsh forced labor programs,
resulting in the deaths of at least one million people.51 Although the violence stopped,
reconciliation efforts have been minimal. In 2003, the government established the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), a hybrid court that uses
both retributive and restorative justice methods to address the atrocities committed
51
Jasini; Phan, “Victim participation at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: are
retributive and restorative principles enhancing the prospect for justice?” 379-80.
30
during the conflict period.52 This allows for a more participatory approach to
reconciliation, but has been criticized for its slow speed. Furthermore, post-traumatic
stress disorder and other mental health problems remain
prevalent.53
Some communities have begun initiating culturallybased methods to address these issues, but they are not
widespread and could use the support of external
practitioners. With Buddhism as the majority religion, the
monastic community has a lot of influence over local
populations and serves as an important group to partner
Donors:
AFD, France
Asian Development Bank
DFATD, Canada
DFID, UK
UN Peacebuilding Fund
World Bank, IDA
with.54 Thus, Cambodia provides numerous opportunities
to begin programming, and the World Bank or Asian
Development Bank would be appropriate donors given their pre-existing projects in
Cambodia.
Sri Lanka
Conflict between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils has been prevalent
in Sri Lanka ever since the end of British colonial rule. In 1983, civil war began between
the government military and the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and lasted
until 2009 when the latter was defeated.55 Political stability has since returned to the
country, which now experiences relative peace. However, the war ended without a truce
between the Tamils and Sinhalese, and relations between the two groups remain
tense.56 The government has been accused of pandering to Sinhalese interests without
addressing the needs of the Tamils, though there is potential for change with the
52
Jasini; Phan, “Victim participation at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: are
retributive and restorative principles enhancing the prospect for justice?” 380.
53 Dicklitch; Malik, “Justice, Human Rights, and Reconciliation in Postconflict Cambodia.” 516.
54 Harris, “Onslaught on beings: Theravada Buddhist Perspective on accountability for crimes committed
in the democratic Kampuchea period.” 61.
55 Bajoria, “The Sri Lankan Conflict.” Council on Foreign Relations.
56 The Economist, “Mahinda misfires.”
31
election of Maithripala Sirisena as president in January 2015. In September of this year,
the Sirisena government announced that they would be
establishing a TRC, similar in model to that of South
Donors:
Asian Development Bank
DFATD, Canada
DFID, UK
UN Peacebuilding Fund
World Bank, IDA
Africa.57 This is undoubtedly an important step, but it
also will be necessary to initiate efforts that prevent
future conflicts. DFID or the UNPFB would be
appropriate donors, given that each organization
expresses an interest enhancing good governance
and promoting national dialogue and reconciliation
in developing countries.
Mali
While Mali experienced a violent conflict since 2012, the situation is of special
interest as the Algiers Accord was recently signed by the government and the
Coordination of Movements for Azawad (CMA), a coalition of rebel leaders, in June
2015.58 To bolster the signing of the Algiers Accord, the National Coalition of Civil
Society for Peace and the Fight Against the Proliferation of
Light Weapons (CONASCIPAL), an umbrella organization
of civil society organizations, in partnership with the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
launched a strategic vision aimed to foster a working
relationship between civil society and government
actors.59 If properly supported, the strategic vision could
Donors:
DFATD, Canada
DFID, UK
UN Peacebuilding Fund
USAID, OTI
World Bank, IDA
serve as a basis for comprehensive long-term
collaborations.60
57
The Guardian, “Sri Lanka to set up a South Africa-style truth and reconciliation commission.”
Reuters, “Malian rebel alliance signs peace deal with government.”
59 Insight on Conflict, “CONASCIPAL.”
60 “SIPRI and local partner CONASCIPAL launch a strategic vision for civil society's contribution to the
Malian peace process.” SIPRI. Web.
58
32
Existing efforts by civil society include peace education, mediating and
preventing conflicts, and training for conflict management.61 Additionally, CSO and the
state of Mali showed interest in ending the conflict when they traveled to Liberia to study
the work of the Palava Peace Huts. To support this interest and strengthen the existing
training activities, civil society could benefit from external support such as Creative’s
Training of Trainers approach that occurred in Guatemala and Liberia. Potential donors
include French Development Agency or the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and
Development since both agencies express an interest in assisting countries with failing
states and divided societies marked by instability and violence
Bosnia
The breakup of Yugoslavia resulted in numerous bloody wars in the Balkan
region. In Bosnia, this culminated in an attempted ethnic cleansing of Bosniak Muslims
at the hands of Serb forces. In July 1995, more than 8,000 Muslim men and boys were
massacred at Srebrenica. Months later, in November the Dayton Accords ended the
war. It also split the country into 2 portions: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
populated by Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, and the Republika Srpska, populated by
Bosnian Serbs.62 In 1993, the UN Security Council
Donors:
DFATD, Canada
DFID, UK
AFD, France
UN Peacebuilding Fund
USAID, OTI
World Bank, IDA
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to prosecute those
responsible for committing atrocities.63 While this is
important for holding perpetrators accountable for their
actions, it has not addressed ways to bring together the
different ethnic groups that inhabit the country.
Today ethnic divides run deep, to the point where the
presidency consists of 3 members: a Serb, a Bosniak,
61
Group of Environmental Support. Insight on Conflict.
McMahon and Western, “The Death of Dayton.” Foreign Affairs.
63 “The Tribunal: Establishment.” United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia.
62
33
and a Croat, each representing their own constituencies.64 Ethnic communities are
largely separated, each with their own political structures, schools, and economies.
Bosnia has experienced poor economic development in comparison to its neighbors,
and the inability of the 3 presidential members to agree on decisions has slowed down
their membership to the EU. Actors such as USAID have initiated reconciliation
programming focused on bringing together these ethnic groups, particularly Serbs and
Bosniaks. The use of sport among youth has been successful in encouraging
interactions between children who otherwise would have no opportunity to meet
members of other ethnic communities. The World Bank has also funded infrastructural
projects in Bosnia, where one of the reported outcomes was increased social cohesion
among communities. These small projects provide promising evidence there are
opportunities for Creative in this country, as the existing efforts are few in number, but
large in impact. USAID and the World Bank would be appropriate donors to approach
for funding, as they have already initiated successful projects in Bosnia.
64
Silber, “Dayton, 10 Years After.” New York Times.
34
Recommendations
Expand Projects into Southeast Asia
There is a clear need for the initiation of reconciliation projects in countries in
South and Southeast Asia, as evidenced by Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and Indonesia. In the
future, Myanmar could potentially be added to this list. These post-conflict countries
have received little attention from reconciliation practitioners, but great need for these
types of projects exists. Additionally, countries like Cambodia offer Creative an
opportunity be a leader in the reconciliation field by integrating mental health
programming into peacebuilding activity. This gap in reconciliation programming offers
Creative an opportunity to distinguish itself from other organizations engaging in postconflict reconciliation. Donors such as the Asian Development Bank and USAID are
already engaged in projects. As such, this region is ripe for opportunity.
Consider Local Conceptions of Reconciliation
Reconciliation has proven to be context-specific. Communities view this concept
differently from one another. In light of this, Creative should keep in mind that what
constitutes justice and healing in one context may not be true in another. Furthermore,
reconciliation may not even mean justice or healing in every context. Overall, based on
the case study analysis and literature review, we conclude that there is not a one size
fits all approach for reconciliation. Instead, when implementing projects, practitioners
should be aware of the various needs of civilians living within a community and develop
programs that are not only culturally relevant but also equally enticing to all groups of
individuals.
Projects With Multiple Objectives
Throughout the case study analysis, it became clear that the projects that
addressed multiple objectives were the most successful. This would include
reconciliation goals, such as justice or healing for communities, but also more long-term
35
goals focused on development and stability. The poetry workshops in Afghanistan serve
as one example. Like peace songs in Sierra Leone, Creative could have adapted its
programing to use poetry as a therapeutic experience and contribute further to a
sustainable peace. Creative should remain aware of future opportunities for program
adaptations and integrate them into reconciliation programming when appropriate.
Continue Stakeholder Analysis
In future proposals and projects, Creative should continue to conduct stakeholder
analysis and mirror local reality in order to increase the success of the programs. As
seen in Guatemala, Creative Associates should also make reconciliation activities easily
available to the entire population. While Interpeace and Play31 worked to include
civilians of all ages, a lack of reconciliation projects at school made it difficult for children
to have direct access to individual or communal healing.
Use of the Sport, Peace, and Development Methodology
Creative already uses sports to develop social cohesion in divided communities,
and it should continue to do so in its reconciliation work. The success of Play 31’s model
shows that a combination of physical sport and skills workshops better equip community
members with the tools to transform injustices, forgive war offenses, and internalize
lessons learned about conflict resolution and human rights. As a result, this combination
leads to a more effective form of reconciliation activity. Programming that integrates
dialogue moves the experience beyond the pitch and into a community forum that
serves as a foundation for growth and reconciliation.
36
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United States Department of State, “What We Do, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations.” Accessed November 23, 2015. http://www.state.gov/j/cso/what/index.htm.
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“Retributive and Restorative Justice.” American Law Psychology 32, (2007): 375-389.
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50
Appendix 1: Approaches to Reconciliation
Retributive and Restorative Justice
Transitional justice offers a wide array of judicial and non-judicial approaches to
achieve justice as it attempts to provide recognition to victims, achieve accountability,
provide victims with reparations, and encourage civic trust.65 From this stems two
further concepts: retributive and restorative justice. Retributive methods focus on a
“unilateral imposition of punishment” for the perpetrator and reparations for the victim.
Proponents of retributive justice argue that war crime tribunals support reconciliation
processes in three significant ways: they ensure that justice is delivered, establish the
truth about crimes committed, and individualize guilt. Advocates of retributive justice
argue that individualizing guilt contributes to the reconciliation process because it shows
that an entire ethnic or political group is not culpable of committing atrocities; instead,
fault is placed on specific actors.
Dr. Janine Clark, professor of international criminal law and transitional justice,
argues that these three claims are flawed and cannot lead to reconciliation, explaining
that the concept of justice is shaped by several internal factors, and varies across
societies. This is mainly due to the lack of a universal definition and understanding of
justice.66 Moreover, she argues that retributive justice only addresses factual or forensic
truth. Tribunals do not provide a space for personal, social, or healing truth. Thus, to
achieve reconciliation restorative justice methods must also be pursued.67
Restorative justice emerged as an alternative paradigm to heal the wounds of all parties
- the victim, perpetrator, and community.68 The aim is for rehabilitation or reintegration
rather than punitive measures toward the perpetrator. These processes hold the victim
and perpetrator responsible in the healing process, though the latter will generally bear
65
“What is Transitional Justice.” The International Center for Transitional Justice.
Clark, “The Three Rs: Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice, and Reconciliation,” in Contemporary Justice
Review: Issues in Criminal, Social, and Restorative Justice.
67 Clark, “The Three Rs: Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice, and Reconciliation,” in Contemporary Justice
Review: Issues in Criminal, Social, and Restorative Justice. 335.
68 Lambourne, “Justice and Reconciliation: Postconflict Peacebuilding in Cambodia and Rwanda,” in Reconciliation,
Justice, and Coexistence.
66
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the burden of repairing the harm done by his or her actions.69 The wrongdoer will also
have to make efforts to restore their broken relationship with the community as a whole,
augmenting the process of reintegration. The community plays a larger role in the
restorative approach than it does in retributive efforts, facilitating not only justice, but
also healing.
Although retributive and restorative methods differ in their approach, scholars
advocate for the combination of these two methods, arguing that they can complement
each other and aid in the reconciliation process.70 For example, after examining the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), experts concluded that
the retributive process failed to produce positive peace. The ICTY placed more
emphasis on punishment than on healing and did not provide survivors with an active
role.71 While there is no hatred amongst differing groups, many participants emphasized
that “they will never trust again.”72 This opens the opportunity for the introduction of a
restorative justice approach to supplement the initial retributive measures, such as a
truth and reconciliation commission (TRC). Dr. Clark believes that a TRC in Bosnia and
Herzegovina would complement the work of ICTY in three distinct ways.73 First, TRCs
would promote self-reflection throughout society.74 Clark firmly believes that selfexamination is crucial for victims and perpetrators to learn from past mistakes and move
forward.
Clark also found that due to the location of the criminal trials, many civilians in
Bosnia were unaware of ICTY results.75 And if the “record is not recognized and
internalized by the people,” it cannot contribute to the reconciliation process.76
69
Llewellyn, “Restorative Justice in Transitions and Beyond: The Justice Potential of Truth-Telling Mechanisms for
Post-Peace Accord Societies,” in Telling the Truths.
70 Mobekk, “Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies-Approached to Reconciliation,” in After Intervention: Public
Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies – From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership. 272.
