safety
status &
signals
2010 - 2011
forEword
Responsible publisher
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway
Professor Olav Hanssens vei 10
P O Box 599, NO-4003 Stavanger, Norway
Tel: +47 51 87 60 50
E-mail: postboks@ptil.no
Web: www.psa.no
Editorial staff
Inger Anda (editor-in-chief )
Øyvind Midttun (editor)
Ole-Johan Faret
Thor Gunnar Dahle
Angela Ebbesen
Odd Bjerre Finnestad
Janne-Beth Carlsen N´Jai
(design and illustration)
Gunlaug Leirvik
(editorial assistant)
Rolf E Gooderham
(English editor/translator)
Safety – Status and Signals is the PSA’s annual
report in a magazine format. Its articles deal with
some of the most important petroleum safety
issues addressed by the Norwegian authorities in
2010, and look ahead to key challenges identified
by the PSA for the industry in 2011.
However, this year’s issue has another dimension.
We have opted to highlight some of the success
stories – safety areas where the PSA has achieved
its goals, in collaboration with the industry.
Five articles on that theme cover the Norwegian
regulatory model, diving safety, international
collaboration between regulators, a parallel look
at the story of mechanical pipe handling and the
lifeboat challenge, and the requirement for an
acknowledgement of compliance (AoC).
We hope that this publication will be studied
in detail by companies and employees alike in
the petroleum industry, and that its contents will
contribute to learning as well as encouraging
debate.
Efforts have also been made to popularise the
material in the hope that the general public can
also increase their understanding of the issues
raised by safety in the petroleum industry.
Being involved is a social responsibility.
Inger Anda
Editor-in-chief
Photos
Morten Berentsen
(unless otherwise stated)
Print run
Norwegian: 3 000
English: 1 500
Paper
Cover: 290 g Mirriboard copper
Inside pages: 150 g Multiart silk
Printer
Spesialtrykk
Published 10 February 2011.
Final copy date 25 January 2011.
Safety – status and signals must be read in conjunction with the formal part of the PSA’s annual report,
which will be published on 27 April 2011, together
with the annual Trends in risk level in the petroleum
activity (RNNP) report. The summary version of the
latter can be read and downloaded in English from
www.psa.no/risklevel, while the Norwegian
summary, the full report and the formal annual
report will be available at www.psa.no.
2
CoNTENTS
MAIN fEATUrES:
1
BUILDING A RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS
2
REVOLUTION UNDER WATER
18-22
3
PROMOTING COORDINATED ACTION
26-29
4
SUCCESS IN THE LONG TERM
34-37
5
FLOATING ON TRUST
44-46
one for all and all for one
An American tragedy
four top tasks
Keeping old heroes going
Combating the cold
Standard solutions
Averting unwanted contact
Blackout bother
repetition at refinery
rights also involve duties
Supply side under stronger scrutiny
A close call downhole
Lifting safety
Putting the facts in place
8-13
4
14
23
24
25
30
31
32
38
39
40
42
47
48
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS PUBLICATION:
AoC: Acknowledgement of Compliance
HSE: Health, safety and the environment
NCS: Norwegian continental shelf
OLF: Norwegian Oil Industry Association
PSA: Petroleum Safety Authority Norway
RNNP: Trends in risk level in the Norwegian petroleum activity
S A F E T Y - S TA T U S & S I G N A L S
PSA 2010-2011
3
One for all
A company unleashing a serious incident will hurt not only itself and operations in one country, but also a whole industry.
and all fOr One
By INGER ANDA
Another serious petroleum accident in Norway or
internationally will hit not only the company concerned
but also the whole industry’s reputation, says PSA directorgeneral Magne Ognedal. “Players must accept and display
greater responsibility than in the past.”
T
he Deepwater Horizon rig
exploded in the US sector
of the Gulf of Mexico on 20
April last year. It took more
than three months before
operator BP succeeded in
capping the subsequent blowout.
As a result, 2010 will always be remembered as the “Deepwater year”. This incident
has yielded new content for and awareness
of the major accident concept.
“Very great attention is being paid worldwide to safety in the petroleum sector after
the US disaster,” observes Mr Ognedal. “That’s
positive in many ways, because it can help to
sharpen and enhance safety for people, the
environment and material assets.”
He notes that the position is very challenging for both oil companies and the supplies
industry, pointing out that each player is and
must be responsible for safety in their own
operations.
“However, a climate has now been created
in the petroleum sector where a company unleashing a serious incident will hurt not only
itself and operations in one country, but also
a whole industry – collectively and internationally. The players will have to relate to
this in the future.”
The most interesting question in this
context is how they are to tackle that position,
Mr Ognedal points out. “Prevention, learn-
ing, expertise and continuous improvement
– these four areas contain some of the most
important keys for avoiding major accidents.”
PREVENTION
Prevention is fundamental to good safety,
he notes. “This concept embraces all systems
and mechanisms required to maintain good
control and avoid accidents.
“Understanding risk is central here. We
must all recognise first and foremost that the
petroleum industry involves risk – just like any
other activity.”
However, accepting risk does not mean
accepting accidents, he emphasises. “Quite
the contrary. But we must constantly remind
ourselves that accidents have happened – and
can happen again.
“The risk of a major accident is present, in
Norway and in all other nations with an oil
and gas industry. This means that incidents
will occur.
“Risk must accordingly be managed, with
clear management responsibility, at every
level and in every company which participates
in the industry.”
Preventive measures can be a challenge,
Mr Ognedal concedes, because they require
that action is taken – often at a cost – without
a disaster or other accident having occurred.
“However, history offers many examples
where extensive measures are adopted after
S A F E T Y - S TA T U S & S I G N A L S
PSA 2010-2011

5
disasters. Companies in the petroleum business
should consciously ask whether it would not be far
better to have an established system which means
that preventive measures based on learning, new
technology and so forth are implemented, in order
to be able to prevent accidents and disasters.”
LEARNING
Operators in Norway have an independent duty to
work responsibly, Mr Ognedal notes. That assumes
not least a commitment to learning.
Magne Ognedal, director-general of the PSA.
Photo: Emile Ashley
“I take it for granted that company managements and all players in the business keep continuously updated about incidents in Norway,
the major accident on Australia’s Montara field in
2009, Deepwater Horizon and so forth – and ensure
that the key lessons are incorporated in their own
organisation,” he says.
But how, he asks, should one learn from
accidents or apply such knowledge to reduce
the probability that new incidents will occur?
“One thing’s certain, though – unless government, companies and the unions all sit down and
study, assess and analyse the reasons for a disaster,
we have no chance of learning anything.”
However, theoretical understanding is not
enough, Mr Ognedal maintains. Lessons must
be incorporated in management’s focus on and
understanding of risk, in governing documents,
training, routines, procedures and compliance.
“They must remain with the companies through
restructurings, changes of ownership and mergers, and must be incorporated in regulations and
government follow-up,” he notes.
A project team has been set up by the PSA to
help it learn from and see connections between
6
Deepwater Horizon, the Montara event and other
relevant incidents.
Its overall goal has been to assess experience
gained from and investigations conducted into
major accidents so that relevant measures can
be instituted and contribute to progress and improvement on the NCS.
“Because it’s indisputable that a major accident
can also occur here, even though safety in Norway
must generally be regarded as good,” Mr Ognedal
observes.
EXPERTISE
The companies need expertise and the ability to
manage such knowledge in order to operate
safely, he adds.
“Statoil has pursued major reorganisations in
Norway in recent years after its merger with Hydro
Oil & Energy, and has had to deal with the impact
of many experienced employees retiring early.
“The PSA assumes that the company is managing this process in a good way, but it’s worth underlining once again the need to plug knowledge
gaps and ensure a well-functioning organisation
with competent personnel at every level.”
He points out that good safety calls for ability
and experience, close collaboration and the involvement of the necessary expertise throughout,
both on land and offshore.
“That’s particularly important in connection
with drilling and well operations, including on the
exploration side. Managing demanding drilling
work in a good and safe way is a company responsibility. Prestige or lines on an organisation chart
must carry insignificant weight in such a context.”
CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT
This is a fundamental principle for the petroleum
industry, Mr Ognedal emphasises. The companies
undertake to apply the best available technology,
best practice and new knowledge.
“Although the principle of continuous improvement is well known and firmly established in the
business, this doesn’t mean it always gets observed.
“Given the challenges facing the industry, it’s
necessary to remember that running a company
in accordance with the continuous improvement
principle is a management responsibility.
“We must all continuously secure information
and knowledge about conditions relevant to the
industry of which we’re a part.
“On the basis of what we then know – at any
given time and in every context – we must then
drive developments forward so that the petroleum
industry becomes ever safer and more robust.
“It must be regarded as a failure when a company repeats a mistake which could have been
avoided by giving priority to learning from errors
and experience of its own and of others.”
Good safety calls for ability and experience, close collaboration and the involvement of the necessary expertise throughout a company – both offshore and on land.
S A F E T Y - S TA T U S & S I G N A L S
PSA 2010-2011
7
1
“It’s impossible to inspect quality into
the petroleum industry. The latter
must itself ensure quality.”
Magne Ognedal
Supervision coordinators and contacts in the PSA.
From left: Semsudin Leto, Ingvill Hagesæther Foss,
Hanne Etterlid, Erik Hørnlund, Leif J Dalsgaard,
Kjell Arild Anfinsen, Rune Solheim, Hilda Kjeldstad,
Hans Kjell Anvik, Odd Rune Skilbrei and
Anders Tharaldsen.
8
BUIldInG
a reSPOnSIBle
BUSIneSS
1
By ØYVIND MIDTTUN
The whole purpose of the PSA can be summed up in a single word: safety – for
people, for the environment and for the material assets managed by the industry.
I
n the broadest
sense, all the PSA’s
activities are directed at
ensuring that Norwegian
petroleum operations are
conducted in an acceptable
manner.
That makes it important to place
the responsibility where it actually
belongs – with the industry.
FORGED
Little or no relevant industrial activity
existed in Norway when the oil companies
arrived in the 1960s and a new administrative structure had to be forged by
government.
The development of today’s Norwegian
regulatory regime for oil and gas operations had to start from scratch. That was
a challenge, but also an opportunity.
It meant that the new Norwegian
Petroleum Directorate (NPD) established
in 1973 could be specifically tailored for
the job.
At the same time, an important development occurred in the process industry.
Attention shifted from conventional
quality control at the end of the conveyor
belt to further up the production line, and
ultimately right into top management.
The NPD made a similar move to a
new supervisory role, shifting attention
from classic “shop floor” checks to work
processes, decision-making mechanisms,
management and control.
CHANGES
The supervisory approach being
pursued on the NCS in 2011 is the result
of a continuous series of changes and
improvements since the early 1970s.
A bold step was taken by the safety
authorities in 1981 with the introduction
of a guideline for safety assessment of
platform concepts which quantified an
acceptable level of risk.
At the time, it was not considered
“good form” to talk about risk. The little
number 10-4, which was a way to describe
risk, accordingly created some political
disquiet.
Nevertheless, it was the passage of
the new Petroleum Activities Act in 1985
which has been seen as the dividing line
between old and new times.
This legislation marked an important
step towards a more performance-oriented and risk-based system of government
regulation.
CONTINUED
Since being separated from the NPD in
2004, the PSA has continued the development initiated in 1973.
The number of players on the NCS has
grown considerably over the past decade.
A picture with a few large companies has
been replaced by Statoil as the dominant
operator and a range of small participants.
Despite this trend, the petroleum industry still comprises a limited number of
well-resourced firms. It remains a capitalintensive and highly competent business
facing big demands.
Among the latter are an independent
duty to ensure that HSE is managed properly, that the regulations are observed
and that operations are pursued in an
acceptable manner.
The companies must be conscious
of these reponsibilities.
APPROACHES
Roughly speaking, two approaches exist
for regulating safety in the petroleum industry – detailed control and performance
management.
The first of these rests on a regulatory
system which sets specific requirements
for the structures, technical equipment
and operations required to protect against
hazards and accidents.
In a model of this kind, the safety
authorities define the appropriate
standards and check that the companies
are complying with them.
Detailed control often encourages
a passive attitude by companies. They
expect the regulator to inspect them,
identify errors and deficiencies, and
explain how these are to be corrected.
FUNCTIONS
Performance management is the exact
opposite. The regulations here are framed
to specify the goals to be achieved – or,
put another way, which functions must
be fulfilled.
Norway’s petroleum regulations are
based today on such functional requirements, which specify the level of safety
to be achieved.
GENERAL
Many of today’s regulatory requirements
are formulated in fairly general terms.
As noted above, they primarily spell out
which conditions or functions are
to be fulfilled.
To avoid misunderstandings about
what is needed to comply with the rules
and to ensure predictability, a number of
recommendations and guidelines have
been provided.
These often refer to recognised
Norwegian or international industry
standards relating to structures,
equipment and procedures.
MANAGEMENT
The regulator’s job is to describe which
goals the companies must reach, and to
ensure that they have established management systems which keep operations
in compliance with the regulations.
Companies can to a great extent
choose for themselves which solutions
they will adopt in order to meet the
official requirements.
This Norwegian model is based on
the conviction that the government
cannot inspect quality into the industry.
The latter must itself ensure that quality
is achieved and maintained.
