Rev Int Organ (2009) 4:47–72
DOI 10.1007/s11558-008-9050-5
IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003
M. Rodwan Abouharb & David L. Cingranelli
Received: 28 February 2008 / Revised: 6 November 2008 / Accepted: 14 November 2008 /
Published online: 19 December 2008
# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2008
Abstract We examined the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF)
supervised programs on changes in government respect for physical integrity
rights in developing countries between 1981 and 2003. A longer period under
an IMF program increased government use of torture and extra judicial killing
and also worsened the overall human rights conditions in developing countries.
The use of a two-stage model ruled out the possibility that human rights
practices would have worsened even if IMF programs had not been in effect.
Previous studies of the impacts of IMF programs also found that they had
worsened government respect for human rights. However, those studies did not
control for the effects of selection. We found preliminary evidence that the
worsened human rights conditions persisted even after the reforms in program
lending of the late 1990s.
Keywords International Monetary Fund . Conditionality . Human rights .
Physical integrity rights
JEL Codes F33 . F34 . F35 . F53 . F55 . F59
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s11558-008-9050-5)
contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
M. R. Abouharb (*)
Department of Political Science, 240 Stubbs Hall, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA
e-mail: roda@lsu.edu
D. L. Cingranelli
Department of Political Science,
Binghamton University, PO Box 6000, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000, USA
e-mail: davidc@binghamton.edu
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M.R. Abouharb, D.L. Cingranelli
1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, the directors of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have
promoted a shift in power from the state to the market. The IFIs have promoted a
variety of programs in developing and transition countries to achieve that goal. The
commonality amongst these programs is the conditionality used to call upon
recipient governments to liberalize and privatize economies in the context of strict
budget discipline. The IMF has four main types of agreements that involve policy
conditions including “The Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), the Extended Fund
Facility (EFF), the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), and the Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)” (Vreeland 2003: 10).1 We collectively refer
to these different arrangements as ‘IMF programs’. Such measures were intended to
jump start economic growth and free up resources for debt service. However, in most
countries, public investment in critical areas (health care, education, infrastructure)
declined, growth rates were disappointing and debts mounted to unsustainable levels
(Pettifor 2001). There is also some evidence that participation in these programs
negotiated with the IFIs has caused the governments of less developed countries to
reduce their respect for a wide variety of human rights. From a policy perspective the
relationship between exposure to programs and respect for human rights is
important, because there is mounting evidence that national economies grow fastest
when citizens can exercise their human rights (e.g., Kaufman 2004; Sen 1999).
Thus, if program lending undermines government efforts to protect human rights, it
also undermines IFI efforts to promote economic growth.
This paper explores the relationship between the length of time a government had
been under IMF programs between 1981 and 2003 and changes in its respect for
human rights. The category of human rights we focus on are physical integrity
human rights which include the rights of citizens to be protected from torture,
political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing, and disappearance. Previous research
on the human rights effects of IMF programs found that loan conditions in less
developed countries has worsened government human rights practices (Franklin
1997; Keith and Poe 2000; McClaren 1988; Pion-Berlin 1984). In our earlier work,
we demonstrated that during the periods that a country was under a World Bank
program, torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing, and disappearances
were all more likely to occur (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006). In another study
focusing on the joint effects of IMF2 and World Bank program lending, we showed
that overall respect for physical integrity rights declined the longer a country had
been under programs negotiated by either the IMF or World Bank (Abouharb and
Cingranelli 2007). In our 2007 study, we showed that government respect for
economic and social rights and worker rights also worsened the longer a program
was in place.
This is the first large scale, selection-corrected study exploring the human rights
impacts of IMF program lending, and the time period examined in this work (1981–
2003) nearly triples the time period examined in any other study of the human rights
1
The ESAF was renamed to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999.
2
We include all four different types of IMF facilities.
IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003
49
effects of IMF programs. We conducted this study for several reasons. First, none of
our previous work had estimated the human rights effects of IMF programs. The
formal missions of the IMF and World Bank are different, so the human rights
effects of IMF program lending may have been different as well.3 Second, while
other scholars had examined the human rights effects of IMF program lending, none
had controlled for selection effects. Doing so is important, because it is possible that
the countries that stayed in IMF programs for long periods were intrinsically difficult
cases. Thus, their poor human rights and economic outcomes might have occurred
whether or not they were under IMF programs. We needed to determine the counterfactual—namely, what would have happened to developing countries if the IMF had
never intervened. Third, this is the only study of the effects of IMF lending on
government respect for particular physical integrity rights such as the frequency of
the use of torture. All previous studies of the human rights impacts of IMF programs
had examined impacts on an aggregate index of respect for physical integrity rights,
the Political Terror Scale. Fourth, in this project, we adopted some important
refinements to our method for estimating selection effects to better control for the
types of countries that were selected for long periods of program treatment rather
than simply controlling for the types of countries that negotiate any program loans
with the IMF. Finally, for the first time, we compare the human rights effects of IMF
programs before and after some reforms in IFI lending took effect in late 1990s. In
recent years the IFIs have been more willing to acknowledge their responsibilities
for the bad social consequences of program lending. Thus, based on our previous
research and the research of others, we hypothesized that the overall human rights
effects of IMF programs had been negative between 1981 and 2003, but had been
more positive since the reforms of the late 1990s.
In general, the results of this study are consistent with the results of all previous
work on the physical integrity rights effects of IFI program lending. We found
substantial evidence of negative impacts on government respect for physical
integrity rights and no evidence of positive impacts. The more years a developing
country government spent under IMF programs between 1981 and 2003, the greater
was the use of torture and extra-judicial killing and the worse its score on the
Political Terror Scale.4 The negative human rights consequences of IMF program
lending were more pronounced during the 1981–1998 period as expected. However,
we did also find that countries with more exposure to IMF programs between 1999
and 2003 also experienced an increase in political terror during that period. Though
it is probably too soon to make an assessment of reforms in program lending, this
finding provides preliminary evidence that reforms in IMF lending practices have
not helped to reduce the negative social impacts of program lending.
3
The formal mission of the World Bank, when it was first established as a UN agency, was to address
issues of economic development, while the IMF was to focus on helping to correct balance of payments
problems. Since 1980, the missions of the two international financial institutions have become more
similar, and there is increasing cooperation between them in developing country-specific strategies to
promote economic development (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Blackmon 2008; Jayarajah et al. 1996).
4
IMF program lending had no effect on the frequency of a government’s use of political imprisonment or
disappearances.
50
M.R. Abouharb, D.L. Cingranelli
2 Theory
There are a several reasons why a long period under loan conditionality might lead
to worse human rights practices by loan recipient governments. In our earlier work
(Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006, 2007) we argued that implementation of programs
caused discontent among the poor, whose lives often were affected in negative ways
as social programs were cut. Discontent produced rebellion in the form of protests,
riots, or even rebellion against the government. Governments often responded with
greater coercion. But there are other ways that the implementation of programs could
begin a chain of events that eventually caused greater repression by the government.
