How African Leaders View US and PRC Engagements on the Continent Kathleen Brindley, Jason Bryant, Christopher Carolin, Mindy Duong, Zach Fedor, Tyler Garner, Jessica Herring, Yasmine Kulesza, Will McHenry, Joseph Quinn, Jared Sarkis, John Storey, Kyle Verhoeve American University, Spring 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ______________________________________________________________ 3 INTRODUCTION ____________________________________________________________________ 4 METHODOLOGY ____________________________________________________________________ 4 CAMEROON Primary Assessments _____________________________________________________________ 5 Security ________________________________________________________________________ 5 Economic _______________________________________________________________________ 7 Political ________________________________________________________________________ 8 Key Projections __________________________________________________________________ 9 DJIBOUTI Primary Assessments ____________________________________________________________ 10 Security _______________________________________________________________________ 10 Economic ______________________________________________________________________ 12 Political _______________________________________________________________________ 14 Key Projections _________________________________________________________________ 15 ETHIOPIA Primary Assessments ____________________________________________________________ 16 Security _______________________________________________________________________ 16 Economic ______________________________________________________________________ 17 Political _______________________________________________________________________ 19 Key Projections _________________________________________________________________ 21 KENYA Primary Assessments ____________________________________________________________ 22 Security _______________________________________________________________________ 22 Economic ______________________________________________________________________ 24 Political _______________________________________________________________________ 27 Key Projections _________________________________________________________________ 30 SOUTH AFRICA Primary Assessments ____________________________________________________________ 31 Security _______________________________________________________________________ 31 Economic ______________________________________________________________________ 33 Political _______________________________________________________________________ 35 Key Projections _________________________________________________________________ 38 1 MOST LIKELY OUTCOME ____________________________________________________________ 39 LOW PROBABILITY/HIGH IMPACT _____________________________________________________ 39 CONCLUSION _____________________________________________________________________ 41 BIBLIOGRAPHY ___________________________________________________________________ 42 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY China and the United States are not in direct competition with each other in the investment, trade, foreign aid, or military spheres in Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Africa. Rather, these African states are benefiting from the two powers in separate economic development and security spheres. Leaders in these states currently use their relationship with China for infrastructure development, economic growth, and arms imports while looking to the US for short-­‐term development projects and counterterrorism assistance. Current trends indicate this relationship will not change in the next five to 10 years. ●
Politically, African state leaders are opportunistic regarding diplomatic relationships as long as they are able to maintain their hold on power. ●
Economically, these African states are closely tied to China because of China’s minimal conditions for aid and extensive investments in African state infrastructure projects. This relationship will continue despite the slowdown in China’s economic growth. By comparison, the US provides emergency aid but does not engage in long-­‐term infrastructure development projects. ●
Current trends indicate that China will likely maintain or increase its military weapons sales and training to African militaries. The US military complements this security effort by playing a supporting role to African state security, especially to support counterterrorism operations against Boko Haram and al-­‐Shabaab. In contrast, China has a small military presence on the continent outside of peacekeeping. 3 INTRODUCTION This paper will focus on African leaders’ perspectives regarding US and Chinese influence, and how leaders use the US and China in the functional domains of security, economics, and politics to benefit their respective states. This is an alternative approach to focusing on Chinese motives, perspectives, and actions on the African continent and how they impact US foreign policy toward China. Our analysis focuses on the following countries: Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Africa. Contrary to the discourse surrounding US and Chinese influence in Africa, US and Chinese weapons sales, military cooperation, investment, trade, and foreign aid activities exist in predominantly complementary, rather than directly competitive, spheres. This is important to African leaders because they use investment, aid, and military assistance from both powers to modernize and develop their respective states. METHODOLOGY We focused our research on Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa because these countries have observable interactions with the US and China in the military, economic, and political sectors. Arms transfers, military-­‐to-­‐military cooperation, significant infrastructure investment, and diplomatic visits are observable interactions. We then developed two hypotheses: 1) African leaders are pitting the US and China against each other to compete for influence on the continent, or 2) African state leaders are using the US and China to fill gaps in different sectors; therefore, the US and China operate in a complementary fashion. Our research included open source and academic research as well as interviews with experts. We sought direct quotes from African state elites regarding their relationship with the US and China in the three functional sectors. Since the information acquired did not support our first hypothesis, we chose to focus on our second hypothesis. Our research suggests that the five selected African states are using their relationship with the US and China to make gains in the security and economic sectors. 4 CAMEROON Primary assessments Cameroonian elites place a strong emphasis on security due to the rise of Boko Haram, causing elites to turn to China for weapons transfers to augment counterterrorism capabilities and modernize its military at a lower cost. Due to the small US economic presence, Cameroon will continue to rely upon Chinese economic assistance to develop long-­‐term infrastructure projects. Source: CIA World Factbook SECURITY President Paul Biya will look to China for additional military assistance to supply weapons with greater operational value to Cameroon’s army and its counterterrorism campaign. This will allow the Cameroonian Army to transition from US military-­‐supplied weaponry to low-­‐cost Chinese alternatives in order to modernize, fill capability gaps, and take on a larger regional role in counterterrorism operations. ● According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Chinese arms exports to Cameroon increased from $25 million to $75 million between 2012 and 2015, while US transfers declined from $10 million to $2 million.1 Additionally, Cameroon purchased a total of 1
“Arms exports to Cameroon, 2000-­‐2015,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Arms Transfers Database. Accessed 22 March 2016. 5 29 major conventional weapons systems compared to four from the US between 2000 and 2015.2 Graph 1: China Military Equipment Imports, United States and China Million USD
80
China, 74
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
US, 0
2010
2013
2014
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database ●
The Cameroonian Air Force’s aging aircraft has hampered its combat capability, according to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment.3Although Cameroon has previously purchased US aircraft to modernize its aircraft, Cameroon is purchasing more Chinese aircraft to fit the military’s operational needs. In 2012, the Cameroonian Air Force accepted an MA60 twin turboprop aircraft from China funded primarily by Chinese grant aid.4 This purchase supplements the US CN235, which was considered the lowest cost solution until the MA60. Like the CN235, the MA60 has short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability, does not require a high standard of runway conditions to operate, and has additional carry capacity. ●
Cameroon purchased the Chinese Type 054A and Type 053H guided missile frigates in 2014 to modernize its navy and better conduct anti-­‐piracy and counterterrorism missions in the Gulf of Guinea.5 2
Ibid. 3
“Military (Cameroon)-­‐Sentinel Security Assessment,” IHS Jane’s, November 2012, http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/cafrsu/cames060.html 4
“Cameroon receives MA60,” Defence Web, November 30, 2012, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28718%3Acameroon-­‐receives-­‐
ma60&catid=35%3AAerospace&Itemid=107. 5
“Poly Technologies of China Building 76mm Gun-­‐Armed Large Patrol Craft for Cameroon Navy,” The Cameroon Journal, May 3, 2014, http://www.journalducameroun.com/article.php?aid=17181. 6 ECONOMIC President Biya will continue to exploit Chinese infrastructure development projects to make Cameroon the economic hub of the Gulf of Guinea. Cameroon’s geographic location allows it to capitalize financially on the shipping industry’s need for ports capable of accommodating large container ships and a larger volume of shipping traffic. Additionally, Cameroon’s demand for electricity is met through Chinese-­‐constructed hydroelectric dams, allowing businesses to operate with fewer power outages. Image 1: Kribi Deep-­‐Water Port ●
China provided 85 percent of the $1 billion in funding for the Kribi deep-­‐water port, with an expected capacity of 100 million tons in shipping per year. This will be a major source of revenue generation once fully operational.6 ●
China appropriated $716 million for the construction of the Memve’ele hydroelectric dam. Cameroon is now able to power its Source: Arabian Supply Chain businesses and industries, further increasing Cameroon’s economic output.7 ●