KEEP PACE
Today’s solution means that the regulations do not need to be constantly revised
in order to keep pace with technological
advances and changes in operating mode.
In return, the PSA’s specialists must
monitor and participate in developing and
revising industrial standards to help make
sure that these are constantly relevant and
reflect best practice.
The work involved in a performance
management system can easily be underestimated, so it is important to emphasise
that this form of regulation demands
much more of the industry, employees
and government than detailed regulations.
That applies to expertise and management as well as flexibility. However, the
payoff comes in the form of better safety
management by an industry which has
been given responsibility.
S A F E T Y - S TA T U S & S I G N A L S
PSA 2010-2011
9
1
By INGER ANDA
The PSA is securely positioned by a small wood in Stavanger.
But the heartbeat of Norway’s huge oil and gas industry
is easy to detect within its walls.
T
he Norwegian
petroleum industry
operates around the
clock throughout the year,
and the PSA’s supervisory umbrella covers in practice all operators and
contractors involved in this business.
Its regulatory responsibility follows
an offshore field or å land-based plant
through every phase from design and
planning, via construction and production, to cessation and removal.
Dry figures show that the PSA supervises some 75 fixed installations in the
North, Norwegian and Barents Seas, as
well as roughly 300 subsea facilities.
In addition come more than 40 mobile
units qualified for use on the NCS and
eight land-based petroleum plants from
Melkøya in the north to Slagentangen on
the south-east coast.
The PSA is also responsible for
supervising about 14 000 kilometres of
pipelines carrying oil and gas to the UK
and continental Europe, and between
installations on the NCS.
The PSA also serves as the labour
inspectorate for roughly 25 000 people
working offshore, and regulates safety
at 50-60 oil companies qualified as
operators.
A large number of licensees, contractors and vessel owners involved in the
petroleum sector – some 120 in all
– come under its supervision as well.
INTELLIGENT
The PSA is able to follow up an industry
of this size and scope by working intelligently and applying its resources in the
best possible way.
This means in practice that it concentrates on the overall dimensions and on
company management systems, aided
by Norway’s regulatory regime. That is
largely based on functional reqirements.
These rules specify which safety level
should be attained, but give companies a
fairly free hand in deciding how they are
to comply with and operate within the
requirements set.
A number of systems, databases,
reports, contact points and people in the
PSA form components of the “ECG” which
A FINGER ON
10
Discipline leaders in the PSA. From left: Sigve Knudsen, Ole Jacob Næss, Ingrid Årstad, Kjell Marius Auflem, Svein Anders Eriksson and Torleif Husebø.
1
monitors the pulse of Norway’s petroleum business from its Stavanger offices.
The agency’s primary job is supervision, but the way this term is applied
in the Norwegian oil and gas sector can
be hard to understand and explain.
Put briefly, however, the PSA’s
supervision covers much more than a
visit offshore or to a land-based plant,
embracing as it does the total contact
between supervisor and supervised.
Including audits, investigations and
dealing with applications for AoCs and
consents, this regulatory model is
primarily preventive in nature.
ORGANISED
The PSA is organised in discipline and
supervisory sections, with the first of
these comprising about 20 small and
specialised areas grouped under six
main headings.
These are “home” for staff members,
and it is here that the professional, overall assessments and analyses are made.
The supervisory section comprises
teams drawn from various disciplines to
assess licensees, other players and their
operations. All operators on the NCS are
allocated to one of three such teams.
While the largest is dedicated to
following up offshore activities by
Statoil, by far the dominant player
on the NCS, the other two cover the
small and medium-sized operators.
Responsibility for contractors is
assigned to another team, as is supervision of mobile units and their owners
and the eight land-based plants.
The regulatory development and
legal affairs area currently embraces
10 staff, who work on the regulations
and support case management.
In addition, they follow up agreements, relations with the European
Union/European Economic Area, and
national and international standardisation as well as pursuing special
projects – including support for the
Ministry of Labour.
The teams exercise the PSA’s use
of formal instruments, as covered below.
DIALOGUE
The bulk of practical supervision
consists of dialogue between the PSA
and the industry – requesting plans,
analyses, documentation, information
and so forth.
A formal, notified audit usually
begins in good time before the team
starts its field work, through meetings with the relevant company which
involve both appropriate managers and
employees.
Notice is usually given about a
month in advance. Separate meetings
are held with the safety delegates to
ensure that employee views are heard.
Audit results are summarised in
reports, which are then posted to the
PSA’s website.
Defined supervisory work is supplemented by multi-disciplinary initiatives
aimed at the industry as a whole to
influence a positive development within
a specific subject.
Sources
A full picture of the PSA’s sources of
information involves too broad a canvas
for a brief article, but some of the most
important include the following.

THE PULSE
S A F E T Y - S TA T U S & S I G N A L S
PSA 2010-2011
11
1
Notification of undesirable incidents
Companies are required to notify the PSA
about undesirable incidents.
The regulations clearly define what
must be reported and notified, and some
800-900 notifications are received every
year on a dedicated form.
Hot line
The PSA has a hot line staffed around the
clock for reporting emergencies. Such
reports are first received and registered
by the duty officer, who also makes the
initial assessment of their seriousness and
the possible immediate action required.
If necessary, the duty officer will
activate the PSA’s emergency response
centre to monitor a serious on-going
incident. This can be done at short notice
around the clock.
Tailored follow-up
Any undesirable incident notified is
allocated to a case officer, who checks it,
categorises its seriousness (which may
differ from operator’s assessment) and
selects a tailored follow-up for the
operator/company.
In the event of very serious events, the
PSA may decide to launch an investigation or another kind of close follow-up.
The response to less serious incidents
will be tailored to their nature.
RNNP
The RNNP process is an important tool for
monitoring the industry, since it measures the development in its level of risk
both offshore and on land.
This yields an annual report based on
the large volume of data provided by the
companies at the end of each year, which
is then quality-assured by the PSA.
These RNNP reports, published around
20 April, provide a realistic picture of developments in the risk level from year to
year. Industry, unions and government all
agree that they give an accurate picture
of conditions.
Whistleblowers
Whistleblowers help to shape and
complete the picture of the safety position. The PSA receives information from
employees in the industry about poor
safety or conditions open to criticism in
their workplace.
Such inputs are closely followed up
in accordance with established and legally required routines. The anonymity
of whistleblowers is protected.
DDRS
The daily drilling report system (DDRS) is
a helpful tool for regulators, with companies required since 1984 to provide
information on all NCS drilling via this
database.
Essential facts about each current
operation can be extracted by the PSA
from the DDRS, thereby assuring itself if
necessary that undesirable well incidents
have actually been reported. It can also
verify the sequence of events with the aid
of print-outs.
FORMAL INSTRUMENTS
Formal instruments (available reactions)
at the disposal of the PSA span from
dialogue to orders, shutting down installations or fields, daily fines and exclusion
from the business.
The agency applies the necessary
measures to ensure that activities are
conducted in accordance with regulatory
requirements.
Although many people compare the
PSA with the police, it is important to
remember that the goal of supervision is
not exposure or punishment.
The PSA’s job is to define the terms for
responsible operation of the petroleum
industry and to check that companies are
working on prevention and continuous
improvement of safety levels. The criminal law is the province of the police.
Supervision by the PSA assumes a
responsible industry which meets its
obligations and complies with the regulations. The system is based on trust.
Companies involved in the Norwegian
petroleum business have an independent responsibility to operate safely. The
government’s job is to supervise that
they do so.
PULLING PROPERLY TOGETHER
Cooperation between companies, unions and the PSA is solidly rooted in history
and the regulations. But specific action had to be taken to get this to work in the right way.
By ANGELA EBBESEN
Employee participation runs like a red thread
through Norway’s regulatory regime for the
oil industry, and is essential for cooperation
to function both locally and centrally.
But good collaboration does not just
happen. Partnerships between employeers,
unions and government at every level
depend on a sense of equality between the
participants, good dialogue and an acknowledgement of roles and responsibilities.
Such mutual recognition between companies and employees did not exist in Norway
at the end of the 1990s. On the contrary,
relations were often confrontational.
ON TRACK
A number of important measures adopted by
the government got collaboration back
on track, including the creation of a genuine
12
basis for dialogue through the PSA’s RNNP
process.
Focusing on the risk level and HSE
challenges in the industry, this work also
contributed to a shared understanding of
hazards.
The tripartite Safety Forum was
established in 2001 in order to initiate,
discuss and follow up current safety,
emergency preparedness and working
environment issues.
It has become an arena for mutual and
strategic information-sharing and debate,
where employers, unions and government
give signals, clarify roles and allocate
responsibilities.
Set up in 2004, the Regulatory Forum
ensures tripartite involvement in developing
the regulations, and is a continuation of
the earlier external reference group for
regulations created in 1985.
EXPERIENCED
Both these fora are chaired and operated by
the PSA, with companies and unions represented by experienced personnel from their
respective central organisations.
All three sides have contributed knowledge and experience through a number of
specific projects and processes. This lowers
the level of conflict and enhances respect for
each other’s roles.
Involvement in work on White Papers,
the RNNP and developing regulations has
contributed to a shared understanding of risk,
ownership of solutions and measures
to reduce risk.
OPEN AND HONEST
Norwegians tend to take their country’s tradition of
openness for granted, but the significance of this part
of the national culture must not be underestimated.
By ØYVIND MIDTTUN
Norway is a transparent nation. An
open approach has been and remains a
fundamental principle of its government
administration. That has rubbed off on
the country’s biggest industry.
Demands for information sharing,
reporting and exchanging knowledge
doubtless felt foreign to the international oil companies who arrived on
the NCS in the 1960s and 1970s.
But the rules of the Norwegian game
were the same regardless of whether
one’s head office was in Houston or
Stavanger.
INFORMATION
The openness principle is central to the
PSA’s information policy, which specifies
that data provided to the industry, the
media and the general public will be
open, available and reliable.
As far as is possible and acceptable,
the agency will inform people about the
industry and reply to questions. That
carries an obligation.
WEBSITE
The PSA’s website is an important
channel for openness, presenting all
consents and AoCs issued as well as
every audit and investigation report
from the agency.
In addition, circular letters are
posted to the site along with articles
about measures and initiatives being
pursued by the PSA.
The most important goal of the site
and the agency’s other information
work is to contribute to experience
transfer and knowledge building about
safety issues in the oil and gas sector.
ARCHIVE
The PSA’s central electronic archive is
at the heart of its information flow. All
documents, whether received or sent,
are registered and recorded there.
This archive also handles the many
requests for access to information,
which are rising year by year. A new
record of 2 784 applications was set
in 2010.
Virtually all of these are granted,
with only 128 refused wholly or in part
last year – a good indication that the
PSA is firmly committed to the principle
of greater transparency and the
ambition of the Storting (parliament)
for more openness in government
administration.
COOPERATION
Openness contributes to information
exchange and learning, creates
credibility and lays the basis for cooperation between companies, unions
and government.
This represents the very essence
of the approach taken by Norwegian
regulators to the oil and gas industry.
Being open about challenges,
problem areas, incidents and near
misses is also an important requirement for efforts to reduce risk.
1
WELL VISITED
Figures for the number of hits on the PSA’s
website confirm that this is a very important
channel for spreading information about
who it is and what it does.
The following were registered in 2010:
• roughly 385 000 visits
• about 1.5 million page hits
– in other words, the average visitor
looked at four pages/articles
per visit
• 25 600 unique visitors during
November 2010
(new monthly record)
• visits from 184 countries/territories
• most foreign visits from the UK,
the USA and Denmark
• one visit apiece from New
Caledonia, Togo, Turkmenistan,
Laos, Aruba and Gibraltar, among
others.
Source: Google Analytics
Tussle over
transparency
A hard fight is being pursued internationally to increase the level
of openness in the oil industry.
Organisations such as Transparency
International, Publish What You Pay and
the Tax Justice Network are in the front
line of the battle.
The UN’s Global Compact initiative
also plays an important role in this
context.
Much of the effort is focused on exposing large cash flows, with the aim of
combating the corruption which means
that huge sums earned from petroleum
end up in the wrong hands.
S A F E T Y - S TA T U S & S I G N A L S
PSA 2010-2011
13
The global oil and gas industry has been responsible for several
disasters over the past decade, but few have heard of them.
When Deepwater Horizon exploded in the Gulf of Mexico,
safety in this business became a worldwide issue.
14
By INGER ANDA
AN AMERICAN
TRAGEDY
Some of the incidents which rocked the
industry in recent years are known to and
much discussed by insiders. They include
Montara off Australia in August 2009 and
the Aban Pearl and Petrobras P36 sinkings
off Venezuela last year and Brazil in 2001
respectively.
But neither the industry nor society as
a whole has taken much notice of platform losses which reportedly occurred
off Egypt in the past three-four years.
Little information is available about these events.
A number of other serious
oil and gas accidents in nonwestern parts of the world have
also failed to arouse much interest.
But the tragedy in the US Gulf has
become a global disaster. Almost 4.7
million Google searches for Deepwater
Horizon were recorded this January.
Everyone has heard of this accident,
seen the pictures, heard the comments
and noted that an oil disaster has occurred off Louisiana.
DISASTER
The incident was certainly a disaster in
anyone’s terms, and accords with the
PSA’s own definition of a major accident
in the petroleum industry.