71 Clark, “The Three Rs: Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice, and Reconciliation.” 341.
72 Clark, “The Limits of Retributive Justice,” in Journal of International Criminal Justice. 470.
73 Clark, “The Three Rs: Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice, and Reconciliation.” 332.
74 Clark, “The Limits of Retributive Justice.” 479.
75Clark, “The Limits of Retributive Justice.” 467.
76 Clark, “The Three Rs: Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice, and Reconciliation.” 335.
52
Therefore, the introduction of a TRC would create a greater sense of local
ownership. Lastly, unlike TRCs which are “victim-centered,” Dr. Clark states that criminal
trials do not support victims in their recovery process.77 Although retributive measures
do not contribute to reconciliation in the form of healing, the prosecution of major actors
provides accountability and traditional justice.78 Therefore, in order to achieve
reconciliation and positive peace, restorative justice mechanisms should complement
retributive measures. Peace scholar David Crocker argues that restorative justice
rehabilitates perpetrators and victims by reestablishing relationships based on respect.
Legal mechanisms, however, cannot provide this foundation for justice.79 International
tribunals can only provide deterrent justice. They cannot deliver “rehabilitative justice or
justice as an affirmation of human dignity.”80
Top-Down Reconciliation
As states move from conflict towards peace, there are three approaches to
reconciliation: top-down, bottom-up, and hybrid. The national government, security
forces, and foreign interveners lead a top-down approach to reconciliation. State
involvement permits the development of national reconciliation by using legislative
powers and political influence to rebuild society and political stability, while security
forces prevent a resurgence in violence.81 Top-down reconciliation hopes “… to build
civic trust, to achieve political reconciliation and democratic reciprocity… the goal is less
to achieve deep understanding and more to build adequate working relations.”82 While
this approach uses state influence to facilitate widespread change and development, it
is limited to post-conflict societies in which the state is recognized as the legitimate
77
Clark, “The Limits of Retributive Justice.” 480.
Mobekk, “Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies-Approached to Reconciliation,” in After Intervention: Public
Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies. 272.
79 David Crocker, “Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society,” in Truth versus Justice. 103.
80 Clark, “The Three Rs: Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice, and Reconciliation.” 343.
81 Charbonneau, “The Post-conflict Paradox: Engaging war, Creating Peace” in Peacebuilding, Memory, and
Reconciliation: Bridging Top-down and Bottom-Up Approaches. 30.
82 Bloomfield, On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation. 27.
78
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governing body. In societies where the state is considered illegitimate, government
sponsored peace strategies will be ineffective.
The Nicaraguan military and national government provide a great example of topdown reconciliation. With the conclusion of the civil war, a collaboration with the
Organization for American States (OAS) brokered a peace deal with the armed
resistance and national armies to lead to democratic elections. After the elections, both
military groups honored their commitment to recognize the elected president and work
with the new government as it transitioned into power. The OAS supported their
transition, and created Peace Commissions to mediate disputes, address human rights
abuses, and run formal workshops between opposition groups.83 This successfully
created a framework for local actors to subsequently engage in bottom-up approaches
to reconciliation within their communities.
Bottom-Up Approach
Researchers advocate for a bottom-up or grassroots approach because of its
inclusive and culture-specific nature to reconciliation. By embracing the local culture and
its actors, bottom-up efforts are more likely to incorporate the local contexts, thereby
becoming a self-sustaining system for internal actors to create and conserve peace.84
Such measures involve local participation to build local capacity, accountability, and
ownership. Bottom-up reconciliation responds to local needs and draws on local
knowledge and energy. Therefore, peace is more likely to be sustained when external
actors leave.85 This is a crucial point to consider in practice because locals know best
what will work in their communities and what will not, as well as what needs and
interests should be addressed and protected to establish and sustain peace. In the
same vein, the community is a local system full of invaluable tools and knowledge
providing internal paths to reconciliation.86 Thus, conflict resolution and peacebuilding
83
Ruhl, "Civil-Military Relations in Post-Sandinista Nicaragua." 117-39.
“Local Systems: A Framework for Supporting Sustained Development.” USAID. Web.
85 “Local Systems: A Framework for Supporting Sustained Development.” USAID. Web.
86 “Local Systems: A Framework for Supporting Sustained Development.” USAID. Web.
84
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mechanisms have already been established within cultures and it would behoove
practitioners to build upon these innate systems as this will ensure the meanings that
external actors and locals hold of reconciliation will align.
In Sierra Leone, for example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
implemented by the UN was deemed ineffective. Sierra Leoneans felt they did not
benefit from traditional justice as it lacked their cultural understanding of reconciliation –
truth telling, accountability, and forgiveness.87 Thus, Fambul Tok (family talk) was
conceived.88 Their approach to reconciliation focuses on communal forgiveness and
healing over bonfire circles in which perpetrators state their wrongdoing and ask their
victim, community, and spiritual ancestors for forgiveness. Afterward, cleansing
ceremonies take place signifying community unity and forgiveness.89 While a grassroots
approach may not be suited for all conflicts, the relationship between local culture,
reconciliation, and sustainable peace is an important one to consider in practice.
Hybrid Approach
The hybrid approach applies a blend of top-down and bottom-up methods,
through collaborations between national and local actors. This helps practitioners
overcome the common critique of being too prescriptive and not paying enough
attention to the needs of communities. It “...encourages us to pay attention to local
actors, and reminds us that the actions employed by local actors need not conform to
conventions of acceptable and unacceptable political behavior as prescribed by actors
from the global north.”90 This approach utilizes a local perspective as it views the
context as a tool for reconciliation while, simultaneously, studying the interrelated
dynamics of all actors and their effects on reconciliation processes. Therefore, a hybrid
approach engages all stakeholders in a mix of top-down and bottom-up reconciliation
processes, and, thus, makes visible the effects reconciliation processes have on
87
Caulker, “Fambul Tok: reconciling communities in Sierra Leone.” African Studies Companion Online. Web.
Caulker, “Fambul Tok: reconciling communities in Sierra Leone.” African Studies Companion Online. Web.
89Caulker, “Fambul Tok: reconciling communities in Sierra Leone.” African Studies Companion Online. Web.
90 Mac Ginty, “International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace.” 5.
88
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individuals, communities, states, and each other.91 Examining these reactions helps to
ensure reconciliation initiatives are producing positive outcomes.
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) have a clearly
stated chief aim to “provide justice to the people of Cambodia, those who died, and the
survivors.”92 In order to achieve this lofty goal, a hybrid approach was applied to the
court system blending domestic and international courts which combined international
justice mechanisms, local actors, and culturally relevant norms.93 Furthermore, these
hybrid courts incorporated elements of restorative justice, such as victim participation
and testimony, thereby facilitating a more well rounded sense of healing for the
individual victims and the collective community. A similar process existed in post-conflict
Rwanda with their Gacaca courts. Community-based tribunals were held for Rwandans
to publicly acknowledge harms with communal elders dictating justice for what were
deemed lesser crimes. For high crimes, however, perpetrators were sent to Tanzania to
be judged by the UN court system.94 Both cases integrated the local context in their
reconciliation processes and by doing so, people were able to heal in a way that was
culturally understood.
91
Mac Ginty, “International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace.” 73.
Bisset, Truth Commissions and Criminal Courts. 22-23.
93 Jasini; Phan, “Victim participation at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: are retributive and
restorative principles enhancing the prospect for justice?” 379.
94 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace. 48.
92
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Appendix 2: Reconciliation Methodologies
As described in the previous section, one or multiple approaches can be applied
to reconciliation efforts. From these approaches, countless processes can materialize.
Acknowledging the argument that reconciliation is socially constructed, scholars have
observed that reconciliation processes vary in practice from culture to culture.95 The
number of processes in practice grows exponentially when applying this logic to
cultures. Reconciliation, thus, is a variable practice that is adaptable to the requirements
of different cultures and manifests in a myriad of ways.96 However, shared practices do
exist across cultures. Therefore, the following section will delve into cross-cultural
methodologies of reconciliation.
Interfaith Dialogue
Interfaith dialogue is a method by which post-conflict communities, particularly
those that have experienced ethnic or religious conflict, strive to achieve reconciliation.
Such dialogue generally consists of conversations between members of different faith
groups with the expressed objective of exploring various means for bridging communal
divides.97 Interfaith dialogue can foster compassion between communities by focusing
on shared commonalities instead of divisive differences.98 Leonard Swindler, professor
of Catholic thought and interreligious dialogue at Temple University, posits three areas
in which interfaith dialogue operates: the practical, where each group collaborates for
the good of humanity; the spiritual, where each group experiences the other’s religion
from “within;” and the cognitive, where the understanding of truth is sought out.99 One of
the major benefits of interfaith dialogue is that it can be used at all levels of society, from
the grassroots to the state. It can target theological issues, but also general political or
social issues that are shared between faiths, helping to build relationships and mutual
95
Claggett-Borne, “Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation.” 11-21.
Claggett-Borne, “Definitions of Peace and Reconciliation.” 11-21.
97 Hayward, “Engaging across divides: interfaith dialogue for peace and justice.” 21-22.
98 Huggins, “Making peace together, faith and reconciliation: reflections of an interfaith dialogue practitioner.” 315-318.
99 Hayward, “Engaging across divides: interfaith dialogue for peace and justice.” 22.
96
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understanding. In addition to reconciliation, interfaith dialogue can be an integral tool for
conflict prevention.
Interfaith dialogue has been used in Indonesia between Christian and Muslim
groups in the post-Suharto era.100 Although the country has transitioned into a
democracy, violent clashes continue to erupt. Between 1999 and 2002, interreligious
violence broke out in the Moluccas, a region comprised of hundreds of islands, resulting
in the deaths and injuries of tens of thousands of people. Due to the lack of
government-led mechanisms, local religious leaders and activists have initiated their
own efforts toward reconciliation.101 The exact methods vary by individuals,
communities, and regions. The most common is pela, a traditional alliance system in the
Central Moluccas that brings multiple villages together in pacts in order to construct
religious buildings, help each other during crises, and organize big events or rituals.102
This has allowed the people of the Moluccas to create and manage shared social
institutions, thereby enabling cooperation at both the individual and community level.
Another community in the region established a team comprised of both Christian and
Muslim members to work together on conflict resolution and improve inter-group
relations. This effort culminated in the signing of a sixteen-point agreement that focused
mostly on agreements to stop religious violence and to work toward peace.103 These
local methods have helped to facilitate peacebuilding and understanding between
previously antagonistic peoples.
Truth Telling
Truth telling provides survivors with a platform to voice their grievances, playing a
pivotal role in reconciliation. Although originally created to gather victim testimonies of
100
Al Qurtuby, “Reconciliation from Below: Indonesia’s Religious Conflict and Grassroots Agency for Peace.”
142-143.
101 Al Qurtuby, “Reconciliation from Below: Indonesia’s Religious Conflict and Grassroots Agency for Peace.”
143-144.
102 Al Qurtuby, “Reconciliation from Below: Indonesia’s Religious Conflict and Grassroots Agency for Peace.”
144-145.
103 Al Qurtuby, “Reconciliation from Below: Indonesia’s Religious Conflict and Grassroots Agency for Peace.”
144-145.
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past abuses to establish the truth, many participants have found therapeutic value in the
process. Therefore, truth telling paves the way to reconciliation through
acknowledgement, acceptance, and collective responsibility.104 This is evidenced in the
lives of Cambodian women experiencing trauma following the Khmer Rouge regime.
After they shared their stories, women reported feeling more empowered and in
control.105 Truth telling participants in Chile, Sri Lanka, and South Africa agreed that
speaking their truth and listening to others allowed them to leave their grievances in the
past and focus on the future.106 Incorporating truth telling into reconciliation processes
helps to achieve community healing and restore peaceful relationships.107
Due to the marginalization of victims through legal and religious mechanisms,
some reconciliation processes have not adequately recognized gender-based trauma.
Feminist theorists agree that truth telling is a critical psychological step towards
individual healing in both men and women.108 This process brings forward the different
gendered roles of men and women in conflict and in reconciliation. In order to be
effective and inclusive of all genders, truth telling processes need to ensure
confidentiality, build trust, and provide a safe space.109 These measures encourage men
and women, who may feel stigmatized, to tell their truth.110 Without such truth telling
mechanisms, survivors of gender-based violence may be excluded from the healing
process and therefore unable to forgive and move on from conflict.
Art and Healing
Approaching reconciliation from an arts perspective is another useful tool in
practice, particularly for healing. Art has the potential to provide opportunities for
individuals and communities to acknowledge harms and explore various means of
healing. Furthermore, art allows for a reframing of the conflict, especially for political
104
Alam, Women and Transitional Justice: Progress and Persistent Challenges. 85.
