PATERNITY: THE CURRENT STATUS GF A LIMITATION STATUTE by Kathryn Jean Mayfield
Independent Research Paper
Prepared for: Professor Benson
April 30, 1982

TA3L2 CF CC~T~:::NTS
II·T:':iODUCTION
~I.3TLRICAL P:SR.SP:SCTIVE
CNE YEAR LI!1ITATIClr STATUTE
ANOTHER CONFLICT
~1ILLS V. HABLUETZEL
OBSERVATIONS AND CO~CLUSIONS
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1
2
8
10
11 i oo27n

I. I~:TRCDUCTIC~,r
Cn January 1, 1974, Title 2 of the Texas ~amily Code became effective.l This paper deals with Chapter 13, in particular, Section 13.01. 2 This is the portion of the Code which imposes a statutory time period after the birth of an illegitimate child during which a paternity suit can be brought.
Currently, the statutory time period is four years--effective
September 1, 1981.3
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As the Title was first enacted it allowed only for voluntary legitimation of illegitimate children by their fathers.4 In September, 1975, this was changed to allow both voluntary and involuntary proceedings.5 This was in response to the United States Supreme Court decision, Gomez v. Perez.
6
In Gomez
7 the Court of Civil Appeals in San Antonio
~ranted a declaratory judgment identifying the father of an illegitimate child, but the court refused to order the father to pay child support. The Texas Supreme Court refused the plaintiff's writ of effor, so the mother appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. By a per curiam decision the
United States Supreme Court held that Texas could not discriminate against ille~itimate children by denyin~ them an equal right of support available to
children. 8
We therefore hold that once a state posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally justification for denying such ?n ~ssential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother. For a state to do so is "illogical and unjust. n9

Prior to the Gomez 10 decision Texas had consistently adhered to the common law rule that illegitimate children had no right to support from their fathers--legally or morally.
11 a 1923 decision. This was a criminal proceeding under the Texas
Penal Code
12 against the "putative" father for failure to support a minor child in destitute or necessitous circumstances.
The Court concluded that under the existing common law there was no legal obligation on the father to provide for his illegitimate children, thus he could not be prosecuted.
1
3
More recently, the Texas courts refused to impose a legal obligation on father's for the support of their illegitimate children in 1972. This decision even involved a written a~reement between the parties for the support of the child.
The Court refused to enforce the agreement citing a lack of consideration, legally that is. Moreover, the Court termed this a gratuitous undertaking on the part of the father.
1 4
Prior to 1973 the legal obligation for the support of illegitimate children rested entirely upon the mother.
1 5 In
1975 the Texas Legislature enacted Title 2 of the Texas Family
Code. Included within its provision is a statute of limitations limiting the time period a paternity suit could be brought.
Specifically, that time period was within one year after the birth of the child.16 This harsh statutory limit has since been ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court.17
III. CNE YEAR LIMITATICJN STATUTE
J
A look at some of the opinions that the Texas courts

rendered regarding the one year statute of limitations re~arding pater~ity suits illustrates the less than equal treatment
~iven to ille~itimate children. ~oreover, this will help identify what the Texas courts see as the parti~s of interest.
As previously stated, this statute only allowed a paternity action if it was brought within one year of the birth of the child.
In Texas Department of Human Resources v. Chapman18 the
Texas Court of Civil of Appeals at Dallas addressed ~he constitutionality issues related to the one year limitation statute. The Court first looked at the standard they sho~ld use to determine whether or not the statute discriminates a'?'ainst illegitimates. They settled on deciding whether or not the statute "bears a rational relationship to a legitimate
~overnmental interest" citing the case of Mathews v. Lucas19 authority. Consequently, the Court settled on finding any type of state interest to support the statute.20
It is interesting to note that the Court interpreted the Gomez21 decision as saying "a state may not absolutely foreclose the right of an illegitimate child to receive support from the natural father.'; ·Thus, this Court determined that the limitation statute did not deny illegitimates the right of support but merely provided a remedy. 22
This Court then recognized that illegitimates are burdened from birth in a way legitimate children are not but found this unavoidable. The Court then proceeded to find that proof of paternity is an essential condition of giving illegitimate children
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0028~

