Aviation Working Team Meeting
October 18, 2005
9:00 AM – 2:00 PM PST
Agenda
Topic
Presenter
Time
Review minutes from last meeting
All
0:15
Aviation Frequency Management
All
0:30
National Interagency Aviation Council Update
Jim
0:30
Aviation Training for 2006
Clay
0:30
Medivac Lessons Learned
Clay
0:30
All
0:15
Clay
0:05
All
0:30
Geographic Additional Aviation Resources
Policy Matrix
Agency Updates
Attendees: Clay Hillin (Chair NPS), Jim Ziobro (Vice-Chair ODF), Jon Rollens (USFS), Gary
Sterling (USFS), Greg Loper (BLM), Ted Stevens (BIA), Eric Hagen (FWS), Bill Lafferty (ODF).
Minutes Review. Here is and update to the minutes from our last meeting
 There were no issues related to leadplane use with non-authorized airtankers. This was a
change from the previous year where leadplanes were prohibited from
leading/coordinating with non-authorized airtankers.
 The BLM/BIA contracted CL-215 didn’t come to the Pacific Northwest this season. They
remained in Alaska up to the time they were transferred back to the Northeast.
 Considerable discussion was paid to the new HELM mnemonic for Helicopter Manager.
The process by which these changes are made is convoluted and the AWT is concerned
about this as it relates to other changes we will see in the future.
Additional Topics
Aircraft Interagency Incident response:
This past summer there was an incident that had Interagency implications (FS SEAT base on a
FS contract through AMD working for the County and State) that pointed to a need to resolve
these issues at the Aviation Working Team level. Near Pendleton a fire on county land protected
by WADNR required the use of the SEAT from Pendleton. This aircraft is on an exclusive use
contract for the Forest Service administered by the DOI. The pilot had a problem with the landing
which put the aircraft out of commission for awhile and the FS went to investigate this incident.
Gary Sterling the R-6 Regional Aviation Safety Manager did the investigation on the incident.
NTSB was notified and didn’t consider it an accident. The Unit had things pretty well together, but
was unable to get a hold of WADNR. A report was completed on the incident. When Dave Doan
was finally contacted it was noted that he had not been contacted regarding the incident even
though his agency was in operational control of the aircraft. Dave Doan concluded that WADNR
didn’t have to do anything further in either the investigation or reporting. Gary’s report went to
Dave without any recommendations, but WADNR later requested them. As a result we in the
AWT see a clear need to work out a protocol and process for future incidents of this nature. AMD
didn’t take the steps necessary in this incident as far as the agency clearing the pilot to fly again,
because the next day after this incident the pilot reported to fly another aircraft on a different
contract. This one was a Forest Service contract flying ATGS missions. When he showed up for
ATGS contract the pilot was interviewed and assessed the pilot’s attitude toward flying and
decided that he was okay to fly In this sense the USFS did what they determined was necessary
to clear the pilot to fly the ATGS mission.
Page 1 of 5
Recommendation for Notification – It is proposed to have the aircraft desk at NWCC
call everyone in the list of AWT members when they are notified of an aircraft incident
with potential or accident. The FS RASTM will determine which agency has the lead,
i.e. who’s incident/accident is it, for the investigation. We will also advise all PNW Units
to include NWCC in the Unit’s contact list for notification of Agency Aviation Managers.
The Chair will take this recommendation to the PNWCG Steering Committee.
Aviation Frequency Management: NMAC Interagency Fire Radio Frequency
The NMAC Strategic Plan has not been widely distributed, even though it is being distributed via
a web link at http://www.nifc.gov/nicc/administrative/nmac/radio_com/radio_rpt.html
Clay read through some of the action items in this plan to the group, which included; Pilots are to
be tested on their ability to use these radios during the carding process, refreshers and
workshops will need to include specific training on the use and programming of radios as a
required part of the curriculum. The group will include this training in their sessions this year.
Emphasis should be made that narrow or wide and how the radio is actually programmed to be
used on the correct frequency.
States will be required to comply with Narrowband by 2013. The FS/BLM Fire and Aviation
Leadership Team (FALT) meeting will be addressing these issues. Greg advised that Montana
had the same issues and that their cooperators are not equipped for narrowband. They got the
okay to use the Montana DNR frequency for IA air to ground. Need secondary frequency for
zones. The AWT reviewed the current Aviation Frequency Guide and agree that the guide’s
current format is fine indicating that the frequencies are wide or narrowband. Users may however,
get confused so we will add a column to depict narrow or wideband and for narrow band
frequencies depict four digits beyond the decimal point and three behind the point of wideband
frequencies.
Air Guard tone guard is not well understood. Glen Johnston (FS) is taking this to the NIFC group.