In April 2014, the Biya government introduced legislation calling for “the ratification of the convention on promotion and reciprocal protection of investments between China and Cameroon.”8 The proposed legislation demonstrates the importance of Chinese investment and infrastructure projects to help Cameroon become a newly industrialized country by the year 2035.9 The Cameroonian government has not introduced similar legislation to foster and protect its economic relationship with the US. 6
“What’s it like to have China build you a port? Ask Cameroon,” Port News, February 28, 2015, http://en.portnews.ru/digest/15330/. 7
Richard Kwang Kometa, “Cameroon: Memve’ele Hydroelectric Dam -­‐ Life Changing Project,” allAFrica, June 18, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201206191140.html. 8
“Cameroon introduces Chinese investment bill,” Star Africa, April 2 2014, http://en.starafrica.com/news/cameroon-­‐introduces-­‐chinese-­‐investment-­‐bill.html. 9
Cameroon Ministry of Economy, Planning and Regional Development, “Cameroon Vision 2035,” Cameroon Embassy, June 2009, http://www.cameroonembassyusa.org/docs/webdocs/Cameroon_VISION_2035_English_Version.pdf. 7 POLITICAL The politically repressive tactics of President Biya’s US-­‐supported Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) counterterrorism team is likely to undermine political stability as well as foster distrust towards the US. President Biya is less likely to maintain political legitimacy and weaken Boko Haram if he relies solely on the BIR. He will therefore need to rely on the general Cameroonian Army to conduct counterterrorism operations. ●
The BIR killed an estimated 100 citizens when suppressing protests over the high cost of living in the northern cities of Douala and Yaoundé in February 2008.10 Furthermore, according to Amnesty International, “Since 2014, Cameroon security forces have arrested and detained more than 1,000 people suspected of supporting Boko Haram,” and most of these arrests were made in “mass screening operations or cordon-­‐and-­‐search raids where security forces round up dozens, sometimes hundreds of men and boys.” The report further details looting and rampant abuses by the BIR through the process of mass detention.11 ●
BIR’s heavy-­‐handed response to Boko Haram is beginning to marginalize populations in the Northern region, particularly among unemployed youth who tend to be more loyal to their respective tribe than to the nation. According to Malte Liewerschiedt, a senior Africa analyst at US-­‐based risk consultancy firm Verisk Maplecroft, “Boko Haram operates rear bases in remote border areas, which are supported by networks on ethnic kinship in Cameroon’s Far North Region.”12 Ethnic and regional loyalties continue to play a role in the radicalization of young people. ●
US Ambassador to Cameroon Michael S. Hoza highlighted US security assistance to the BIR: “We [the US] are partnering closely with the BIR, who are fighting courageously, and we are doing everything we can to assure that they stay alive to continue the fight and that they have all the training and equipment they need to be fully successful.”13 Extensive US assistance to the BIR undermines US credibility as an outside partner trying to help northern Cameroonians. 10
“Rapid intervention military unit strays from its mission,” IRIN, August 28, 2008. http://www.irinnews.org/report/80065/cameroon-­‐rapid-­‐intervention-­‐military-­‐unit-­‐strays-­‐its-­‐mission. 11
“Cameroon: Hundreds slaughtered by Boko Haram and abused by security forces,” Amnesty International, September 15, 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/cameroon-­‐hundreds-­‐slaughtered-­‐by-­‐
boko-­‐haram-­‐and-­‐abused-­‐by-­‐security-­‐forces/. 12
Bax Pauline, “Boko Haram focuses on Cameroon’s soft targets,” Business Day, February 5, 2016, http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2016/02/05/boko-­‐haram-­‐focuses-­‐on-­‐cameroons-­‐soft-­‐targets. 13
“Charge d’Affaires Matthew D. Smith’s Remarks to the Media,” U.S. Embassy Yaoundé, September 2, 2015, http://yaounde.usembassy.gov/spdcm_090315.html. 8 Key Projections Cameroon’s economic growth is expected to remain strong with a continued average GDP growth rate above five percent for the next five years. Additionally, the economic downturn in China will not likely alter trends in long-­‐term investment projects in Cameroon. Security, rather than economic considerations, will likely be the driving force in President Biya’s decision-­‐making calculus. The current security environment is not likely to change as Boko Haram strengthens its position among the marginalized population in Northern Cameroon. Biya’s ability to strengthen civil-­‐military relations by relying less on the BIR will be vital to maintain his popular legitimacy. To do so, he will start to depend more on Chinese arms transfers to bolster and modernize the Cameroonian general army. 9 DJIBOUTI Primary assessments Djibouti will have a significant Chinese military presence because China is placing its first ever overseas base in Djiboutian territory. Djiboutian leaders are opportunistic and permit foreign bases on their territory primarily for their own economic gain rather than enhanced security. Leaders also gain revenue from China’s use of Djibouti’s deep-­‐water ports. However, the Djiboutian Armed Forces (FAD) receives adequate military assistance from the US instead of China because China does not yet support Djibouti in a military capacity. SECURITY Djiboutian leadership will allow the buildup of Chinese and other foreign military bases for financial gain rather than added regional security. The future Chinese base located in Djibouti is the first foreign military posting in the history of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The base will generate revenue and spur job creation. Djibouti does not exclusively favor the US or China regarding military base construction or assistance because the Djiboutian government views foreign military bases as revenue generators. In addition to debt reduction, it boosts Djibouti’s credentials as a regional military and shipping hub.14 14
Michel Arseneault, 'Historic' Chinese military base to open in Horn of Africa, November 5, 2015, http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20150511-­‐historic-­‐chinese-­‐military-­‐base-­‐open-­‐horn-­‐africa, accessed March 2016. 10 ●
African expert Jennifer Brass of Indiana University states that the Chinese base will bring in $100 million per year in revenue and potentially create hundreds of jobs for Djiboutian locals.15 ●
According to President Ismail Omar Guellah, the largest concern for Djibouti is its financial standing, as their public debt is 80 percent of GDP with an unemployment rate of 48.4 percent.16 In relation to China, Guellah states, “They are the biggest investors in our country. They are the ones who were sensitive to what we feel and seek, and our interests are complementary."17 ●
From the US perspective, the future Chinese base is cause for concern, as it could house up to 10,000 PLA soldiers, posing the potential threat of Chinese surveillance of US military activities.18 From the Djiboutian perspective, the new Chinese base is an opportunity to generate $100 million per year in rent. ●
Djibouti-­‐based AFRICOM Camp Lemonnier is the only permanent US base on the continent of Africa as well as being the only installation dedicated to counterterrorism.19 The Djiboutian government accepts Camp Lemonnier’s presence because of the $63 million yearly revenue supplied by the US Government. From the Djiboutian perspective, Camp Lemonnier is valuable for its financial potential rather than the security it provides. The Djiboutian Armed Forces (FAD) will not increase military cooperation with the People’s Liberation Army because they receive adequate military assistance from the US in the form of training and military equipment. The FAD liaises with US and French military personnel, but does not participate to the same extent with the PLA. The FAD relies primarily on US military assistance due to the US’ experience and capabilities in countering terrorism and violent extremism. 15
Morgan Winsor, With China’s Naval Base, Djibouti Could Become Africa’s Singapore, February 4, 2016, http://www.ibtimes.com/chinas-­‐naval-­‐base-­‐djibouti-­‐could-­‐become-­‐africas-­‐singapore-­‐2292581, accessed March 2016. 16
International Monetary Fund. IMF Executive Board Concludes 2015 Article IV Consultation with Djibouti. Press Release No. 15/587, December 28, 2015, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr15587.htm. 17
Edmund Blair, China to start work soon on naval base in Djibouti: Guelleh, February 3, 2016, http://news.yahoo.com/china-­‐start-­‐soon-­‐naval-­‐djibouti-­‐guelleh-­‐074246196-­‐-­‐business.html, accessed March 2016. 18
Winsor, With China’s Naval Base, Djibouti Could Become Africa’s Singapore. 19
Craig Whitlock, The Washington Post, October 25, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-­‐
security/remote-­‐us-­‐base-­‐at-­‐core-­‐of-­‐secret-­‐operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-­‐197a-­‐11e2-­‐bd10-­‐
5ff056538b7c_story.html, accessed March 2016; Steve Contorno, Hillary Clinton says in memoir that there's very little U.S. military presence in Africa, June 12, 2014, http://www.politifact.com/truth-­‐o-­‐
meter/statements/2014/jun/12/hillary-­‐clinton. 11 ●
The US National Guard and AFRICOM work closely with the Djiboutian military on countering violent extremism and terrorism. They also share best practices on Entry Control Points (ECPs) such as personnel search procedures, border patrol security, and first aid.20 Additionally, the US State Partnership Program facilitates military-­‐to-­‐military engagement between the Kentucky National Guard and the Djiboutian military.21 Such cooperation helps maintain open lines of tactical communication between states, facilitate civilian engagements, and boosts trust between both forces, according to Sgt. Darron Salzer of US AFRICOM.22 ●
The Department of Defense (DoD) supports Djibouti’s military and civilian authority because Djibouti lacks the manpower and military capabilities needed to combat terrorist threats. DoD contributes to regional missions and projects power from Camp Lemonnier through counterterrorism, peace operations, and counter piracy, and has nearly doubled the Djiboutian navy by equipping it with extended-­‐range patrol vessels.23 There is no indication whether Djibouti will prefer US or Chinese military training in the future. ECONOMIC Djibouti’s leaders will rely on Ethiopia and China’s use of the country’s deep-­‐water ports to continue strong economic growth. Djibouti’s status as a regional shipping hub is especially important to landlocked Ethiopia, which has extensive trade ties with China. Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti’s ports is likely to increase with Sino-­‐Ethiopian trade growth, resulting in increased revenue for Djibouti. China desires to protect shipping routes through its recent plans to construct a military base in Djibouti. 20