their equal right of support. ~ro~ here the Court determined whether or not t~e one year statute of limitations was "reaso~ably related to a legitimate state interest.
~ 2 3
This is not the same as determining w~ether or not the statute is reas-
. enable or not. The Court found that the State has an interest in preventing stale or fraudulent claims. Further, the purpose of the statute is to give the father a chance to defend himself with readily available evidence.24
The Court then made several observations worthy of note.
The Court supposed that maybe the legislature decided that the longer time that passed the more likely that the claims would be fraudulent. The passage of time supposedly makes it harder for the father to defend against such claims.
In viewing the equal protection argument the Court decided that it was up to the legislature to determine whether or not this time limit was a reasonable time. Moreover, the test was determined by this court to be whether or not this created a "impenetrable barrier. n
2
5
The Court then addressed the issue of whether or not the paternity suit is a denial of due process by placing the responsibility of meeting the time limit upon the mother. The
Texas Department of Human Resources 2 6 pointed out that the mother's interest is not always the same as the child's for varying reasons. The Court responded that these contentions did not raise a constitutional argument.27 The Court then summarily found that the danger to the father's having to defend against fraudulent and stal~ claims· outwe{gh~d any potential harm the child might suffer from the mother's inaction.28 Thus,
~0280

this Court rejected the constitutional challenges of a denial of equal protection and lack of due process.
Texas Denartment of Human Resources v. Hernandez29 adopted the rationale of the Chanman c~urt in its rejec~ing constitutional challenges with~ut further comment.30 This Court determined that the purpose of the statute was to protect both the father's interest and the child's interest.31 These interests were not defined at this point, but the Court seized upon the Chapman decision simply because the Texas Supreme Court denied a writ or error.32
This Court then considered whether or not the tolling statute should apply to paternity actions.JJ The Court determined that the child is the real party in interest but then rejected the tolling argument. Supposedly, it is both "illogical and unreasonable" to allow a child to sue his father for support after the child reaches the age of majority. This is even though their is a legal duty of support imposed on the father. Moreover, the Court terms this "a disingenous way of holdin~ Section 13.01
(the limitation statute) unconstitutional." The Court further held that the limitation statute qualifies the illegitimate child's ri~ht to support. Consequently, this Court rejected the application of tollin~ saying this would only "emasculate" the Code.J 4
The Court then adds some dictim regarding the rights of an illegitimate child and the duties imposed on the father.
The Court found these rights to be vastly different when they are acquired through a paternity action as· opposed to a suit for child support. This contention was not expounded, but it was noted that an ille~itimate must first prove paternity before

a legal duty of support will be ·imposed upon the father.35
Conversely, In the Interest of Miller36 the Fort
~orth court of Civil Appeals rejected the one year limitation statute as bein~ unconstitutional. .
are nersons and are entitled to support as long as they establish their paternity within their first year of life. No corresponding limitation is placed upon a maternity suit. Inherent in the statute is the assumption that every child will know its biological mother; however, this Court reasons that a woman has just as much interest in defending against stale and fraudulent claims as a man.37 '
The Court then outlines the historical development of the rights of illegitimate children in Texas. The Court recognized the two above-mentioned cases but decided that they misconstrued Gomez.38 This court then narrowed their consideration to two issues: (1) Does the Texas statute of limitations give an infant a reasonable time to determine his paternity? and (2) Does the limitation statute violate the equal protection guaranteed by the constitution?39
Subsequently, the Court looked at the rights of illegitimate children that were born prior to the enactment of the one year limitation statute. It was noted that these children are subjected to a four year limitation statute, but that this limitation is tolled until they reach the age of majority.40
This court agreed with those cases in that the legal obligation for support should be shared by both parents. ~urther, the
Gomez4
1
" 7 decision invalidated the imposition of impenetrable
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00283