This is an acute incident, such as a
major spill, fire or explosion, which immediately or later causes a number of
serious personal injuries and/or loss of
human life, serious harm to the environment and/or loss of large material assets.
Deepwater Horizon meets all these
criteria. Eleven people were killed and
17 injured – some seriously. Huge
volumes of oil were discharged to the
sea. The financial losses are astronomic.
This US disaster has been responsible
for nothing less than a paradigm shift in
society’s perception of the importance
of safety in the petroleum industry.
Most of the world’s major producing nations have initiated follow-ups,
projects and studies in the wake of the
tragedy, and demands and expectations
for action are being voiced.
These include calls for global regulation, international coordination, crossnational regulatory requirements and
a more unified safety regime in general
for petroleum operations.
Supranational bodies and certain
nations have launched initiatives on international cooperative efforts to assess
how regional and global challenges can
be tackled.
They include the European Union, the
Oslo-Paris convention for the protection of the marine environment of the
north-east Atlantic (Ospar), the G20,
the International Association of Oil &
Gas Producers (OGP) and the International Association of Drilling Contractors
(IADC).
PROJECT
The PSA established a project team on
7 May 2010 with some 20 members
drawn from relevant disciplines to follow
up the Deepwater Horizon disaster.
Its overall goal is to systematise and
assess experience and investigations in
the wake of this incident, so that appropriate lessons can contribute to learning
and improvement on the NCS.
The project will identify areas where
enhancements can be made to the requirements in Norway’s regulations and/
or other types of measures related to
Norwegian petroleum operations.
Other assignments for the team
include:
• charting and assessing all aspects
of Deepwater Horizon which relate to
safety and emergency preparedness,
and clarifying the scope, course and
causes of the accident
• identifying and describing observations concerning direct and
underlying causes as well as
non-compliance with regulations,
methods and procedures
• assessing and comparing relevant
US and Norwegian regulatory
requirements
• describing the actual consequences
of the accident, including harm to
people, material and financial
assets and the environment (duration
and quantity of oil discharges)
• assessing the potential of the
incident to cause such harm
• helping to convey information to
other players and government
agencies, primarily via established
collaboration arenas at national and
international level.
The project will assess Deepwater
Horizon in relation to similar incidents in
order to identify common features, with
particular reference to Montara, Aban
Pearl and the loss of mooring chain on
Ocean Vanguard off Norway in 2004.
Plans call for the team’s conclusions
to be published this spring. No final date
had been set when this issue went to
press. Key elements will be published on
the PSA website.
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PSA 2010-2011
15
By INGER ANDA
Be prepared
Studies of emergency preparedness and well
integrity, design and construction were launched
in Norway after a review of initial analyses and
reports from the Deepwater Horizon incident.
This work is being coordinated by the OLF at
the request of the PSA.
The industry’s need to assess the validity of emergency
response principles for halting a possible subsea blowout
in Norway was stressed by the PSA on 15 June in a letter
to the OLF.
In addition, the industry association was asked to evaluate
existing strategies for limiting the volumes discharged from a
blowout while it is under way.
That would also mean identifying possible improvements
in the form of new practices, development of technology and/
or a revised understanding of preparedness requirements.
COMPARISON
The PSA compared the 21 recommendations in the report
on Deepwater Horizon published by US interior secretary
Ken Salazar in late May with the minimum requirements in
the Norwegian regulations. These proved to accord almost
entirely with the US proposals.
However, the PSA resolved to initiate analyses of the
following areas in Norway:
1. Well integrity, including:
- organisational factors – educating, training and
qualifying people with critical functions in planning
and executing well operations
- operational and technical management systems for
well control
- operational and maintenance requirements for blowout
preventers (BOPs), including existing systems for
certifying such equipment
2. Well design and construction
It was resolved to pursue part of the work under the two
first sub-items in the list above in cooperation with the Well
Integrity Forum (WIF). This group was established at the
PSA’s initiative in 2006 and is run by the OLF.
The assessment of the Salazar findings was commissioned
on 1 July, and its results had not been finalised when this issue
went to press. See the PSA website for the latest status.
16
Much attention in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon accident
has focused on technology and emergency response requirements.
But divisions of responsibility, roles and collaboration between
management and employees are also important factors.
NOT ONLY DOWNHOLE
Widening the perspectives of work being done in
the wake of the US disaster is a key concern for Kjell
Marius Auflem, the PSA’s discipline leader for drilling and well technology. He also headed the PSA’s
project team on lessons from Deepwater Horizon for
the first six months.
“I’ve noted that most people are talking about
technology, deep water, cement, BOPs, casing and
tubing after Deepwater Horizon,” he says. “I believe
it’s equally important to focus on responsibilities,
roles and union-management cooperation.
“It’s gratifying to affirm that conditions in these
areas are good in Norway, including a well-functioning system of safety delegates who have the right to
halt work.”
He emphasises that a good safety culture is one
which involves employees, shows respect for divergent opinions and tolerates challenges to decisions
when life and health are under threat.
“That said, a number of technical conditions need
to be looked at more closely after the US accident,
including the design of BOPs.
“The PSA, acting on behalf of the International
Regulators’ Forum, has launched a study through
the IADC and the OGP to assess this in more detail.
“Cementing and the quality of cement plugs will
also occupy a key place in the technical part of the
post-Deepwater studies.”
FACING A
MEDIA STORM
That everybody’s eyes turned to the
USA after the Gulf tragedy is perhaps not surprising. But it was less
easy to predict that the PSA would
be overwhelmed with calls from the
world press
MANY LESSONS
TO LEARN
The US presidential commission’s report on Deepwater
Horizon was published just after Hilde-Karin Østnes
took over as head of the PSA’s post-accident project in
January.
“This is a very voluminous document, which we’re
going through in great detail,” says Ms Østnes, who
comes like her predecessor from the drilling and well
technology discipline.
“The report is fairly scathing in its judgement of the
way the companies involved handled the conditions
which led to the rig explosion.
“That offers many lessons for the industry, also in
Norway. But it remains to be seen whether these and
other findings prompt the PSA to propose regulatory
changes or the like at home.”
Although the division of responsibility in the PSA
and its opposite number in the USA are very different,
she also considers it interesting that the commission
report so openly emphasises the need for a competent
and clear regulator with adequate resources.
“It’s also worth noting that the commission
deals with the industry’s independent duty to
operate safely, and calls for a model which focuses
more on the approach to risk and on enhancing the
responsibility of the US industry.
“That coincides with the safety regime we’ve
had in Norway for many years”.
The duty press officers at the agency observed
developments in the days, weeks and months after the
Deepwater Horizon disaster with some astonishment.
Their normal job is to answer questions from regional and national media – in that order. But most of
the questions they received in the weeks after 20 April
came from abroad.
Calls were made by the USA’s biggest and mightiest
newspapers, British media, Swedish radio channels,
prestigious international magazines, and print and
broadcast journalists in a number of European nations.
This endless stream of inquiries involved not only
big and all-embracing questions but also queries at a
level of detail which even the biggest experts in
Norway might hesitate to answer.
It became clear during the spring and summer
why all this attention concerning an accident in the far
south of the USA was being directed specifically
at Norway.
The country is regarded internationally as one
of those with the best offshore safety, the soundest
regulations and the most demanding government
supervision.
That reputation carries an obligation as well as
being rather awesome – at least for the authorities and
perhaps for the industry. But it might also serve as an
inspiration.
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17
2
By OLE-JOHAN FARET
reVOlUTIOn
Under WaTer
Diving on the NCS is conducted on acceptable terms and at a level of
risk comparable with other petroleum industry in Norway.
These conditions have prevailed for longer than many might think.
T
-
-
he bare figures
illustrate the revolution which has occurred in underwater
working off Norway:
- no deaths related to
diving in the petroleum
industry since 1987
few serious personal injuries or
cases of the bends over the past
two decades, but some serious
near-misses – particularly in subsea lifting operations
substantial improvements in equip ment and the working environ ment over the past 30 years.
RESPONSIBILITY
The Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate (NPD) took over responsibility for marine diving operations
from the Labour Inspectorate in
1978, and established a five-person
section for this area.
Separate regulations for offshore
diving were adopted in the same
year, while diver certification was
18
introduced in 1980 and training
gradually improved.
Combined with intensified inspection and a steady tightening
of the regulations, this converted
North Sea diving into safer modes
– and brought it into line with other
petroleum activities.
This positive trend continued in
the 1990s through such measures as:
- standardisation of diving tables
and a number of new or tougher
requirements in the diving
regulations of 1991
- increased attention paid to
health issues, including longand short-term diver monitoring
- introduction of a clear hierarchy
of responsibility in the industry,
with the operator’s compliance
responsibility ensuring that the
diving companies work safely and
in line with regulatory
requirements.
The NPD – the PSA since 2004
– has also made a substantial
contribution by acting as a prime
mover for improvement and by
setting the terms for the industry.
NO GUARANTEE
“Knowledge, statistics and a positive
attitude in today’s diving business
provide no guarantee that a serious
incident couldn’t happen tomorrow,”
emphasises PSA special adviser
Olav Hauso.
He points out that the physical
strains imposed on divers – water
and high pressure – will always
pose a risk.
“We now have good regulations,
serious players, new diving support
ships, solid diving expertise and
positive accident statistics.
“However, my greatest fear is
that we’ll lock ourselves into a selfsatisfied condition. It’s important to
keep up the pressure and not fall for
the temptation to treat safety efforts
lightly.”
The PSA’s core team dealing with the diving business comprises three
people with long and wide – but also highly varied – experience.
Mr Hauso decided to move to the diving sector in
the early 1980s after two years with the Norwegian
Petroleum Directorate (NPD) as a newly graduated
naval architect.
He secured a job with France’s Comex, which
also employed the five men who died in the Byford
Dolphin accident, but returned to the NPD in 1986.
A few months later, a Briton working from Seaway
Condor died during work on the Oseberg field in the
Norwegian North Sea. Mr Hauso helped to investigate that incident.
“These accidents, along with a death in 1983 on
Seaway Falcon on Ekofisk, made an impression on
me,” Mr Hauso says. “It prompted a strong involvement over many years in helping to enhance safety
and avoid more such tragedies.”
2
DEADLY SERIOUS
The 1983 accident on Byford Dolphin, which
claimed the lives of five divers, still has a deep
effect on Olav Hauso. That incident has influenced
subsequent work on diving safety in Norway.
FRAMEWORK
He headed a far-reaching NPD project in the late
1980s to develop a new framework which could
reduce diving risk to the same level as in the rest
of the petroleum industry.
“The most important milestone was passed in
1991, when new regulations for manned underwater
operations were adopted,” says Mr Hauso.
These rules tightened the requirements in such
areas as a risk-analytical approach to activities, and
new standards were set for technical, organisational
and operational solutions.
A separate chapter was devoted to health
considerations, with the Norwegian Board of Health
responsible for following up in this area.
“These regulatory requirements are still appropriate,” says Mr Hauso, and notes that – while the
HSE regulations have since been amended – key
demands from the 1991 diving rules are implemented in the Norsok U-100N industry standard.
WORKED
Mr Hauso has worked on diving at the NPD/PSA
for more than 25 years, including six as head of
the NPD unit which embraced this activity until
a reorganisation in 2000.
A direct line still runs from the accidents
mentioned above, he says. “The most important
consideration for me is that we haven’t had a fatal
diving accident on the NCS since 1987.
“I hope that good statistics will be maintained.
We have to know the history of this work so that
new generations in the industry don’t repeat
earlier errors.
“It’s then important that we use the potential
offered by the tripartite collaboration between
companies, unions and government to secure
good workplaces and a safe industry.”
Olav Hauso has had a strong commitment to diving safety for many years.

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2
THIRSTY FOR
KNOWLEDGE
A big commitment to research and
development (R&D) characterises
Norway’s diving sector. The PSA’s
John Arne Ask has been a prime
mover or participant in many
major projects and studies.
Dr Ask, who has a PhD in physiology, joined the Norwegian
Petroleum Directorate (NPD) in 1989 and has subsequently
played an active role in supervising the diving industry.
That includes being an observer and participant in a number
of R&D projects devoted to learning more about health risks.
He has not been alone.
“Few if any occupational groups have been so well followed
up as offshore divers, both for safety at work and with regard to
their short- and long-term health,” says Dr Ask.
ISSUES
Large sums of money have been spent since the 1980s on
getting to grips with technical/operational and work
environment/health issues related to diving.
“It made a big change to come from a university with limited
resources and struggles over research funding to the diving field,
where plenty of cash was available,” Dr Ask observes.
Funded by both government and oil companies, with Statoil
in the lead, this R&D work has yielded important knowledge
about risk, which benefits diver safety.
“One example in which I was personally involved was the
trials conducted to learn more about the threat of dehydration
in diving,” Dr Ask reports.
“These showed that divers have extremely high fluid loss
when working. That prompted changes to the rules on the time
spent in water, requiring breaks with a plentiful supply of liquid.”
TABLES
Another important improvement was the introduction of
standardised diving tables in the early 1990s. Such tables had
previously been regarded as a competitive element, with the
“smartest” versions giving their users a commercial edge.
“Through a government initiative, the diving industry
developed tables for all saturation diving on the NCS,” Dr Ask
says. “That’s almost eliminated decompression sickness (bends).”