McKay, “Gender Justice and Reconciliation.” 565.
106 Kiss, “Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints.” 72.
107 Alam, Women and Transitional Justice: Progress and Persistent Challenges. 86.
108 McKay, “Gender Justice and Reconciliation.” 564.
109 Alam, “Engendering Peace: Gender Mainstreaming in Transitional Justice.” Peace Women.
110 Mulli, “Achieving Gender Justice through Truth Telling.” Justice and Reconciliation.
105
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purposes in creating a shared national identity among communities. Additionally, it can
facilitate psychological mending on an intrapersonal level.111 In essence, artistic
expressions allow people to speak through their craft when traditional speech actually
inhibits them. Further, it acts as a tool for remembering. This is an important factor in
reconciliation because acknowledgment is important for the healing process.112
Arts-based approaches provide a global tool for reconciliation. Peace-links, a
non-governmental organization (NGO) in Sierra Leone, draws upon the Leoneans’ rich
cultural heritage to build community and heal from the civil war by utilizing such artsbased approaches as dancing, singing, drawing, and theater. These methods employ
symbols and notions of healing through visual and non-visual means to encourage
reconciliation. 113 In Northern Ireland, the Belfast Kids’ Guernica project approaches
healing through the process of remembering by transforming politically divisive murals
into new pieces of art promoting reconciliation.114 In tandem with Canada’s TRC, art
exhibitions serve to convey and explore deep feelings such as anger and reluctance to
forgive that are commonly discouraged in court settings. Rather than dictating justice as
an outcome, art shapes the reconciliation process to focus more on healing victims and
their emotions allowing for deeper reflection and understanding.115 While arts-based
reconciliation may not have a direct impact on the conflict, the experience and
communication that is facilitated will encourage parties to think differently about
themselves and the other.116
Sport, Development, and Peace
A contemporary approach to grassroots reconciliation is the sport, development,
and peace (SDP) sector. SDP uses sports to reduce community tensions and
supplement reconciliation and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict societies. Team-
111
Conlon, “The Art of Conflict and Peace in Northern Ireland.”
Conlon, “The Art of Conflict and Peace in Northern Ireland.”
113 Kanyako, “Using Creative Arts to Deglamorize War, Peacelinks in Sierra Leone.”
114 Conlon, “The Art of Conflict and Peace in Northern Ireland.”
115 Sandals, “Art, Residential Schools & Reconciliation: Important Questions.” Canadian Art.
116 Zelizer, “Integrating Community Arts and Conflict Resolution: Lessons and Challenges from the Field.”
112
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building trainings, practices, and games attended by the public aim to counteract
racism, intolerance, and prejudice in divided societies.117 In creating an environment of
mixed teams and collaboration, SDP de-stigmatizes the “other” by tearing down
stereotypes to build an environment where youth perceive each other as friends. For
example, Play 31 in Sierra Leone uses football to initiate the processes of reconciliation
and forgiveness in post-conflict communities. This is done through the organization of
football tournaments, as well as human rights and conflict resolution workshops in which
locals are trained as peace ambassadors.118 Not only does Play 31 use the physical act
of sport to bring people toward together, it also places emphasis and value on equipping
locals with tools to transform injustices and inequalities. Along with the opportunity to
come together to forgive war offenses and mend as a collective, Leoneans are able to
internalize lessons learned about conflict resolution and human rights.119
Another benefit of SDP is the underlying multiplier effect in which youth are
trained to become coaches or mentors to take lessons learned into their own
communities, encouraging future youth engagement.120 Lastly, SDP initiatives are also
inclusive to marginalized groups such as the disabled through wheelchair basketball
and females through gender specific sports. In communities where divided populations
may not share a common language, sports offer participants and their families a
platform to engage with each other and develop positive relationships.121 By fostering
cooperation, sportsmanship, and respectful competition, vulnerable youth learn to deal
with confrontation and conflict without aggression.122
117
Giulianotti, “Sport, peacemaking and conflict resolution: a contextual analysis and modelling of the sport,
development and peace sector.”208.
118Stanners, "Battling War Wounds with Football." The Murmur.
119Stanners, "Battling War Wounds with Football." The Murmur.
120 Lecrom; Dwyer. “Plus-sport: The impact of a cross-cultural soccer coaching exchange.” 5.
121 Lecrom; Dwyer. “Plus-sport: The impact of a cross-cultural soccer coaching exchange.” 5.
122 Fink, "Thinking Outside the Box Exploring the Critical Roles of Sports, Arts, and Culture in Preventing Violent
Extremism.” 5.
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Mental Health
Mental health initiatives target the emotional and psychosocial damages that
result following conflicts. Community measures toward reconciliation are typically better
at addressing mental health than top-down efforts.123 Grassroots initiatives are more
effective in creating methods that come from within the community in which they are
operating, and are therefore better able to address how trauma is manifested and
experienced in that group. Sociologist Jeffrey C. Alexander states that, “Traumas are
constructed not only as threats to already existing collective identity, but also as
symbolic vehicles that allow future collective identities to be formed.”124 This can be
seen in Cambodia with survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime where children raised by
parents with mental illness are more likely to inherit similar issues, thereby creating a
self-perpetuating cycle of intergenerational trauma.125 In order for reconciliation to be
effective in perpetuating trauma, attention must be paid to the psychosocial processes
involved with post-conflict healing and reconstruction. One of the mechanisms by which
healing can occur is Interactive Conflict Resolution.126 This method is based on socialpsychological principles, concepts, and practices that focus on the centrality of the
relationship between victim and perpetrator in conflict resolution.127
However, many challenges exist in efforts to address mental health and trauma
in cross-cultural contexts. Culture frames how an individual or community constructs
and perceives reality.128 As such, the way trauma is expressed will vary across different
groups. The concept of post-traumatic stress disorder, for example, is a Western
construct and focuses primarily on specific clinical factors, such as patterns of onset or
the manifestation of symptoms.129 Furthermore, the notion of “post-traumatic stress” is
contradictory in that trauma is an ongoing process; its incidence may be tied to a certain
123
Brahm, “Trauma Healing.” Beyond Intractability.
Hein,“The Multiple Pathways to Trauma, Recovery, Vindication, and National Reconciliation in Cambodia.” 195.
125 Chea, “Reconciliation in Cambodia: Politics, Culture, and Religion.” 52.
126 Fisher, “Social-Psychological Processes in Interactive Conflict Analysis and Reconciliation.” 26.
127 Fisher, “Social-Psychological Processes in Interactive Conflict Analysis and Reconciliation.” 27.
128 Marsella, “Ethnocultural Aspects of PTSD: An Overview of Concepts, Issues, and Treatments.” 19.
129 Marsella, “Ethnocultural Aspects of PTSD: An Overview of Concepts, Issues, and Treatments.” 20.
124
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event in the past but the process by which one experiences it is very present.130 As
such, when evaluating trauma, it is imperative to tie it to the social and historical
contexts from which they emerged. Hans Keilson, psychoanalyst and psychologist,
advocates for the concept of “sequential traumatization,” where trauma is described as
a sequential process rather than the consequence of an event.131 This allows for trauma
to be understood from within its original context. Since it focuses on process, as
opposed to symptoms, it can be applied to nearly every cultural or political setting.132 130
Becker, “Confronting the Truth of Erinyes: The Illusion of Harmony in the Healing of Trauma.” 239.
Becker, “Confronting the Truth of Erinyes: The Illusion of Harmony in the Healing of Trauma.” 238.
132 Becker, “Confronting the Truth of Erinyes: The Illusion of Harmony in the Healing of Trauma.” 238.
131
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Appendix 3: Considerations for Reconciliation and
Development
As the diverse approaches to reconciliation illustrated, there are a multitude of
opportunities for International Development Organizations (IDOs) to engage in postconflict reconciliation, support local institutions, and contribute to the development of
positive peace practices. Depending on their mission, IDOs can approach their
reconciliation efforts using either a prescriptive or elicitive model of engagement. With a
prescriptive model, IDOs serve as experts entering post-conflict zones with knowledge
and experience to provide a solution to a problem.133 While a prescriptive model aligns
with top-down approaches, the elicitive model aligns itself with bottom-up processes.
The elicitive model grounds itself in a culturally relativist position, seeking customized
solutions from within each post-conflict society. This perspective views local systems
and civil society as rich resources of knowledge and tools to advance peace and
reconciliation programs.134
Whether IDOs engage in prescriptive or elicitive partnerships, they face many
challenges in facilitating state’s transitions to peace. Violent conflicts erode political and
civil society institutions, thus IDOs may find themselves operating in countries with nondemocratic governments and weak civil society institutions. In such environments, IDOs
may be caught between aiding a community in immediate need and promoting justice
by reforming authoritarian institutions. Remaining neutral in a conflict, as Medecin Sans
Frontieres does, may grant an IDO the freedom to serve those in need, but also make it
complicit in human rights abuses. Alternatively, an IDO may engage in government or
institutional reformist activity, thus supporting a state’s development of critical positive
peace pillars. This activity, however, may make the IDO and its staff a political target,
inhibiting its role as a mediator or community developer.135 Liaising with local NGOs
may help IDOs determine the best course of action, but also risks endangering
133
Lederach, “The Prescriptive Model.” 51-52.
Lederach, “The Prescriptive Model.” 55.
135 Bells; Carens, “The Ethical Dilemmas of International Human Rights and Humanitarian NGOs: Reflections on a
Dialogue between Practitioners and Theorists.” 319.
134
64
domestic partners. Yet, this collaboration could strengthen the reconciliation process by
rebuilding internal institutions that unify rather than segregate, capitalizing on the IDOs
status as a third party mediator.136 By strengthening the capacity of local actors and
ensuring local ownership of foundational institutions, IDOs can contribute to sustainable
progress towards reconciliation.137 136
Newman; Albrecht, “Introduction.” 1-2.
Albrecht, “Introduction.” 1-2.
137Newman;
65
Appendix 4: Case Study Analysis
INTRODUCTION
This case study analysis will outline the reconciliation efforts of Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Indonesia, and Nicaragua. The definition of reconciliation varies from culture to
culture as it holds different meanings in different societies. However, for the purposes of
this analysis, reconciliation “generally refers to the process of developing a mutual
conciliatory accommodation between antagonistic or formerly antagonistic persons or
groups.”138 To analyze the effectiveness of reconciliation efforts, this analysis will
explore methods of interfaith dialogue, truth telling, art, sport, and mental health as tools
to promote healing and amicable relationships in post-conflict society.
In order to best serve the needs of Creative Associates International, each study
was selected using six criteria and will delve into the reconciliation efforts applied by
international, national, and civil society actors. Our research found that these methods
are complementary, meaning any combination can be used to achieve reconciliation as
there is no universal approach or combination of methods that will ensure reconciliation.
Instead, it is more important that practitioners consult with the civilian population prior to
project implementation to ensure that the chosen methodologies are culturally relevant.
In order to measure the effectiveness of reconciliation efforts, the projects are measured
through applicable indicators recommended by the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation
Index (SCORE) designed by the Center for Sustainable Peace and Democratic
Development. Effectiveness is defined as a cessation of violent conflict, and the start of
a transition from conflict to sustainable peace.
Case Study Selection Criteria
The cases featured in this analysis were chosen using a variety of criteria. First,
the authors sought regional diversity to explore reconciliation in different cultures and
138
Lerche, “Peace Building Through Reconciliation,” in The International Journal of Peace Studies.
66
contexts. Second, the cases utilize grassroots movements, an important element of
reconciliation that increases social cohesion. Third, national governments have formally
acknowledged an end to conflict and initiated a process of reconciliation. Fourth, given
the contemporary emergence of this field, all cases embarked on reconciliation within
the last thirty years. Fifth, each case study uses at least three of the five grassroots
methodologies outlined in the introduction. For further exploration of the methodologies,
refer to Appendix 2. Finally, each case study offers an example of effective and less
effective uses of hybridity, which engage all stakeholders in a mix of top-down and
bottom-up reconciliation processes.
Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index
The SCORE Index was selected because it is a system that goes beyond
measuring the quantity of decommissioned guns, demilitarized soldiers, or rate of fighter
reintegration. It also measures a community’s willingness to coexist, work with others,
and rebuild societal rifts.139 Together, these elements create a broad foundation for
measuring social cohesion, which serves as a precursor to and a product of
reconciliation. The Index uses five indicators to measure social cohesion: trust in and
representativeness of institutions, human security, civic life satisfaction, personal life
satisfaction, and in-group identification.140 Social cohesion is critical because it is
embedded in all components of reconciliation. Additionally, the Index assesses the level
or presence of five indicators to measure a community’s transition toward reconciliation:
negative stereotypes, intergroup anxiety, social distance, social threat perceptions, and
cultural distance.141
139
Ioannou, “Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE): Methodology.” 2.
