International Journal of Engineering Trends and Technology (IJETT) – Volume 4 Issue 8- August 2013
Perceptually Tuned Price Control Using TwoWay Stackelburg Game Theory
A. Sunil Kumar #1, D. Prasanth *2
1#
M.Tech 2nd year, Dept of CSE, ASCET, GUDUR, AP, India
Assistant Professor, Dept of CSE, ASCET, GUDUR, AP, India
2*
and digital TV broadcasting, video conferencing, telemedicine
that encompasses, on the one aspect, present video and telemanipulation, military applications, and remote video
acquisition and, on the opposite aspect, presents video surveillance.
All these applications share many technological
process and viewing, addressing each computer-based and
human-based surveillance. Adaptive control algorithms challenges. On the one side, videos create serious issues in
are utilized to realize the most effective trade-off between terms of each quantity of knowledge transferred on the
low latency and smart video fluidity. The recent network and process resources. On the opposite side, mobile
developments of good mobile phones and 3G networks devices and UMA scenario need accessibility through
modify users to fancy video programs by subscribing to completely different and infrequently restricted wireless
information plans. Due to mobile to mobile networks, either 802.11 Wi-Fi, 3G networks like HSPA (High
communication technologies and enjoy of mobile phones, Speed Packet Access) and UMTS (Universal Mobile
data-plan subscribers/leader are able to distribute the Telecommunications Service), or perhaps 2/2.5G networks
video content to secondary buyer/follower. Such a such as GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) or EDGEdistribution mechanism is a potential contender for the GPRS (Enhanced knowledge rates for GSM Evolution).
Also, the enhanced quality of wireless networks and
mobile service supplier and is extremely difficult to trace
mobile
devices
is conclusion of attentions on ubiquitous
given users’ high quality. The service supplier has to set an
inexpensive value for the information conceives to forestall multimedia access within the transmission community within
such unauthorized re-distribution behaviour to safeguard the past decade. Network service suppliers and researchers
or maximize his/her own profit. during this paper, new suppliers focusing on developing efficient solutions to present
and all-purpose methodologies for streaming performance access of transmission knowledge, particularly videos, from
analysis also are planned and used to compare Moses with all over using mobile devices (laptops, PDAs or sensible
existing solutions in terms of various parameters (latency, phones that may access 3G networks) [1]. Mobile-phone users
image quality, video fluidity, and frame losses), as well as will watch video programs on their devices by subscribing to
in terms of performance in individuals segmentation and the info plans from network service suppliers, and they can
pursuit. We have a tendency to investigate the simply use their programmable hand devices to retrieve and
evolutionarily stable magnitude relation of mobile users reproduce the video content [2]. Therefore, it's necessary to
who arrange to subscribe the information arrange. Such know finish users’ potential actions of so as to produce higher
an analysis will facilitate the service supplier preserve present video access services. With such a high quality and
his/her profit beneath the threat of the distribution also the convenient mobile-to-mobile communication
networks and might improve the standard of service for technologies, it's very potential for data-plan leaders to
distribute the video content while not authorization. For
finish users.
example, some users who don't buy the data set up may need
Keywords— Game theory, 3G network, MoSES, video fluidity, to watch TV programs whereas looking forward to public
transportation, and some of them may wish to examine news
Mobile network.
from time to time. Hence, these users have incentives to shop
I. INTRODUCTION
for the specified video content from neighbouring knowledge
Ubiquitous multimedia Access (UMA) has become a leaders if the price is less than the subscription fee charged by
really common topic inside the transmission community the service supplier. In contrast to generic knowledge,
throughout the previous couple of years. Analysis centers and transmission knowledge may be simply retrieved and
telecom suppliers address new, sensible and efficient solutions modified, that facilitates the distribution of video content.
for the ever-present access to transmission knowledge and Nevertheless, the mobile network service supplier would
particularly videos, from all over with mobile devices (laptops, really like to set the content worth to maximize his/her own
PDAs or last generation cellular phones). Potential profit. The service supplier’s profit may be pictured because
applications of such technology include consumer recreation the total variety of subscriptions times content worth. If the
Abstract— Mobile video represents a brand new paradigm
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International Journal of Engineering Trends and Technology (IJETT) – Volume 4 Issue 8- August 2013
content worth is high, mobile users have less incentive to buy
the data set up which could result the authors may be reached
at wylin@umd.edu and kjrliu@umd.edu. In low subscriptions.