There are also ways that the negotiation of loans with the IMF or dependence on
loans could cause a government to become more repressive, even when many of the
conditions associated with the programs were never implemented. In the discussion
below, we begin with causal linkages that assume some implementation of the
provisions of programs, and then we consider some that result in more government
repression even if few or no provisions of programs were implemented.
Besides the program-hardship-rebellion-repression linkage described in our earlier
work another causal argument is that implementation of programs weakens the role
of the state as it strengthens the market. A shift in power from the state to the market
may cause worsened human rights practices by governments mainly because a
strong state and substantial government intervention in the market is essential for the
protection of all human rights (Donnelly 2003). The protection of physical integrity
rights, for example, requires government expenditures for properly training and
adequately compensating judges, police and soldiers. Funds are also needed to
establish institutions for monitoring the activities of police and soldiers, so that
principals (government leaders) can constrain their discretion. More administrative
discretion on the part of police and soldiers is likely to lead to greater abuse of
physical integrity rights (Policzer 2004). As other examples, the protection of worker
rights in general and women’s economic rights, in particular, requires that
government regulate the relationship between workers and employers.5
Besides requiring that the government withdraw from much of their involvement
in the market, implementation of programs, by definition, requires that the
governments of loan recipient countries adopt new economic policies designed to
produce substantial, long-term, behavioral changes in the affected populations.
People have a natural tendency to resist making substantial changes in their previous
behavior (Davidson 2002). Those required to make such changes may start or join
social movements including political parties committed to the opposition of
government economic policies. They may organize peaceful or violent protests.
One of the tools government may use to overcome such resistance to policies is
5
Some scholars have argued that a weak state is necessary for the protection of physical integrity rights.
According to this view, a relatively limited government is fundamental to all human freedoms. Limited
government reduces barriers to the functioning of the free market, allowing human beings to pursue their
own interests in their own ways and allowing them to pursue opportunities that are likely to be lost if
human freedom is restricted (Friedman 1962; Hayek 1984). With regard to the physical integrity human
rights examined here, Cranston (1964) has argued that respect for these rights only requires forbearance on
the part of the state.
IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003
51
increased coercion in the forms of increased torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, and disappearances.
The three causal linkages described above all require that at least some provisions
of programs be implemented, but programs may cause repression of human rights
even when they are not implemented at all. It is important to consider these
arguments, because research has shown that some governments’ never implement
the provisions of their programs and many more do not fully implement those
provisions (e.g., Dollar and Svensson 2000; Killick 1996; van de Walle 2001).
Indeed, previous research has argued that the numbers and types of conditions
associated with programs vary for a variety of political reasons (Dreher and Jensen
2007; Stone 2004). Even if the liberalization and privatization provisions of
programs are not fully implemented, negotiation of programs can cause greater
government repression by reducing the need for governments to raise revenue
through taxes on their populations, angering citizens who prefer that their
government not cede sovereignty to foreign powers, and causing citizens’ expectations to outpace improvements in economic conditions. We examine each of these
arguments below.
The revenue argument begins with the contrast between governments that depend,
largely or entirely, for revenue on earned income in the form of broad taxation and
those that depend on unearned income from oil, gas and mineral exports, foreign
grants or foreign loans (Collier 2003; Moore 1998, 2007). In economies that are
based on earned income and are less dependent on loans from international financial
institutions, elites rely upon levying taxes across a broad base of their citizenry. In
return citizens demand efficient and responsive government. This bargain establishes
a legitimate political relationship between rulers and subjects. In states where the
government depends on unearned income, elites are financially independent of
citizen-taxpayers. This changes the political incentives that they face, and the ways
they seek, use and retain power. The mutually beneficial relationship between rulers
and subjects may not develop or, if developed already, may break down. More
insidiously, those leaders who benefit from unearned income may perceive an
effective and watchful civil service and civil society as a threat to the benefits they
enjoy (Alexander 2006), and they may take steps to thwart them. As a result, citizens
are often poorly served by their rulers, and if the citizens complain, unearned income
enables governments to pay for armed forces to keep the citizens in check. Thus,
countries whose economies are dependent on loans from international financial
institutions or whose revenues are dominated by resource extraction industries tend
to be more repressive, corrupt and badly-managed (Moore 2007).
Furthermore groups opposed to the government may interpret entering into an
agreement with the IMF as a signal of government weakness or as a signal of the
government’s willingness to collaborate with western interests. These popular
perceptions can, in turn, stimulate acts of rebellion, which may cause increased
government repression of human rights. For example, the Shagari Administration in
Nigeria, had assiduously avoided entering into an IMF agreement despite great need
because the general public’s view towards the IMF was one of “vehement popular
antipathy” (Callaghy 1990: 269). The government avoided entering into negotiations
with the IMF until winning re-election. Having been safely re-elected, the
Administration decided to enter into negotiations with the International Monetary
52
M.R. Abouharb, D.L. Cingranelli
Fund. Subsequently, a military coup toppled the civilian administration (Vreeland
2003: 37). In Egypt, the government’s willingness to negotiate with the IMF was
portrayed by the Muslim Brotherhood as further evidence that the government was
too friendly with the West (Kienle 2001).
Finally, establishing an IMF program may cause citizen expectations to outpace
improvements in economic conditions. The concept of relative deprivation describes
the differences between what an individual expects and whether those expectations
are satisfied (Davies 1969; Feierabend and Feierabend 1966; Gurr 1968). The
signing of a program between an individual’s own government and the IMF may
lead to higher expectations about the future of the nation’s economy. If these
expectations are not satisfied, the nation’s citizens may feel relatively deprived.
Their reaction may be some form of rebellion against the government. This rebellion
may stimulate greater levels of government repression of human rights (Gurr 1968).
3 Previous Research on IMF Programs and Human Rights
Sen (1999) contended that increasing people’s ability to exercise their fundamental
human rights was critical, in an instrumental way, to the promotion of economic
growth. At the time Sen wrote his book, there already were suspicions that structural
adjustment policies were not producing economic growth in most developing
countries. Moreover, in those cases where economic growth had occurred, often the
growth did little to alleviate poverty. Some studies even have argued that IMF
programs have had a negative effect on economic growth (Dreher 2006; Przeworski
and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003). These studies showed that IMF programs
produced less growth in developing countries than would have occurred without any
IMF intervention. Vreeland noted that structural adjustment did the most damage to
the least well-off in society. It usually reduced the size of the “economic pie” to be
distributed, and resulted in a more unequal distribution of the pie itself (Vreeland 2002).
Lower levels of economic development have been associated with reduced respect for
human rights (e.g., Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2004;
Mitchell and McCormack 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999).