Rachel Waller, 2-­‐138th FSC Shares Best ECP Practices With Djiboutian Army, Edited by Djibouti Loyada. June 7, 2013, http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/10861/2-­‐138th-­‐fsc-­‐shares-­‐best-­‐ecp-­‐practices-­‐with-­‐djiboutian-­‐
army, accessed March 2016. 21
Djibouti, Embassy of the United States-­‐, Djibouti, State of Kentucky Forges Lasting Ties Through Partnership Program, June 2, 2015, http://djibouti.usembassy.gov/press-­‐releases/untitled5.html, accessed March 2016. 22
Daron Salzer, National Guard State Partnership Program: East Africa, October 23, 2015, http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/26681/national-­‐guard-­‐state-­‐partnership-­‐program-­‐east-­‐africa, accessed March 2016. 23
Joseph Giordono, U.S. Donation of Patrol Boats Beefs up Djibouti's Navy, June 16, 2006, http://www.stripes.com/news/u-­‐s-­‐donation-­‐of-­‐patrol-­‐boats-­‐beefs-­‐up-­‐djibouti-­‐s-­‐navy-­‐1.50402, accessed March 2016; Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC), Mission and Vision, http://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnreurafswa/installations/camp_lemonnier_djibouti/about/mission_and_visio
n.html, accessed March 2016. 12 ●
“Djibouti’s economy is dependent on foreign financing, foreign direct investments, rents from foreign countries’ military bases, and port services,” according to the World Bank.24 Trademark East Africa also states that “Ethiopia currently uses Djibouti port[s] for over 90-­‐95 percent of its [$4 billion] imports and [$3 billion] exports [annually].”25 DPWorld, an Emirati shipping company, states that it charges between $272 to $544 per container (depending on size) at the Doraleh Port in Djibouti. The average number of containers on a ship numbers at 20,000, resulting in average revenue between $5.4 million and $10.8 million per ship.26 ●
Workeneh Gebeyehu, the Ethiopian Minister for Transport stated, “5-­‐10 percent of the country’s imports are planned to come through the port of Berbera (Somaliland), and we will be looking for proper ports for different areas of the country. But the Port of Djibouti continues to be the major one.”27 This demonstrates that Djibouti benefits from Ethiopia’s reliance on the coastal nation’s ports for shipping. ●
Djibouti experienced a steady increase in container port traffic since 2007 as economic relations between China and Ethiopia rose. The bilateral trade between Ethiopia and China has managed to show 12 percent positive growth, which accounts for about half a billion USD.28 Djibouti’s economic growth (5 percent in 2013, 5.6 percent in 2014) is expected to reach 6.2 percent in 2016, according to African Economic Outlook.29 The Government of Djibouti will continue to use funding from foreign military bases to subsidize infrastructure projects, such as those affiliated with Vision 2035. Vision 2035 is a domestic strategy that aims to improve Djibouti’s infrastructure. Djibouti seeks to take advantage of foreign investment 24
World Bank, Overview [Djibouti], September 16, 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/djibouti/overview, accessed March 2016. 25
Trade Mark East Africa, Ethiopia Look to Ports in Kenya… to Increase Imports and Exports, June 18, 2015, https://www.trademarkea.com/news/ethiopia-­‐looks-­‐to-­‐ports-­‐in-­‐kenya-­‐somaliland-­‐and-­‐sudan-­‐to-­‐increase-­‐
imports-­‐and-­‐exports/, accessed February 2016; John Sambo, Ethiopia to Widen Choices Over Ports, June 28, 2015 , accessed February 2016. 26
DPWorldwide, Doraleh Tariff Book 2015. 27
Sambo, Ethiopia to Widen Choices Over Ports. 28
Yared Gebremeden, Ethiopia: Ethio-­‐China Trade Volume Steadily Growing, Yet Untapped – Ambassador, March 17, 2016, http://allafrica.com/stories/201603170796.html, accessed March 2016. 29
Guy Blaise Nkamleu, Djibouti. African Economic Outlook, May 28, 2015, http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/country-­‐notes/east-­‐africa/djibouti/, accessed March 2016. 13 from the United States and China to develop infrastructure that will transform the country into a regional platform for commercial, logistical, and financial services.30 ●
President Guelleh justified the presence of the Chinese military base in Djibouti by stating that “[foreign governments] have the right to defend their interests [through building military bases], just like everybody else does." This demonstrates that Guelleh allows investment from any country regardless of Djibouti’s political relationship with said country.31 ●
Djibouti uses Chinese funding for Vision 2035. This plan focuses on “the development of roads, ports, airports and telecommunications infrastructure to make Djibouti the hub of regional and international traffic.”32 The program includes the addition of six ports to those already existing, which will further increase Djibouti’s capacity as a regional shipping hub.33 ●
According to Tomi Oladipo, BBC Africa Security Correspondent, the income from all foreign military bases, including the United States, France, Japan, Germany, China-­‐-­‐and soon Saudi Arabia-­‐-­‐provides Djibouti with steady sources of funding to complete infrastructure projects.34 POLITICAL President Guelleh’s fourth presidential victory ensures that Djibouti will continue to accept investment from China and the United States. Guelleh prioritizes investment for infrastructure development from both China and the US, allowing Djibouti to maintain economic growth. Guelleh’s even-­‐handed approach to investment will likely continue. ●
“[Foreign governments] have the right to defend their interests [through building military bases], just like everybody else does.” -­‐President Ismail Guelleh of Djibouti President Guelleh has a strong desire to continue investment in infrastructure projects, stating "Infrastructure always pays off, doesn't it?" in response to a question on the country’s debts.35 30
Embassy of the Republic of Djibouti –Ankara, Djibouti Vision 2035, 2014, http://djibembassytr.org/business-­‐
and-­‐investment/djibouti-­‐vision-­‐2035, accessed March 2016. 31
Edmund Blair, China to Start Work Soon on Naval Base in Djibouti – Guelleh, February 2, 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-­‐djibouti-­‐china-­‐idUKKCN0VB1Z6, accessed March 2016. 32
Embassy of the Republic of Djibouti –Ankara, Djibouti Vision 2035, 2014, http://djibembassytr.org/business-­‐
and-­‐investment/djibouti-­‐vision-­‐2035, accessed March 2016. 33
Ibid. 34
Tomi Oladipo, Twitter Post, March 7, 2016, 8:18pm, https://twitter.com/JQuinn1266/status/707204510729551872. 35
Blair, China to Start Work Soon on Naval Base in Djibouti – Guelleh. 14 ●
The ministers in President Guelleh’s cabinet predicted the country will become “the next Dubai, a magnet for capital and free trade” in the next 20 years if it continues its commitment to accepting investment.36 Key Projections The Djiboutian government will continue to allow more military base construction on its territory regardless of the base’s national ties. While the US military may view other base constructions as a threat to its interests and operations, the Djiboutian government views the presence of foreign military bases positively because they generate revenue. Djibouti will continue to engage both China and the US for financial benefit. 36
Monte Reel, Djibouti Is Hot: How a forgotten sandlot of a country became a hub of international power games, March 23, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-­‐djibouti/, accessed March 2016. 15 ETHIOPIA Primary assessments Ethiopia prefers China’s contributions in the security and economic sectors over those of the United States. However, Ethiopian leadership approaches foreign partnerships and investment pragmatically, placing Chinese and US influence in complementary rather than competitive spheres. Lower conditional standards on Chinese investment allows Ethiopia to dictate its own economic policies, creating an environment where the Ethiopian government increasingly uses Chinese political ties and monetary support to complement existing gaps in US and other foreign contributions. SECURITY Ethiopian leadership will increase Sino-­‐Ethiopian security collaboration due to the reduced US military presence in the country. High-­‐level military personal relationships, ongoing military training exchanges, and continuing arms imports influence Chinese security involvement in Ethiopia. Ethiopian officer training and the courting of the senior military leader, General Samora, provide professional development to Ethiopian armed forces and builds confidence in Chinese commitment to the country. Ethiopia also displays a recent trend of acquiring the bulk of its military ground equipment (excluding tanks) from China. Reinforced by the presence of Chinese military equipment across the continent, this trend should continue. These current Sino-­‐Ethiopian security engagements will likely increase due to the reduction of US military presence, specifically Unmanned Aerial Vehicle operations. Strained US-­‐
Ethiopian relations drive this reduction in US military presence. 16 Ethiopia purchased more than 100 APCs, artillery, and SAM systems from China between ●
2005-­‐2015. During this time period, Ethiopia purchased one C-­‐130 transport aircraft from the US, according to SIPRI arms import data (not including small arms transfers).37 Ethiopian leaders view Chinese weapons systems as adequate in quality and less expensive than western options.38 “Every year [China] trains an undisclosed number (perhaps ten) Ethiopian officers,” Ethiopian ●
Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Samora Yenus stated on a 2010 visit to China. He met with former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xu Caihou, and Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army of China, Chen Bingde. Samora stated, “The exchanges and cooperation previously conducted by the two countries was of great benefit for the Ethiopian side.” Samora and Chen vowed to build closer military ties in the future.39 ●
The US drone base in Ethiopia closed in January 2016 because it was “not required at this time,” according to Pentagon spokeswoman Lt. Col. Michelle Baldanza. However, the closure of the US drone base was likely due to the insistence of Ethiopian leadership as a result of declining US-­‐Ethiopian relations, according to multiple sources.40 ECONOMIC Ethiopian leaders believe that Chinese investment in infrastructure, manufacturing, and industrial sectors will maintain economic stability. Ethiopian leaders favor long-­‐term Chinese economic development strategies that secure footholds for Chinese industry. Ethiopia illustrates the capacity and desire to mobilize a low-­‐cost labor force to attract Chinese investment. China demonstrated that it is a reliable economic partner due to historically high levels of FDI, infrastructure investment, and industry projects. Sino-­‐Ethiopian trade relations will therefore continue despite a projected Chinese economic slowdown. 37
(SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. "Stockholm International Peace Research Institute” n.d.) 38
David Shinn, Interview with the research team, March 25, 2016. 39
Jean-­‐Pierre Cabestan, "China and Ethiopia: Authoritarian affinities and economic cooperation," China Perspectives 4 (2012): 53; He Wenping, “A new Era of China-­‐Africa Cooperation,” China-­‐Africa Cooperation Net, http://www.zfhz.org/plus/view.php?aid=3271. 40
John Hudson and Siobhan O. Grady, "As New Threats Emerge, U.S. Closes Drone Base in Ethiopia," Foreign Policy, January 4, 2016; Shinn, Interview with the research team; Hudson and Grady, "As New Threats Emerge, U.S. Closes Drone Base in Ethiopia." 17 ●
Chinese FDI in Ethiopia quadrupled from 2006-­‐2012 from $24 million to $122 million, with China being the number one foreign investor in the country. 41 Chinese FDI increased at the same time Ethiopia’s GDP was on the rise and the World Bank reduced grants for projects.42 Graph 2: Ethiopia’s External Economic Picture Million USD
1000 100 10 1 United States China Total FDI inflow Source: World Bank UNCTADFDI/TNC Database and IMF Country Report ●
Regarding the Ethiopian preference for Chinese loans, former Deputy Prime Minster Hailemariam Desalegan stated in 2010 that “[China] largely follows a ‘no-­‐strings attached’ approach in its dealings with Africa. We like the Chinese way of doing things, because they don’t say ‘do this, don’t do that’—there are no preconditions.”43 ●
Condition-­‐based loans from the US discourage Ethiopia from seeking those loans because it would force the Ethiopian government to institute political reforms, thereby limiting its ability to govern according to its own principles. 41
UNCTADFDI/TNC database 42
Ibid; IMF Country Report No. 14/303. October, 2014. 43
Elsje Fourie, New Maps for Africa? Contextualising the ‘Chinese Model’ within Ethiopian and Kenyan Paradigms of Development, School of International Studies University of Trento, Italy (2012): 157; David H Shinn, "Ethiopia and China: When Two Former Empires Connected,” International Policy Digest, June 11, 2014. 18 ●
Chinese state-­‐owned enterprises subsidize and construct the bulk of renewable energy initiatives, hydropower, and Ethiopia’s urban rail transportation.44 This improves Ethiopia’s energy efficiency and infrastructure at little-­‐to-­‐no cost to the Ethiopian government. ●
Ethiopia’s “inexpensive, yet relatively skilled labor force” and efforts to bring in Chinese investment enable Ethiopia to attract substantial investment in labor-­‐intensive industries, according to the World Bank.45 Ethiopia supplies labor at one-­‐quarter that of China. Ethiopian foreign minister, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, stated, “I expect even more foreign direct investment flow from China. There is strong interest to migrate manufacturing to Ethiopia.”46 POLITICAL Ethiopian leaders favor Chinese diplomatic partnerships because of continued Sino-­‐Ethiopian bilateral agreements and strong personal ties among elites. Continual Sino-­‐
Ethiopian diplomatic visits, professional development of Ethiopian elites in China, and personal relationships illustrate a durable diplomatic alliance. Public Chinese visits occurred more frequently than US diplomatic interactions, accompanied by bilateral economic agreements. Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) press releases and rhetoric demonstrate a positive view of Sino-­‐Ethiopian relations while “Ethiopia and the US have largely maintained more or less effective cooperation in matters of security though the relationship hasn't been as close as some critics have tried to suggest. Ethiopia has never been a US ‘poodle’.” -­‐Ethiopia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs remaining ambivalent towards US-­‐Ethiopia ties. “[T]wo factors that contribute largely to the consolidation of the bonds between Ethiopia and ●
China are the frequent exchange of visits by high-­‐level officials and legislators; and secondly, the successful signing of agreements on a number of significant bilateral issues,” according to the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.47 44
Ethiopia Energy Situation. Energypedia.info; Ethiopia: Sub-­‐Saharan Africa gets its first metro, The Economist, September 22, 2015. 45
Miria Pigato and Wenxia Tang, China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an Evolving Global Context, World Bank, March, 2015 46
Adrienne Klasa, “Ethiopia Industry: Still Banking on China,” Financial Times, January 7, 2016. 47
“Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs – PRC,” http://www.mfa.gov.et/web/guest/asia-­‐countries. 19 ●
Ethiopian President Mulato Teshome attended Peking University and maintains personal ties with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, indicating a strong political and cultural understanding of China. Current educational programs for Ethiopian leaders in China exhibit an upward trend.48 “The Chinese leadership has increasingly followed a strategy of bringing African elites to China for study visits… Chinese embassy in Addis Ababa estimates that the number of Ethiopian ministers who visit China annually has doubled over the past decade,” according to Elsje Fourie, Assistant Professor of Globalization and Development Studies at Maastricht University. Approximately 60 percent of the 91 governmental elites interviewed in the article cited visited China.49 ●
Two meetings occurred between Ethiopian and Chinese presidential leaders in the past three years, as well as one US presidential meeting. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi met with Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2012.50 Cabinet level visits between Ethiopian and Chinese leaders are conducted twice as often as those of Ethiopian and US visits, with the Sino-­‐
Ethiopian agendas focused on improving bilateral relations.51 By comparison, US Department of State officials attended addresses at the African Union headquartered in Addis Ababa.52 Ethiopian leaders view US strategy as short-­‐term and reactive, whereas China is valued for its long-­‐
term, development-­‐focused assistance. The US government remains the largest donor to Ethiopia by providing food and other assistance during humanitarian crises. However, Ethiopian leadership believes the US does not assist with long-­‐term development efforts. In contrast, Ethiopian leaders see Chinese humanitarian efforts as more beneficial in building long-­‐term capacity, even though overall Chinese monetary contributions are lower than that of the US. Ethiopian elites’ perspectives on US assistance are affected by a perceived lack of commitment to Ethiopian economic issues. ●
Ethiopia received $532 million in total US aid in response to the 2015 drought, including 60 percent in nutrition.53 Comparatively, in 2015, China constructed a $13 million hospital near 48
China’s Old Friend: Mulatu Teshome, President of Ethiopia, China Scholarship Council, December 24, 2014, 49
Fourie, New Maps for Africa? Contextualising the ‘Chinese Model’ within Ethiopian and Kenyan Paradigms of Development, 154. 50
“U.S. Senior Officials Visits Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,” Embassy of the United States, http://ethiopia.usembassy.gov/. 51
Ethiopian Prime Minster Meles Zenawi met with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Xinhuanet, August 12, 2011; China-­‐Ethiopia relations: an excellent model for South-­‐South cooperation, Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 1, 2014; Ethiopia: Chinese Vice-­‐Premier Concludes Her Visit to Ethiopia, Allafrica.com, November 26, 2011. 52
“U.S. Senior Officials Visits Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,” Embassy of the United States, http://ethiopia.usembassy.gov/; “Secretary Clinton to Travel to U.A.E., Zambia, Tanzania, and Ethiopia,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164673.htm. 53
Food Assistance Fact Sheet – Ethiopia, USAID, Food Assistance Fact Sheet, February 3, 2016. 20 Addis Ababa and sent a military medical team to provide support to the Ethiopian National Defense Forces.54 The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official policy statement towards the US ●
acknowledges Ethiopia’s appreciation of humanitarian assistance, but states “the US has remained aloof… in structural projects in development in the last decades.” The Ethiopian MFA further stresses the integrality of long-­‐term development projects and infrastructure to Ethiopia’s future.55 ●
The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official policy statement for the PRC commends China’s aid and assistance and states that Chinese doctors serving in Ethiopian hospitals are “assisting Ethiopia achieve the Millennium Development Goals.”56 Key Projections The Chinese economic slowdown will not markedly affect Ethiopia’s economy, diplomatic relations, or security agreements with regards to the complementary nature of US and Chinese involvement in Ethiopia. China is committed to Ethiopia because of long-­‐term infrastructure programs and low-­‐cost labor. Ethiopia will also continue to rely on China for development of infrastructure and industry, due in part to Chinese non-­‐conditional monetary support. In the event of reduced Chinese investment, Ethiopian leaders will continue their pragmatic approach to foreign relations in order to ensure economic stability. 54
Shinn, "Ethiopia and China: When Two Former Empires Connected.” 55
“Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs – United States of America,” http://www.mfa.gov.et/web/guest/united-­‐state-­‐of-­‐america. 56
“Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs -­‐ PRC” http://www.mfa.gov.et/web/guest/asia-­‐countries. 21 KENYA Primary assessments Kenya maintains strong economic ties with China. Kenyan elites accept non-­‐conditional Chinese funding to subsidize significant infrastructure projects to boost Kenya’s economic power and regional influence. However, Kenya engages pragmatically with both China and the US to achieve goals outlined in Vision 2030, a domestic strategy that aims to transform Kenya into a middle-­‐