The big commitment to R&D in the diving field has contributed to substantial results and expertise-building from
both pure and applied studies at various institutes in Norway.
“The Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)
in Trondheim, for instance, has succeeded in combining medical
and technical expertise,” reports Dr Ask.
“That’s allowed it to develop a group of researchers who rank
among the world leaders for extreme working environments.
Work on decompression and bubble formation in blood, for
instance, is relevant for astronauts – who can also suffer the
bends.”
20
John Arne Ask believes that few occupations, if any,
are as well monitored as petroleum industry diving.
2
Bjarne Sandvik was a North Sea diver
himself for much of the 1980s.
VETERAN SUBSEA
With only three years of service at the PSA, Bjarne Sandvik might seem to be the
new boy among the agency’s diving specialists. But such appearances are deceptive.
Mr Sandvik was an offshore diver himself for much of the 1980s,
and then worked as a manager related to diving. So he has a
solid basis for the views he expresses at the PSA.
“I know that conditions could be tough in the 1970s, but my
main impression as a North Sea diver in the following decade
is that we were reasonably well looked after,” he says.
“I experienced an increasingly serious approach across the
board, both from Stolt Nielsen Seaway – the diving company
I worked for – and by the operators.”
The quality idea sneaked its way in, he recalls. “We were
more and more involved in fairly tough internal audits to
ensure that we had the work under control.
“A growing focus on developing procedural tools was another
example of the way safety was being taken seriously.
“Although some memorable incidents occurred, I never
experienced unacceptable pressure on us divers which compromised our safety.”
CLEAR
He also has the clear impression that the NPD, as the regulator
at the time, was actively involved in both regulatory development and not least in issuing safety reports.
These attracted great attention and formed the basis for
experience transfer and improvements to safety and the
working environment.
“The safety reports were often issued on the basis of incidents
or problems reported to the authorities,” explains Mr Sandvik.
“They focused on specific issues, and functioned as an
effective channel for spreading knowledge rapidly to the
whole industry. And they were taken seriously.
“I particularly remember safety report no 1 for 1986, which
gave us divers a minimum 12-hour rest break at a fixed time
of day. That contributed directly to a dramatic improvement in
our working conditions.”
NOT EASY
Although safety was eventually taken seriously, Mr Sandvik says
that being a North Sea diver was not an easy life by any means.
People competed over the available jobs.
“Many of us were looking for work at one time, and it was crucial to be acceptable to the diving manager and superintendent.
They had power, and were fully aware of it.
“Nevertheless, once you were on the inside and had been
selected to make saturation dives, safety was handled in a good
way.”
For various reasons, the diving contractors have always had
relatively few permanent employees – apart from a golden age
in the 1980s.
While the regulations do not specifically require permanent
jobs, Mr Sandvik regards organisational conditions – including
employment and a predictable personnel policy – as an important area for further advances in diver safety.
That not least influences opportunities for achieving good
follow-up of diver health, he adds.
“Although the PSA has limited powers in this area, we can’t
avoid emphasising perhaps the most important frame condition
for divers – who’re a group particularly exposed to risk, of course.”
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2
ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY
When the PSA was formally separated from the
NPD on 1 January 2004, one of the responsibilities
it inherited was regulating and supervising
professional diving in the petroleum industry.
Covering both the NCS and the land-based
plants, this includes developing regulations,
conducting audits and verifications and
considering documentation submitted with
consent applications.
In addition, the PSA holds meetings with the
players and participates in regulator fora both
nationally and internationally
ACTIVITY DOWN
BUT STABLE
After peaking at more than 100 000 work-hours in
2006-07, the volume of saturation diving on the
NCS has declined to about half that level and is
expected to stay there for the next few years.
An estimated 200 people are directly involved
in petroleum-related diving in Norway, including
50-100 divers. The majority of these are Britons.
Norwegians account for only 10-15 of the
saturation divers, and there are few if any signs
that this figure is set to rise.
What’s in a name
The word diving has been replaced
in a number of context with the
more heavyweight expression
“manned underwater operations”
or MUO.
This designation was introduced with a revision of Norway’s
regulations in 1991, because these
apply not only to regular diving but
also to one-man submersibles and
atmospheric suits. “Diving” then
became too narrow.
Saturation diving
The diver works from a bell, which
transports them under pressure from
a chamber on the support ship to the
work site, and remains pressurised in
the chamber between bell runs.
Surface-oriented diving
BROAD AGREEMENT
The PSA’s view that diving operations on the NCS are
conducted in an acceptable manner is shared with
both sides of the industry.
A working party set up by the Safety Forum in
2004 and drawn from companies, unions and government, for instance, concluded the following year that
offshore diving was pursued in line with the regulations and the level of risk accepted for all operations.
22
The diver enters the water at the
surface, carries out the job at the
relevant working depth – down to
about 50 metres – and returns.
Additional chamber compression/
decompression may be part of
such diving.
By ØYVIND MIDTTUN
fOUr TOP TaSKS
Management and major accident risk, groups exposed to risk, barriers and the
natural environment have been defined as the PSA’s main priorities for 2011.
A limited number of priority issues are
identified by the agency every year as
the ones which need particular attention
from the industry.
These are selected on the basis that
improvement is needed and that a special commitment and willingness will be
required to secure the necessary measures or processes.
The PSA believes that action in these
areas will have the biggest effect – in
other words, give society and the petroleum industry the best return for its
efforts.
In addition, the main priorities provide an important guideline for planning
activities at the PSA, which has selected
the following issues for special attention
in 2011.
Management and major accident risk
Management at all levels of the industry
will work to reduce major accident risk,
and ensure that this work is pursued in an
integrated manner.
Initiatives and decisions taken by
managements significantly affect frame
conditions for such threats.
It is important to recognise that the
industry poses risk, but that this can be
managed. Accepting a certain level of
risk does not mean that an accident is
acceptable.
Several close shaves in recent years
are a reminder that the underlying threat
of a major accident always exists.
PSA audit results, experience from
major accidents internationally and
recognised accident theory all highlight
the key role played by management in
reducing such risk.
Learning by senior executives and
their contribution to implementing similar lessons in the organisation are important elements. By giving a high priority
to this issue, the PSA will follow up and
exert influence to achieve improvements.
Barriers
Safety barriers must be maintained in an
integrated and consistent manner in order
to minimise the risk of a major accident.
Experience shows that reduced
performance or breaches of barriers
are often a causal factor in incidents.
The sum of technical, operational and
organisational conditions is crucial in
ensuring that a barrier works efficiently
at all times.
The PSA considers it important that
the maintenance and improvement of
barriers are further developed. Enhancing awareness and expertise represent
key elements in this context.
In order for the industry to continue
developing and improving its systems, it
is important that everyone concerned –
such as contractors and vessel operators
– participates actively and accepts their
share of the responsibility.
Maintaining barriers on ageing installations, not least in connection with
production life extensions, is also a key
concern here.
Groups exposed to risk
The risk of injury and ill-health varies from
one occupational category to another in
the petroleum industry. The PSA is challenging the industry’s ability to tailor its
follow-up with measures designed for the
groups which need them most.
The clearest distinction in worker risk
in the petroleum sector lies between
contractor personnel and operator company employees.
Many contractor personnel score high
for risk factors, where noise, hazardous
chemicals and physical strain are the
most important. Psychosocial conditions
and work with a high accident potential
are also significant.
The cost of occupational ill-health and
injury is high, and the losses are considerable for those affected, for the companies and for society.
Follow-up by the PSA has shown that
contractors have some way to go in developing management systems, expertise and capacity to handle risk factors.
At the same time, good frame conditions
are essential if they are to succeed.
The PSA will pay particular attention
in 2011 to noise levels which can cause
hearing damage and to risk conditions
for a steadily growing body of contract
workers.
Natural environment
The PSA’s role in efforts to protect nature
and the environment from harm is aimed
primarily at the preventive side – in other
words, helping to stop accidents from happening.
Good management is again an important aspect of environmental protection.
The RNNP process has now been expanded to cover the risk picture for acute
discharges as well. These findings help
to form the basis for the PSA’s risk-based
supervision, and must be used by the
industry to act on the principal contributors to risk.
In 2011, the PSA will look at links between the potential for major accidents
and environmental harm. How company
managements get involved in and contribute to managing such risk will also
be in focus. Learning from accidents and
incidents is a key element in that context.
The PSA also contributes to the
national commitment on reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. It does this
by adapting the regulations to facilitate adoption of new technology and
solutions by the industry which can cut
emissions.
At the same time, it checks that the
players ensure such new solutions are
also acceptable in safety terms.
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Keeping old heroes going
Veterans of the NCS such as Åsgard, Valhall, Hod and Gyda have had
their producing life extended – but not at the expense of safe operation.
By OLE-JOHAN FARET
The need to secure an official consent
to let fields stay on stream longer than
originally planned was included in Norway’s offshore regulations in 2002.
By clarifying the extension process,
this has helped older fields and facilities
on the NCS, many with heroic names
taken from Norse mythology, to continue producing.
Ageing installations have been a
priority at the PSA for a number of years,
since roughly half the production facilities on the NCS are already beyond their
design life. And 25 more are due to pass
this milestone over the next decade.
“New technology, operating methods
and improved recovery methods mean
that licensees often want to use existing
facilities beyond their planned duration,” explains Gerhard Ersdal, project
manager for ageing and production life
extension at the PSA.
“This will often make socio-economic
sense. At the same time, it’s not acceptable to keep an installation on stream if
it puts safety at risk.”
FACTORS
Both technical and non-technical factors
can require a facility to be updated. The
first category includes time-dependent
conditions such as corrosion or fatigue,
and long-term developments like collisions or seabed subsidence.
Non-technical considerations cover
obsolescence of equipment or changes
to standards and requirements since
24
hardware was manufactured.
Organisational aspects can also be
important, as when a company loses
expertise about the way to use relatively
old equipment.
A consent to extend producing life
requires the operator to demonstrate
that all risk factors have been assessed
and the necessary steps taken so that
operation remains acceptable.
RESOURCES
The PSA has devoted substantial
resources to enhancing its grasp of conditions which influence safety on elderly
offshore installations.
Operator audits, surveys – either
conducted or initiated by the PSA – and
close follow-up of projects and processes in the industry have yielded a better
overview of risk factors and the most
important safety aspects.
That in turn has laid the basis for
developing regulations, standards and
routines, and not least boosted awareness of the issues by the authorities and
in the industry.
“In addition to cooperating with
management and unions, we’ve
conducted and initiated a number of
projects to clarify how regulators in
other industries – including nuclear
power and aviation – handle these
questions,” reports Mr Ersdal.
“Learning from these sectors has
enhanced our knowledge. We’ve also
collaborated closely and well for a
number of years with regulators in
other countries.
“Involving the UK, the USA and the
Netherlands in particular, this boosts
experience transfer and contributes to
equal treatment of producing life extensions across national boundaries.”
He emphasises that the outcome
of combining knowledge in this way
exceeds what any one of these bodies
could have achieved on their own.
MAINTENANCE
A fundamental requirement for a safe
production extension is good maintenance throughout the time an installation has been on stream.
Experience also shows that a focus
on managing such work becomes
even more important as an installation
approaches middle age.
According to a survey conducted
by the PSA in 2010, maintenance on
older installations increases in scope
and takes longer than when they were
young.
Requirements for updating analyses
and carrying out modifications also
increase, while work on replacements
becomes more extensive.
This clearly confirms that more
attention will need to be given to these
issues by the industry as well as the
regulator in 2011.
Read more about ageing and
production life extensions at
www.psa.no/ageing.
Combating
the cold
A lengthy freeze in 2009-10 hit a number
of Norway’s land-based petroleum plants.
Faulty design was the main reason for these
problems, according to a PSA review.
By ØYVIND MIDTTUN
Many weeks of extreme cold allowed ice to build up in piping
systems at various processing facilities last winter. But this
went unnoticed until pipes were wholly or partly plugged or
pressure had built up.
The most serious incidents occurred at Kårstø north of
Stavanger, Mongstad near Bergen and Nyhamna in mid-Norway.
Icing at all these facilities cut or eliminated flaring capacity.
This problem may have existed for a number of days before it
was detected. Ice could also have reduced flare system capacity
in earlier winters, but melted before being discovered.
TESTING
These experiences underline the importance of testing safety
systems during cold spells, since most safety barriers in a process
plant are passive in normal operation.
As happened with the flare systems, these barriers could be
weakened or demolished without anyone realising it. Tests are
needed to establish that they remain intact.
Temperatures offshore were not as low as on land last
winter, and relatively few incidents related to icing problems
were reported from NCS installations.
But fresh incidents occurred at Kårstø and Nyhamna this
December. They did not introduce any new factors, but underlined
that the problem is not being adequately addressed.
The PSA will therefore continue to devote attention to the icing
problem in 2011 in order to check that operators and the industry
in general have amended winter test routines for safety.
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3
PROMOTING
The petroleum sector is a global industry, and knowledge of conditions in other comparable countries is
therefore very useful, says Magne Ognedal (right).
Together with special adviser Odd Bjerre Finnestad,
he has worked for many years to promote closer
collaboration between international safety regulators.
26
3
By ØYVIND MIDTTUN
COORDINATED ACTION
The risk of major
accidents recognises no
frontiers. Cross-border
collaboration between
government agencies can
accordingly help to boost
safety in the international
petroleum industry.