Research seeking to untangle the causal relationship between respect for physical
integrity rights and economic development is in its early stages. The most
comprehensive and methodologically sophisticated study on this topic explored the
links among respect for human rights, the quality of governance, and the rate of
economic growth (Kaufman 2004). Three possible explanations for the strong positive
correlation between average per capita incomes and respect for physical integrity and
democratic rights were suggested (Kaufman 2004). More respect for these human
rights may exert a powerful causal effect on per capita incomes. Alternatively, higher
incomes may lead to improvements in respect for physical integrity and democratic
rights. As a final possibility, he speculated that the relationship might be spurious. In
other words, there might be another factor that makes countries richer and causes them
to have more respect for physical integrity and democratic rights. His statistical tests
indicated that more respect for physical integrity and democratic rights caused higher
level of respect for economic and social rights. Unfortunately, previous studies have
shown that IMF programs have been associated with worsened government respect for
IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003
53
physical integrity rights (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Franklin 1997; Keith and
Poe 2000; McLaren 1998).6
Many studies of one, two or a few countries have described the negative
consequences of structural adjustment programs (e.g., Structural Adjustment
Participatory Review Network 2004). Not many of these case or small-n comparative
studies focus explicitly on the human rights effects of IFI conditionality, but most of
them describe hardships that structural adjustment conditions caused for the poorest
people. There are many web sites maintained by human rights non-governmental
organizations that also detail the harmful effects of structural adjustment policies on
the least well off in developing countries. Work by David Pion-Berlin (1983, 1984,
1989, 1991) explored the linkages between programs and repression of human rights
in Argentina and Peru. His work led us to expect that governments seeking to make
major economic changes that hurt the poorest members of society would be likely to
resort to coercion including the violation of human rights.
Earlier studies also found support for the hypothesis that more respect for democratic
human rights led to higher levels of effectiveness of World Bank development projects
around the world (Isham, Kaufman, and Pritchett 1997) and higher rates of economic
growth (Haggard 1995). However, previous research mainly argues that programs
negotiated by the IMF principally with the executive branch of developing and
transitioning countries may be undermining democratic systems (Haggard 1995;
Stiglitz 2002).7 They may be increasing the level of corruption in loan recipient
countries (Alexander 2006). Less democracy has been associated with reduced respect
for human rights (e.g., Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006, 2007; Davenport and
Armstrong 2004; Mitchell and McCormack 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe 1999).
Increased corruption also may lead to more violations of human rights, since the
existence of corruption makes it more difficult for politicians (principals) to control the
discretion of police and soldiers (agents).
Partly in response to such criticisms of the consequences of program lending, the
IMF and World Bank instituted a series of reforms in the late 1990s. Those reforms
included the introduction of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC)
in 19968 coupled with the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSP) in 1999. The HIPC Initiative was designed to reduce the debt of poor
countries through debt relief. The purpose of the PRSP was to re-direct resources
that had previously gone to servicing a country’s debt towards programs aimed at
improving social services such as health care and education (Blackmon 2008). No
previous study of the human rights effects of IMF programs has compared
consequences before and after these reforms.
The World Bank has been more willing to address poverty and human rights as
societal and developmental issues (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Blackmon 2008;
World Bank 1998). As former World Bank President Wolfensohn said in his statement
to the Bank’s Development Committee, “There is …widespread recognition of the
strong link between human rights and development…The Bank is currently reviewing
6
Only two of those studies controlled for selection effects (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006, 2007).
7
For a more nuanced view, see Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007).
Subsequently, the HIPC was strengthened and renamed “the Enhanced HIPC Initiative” (Blackmon
2008).
8
54
M.R. Abouharb, D.L. Cingranelli
its role with a view to making a more explicit link between human rights and our work,
while at the same time remaining fully in compliance with our Articles of Agreement”
(World Bank 2005). Former World Bank President Wolfowitz also expressed his
commitment to this endeavor most recently by emphasizing the role of respect for
women’s rights in development (World Bank 2005).
The IMF has been slower to address issues of poverty and human rights directly, and is
still more likely to focus on macroeconomic issues that affect the poor such as high
inflation and slower economic growth (Blackmon 2008). An Assistant Director in the
IMF’s Office in Europe contended that human rights advocates should not expect the
international financial institutions (IFIs) to impose human rights-related policy
conditions on their member countries, because the IFIs do not have the expertise
required to make judgments about human rights practices and nothing prevents
developing country governments under structural adjustment from incorporating human
rights into their poverty reduction agreements (Leite 2001). Responding to criticism
that the IMF was ignoring the human rights consequences of its activities, another IMF
spokesperson declared that it was not obligated to promote human rights around the
world. Speaking before the United Nations Sub commission for the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, he said that the Fund, in a strict sense, does not have a
mandate to promote human rights. He also stressed that the IMF is not “bound by various
human rights declarations and conventions” (Capdevila 2001). Several members of the
UN Sub commission expressed their disappointment. Yozo Yokota, of Japan, noted that
human rights are “peremptory norms” that cannot be ignored in agreements between
states or in the operations of international financial institutions (Capdevila 2001).
Estimating the human rights effects of program lending by the international financial
institutions requires the use of a two-stage econometric model. As explained by Achen
(1986), Dreher (2006), Heckman (1988), Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and
Vreeland (2002, 2003) issues of endogoneity, selection, and randomization must be
accounted for when assessing the impact of any public policy. Unfortunately, few
previous studies of the human rights effects of program lending had controlled for the
effects of selection. Perhaps the countries the IMF had worked with had failed because
they were intrinsically difficult cases. We needed to determine the counter-factual—
namely, what would have happened to developing countries if the IMF had never
intervened. One needs to disentangle the impacts of the policy from any prior
attributes that may also have an impact (Collier 1991). Were the negative effects of
IMF programs on government respect for physical integrity rights practices found in
previous research the result of the economic difficulties that made the loan recipient
country a good candidate for a program in the first place or were they the consequence
of the program itself? Single-stage models cannot provide an answer to that question.
4 Hypotheses
There is a substantial literature explaining IMF selection practices.9 The findings of
that research suggest that economic, political, conflict, and human rights factors help
9
Thorough reviews of studies examining the selection biases of the IMF can be found in Abouharb and
Cingranelli (2007), Stone (2004) and Vreeland (2003).
IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003
55
determine when countries go under IMF programs. Previous research has found that
governments are more likely to go under IMF programs if they have greater
economic difficulty, greater respect for workers’ rights, an alliance with the United
States, larger populations, more authoritarian political institutions, or a previous
colonial/dependent relationship with the US, the UK or France (Abouharb and
Cingranelli 2006, 2007; Dreher 2006; Joyce 1992; Keith and Poe 2000; Stone 2004;
Vreeland 2003). They also were more likely to go under IMF programs before the
end of the Cold War and during years when larger numbers of countries were under
programs (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Vreeland 2003).
The focus of this study is on the second-stage hypotheses concerning the human
rights effects of programs. Previous research supports the following hypotheses,
which will be tested:
H1: The greater the number of years a country has been under IMF-supervised
programs, the more frequent will be the government’s use of torture, political
imprisonment, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings.
H2: The relationship between the number of years under programs and repression
of physical integrity rights will be negative prior to 1999. After 1999, because
of reforms enacted in the late 1990s, there will be a positive relationship.