income country by 2030 via infrastructure and development projects.57 Kenya also uses both US and Chinese assistance to fund different aspects of its security apparatus. SECURITY Kenyan leaders will rely primarily on China as an arms supplier, whereas leaders will increase coordination with the US to bolster its counterterrorism operations. Kenya accepted substantial military exports from China in 2015, including arms, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and tanks to bolster internal security operations and combat arms smuggling. While the Kenyan government’s security partnership with China is likely to increase, Kenyan leaders will continue to receive substantial counterterrorism assistance from the United States in the form of aircraft and training and equipping of Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF). Chinese forces cooperate with the KDF to conduct peacekeeping operations; however, they do not coordinate with China on countering terror. Kenyan leaders will therefore continue to rely on the United States to carry out counterterrorism operations, specifically against al-­‐Shabaab. 57
Government of Kenya, “Kenya Vision 2030,” accessed on March 6, 2016, http://www.vision2030.go.ke/. 22 ●
Kenya’s police force purchased 30 Norinco VN armored vehicles from China in February 2016 for peacekeeping, anti-­‐terror, and police missions conducted by Kenya’s National Police Force, according to Defence Web. President Uhuru Kenyatta stated during the commission ceremony on February 1: “Kenya’s police force will for the first time in history acquire armored personnel carriers [APCS] to increase their mobility and protective gear when deployed in volatile areas. You don’t have to depend on the military or other security agents for you to perform your duties.”58 ●
Kenya purchased $77 million in arms from China in 2015, including tanks, Harbin z-­‐9 light attack helicopters, and spare parts, according to Business Daily Africa.59 Kenyan leaders purchase military materiel from China rather than the United States because they are less expensive: Chinese APCs cost approximately $700,000 compared to US-­‐produced APCs, which cost approximately $1.2 million, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).60 Comparatively, Kenya has decreased arms trade with the US. The US only exported $1 million in arms to Kenya from 2010-­‐2014, according to SIPRI.61 Kenyan leaders therefore use China as a primary arms source. ●
While China provides more arms to Kenya, the United States provides more overall security assistance. The United States provided $100 million in counterterrorism assistance to Kenya in 2015—a 163 percent increase from FY 2014—due to the rising level of terrorist violence in the country, according to Security Assistance Monitor.62 $95 million in US aid aims to enhance the KDF’s participation in AMISOM’s operations against al-­‐Shabaab, according to Security Assistance Monitor.63 They enhance efforts to create a “maneuver and border force, counter-­‐
58
“Kenya’s Police Receive Norinco VN4 Armoured Vehicles,” DefenceWeb, February 10, 2016, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=42285%3Akenyas-­‐police-­‐
receive-­‐norinco-­‐vn4-­‐armoured-­‐vehicles&catid=50%3ALand&Itemid=105; Neville Otuki, “Kenya Boosts China Ties with Sh 7.9bn Arms Purchase Deal,” Business Daily, February 15, 2016, http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Kenya-­‐boosts-­‐China-­‐ties-­‐with-­‐Sh7-­‐9bn-­‐arms-­‐purchase-­‐deal/-­‐
/539546/3076738/-­‐/pisutkz/-­‐/index.html. 59
“China-­‐ Africa News: Kenya’s Arms, Nigeria’s Collapsed Security Deal, Zimbabwe’s Elephants,” China-­‐Africa Reporting Project, February 22, 2106, http://china-­‐africa-­‐reporting.co.za/2016/02/china-­‐africa-­‐news-­‐kenya-­‐
arms-­‐nigerias-­‐collapsed-­‐security-­‐deal-­‐zimbabwes-­‐elephants/#sthash.uo7AejjZ.dpuf. 60
Otuki “Kenya Purchases sh2.6bn Weapons from East Europe.” 61
Ibid. 62
“U.S. Counterterrorism Aid to Kenya,” Security Assistance Monitor, July 21, 2015, http://www.securityassistance.org/fact_sheet/us-­‐counterterrorism-­‐aid-­‐kenya. 63
Ibid. 23 IEF, intelligence, and logistics” as well as aircraft to enhance troop mobility to help soldiers target al-­‐Shabaab operatives.64 Kenya’s increased military trade with China bolsters Kenya’s overall security, thereby complementing US counterterrorism aims. Kenyan leaders’ increased military trade with China enhances internal security, as Chinese military hardware strengthens Kenya’s internal policing and peacekeeping operations. China and the US therefore operate in complementary spheres. ●
Kenya will increase military imports from China to gain regional military superiority and aid the KDF and AMISOM’s fight against al-­‐Shabaab, according to Samuel Perlo-­‐Freeman, SIPRI military expenditure program director.65 ●
The KDF provides construction assistance, medical care, and enhanced security to Chinese peacekeepers aiding the UN Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan, according to African Defense.66 Kenya continues its strong military-­‐to-­‐military relationship with Chinese peacekeeping forces to degrade al-­‐Shabaab and enhance stability in South Sudan. ●
“China and Kenya have a long-­‐standing friendship. I hope peacekeepers of the two countries will carry on the friendship and work more closely to make greater contributions to peace in South Sudan,” KDF Lt. Gen. Leonard Muriuki Ngondi said during a trip to Chinese peacekeeping forces in November 2015.67 While China will likely increase peacekeeping forces in the region—mostly to protect the flow of oil from South Sudan—China bolsters KDF operations via arms and APC exports, not aid and training. ECONOMIC Kenyan leadership seeks to judiciously foster relations with both the US and China through foreign aid, FDI, and infrastructure loans in support of Vision 2030. Vision 2030’s highest priority project, the LAPSSET corridor, will require financial support from multiple international partners. Kenya’s economic 64
Ibid. 65
“China-­‐Funded Railway in Kenya Accelerates Military Ties,” Foreign Military Studies Office, November 28, 2013, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/OEWatch/201401/Africa_07.html 66
“Kenyan Army Commander Visits Chinese Peacekeepers in South Sudan,” African Defense, November 20, 2015, http://www.african-­‐defense.com/defense-­‐news/kenyan-­‐army-­‐commander-­‐visits-­‐chinese-­‐peacekeepers-­‐in-­‐
south-­‐sudan/. 67
Ibid. 24 relationship with China and the US is a rare instance in which both the US and China work in similar spheres to develop Kenya’s infrastructure. ●
The $26 billion LAPSSET corridor is Vision 2030’s Map 1: LAPSETT Corridor highest priority infrastructure project and enjoys broad political support among Kenyan elites.68 The LAPSSET corridor will require financial support from multiple international partners. President Kenyatta affirmed the pragmatic nature of Vision 2030 during President Obama’s 2015 visit to Nairobi, stating that Kenya could “not afford the luxury of aligning itself with either the East or West.”69 ●
Currently, the China Road and Bridge Corporation is poised to build the first three berths of the Lamu port at a cost of approximately $500 million.70 US companies Source: The Africa Report are involved in talks to construct oil pipelines from the Kenyan interior to the Lamu port, as well as six new berths at the Lamu port.71 ●
According to a 2015 memorandum of understanding between the Kenyan and US governments, Kenyan leadership views Vision 2030 as a strategic priority:72 “In particular, 68
David M Doya, “Kenya, US Companies in Talks on Multi Billion Dollar Port Deal,” Bloomberg News, July, 26, 2015, accessed March 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-­‐07-­‐26/kenya-­‐u-­‐s-­‐companies-­‐in-­‐
talks-­‐on-­‐multibillion-­‐dollar-­‐port-­‐deal; Adrian J Browne, “LAPSSET: The History and Politics of an Eastern Africa Megaproject,” The Rift Valley Institute, 2015. 69
Otiato Guguyu, “Kenya Risks Souring Ties with Partners Over Projects,” Sunday Nation, August 30, 2015, http://www.ipsos.co.ke/NEWBASE_EXPORTS/Prosperity/150830_Sunday%20Nation_34_a0495.pdf. 70
Apurya Sanghi and Dylan Johnson, “Deal or No Deal: Strictly Business for China in Kenya?” World BankGroup Working Paper, March 2016, http://www-­‐
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2016/03/23/090224b08422cf5b/2_0/Render
ed/PDF/Deal0or0no0dea0for0China0in0Kenya00.pdf. 71
Doya, “Kenya, US Companies in Talks on Multi Billion Dollar Port Deal.” 72
“Memorandum of understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Kenya-­‐Concerning the Development and Implementation of Strategic Priority Infrastructure Projects in Kenya,” US Government Trade Database, 2015, http://trade.gov/dbia/signed-­‐usg-­‐gok-­‐infrastructure-­‐
mou-­‐usg-­‐07242015.pdf. 25 [Kenya] seeks to promote US commercial participation and investment in Kenya’s infrastructure sector, including strategic infrastructure priority projects (re: LAPSSET).” The Kenyan government will maintain close ties with China despite the current Chinese economic downturn. Kenyan elites seek to emulate China’s domestic infrastructure boom and use China’s expertise in completing low-­‐cost and efficient large-­‐scale projects. Large-­‐scale infrastructure development remains the single biggest priority of Vision 2030 and the backbone of Kenya’s Second Medium Term Plan (2013-­‐2017). ●
As of 2015, there are approximately 80 ongoing Chinese development and infrastructure projects in Kenya worth about $3.5 billion.73 China’s low cost infrastructure providers will seek to market their services in Africa due to the slowdown of the Chinese economy. Therefore, Chinese infrastructure projects in Kenya will likely continue, according to the World Bank.74 ●
The Chinese slowdown and rebalancing has the potential to actually strengthen Kenya’s economy through an increase in exports, according to a March 2016 World Bank assessment of Kenya’s economic future with China. The report states that “exports to China, especially of services, may increase once China transitions to a consumption driven economy closer to 2030.”75 ●
The Chinese “grand strategy” and the Kenyan domestic agenda are linked. According to Shannon Tiezzi, managing editor of The Diplomat and expert on China/Africa relations, infrastructure projects such as LAPSSET and SGR are key components of China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative in addition to Kenya’s Vision 2030.76 Evidence suggests that Kenyan elites view Western aid and traditional avenues of financial loans as ineffective. Kenya’s governing elites seek out Chinese aid because they view western aid as having too many stipulations. China applies its non-­‐interference policy to loan-­‐seeking states. Kenya benefits from this because it does not have to alter its governing policies to accept loans for development. 73
“President Kenyatta: Sustained Strategic Ties with China Will Boost Development in Africa,” Government of Kenya, accessed March 5, 2016, http://www.president.go.ke/2015/12/05/president-­‐kenyatta-­‐sustained-­‐
strategic-­‐ties-­‐with-­‐china-­‐will-­‐boost-­‐development-­‐in-­‐africa/. 74
Apurva and Johnson, “Deal or No Deal: Strictly Business for China in Kenya?” 75
Ibid. 76