barriers on the rights of ille~itiMate children to obtain that
5 upport. 42
This Court then looked at other jurisdictions dealing with similar statutes. In 1 Aashington43 the limitation
•
( statute was held constitutional as long as it was not the only method an illegitimate child could bring a filiation suit.
In New Mexico44 the limitation statute was limited to the mother's cause of action for child support. There was no limitation imposed on the child's action. Kansas45 likewise ccnstrued a one year limitatior. statute as applying to a mother's cause of action only. The Texas Court then concluded that the limitation statute was unconstitutional in that it applies or.ly to paternity suits with no like provisions for maternity suits.
46
Further, the Court found the illegitimate child to have a fundamental right to support which cannot be waived by the mother by her inaction. The father's interest in being protected from stale and fraudulent claims was recognized, but the Court also noted that the father has an obligation to support his child. The public policy of this state imposes an obligation to support both le~itimate and illegitimate children. Moreover, the Court found this to be a "part of the responsibility for having brought the child into being." Thus, the Court found the limitation statute unconstitutional.47
In reviewing the before-mentioned cases several conelusions can be made. Some Texas Courts seem to feel there is a legitimate state interest·in placing a time limit for bringing
7

pater~itY suits. ~his state interest is defined as "preventing fraud and s a e C-almS. II
Jith the advent of hi~hly technical methods of provin£" paternity the validity of this "state interest" is highly questionable. Apparently, the state ~nterest has been identified with the father's interest. The courts seem to see them from the same perspective. Generally, the mother's interest is not considered, but it is assumed to be the same as the child's interest. At least one Texas appellate court recognizes that this is just not so. It states that the mother's interest might be the same as the father's--being protected from stale and fraudulent claims. Tolling the statute until the age of majority seems to have been consistently rejected.
Gomez
48 is the apparent source of this conflict and is not to be resolved until the United States Supreme Court faces the conflict.
III. Al'TOTHER CONFLICT
An anomaly has developed reQ.'arding children born prior to the enactment of any statute of limitations for paternity suits. As the limitation statute was being applied by the
Texas courts these children were in a better situation. This is well-illustrated in Texas Department of Human Resources v.
Delley. 49
In that case the Court considered whether or not the
~eneral four year statute of limitations5° should be tolled under the general tolling statute.51 This Court held that it was tolled until the child reaches the age of majority.52
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0028~'

The Court then reviewed the right of illegitimate children to maintain paternity suits in Texas. It is worthy of note that this Court simply viewed Gomez53 as holding that Texas could not bar illegitimate children from soliciting s~pport from their fathers. Moreover, they agreed with other appellate courts that the limitation statute under section 13.01 is not retroactive.
It became effective September 1, 1975, so only applies to children born after that date. This case dealt with a child born before then.5
4
The reasoning applied by the Court was both simple and direct. The Court looked at the four year statute of limitations and then the tolling statute. Without further discussion the
Court found that since the four year statute was found under the
Title pertaining to limitations on personal actions and the tolling article was found there also, the four year statute was tolled. 55
The Court followed this rationale with supporting considerations. For instance, it would be against public policy to absolve the father of illegitimate children from supporting that child because a paternity action had not been filed within four years of the birth of the child. Moreover, in this particular case there was a written acknowledgment of paternity. The Court then concluded with a review of other jurisdictions and finding that their holding was consistent.56
In Prejean v. Prejean57 the Court agreed that the tolling provision applied. This court found the child's right to be legitimated was of paramount importance and that the
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00288