Since no previous study has examined the human rights effects of IMF programs
after the adoption of reforms in lending instituted in the late 1990s, the hypothesized
positive relationship between exposure to IMF programs and respect for physical
integrity rights after 1999 requires justification. The reforms were not expressly
designed to improve the human rights practices of loan recipient governments. They
were designed to reduce the potential hardships of debt payment, privatization and
liberalization policies on the poorest people in loan recipient countries. There would
be no expected positive effect of the reforms if the debt payment, privatization and
liberalization policies included in IMF programs were never implemented. In
those cases, the act of going under an IMF program could have caused greater
government repression by reducing the need for governments to raise revenue
through taxes on their populations, angering citizens who prefer that their
government not cede sovereignty to foreign powers, and causing citizens’ expectations to outpace improvements in economic conditions. Thus, if the reforms made a
difference, they did so because they changed the content of IMF programs or the
way these programs were implemented.
Other studies—especially those by Poe (2004), Poe and Tate (1994), and Poe,
Tate and Keith (1999)—have demonstrated that wealthier countries, more democratic countries, and countries with a British colonial experience tend to have
governments that provide more respect for the physical integrity rights of their
citizens. Countries with military governments, relatively large populations, relatively
large population increases, high levels of domestic conflict, and involvement in
interstate war tend to have governments that provide less respect for the physical
integrity rights of their citizens. The findings on the human rights effects of interstate
war are the least consistent in previous research.10 All of these factors were included
as control variables in the second, human rights stage of the analysis.
10
See for example the findings of Landman (2005).
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M.R. Abouharb, D.L. Cingranelli
5 Research Design
This study uses a cross-national, annual time-series dataset comprised of 131
developing countries, with a population of at least 500,000 in 1981, which were in
existence for the entire period under examination. Our IMF program implementation
measure is a running count of the individual years countries have spent under IMF
programs for the entire period. It measures the long-term, cumulative effects of IMF
programs. More detail on the construction of this measure is provided below. The
data spans the time period from 1981 to 2003. During the period of our study, the
IMF negotiated a total of 465 programs to 98 countries in our sample. The unit of
analysis is the country year.
At the second, human rights impact stage, we investigate whether the number of
years under an IMF program between 1981 and 2003 was associated with a change
in the frequency of the use of torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing
and disappearances by the governments of loan recipient countries. This permits a
test of our first hypothesis. To test the second hypothesis, we compare the human
rights effects of IMF programs on loan recipients between 1981 and 1998 with the
human rights effects on loan recipients between 1999 and 2003.
5.1 Variables
The number of years each country was under a program in a particular year is our
dependent variable in our first selection stage and in the second, human rights stage
of our analysis. Our data-set uses Vreeland’s (2003) measure of when countries were
under IMF programs. His data-set separately codes each time a country negotiated
an IMF program. He also codes the years that countries were under programs using the
IMF Annual Reports to generate this information. Vreeland’s (2003: 167) approach
gives a value of ‘1’ for each year a country is under any of the following IMF loans:
Stand-By Agreements, Extended Fund Facility (EFF), Structural Adjustment Facility
(SAF) and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), (whose name was
changed to Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999). We follow his
coding scheme as we updated his data through 2003 using the IMF Annual Reports.
The commonality amongst all these programs is that each has economic liberalization
conditions attached. To be sure, the breadth and depth of the conditions attached
change depending upon the particular type of loan and the individual program
negotiated by the loan recipient governments and the International Monetary Fund.
Our update provided us with information about when countries negotiated these
programs and, importantly for this research, the individual years which countries
were under IMF conditionality over the period 1981–2003. Using this measure we
are able to count the cumulative number of years countries have been under IMF
conditionality. This measure is used as the dependent variable in the first stage of our
equation estimating the length of time countries are under IMF programs and is also
our key independent variable in the human rights stage equations. Our measure,
apart from being a cumulative count of the years under IMF conditionality, contains
one difference from Vreeland’s approach. Other research has determined that on
average it takes eighteen months for any implementation to affect the economy
(Jayarajah et al. 1996). For this reason, the year of negotiation was coded as “0” in
IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003
57
our measure indicating whether a country was under program conditions unless a
previously negotiated IMF program was still in effect that year. We generated a
running count of the numbers of years under IMF programs countries have spent
during the period 1981–2003. Thus the number can range from 0 to 22. A value of
22 indicates that a country had been under an IMF program for the entire period.11
To test whether the human rights effects were different before and after IMF reforms
were put in place in 1999 we created one “number of years under a program”
variable from 1981–1998 and another from 1999–2003. The former variable ranges
between 0 and 18, and the latter ranges between 0 and 4.
In developing our selection model, we did not seek to contribute to the large
literature on IMF selection. There is nothing new included in our selection equation.
Our purpose was to create a selection equation that included those variables
repeatedly found to be significant in previous research while at the same time
ensuring proper identification of the selection and human rights impact equation
models. For the current research project this required finding variables that in the
first stage of our model predict program participation but are not correlated with
human rights violations, and in the second stage of our model predict human rights
violations but are not correlated with program participation. Several variables
included in the selection equation have never been shown to affect human rights
violations such as average foreign currency reserves, alliance with the United States,
the number of countries under IMF programs, most types of colonial experiences.
Variables included in the second stage human rights impact equation that have been
shown to predict human rights violations but not IMF participation were the level of
domestic conflict, the level of interstate conflict, and population density.
The number of years a country has been under IMF programs is not the same as
the number of years that IMF programs have been implemented. Many scholars have
noted that conditions included in most IMF programs are not fully implemented
(e.g., Dollar and Svensson 2000; Dreher 2006; Dreher and Jensen 2007; Killick
1996). It is conceivable, therefore, that one or more of the countries in our sample was
under IMF programs for most of the period of our study, but never fully implemented
its program in any of the years it was under those conditions. We considered the
possibility of controlling for degree of implementation of programs but decided not to
do so. First, some of our theoretical arguments linking years under IMF programs to
the level of repression by loan recipients are not contingent on the implementation of
all or most provisions of these programs. In addition, there is a wide gap between
existing measures of IMF program implementation and our theoretical arguments that
do link human rights abuse to implementation of these programs.
The measures used to assess implementation have been proxies such as the
amount of money drawn from the IMF as a proportion of the amount that could be
drawn in a particular year (Killick 1996; See Dreher 2006 for a good review of the
literature). When governments drew less than 80% of this total, Killick evaluated
them as not fully implementing the provisions of their agreements. Killick inferred
that the partial draw down occurred because the loan recipient government had been
11
Note that the value of numbers of years under IMF programs maximizes at 22 rather than 23 because
we exclude the first year a government enters into a program unless it is already under conditionality from
a previous loan.