Shannon Tiezzi, “Africa’s role in China’s One Belt, One Road global trade strategy,” The China in Africa Podcast (2015), The China Africa Project, March 8, 2016. http://www.chinaafricaproject.com/podcast-­‐china-­‐obor-­‐belt-­‐road-­‐shannon-­‐tiezzi-­‐africa-­‐trade/ 26 ●
“In my view, the prescriptions by the World Bank do not help developing countries to grow. It's like they look at you as if you are a small baby – ‘do this, do that’. Sometimes they are very wrong. And that's why I prefer private capital to borrowing from the World Bank,” according to Samuel Poghisio, the former Minister of Information.77 POLITICAL Kenyan leaders even-­‐handedly engage with the US and China in political and economic sectors despite recent anti-­‐West campaigns. Former President Mwai Kibaki’s rhetoric was frequently anti-­‐
West in recent years, and elites looked to China for economic assistance instead of the US. However, President Uhuru Kenyatta is beginning to rebuild diplomatic ties with the US in order to realize Kenya’s economic goals. "Kenya cannot afford the luxury of aligning itself with either East or West." ●
President Mwai Kibaki’s “Look East” policy encouraged stronger relationships with Asia, the Middle East, BRIC countries, and Eastern Europe due to their adherence to non-­‐interference -­‐President Uhuru Kenyatta, 2015 policies, according to The East African.78 ●
President Kenyatta used his indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to win the 2013 elections by propagating anti-­‐West rhetoric. He led an anti-­‐US campaign to appeal to anti-­‐colonialist and populist elements in Kenya. He portrayed the US and Europe’s policy of limited “essential business” contact as the meddling of western powers in Kenyan elections, according to The New York Times.79 ●
The al-­‐Shabaab attack at Garissa University in April 2015 and President Obama’s visit to Kenya in July 2015 signaled an expanding relationship between the US and Kenya in 77
Fourie, “New Maps for Africa? Contextualizaing the ‘Chinese Model’ within Ethiopian and Kenyan Paradigms of Development. 78
“Kenya reaps handsome rewards from its robust ‘Look East’ policy,” The East Africa, accessed March 10, 2016, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-­‐/2558/914708/-­‐/view/printVersion/-­‐/pq3m5q/-­‐/index.html. 79
Michela Wrong, “Indictee for President!” The New York Times, March 11, 2013, accessed March 10, 2016, http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/being-­‐prosecuted-­‐by-­‐the-­‐i-­‐c-­‐c-­‐helped-­‐uhuru-­‐kenyattas-­‐chances-­‐
in-­‐kenyas-­‐election/?_r=0. 27 counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and economic sectors, according to the US State Department.80 81 A political power shift in Kenya as a result of 2017 elections will not diminish Sino-­‐Kenyan relations. A victory by the pro-­‐West Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) will likely signal a strengthened relationship with the US; however, Kenyan relations with China will not diminish. Although CORD supporters view China more negatively than the incumbent Jubilee Alliance, Sino-­‐
Kenyan relations will remain strong. Kenyan leaders acknowledge the country’s strategic location and will seek to reap economic benefits from their relationship with China. ●
A win by the opposition CORD will not negatively impact Kenya’s relations with China, according to Charles Kagwanja, a consultant at Nairobi-­‐based Africa Practice.82 ●
The US-­‐Kenyan relationship will also not be adversely impacted if Jubilee wins. The US engages in Kenyan counterterrorism and humanitarian efforts, according to Lauren Ploch Blanchard of the Congressional Research Service.83 Security cooperation in Kenya and the region has been a major draw in the “American package” as Kenya seeks to develop its infrastructure and economy.84 ●
President Kenyatta and President Obama both emphasized the need for expanded US-­‐Kenyan partnership to counter Kenya’s ongoing economic and security challenges.85 “The United States is a country of entrepreneurs with the unique capacity to build transformative businesses, and I hope that these entrepreneurs and investors will recognize and act on the immense opportunities Kenya and Africa present,” President Kenyatta said in a public address 80
“U.S. Relations with Kenya Fact Sheet,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, August 14, 2015, accessed February 27, 2016, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2962.htm. 81
Edward-­‐Isaac Dovere, “When Obama Met Kenyatta,” Politico, February 25, 2015, accessed March 2, 2016, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/when-­‐barack-­‐obama-­‐met-­‐kenyatta-­‐120623. 82
Charles Kagwanja, Policy Analyst and Research Consultant, Skype Interview on February 29, 2016. 83
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, “U.S.-­‐Kenya Relations: Current Political and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service (2013): 13, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42967.pdf. 84
Marc Santora, “Obama to push U.S. Trade in Kenya as China’s Role Grows,” New York Times, July 24, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/25/world/africa/obama-­‐trip-­‐to-­‐kenya-­‐offers-­‐rare-­‐chance-­‐to-­‐shore-­‐up-­‐
economic-­‐ties.html?_r=2 85
“Remarks by President Obama and President Kenyatta of Kenya in a Press Conference,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 25, 2015, accessed March 2, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-­‐press-­‐
office/2015/07/25/remarks-­‐president-­‐obama-­‐and-­‐president-­‐kenyatta-­‐kenya-­‐press-­‐conference. 28 during a July meeting with President Obama.86 Kenyan leaders emulate international development models on a sector-­‐by-­‐sector basis that best further Kenyan progress, thereby rejecting an exclusively Chinese or Western model.87 The US and China operate in separate sectors based on the advantages each country brings to Kenyan development. China dominates infrastructure while the US is viewed as particularly valuable in the realm of good governance, evidenced by Kenya’s use of the US Constitution as a guide to restructure the country’s government.88 ●
Despite the deepening relationship between Nairobi and Beijing, Kenyan elites suggest the Chinese model of development is only used for the infrastructure sector.89 “China is at the bottom, in terms of what we aspire to be,” according to Kenyan Minister of Lands James Orenga in 2012.90 ●
Despite admiration for Chinese infrastructure, loan, and aid policies, elites hold a general distrust of China and its actions on the African continent. Justice Ringera, former director of Kenya’s Anti-­‐Corruption Commission, pointed to China’s sponsorship of repressive regimes in Sudan and elsewhere as a reason to distrust China’s actions in Kenya. The former minister of industrialization also complained about the “low standard of Chinese imported goods and the threat that these posed to domestic industries.”91 ●
Kenyan leaders appreciate the US in the realms of good governance, law, and education. Upon restructuring the 2010 constitution, Kenyan leaders aimed to emulate the American system. A chief advisor from the Party of National Unity under President Kibaki stated, “We ended up literally adopting the American system – not only the Presidential system, but also the way it is structured...all the principles that define the American constitution...So in terms of political framework, we are looking to America as a country.” 86
Ibid. 87
Fourie, “New Maps for Africa? Contextualising the ‘Chinese Model’ within Ethiopian and Kenyan Paradigms of Development.” 88
Ibid. 89
Ibid. 90
Ibid. 91
Ibid. 29 Key Projections Kenya will maintain strong relations with both the US and China despite the Chinese economic slowdown. The upcoming presidential election will not impact Kenya’s counterterrorism cooperation with the US nor its economic and development partnership with China. With Vision 2030 at the forefront of the national agenda, Kenya’s vested interest lies with infrastructure development centered around the LAPSSET Corridor and SGR project. Kenyan elites will continue to seek economic and security benefits with global partners, in addition to the US and China, to build Kenya into an economic powerhouse on the continent. 30 SOUTH AFRICA Primary assessments South Africa is strengthening its economic and political ties with China more than the United States. This is evidenced by increased trade with China and ideological alignment with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The African National Congress (ANC) propagates anti-­‐
West rhetoric due to strengthened military and political support for the CCP, illustrating a decline in US-­‐South African relations. However, South African leaders will engage with both the US and China to enhance South Africa’s security sector via enhanced military-­‐to-­‐military cooperation. SECURITY The ANC will continue to engage with both the US and China opportunistically to bolster its security sector through expanded military-­‐to-­‐military cooperation. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) will pursue increased military-­‐to-­‐military cooperation with the Chinese, demonstrating the willingness of South Africa to cooperate with China on peacekeeping and security issues. However, the US continues to provide significant defense and intelligence support to enhance South Africa’s security apparatus. ●
In 2014, Chinese defense minister Chang Wanquan and SANDF General Solly Shoke announced an initiative for increased “strategic and long-­‐term cooperation” between China and South Africa via “high-­‐level visits and personnel exchanges between the two armed forces… [and the 31 expansion of] pragmatic communication and cooperation so as to push forward [a] China-­‐
South Africa comprehensive strategic partnership,” according to Xinhua News Agency. This reflecting deepening ties between the two militaries.92 ●
South Africa emulates the US defense model of instruction through International Military Education and Training (IMET), in which the US embassy in Pretoria educates three South Africans per year at military schools such as the US Naval Academy. The students later returned to work for South African defense companies.93 SANDF also participates in a partnership program with the New York National Guard to train South African soldiers, according to South African expert Scott Firsing.94 Additionally, the US cooperates with South African forces to conduct peacekeeping missions.42 ●
President Jacob Zuma praised China’s expanded role in peacekeeping at the 2015 Forum on China-­‐Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit: “We appreciate this commitment to peace, development, and progress. It gives practical meaning to the belief of President Xi [Jinping] that China’s military capability must be utilised to achieve peace.”95 South African leaders will increase military cooperation and arms transfers from China to enhance South Africa’s security capabilities. South Africa will engage China for support of South African-­‐led UN peacekeeping missions through the commitment of Chinese troops. South Africa aims to improve the efficacy of its peacekeeping operations in order to gain a seat on the UN Security Council. ●