T
hey may operate with
different frameworks,
regulations and cultures, but the
10 members of the International
Regulator’s Forum (IRF) present a
united front on reducing risk.
This informal but nonetheless important
body brings together agencies which regulate safety in the offshore oil and gas industry
in various countries and provinces worldwide.
The PSA has been a member since the
forum was established in 1994.
LIMITED
Cooperation between safety regulators in
the various countries was limited until the
mid-1990s, explains PSA special adviser
Odd Bjerre Finnestad.
“We undoubtedly felt that each of us sat
on our own little patch and concentrated
on our own jurisdictions,” says the man
responsible for the agency’s day-to-day
contact with the IRF.
“One result was that the authorities in the
various countries developed varying types
of regime and regulations, and had different
approaches to supervision.
“However, the industry – and to some
extent the unions – had formed international
organisations at an early stage to protect their
interests.
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3
“A number of safety regulators found
that these bodies could exert pressure on
them by reporting that other countries
imposed less onerous requirements for
their operations.”
Together with PSA director-general
Magne Ognedal, Mr Finnestad has been
an important driving force in developing
the international collaboration.
KICKED OFF
A 1994 meeting held at the annual Offshore Technology Conference (OTC)
in Houston, Texas, kicked off a closer
collaboration over safety regulation.
“In the space of an hour or so, the US,
Canadian, British and Norwegian regulators agreed to set up an informal forum
to discuss and exchange information,”
explains Mr Finnestad.
Other countries have subsequently
joined, and the IRF’s membership is now
drawn from nine countries. But the motive has remained unchanged.
This is to keep each other updated
and informed, share experience, compare
regulatory methods and assess safety
levels in the various member states.
EXCHANGE
The IRF facilitates the exchange of ideas
and opinions on methods applied and
principles for effective supervision of
safety and the working environment.
Swapping facts about regulatory
activities and information on relevant
technical issues, development of regulations and so forth is also part of its remit.
Within the opportunities and constraints which apply in each country, this
helps to promote mutual understanding
among the members over the regulator’s
role, use of instruments, regulatory methods, expertise development and relations
between government and industry.
IMPORTANT
Mr Ognedal has followed the progress of
the IRF closely since 1994, and believes it
is important both as a meeting place and
as an information channel.
“The many discussions and debates
conducted through the IRF have been
informative and constructive, and have
provided valuable insight into regulatory
systems in other countries and current
issues in regulation,” he says.
“We’re part of a global industry, and
being familiar with conditions in other
comparable countries is accordingly very
useful.
“That applies to the meeting with the
oil companies, in international contexts,
and in relation to our duties in the Norwegian petroleum industry.”
The annual meetings represent the
core of the IRF collaboration. Every twothree years, the forum also stages an
International Regulators’ Offshore Safety
Conference.
Open to all, the latter attracts civil
servants from countries which have or
are planning offshore oil and gas operations, and representatives from everyone
involved in the industry.
The most recent IRF conference took
place in Vancouver, Canada, last autumn,
at the end of a very hectic year for the IRF.
Sea during 2009 and the helicopter crash
off eastern Canada in the same year, with
17 fatalities.
The biggest impact nevertheless came
from the Deepwater Horizon incident
on the Macondo prospect in the Gulf of
Mexico on 20 April 2010.
That disaster shook the world. Eleven
people died, many more were injured
and a major oil spill followed. It demonstrated the risk presented by oil operations with full clarity.
All the IRF’s member countries had
to re-prioritise their work in order to follow developments and decide whether
changes were needed to their regulations and regulatory practice.
ISSUES
In the wake of Deepwater Horizon, the IRF
has resolved to continue pursuing important issues such as safety culture and
management, and assessing the functionality of blowout preventers (BOPs).
The development of indicators to
measure each member country’s HSE
performance is also on the agenda.
So are preparing the necessary acceptance criteria for company expertise
and capacity, and last – but not least– the
selection of the best standards and best
practice.
Responsibility for studying these matters has been divided up between the
members, who will in turn approach the
parties involved to find good solutions.
ATTENTION
Much attention was levelled at Australia’s
West Atlas/Montara accident in the Timor
IRF IN BRIEF
The annual letter of allocation from the Ministry of Labour requires the PSA to
maintain a good collaboration with petroleum regulators in other countries or regions.
A central place in the global arena is occupied by the International Regulators’
Forum (IRF), which currently embraces
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the
UK and the USA.
As an informal body, it has neither an
elected leadership nor its own administrative staff. But that does not mean the
IRF is without international influence.
Over the years since its creation in
28
1994, it has established itself as a selfevident partner for other influential
interest organisations.
The forum currently comprises the
heads of 10 independent safety regulators for the upstream offshore oil and
gas industry. All have the authority to
account for their country’s operational,
technical, strategic and political conditions.
In addition, they have full access to
relevant information from their own
country/province, which helps to ensure
meaningful debate.
Decisions which serve as guidance for
the members are adopted unanimously
at an annual plenary meeting.
3
GETTING TOGETHER
Safety regulators from all
over the world will be meeting in Stavanger this autumn
to review follow-up activities
in the wake of the Deepwater
Horizon disaster.
Odd Bjerre Finnestad (left) and Magne Ognedal in the PSA will be bidding
delegates welcome this autumn to a major conference for international
safety regulators in Stavanger.
The IRF conference in Vancouver last
autumn resolved to hold an extraordinary
session during 2011 to update the industry
on the status of work and the execution of
IRF-initiated assignments.
It has since been decided to stage this
meeting in the Norwegian ”oil capital”
from 4-5 October.
TIES THAT BIND
The PSA is an active participant in several
international fora and activities.
NORTH SEA
The North Sea Offshore Authorities’
Forum (NSOAF) brings together all
government agencies in this region with
regulatory authority for offshore petroleum operations.
Established in 1989, its goal has been
to ensure a continuous improvement of
HSE in the North Sea oil and gas industry.
Many projects have been pursued
by the NSOAF with the aim of reducing
differences between formal national
requirements for technical, operational
and educational conditions.
The members meet annually for a
plenary meeting, where activities are
summed up and new assignments initiated and discussed.
RESEARCH
Another multinational collaboration
is the International Committee on
Regulatory Research and Development
(ICRARD), which was created in 1994.
It provides an arena for information
sharing and experience transfer in HSE
research for the petroleum industry. The
aim is to make research work known so
that it does not necessarily need to be
repeated elsewhere.
CRANES AND LIFTING
Together with regulators in other North
Sea countries, the PSA has been an active
participant in the Offshore Mechanical Handling Equipment Committee
(OMHEC).
This aims to improve safety in crane
and lifting operations, and guidelines
have been prepared for the industry
through the committee in an effective
manner.
DIVING
The PSA participates actively in the
European Diving Technology Committee
(EDTC). Common educational standards
for divers are a visible result of this collaboration.
COUNTRY TO COUNTRY
Bilateral collaboration with other
offshore regulators in northern Europe
allows the PSA to contribute at a technical level to meeting the internationalisation of the industry. This involves the
exchange of knowledge and experience
in a number of areas.
WORKING GROUP
The Norwegian and British authorities
have also collaborated through a special
working group (SWG) on exchanging
experience and strategy work. Meetings
are held twice a year.
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STANDARD SOLUTIONS
Getting to the bottom without sinking safety is a challenge.
Greater standardisation could hold part of the answer.
By THOR GUNNAR DAHLE
More and more petroleum production equipment is being located on the seabed. Norway
currently has about 75 installations visible
on the surface, and roughly 300 positioned
subsea.
Good grounds exist for seeking underwater solutions, including the cost of installing concrete or steel support structures
exposed to strong natural forces and in need
of maintenance.
In practice, surface facilities attached to
the seabed cannot be used in water depths
beyond 500 metres.
MONITORING
Reliable methods and equipment to monitor
the condition of subsea facilities are essential
for such solutions to function acceptably in
terms of safety and economics.
Seabed hardware also needs maintaining.
Components and equipment packages must
be replaceable or repairable. That calls for
remote control or the use of mini-submarines.
30
SHARED
The Norwegian players are praised by PSA
principal engineer Trond Sundby for their
willingness and ability to be open about
development and experience.
“A high degree of standardisation has a
positive safety effect,” he believes.
“In critical circumstances, where an fault
needs to be swiftly rectified, this would
simplify access to spare parts and help ensure
that they are installed quickly and safely.”
INTEGRATED
Mr Sundby sees a need for even more integrated thinking in standardisation efforts,
cutting across disciplines and areas of responsibility.
“We must elevate analyses and assessments from the component level to a higher
plane, so that function and robustness are
assessed in a more integrated manner,” he
maintains.
“Each component may be high quality
and satisfy the requirements. But that doesn’t
necessarily mean the complex system of
which this unit forms part will cope with the
stresses involved and thereby perform its
intended function.”
Subsea facilities on the NCS have so
far comprised wellheads, templates and
manifolds. But development is continuing,
with the first seabed separation and injection
equipment now in place.
Mr Sundby notes that subsea installations
are becoming ever more complex, which
calls for extensive control systems and instrumentation.
“Such solutions are vulnerable and present
new safety-related challenges, not least with
regard to data transfer,” he says, and emphasises that the risk of acute discharges must
be acceptable.
EXPERTISE
A more electronic future opens the way to
new types of faults and problems, he believes,
and will not least impose higher standards for
personnel who install, operate and maintain
such systems.
“It’s positive that many good educational
initiatives have been taken in the industry,”
Mr Sundby says. “That shows attention is also
being given to human factors in the hightech picture.”
In addition to developing regulations and
exercising supervision, the PSA’s contribution
to this exciting trend consists partly of active
involvement in standardisation work.
Its role in this context is to make its knowledge and experience available and to clarify
the regulatory requirements for equipment
and methods.
Averting unwanted contact
The PSA is concerned that the many collisions between vessels and installations on the
NCS could lead to major accidents. It has called for big improvements in ship operation.
By ODD BJERRE FINNESTAD
A dramatic impact hit the Norwegian
headlines in the summer of 2009, when well
stimulation vessel Big Orange XVIII ran into
the Ekofisk 2/4 W platform at a speed of
almost 10 knots.
Extensive damage was caused, and the
PSA’s investigation found that the incident,
under slightly changed circumstances, could
have developed into a major accident.
But this event was by no means unique.
Collisions have been occurring on the NCS
ever since the oil industry arrived in Norway
during the mid-1960s.
In 1966, for instance, the Ocean Traveler
rig almost sank after supply ship Smit Lloyd 8
holed one of its columns several times when
discharging because of a strong current and
high waves.
REPORTED
A total of 115 collisions between installations
and visiting vessels with work on the field
have been reported since 1982, and no less
than 26 between 2001 and 2010.
None of these incidents have caused loss of
human life or personal injury, but the material
damage has been extensive in some cases.
NOT LEARNT
The investigation of the Big Orange XVIII
incident showed that important lessons had
not been learnt after a similar event in June
2005, when supply ship Ocean Carrier hit a
bridge on Ekofisk.
Both cases involved inadequate routines
for handing command of the ship from one
officer to another. And although collisions
occur for a variety of reasons, some key
features recur.
These incidents are often the result of poor
organisation of work and responsibilities,
deficient training of the personnel involved,
or the failure of technical equipment.
Facilities on the NCS are dimensioned
to withstand collisions of a certain size, but
a number of such incidents have involved
impact energies above the design values.
The PSA has got to grips with this issue,
and believes that a significant improvement
in vessel operation is needed along with
better methods for assessing loads on installations and their strength.
EDUCATION
Paying greater attention to education and
organisational aspects will also be important,
along with a reduction in the technical failure
rate.
However, the PSA sees no need to amend
the regulations.
The trend is good for collisions between
petroleum installations and vessels not working on the field, with a decline in the number
of incidents.
That partly reflects good monitoring.
Two traffic management stations, one on
the Ekofisk and the other at Sandsli outside
Bergen, cover most of the NCS.
Some fixed installations and mobile units
are also responsible for keeping track of
passing maritime traffic.
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BLACKOUT
BOTHER
Several cases of serious power failures on Norwegian
offshore installations in 2010 boosted safety risks,
and tougher supervision is planned in this area.
By THOR GUNNAR DAHLE
Some of the cases of lost power reported to
the PSA in 2010 were total blackouts, which
involved both main and emergency supplies
dropping out.
Losing the main electricity supply is not
a serious threat to safety in itself, according
to PSA principal engineer Eivind Sande.
“The systems are designed to fail-safe
if the power is cut off,” he notes. “But any
unplanned irregularity in the production
process increases risk, so such events
must be avoided.
“An extensive power failure usually halts
production as well, so it causes a financial
threat as well as enhancing risk.
“In addition, loss of emergency power
in an incident reduces opportunities for
pursuing important response functions in
a sufficiently robust manner - and must not
happen.”
TIME
It can take time to get power generation and
all the other systems up and running again.
In one case last year, the installation was
without power for almost two days.
Secure electricity provision is essential for
a facility to function, whether transmitted by
cable from land or generated on-site.
The main power supply is needed for the
32
many work processes on board as well as
for lighting, heating, cooking, ventilation
and sanitation.
If it fails, emergency generation will also
be required to keep key systems going –
such as emergency lighting, communication
and safety systems. That applies not least
during an evacuation.