However on the opposite hand, the content worth within the
redistribution network might get higher due to less leaders and
more followers. In such a case, though a leader pays more for
the video stream, he/she additionally gets a lot of
compensation by re-distributing the info. Hence, setting
content worth higher doesn't necessarily cut back the quantity
of subscriptions and it's not trivial to and the best worth that
maximizes the service supplier’s utility. The service supplier,
data-plan leaders and also the followers who have an interest
within the video knowledge move with one another and
influence every other’s selections and performance. In such a
scenario, game theory may be a mathematical tool to model
and analyses the strategic interactions among rational maker’s
manufacturers [3]. In our previous work [4], the equilibrium
worth of the video stream within the re-distribution network
was derived. Given the worth of the decentralized video
streams, the service supplier would choose the official price to
maximize its net profit. Since the mobiles users will change
their choices on subscribing or re-subscribing, the content
owner is interested in the quantity of leaders that's stable over
the time. Hence, we tend to formulate the video streaming
promoting development as an evolutionary game and derive
the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) [5] for the mobile
users that is that the desired stable equilibrium for the service
supplier.
Fig: architecture for mobile video surveillance
A typical example of design for mobile video surveillance is
that the three-layer design of Fig. 1. The first layer
(transmitting aspect or write in coder) is dedicated to encode
the video provided by either a live supply (camera) or a keep
repository of videos. The encoded video is distributed to the
second layer (receiving side or decoder) through a wireless
radio channel that provides the widest potential coverage. The
received video, once decoded, is processed by the third layer
(video surveillance system); it are often a conventional
human-based system consisting of human operators analysing
The which means of the term “mobile” is kind of hazy and the videos or a computer-based system with automatic process
may assume completely different meanings, looking on the that extracts moving objects and acknowledges interesting
context: as an example it might be an installation not events. This is not the only potential design for mobile video
unnatural to stay in an exceedingly fixed location, a moving surveillance. The expansion of good cameras makes additional
device, a transportable device (such as handhelds and laptops), possible and interesting the shifting of some process tasks onor finally a powered device. However, in multimedia the term board on the native encoder side. In general, a part of the
“mobile” is mostly associated with the property. Consequently, computer-based video surveillance algorithms can be enforced
here we tend to assume that the reference mobile video on the first layer with the twofold advantage of reducing the
surveillance system is given a present wireless property (either transmission bandwidth and working with uncompressed
on the server, on the client or on both). Conversely the term pictures. However, our focus are kept on a first layer that
“fixed” are going to be used to think about systems with wired performs video encoding and streaming only, demanding any
surveillance tasks tithe any steps: this answer remains the
property.
mostflexible since no specific assumptions are created on the
surveillance applications implemented on the third layer. In
our work the first layer can be embodied by a standard pc
design, being aware that standard video encoders have usually
embedded hardware implementation.
II. RELATED WORK:
Today's mobile computing setting has redefined the approach
business is completed, and challenged enterprise networks to
deliver security and repair levels exceptional any previous
benchmark. Not only are today's users demanding mobile
access, they convey and use their own devices. Enterprise
networks have to offer that access transparently, securely,
wired or wirelessly, at any field or branch location within the
enterprise, and from any external location further. The Bring
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Your Own Device (BYOD) development brings with it
particularly difficult security challenges as a result of every
type of mobile device is totally different and has distinctive
vulnerabilities. At an equivalent time, attackers are additional
various and refined, and keep finding new ways in which to
attack every type of device. additionally, today's transmission
and interactive applications present new ways in which of
masking attacks, further increasing network vulnerability.
And it's all growing quickly. Today's networks have to enable
access to a quickly growing range of employees, partners,
customers, patrons, and even casual visitors, and then they
need to have robust and flexible identity management systems
to make sure appropriate access. At an equivalent time they
have to protect of business critical applications and property,
and change all types users to possess access to sophisticated
on-line applications designed to fulfill their explicit business
functions.
All of this needs to be given enhanced levels of
performance that support wide and responsive distribution of
today's refined business and entertainment applications,
ranging from straightforward order entry and account
management, to VoIP telephone and interactive video
coaching programs.
III. CONTRIBUTION WITHIN THE PAPER
According to a survey on the recognition of mobile
devices [2], almost everyone has a minimum of one mobile
phone in developed countries. With such a high quality and
therefore the convenient mobile-to-mobile communication
technologies, it's potential for data-plan leaders to distribute
the video content at minimal worth in an unauthorized
approach. Compared to generic data, multimedia information
is simply retrieved and changed, which facilitates the
distribution of video content and permits the leaders to
distribute the content typically for a higher price than their
transmission price. This distribution activity exists just for a
brief amount of your time and is extremely difficult to trace by
the service owners. So the higher way to forestall this type of
copyright action is to line a worth distribution strategy so no
primary leader can have the incentive to distribute the video
content to the second leaders.