58
M.R. Abouharb, D.L. Cingranelli
sanctioned by the IMF for failing to fulfil essential provisions of the program. This
approach to evaluating the degree of program implementation has been criticized along
a number of different dimensions (Bird and Willett 2004). In some cases the IMF may
disburse its money even though implementation of conditions has been poor, because
it feels that significant progress has been made, or even for political reasons (Bird and
Willett 2004). Indeed, other work has described how politics permeates if and when
loans are approved as well as the type and number of conditions associated with them
(Stone 2004). In other cases, the whole of the available loan may not be used because
of improvements in the economy. In still other cases governments negotiate programs
as a precautionary tactic, without intensions to draw at all.
More important, the use of a proxy measure of implementation of IMF programs that
relies on the percentage of funds that were drawn down does not capture the
“implementation-hardship-dissent-repression” linkage we have proposed. If any
provisions of an IMF program were implemented that caused hardships for the poor,
then discontent could have arisen that could have led to civil conflict and have evoked
government repression. Imagine the hypothetical situation where a water system was
privatized in one city pursuant to an IMF program but no other provisions of the
program were implemented. Killick’s (1996) measure of the degree of implementation
of IMF programs in countries around the world probably would indicate that this was
a country where the program was only partially implemented. Despite the lack of full
implementation, there may have been demonstrations, riots, and repression. We need a
measure indicating whether any provision of a program was implemented that caused
hardships for poor people in a particular country and in a particular year. No existing
measure of IMF program implementation captures this idea.
Finally, our study encompasses the 1981–2003 period. The units of analysis are
country years. No data set on implementation covers this period, using country years as
units of analysis for all less economically developed countries. Constructing a new
measure of implementation was impractical, because it is difficult to obtain information
about the kinds of conditions included in these programs for a large number of countries
over a long period of time. Often documents concerning the degree of implementation of
conditions in particular countries for particular years are proprietary in nature. The
IMF’s own database on implementation of program conditions has been criticized for
the non-random sample of loans included (Dreher 2006).
Tables 1 and 2 explain the operationalization of the independent variables used in
the first and second stages of the analysis.
5.2 The Dependent Variables: Human Rights Practices of Governments
The human rights practices of governments are the dependent variables in the second
stage. Four physical integrity rights from the CIRI human rights dataset (Cingranelli
and Richards 2004) were used as dependent variables—extra-judicial killings,
disappearances, political imprisonment, and torture. The annual US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International annual
reports were used by trained coders to develop the scores in both data sets. Each of
the four physical integrity variables was coded on a three-point ordinal scale where
0=frequent violations of the right (50 or more), 1=some violations (1–49), and 2=no
violations. The correlations among the four physical integrity rights from 1981–2003
IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003
59
Table 1 Operationalization of first-stage equation variables
Dependent variable
Indicator
Source
Years under IMF programs
Running count of number
of years under IMF Program.
Each year of loan period
coded “1” & 0 otherwise.
Vreeland (2003) updated by
authors using IMF Annual Report
GDP per capita current U.S. $
(Purchasing Power Parity)
Percentage change in GDP
per capita current U.S. $
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
Average government foreign
reserves to reflect monthly imports
Average annual official exchange
rate local currency unit per US $
Trade as a percentage of GDP
World Bank: World Development
Indicators CD-Rom (WDI)
World Bank: WDI
Independent variables
Economic
GDP per capita
Percentage change in GDP
per capita
Average foreign currency
reserves
Exchange rate value
International trade
Political
Alliance with the United
States
Post cold war
Correlates of war (COW)
alliance measure
Dichotomous, “0” before 1991;
“1” if 1991 or later
Level of respect for
0=Not protected by govt.
workers rights
1= Somewhat protected by govt.
2=Protected by govt.
Level of democracy
Democracy-Autocracy measure
Military regimes
Type of regime: Civilian or
military
Japanese, French, UK, USA The decision rule of the most
Dependent/Colonial
recent possessor is used to
Experience
identify the relationships
under examination.
Number of countries under Number of countries under IMF
IMF programs
programs in each year
World Bank: WDI
World Bank: WDI
World Bank: WDI
COW alliance dataset
Cingranelli and Richards CIRI)
(2004)
POLITY IV Dataset
Banks (2002) updated using
Freedom House Reports
Issues COW Colonial History
Dataset Hensel (2006)
Vreeland (2003). Updated
by authors using IMF annual
reports.
ranged from 0.35 between political imprisonment and extra-judicial killing to 0.56
between disappearances and extra-judicial killing in our sample. Over the period of
this study, torture and political imprisonment were the most common forms of abuse
of physical integrity rights. Frequent use of disappearance and extrajudicial killing
by the state was much less common (Cingranelli and Richards 1999a, 1999b).
As an additional test, the Political Terror Scale (PTS), an index including all four
elements, was used as well (Gibney and Dalton 1996; Gibney et al. 2007). The CIRI
scores measure government human rights practices. The PTS measures human rights
conditions in each country. Human rights practices refer to what governments actually
do to protect the physical integrity human rights of their citizens. Human rights
conditions refer to the extent to which citizens actually can enjoy those rights. The
distinction is important, because sometimes, as in the case of civil war, citizens cannot
enjoy their human rights, but governments may not be responsible, or are only
partially responsible for the human rights violations. Our theories concern government
policies, so the CIRI scores are most relevant to the tests of the hypotheses.
60
M.R. Abouharb, D.L. Cingranelli
Table 2 Operationalization of second-stage equation variables
Dependent variable
Indicator
Source
Disappearances
0=Frequent (50+) 1=Occasional
(1–49 instances) 2=None
0=Frequent (50+) 1=Occasional
(1–49 instances) 2=None
0=Frequent (50+) 1=Occasional
(1–49 instances) 2=None
0=Frequent (50+) 1=Occasional
(1–49 instances) 2=None
Ordinal level of human rights
conditions (1–5 measure).
Original scale inverted for ease
of comparison.
1=Worst Human Rights Conditions,
5=Best.
Cingranelli and Richards
CIRI (2004)
CIRI (2004)
Killings
Torture
Political imprisonment
Political terror scale
Independent variables
Years under IMF programs
CIRI (2004)
CIRI (2004)
(Gibney et al. 2007).
Running count of number of years
under IMF Programs. Each year of
loan period coded “1” & 0 otherwise.
Vreeland (2003) updated by
authors using IMF Annual
Report
Control variables economic
GDP per capita
GDP per capita current U.S. $ (PPP)
World Bank: World
Development Indicators
CD-Rom (WDI)
Political
Level of democracy
Log of population
Democracy
Logged midyear country population
POLITY IV Dataset
U.S. census: International
Data Base
Issues COW Colonial History
Dataset Hensel (2006)
UK dependent/colonial
experience
Conflict proneness
Level of interstate conflict
Level of domestic conflict
Temporal dependence
Lagged dependent variable
The decision rule of the most recent
possessor is used to identify the
relationships under examination.