140
Ioannou, “Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE): Methodology.” 6.
141
Ioannou, “Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE): Methodology.” 7.
67
Each case will conclude with a SCORE card that shows how the chosen
methodologies contribute to increasing each society’s social cohesion or chances of
completing a successful reconciliation process. The charts above outline and explain
the indicators for social cohesion and reconciliation. Each country’s card will have check
marks next to the applicable indicators. Those indicators without check marks means
efforts did not focus on these measures or were not applicable to the country.
LIBERIA
Introduction
Post-conflict initiatives in Liberia have grown tremendously since the 2003 Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Today, the government is increasing support for
hybrid reconciliation, placing a greater emphasis on healing.142 Following the
142
Dabo, “In the Presence of Absence Truth-Telling and Displacement in Liberia.” 9.
68
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Liberia’s Peacebuilding Program (LPP) did
not provide civilians with a platform to engage in meaningful reconciliation because its
benefactors were mostly international NGOs.143 Therefore, many Liberian organizations
were left to create their own processes.144 However, the most recent state-led approach
exhibits hybridity by including civilian actors in efforts to cultivate sustainable peace.
This transition from exclusivity to hybridity offers the field valuable insight. While the
TRC’s final report divided political actors and stalled many national reconciliation efforts,
civil society and international actors persevered, using truth telling, mental health
initiatives, and dialogue to support community cohesion. Although these three
methodologies have distinct approaches, all support trust building, as well as individual
and community healing.
Context of the Conflict
The Liberian Civil War claimed more than 250,000 lives and unfolded in two
cycles of widespread violence from 1989 to 1996 and 1999 to 2003. During these
cycles, thousands of civilians were subjected to arbitrary killings, psychological torture,
abductions, sexual slavery, mass displacement, and economic and property
violations.145 The civil war began in December 1989 as Charles Taylor, former Director
General of the government’s General Services Agency, led the National Patriotic Front
(NPF) to overthrow Samuel Doe from power.146 After almost seven years of instability,
the Liberian government and the NPF signed the Abuja Accord in 1995. Both parties
were responsible for committing major human rights abuses against civilians, and the
warring parties’ solitary focus on military and political issues allowed grievances to
continue.147 This is important to note as the TRC Report in 2009 concluded that issues
pertaining to civic life such as corruption, poverty, and inequality fueled the violence
143
Insight on Conflict, “Liberia: Challenges Facing Peace and Reconciliation.”
144
Aaron, “Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Transitional Justice Options in Liberia.” 8.
145
Dabo, “In the Presence of Absence Truth-Telling and Displacement in Liberia.” 5.
146
Insight on Conflict, “Liberia: Conflict Profile.”
147
“ECOWAS and the Subregional Peacekeeping in Liberia.” Journal of Humanitarian Assistance.
69
from 1989 to 2003.148 Failure to address these initial grievances and acknowledge
human rights violations resulted in the reemergence of widespread fighting.149 From
1999 to 2003, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) attacked Charles Taylor and his forces
while committing mass atrocities throughout Liberia. After four years of instability and
conflict, the Government of Liberia, MODEL, and LURD signed the Accra CPA and
established the TRC to “provide a forum to address issues of impunity,” beginning the
process for reconciliation.150
The Hybrid Approach
Unlike the Abuja Accord, the CPA accounted for the needs of civilians and
established the TRC, making it the first peace agreement in Liberia to establish a
mechanism for accountability. To address the needs of marginalized groups such as,
survivors of sexual violence and ex-child soldiers, the TRC sought multilateral support
and encouraged civil society to play an active role. Together, the Ministry of Gender and
several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) collected roughly 8,000 statements
from women.151 Additionally, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and over 80
child protection groups from the National Child Protection Network collaborated to
collect statements from children.152 According to the TRC report, the commission
identified 86,647 victims.153 While it reached a broad group of civilians and recorded
more violations than any previous commission, the TRC did not adequately address the
needs of all Liberians as it only documented 607 testimonies from 14 counties outside
of Monrovia.154
148
Schmid, Liberia’s Truth Commission Report: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Transitional Justice. 5.
149
United States Institute of Peace, Abuja Agreement.
150
Aaron, “Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Transitional Justice Options in Liberia.” 5
151
Dabo, “In the Presence of Absence Truth-Telling and Displacement in Liberia.” 9.
152
Dabo, “In the Presence of Absence Truth-Telling and Displacement in Liberia.” 10.
153
Aaron, “Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Transitional Justice Options in Liberia.” 15.
154
Aaron, “Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Transitional Justice Options in Liberia.” 8.
70
After concluding hearings in 2009, the TRC released a set of recommendations
to guide the government on a path for a sustainable future.155 Some recommendations,
such as the establishment of a National Palava Hut Program were well received.
However, the report’s recommendation to establish a criminal tribunal and domestic
criminal courts divided Liberians. Civil society organizations at CPA negotiations thought
the TRC would lead to prosecutions, thus many survivors welcomed the
recommendation. Their embrace of the TRC, however, contrasted with the protests of
over 180 individuals identified for trial by the TRC. These perpetrators originally
supported the TRC because they initially saw it as an alternative to criminal
prosecution.156 The question of retributive justice also divided the commission; two
commissioners refused to endorse the TRC recommendations because they did not
agree that prosecutions would foster reconciliation or lead to positive peace. To this day,
the government of Liberia has not established a war crimes court to prosecute
individuals responsible for gross human rights violations, and instead, initiated the
National Palava Hut Program.157
After reviewing the recommendations made by the TRC and consulting with civil
society and the UN, in 2013, the Liberia Peacebuilding Office unveiled the Strategic
Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation (SRNHPR).158 In the
Roadmap, Liberia defines reconciliation as a “multidimensional process of overcoming
social, political, and religious cleavages; mending and transforming relationships;
healing the physical and psychological wounds from the civil war...”159 This definition
reflects the SRNHPR’s goal to foster a stronger working relationship between
institutions and civil society.160 To achieve this goal, SRNHPR effectively focuses on
155
Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia. Republic of Liberia: 58.
156
Aaron, “Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Transitional Justice Options in Liberia.” 3.
157
Connoll; Singh, “The Road to Reconciliation: A case study of Liberia’s Reconciliation Roadmap.” 11.
158
Towards a Reconciled, Peaceful and Prosperous Liberia: A Strategic Roadmap for National Healing,
Peacebuilding, and Reconciliation. 9.
159
160
United Nations Mission in Liberia, “Reconciliation and Peace Consolidation Section.”
Towards a Reconciled, Peaceful and Prosperous Liberia: A Strategic Roadmap for National Healing,
Peacebuilding, and Reconciliation. 2.
71
individual and community healing, as well as coordinates with local actors to employ a
more holistic approach to reconciliation. The Roadmap’s decision to learn from local
peacebuilders regarding the implementation of the National Palava Hut Program
highlights this new direction.161
Reconciliation in Practice
Interfaith and intergroup dialogue, truth telling, and mental health reconciliation
efforts place an emphasis on individual healing and relationship building, which
augment the possibility for positive peace. After identifying gaps in these three areas,
the government of Liberia collaborated with external and local actors to increase access
to interfaith and intergroup dialogue, truth telling, and mental health.162 The partnership
to expand dialogue and truth telling is of particular interest as the success experienced
at the local level improved the crosscutting collaborations that exist today.163 Therefore,
the following section will further explore and assess the efficacy of these initiatives in
Liberia.
Interfaith Dialogue
In 1990, the Liberian Council of Churches (LCC) and the National Muslim
Council of Liberia (NMCL) collaborated to create the Interreligious Council of Liberia
(IRCL), and it has supported reconciliation through dialogue since the end of the war. In
2004, members of the IRCL and peace scholars convened in Monrovia to evaluate past
dialogues and create a plan for future efforts. For several years, only leaders of the LCC
and NMCL directly participated in dialogues.164 As a result, the IRCL now works with the
Independent National Commission for Human Rights (INCHR) to engage entire
161
Ioannou, “Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE): Methodology.” 6.
162
Towards a Reconciled, Peaceful and Prosperous Liberia: A Strategic Roadmap for National Healing,
Peacebuilding, and Reconciliation. 2.
163
164
Dabo, “In the Presence of Absence Truth-Telling and Displacement in Liberia.” 3-9.
Sarwolo, Peacemaking and Muslim-Christian Dialogue: Learning From the Examples of the Inter-Religious
Council of Liberia. 86.
72
communities in conflict resolution workshops and trauma healing seminars. This
partnership also supports the expansion of programs like Platform 4 Dialogue and
Peace (P4DP) and Palava Peace Huts nationwide.165 Additionally, this is a benefit to
the government, because the IRCL is highly regarded by Liberians and has extensive
experience in building trust and social cohesion at the local level.166
Influenced by the interfaith dialogue process in Liberia, external and local actors
have also developed intergroup dialogues to promote reconciliation and trust.167
Following the civil war, property disputes became a source of tension in many
communities. As a result, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in partnership with the UN
Mission in Liberia, invited Interpeace, an international peacebuilding organization, to
design a pilot project that addressed inter-ethnic tensions and land disputes through
dialogue.168 The pilot project, Platform 4 Dialogue and Peace (P4DP), was first unveiled
in the county of Nimba, where Mano and Gio inhabitants were involved in land disputes
with returning Mandingo refugees. The project involved consultation, dialogue, and
consensus building. After fostering trust in Nimba County, Interpeace established a
network with eight NGOs, including the IRCL, and consulted with more than 10,000
Liberians to identify challenges, tensions, and concerns.169 After, the Liberian
government and Interpeace unveiled P4DP across the country, especially in regions that
experienced intense violence, such as Grand Gedeh, Bomi, and Montserrado. Today,
P4DP is an independent Liberian organization that provides a space for dialogue and
provides capacity building for youth through educational activities.170
165
Towards a Reconciled, Peaceful and Prosperous Liberia: A Strategic Roadmap for National Healing,
Peacebuilding, and Reconciliation. 3.
166Towards
a Reconciled, Peaceful and Prosperous Liberia: A Strategic Roadmap for National Healing,
Peacebuilding, and Reconciliation. 3.
167
Interpeace, “Interpeace’s Platform 4 Dialogue and Peace goes national in Liberia.”
168
Insight on Conflict, “Platform for Dialogue and Peace in Liberia.”
169
Interpeace, “Liberia.”
170
Interpeace, “Platform for Dialogue and Peace in Liberia.”
73
Truth Telling
Similar to the multilateral efforts for P4DP, the government of Liberia is partnering
with external actors to expand truth telling programs. Although the TRC failed to
generate reconciliation at the local level, support for traditional methods like the Peace
Huts is providing a space for truth telling and community healing. Annie Nushann, a
women’s rights activist, established the first Peace Hut and Women’s Empowerment
Center in the county of Totota.171 Based on traditional Liberian dispute resolution
mechanisms, the Peace Huts grant civilians a greater sense of ownership and
participation in the reconciliation process as they have the power to drive reconciliation
efforts and resolve tensions within their own communities. Since 2011, international
actors, such as UN Women, have collaborated with civil society to redesign Peace Huts
in accordance with community needs. Before the conflict, Peace Huts were primarily
used by local elders to resolve disputes. Now, the Peace Huts are driven by women and
are more inclusive of their needs. Initially, the discussions in the Palava Huts ranged
from murder, theft, divorce, debt, war, and even land disputes.172 Today, Peace Huts
handle cases of abandonment, infidelity, child support, domestic violence, theft, or any
issues that arise within communities.173 With the help of UN Women, 17 Peace Huts
and Women’s Empowerment Centers were established.174
In addition to truth telling, these huts provide a space to discuss issues of
inequality, prevent conflict, and build local capacity.175 The Peace Huts and Women’s
Empowerment Centers trained over 425 women in leadership, peacebuilding and
conflict resolution.176 To handle community disputes, the accuser and accused air their
grievances face-to-face, after which a leader helps the pair find a resolution.177
171
Campbell, “UN Women Dedicate Peace Huts.”
172
Chereji, Christian; Wratto, Charles. “A Comparative Study of Traditional Conflict Resolution Methods in Liberia and
Ghana.” 10-11.
173
Douglas, This Hut is Working for Me. 149.
174
Douglas, This Hut is Working for Me. 151.
175
UN Women, “From conflict resolution to prevention: connecting Peace Huts to the police in Liberia.”
176
UN Women, “Building peace through women’s leadership.”
177
UN Women, “From conflict resolution to prevention: connecting Peace Huts to the police in Liberia.