DIFFICULT
A power failure on an installation can make
life difficult for the crew, Mr Sande points out
– particularly by boosting the risk of injury
when the necessary lighting for work and
movement is lost.
“If the incident lasts for a long time,
heat will also be lost in workspaces and
accommodation, indoor air quality will
deteriorate and non-functioning toilets
will pose problems.
“In such conditions, it can be necessary
to reduce staffing on the installation to a
minimum.”
The PSA intends to strengthen its supervision by implementing measures which
persuade those responsible to deal with the
challenges of safeguarding power supplies
on installations, particularly with regard to
emergency generation.
The PSA registered a sharp increase in power failures on NCS installations during 2010. In one case, it took two days to restore normal working.
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4
By OLE-JOHAN FARET
Success in the long term.
The story of mechanical pipe handling
confirms that innovation requires time, money, commitment – and courage.
These regulatory requirements created a storm in the industry when they
were introduced in the 1990s, but worker safety improved sharply.
History also demonstrates that the industry must see the challenges, be
innovative in finding good solutions and not least display the ability to
adopt newly developed equipment. Mechanical pipe handling is now
also taken for granted internationally. It represents a success story.
The PSA is now working to achieve the same outcome for offshore lifeboats.
Efforts to improve lifeboats offer several parallels with the fight over mechanical pipe handling.
34
4
Reviled requirements paid off
The demand for mechanical pipe handling on offshore facilities aimed
to get people off the drill floor – a dangerous place to be, with many
accidents including serious injury and death.
One of Norway’s most controversial
offshore regulations was introduced in
1992. It called for remote handling of all
tubulars less than 20 inches in diameter
on the drill floor and in transit from the
pipe racks.
“It was clear to everyone that
working conditions for people on the
drill floor were unacceptable,” says
Øyvind Tuntland, the PSA’s director for
regulatory development.
“Crews had to handle a lot of heavy
equipment in motion both horizontally
and vertically on uneven floors slippery
with mud and other muck.”
He was appointed head of the drilling
section at the Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate (NPD) at the same time as
the disputed regulation appeared.
“Joining the NPD in mid-1992 was like
landing in the middle of a war. Formulated as mandatory, the regulation meant
that all fixed installations and mobile
units with drilling facilities had to be
extensively modified.
“Another major problem was the lack
of standardised remote control solutions
for the drill floor which met the new
rules. This meant that systems had
to be specially designed.”
PROTOTYPES
Many different prototypes installed in
the first few years had not been adequately tested and failed in use.
The disconsolate mood was reinforced
by a slump in the petroleum industry
during the early 1990s, with a poor rig
market and low day rates.
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4
A number of complaints about the new
requirements and the way they were applied by the NPD also winged their way to
the ministry. None were accepted.
“The main reason why the government’s
view prevailed was that the extra costs for
the industry could not outweigh the social
benefit of adopting the regulation,” explains
Mr Tuntland.
“Heavy, physical and risky work on the
drill floor, which had caused so many serious
accidents, was no longer acceptable either
offshore or by comparison with conditions
in land-based industry.”
The first formulation of the requirement
for remotely operated handling appeared in
the 1980s, but did not become mandatory
until 1992.
With hindsight, the process of making
this demand compulsory was not ideal.
During the public consultation, the industry
dismissed it almost as a castle in the
air while the NPD gave more weight to
socio-economic considerations than to
the financial impact for the companies.
SHARP
Discussions between the industry and the
companies on one hand and the authorities
on the other were accordingly conducted in
fairly sharp tones.
“We were roundly abused both on the
phone and in meetings,” Mr Tuntland recalls.
“And I remember being booed when giving
a paper at a drilling conference. Tempers ran
fairly high for a time.”
After a few tough rounds, however, the
climate between the industry and government improved. A two-year transitional
period was part of the regulation, and the
NPD took a pragmatic approach to applications for extensions to the deadline
during the 1990s.
It was necessary not least to gain adequate experience with the equipment
and to ensure that pipes with both large
and small diameters could be handled.
The key job was to commit all operators
and rig contractors to upgrade existing facilities. Where new installations or rigs were
concerned, the rules were enforced more
rigorously.
STORY
The demand for mechanical pipe
handling was undoubtedly a success story
for the Norwegian authorities, and for the
36
country’s petroleum industry.
“Serious incidents, including ones with
tragic outcomes, continue to occur during
lifting operations on the drill floor,” Mr
Tuntland concedes.
“All the figures nevertheless show that
this regulation gave safety a boost. A drill
floor was perhaps the most dangerous
workplace in Norway until its introduction.”
It also gave part of the supplies industry a
shot in the arm. Hitec, under the leadership
of founder Jon Gjedebo, was among the
first to develop technology for remote pipe
handling.
An industry worth billions of kroner
thereby grew up in the wake of the
regulatory requirement.
Although specific demands for mechanical pipe handling have not been incorporated in the regulations of other countries,
this technology also dominates the
international scene.
That is not only because safety improves,
but also because experience shows that it
reduces downtime and thereby makes
drilling more efficient.
“The whole world manufactures and
uses such systems now, whatever the
regulatory requirements,” acknowledges
Mr Tuntland. “But Norway showed the
way, and that the impossible was
possible all the same.”
Key figures in the lifeboat affair
and the work on mechanical
handling are Øyvind Tuntland
(above right)
Sigurd Robert Jacobsen (right)
and Rune Solheim (far right).
Long fight for secure evacuation
4
Efforts to enhance the safety of lifeboats on the NCS began in
the mid-noughties and are still in full swing. Within a few years,
it may be possible to say “Look to Norway” in this area as well.
Extensive damage to the superstructure
of one of the freefall lifeboats installed
on the Veslefrikk B platform in the North
Sea was exposed during testing in 2005.
When the same happened shortly
afterwards on the Kristin field in the
Norwegian Sea, both the PSA and the
industry understood that action had to
be taken.
“Lifeboats are your last chance of
getting away in an emergency where
every other means of evacuation fails,”
says Rune Solheim.
“That’s why it’s so important that they
can do their job,” adds the PSA staffer,
who has been closely following the lifeboat affair with colleague Sigurd Robert
Jacobsen.
The petroleum industry established
a project which uncovered a number of
weaknesses with existing freefall lifeboats. Similar problems have also been
identified for davit-launched craft.
This work thereby became relevant for
everyone working in the petroleum
activity on the NCS.
MARITIME
It quickly became clear that freefall and
davit-launched lifeboat designs were
based on maritime regulations. These
had not been adequately modified for
the special conditions in the offshore
business on the NCS.
Norwegian petroleum operations
are also characterised by round-theclock activity, regardless of season and
weather.
“Our regulations include a functional
requirement that it must be possible to
evacuate personnel on installations to a
safe area under all conditions,” Mr Jacobsen says.
STRUCTURAL
Weaknesses in both freefall and
davit-lowered lifeboats, with associated
launch gear, relate to structural strength
of both hull and superstructure, G forces,
propulsion and buoyancy/stability.
“As a result, a large proportion of
existing lifeboats and launching systems
have significant weaknesses, and so fail
to meet the demand for evacuation under all conditions,” says Mr Solheim.
To compensate for this, a number of
installations must reduce their staffing
in bad weather – which can have consequences for safe and efficient operation.
STANDARDS
New industrial standards based on the
latest findings have been developed for
freefall lifeboats and launch systems.
These must be revised as fresh questions
are raised about their suitability, but
nevertheless represent an important
step in upgrading the stock of such craft.
“Lifeboat owners – in other words,
operators/rig contractors – have an
overall responsibility to ensure that the
equipment used is suitable for its purpose and complies with the regulations,”
says Mr Jacobsen.
Statoil is the primary operator on the
NCS to have accepted the consequences
of the latest information, launching a
project to build new freefall lifeboats
which meet the revised standard.
“We haven’t observed a similar
commitment among the other operators
or rig contractors with freefall craft,”
Mr Jacobsen reports. “They’ll be in our
sights in the time to come.”
Despite the weaknesses which have
been identified, the PSA still regards freefall craft as the best available technology
for lifeboat evacuation on the NCS.
LAUNCHING
A new standard for davit launching
systems has been drawn up, but work
on a corresponding norm for the actual
lifeboats using such equipment has yet
to start.
Such lifeboats are common on
mobile units which observe maritime
regulations, but can also be found on
fixed installations such as Veslefrikk A,
Ekofisk, Ula and Valhall.
One of the most serious weaknesses
identified for davit launched craft is the
risk of using them when significant wave
heights are greater than five metres,
Mr Solheim explains.
PARALLELS
The lifeboat affair has several parallels
with the fight over mechanical pipe
handling on the drill floor in the 1990s –
the process takes many years, and new
equipment must be developed, tested
and adopted to comply with the
regulations.
“Achieving the same level of safety
must be the goal, regardless of the
type of installation/unity, the lifeboat
model and when this was adopted,”
Mr Jacobsen emphasises.
“To prevent accidents during lifeboat
evacuation, we consider it necessary to
take action through the regulations and
in other ways.
“Norway has an expressed goal of
being a world leader in HSE. Players on
the NCS must accept that this also
extends to the stock of lifeboats.”
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REPETITION AT REFINERY
The PSA was required to investigate two gas escapes at the Mongstad complex
north of Bergen during 2010. It will be keeping a close eye on the plant this year.
By ØYVIND MIDTTUN
A leak occurred at the Mongstad refinery on
8 February, last year when workers insulating
a liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) line drilled a
hole in it and thereby released some 300
kilograms of gas.
Although this volume was very small
and the potential threat proved equally
limited, the PSA’s investigation revealed
non-conformances with the regulations.
These related to inadequate risk assessment in the planning phase and a lack of
expertise and understanding of the hazards
involved.
SECOND
The refinery suffered a second leak on
12 September in connection with routine
maintenance of a reactor used in producing
petrol products.
This incident involved escapes from two
points – a thermowell on the actual reactor,
and a heat exchanger which leaked as a
result of overloading after shut-down and
pressure reduction,
Overall, large volumes of gas were
released. The leak rate was put at 4.7 kilograms per second by investigators for both
the PSA and operator Statoil. It took an hour
to halt both escapes.
The PSA’s investigation revealed two nonconformances from the regulations related to
inadequate spare-part management and lack
of expertise.
LEARNING
Audits have been conducted by the PSA
with Statoil at Mongstad for several years,
where the focus has been on learning from
and following up incidents. This supervisory
activity will continue in 2011.
Maintenance is one of the areas in the
spotlight this year, reports principal engineer
Arne Johan Thorsen in the PSA’s process
integrity discipline.
“The Mongstad refinery has a relatively
large maintenance backlog. A lot of good
work is being done, but the high level of
activity imposes strict requirements on its
planning.
“We want to take a closer look at this,
partly with regard to risk assessment and
expertise. ”
Supervision of this maintenance planning
will be conducted in collaboration with the
Norwegian Climate and Pollution Agency
(Klif ).
GETTING
TOGETHER
A positive view is taken by the PSA
of a special network which has been
created for the small operators and
licensees (SOL) on the NCS.
Participation in this link-up should
provide good opportunities for
exchanging experience and learning
across the companies.
That relates to such areas as compliance with the regulations, industry
challenges in general, and exploration
activities in particular.
38
RIGHTS ALSO INVOLVE DUTIES
A growing number of new companies want to operate exploration
activities on the NCS. But not all are equally well prepared.
By ØYVIND MIDTTUN
Applications for an exploration drilling
consent have twice been refused by the
PSA in recent years because the operator
concerned lacked the necessary knowledge
and expertise.
“Some of these new companies haven’t
paid enough attention to the duties which
accompany the rights they’ve acquired,” says
PSA supervision coordinator Hilda Kjeldstad.
“The regulations impose requirements for
capacity, expertise and organisation.”
The increase in companies seeking to
become involved in the hunt for oil and
gas on the NCS has escalated over the past
decade, and the number of operators is
expanding year by year.
operators great flexibility in organising
their operations. But some requirements
are absolute.
The operator must protect the safety of
people, the environment and the material
assets represented by vessels – including
operating reliability.
They are also responsible at all times for
maintaining an effective emergency response
to hazards and accidents which could mean
fatalities, injuries, pollution or major material
damage.
The framework HSE regulations require
operators to have an organisation in Norway
which can stand on its own feet in ensuring
that operations comply with the rules.
MODEST
Common denominators for many of the
latter are that they have a relatively modest
organisation, operate production licences in
an early phase, and are pursuing or planning
exploration drilling.
Several of them aim to make their debut
as an exploration operator during 2011. In
addition, a number of companies with limited
experience are making drilling preparations.
“The operator is responsible for ensuring
that work is done in an acceptable manner
and in compliance with the applicable regulations,” says Ms Kjeldstad. “Players preparing to
drill must be aware of their duties.”
Norway’s petroleum regulations give
DOCUMENTATION
Requirements for documentation in the early
phase are being extended from 2011 under
section 26 of the framework regulations.
This ensures that the PSA can follow up at
a sufficiently early stage how the exploration
operator organises itself, manages and plans
activities until applying for consent to drill.
Once an operator has decided to start
planning such a well, the PSA must be
notified of the date when this preparatory
work is due to begin.
The provision is directed primarily at new
operators who are intending to spud their
first exploration well.