Ordinal level of international
conflict (0–3 measure)
Ordinal level of civil conflict
(0–3 measure)
Gleditsch et al. (2002)
Disappearances, killings,
torture, political imprisonment
lagged 1 year
Constructed
Gleditsch et al. (2002)
The PTS is one of the most widely used indices measuring levels of political
violence and terror that a country experiences in a particular year based on a 5-level
“terror scale” originally developed by Freedom House. The ordinal scale ranges
from level 1, where the level of enjoyment of physical integrity rights is very high to
level 5 where the level of enjoyment is very low. The human rights situation in levelone countries is described as follows: Countries are under a secure rule of law,
people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political
murders are extremely rare. The human rights situation in level-five countries is
described as follows: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of
these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue
personal or ideological goals (Gibney and Dalton 1996).
IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003
61
5.3 Statistical method
This research project incorporates a number of methodological refinements. As noted,
the models we present provide a better identification of the selection and second stage
equations. We argue that those countries that spend more time under IMF programs
represent a non-random sample of all the possible countries often poor and in economic
distress, which other work has found are more likely to be repressors of human rights. It
is important to control for these effects when estimating the human rights impacts of
IMF programs. In our earlier work (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006, 2007), we
corrected for the probability that a country would enter into an IMF program.
However, in this work we correct for the probability that a specific country would
spend more or less time under a program. Arguably, this is a better approach, since, at
the second stage, we wish to estimate the human rights effects of the amount of time
spent under an IMF program. We chose to use a three-stage least squares estimation
procedure. Three-stage least squares is more efficient than two-stage least squares, but
is more sensitive to model specification. As a test of robustness, the results also were
estimated using two-stage least squares. Results concerning the human rights impacts
of longer participation in IMF loan programs were the same.12
For ease of presentation we begin by discussing the model examining the
determinants of time spent under IMF programs and then move to a discussion of the
human rights effects of IMF programs. An OLS analysis was used in the first model to
estimate the length of time countries were under IMF programs. We also employed a
number of other specifications to assess the robustness of our first stage equation
including time dummies for each year and an alternate negative binomial regression
estimation procedure. We then ran our three-stage least squares models. We present just
the second human rights stage equations. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics.
As shown in Table 3, the most respected physical integrity rights are the rights not
to be disappeared and to be protected from extra-judicial killing. These are arguably
the most extreme forms of abuse of physical integrity rights. Torture and political
imprisonment are much more common as is indicated by their near-zero mean
values. This ranking of government respect for physical integrity rights is consistent
with the findings of earlier research (Cingranelli and Richards 1999a, 1999b). The
average number of years under programs between 1981 and 2003 for the countries
included in our study was about four and one-half years, but several countries were
under programs for the entire period of the study—22 years.
6 Results
6.1 Numbers of Years Under IMF Programs
The first-stage results in Table 4 display the factors that affect the numbers of years a
country spent under an IMF program over the period between 1981 and 2003. We
discuss the results that were robust across two or more of the three models presented
12
These are available from the authors upon request.
62
M.R. Abouharb, D.L. Cingranelli
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable name
Mean
Dependent variables
Disappearance
1.574
Extra judicial killing
1.165
Political imprisonment
.89
Torture
.643
Political terror scale
3.383
Key independent variables
Years under IMF programs
4.342
(Cumulative Years under IMF
(8.99)
programs for 2003)
Control variables
Alliance with United States
.712
Average foreign currency reserves
3.4
Level of democracy
3.193
Level of domestic conflict
.553
Exchange rate value
2,417.984
French dependent/colonial experience
.186
GDP per capita
4,041.62
International trade
75.3227
Level of interstate conflict
.076
Japanese dependent/colonial experience
.015
Military regime
.123
Percentage change in GDP per capita
1.082
Log of population
15.46
Post cold war
.54
Level of respect for workers rights
.811
UK dependent/colonial experience
.36
USA dependent/colonial experience
.007
Standard deviation Minimum
Maximum
.693
.7936
.83
.689
1.15
0
0
0
0
1
2
2
2
2
5
5.095
(6.974)
0
(0)
22
(22)
.453
2.989
3.756
1.035
47,229.83
.389
4,175.651
41.825
.429
.121
.329
6.131
2
.499
.75
.48
.086
0
1
−.092
27.084
0
10
0
3
9.33E-12 1,507,226
0
1
339.999
25,317.89
1.531
280.361
0
3
0
1
0
1
−50.486
89.828
10.326
20.979
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
1
in Table 4. The results indicate the importance of economic and political factors,
both international and domestic, affecting the length of time countries spent under
IMF programs. Countries spent more time under IMF programs if they had a lower
GDP per capita or an over-valued exchange rate. Countries allied with the United
States spent longer periods under IMF programs as did those who were under IMF
programs after the end of the Cold War. We find that countries with higher levels of
respect for workers’ rights and those that were more democratic spent longer periods
under IMF programs. There is also some support that countries which have
dependent relationships with key backers of the IMF were treated differently. Those
that had a Japanese, French or U.S. dependent/colonial relationship were likely to
spend longer periods under IMF programs. Finally as the competition for IMF
programs increased, indicated by the number of countries under an IMF program,
the length of time countries spent under IMF programs declined.
6.2 The Impact of IMF Programs on Government Respect for Physical Integrity
Rights
Four separate models were run—one for each of the four physical integrity rights.
IMF programs had no significant effect on freedom from political imprisonment or
IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003
63
Table 4 Number of years under IMF programs, 1981–2003, all developing countries
Number of years under IMF programs
Economic variables
GDP per capita
Percentage change in GDP per capita
Average foreign currency reserves
Exchange rate value
International trade
International political variables
Alliance with United States
Post cold war
Domestic political variables
Level of respect: workers rights
Level of democracy
Military regime
Japanese dependent/colonial experience
French dependent/colonial experience
UK dependent/colonial experience
USA dependent/colonial experience
Number of countries under IMF
programs
Constant
N
R-Squared
Ordinary least
squares
(Robust St. Errors)
OLS with year
dummies1
(Robust St. Errors)
Negative binomial
regression model
−.0004***
(.00008)
.017
(.022)
−.142
(.105)
2.01e-06**
(6.65e-07)
−.015
(.009)
−.0004***
(.00008)
−.004
(.022)
−.202*
(.093)
1.27e-07
(6.77e-07)
−.016
(.009)
−.0001***
(.00003)
.009
(.006)
−.045
(.03)
3.19e-07**
(1.12e-07)
−.004
(.002)
1.623*
(.67)
6.534***
(.45)
1.471*
(.639)
14.302***
(.892)
.329*
(.139)
1.183***
(.091)
.522*
(.27)
.273**
(.084)
−.667
(.518)
3.473***
(.798)
2.359**
(.847)
.967
(.763)
4.343***
(.588)
−.027*
(.013)
3.267***
(1.181)
1,874
.46
.575*
(.28)
.243**
(.081)
−.54
(.518)
4.336***
(.601)
2.204**
(.859)
1.078
(.762)
4.336***
(.601)
−.249***
(.023)
12.754***
(1.538)
1,874
.58
.154
(.055)
.068***
(.021)
−.069
(.151)
.938***
(.243)
.358
(.197)
.092
(.17)
.464***
(.124)
.003
(.003)
.749**
(.284)
1,874
Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; two tailed test.
included, not displayed because of space constraints
1
Year Dummies
disappearance, so these results are not shown.13 The results in Tables 5 and 6
indicate that greater exposure to programs had a significant negative impact on
government practices respecting the citizens’ rights to freedom from torture and
extra-judicial killing for both the entire 1981–2003, and the shorter 1981–1999
periods. Both human rights variables range from zero to two, with lower scores
indicating more frequent violations of the right by the government. Thus statistically
significant, negative relationships between the number of years under an IMF
13
These results are available as a web appendix on the Review of International Organization’s website.