74
Depending on the issue, resolutions can range from child support compensation to
reparations for harms inflicted.178 Moreover the Weala County Peace Hut offers training
programs, such as baking and tailoring, to over 80 men and women, based on a desire
from community members to gain practical skills.179
Palava Peace Huts also improve human security. According to the Liberian
Ministry of Gender and Development, rape remains the most reported violent crime
since the civil war. Consequently, the Liberian National Police (LNP) in Weala County
distributed cellular phones to Peace Hut members and established a free hotline so that
civilians could prevent crimes by reporting suspicious individuals to police. Weala
Commanding Police Officer James Flomo shared that since the phones were
distributed, “the calls are coming less and less... because the Peace Hut Women are
stopping the violence before it happens.”180
After hearing of Liberia’s success with Peace Huts, UN Women, and a delegation
of government and civil society actors from Mali traveled to Totota in 2013 to determine
the feasibility of establishing Peace Huts in their own country.181 Since then, Mali has
passed a peace accord, but has not moved forward with instituting its own Peace Hut
Program.182 The success in Totota and Weala also inspired the Liberian government to
reproduce the Peace Huts. A year after the Strategic Roadmap announced efforts to
expand Peace Huts, the Liberian government launched its first Peace Hut in Zwedru,
Grand Gedeh. Eventually, the government and IRCL hope to establish Peace Huts in all
64 districts to provide victims and perpetrators a space for national healing and social
cohesion at the community level.183 While the Liberian government is making an effort
to learn from civil society, the national Peace Huts program is still in the early
implementation stage.
178
179
Douglas, This Hut is Working for Me. 153.
All Africa, “Liberia: Weala Peace Hut Women Seek Support.”
180
Douglas, This Hut is Working for Me. 149-150.
181
UN Women, “Building Peace from the Ground Up: Mali Learns from Liberia.”
182
Al Jazeera, "Malian Rivals Sign Peace Deal."
183
Aaron, “Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Transitional Justice Options in Liberia.” 9.
75
Mental Health
The Liberian government has collaborated with multiple actors to address the
issue of mental health and trauma. The psychological impact of the conflict left many
Liberians traumatized. Those who suffered from mental illnesses experienced stigma,
discrimination, and alienation, thus making the process for social cohesion and
reconciliation more difficult.184 Before 2003, local health and social workers lacked the
formal training to address the issue of mental health and rehabilitation.185 Records show
that there was only one psychiatrist for every 300,000 Liberians.186 It was not until 2010
that the Liberian Ministry of Health and Social Welfare invited the Carter Center to
partner with NGOs and local civilians to launch a five-year program to develop a more
comprehensive mental health system.187
Before the joint five-year initiative, less than one percent of Liberians had access
to mental health care.188 Moreover, although 40 percent of individuals in Liberia
experienced post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), many physicians and individuals
with mental illnesses misunderstood PTSD as a punishment for bad behavior.189 This
misconception caused isolation and increased distress for many who had PTSD. To
reduce stigma and encourage individuals to seek help, a nationwide campaign
introduced programs to spread the truth about mental illness, encouraging acceptance
and compassion for mental health patients.190
Furthering these efforts, the Carter Center and government of Liberia set out to
train 150 local mental health clinicians.191 Instead of bringing in external mental health
clinicians, the Carter Center and the Liberian government created an extensive sixmonth program to strengthen local capacity. By investing directly in the Liberian people,
184
Carter Center, “Development of Mental Health Services in Liberia.”
185
Medeiros, Integrating Mental Health into Post-Conflict Rehabilitation. 501.
186
Rohe, “123 Mental Health Clinicians Promoting Mental Health in Communities Across Liberia.”
187
Rohe, “123 Mental Health Clinicians Promoting Mental Health in Communities Across Liberia.”
188
Carter Center, “Development of Mental Health Services in Liberia.”
189
Carter Center, “Development of Mental Health Services in Liberia.”
190
Carter Center, “Development of Mental Health Services in Liberia.”
191
Carter Center, “Development of Mental Health Services in Liberia.”
76
the government and its international allies effectively increased access to health care,
created trust between patients and clinicians, and provided 166 Liberians with mental
health expertise. As a result, hundreds of mental health clinicians returned to their
communities, opened clinics in prisons, and provided services to isolated communities
such as Matadi and Old Road in Monrovia.192 In August of 2015, the Carter Center
reported at least three mental health clinicians in every county and anticipates 70
percent of the population will have access to mental health care within the next few
years.193 With access to mental health care at the national level, the government of
Liberia and the Carter Center are hopeful that this will support the process for
reconciliation as more individuals will be able to pursue individual healing.194
Effective Practices
While diverse in their technical approaches, all three efforts included the use of
civil society and focused on individual and community healing. Moreover, due to the
Strategic Roadmap for Reconciliation, P4PD and Palava Peace Huts approach
reconciliation in a more holistic manner.195 As mental health care, truth telling, and
dialogue programs support reconciliation in Liberia, each strives for success by
exhibiting a comprehension of local customs, consulting with civil society, and allowing
for adaptable processes that change with civilians’ new needs and goals.
The Liberian government’s efforts to incorporate civil society into national truth
telling, mental health, and dialogue programs increases the possibility for reconciliation.
By complimenting local traditions and consulting with communities before project
design, government and international actors increase social cohesion and reconciliation.
In particular, the participatory approach and ability of Interpeace to consult with
192
Rohe, “123 Mental Health Clinicians Promoting Mental Health in Communities Across Liberia.”
193
Carter Center, “Carter Center Helps Bolster Liberia's Mental Health Workforce Following Ebola Epidemic.”
194
Carter Center, “Development of Mental Health Services in Liberia.”
195
Towards a Reconciled, Peaceful and Prosperous Liberia: A Strategic Roadmap for National Healing,
Peacebuilding, and Reconciliation. 28.
77
communities allowed P4DP to create practices tailored to the needs of communities.196
While the pilot program improved relations in Nimba County, it was not blindly
duplicated across the country without input from civilians. Realizing that approaches
need to relevant, the government and P4DP consulted with over 10,000 civilians prior to
developing the nationwide P4DP program to best meet the needs of civilians in each
county. Therefore, these approaches enabled the programs to further social cohesion by
fostering trust in government and increasing individual satisfaction. Specifically, efforts
for reconciliation increased the quality of public services through mental health
initiatives and increased civic life satisfaction through representation, thereby
addressing the SCORE indicators for social cohesion.197
Moreover, the P4DP and Palava Peace Huts have evolved in relation to the
changing needs of communities. Today, they offer more than a place to air psychological
or emotional grievances. They have expanded their efforts to build the local capacity of
marginalized groups.198 For example, P4DP encourages youth employment and
promotes educational activities, while some Palava Peace Huts support men and
women’s agency by providing skills training programs.199 The UN Women and
Interpeace report that individuals experience an increase in satisfaction and human
security, addressing SCORE’s social cohesion indicators.200 Thus, holistic programs that
address multiple grievances increase the possibility for sustainable peace.201
Lastly, all three methodologies emphasize the importance of individual and
community healing. Unlike the TRC, Palava Peace Huts, mental health and dialogue
programs foster healing, mend relationships, and mitigate tensions before they escalate
to violence. The agreement of government and local actors to focus on healing
individual trauma and mending relationships has supported the possibility for
196
Interpeace, “Interpeace’s Platform 4 Dialogue and Peace goes national in Liberia.”
197
Ioannou, “Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE): Methodology.” 7.
198
Interpeace, “Platform for Dialogue and Peace in Liberia.”
199
Brown, “Evaluation of UN Women’s Contribution to Increasing Women’s Leadership and Participation in Peace
and Security and Humanitarian Response.”
200
Douglas, This Hut is Working for Me. 149-151.
201
Ioannou, “Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE): Methodology.” 8.
78
sustainable peace. It is too soon to gauge the effects of the Carter Center’s mental
health initiative or the national P4DP and Palava Peace Huts as both are fairly new and
in early stages. With respect to social cohesion, however, the pilot P4DP as well as the
Palava Huts supported by UN Women have shown the power to increase human
security and civic life satisfaction.202 Furthermore, based on SCORE’s indicators, local
healing bolsters reconciliation by reducing stereotypes, intergroup anxiety, and social
distance between ex-combatants and victims as well as between ethnic groups. By
including civil society groups, focusing on healing, and allowing for flexibility throughout
reconciliation practices, these three strategies increased the possibility for sustainable
peace.
SCORE Card
Liberia
202
Insight on Conflict, “P4DP.”; Douglas, This Hut is Working for Me. 151.
79
SIERRA LEONE
Introduction
The case of Sierra Leone is of great importance to the international community
because it is representative of contemporary conflicts and exemplifies the effectiveness
of partnering with locals to work toward reconciliation.203 The decade long civil war,
fueled by greed and economic injustices, saw thousands of active participants, and
involved mass atrocities, an extremely high abduction rate and death toll, and multiple
factions.204 Such motivations and characteristics require a holistic approach to
reconciliation in which transformations and forgiveness occur within the local culture.
Sierra Leone’s reconciliation process showcases the necessity of incorporating contextspecific knowledge and tools to ensure local needs are addressed. With such inclusive
and local solutions, reconciliation is more likely to be sustained.205
Context of the Conflict
The civil war in Sierra Leone erupted in 1991 when the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) infiltrated from Liberia and attacked the All People’s Congress (APC)
dictatorship.206 Because the invasions were made from the north and south, some
Leoneans did not experience war immediately, such as those in the capital of
Freetown.207 However, others were driven to refugee camps in Guinea or internally
displaced. Additionally, the RUF forced youth and adults to commit sexual assaults,
abduct children, burn villages, and threaten death and body mutilations to those who
refused their orders.208 Child soldiers, volunteers, and abductees, made up a large part
of warring factions. Although security, survival, and a drive to remove injustices from
203
Humphreys, et al., "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War." 439.
204
Humphreys, et al., "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War." 439.
205
“Local Systems: A Framework for Supporting Sustained Development.” https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/1870/LocalSystemsFramework.pdf.
206
Humphreys, Macartan, and Weinstein. "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War." 437.
207
Shepler, Childhood Deployed: Remaking Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone. 8-10.
208
Lahai; Ware. "Educating for Peace: The Sociocultural Dimensions of Grassroots Peace Education as a Tool for
National Reconciliation and Social Forgetting in Sierra Leone." 70.
80
Sierra Leone motivated volunteer soldiers, abducted boys and girls were forced to fight
and support war related activities.209
In 1995, civil society convened and pushed for elections, electing President
Kabbah.210 Yet, in 1997, a coup forced Kabbah and his government into Guinea.211 Two
years later, a peace deal granted amnesty to RUF members and supported a shared
government between the exiled civilian government, led by Kabbah, and Foday Sankoh,
leader of the RUF.212 To support peace, the UN deployed peacekeepers throughout the
country under the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), some of whom
were taken hostage when the accord fell apart in 2000.213 In 2002, President Kabbah
declared peace, and the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) was re-elected into office
with support from Britain and Guinea.214
The Hybrid Approach
With support from the UN and the United States, reconciliation efforts officially
began in 2003 with a TRC.215 The Special Court for Sierra Leone provided assistance
for establishing and organizing national elections.216 However, these transitional justice
mechanisms were ineffective because they lacked cultural constructs of forgiveness
and healing, and prosecuted few perpetrators.217 As a result, the courts were criticized
for their short-term efforts, which failed to address the time needed to heal and foster
long-term reconciliation. Justice favored the elites, as courts were mainly accessible to
national actors and those in power roles because the headquarters were in Freetown.
Furthermore, when the courts did travel to remote provinces, they stayed for one week
209
Humphreys, et al., "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War." 438.
210
Francis, When War Ends: Building Peace in Divided Communities. 107.
211
Francis, When War Ends: Building Peace in Divided Communities. 108.
212
Humphreys, et al., "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War." 437.
213
Shepler, Childhood Deployed: Remaking Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone. 13.
214
Humphreys, et al., "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War." 438.
215
Shepler, Childhood Deployed: Remaking Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone. 13.
216
Francis, When War Ends: Building Peace in Divided Communities. 113.
217
Hoffman, “Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: Local Processes Yield Global Lessons.” 131.
81
or less, leaving only a short time for perpetrators and victims to recount their stories. 218
Thus, civil society had limited access to attend trials and have their voices heard,
despite being the ones who endured the most atrocious harms and required the most
attention from reconciliation efforts.
While international assistance was initially helpful in reintegration and democratic
efforts, these processes were short lived and unsustainable.219 Instead, a grassroots
reconciliation effort emerged as a response to the apprehensiveness towards national
officials, and the need to incorporate civil society and the Leonean culture into
reconciliation efforts.220 In this way, root causes of the conflict could be addressed and
personal pleas of forgiveness could be made in alignment with cultural values and
norms.