Operators with experience of and involve-
ment in such drilling on the NCS provide the
PSA with the necessary information through
continuous follow-up of each company.
PRIORITY
New operators, particularly those applying for
their first exploration drilling consent, will be
followed up in 2011 through the PSA’s main
priority of management and major accident
risk.
“Our experience in recent years emphasises the special importance of monitoring the
planning of the first exploration well activity,”
says Anne Vatten, one of the PSA’s directors of
supervisory activities.
Key considerations here are management
of HSE in the preparatory phase and taking
care of the operator’s compliance responsibility.
In addition comes ensuring that the
company in question has the capacity and
expertise to take key decisions and to make
assessments which ensure acceptable activity.
“Players must demonstrate that they
are capable of discharging their operator
responsibilities, that they are familiar with the
regulations and that they can comply with
them,” Ms Vatten says.
She emphasises that the partners in
Norwegian production licences also have a
duty to follow up the operator’s plans.
Well incident under scrutiny
A wireline operation on the Shell-operated Draugen field in the Norwegian Sea on
4 December 2010, which weakened safety barriers, is being investigated by the PSA.
The incident in the temporarily shut-down
production well, regarded as serious by the
PSA, occurred while seeking to replace a gas
lift valve.
In order to access this device, the downhole safety valve had to be retrieved. But the
latter got stuck as it was being pulled through
the Xmas tree.
That in turn prevented operation of the
upper and lower master valve in the tree,
which lowered safety barriers for the well.
The PSA decided to investigate the
incident on 7 December, but the work had
not been completed when this issue went to
press. The report will be published at
www.psa.no.
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Supply side under
stronger scrutiny
The role of the contractor has become steadily clearer, not least to the PSA,
over the four decades since Norway became a petroleum producer.
By ANGELA EBBESEN
Changes in roles and interfaces between
players on both sides of the operator-contractor divide have emerged as the latter’s
place in the industry expands.
This has also demanded adaptability and
innovation throughout the supplier chain,
presenting challenges in identifying and
managing safety and working environment
risk – both that created by others and that
generated by one’s own operations.
“The PSA addresses both operators and
contractors through our audits today,”
explains Finn Carlsen, a PSA director for
supervisory activities and involved in this
role since 1994.
“I think this contributes to all players in
both these camps implementing processes
for continuous improvement,” he maintains.
ALL PLAYERS
Although the operators have been
central to government regulation since
the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate was
established in 1973, the regulations have
always been directed at all players.
Supervision and the framework for the
industry have been developed in line with
technological advances, risk understanding
and practical experience.
Kicking off in 1985 along with the new
40
Petroleum Activities Act, risk-based supervision was a result of lessons learnt from
investigations, audits, and work on regulations after accidents on the NCS.
It was still important 20 years ago to help
enhance awareness and professionalism at
the operators concerning their obligations
under a functional and risk-based regulatory
regime.
“It was important for us to follow up the
operator and its compliance responsibility,
and to gather the threads from the regulations and audits,” says Mr Carlsen.
“Our starting point was literally the
operator’s role and duty to ensure that all
contractors and sub-contractors complied
with the regulations.”
ing environment conditions, and conducted
audits of both operators and development
contractors.
“We had long recognised that the operator
played the key role in determining the terms
for safety and the working environment in the
industry,” explains Mr Carlsen.
“That was exercised through contracts and
the ownership of installations and equipment, and through established management
systems.
“We had to make strategic choices which
ensured an integrated approach to supervising HSE through the players in the industry.
The new aspect was that we, as the regulator,
summed up our supervision and sent reports
to both operators and contractors.”
DIRECT
Contractors became subject to direct supervision during the 1990s, with the initial focus
mainly on management and follow-up of
working environment conditions.
New regulations on systematic working
environment (SAM) follow-up were introduced in 1995, and became an important tool
in the design process for new installations.
The contractors played a key role here.
With SAM, the PSA began to monitor
physical, technical and organisational work
CENTRAL
Sigve Knudsen has played central roles in
the regulation project and the systematic
commitment to supervising contractors since
joining the PSA from just such a company in
the late 1990s. He became discipline leader
for the working environment last summer.
“It’s interesting to have been audited by
the NPD, and then getting the opportunity to
help develop strategies for the risk-based and
integrated supervision of the whole hierarchy
of responsible parties in the industry,” he says.
Changes to the player picture, work processes, expertise and size have helped to alter
the balance of power between participants.
That applies to both operators and contractors.
The latter have secured new and important
roles with regard to planning and executing
major projects – and thereby to managing risk.
“When conducting audits directly with the
contractors, we found that we were meeting the
chief executive,” notes Mr Knudsen. “That gave
us a channel right into the company.
“It’s the top management which negotiates
with the operators. Being in contact with the
regulator has an effect when they talk with their
own customers. I believe their understanding of
their own role in the wider picture is changed
and enhanced.
“We must think in terms of integrated risk
management and player follow-up. The composition of participants and the interfaces between
them are factors which must contribute to the
choice of supervision strategy.”
AGENDA
The Deepwater Horizon disaster in the US
Gulf has made it clear to every player in the
industry – including the suppliers – that nobody
can avoid having major accidents high on their
agenda.
Management and major accident risk has
already been a top priority at the PSA for
several years.
“I think the gas blowout on Snorre A in
2004 contributed to a new awareness, not
least among drilling contractors, of their own
role in managing and influencing risk,” says Mr
Knudsen.
“The investigation into the oil leak from
Statfjord A in 2008 identified failures both at the
operator and among the contractors involved.
“We followed up with orders directed at all
those concerned, in part to ensure an integrated
review, an assessment and learning across the
players.
“It’s crucial that serious incidents with a
major accident potential receive a broad and
integrated follow-up both from those involved
and from industry organisations and the
authorities.”
Maintenance has proved a contributory
cause of major incidents in the petroleum
industry and other sectors, and contractors
play a key role in ensuring that such work is
done in a way which avoids accidents.
The PSA has accordingly followed up risk
factors related to maintenance work in the
industry for a number of years.
ATTENTION
A survey by the Sintef research foundation for
the PSA found that maintenance contractors
pay far more attention to incidents with a major
accident potential than to less serious events.
“We nevertheless receive constant feedback
from contractors about operators who use
lost-time injuries as criteria when awarding
contracts,” says Mr Knudsen.
“At the same time, the employees argue that
many contractors still pay most attention to individual and minor injuries in their safety work.”
He says that contractors often claim to have
difficulties influencing frame conditions which
could affect the risk of serious accidents.
“They have an important point when they
identify long-term contracts with operators as
essential for collaboration and for efficient
learning and improvement over time.
“This was also confirmed for us through
another study on the significance of frame
conditions for HSE work, again carried out by
Sintef on our behalf last year.”
Mr Carlsen emphasises that the PSA is
constantly seeking dialogue and contact with
industry segments and interest organisations for
operators, contractors and their personnel.
“These contacts influence our own understanding of the risk picture, and thereby our
supervisory priorities. At the same time, we’re
developing a greater degree of shared understanding between those involved.”
Escape
inquiry
A gas leak on the Statoiloperated Gullfaks B platform in the North Sea this
December is the subject
of an investigation by the
PSA.
The outflow occurred during leak testing after maintenance work on a well,
and involved gas trapped in the well
between the downhole safety valve
and the Xmas tree.
Lasting about an hour, the incident
involved an initial leak rate of 1.3 kilograms per second and released some
800 kilograms in all.
Nobody was injured, but the leak
created a serious condition on the
installation.
The PSA investigation had not been
completed when this issue went to
press. Its report will be posted to
www.psa.no in due course.
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41
A CLOSE CALL DOWNHOLE
Under slightly changed circumstances, a well control incident on the Statoil-operated
Gullfaks C platform in the North Sea could have developed into a major accident.
By ØYVIND MIDTTUN
Problems had arisen with the same producer
in December 2009 and March 2010 before
the most serious incident occurred in the
afternoon of 19 May 2010.
Control of pressure in the C-6A well was
suddenly lost, the mud column vanished,
and the alarm was sounded.
“This event was very serious,” emphasises
PSA supervision coordinator Hanne Etterlid.
“Under only slightly different circumstances,
it could have turned into a major accident.”
Work on restoring control over C-6A and
re-establishing its downhole barriers lasted
for more than two months.
DEFICIENCIES
The PSA’s investigation of the incident identified serious deficiencies in Statoil’s planning
of the drilling and completion operation in
this well. Management checks that activities
were being conducted satisfactorily were
also inadequate.
These shortcomings related to key conditions such as risk management and change
control, as well as experience transfer and
the application of expertise.
42
Familiarity and compliance with the
operator’s own governing documents as
well as documentation of decisions taken
were also found to fall short.
These serious findings resulted in a
far-reaching order to Statoil, including a
requirement to review and assess processes
related to well work on Gullfaks.
“It’s important for us that all aspects of
the order are assessed and dealt with, so that
specific improvements result,” emphasises
Ms Etterlid.
“That includes Statoil achieving genuine
learning and experience transfer, both on
Gullfaks C and on other installations where
necessary.”
MEASURES
The company was also required to establish
why measures initiated after the serious gas
leak on Snorre A in 2004 failed to have the
desired effect on Gullfaks.
“We take the view that the C incident
could probably have been avoided if Statoil
had learnt from earlier mistakes and drawn
on available expertise in-house,” comments
Ms Etterlid.
“A key job for the company is accordingly
to find out why it has failed to apply the
lessons provided by earlier incidents.”
The PSA has questioned whether Statoil
is making sufficient effort to seek out and
evaluate the underlying causes of the
errors made.
RELIEF
The Gullfaks C incident has also helped to
illustrate the challenges posed in complying
with the regulatory requirement on drilling
programmes for relief wells.
According to the regulations, such plans
are required for every well drilled on the
NCS. The operator must keep them updated
in line with reservoir changes and new
technology or methods.
The PSA intends to monitor the industry’s
work both on relief wells and on overall
strategies for emergency response to
downhole problems.
No grounds for well complacency
Wells cannot be treated lightly. Every one of them needs to be cared
for properly, or they can cause trouble.
By THOR GUNNAR DAHLE
Over 4 500 exploration and production wells
have been drilled on the NCS to date. Names
and goals may differ, but all share one feature
– they are far more than a simple hole in the
ground.
Like fixed installations and other petroleum industry facilities, wells need to be
maintained and monitored to prevent faults
and incidents.
The most critical components are valves,
seals, tubular joints and similar equipment.
External barriers – entrenchment in the geological formations – are also very important
for safety. And corrosion and erosion present
major challenges over time.
CAUTION
Although Norway has a good history for
serious accidents caused by well leaks and
failures, PSA principal engineer Arne Mikael
Enoksen urges caution in resting on one’s
laurels.
“At the same time as their number is rising,
wells on the NCS are getting older,” he points
out. “The industry has an important job to do
here.
“Developing and adopting methods and
equipment which can effectively monitor well
condition and spot leaks and failures as early
as possible is a demanding business.”
He reports that an extensive PSA study of
data from more than 400 selected wells in
2004 found that 18 per cent – a high proportion – faced challenges from leaks and barrier
failure.
“About the same time as this work was
launched, we experienced the very serious
blowout on Snorre A in the North Sea, when
large volumes of gas flowed from the seabed
just under the platform.
“This incident demonstrated with full clarity the possible consequences of a well leak,
and gave an extra boost to work on this issue.”
EXTEND
Confronted with the facts from the PSA’s
review, the industry undertook in 2007
to extend the project by establishing an
overview of and categorising well status.
More than 1 700 wells have so far been
subject to this evaluation, and the results
obtained are also included in the PSA’s annual
RNNP report.
Mr Enoksen is pleased that the industry
has established a special Well Integrity Forum
(WIF), involving eight key production operators with the PSA as an observer.
“This body holds regular meetings,” he
notes. “An important job is the development
of “stoplight” criteria – categorising possible
well problems by character and seriousness,
so that corrective measures can be applied
in the right place and at the right time.”
GUIDELINES
At the WIF’s suggestion, the OLF has now
prepared well integrity guidelines. These
cover a wide range of important factors, such
as education, experience transfer, barrier
philosophy and stoplight criteria.
“These guidelines should mean that the
industry is now much better equipped to
meet the challenge of ensuring that wells are
intact at all times,” Mr Enoksen observes.
MORE SECURELY HELD
A mobile unit which fails to stay put when required presents a substantial risk.
So systems for anchorhandling or positioning must be trustworthy.
By THOR GUNNAR DAHLE
Floating installations as well as rigs and ships
are held in place with the aid of dynamic
positioning or by mooring to the seabed.
Any failure of such systems may have serious
consequences.
Drilling rigs or production floaters can
have their connection with subsea equipment destroyed or damaged, with a potential
loss of well control and the risk of a blowout.
Losing position also poses the threat of
a collision with other facilities, offering the
possibility of a major accident as well as
extensive material losses.
FEW
While the PSA registered a worrying increase
in mooring-related incidents some years
ago, its initiatives and industry action have
reversed this trend and few such events were
recorded in 2009-10.
However, further improvements to
mooring systems are still needed in order to
reduce the risk contribution of incidents like
this to an absolute minimum.
Failure of winch brake systems has caused
most of the undesirable incidents, and
improvements are needed here on existing
mobile units on the NCS.