But there's a bent that the mobile network service
supplier are additional fascinated by setting the video content
price to maximize his own profit instead of protective
copyrights. During this paper a no-cooperative theory of
games is applied between the service supplier & leader in
such a way so the service supplier’s is pictured because the
total range of subscriptions times the content worth. If the
content worth is high, mobile users have less incentive to
subscribe to the information arrange, which could lead to less
subscription. however on the opposite hand, the content worth
within the redistribution network could get higher owing to
less leaders and additional followers. In such a case, although
a leader pays additional for the video stream, he/she also gets
more compensation by re-distributing the information. Hence,
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setting the content worth higher doesn't essentially reduce the
number of subscriptions, and it's not trivial to search out the
optimal worth that maximizes the service supplier’s utility.
The service supplier, the data-plan leaders, and the secondary
consumers who have an interest within the video information
act with one another and influence every other’s choices and
performance. In such a situation, the game theory could be a
mathematical tool to model and analyzes the strategic
interactions among rational call manufacturers. during this
game theory model we have a tendency to add the service
supplier as a player to the game to research the best rating for
the service supplier in the video streaming promoting network.
Since the mobile users will modification their choices on
subscribing or re-subscribing, the content owner is fascinated
by the quantity of leaders that's stable over the time.
Therefore, a robust equilibrium solutions is desired for the
service supplier. Hence, we formulate the video streaming
promoting development as an evolutionary game and derive
the evolutionarily stable strategy for the mobile users [6].
IV. GAME THEORITIC MODEL
Since the video-stream distribution network could be a
dynamic system within which all users have high quality that
may be part of and leave anytime, it's very tough to possess a
central authority to control the users’ behavior. additionally,
since this redistribution is unauthorized and illegal , to reduce
their risk of being detected by the service supplier, the taking
part users (leaders and followers) haven't any incentives to
trust one further person and therefore the central authority,
and a distributed strategy is most popular. Given the very
fact that there's just one follower, we propose a Stackelburg
game model to research however the follower offer incentives
for leaders to redistribute the video stream and realize the best
worth and quantity that the follower should provide. the last
word goal of this model is to assist the content owner to line
an appropriate subscription fee such the equilibrium of the
game between the leaders and therefore the followers leads
to negative payoffs. Thus, leaders can have n’t any incentive
to distribute the video. Before the game starts, each user,
either a leader or the follower can declare his/her presence to
any or all different users inside his/her transmissions vary.
(1)Game Stages: the primary stage of the game is that the
leaders’ (leaders’) move. for every leader, he/she can set
his/her unit worth Pi per unit transmission power, as well as
his/her highest transmission power Pi (max)
. Then, in the second stage of the game, the secondary leader
(follower) will decide from whom to shop for the video and
the way a lot of power he/she needs the leader to transmit. The
secondary leader then pays every leader consequently at the
value that the leader sets in stage one.
(2)Utility perform of the secondary buyer /follower: we have a
tendency to initial define the secondary leader’s utility
perform and study his/her best action. The secondary leader Ss
gains rewards by with success receiving the video with a
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precise quality. On the other hand, Ss has got to pay money
for the ability that the leaders use for transmission.
8.
9.
(3)Utility functions of the leaders: every leader Si will be
viewed as a sellers, who aims to earn the payment that covers
his/her transmission price and conjointly to realize the
maximum amount further reward as potential. we have a
tendency to introduce parameter , Ci i.e., the cost of power for
relaying information, that is decided by the characteristics of
the device that leader Si uses. Hence, the utility of Si is
outlined as:
10.
11.
12.
13.
Where Pi is the power that leader i uses to transmit to the
follower. Thus, leader Si can opt for worth Pi that maximizes
his/her utility πSi
.
The choice of the best worth Pi is stricken by not only the
leader’s own channel condition however also different
leaders’ prices, since totally different leaders non
cooperatively play and they contend to be selected by the
secondary leader. Thus, a better worth might not help a leader
improve his/her payoff.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
V.CONCLUSION
19.
The same video-stream distribution game could be a game
with excellent data, and therefore the secondary
buyer/follower has perfect data of every subscriber’s/leader
action (the hand-picked price). consistent with backward
induction, a game with excellent information has a minimum
of one equilibrium. Therefore, the optimal ways for each the
secondary buyer/follower and therefore the subscribers/leader
exist and may be obtained by finding the best decision for
every stage mistreatment backward induction
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