Reconciliation in Practice
Effective reconciliation requires a primary focus on the needs of civilian
populations.221 Yet, some interventions implement a prescriptive approach to
reconciliation by providing a preconceived resolution for a group of people that ignores
civil society’s needs. This is an ineffective practice as it fails to integrate local needs, a
necessary component to reconciling differences.222 Therefore, the following
methodologies reflect a community focused and elicitive approach to reconciliation,
proving local needs should be at the forefront of efforts to increase program success.
Truth Telling
One of the main criticisms of transitional justice in Sierra Leone is that it lacked a
platform for forgiveness and was only accessible for national actors. Yet, the civil war
218
Lahai; Ware. "Educating for Peace: The Sociocultural Dimensions of Grassroots Peace Education as a Tool for
National Reconciliation and Social Forgetting in Sierra Leone." 71.
219
Francis, When War Ends: Building Peace in Divided Communities. 114.
220
Hoffman, “Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: Local Processes Yield Global Lessons.” 130.
221
Hoffman, “Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: Local Processes Yield Global Lessons.” 130.
222
Hoffman, “Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: Local Processes Yield Global Lessons.” 140.
82
caused vast grievances and widespread harms that affected civil society. Catalyst for
Peace, a US-based NGO, recognized the need for civil society to access healing. As a
result, it filled this need by implementing Fambul Tok, or family talk in Krio, which built
upon traditional Sierra Leonean truth-telling ceremonies. Through this model, Fambul
Tok became, “...a national initiative that addresses the need to foster a lasting peace
from the village-level up.”223 Catalyst’s unique program centers around a truth telling
bonfire that incorporates the entire community in which victims and offenders speak
their truths of harms committed and experienced. Following their stories, perpetrators
request or offer forgiveness. The next day, a cleansing ceremony takes place to signify
healing and reintegration.224 This method proved beneficial to Sierra Leoneans because
they felt secure and safe in familiar traditions, helping victims and perpetrators open up
to express their truths and grievances. Furthermore, this intervention encompassed the
Sierra Leonean value of community wholeness, as they believe they are brothers and
sisters of one family.225
Initially, the program focused its efforts in war-torn districts holding 60
ceremonies for smaller communities to address specific needs of reconciliation.226 Over
the years, the Fambul Tok method has grown to include multiple villages and
stakeholders where the NGO facilitates the space for truth telling, while local
communities adjust the process to accommodate their needs.227 As a model, each
ceremony includes truth telling, accountability, apologies, forgiveness, and collective
activities. The culminating activities are integral to healing because they bring the
community together through shared values and celebrate each other as a collective
group, preventing alienation, encouraging participation, and empowering people to
address harms.228 Examples of culminating activities include the establishment of 30
223
Hoffman, “Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: Local Processes Yield Global Lessons.” 132.
224
Hoffman, “Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: Local Processes Yield Global Lessons.” 132-133.
225
Hoffman, “Fambul Tok International: Community Healing in Sierra Leone and The World.” 7.
226
Hoffman, “Fambul Tok International: Community Healing in Sierra Leone and The World.” 7.
227
Hoffman, “Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: Local Processes Yield Global Lessons.” 133.
228
Hoffman, “Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: Local Processes Yield Global Lessons.” 132-135.
83
peace farms that signify the harmonious and working relationships derived from the
successful completion of circles.229 Additionally, in Madina Village, locals worked
together to build a guesthouse as their group activity. This signified communal peace,
symbolized their forgiveness, and represented Sierra Leonean’s cultural trait of
hospitality.230 These factors contributed to increased social cohesion, a necessary
component for sustainable peace.231
Art and Healing
In Sierra Leone, arts-based reconciliation efforts brought about a “reconstruction
of social and cultural identities” at the individual and collective levels through symbols of
self-expressions that explored the concepts of identities, conflict, peace, and
reconciliation.232 Peacelinks, a local NGO created by Sierra Leonean youth, emerged
during the civil war with a goal of community-focused reconciliation through song,
dance, and drama. They popularized peace songs, which are songs created about the
war. These songs call for audience interaction and provoke an affective response by
singing about emotions felt during the war as a way to transform their personal
perceptions and those of others.233
Programs drew on cultural traditions and folklore to advocate and educate as
well as to evoke “feelings of oneness, unity, and solidarity between performers and
audience members.”234 The belief that public engagement is crucial to overcoming
divides drive Peacelinks performances as they perform in public spaces such as
schools, churches and places inhabited by victims like IDP housing and interim care
centers.235 As some performers are ex-child soldiers, performance facilitates a space for
229
Hoffman, “Fambul Tok International: Community Healing in Sierra Leone and The World.” 7.
230
Hoffman, “Fambul Tok International: Community Healing in Sierra Leone and The World.” 12.
231
Hoffman, “Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: Local Processes Yield Global Lessons.” 135.
232
Kanyako, "Arts and War Healing: Peacelinks Performing Arts in Sierra Leone." 107.
233
Kanyako, "Arts and War Healing: Peacelinks Performing Arts in Sierra Leone." 115-116.
234
Kanyako, "Arts and War Healing: Peacelinks Performing Arts in Sierra Leone." 110.
235
Kanyako, "Arts and War Healing: Peacelinks Performing Arts in Sierra Leone." 113-115.
84
offenders and victims to address and reconcile their perceptions and mend
relationships.236
Sports, Development, and Peace
Football plays a positive role in the lives of Sierra Leoneans, as it is a popular
pastime and provides a gathering space for the community.237 Silas Lund founded Play
31 in 2009, after he noticed the cultural fondness for football, recognizing that it could
foster reconciliation and rehabilitation.238 The name refers to the 31st Article in the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which allows all children to participate in play and
recreation. Play 31 is community-focused and works within war-torn communities in
which success stories include rape victims playing football alongside their rapists as a
process of reconciliation and forgiveness.239
To avoid imposition, Play 31 approaches communities to see if they desire their
presence by asking locals if they would like the organization to host football games and
skills workshops. If communities agree, then Play 31 organizes a tournament, as well as
human rights and conflict resolution workshops in which locals are trained as peace
ambassadors. Play 31 identifies these peace ambassadors from within communities,
paying close attention to equal representation - gender, religion, offenders, and victims.
Additionally, Play 31 requests that each player signs a peace accord, an agreement to
treat the other team with respect. Not only does Play 31 use the physical act of sport to
bring people toward reconciliation, but it also places much emphasis and value on
equipping locals with tools to transform injustices and inequalities. Along with the
opportunity to come together to forgive war offenses and mend as a collective, Sierra
Leoneans are able to internalize lessons learned about conflict resolution and human
236
Kanyako, "Arts and War Healing: Peacelinks Performing Arts in Sierra Leone." 111.
237
Van Der Niet, "Football in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone." 48.
238
Stanners, "Battling War Wounds with Football." http://murmur.dk/articles/battling-war-wounds-with-football.68.html.
239
Stanners, "Battling War Wounds with Football." http://murmur.dk/articles/battling-war-wounds-with-football.68.html.
85
rights. This betters their communities and moves them towards a more sustainable
peaceful environment.240
Effective Practices
When considering future practice, it is important to use measures to determine
effectiveness. By linking SCORE to a few crosscutting trends, real world applications
garner more merit. The most useful trends for employing future reconciliation work in
Sierra Leone are local inclusivity, a focus on healing individuals and communities, and
approaching reconciliation as a holistic process.
Reconciliation efforts should be developed within a local context as these will be
the most viable and sustainable solutions. Moreover, locals know their communities
best, and direct participation in program design ensures that their needs are addressed.
Fambul Tok, Peacelinks, and Play31 advocated for this approach as their programs
drew upon cultural tools such as communal ceremonies, football, and music. Messages
of peace and reconciliation were conveyed and understood within the Sierra Leonean
culture making the overall impact one of unity and communal transformation. By utilizing
local culture, these programs were able to address measures of social cohesion, such
as social and cultural distance, increasing reconciliation effectiveness.241
The second trend identified centers around the notion of healing. All
methodologies include a focus on intrapersonal healing to transform their own
perceptions and interpersonal healing to shape a collective identity of unity. This
dichotomy is important to reconciliation as it is clear how harms inflicted on one person
can spiral into communal effects. Healing can be associated with all of the indicators
SCORE uses to measure reconciliation effectiveness. However, one can argue the most
240
241
Stanners, "Battling War Wounds with Football." http://murmur.dk/articles/battling-war-wounds-with-football.68.html.
Ioannou, “Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE): Methodology.” 7-8. http://scoreforpeace.org/app/
webroot/files/general/files/SCORE%20Methodology%20Final%20share(1).pdf.
86
impactful transformations occur in decreased intergroup anxiety, increased acceptance
of social distance, and decreased social threat perceptions.242
Finally, reconciliation is not a linear process, thus programs should be careful to
avoid linear design. Practitioners need to consider on the ground realities, “the actors,
their interrelationships and the incentives that guide them.”243 Therefore, programs
should be comprised of multiple strategies to address each layer of the conflict requiring
reconciliation. Play 31 utilized this approach in combining football with human rights and
conflict resolution education. After cleansing ceremonies, Fambul Tok worked with
communities to implement programs to sustain reconciliation through outlets like radio
and communal farming.244 Accordingly, a more holistic approach allows reconciliation
efforts to pervade all of society and address all measures of social cohesion: negative
stereotypes, intergroup anxiety, social distance, social threat perceptions, and cultural
distance.245
The three practices discussed above are implementable outside of Sierra Leone.
Every reconciliation program can consider local contexts, use aspects of healing, and
design dynamic programs. Yet, the case of Sierra Leone does exclude processes of
trust building among political institutions, as shown on the SCORE card below. This is
likely due to the political distrust and economic injustices pervading the state before the
civil war commenced. While the government did support a national TRC, that was
considered ineffective in the eyes of civil society. Therefore, the focus of reconciliation
was very community oriented, and less about reconciling with their government, and
more about becoming a one-unit village again. However, this case study confirms the
benefits of using local people and its culture to design and implement programs.
242
Ioannou, “Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE): Methodology.” 8. http://scoreforpeace.org/app/
webroot/files/general/files/SCORE%20Methodology%20Final%20share(1).pdf.
243
USAID. “Local Systems: A Framework for Supporting Sustained Development.” 4.
244
“Fambul Tok.” http://www.fambultok.org/what-is-fambul-tok.
245
Ioannou, “Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE): Methodology.” 7-8. http://scoreforpeace.org/app/
webroot/files/general/files/SCORE%20Methodology%20Final%20share(1).pdf.
87
SCORE Card
Sierra Leone
INDONESIA
Introduction
Reconciliation in Indonesia has largely been conceived at the grassroots level.
Early national efforts were ultimately a failure due to the preference toward granting
amnesty for perpetrators rather than justice for victims. As a result, local actors took it
upon themselves to initiate programming in their own communities. In the areas where
grassroots movements emerged, efforts have generally been successful at promoting
dialogue, and building understanding and cooperation between parties. Although
individual communities use local methods to promote reconciliation, the lack of
partnerships with national actors means the country as a whole has yet to reach this
phase. As a result, the process has been uneven and disjointed, but does provide
potential for future engagement.
88
Context of the Conflict
President Suharto came to power in 1965, following a coup of his predecessor,
Sukarno.246 His ideology was vehemently anti-Communist; a facet that was continually
reinforced throughout his rule. This era is known as the “New Order.”247 Suharto
transformed the economic climate of the country, creating an atmosphere for
considerable growth and development. Up until 1997, poverty was reduced drastically,
food security improved, and basic health and education services were available to much
of the country.248 However, the regime was also extremely repressive and corrupt. The
military operated ruthlessly in the name of security. It is estimated that between 300,000
and 1 million people were killed during Suharto’s ascension to power in 1965 and 1966.
Separatist groups in Aceh, a province seeking to gain independence, were suppressed.
Many were also killed in the areas of Papua and East Timor, which were occupied by
Indonesia. The government regime accused many victims of being communists or
communist sympathizers. In an effort to secularize the country, Muslims, who make up
the majority of the country, faced discrimination and were expelled from the
government.249 This planted the seeds for further conflict between Muslim and Christian
communities, continuing up to the present. The New Order period came to an end in
1998, when Suharto stepped down. The previous year was marked by unrest and
violence, in addition to economic strife caused by the 1997 financial crisis.
The Hybrid Approach
The post-Suharto government struggled with bringing justice and reconciliation to
those who endured human rights abuses and to the families who lost loved ones during
the New Order period. After he stepped down in 1998, NGOs and activists called for the
246
Dittmer, “The Legacy of Violence in Indonesia.” 542.
247
Ehito, “The Struggle For Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Suharto Indonesia.” 73.
248
Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order. 4.
249
Al Qurtuby, “Reconciliation from Below: Indonesia’s Religious Conflict and Grassroots Agency for Peace.”