South African military expert Helmoed Heitman stated South Africa “May want this [a UNSC seat]...but our neighbors say we are not performing peacekeeping-­‐wise,” emphasizing South Africa’s politically driven peacekeeping missions in pursuit of the UNSC seat. South Africa has 1388 SANDF troops in the DRC, 220 troops to counter piracy along the coast, and 850 troops in Darfur, Sudan.96 ●
Senior Colonel Xu Jianwei confirmed Beijing’s offer to provide Chinese soldiers to South African UN-­‐mandated peacekeeping missions in support of South Africa’s greater foreign policy 92
“Chinese defence minister meets chief of SANDF,” DefenceWeb, August 29, 2014. 93
Scott Firsing, “South Africa and Africa’s Place in America’s National Security Strategy,” International Policy Digest, May 5, 2015. 94
Ibid. 95
“Watch: Zuma Really Loves China,” BussinessTech, December 4, 2015, http://businesstech.co.za/news/government/106359/watch-­‐zuma-­‐really-­‐loves-­‐china/. 96
Peter Dorrie, “South Africa’s Military is Falling Apart,” War is Boring, April 9, 2014; Firsing, “South Africa and Africa’s Place in America’s National Security Strategy.” 32 objective of stabilizing continental Africa.97 SANDF Major General Sigudu cited the PLA’s designation of military attaché Colonel Jianwei in South Africa as evidence of Chinese efforts to share military expertise with SANDF. This evidence indicates the strength of the Sino-­‐South African military-­‐to-­‐military relationship. While South Africa partners with the US to enhance its aerial surveillance technology, China will continue to remain a close cyber security ally. Although South Africa will continue to partner with both nations in separate spheres of security, South African elites will depend more on China in the future due to the overwhelming threats to the digital economy. ●
A weaponized variant of the South African-­‐made AHRLAC surveillance plane is under development by Boeing and South African company Paramount Group.98 ●
The South African Department of Communication (DOC) is working with Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications equipment maker and multinational networking and service company, to install cyber laboratories in three schools in the provinces of Eastern Cape and Limpopo. The DOC has received media pads, 3G routers, plus a server, as well as a 3G SIM data package card with one-­‐year validity.99 ●
The 2015 Chinese-­‐South African Plan of Action on areas of cooperation in Information and Communications Technology (ICTs) will strengthen Chinese-­‐South African ties in the information and communications technology arena by stimulating the sharing of methods and strategies regarding cyber security, research and development, and Internet governance.100 ECONOMIC The ANC—which will likely remain in power—will continue to encourage Chinese long-­‐term economic investment as demonstrated by recent South African-­‐Chinese pledges to conduct long-­‐
term industrialization and infrastructure projects. China and South Africa signed several strategic 97
Ibid. 98
Richard Tompkins, “Boeing, Paramount developing weaponized surveillance plane,” March 10, 2016, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-­‐Industry/2016/03/10/Boeing-­‐Paramount-­‐developing-­‐weaponized-­‐
surveillance-­‐plane/9831457625004/. 99
China, South Africa: HUAWEI to participate in cyber laboratory schemes in South Africa, MENA Report, 2013. 100
Charlie Fripp, “Here Are the Details of SA’s ICT Deal With China,” htxt.africa, June 11 2015, http://www.htxt.co.za/2015/06/11/here-­‐are-­‐the-­‐details-­‐of-­‐sas-­‐ict-­‐deal-­‐with-­‐china/. 33 agreements that strengthened investment and economic cooperation. South Africa views China as a long-­‐term development partner and will continue to rely on Chinese funding and expertise for infrastructure projects. South Africa will therefore remain heavily dependent upon China for its economic growth. As political policy, the ANC favors a pro-­‐Chinese economic development model to the detriment of US diplomatic ties.101 ●
In 2014, more than 100 Chinese state-­‐owned entities invested $10.4 billion in South African industrialization and infrastructure. Chinese direct investment doubled between 2012 and 2014 from approximately $4 billion to $8.2 billion following a trend of increased economic ties that is likely to continue.102 ●
China and South Africa set forth goals for a long-­‐term economic partnership in the Chinese-­‐
South African 5 to 10 Year Framework on Cooperation. A 2015 progress report demonstrated Chinese-­‐South African goal achievement with respect to industrialization, infrastructure development, special economic zones, and financial cooperation.103 ●
China made large economic assistance pledges to South Africa and is considered a dependable development partner. China pledged 245 new economic assistance agreements, signed 41 medical aid agreements, and unveiled a $60 billion aid package to South Africa at the December 2015 FOCAC summit. Yazini April of the Human Science Research Council of South Africa praised Chinese dependability, stating, "China proved itself that it's a dependable partner. When China promises to do this and that this year, they do it. China is not the World Bank or the US, which tell you a lot stories and take time to deliver. China has deliverables which are tangible.”104 101
Shinn, in discussion with the research team. 102
“Chinese Have Invested R120 billion in South Africa: Zuma,” Times Live, December 5, 2014, http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2014/12/05/chinese-­‐have-­‐invested-­‐r120-­‐billion-­‐in-­‐south-­‐africa-­‐zuma. 103
“South Africa, China Sign Trade and Industry Deals,” Southafrica.info, http://www.southafrica.info/business/Chinese-­‐South-­‐Africa-­‐trade-­‐041215.htm#.VuokKhIrKRt. 104
“China-­‐Africa cooperation ushers in new era of mutual benefits,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa, December 22, 2015, http://www.chinese-­‐embassy.org.za/eng/zngx/t1326922.htm. 34 POLITICAL It is likely the ruling African National Congress (ANC) will remain in power and strengthen Sino-­‐South African political relations through closer relations with the CCP. Unless there is a drastic shift in SA-­‐
China relations, the ANC’s pro-­‐China policies will continue to hinder US efforts to strengthen diplomatic ties with South Africa. President Zuma’s term as president of the ANC concludes in 2017 and his presidential term concludes in 2019; however, election forecasts Graph 3: South African Election Results indicate that the ANC will stay in power.105 Despite efforts by the pro-­‐West Democratic Alliance to replace the ANC, success is unlikely because the Democratic Alliance commands less financial and political power. The ANC distrusts the motives of American leaders, rendering US diplomatic relations and soft power implementation difficult.106 The ANC’s public messages demonstrate distrust of US intentions, supporting its burgeoning ties with China as an ally against the “imperialist” West. Source: The South African
●
ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe alleged US diplomats conducted meetings at the American embassy “about nothing else other than mobilization for regime change.”107 ANC spokesperson Keith Khoza stated that he addressed US diplomats regarding their “irregular activities” in South Africa, but refused to elaborate publicly.108 This suggests ANC leaders lack trust in American political aims. 105
John Campbell, “South Africa’s Possible Successors,” Africa in Transition, Council on Foreign Relations, September 9, 2015, http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2015/09/09/south-­‐africas-­‐possible-­‐presidential-­‐successors/ 106
Shinn, in discussion with the research team. 107
Conor Gaffey, “South African Ruling Party Accuses US of Plotting Coup,” Newsweek, February 22, 2016. 108
Roy McKenzie, “ANC Following up on US ‘regime change’ concerns,” News24, February 22, 2016. 35 ●
Mantashe also cited suspicion regarding an Obama Administration initiative, the Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young Leaders, which sends young South African professionals to the US for education on democratic governance and leadership. He indicated that the program aims to dissuade South African leaders from supporting the ANC.109 The leading opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, views the US more favorably than China. However, it is very unlikely that the party will gain majority power in the next election. While polls indicate that the general populace views the US favorably, their views are not reflected in ANC policies.110 ●
Democratic Alliance leader Mmusi Maimane said it was “not in [South Africa’s] national interest to turn their backs on the West,” lending support to accusations of a Western alliance with the ANC-­‐opposition group competing against an ANC-­‐CCP alliance.111 ●
The Democratic Alliance does not possess the funding or political power to unseat the ANC. ANC election budgets have reached as high as $19 million, whereas the budget for the Democratic Alliance was last reported at $3.8 million. The ANC’s likely hold on power will promote a strengthened relationship with China. The ANC is influenced by the Chinese Communist Party and condemning a Western “destabilization strategy against “The exemplary role of the collective leadership of the Communist Party of China in this regard should be a guiding lodestar of our own struggle." China.” 113 -­‐African National Congress, 2015 propagates anti-­‐US rhetoric. South African leadership supports an anti-­‐West political model by emulating Chinese political and economic policies.112 The ANC’s National General Council produced a policy document accusing the West of “imperialism against progressive values” and Discussion Documents 109
“South Africa’s ANC Accuses US diplomats of pursuing regime change,” Associated Press, February 21, 2016. 110
Pew Research Center, “Opinion of the United States,” Global Indicators Database, August 2015, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/. 111
Ibid. 112
“America’s Global Image Remains More Positive Than China’s,” Pew Research Center, July 18, 2013, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/chapter-­‐1-­‐attitudes-­‐toward-­‐the-­‐united-­‐states/. 113
Alex Newman, “South African Regime Embraces Chinese Communism, New World Order,” The New American, August 27, 2015. 36 ●