64
M.R. Abouharb, D.L. Cingranelli
Table 5 3-stage least squares model of years under IMF programs on freedom from torture, 1981–2003,
all developing countries1
Respect for Human Rights
Column I
1981–2003
Column II
1981–1998
Column III
1999–2003
Years under IMF programs
−.015***
(.004)
−.017**
(.006)
−.004
(.009)
−2.81e-06
(3.81e-06)
.013***
(.004)
−.075***
(.009)
.055
(.032)
−.082***
(.014)
.003
(.027)
.444***
(.021)
1.639***
(.152)
1,794
7.34e-06
(5.03e-06)
.016***
(.004)
−.074***
(.01)
.058
(.037)
−.093***
(.016)
.006
(.03)
.442***
(.024)
1.64***
(.175)
1,398
.00001
(7.72e-06)
.002
(.007)
−.078***
(.018)
.051
(.063)
−.045
(.026)
−.005
(.053)
.393***
(.045)
1.533***
(.318)
396
Control variables
GDP per capita
Level of democracy
Log of population
Level of interstate conflict
Level of domestic conflict
UK dependent/colonial experience
Lagged dependent variable
Constant
N
Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; two tailed test. 1 Only Second stage
equations are displayed.
Table 6 3-stage least squares model of years under IMF programs on freedom from extra judicial killing,
1981–2003, all developing countries1
Respect for human rights
Column I
1981–2003
Column II
1981–1998
Column III
1999–2003
Years under IMF programs
−.01*
(.004)
−.02**
(.006)
−.003
(.01)
7.72e-06*
(3.98e-06)
−.005
(.004)
−.074***
(.01)
.039
(.034)
−.149***
(.015)
−.004
(.028)
.513***
(.02)
1.893***
(.163)
1,795
6.99e-06
(5.11e-06)
−.005
(.004)
−.063***
(.011)
.063
(.038)
−.175***
(.017)
.032
(.031)
.49***
(.023)
1.781***
(.182)
1,399
.00001
(9.07e-06)
−.006
(.009)
−.104***
(.021)
−.033
(.072)
−.077**
(.03)
−.112
(.061)
.533***
(.043)
2.279***
(.375)
396
Control variables
GDP per capita
Level of democracy
Log of population
Level of interstate conflict
Level of domestic conflict
UK dependent/colonial experience
Lagged Dependent Variable
Constant
N
Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; two tailed test. 1 Only Second stage
equations are displayed.
IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003
65
program and these indicators of respect for physical integrity rights in columns I and
II support our first hypothesis. We hypothesized that we would find a positive
relationship in Column III, estimating the relationship in the post-reform period, but
this coefficient is insignificant in both tables. Thus, these results support our first,
but not our second hypothesis.
As a test of robustness, we substituted the Political Terror Scale (PTS) in the
second stage equation. The results from this specification are displayed in Table 7.
The PTS is a five-point ordinal scale (Gibney and Dalton 1996) designed to measure
the extensiveness of political terror in a society. The scale was inverted for this test,
so the direction of the coefficient would be consistent with our two earlier tables.
Low scores indicate more terror. As a reminder, the PTS measures human rights
conditions in a country, whereas the CIRI scores measure government human rights
practices. Again, the results provide strong support for our first hypothesis. Longer
periods under IMF programs significantly worsened the personal security rights
situation in developing countries across all three periods examined. The significant
and negative relationship for the 1999–2003 period provides additional evidence that
the changes instituted by the IMF in the late 1990s have not improved the personal
security rights situation in developing countries.
The control variables included in Tables 5, 6 and 7 that exerted statistically
significant effects behaved as one would have expected given the results of previous
research. Other things being equal, countries that were more democratic, had larger
populations, and had lower levels of violent domestic conflict also had better human
rights practices.
Table 7 Test of robustness 3-stage least squares model of years under IMF programs on political terror
scale, 1981–2003, all developing countries1
Respect for human rights
Column I
1981–2003
Column II
1981–1998
Column III
1999–2003
Years under IMF programs
−.014***
(.004)
−.019***
(.006)
−.022*
(.01)
6.32e-06
(4.01e-06)
.02***
(.004)
−.073***
(.01)
−.008
(.034)
−.203***
(.016)
.002
(.028)
.617***
(.017)
2.534***
(.184)
1,835
5.5e-06
(5.19e-06)
.021***
(.005)
−.065***
(.011)
−.023
(.039)
−.226***
(.019)
.024
(.032)
.609***
(.019)
2.445***
(.208)
1,443
7.84e-07
(8.95e-06)
.021*
(.009)
−.105***
(.021)
.069
(.069)
−.137***
(.031)
−.091
(.061)
.62***
(.039)
3.178***
(.411)
392
Control variables
GDP per capita
Level of democracy
Log of population
Level of interstate conflict
Level of domestic conflict
UK dependent/colonial experience
Lagged dependent variable
Constant
N
Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; two tailed test. 1 Only Second stage
equations are displayed. PTS scale inverted.
66
M.R. Abouharb, D.L. Cingranelli
6.3 Model Predictions
Figure 1 displays the relationship between differing levels of exposure to IMF
programs over the entire 1981–2003 period and the frequency of torture. These
predictions hold all the independent variables constant to their mean or modal value
and provide the baseline to compare the effects of IMF programs on the frequency of
torture. The intercept indicates that in developing countries the frequency of torture
is close to a value of ‘1’ on our dependent variable indicating that peoples’ rights are
sometimes violated (1–49 violations) even if a country had no exposure to IMF
programs. This prediction accords with actual levels of violations in most developing
countries.
Figure 1 indicates that the longer a government had been under an IMF program
the more frequent its use of torture. The level drops by almost .4 from countries that
have been never under these programs to those that have been under for the entire
period of our study. While these predictions are mean predictions they do indicate a
steady worsening of the situation in developing countries under IMF programs. With
longer exposure to IMF programs, on average, governments moved from
occasionally torturing their citizens to becoming frequent violators of this right.