136-137.
89
immediate establishment of a TRC, which Law 27 created in 2004.250 The law, however,
was later altered in ways that did not provide true justice to victims for three main
reasons. The first is that the TRC described in the bill recommended amnesties for
perpetrators of serious crimes in exchange for their confessions. Second, the language
used in the bill implied that crimes brought to the TRC could not be prosecuted in the
courts. Third, the legislation stated that victims would only receive compensation in
exchange for the perpetrator receiving amnesty.251 This amendment prompted protest
from activists and other members of civil society. As such, the Constitutional Courts
eventually nullified the law establishing the TRC in 2006.252 The current government is
said to be working on a new law to move the national reconciliation process, but the
lack of programs has halted the road to justice and healing in numerous parts of the
country, like Aceh and Papua. In response, there have been multilateral efforts on the
part of civil society, NGOs, and local citizens to achieve reconciliation between
conflicted parties.
Reconciliation in Practice
Indonesia’s reconciliation process has largely occurred at the grassroots level.
The practices originated within communities where locals have taken it upon
themselves to initiate conflict resolution, justice, and healing. These methods, for the
most part, have all involved cultural elements relevant to the particular areas in which
they have been implemented. The downside of this process is that it has not spread
across the entire country, and has mostly remained localized in these communal
contexts. To exemplify local initiatives of Indonesia’s reconciliation process, this case
study will explore the methods of interfaith dialogue, art and healing, and truth telling.
250
Ehito, “The Struggle For Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Suharto Indonesia.” 77.
251
Ehito, “The Struggle For Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Suharto Indonesia.” 79.
252
The International Center for Transitional Justice, “Indonesia.”
90
Interfaith Dialogue
One of the most common methods of reconciliation in Indonesia is interfaith
dialogue between Christian and Muslim communities, which were ripe with conflict
following the Suharto era. These efforts are undertaken all over the country, though the
exact approach varies based on people and their communities. Of particular interest is
the joint work between KH Muhammad Dian Nafi and Reverend Paulus Hartono. These
two religious leaders are based in Solo, a regency in Central Java, but have completed
peacebuilding work all over the country in areas with political, religious, and collective
violence.253 Nafi and Hartono built the Forum for Peace across Religions and Groups as
a medium for interfaith gatherings with the goal of transforming conflicts into productive
peace. Hartono and Nafi have also befriended members of Hizbullah, a Solo-based
Islamist paramilitary group (not related to the Lebanese Hezbollah). Hizbullah members
were previously involved in various sectarian conflicts, but have now become peace
activists and humanitarian workers. Other extremist groups have since joined Hartono
and Nafi to work together on disaster relief efforts, dialogues, and peacemaking
activities. 254
Following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, members and leaders of Hizbullah
joined Christian teams to work on reconstruction efforts in Aceh, the hardest hit area.255
In this case, the post-tsunami relief work was both a form of dialogue and the result of it.
The participation of extremist group members dispels the common critique that only
moderates engage in dialogue; it provides evidence that even those considered
extremists find merit in peacebuilding and cooperation with people of other faiths.
253
Al Qurtuby, “Reconciliation from Below: Indonesia’s Religious Conflict and Grassroots Agency for Peace.” 148.
254
Al Qurtuby, “Reconciliation from Below: Indonesia’s Religious Conflict and Grassroots Agency for Peace.” 148.
255
Al Qurtuby, “Reconciliation from Below: Indonesia’s Religious Conflict and Grassroots Agency for Peace.” 148.
91
Art and Healing
In Indonesia, performing arts are linked to religious rituals, mark key events in
social life, and give expression to community identity.256 Because it is so ingrained in
society, theater plays a useful role in community reconciliation and integration. For
example, Bang-bang Sumirat (The Red Light of Dawn) was a performance held in the
town square of Bantul on the anniversary of the town’s founding.257 The show was set in
a mythical kingdom whose circumstances resembled those of 1965 Indonesia and
depicted events paralleling those of Suharto’s rise to power. Although the performance
used symbolism and allegory that would have not been immediately obvious to the
audience, the final words of the performance encouraged reconciliation and looking to
the future, offering clear and direct recommendations to the viewers. Second is Jaran Sungsang, staged by a modern theater group called Teater
Gadjah Mada. This show was based on a true story, detailing the killing of a communist
party member’s son. Jaran Sungsang provoked viewers to acknowledge this atrocity
rather than deny. It offered a more obvious story, as opposed to allegory in the
performance described above. In a community where the mention of the atrocities
committed under Suharto is considered taboo, Jaran Sungsang provided an opportunity
to spark discussion. It is, however, important to note that the people who appear to have
gained the most out of these performances were the cast, crew, and other immediate
participants. Therefore, theater is a useful tool in bringing controversial and difficult
memories to the surface for healing purposes, but appears to be the most useful when
community members have the opportunity to participate in the performances. These two
performances are examples of moderately successful reconciliation tools, but it would
be incorrect to generalize their success across the entire country. Nevertheless, they do
illustrate the potential that this method can have in Indonesian communities.
256
Hatley, “Social Reconciliation and Community Integration through Theater.” 79.
257
Hatley, “Social Reconciliation and Community Integration through Theater.” 84
92
Truth Telling
Truth telling has been a powerful method in Indonesia’s path to reconciliation,
particularly for women. One example of this is Temu Rindu, Menggugat Senyap (Come
together in longing, challenging loneliness), an event held in Yogyakarta in July 2005.
Two former female prisoners, who found comfort in one another’s company during
imprisonment, conceptualized the event.258 Over 500 women from various parts of
Central Java attended the event. One of the researchers from the Center for History and
Political Ethics of Sanata Dharma Catholic University described numerous emotional
encounters between women who had not seen each other in 20 to 25 years, many not
knowing if their friends were still alive. The women sat together exchanging their
experiences through poems, dances, and songs. These performances provided the
group with shared validation of experiences and a cathartic release in knowing they
were not alone.259
Temu Rindu, Menggugat Senyap illustrates an example of how truth telling
strengthens solidarity and relationships by providing people with the opportunity to
share their experiences. However, it is important to note that there is resistance to truth
telling as a state-led effort.260 Some of this is out of concern that it will be a disguised
effort to revive communism, but the larger fear is how a re-evaluation of history will
impact Indonesian national identity. As such, the potential efficacy of truth telling
appears to be most successful when driven by grassroots efforts.
Effective Practices
In the absence of state-led reconciliation efforts, there have been numerous
attempts to bridge the divide between conflicting parties and promote healing from
within individual communities. Rather than being externally imposed, locally developed
methods strengthen links between conflicting parties, producing lasting peace and
258
Hatley, “Social Reconciliation and Community Integration through Theater.” 82.
259
Hatley, “Social Reconciliation and Community Integration through Theater.” 82.
260
Leksana, “Reconciliation through history education.” 182
93
healing. This approach allows reconciliation efforts to develop in a way that is relevant
to communal contexts, thereby strengthening social cohesion among previously divided
communities. The use of cultural elements creates a safe space that encourages people
to tell their stories, while fostering an understanding of diverse circumstances through
mutual sharing.
Second, these methods have found ways to involve people who are often
marginalized or whose voices tend not to be heard, particularly women. Groups led by
women have reproduced each of the methodologies has been reproduced by groups
led by women. This ensures that reconciliation efforts are more holistic and gender
inclusive. Inclusion helps to dispel negative stereotypes, an indicator of reconciliation
outlined in SCORE.261 In addition, when different groups are leading these efforts, it
helps to create multiple perspectives. This is important for building empathy and
compassion within communities, and ultimately, decreases social distance.
Lastly, the involvement of people who have committed atrocities, not only as
members of the reconciliation process, but also as leaders makes for a more wellrounded sense of healing. By attracting individuals involved in violence, inclusion
provides a stable multiplier effect for reconciliation and introduces new peacebuilding
skills in the community. This can be seen in the post-tsunami reconstruction in Aceh. It
was dialogue that initially brought the people together, but when they saw a community
in need, they used their new skills and partnerships to help. Through this cooperative
effort, their trust in one another was further strengthened. This addresses the SCORE
indicator of intergroup anxiety, as well as social threat perceptions.262 By reducing
anxiety and the perception of threats, a stronger sense of reconciliation can be
achieved.
261
Ioannou, “Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE): Methodology.” 7-8.
262
Ioannou, “Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE): Methodology.” 7-8.
94
SCORE Card
Indonesia
As the SCORE cards show, not every indicator has been addressed in
Indonesia. Negative stereotypes remains unchecked because despite the country
having transitioned to democracy, anti-communist rhetoric remains prevalent. Some
have been resistant to reconciliation and truth telling because of this, as they view such
mechanisms as an effort to revive communism and damage Indonesian identity.263 Truth
in and representativeness by institutions also is unchecked, because the lack of
reconciliation efforts on the part of the government has slowed down the process in
parts of the country. As such, this does not foster trust. This relates also to civic life
satisfaction, and therefore means that this indicator cannot be checked off. Lastly, group
identification is unchecked because the efforts that have emerged have not adequately
addressed what it means to be a part of the specific group. It is important to note that
due to the disjointed nature of the reconciliation process, it cannot be assumed that the
checked off indicators apply to the entire country.
263
Leksana, “Reconciliation through history education.” 182
95
NICARAGUA
Introduction
The reconciliation process in Nicaragua utilized two perspectives: a top-down
approach led by the government and multinational actors, and a bottom-up process
developed by local actors. After the second wave of violence, elections resulted in the
ascension of conservative challenger Violeta Barrios de Chamorro to the presidential
office. Campaigning on a platform to bridge the Contra-Sandinista divide, President
Chamorro advocated for state-led reconciliation efforts that targeted fighter reintegration
and economic development. While the Organization of American States (OAS) and the
government implemented a national plan, the Church, public theater and poetry groups,
and mental health networks worked at the grassroots level to rebuild communities.
Context of the Conflict
From 1974 to 1990, Nicaragua experienced two cycles of violence between the
Sandinistas and the Contras. The first war, the Sandinista Revolution, was a revolt
against a brutal dictator that resulted in over 100,000 refugees, 300,000 civilians
wounded, and almost 100,000 deaths.264 The subsequent Contra War resulted in over
30,000 deaths and over 20,000 wounded.265 In 1967, Anastasio Samoza Debayle
“elected” himself as president, perpetuating his father’s reign of terror and increasing
widespread corruption, repression, and inequality.266
Under Anastasio’s reign, his inner circle and supporters indulged in extravagant
lifestyles, while countrywide, many Nicaraguans lacked access to clean water and
sufficient standards of living.267 The lack of basic needs resulted in high rates of child
mortality due to poor public health institutions, murder as people struggled for survival,
264
Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution. 183.
265
Balderston, et al., “Encyclopedia of Contemporary Latin American and Caribbean Cultures.” 41.
266
Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution. 78.
267
Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution. 168.
96
and alcoholism because populations turned to substance abuse as a coping strategy.
Additionally, these living conditions inspired the formation of a guerilla revolution group,
the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Sandinistas), whose aim was to end rampant
inequality by overthrowing the Somoza dictatorship, redistributing its wealth, and
establishing an egalitarian socialist system.268 As the regime used increasingly brutal
tactics against the insurgency, including random murders, rapes, and property
destruction, the international community turned against Anastasio’s regime. The
escalation in violence caused the OAS and UN to oversee a ceasefire and mediation
process.269 On June 30, 1979, Anastasio conceded to international pressure and
announced his resignation, paving the way for the Sandinistas to take control.270
Despite Anastasio’s resignation, groups of Somoza loyalists, displaced Miskito
Indians, and farmers who disagreed with the Sandinista land redistribution program
regrouped to attack the Sandinista government. Beginning in 1981, the Reagan
administration trained and armed these anti-Sandinista forces in Honduras. These
forces formed a resistance coalition known as the Contras.271 The Contras kidnapped
and tortured government employees, attacked schools and health clinics, as well as
bombed food storage facilities.272 Despite efforts to undermine and overthrow the
Sandinista government, the Contras failed to gain a foothold in Nicaraguan territory and
became embroiled in a protracted offensive.273
Due to the fall of Communism and an increased threat of violence to Honduran
communities, by 1990, Honduras and the US decreased their support of Contra forces.
Without the support of foreign institutions, the Contras lacked any hope of defeating the
Sandinista government, and entered peace negotiations. On the Sandinista side,
268
Wiggins, Growth and Chronic Poverty in Nicaragua. Rep. Chronic Poverty Research Centre.
269
Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution. 168.
270
Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution. 178.
271
Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders : Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. 89.
272
Walker; Wade, Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle. 50.
273
Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. 92.