The 2015 ANC’S National General Council document cited a “new world order” with China at its helm, and warned against the “wrath of US-­‐led Western imperialism” and a US-­‐imposed “cold war” against China and Russia.114 The document asserts that the US is inimical to South African interests: “The South has been rising in a manner that promises to alter the international balance of power and offer opportunities for the emergence of a post-­‐Western world order and Washington is in a fighting mood to ensure that this does not happen.” The ANC has received political grooming by the CCP thorough education and training in Chinese academies. Additionally, there are unconfirmed accounts of CCP funding of ANC elections.115 ●
The ANC declared 2013-­‐2023 the “decade of the cadre,” with the goal of putting every party member through some version of political school. The ANC’s Political School and Policy Institute is funded by the Chinese government and modeled on the Communist Party’s China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong in Shanghai, suggesting the ANC aims to emulate Chinese governing practices.116 ●
Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa led a South African delegation to the PRC in July 2015 to study state-­‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and how South Africa could use the Chinese model in its own reindustrialization process.117 During Ramaphosa’s 2015 visit to China, the Chinese Academy of Governance agreed to place South African government officials and business leaders in their training and skills development program.118 ●
ANC spokesman Jackson Mthembu refused to reveal the identities of ANC campaign donors. According to South Africa’s Mail and Guardian, anonymous party insiders involved in fundraising claimed the CCP pledged large donations to the 2009 ANC campaign, suggesting ANC-­‐Chinese cooperation.119 114
Simon Allison, “ANC’s Future Foreign Policy: All Roads Lead to China,” August 20, 2015. 115
Norimitsu Onishi, “African Economies, and Hopes for New Era, Are Shaken by China,” The New York Times, January 25, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/world/africa/african-­‐economies-­‐and-­‐hopes-­‐for-­‐new-­‐
era-­‐are-­‐shaken-­‐by-­‐china.html?_r=0 116
Findlay, “South Africa’s Ruling ANC Looks to Learn from Chinese Communist Party.” Setumo Stone, “Ramphosa visits China to study SOE reforms,” Business Day, July 13, 2015, http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2015/07/13/ramaphosa-­‐visits-­‐china-­‐to-­‐study-­‐soe-­‐reforms. 118
Genevieve Quintal, “Ramaphosa returns from China,” News24, July 19, 2015, http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Ramaphosa-­‐returns-­‐from-­‐China-­‐20150719. 119
Mandy Rossouw, “ANC’s Dodgy Funders,” Mail and Guardian, March 21, 2009. 117
37 Key Projections The beginning economic slowdown of the Chinese economy is causing a devaluation of the South African rand due to the South African economy’s overreliance on China; the World Bank also declared that South Africa is on the brink of recession. However, President Zuma and the ANC denied claims of recession, indicating that South Africa will remain committed to China due to continued investment projects and shared political ideology.120 China will likely continue to fund and construct South Africa’s infrastructure projects to boost the country’s revenue and development. 120
Onishi, “African Economies, and Hopes for New Era, Are Shaken by China.” 38 MOST LIKELY OUTCOME China and African states will likely strengthen ties because African elites will continue using Chinese funding for modernization initiatives. African state leaders will continue to seek Chinese funding for infrastructure projects despite China’s economic downturn. African leaders will continue to favor China’s “non-­‐interference” foreign policies and non-­‐conditional loans for infrastructure projects because both African states and the PRC benefit. African leaders are not required to institute political reforms to receive aid, and the PRC garners political support in the international arena as well as a reputation for efficiently developing large-­‐scale infrastructure projects. However, African leaders should not assume Chinese financial benevolence will continue indefinitely; Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe was recently unable to secure loans from China. In the security realm, African elites will continue to look to China for weapons systems and small arms instead of the US because Chinese weapons are lower in price and of adequate quality. In some cases, Chinese weapons systems are better suited for African state militaries’ operational needs than US weapons systems. Therefore, African state leaders will likely increase the purchase of Chinese weapons. However, leaders will look to the US military to assist with counterterrorism operations against al-­‐Shabaab and Boko Haram. Most African elites will remain pragmatic in their relationship with China and will not exclusively favor a Chinese political model. African leaders will continue to seek aid from both China and the US to achieve state development goals. However, certain states, e.g. South Africa, may politically align themselves more closely with China due to anti-­‐West sentiments. LOW PROBABILITY/HIGH IMPACT There are multiple indicators that could portend a drastic shift in Chinese-­‐African relations. These include: 1) A drastic drawdown of Chinese FDI and infrastructure financing. ●
This could indicate that China is decreasing foreign investments and funding due to the country’s economic downturn. China could also decrease involvement in Africa if there is an increase in violence against Chinese nationals living in Africa. ●
African states could see a decrease in GDP growth and employment, resulting in a higher likelihood of civil discontent. ●
An increase in civil discontent could lead to an uptick in violence and create instability, which could impact surrounding states and destabilize the region. 39 2) A populist coup against African state leaders. ●
A discontented populace could effectively instigate a coup against African state leaders. This could occur if a state government is no longer able to pay the military to suppress dissidents due to an economic downturn, possibly as a result of Chinese withdrawal of investments. ●
The inability to suppress an uprising could allow the populace to usurp the government and alter its interactions with China. This could lead the government to lessen economic and political engagements with China. 3) A destabilization of the region could yield a higher terrorism threat, which could draw more US troops to the region for training and assistance in counterterrorism operations. Increased Chinese military presence for purposes other than peacekeeping missions on the African Continent. ●
Increased Chinese military presence indicates China’s desire to project power on a global scale. This could indicate that China is rejecting its non-­‐interference foreign policy because it perceives that its overseas interests-­‐-­‐ infrastructure projects, strategic interests, and citizens-­‐-­‐ are physically threatened. ●
China could use its military presence on the African continent for increased espionage activity, especially where US training programs are taking place with African military troops. China could engage in subversion to gain access to classified US intelligence, which could threaten US activities on the continent. ●
Increased Chinese military influence in African states could alter the military relationship between those states in China’s favor. 4) Violent attacks on Chinese citizens or terrorist attacks on Chinese infrastructure could lead to China airlifting Chinese workers out of Africa and/or halting infrastructure projects/FDI. ●
Violent attacks on Chinese citizens, i.e. Chinese laborers, could prompt the Chinese government to airlift Chinese workers out of African countries. This could lead to a moratorium or permanent cessation of Chinese infrastructure projects in African states. ● Terrorist attacks on Chinese projects by groups like Boko Haram or al-­‐Shabaab could lead to China halting infrastructure projects and possibly FDI due to threats to their strategic interests. 40 CONCLUSION The security, economic, and political sectors of the five case studies demonstrates that African leaders successfully use foreign influence to benefit their own countries. African leaders are pragmatically opportunistic in their acceptance of aid and investment from China and the US. Such pragmatism is evidenced in all three functional areas: Djibouti allows foreign military bases for economic gain, Cameroon and Kenya import Chinese weapons to aid counterterrorism operations, and South Africa aligns itself politically with China to gain support for a seat on the UNSC. While South Africa favors Chinese investment, most African elites accept investments from any willing party. The US would need to formulate more long-­‐term policies, such as providing increased economic development assistance, to achieve African development goals. As US and Chinese assistance in Africa is often complementary, the US could strengthen collaborative efforts with Chinese civilian and military officials to minimize favoritism towards China. US and Chinese cooperation could also enhance African states’ development and internal stability. In addition, Sino-­‐US military-­‐to-­‐military collaboration on counterterrorism operations could better counter terrorist threats and further stabilize the region. Therefore, the development and stability of African states depends on continued investment and engagement from both the United States and China. Although discourse surrounding US and China’s involvement in Africa paints a competitive, Cold War style battle for political and economic influence, African states actually exercise their agency by using US and Chinese assistance to achieve growth in complementary spheres. The continued modernization of Africa is therefore dependent upon leaders using Chinese and US assistance in a complementary fashion. 41 BIBLIOGRAPHY Allison, Simon. “ANC’s Future Foreign Policy: All Roads Lead to China.” The New York Times. August 20, 2015. “America’s Global Image Remains More Positive Than China’s”, Pew Research Center, 18 July 2013, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/chapter-­‐1-­‐attitudes-­‐toward-­‐the-­‐united-­‐states/ “Arms exports to Cameroon, 2000-­‐2015,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Arms Transfers Database (Accessed March 22 2016). Arseneault, Michel. 'Historic' Chinese military base to open in Horn of Africa. November 5, 2015. http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20150511-­‐historic-­‐chinese-­‐military-­‐base-­‐open-­‐horn-­‐africa (accessed March 2016). Bax, Pauline. “Boko Haram focuses on Cameroon’s soft targets,” Business Day, 05 February 2016. http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2016/02/05/boko-­‐haram-­‐focuses-­‐on-­‐cameroons-­‐soft-­‐
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