tolling statute protected that ~ight. The Court further held that the tolling statute protected the rights of the state but did not elaborate on what those rights were.58
More recently, In the Interest of Renteria59 followed the above-mentioned cases in the application of the toll~ng statute. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's application even thou~h the tolling statute was not pled. The court found that the petitioner did plead the age of the child which es~ablished the right to rely on the tolling statute.60
Thus, the Texas courts have given children that were born before the enactment of a limitation statute the benefits of tolling any applicable limitation until the age of majority.
It should be noted that these cases are even in the same courts as the cases refusing to toll the one year statute. These are the appellate courts in Corpus Christi and the one in Dallas.
How they can rationalize such a diverse viewpoint cannot be comprehended.
IV. MILLS V. HABLUETZEL
The most recent and pertinent case in the area of limitations on paternity suits is Mills v. Habluetzel. 61 In that case the United States Supreme Court held that the Texas statutory limitation of one year on paternity suits denies illegitimate children in Texas the equal protection of law.6 2
Arguments \'lere presented to the United States Supreme
Court on January 12, 1982. Briefly, the facts are that Lois
Mae Mills and the Texas Department ~f ~uman Hesources filed a paternity suit in 1978 on behalf of Lois ~ills• son, Archie
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gurton Duncan. Archie was at that time twenty (20) months of
~~e. ~he alle~ed father, Dan ~abluetzel, pled t~e one year statute of limitations barred the suit. The Trial Court dismissed t~e case and the petitioner appealed. The Texas.Court of Civil
•
Appeals af~irmed the Trial Court relying on its previous decision of Texas Deoartment of Human Resources v. Hernandez.6J The petitioner applied for a writ of error to the Texas Supreme Court which was denied. Thus, the petitioner appealed to the United
States Supreme Court for relief.64
The mother, Appellant, argued that the one year statute
., invidious discriminates against illegitimate children that are more than one year of age as they are forever denied from seeking c~ild support from their father. Moreoever, she argued that there is no rational relationship between the statute and any le~itimate state interest. Further, the illegitimate child is denied an opportunity to be heard.65
The father, Appellee, on the other hand argued that the one year limitation statute merely establishes a method for bringing the suit. Further, he argues that the time period is not too brief and that after he has established paternity the rights of the illegitimate are equal to legitimate children. He further urged the Court to allow Texas a chance to consider the new statute of limitations of four years and whether or not it would be retroactive. Alternatively, he argued that this
Court should give retroactive effect to the four-year statute but at the same time u~hold the constitutional:ty of the one
....
~
.,. year statute for the time period September 1,
.
1975 to September 1,
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In oral ar~ument the appellan:'s counsel argued that what Texas has done is create two different periods for child support actions--that is illegitimate children have one year
• and legitimate children have 18 years to bring an action. He also pointed out that this is the only time Texas has imposed a limitation statute on the interest of a child--all others are tolled either by case law or statute.67
Subsequently, it was pointed out that the new statute does not have a tolling provision either an~ in any case it would not benefit this child as he was already four when it became effective. Emphasis was placed on the fact that there are two different limitation periods and the test for imposing such a differentiation is that the state must have some significant interest in doing so.68
Then the supposed state interest of preventing the litigation of stale and fraudulent claims was attacked. The appellant's counsel pointed out that "the high reliability and probativity of modern blood grouping tests" insure that the required proof of paternity will withstand the passage of time. Fraudulent claims are nonexistent because of the action itself. The procedure as it exists now requires that there be some positive evidence in the way of blood tests that would establish the likelihood of paternity. The father also has other defenses such as non-access.69
Further, it was noted that the runnin~ of the limitation statute is a vested defense. Thus, if a father ~aid for the
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support of an illegitimate child until the limitation statute had run he could stop without any legal obligation of support. Also, it was pointen out that since limitation statutes are a vested defense the four year statute could not be made retroactive.7°
•
Conversely, an attorney from Rockport argued that both legitimate children and ille~itimate children can bring a suit ror support until they reach majority provided that the illegitimate child has established paternity. Moreover, she argued that the law would revert to giving illegitimate children four more years than legitimate children to file a paternity suit.71
Apparently, this argument is based on the Delley72 case which tolls the general four year statute of limitations until the child reaches majority.
Continuing, this attorney ar~ues that the effect of declaring this paternity limitation statute would create two different classes of ille~itimate children--those subject to the new four year statute and those subject to the general statute of limitations tolled by case law.73
Generally, the above arguments are what were presented to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not hand down an opinion until April 5, 1982. The Court held that the one year limitation statute was unconstitutional as denied illegitimate children the equal protection of the law.74
On April 5, 1982, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Texas one year statute of limitations pertaining to paternity suits. Briefly, the most
~ -~
-
. important parts of the decision are the guidelines presented.
The Court said that when a state purports to give both legitiu
_lo.,,,'\ ,;•.J