Certain of these vessels have also failed
to adopt the best available solutions.
New regulations impose tougher and
more integrated requirements in this area.
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43
5
By ØYVIND MIDTTUN
The PSA has manoeuvred
the acknowledgement of
compliance (AoC) onto
the NCS with a firm hand.
This scheme is now securely
anchored as an important
tool for monitoring
mobile units.
FLOATING
A
very ambitious
approach was taken by
the PSA in the late 1990s
when it launched a trial with
a process for advance approval
of mobile units, better known
today as the AoC.
But the question was whether it would
be possible to create a scheme which could
clarify responsibility and make the consent
process more efficient.
At the same time, the PSA wanted the
AoC to reduce bureaucracy, make roles
clear and establish greater predictability.
DISCUSSED
A system of this kind had been discussed
in various contexts, and the decision to
establish it on a trial basis was accordingly
welcomed.
That applied particularly to the rig contractors, who had long been pressing for a
more predictable system. Companies and
unions played an active role in shaping and
establishing the AoC.
“Broad agreement prevails across the
industry today that the aims have been met
and that experience with the AoC is positive,”
says special adviser Kjell-Gunnar Dørum at
the PSA.
He is more familiar than most with the
scheme, having been present when the idea
was launched, the trial period initiated and
the AoC made mandatory.
Over the 11 years that the system has
been in place, he has also been involved
with the bulk of AoC applications received
by the PSA.
The West Navigator drilling rig, then
owned by Norway’s Smedvig, had the
honour of being the AoC’s first guinea pig
in 2000.
44
The AoC scheme is here to stay, say supervision coordinator
Ingvill Hagesæther Foss (left) and special adviser Kjell-Gunnar Dørum.
ON TRUST
5
Since then, applications for such
recognition have flowed in at a
steady pace, and a total of 42 units
were covered by an AoC at 1 January
2011.
It should be noted that the AoC
does not represent an approval.
RANGE
The scheme was aimed at achieving a range of improvements, which
included helping to describe the rig
contractor’s responsibilities and their
interface with the operator’s duties.
An AoC was also intended to
contribute to making contractors
more responsible, and encouraging
more direct contact between them
and the PSA.
In addition, it would boost efficiency for contractors, operators and
government by underpinning both
applications for and consideration of
consents concerning units with AoCs.
The system was furthermore
intended to provide greater predictability for the contractors with regard
to regulatory requirements and their
own management.
And it would facilitate the
movement of mobile units between
fields and operators on the NCS, and
ultimately between countries
in north-western Europe.
PARTICIPATION
The introduction of the AoC has
contributed to greater participation
by as well as better knowledge of the
regulations among employees.
At the same time, rig contractors
have gained increased expertise
about the units they own and their
technical condition – which has also
seen a general improvement.
RESPONSIBILITY
The rig contractors are responsible
for ensuring that their organisation
and management system as well as
the technical condition of their units
accord with the rules at all times.
They also have a duty to measure
compliance, and must be able to
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45
5
document that the regulatory requirements
have been met.
This is checked by the authorities, in
part through audits.
“Trust is the key word here,” says PSA
supervision coordinator Ingvill Hagesæther
Foss. “When we’ve awarded an AoC, it means
we rely on the contractor to live up to their
responsibilities.”
LONG TIME
Everyone who has applied so far has
eventually received an AoC, but the
process has taken a long time in some
cases. Normal consideration lasts three
months, assuming that:
• the application has the expected
content and quality
• the necessary compliance checks
have been conducted in relation to
the regulations
• the necessary analyses and verifications
have been performed
• complete lists of non-conformances
have been compiled, with reference
dates and timetables for corrective
action
• employee participation has been
genuine and is documented
• the unit is available for inspection
by the PSA.
Longer consideration could mean the
application is poorly based, the unit’s
condition is unacceptable, or the operating
organisation and management systems
are deficient.
“We’ve seen a number of examples in
recent years where people have failed to
understand the work involved in building
up a company and introducing a new unit
to the NCS,” says Ms Foss.
Time-consuming processes mean
increased use of resources for the PSA,
and also impose additional costs on the
AoC applicant.
CHANGES
The player picture on the NCS has
changed significantly since the system
was introduced, with more than
50 companies entering.
Whether the AoC process might have
helped a number of them to accept the
demanding job of serving as an operator is
a question that remains to be answered.
Ms Foss merely notes that both operators
and rig contractors are positive. “Contractors have both received and accepted more
responsibility. They’ve had to roll up their
sleeves. And we must suppose that this has
led to safer operation.”
Figures from the PSA’s RNNP process
are positive. Results for mobile units have
clearly improved in several areas during
recent years, including major accidents,
personal injuries and noise.
“We hope this trend will continue,”
Ms Foss comments.
Requirement
MANDATORY
SINCE 2004
An AoC is a requirement which a
mobile unit must fulfil before it can
work in the petroleum sector on the
NCS, and is mandatory today for
vessels listed in a ship register.
It serves as a statement from the
PSA that the authorities are confident
the unit can conduct petroleum
operations within the framework
of the regulations.
Launched in 2000 as a voluntary
arrangement for mobile drilling rigs on
the NCS, the AoC became mandatory in
2004 and was expanded two years later
to include various other types of units.
These include flotels, vessels for
production, storage and offloading
or for drilling, production storage
and offloading, and well intervention
ships.
AoC on the web: see www.psa.no/aoc
46
THREE ACKNOWLEDGED
AoCs were awarded by the PSA in 2010 to three new mobile units:
• Flotel Superior (flotel)
• Island Constructor (well intervention vessel)
• COSL Reval (flotel)
The last of these was originally called Port Reval, and the
AoC was given to COSL as the new operations organisation.
In addition, COSL Rigmar – another flotel, earlier known as
Port Rigmar – formally received a new AoC in connection
with the change of name.
LIFTING SAFETY
Heavy objects which fall onto the drill floor – often with crew
close by – represent an unacceptable risk. The PSA has called on
everyone involved to make a collective effort to end such hazards.
By OLE-JOHAN FARET
A wide-ranging order was issued to
Statoil by the agency in April 2010 after
a serious lifting incident on the Heidrun
field in the Norwegian Sea.
Also referring to seven earlier cases
when heavy drill floor equipment had
dropped, it required the company to
review and improve lifting gear and
routines in all its drilling operations.
But another incident occurred in late
December, when a 23-tonne slip joint
fell five metres to the deck on Njord
A. Nobody was hurt, but the person in
charge of the lift was close by.
Statoil is operator of this Norwegian
Sea platform, while drilling contractor
KCA Deutag owns and uses the
mechanical handling equipment.
“This event could easily have had a
tragic outcome,” says Sigurd Førsund,
who heads the PSA team appointed to
investigate the accident.
Closely involved in the numerous
mechanical handling incidents which
have occurred on the NCS over many
years, he is at a loss to explain why the
industry fails to achieve noticeable
improvements.
“One reason has been a widespread
attitude that ‘as drillers, we drill – we
don’t do lifting’,” he suggests. “But the
truth is that perhaps as much as 80 per
cent of what happens on the drill floor
relates to lifting. That makes it important to apply the appropriate expertise.”
Mr Førsund emphasises that heavy
equipment coming loose over the drill
floor represents a problem which the
whole industry must take seriously.
There have also been a number of
serious incidents in addition to those
involving Statoil as operator, he adds.
The seriousness of the position is
underlined by statistics which show that
nine out of 10 fatal accidents on the NCS
since 1994 relate to lifting operations.
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Putting the facts in place
The technical basis for managing activities in parts of the northern NCS was revised in 2010,
with the PSA providing input on safety and the working environment in the petroleum sector.
By OLE-JOHAN FARET
An updated version of the integrated management plan for the Barents Sea and the
Norwegian Sea off Lofoten (BHL) is due to be
submitted in a White Paper before the end of
March.
Many government agencies and scientific
teams have contributed updated mapping,
research and monitoring data about the environment, resources, value creation, oil spill
risks and the human impact on the ecosystem
in these waters.
The PSA has served on the risk group and
the technical forum, two of three teams – the
third being the monitoring group – set up to
strengthen the knowledge base for the plan.
These delivered a collective report last
April to the Ministry of the Environment,
which is coordinating the work. The PSA has
also posted supporting technical papers to its
own website.
Among the agency’s technical contributions were descriptions of possible blowout
scenarios, based on available knowledge and
experience.
This information related to the petroleum
sector, the NCS in general, the BHL area in
particular, accidents and the management
of such mishaps.
The blowout scenario for the BHL region
was selected from a combination of flow
rates, durations and oil properties which is
unfavourable from an overall perspective.
Following the Deepwater Horizon disaster
last April, the risk group was asked to
evaluate the technical conclusions drawn for
the BHL plan in the light of this Gulf of Mexico
incident.
Extensive assessments made in the PSA’s
jurisdiction included risk conditions related
to acute discharges, and likely discharge
scenarios in terms of rates, duration, volumes
and so forth.
Given what is known so far about the Gulf
of Mexico incident, the PSA found no technical arguments to justify significant changes
to the factual basis for the BHL management
plan.
Read more at www.psa.no/environment.
RUNNING SECURELY
The Kårstø gas processing plant near Stavanger – the largest facility of its kind in northern
Europe – celebrated its 25th anniversary last year with praise for safe operation.
48
Kårstø – the town which never sleeps.
SPOTLIGHT ON SPILLS
The annual RNNP process pursued by the PSA was extended last year to include the risk for
acute discharges of oil and industry-related chemicals to the sea.
Aimed at measuring and improving HSE
conditions in the petroleum sector, the RNNP
serves as a key source of information for the
PSA and the industry on risk trends in a
number of areas.
This process has previously focused primarily on major accidents, work accidents
and selected working environment factors.
In 2010, however, its measurements were
further extended in order to cover developments in the risk of acute polluting spills on
the NCS.
The study utilised part of the existing data
in the RNNP as well as information from the
Environment Web database maintained by
the Norwegian Climate and Pollution Agency
(Klif ).
Risk in this context is confined to frequencies and volumes of acute discharges, and
no assessment has been made of actual or
potential environmental harm.
Presented last November, the RNNP report
on acute discharges in 2001-2009 provides an
important supplement to the factual basis for
setting accident prevention priorities.
The PSA aims to publish two RNNP studies
“We’ve seen a marked decline in serious
incidents at Kårstø since 2004,” reports Kjell
Arild Anfinsen, the PSA’s supervision coordinator for land-based plants.
“The difference in figures between the
major development projects in 2005 and
2010 demonstrates that clearly, but the
general trend over time has also been
positive.”
In his view, a crucial reason for this
progress rests with operator Gassco – along
with technical service provider Statoil, which
is responsible for day-to-day work at the
plant.
They have understood that continuity
and great attention to safety are essential
for achieving improvements.
“The organisation has frequently shown
that it has a good attitude to HSE work,” notes
Mr Anfinsen. “It doesn’t assume that good
annually, with the regular report appearing as
usual in the second half of April and results for
acute discharges presented in the autumn.
This separation of publication dates reflects
the fact that Environment Web data first
become available in May each year.
Read more at www.psa.no/risk levels
results today say anything about what’ll
happen tomorrow.”
Kårstø’s good safety progress has been
confirmed by a number of awards, including the PSA’s HSE prize. This was presented
to Vidar Bernt Sørensen, head of the plant’s
HSE24 training programme, at the ONS 2010
oil show in Stavanger last August.
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UNDER A COMMON CODE
Norway’s petroleum sector operated
until this year with separate regulations
for offshore and land-based activities.
A single regime has now been put in place.
New HSE regulations for oil and gas operations under
the PSA’s jurisdiction came into force on 1 January,
unifying the rules for operations at sea and on land.
With work on the change under way since 2004,
its purpose has been to achieve a more integrated
regulation of the Norwegian petroleum sector.
The regulations with guidelines are available in
Norwegian and English at www.psa.no.
Assigned on
emission role
The PSA has been picked to serve as
the safety regulator for carbon capture,
transport and storage.
At the request of the Ministry of Labour, the PSA has
initiated work to identify any necessary changes to the
HSE regulations for petroleum activities.
These came into force on 1 January, and the possible
amendments would extend them to include safety and
the working environment related to carbon management.
Norway has two large gas-fired power stations, at
Kårstø north of Stavanger and Mongstad near Bergen.
Both fall within the PSA’s jurisdiction.
Plans have been drawn up for capturing, transporting
and storing carbon emissions from these facilities, and a
test centre for the necessary technology is being built at
Mongstad.
Changes proposed to the regulations will be the
subject of a public consultation during the spring.
CHANNEL FOR COMMUNICATION
The petroleum industry is an international business involving many English speakers, so the
PSA publishes the bulk of the material posted to its website in both Norwegian and English.
That applies to all investigation reports, summaries of audit reports, articles about notifications
of orders and orders, brief announcements of consents and AoCs, and circulars to the industry.
Information is published on the PSA’s website after the company concerned has received the
documentation.
During 2010, materials published included:
• 85 articles on consents (Norwegian and English)
• 100 articles on audit results (Norwegian and English)
• six articles on completed investigations (Norwegian and English)
• 29 articles on notification of orders or orders issued by the PSA (Norwegian and English)
• four articles on units which have received AoCs (Norwegian and English).
Read more at www.psa.no/audit.
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