97
extensive defense spending had exacerbated preexisting economic issues, threatening
their movement to lead Nicaragua down a path of egalitarian economic growth.274
These conditions created a ripe moment for transformation as both sides were tired of
war and willing to embark on a peace and reconciliation process.
The Hybrid Approach
Peace negotiations between the Contras and Sandinistas began in 1987 at the
request of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sánchez, head of the OAS observer
mission. By 1989, peace negotiations resulted in Nicaragua agreeing to hold inclusive
elections under international observation in exchange for Honduras and the US closing
Contra bases. Despite the Contras’ failure to disarm, Nicaragua proceeded with
elections that resulted in the election of primary opposition leader Violeta Chamorro.275
By June 1990, a majority of Contras disbanded and the Chamorro government initiated
a Contra reintegration program that included land distribution to members of the Contra
forces. Part of this OAS-driven plan included housing construction projects, which
served as opportunities to unite divided communities by co-building housing
developments that housed integrated communities.276
Although the top-down approach integrated Contras into society through cash
and land incentives, it failed to build a sense of community or address the distrust
between Sandinista and Contra groups for two reasons. First, the amount of land
redistributed remained disproportionate to the claims for land titles. Second, land claims
remained divided by political ideology as Sandinistas that received land under the
1980s redistribution sought firmer claims to their titles, while demobilized Contra fighters
hoped to regain the land they controlled prior to the 1990 war.277 These conflicting land
claims, combined with the government's stagnated approach to redistribution meant that
274
Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, "Nicaragua- The Regional Peace Effort."
275
Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. 96.
276
Nilson, “Grassroots Reconciliation Stories from Post-Conflict Nicaragua.” 50.
277Wiggins, Growth
and Chronic Poverty in Nicaragua. Chronic Poverty Research Centre.
98
land claims remained unresolved as late as 2007.278 Further, these land redistribution
efforts failed to address larger issues of development like technical advice and training,
medical care, and access to education.279 To fill this void, grassroots institutions utilized
the foundation created by the state to address development issues and improve
Nicaraguans’ human security and civic life satisfaction.
Reconciliation in Practice
Unlike the state’s failure to integrate a holistic approach to reconciliation,
grassroots institutions utilized the foundation created by the state’s top-down
reconciliation approach to create an effective hybrid system of peace and development.
Through the work of faith based institutions, art and healing, and mental health reform,
grassroots actors worked to bridge the gap between ending violent conflict and
transitioning to a unified community.
Interfaith Dialogue
Unlike the previous cases, Nicaragua’s largely homogenous Christian society
means that its faith based dialogue occurred as intra-faith rather than interfaith dialogue.
Historically, through its instrumental position in Nicaragua, the Church influenced
government policies and societal attitudes. This historical legacy was one reason the
Samoza regime served as a church patron, protecting it from economic upheavals in
exchange for the church’s tacit silence regarding regime abuses. This apathy towards
abuse, however, ended with the creation of Vatican II, as church leaders responded to
the Pope’s call to reexamine their purpose and role as pastoral leaders. As a result,
church leaders embraced liberation theology and switched allegiance from the
corrupted state to supporting the Sandinistas.280 As the Sandinista government resorted
278
Silva, "NICARAGUA: Aid for Former Combatants Finally Comes Through." Inter Press Service.
279Silva,
280
"NICARAGUA: Aid for Former Combatants Finally Comes Through." Inter Press Service.
Dodson; Nuzzi, "Part Two: The Traditional Church and the Prophetic Church." Nicaragua's Other Revolution:
Religious Faith and Political Struggle.
99
to repressive tactics during the Contra War, the Church spoke out against both
Sandinista and Contra abuses, organizing an alternative Commission, comprised of
Church representatives, the Red Cross, Contra leaders, and Sandinistas, to promote a
ceasefire and free elections.281
Given the Church’s influence over political affairs, the Church played an
instrumental role in bringing peace to the Contra and Sandinista communities. The
Church approached reconciliation as an extension of Penance, appealing to individuals’
responsibility to offer concessions in exchange for the forgiveness of sins. This model
created a narrative that recognized abuses by Sandinistas and Contras, and offered
opportunities for forgiveness, dialogue, and confession during informal church
gatherings.282 Because the Church integrated church doctrine and reconciliation,
Penance and confession became an extension of reconciliation, maximizing the healing
potential of self-reflection and confession.
Unlike top-down initiatives, the Church also integrated the Miskito Indian
population into its reconciliation efforts. During the Contra War, the Church spoke out
against the forceful relocation of the Miskito population. Additionally, faith based healing
in Nicaragua expanded upon top-down initiatives by integrating the marginalized Miskito
Indian population into reconciliation efforts. After the conflict, the Church continued its
support of the indigenous group by sponsoring rebuilding efforts, literacy campaigns,
and agricultural reform.283
281
Wilson, “Church, State and Society during the Nicaraguan Revolution.” 130.
282
Comblin, “The Theme of Reconciliation in Theology in Latin America.” in Reconciliation, Nations and Churches in
Latin America. 160.
283
Tillman, “The Miskito Settlement Landscape of Eastern Honduras, with Emphasis on the Moravian Contribution.”
112.
100
Art and Healing
Similar to the Church’s use of tradition for reconciliation efforts, Nicaraguans
adapted their long history of poetry and theater to bring together conflicting parties.
Under the Sandinista government, the Ministry of Culture launched poetry workshops
across Nicaragua as part of a literacy campaign and post-revolution experiment. These
locally organized workshops involved all community members, from low-income workers
to military members.284 Additionally, public theater groups rose in popularity, often using
the problems of the community and the nation as inspiration for their subject matter.285
Although the Contra War substantially curbed the funding available to support these
workshops, the tradition of criticizing and understanding politics through the arts
continued during the reconciliation period.
Theater companies like Nixtayolero used theater to create a visual timeline of
Nicaragua’s national history. By becoming aware of their shared history, Contras and
Sandinistas developed a communal national identity that transcended ideological
divides. Additionally, the plays reminded Nicaraguans of their coexistence before the
outbreak of violence, making the prospect of future peace a plausible reality.286 Like
public theater, poetry also helped Nicaraguans analyze their shared experiences and
assess the societal realities around them. The grassroots push for national literacy and
increased interest in poetry culminated in the establishment of the annual International
Poetry Festival of Granada. Modeled after the public poetry readings and contests that
occurred under the Sandinista regime, this new outlet of expression turned churches,
markets, city streets, public schools, police stations, and university campuses into
platforms for art and public expression.287 The festival’s success made it a staple in
Nicaragua’s culture, as it celebrates its 25th anniversary by attracting talented poets
from conflict areas around the world.
284
Johnson, “Poetic Democracy in Nicaragua.” 36.
285
Byron, “Doris Tijerino: Revolution, Writing, and Resistance in Nicaragua.” 107.
286
Westlake, Our Land Is made of Courage and Glory: Nationalist Performance of Nicaragua and Guatemala. 89.
287
FIPG Nicaragua, “Festival Internacional De Poesia De Granada, Nicaragua.”
101
Mental Health
The Contra War reduced Nicaragua’s ability to provide mental and direct health
care to its citizens. The large death toll from both cycles of violence, along with the
amount of Nicaraguans permanently disfigured from the conflict’s use of landmines and
guerilla tactics, left a deep psychological scar on the population. Additionally, the
prevalence of alcoholism in Nicaragua called for specialized services that targeted both
addiction and trauma healing.288 Recognizing the role of trauma healing and mental
health services in rebuilding, the government created a framework for local coalitions of
community health services. The goal of this framework was to increase community
access to health services by creating free and decentralized care centers.289 To
maximize impact, the Ministry of Health extensively trained grassroots volunteer health
workers called Brigadistas in psychological skills, family therapy practices, crisis
intervention, and techniques to address unresolved bereavement. These Brigadistas
traveled throughout Nicaragua to aid underserved communities.290 If they identified
patients in need of more formal care, they would refer patients to community
psychosocial care centers, where patients participated in group therapy and possible
neurological examinations.
In addition to the state’s health care mobilization campaign, the National
Autonomous University of Nicaragua in Léon collaborated with external donors to
improve the quality and training of Nicaragua’s mental health care professionals.
Through these efforts, the University developed a program to increase the amount of
health care professionals trained in trauma and addiction counseling.291 Beginning in
2009, the collaboration launched a workshop that trained 47 nurses, social workers,
psychologists, and physicians. After this initial phase, subsequent workshops in 2011
trained 32 additional professionals, and created the foundation for a certification and
288
Summerfield, “Nicaragua: War and Mental Health.” 914.
289
Harris; Schefer, “Mental Health Services in Nicaragua: Ten Years of Revolution.” 346.
290
Harris; Schefer, “Mental Health Services in Nicaragua: Ten Years of Revolution.” 347.
291
Sapag et al., “Global Mental Health: Transformative Capacity Building in Nicaragua.” 2.
102
master program focused on addiction treatment and conflict trauma counseling. This
expansion of medical service supported Nicaragua's reconciliation efforts by
strengthening social cohesion through increasing the population's sense of human
security by improving access to and quality of medical services.
Effective Practices
As illustrated by the three methodologies outlined above, reconciliation efforts
utilized Nicaraguan history and culture to overcome ideological divides to reestablish
social cohesion. By applying SCORE indicators to Nicaragua’s top-down and grassroots
reconciliation methodologies, it is appropriate to conclude that Nicaragua’s
reconciliation efforts were a success. The decision to involve both Sandinista and
Contra forces in rebuilding projects reduced the social distance between the former
enemy groups. Additionally, by randomly assigning diverse families to live in the newly
constructed communities, the housing project forced the Sandinistas and Contras to
accept each other as an integrated community. By 2010, 80% of Nicaraguans surveyed
from these mixed communities stated that they made peace with their opposition
neighbors, permitting their children to play with the children of their former adversaries.
Although 37% believed that political tensions remained, 80% confirmed that they would
not participate in an armed conflict against their neighbors.292
The use of faith based dialogue, poetry, and public theater created a new primary
identity that replaced ideological loyalties and successfully reduced intergroup anxiety. It
reduced the cultural distance between the Sandinistas and Contras by demonstrating
mutual commonalities and shared values. The Church’s recasting of former enemies as
brothers in penance created a spiritual bond for forgiveness and reconciliation, while
poetry and theater performances reinforced a shared culture that predated the outbreak
of war. Finally, the improvement of mental health services acknowledged the deep
292
Nilson, “Grassroots Reconciliation Stories from Post-Conflict Nicaragua.” 50.
103
trauma caused by two cycles of violence and showed the state’s commitment to
improving human security by increasing access to health services.293
SCORE Card
Nicaragua
As Nicaragua’s SCORE card shows, these trends align with four of the five
indicators used to measure effective reconciliation. The cultural distance indicator does
not apply, thus marked N/A, because Nicaragua is a largely homogenous society.
Outside of its Amerindian population, Nicaragua lacks ethnic or religious diversity. As a
result, bridging cultural distance is not an applicable indicator to this conflict since there
was no cultural distance to overcome. Additionally, on the Social Cohesion SCORE
card, group identification remains unchecked because Nicaraguans’ political
identification remains a strong and divisive aspect of their identity formation. Whether
that identity is political or a part of the Amerindian-Nicaraguan divide, their primary
293
Ioannou, “Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE): Methodology.” 6.
104
community identity remains more important than their identity as Nicaraguans. Despite
this, Nicaragua’s reconciliation processes fulfill a majority of effective reconciliation
indicators. Taken together, the indicators prove that Nicaragua successfully
implemented a post-conflict reconciliation strategy that integrated top-down and
grassroots actors.
CONCLUSION
The four case studies demonstrate the impactful role of social cohesion and
reconciliation in post-conflict societies. The SCORE cards illustrate how reconciliation is
applicable to all levels of everyday life and societal relationships. Therefore, efforts
should not only address internal issues of healing and perceptions, but also aim to
assist communal healing and transformation toward a shared identity in which all people
feel included. Additionally, these initiatives should address civilian grievances, and
directly involve civil society, paying particular attention to marginalized groups.
While the methodologies employed in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, and
Nicaragua are specific to the culture, history, and traditions of each region, all cases
have similarities in trends and effective practices. The SCORE cards show how
comprehensive reconciliation efforts can be in that they encompass aspects of ending
violence, preventing future conflict, and focus on moving forward as a united
community. For example, many case studies touch on the need for internal and
communal healing, holistic approaches, and modeling interventions after local traditions.
Interestingly, many modern initiatives apply multiple methods of truth telling, interfaith
dialogue, art, sport, and mental health simultaneously. Based on these observations, in
order to broaden the opportunity for social cohesion and reconciliation at every level, it
is in the best interest of state and non-state actors to continue to employ multiple
methodologies and apply them broadly in future reconciliation efforts.