~ate and ille~itimate children~ ri~ht to support, it must be "more t~an illusory." Yet, the Court also stated that the procedures did not have to be the same. Moreover, the Court established a two-step analysis for determining the consti-
_,
.
(1) the time period must give those who can bring the suit a reasonable opportunity to do so; and (2) there must be a substantial relation between the State's interest in preventing stale and fraudulent claims and the time limitation imposed.75
The Court rendered a three part opinion with two concurring opinions and no dissentin~ opinions. The first part of their opinion basically outlines the historical perspective related to the enactment of the one year limitation statute.
The Court noted that Texas courts have applied the statute literally and as a part of the substantive law not a procedural rule. The Court termed the statute "less than generous" and further said "Texas has created a one-year window in its previously "impenetrable barrier," through which an illegitimate child may establish paternity and obtain paternal support.n76
The second part of their opinion reviewed the facts of this particular case and the Appellant's argument that the limitation statute is not justified by the State's interest in preventing fraudulent and stale claims. The Court stated that they agreed with the Appellant's argument as to the State's interest and so would not consider the due process challenge.??
The third part of the opinion dispenses with the
.. preliminaries and gets to the issues at hand. Specifically
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the Court held that if the Gomez78 decision were goi~g to
~ave any meaning, then there must be an opportunity for ille~itimate children to obtain support from their father that is "more than illusory." The Court concluded that to have an opportunity so truncated that its effectiveness was affected would be a denial of equal protection.79 The strong implication is that the Texas statute is just so.
The Court found nothing wrong with the requirement of a paternity suit before the imposition of a legal obligation of support, but the Court also recognized the many problems of proof in such suits. These problems were more fully set out in a footnote and were related to the failure of blood tests to exclude a potential father. Then the ••rather" has to turn to other forms of defense such as lack of access and testimony.80
Because of the above-mentioned problems with proof in
~ternity suits the Court contends that the State does have a legitimate interest in preventing fraudulent or stale claims.
Moreover, the Court held that this interest becomes more probative when the periods of limitation are so long as to present a loss or unavailability of evidence. T~e Court then set out the two-step analysis for determining the constitutionality of a limitation statute on paternity suits.81
Continuing, the Court recognized the many obstacles that are presented to unwed mothers during the first year after the birth of a child. Coupling this with the fact that failure to bring suit within the first year forever bars this right t~e Court stated only accentuates the inadequacy·of the one
15