Figure 2 displays the relationship of the level of exposure to IMF programs over
the 1981–2003 period and its average impact on a government’s use of extra judicial
killing. The intercept in this case indicates that developing countries have a slightly
higher level of respect for the right not to be extra judicially killed with an average
value of just above 1.2. Since this value is close to a value of ‘1’ on our dependent
variable it suggests that developing countries with no exposure to IMF programs still
occasionally extra-judicially kill their citizens. The impact of increased exposure to
IMF programs also leads to a progressive, if smaller, worsening in the frequency of
extra judicial killing from a value of just over 1.2 for those countries who have never
gone under these programs to a value of about 1.0. While this drop is smaller it
reflects the fact that at least a few countries with long exposure to IMF programs
moved from occasionally to frequently extra-judicially killing their citizens.
Fig. 1 The impact of years
under IMF programs on the
frequency of use of torture
1981–2003. Low scores indicate
more extra judicial killing. Full
scale ranges from zero to two
IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003
67
Fig. 2 The impact of years
under IMF Programs on the
frequence of extra judicial killing 1981–2003. Low Scores indicate more extra judicial killing.
Full scale ranges from zero to
two
We also generated predictions about the human rights situation in developing
countries using the PTS measure. Figure 3 displays the relationship of the level of
exposure to IMF programs over the 1981–2003 period and its impact on the human
rights situation in developing countries. The intercepts in this case indicates that
developing countries have a value of just over 3.4 on our inverted PTS scale. While
this mean score falls within two categories, the PTS descriptions give a good
indication of the human rights situation in developing countries that have not
undertaken IMF programs. A score of three on the PTS scale is described as follows
“There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment.
Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited
detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted” (Gibney et al.
2007). Our initial score suggests that the conditions are somewhat better than a value
of three on the PTS scale. In comparison a score of 4 on our inverted scale would
correspond to an original PTS score of two described as follows: “There is a limited
Fig. 3 The impact of years
under IMF programs on political terror scale 1981–2003. PTS
scale inverted. Lower Scores
indicate more terror. Full scale
ranges from one to five
68
M.R. Abouharb, D.L. Cingranelli
amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are
affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare” (Gibney et al.
2007). Thus our baseline resides in between these two descriptions.
Countries that spend the entire period of our study under IMF programs have
scores which drop in value by about 0.4 to a mean of 3.1. This corresponds to
almost a value of four on the original PTS scale which would be described as
follows: “Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of
the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life.
In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves
in politics or ideas” (Gibney et al. 2007). This description corresponds with our
earlier findings that the impacts of IMF programs may well shift countries from
being occasional violators of physical integrity rights to becoming frequent violators
of these rights.
7 Discussion
The findings of this study showed that longer exposure to IMF programs was
associated with more frequent use of torture and extra judicial killing by
governments and worsened human rights conditions (as indicated by lower Political
Terror Scale scores). The other important substantive finding was that recent
reforms of IMF lending have not led to better human rights impacts. To the
contrary, the Political Terror Scale findings indicated that longer exposure to IMF
programs between 1999 and 2003 led to worsened human rights conditions in
developing countries. This is the first study to compare the human rights effects of
IMF programs before and after some reforms in IMF lending took effect in the late
1990s.
These findings support criticisms of the IMF that are common in the case study
literature. They are generally consistent with the findings of previous comparative
and case study research on the human rights effects of IMF programs (Franklin
1997; Keith and Poe 2000; McClaren 1998; Pion-Berlin 1984). The variation in the
effects of programs across the four human rights practices examined illustrates the
usefulness of using disaggregated measures of human rights violations as advocated
by McCormick and Mitchell (1997) rather than simply focusing on indices of respect
for human rights. They are also consistent with our previous findings concerning the
separate effects of World Bank programs (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006) and joint
effects of World Bank and IMF programs on human rights practices (Abouharb and
Cingranelli 2007). The evidence from all studies has pointed to the negative effects
of program lending by either or both the World Bank and IMF on government
respect for physical integrity rights in developing countries.
Why would governments be more likely to torture and extra judicially kill their
citizens as a result of longer exposure to IMF programs, but not be more likely to
make them disappear, or imprison them for their political beliefs? It would be a
mistake to attach much significance to the type of human right that was protected
less. To a large extent various types of physical integrity rights abuse are
interchangeable or substitutable tools of repression available to the state. A
government can choose to politically imprison and torture its citizens or it can
IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003
69
simply have its security forces kill them. Which tool it uses is probably determined
most by what it can afford and what behavior is most beneficial to the government’s
maintenance of political control. What is important is that there was a statistically
significant increase in two types of physical integrity right abuse associated with
longer exposure to IMF programs.
Why IMF program lending has any negative human rights consequences is less
clear and a more important subject for future research. We argued for some new
theoretical linkages between longer exposure to IMF programs and worsened
government respect for security rights. These theoretical arguments are as important
as the empirical findings. In our earlier work, our theory linked implementation of
the common provisions of IMF programs to hardships on the poor, discontent,
rebellion, and then repression (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007). Critics questioned
the causal argument, because some previous studies have shown that many IMF
programs were not fully implemented. In this work, we argued that, even if the
liberalization and privatization provisions of programs were not fully implemented,
partial implementation could have been sufficient to cause discontent. Even if no
provisions of IMF agreements were implemented, negotiation of programs could
have caused greater government repression by reducing the need for governments to
raise revenue through taxes on their populations; angering citizens who prefer that
their government not cede sovereignty to foreign powers; and/or causing citizen
expectations to outpace improvements in economic conditions. These causal
arguments are not mutually exclusive. All of them could contribute to our
understanding of how and why the existence of IMF programs causes discontent
and stimulates repression in developing countries. Our previous research provides
evidence that longer exposure to conditional lending is associated with higher levels
of political discontent and violent political conflict in developing countries
(Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007). But more research will be required to determine
which of the causal mechanisms or which combination of causal mechanisms, on
average, best explains why.
More generally, these findings provide additional evidence that transnational
actors including international financial institutions affect the human rights practices
of governments. Most previous studies of repression of human rights have focused
mainly on state-level characteristics such as a country’s wealth or level of
democracy. The results of this study suggest that greater attention should be given
to transnational causal forces in developing theories that explain the human rights
practices of governments. International organizations such as the IMF, the World
Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the International Labor Organization are
sources of policies that may affect the human rights practices of governments that
choose to participate. Scholars have only begun to explore those impacts.
The IMF should be concerned about the human rights consequences of program
lending. The IMF is a specialized agency of the United Nations. The United Nations
Charter states that the two main goals of that organization are to protect world peace
and to ensure that governments’ protect the human rights of their citizens. No
organization created by the United Nations should undertake activities that
undermine either of the parent organization’s two most important missions.
Moreover, previous research has shown that a relatively high level of respect for
some human rights, including physical integrity rights, is a necessary precondition
70
M.R. Abouharb, D.L. Cingranelli
for economic development (Kaufman 2004). Thus, if IMF programs undermine
respect for human rights, they also undermine the effort to promote economic
development around the world.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank David Clark, Axel Dreher, David Sobek, Randall Stone
and James Vreeland for their comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. This research was supported
by a grant (No.SES-0318273) from the Political Science Division of the National Science Foundation.
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