year statute. Further, the Court concluded that such a short period is not related to the State's interest simply is so restrictive that it extin~~ishes the illegitirnates right to establish paternity.82
•
·rhe concurring opinions are concerned about this Court 1 s opinion being read as "prejudging the ccnstitutionality of longer periods of limitation." Then, both concurring opinions note the fact that in Texas paternity suits are the only suits not tolled by the minority of the plaintifr.83
It should be noted that all eight justices were unanimous in their decision to declare the Texas one-year statute cf limitations unconstitutional. The concurring opinions are written simply to emphasize that this is not an indication that all limitation periods are unconstitutional. Uf particular note is the following quote from one of the concurring opinions that seems to indicate the limitation statutes should be tolled:
The risk that the child will find himself without financial support from his natural father seems as likely throughout his minority as during the first year of his life.
84
V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, there is no doubt that a very short limitation period is unconstitutional. The question then becomes what is a reasonable time limit. Conversely, there is little doubt that tolling the limitation statute would be
' a reasonable alternative. Thus, the United States Supreme
..
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~
Court has ~iveYl the .States a definite unconstitutional limit
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and a probable accep~abl9 limit--one year and tolling until ~ajority respectively. The more immediate problem in Texas courts is where does that leave our four year statute?
It should be noted that a survev of case& since the v • enactment of the four year statute did not reveal any appellate cases. The Texas Supreme Court had never ruled on the constitutionality of the prior one year statute but there was some indication that one was pending awaiting the outcome of I'1ills. 8 5
Thus, any observations are just that.
If Texas courts decide to toll the four year statute u:1t il the child reaches rnaj ori ty then the illegi t ima tes will be on the same footing as the illegitimates born before the enactment of a statute of limitations under the Pelley cases. 8_6
The only real purpose in litigating a paternity.suit is so that an illegitimate child can receive some sort of support from its biological father. Consequently, tolling the statute would also put illegitimates in the same boat as le~itimates in that the only years that they are entitled to support is until the age of majority. There is no merit in the argument that this would place illegitimates in a favored position.87 The general four year limitation statute currently applicable to pre-limitation paternity statutes would then apply. Thus, both legitimates and illegitimates would be entitled to bring paternity and then suits for child support four years after they reach the age of majority. Of course, this would then emasculate the need for a limitation suit on paternit~ action_s.
. reasonable or not would turn on the 3tate's interest in preventing
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stale or fraudulent claims.
·:Ihile proof problems do exist '~Then blood tests are not conclusive, the highly advanced methods of blood typing are becoming nore reliable. In Texas the blood tests qre an accepted part of a paternity suit. Thus, the proof in a paternity suit is becoming more and more reliable.
It should be noted that this paper did not attempt to be an exhaustive study of each case in Texas considering the statutory limitation on paternity actions.
1
.-!hat was attempted was a look at illustrative cases to highli~ht some of the problems. The problems with proving paternity in inheritance. proceedings t:rere beyond the scope of this paper and it is conceded that the State interest in those instances is more viable.
In reviewing the cases presented, the Texas courts seem to assume that the father's interest and the State's interest are one and the same--preventing stale and fraudulent claims.
Conversely, the mother's interest seems to be assumed to be the same as the child's. The only case assuming differently was
Miller
88 and it seemed to get off more on gender discrimination to hold the one year statute unconstitutional.
In conclusion, the better approach for Texas courts is to toll the four year statute of limitations until the ille~itimate child reaches the age of majority. This would best serve the interest of the child in receiving financial support, protect the mother's interest in the event she is not aware of this cause of action, and both the father's and State's -interest in preventing stale and fraudulent claims. In the event of the death of the alleged father, the proof needed to establish paternity would be gone--blood. This is when the State's interest becomes necessary lftO?O~

L.O preven.J f d ~ . t~· t o th e rna t ter h •t claims and is b~yond the scope of this paper .
•

SNDNCT~S
-
~isely,
~aote~
Paternity ~eter:.li!lations in ~exas: ?ive Years under
13 of the Texas ?amily Code, 20 s. ?2X. L.J. 465 (1980).
~::.·c FA~·L
CCDS
AN~'1.
§ 13. 01 (Vernon Supp. 1981).
•
-
:d.
~nisely, supra note 1, at 465.
~X. FAM. CODE ANN. §§13.01-13.43 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
~09 u.s. 535 (1973).
[d.
[d. at 538.
[n.
[d. at 535.
46
·n I"' • 179, 256 S.A. 929 (1923).
~::X. PEUAL CODE ANN. art. 640a (Vernon 1916).
", -
'C
I
... . t. •
, ~-
... , .,.,, ,
...... , .. ..., . .
L...- / .. , .::::, • ,
4 •
92 q (
,
1' 92 3)
•
).D.C. v.
10 wr1t).
T.ttl., 480 S.,-J.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App.--Amaril1o 1972,
\!lisely, suPra note 1, at 466.
~SX. ~AM. GCDE ANN. §13.01 ( VerT!on Supp. 1980).
·~ills v. Habluetzal, 50 U.S.L.'.~. 4J72 (3~~A--Apri1 6, 1982).
;70 s.!·J .2n 46 (Tex. Civ. App. --Dallas, 1978, reh den).
M. at 48, Note: In Mathews 427 U.S. 49S (1976), the United
~ates
Supreme Court reJected the classification of ille~it-
~tes as "suspect." Thus, upon judicial review illegitimates
•e !lot a classification invitiating a review of strict scrutiny.
)70 S.A.2d 46, 48 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas, 1978, reh den).
~09
U • .3 • 5 J 5 ( 197 J) .
.. i7, 0 ..,
) .. ~.~
6
App.--~allas, 1978, reh den).
20 002~0

23rc_. at ~8.
•
2
They are the petitioner in this suit on behalf of the c~ild.
2
7570 S.W.2d 46,50 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas, 1978, reh den).
2Rrd.
2
9595 S.W.2d 189, (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus _Christi, 1980).
JOrd. at 191.
3 1 rd.
32rd. at 192.
33rd.
A
Note: TE:(. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5535 (Vernon Supp.
T9"7o-1979). "If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this subdivision of this title be at the time the cause of action accrues either a minor ... the time of such disability shall not be deemed a portion of the time limited for the commencement of the action and such person shall have the same time after the removal of his disability that it allowed to others by the provisions of this title.
34rd.
35ra. at 193.
36605
S.~.2d
332 (Tex. Civ. App.--Fort Worth, 1980).
37 rd. at 334.
38409 u.s. 535 (1973).
39605 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ. App.--Fort Worth, 1980).
40rd. Note: This was determined in Texas Denartment of Human
Resources v. Delley, 581 S.~
1979) . .
41
409 u.s. 535 (1973).
4 2
6 o ~
3 . · . .J • 2 n J 3 2 , 3 3 5 (
~ex
. c i v . A p p . -
_7 or t · ·l or t :: , 1 9 8 0 ) •

11 ~ash. App. 362, 522 P.2d 1198 (1974).
4~stri~ger v. Dudoich, 92 N.S. 98, 582 P.2d 426 (1978).
" -
45guss v. DeMott, 215 Kan. 4SO, 524 F.2d 743 (1974).
46605
A.~.2d
332,336 (Tex. Civ. App.--Fort
~orth,
1980).
47Id.
48409 u.s.
535 (1973).
49581 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas, 1979).
50r,fote: TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958)
"Every action ... for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed, shall be brou~ht within four years next after the ri~ht ward. " to bring the same shall have accrued and not after-
51Note: TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 5535 (Vernon Supp. 1978-
1979) see text sunra note 33.
52rd. at 522.
53409 u.s. 535 (1973).
54581 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.--Da11as, 1979).
55rd. at 521.
56 rd. at 522.
57592
S.~.2d
660 (Tex. Civ. App.--Beaumont, 1979).
58rd. at 661.
59624
S.~.2d
353 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi, 1981).
601.1. at 534.
61
50
U.S.L.~.
4372 (BNA--Apri1 6, 1982) .
•
•
6Jrd. at 4373, Note: see discussion on pa~e
5.

64rd.
65g FAM. L. }SP .. 2162 (3NA, Jan. 19, 1982) .
..
66rd. at 2163.
67rd.
68rd.
69rd. at 2164.
72Texas Department of Human Resources v. Del1ey, 581 S.~.2d 519
(Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas, 1979).
73g FAM. L. REP. 2162,2164 (BNA, Jan. 19, 1982).
?
4 50 U.S.L.~.
4372 (BNA--Apri1 6, 1982).
75rd.
76rd. at 4373.
78Note: 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
'
79 50 U.S. L. H. 4373 ( BNA--Apri1 6, 1982) .
80rd. at 4374, Note: see footnote 4.
81Id.
82Id.
83rd. at 4375 & 4376.
84 rd. at 4376.
85rd. at 4372.
86~exas
~ex.
Denartment of
Civ. App.--Da
v . De 11 e. , 5 81 .3 .'.•! . 2 d 519

87'g FAM. L. REP. 2162,2164 ( 3NA,
~Jan.
19, 1982).
88rn the Interest of Miller,
Fort Worth, 1980)~
605 3.~.2d
332 (Tex. Civ. App.--