Greg will take this to the BLM National Meeting. BIA was given an extension to 2007 to convert
their systems to narrowband. Colville BIA, however, has the capability to change over now. In
the short term we will have to be vigilant about this issue. STAT teams were of great benefit at
getting personnel trained in the field.
National Interagency Aviation Council Update
Jim passed out several handouts. Gray areas exist between policy and operational issues at the
policy level. It is not clear yet what the charge for this council is. The group has been formed but
the direction and support for the group is unclear. There are many papers being issued and
projects underway. Recent work involved; Katrina aircraft use decisions, interagency aviation
Strategy, Airtankers and informational issues, and BLM Fire Aircraft acquisition strategy. Jim is
the representative for the States, but thinks that we in the AWT need to be discussing these
issues concurrently. Currently there is a new airtanker study being undertaken. Phase 1 is a
snapshot in time and is no big deal. The phase 2 is tied to NATS 3 which will tell us what the
right mix of aircraft should be. Don Carlton, who was on the original NATS, is working on
updating NATS 2 to 3. This study wasn’t well thought out, but had a deadline and is being
worked to be complete by then. Jim’s goal is to provide this working team with the information
and for us to identify and discuss issues.
Aviation Training for 2006 IAT:
ACE April 3 – 7 2006 Spokane, WA
Aviation Awareness sessions are no longer being planned. What we are transitioning to is a
series of workshops (UAO, RT-372, etc.) that will include IAT 200 and 300 level courses.
RT-372 – ODF seasonal. Refresher needs to be shorter. S-372 ODF 10, is being considered.
Medivac Lessons Learned
Page 2 of 5
Dave Doan had shared their Lesson Learned from R-340 Medivac Incident with the working team
although he was not present at the meeting. As we looked over this material it is apparent that
each helispot needs to be managed somehow. There are any numbers of solutions, but mainly is
there a manager available to manage a first time in? The material in this handout needs to get
into the Operations arena perhaps as a six minutes for safety briefing item. Jon will hand out at
the FALT Meeting, and others will use this at the training sessions that they are planning to
attend. We will also add this to the agenda at our next AWT meeting for Dave Doan to share his
vision of the use of this information.
Geographic Additional Aviation Resources
As we look to the future of the coming season, it is the working team’s opinion that we are back to
a normal quota of airtankers. The question begs, do we need to gear up for additional
resources? This will be discussed in the FS. ODF is planning to putting on two airtankers next
year again as they have the past two years. Their strategy depends on what feds will approve
again. ODF focus is on where the airtankers are parked day to day. If the airtankers are taken
somewhere else as they are national resources, ODF is not sure that they can get airtankers
support when they need them. Bill Lafferty doesn’t think that IA is adequately covered with the
national strategy and only 20 airtankers available. Concerns are also voiced about what aircraft
the Feds will contract, and what would be left for ODF to contract. S-3’s are being looked at
again for airtankers. The AWT is planning to update the plan for 2006 depending on what
additional airtankers will be coming.
Policy Matrix
Update Helicopter manager to add note for multiple helicopters
SEAT Performance:
We are again covering familiar ground in that we are using aircraft that are being flown out of
where they were designed to be flown. Ag planes are designed for flat open spaces with low to
no wind or turbulence encounters. This is compared to the SEAT missions that are taking these
aircraft into mountainous terrain that have strong up and down drafts and quite variable wind
conditions. SEAT Pilots don’t have the planning information they need to know what their engine
power requirements are or what the aircraft is capable of carrying. The FS is still looking at
requiring charts for predicting performance along with maneuverability. At the present time the
802 is the only one that has the data. Pat Norbury is going to NIAC with this to get support.
Aviation Web Sites:
Clay will continue to update the Aviation Working Team website, and will mentor Scott Dewitz to
be able to update this and other FS/BLM websites.
Agency Updates
ODF
Jim Ziobro passed along a handout with 2005 Airtanker Fire Statistics. ODF had very good
results at the bases they operated from. The wished to extend a thanks to leadplanes at,
Redmond and Medford for support. ODF is planning to have a similar contract strategy next year.
The ASM flew nine fires, and could have been used on seven more. They didn’t get released
from AK soon enough to suit the state. They contracted five type 2 helicopters in August for 30
days. These were all federally carded and worked out all right. There is so much interagency mix
any more that not just one agency will be involved. The State wants their contracted aircraft to be
federally carded as well so that can be used by everyone. Having state resources complicates
the system. The Federal severity resources provided a lot of aircraft that were available to
supplement the State’s needs. AK had to be asked numerous times to send the bill so that FEMA
could be used to pay for the aircraft they received from them.
Page 3 of 5
USFS
RAO council meeting notes included; PPE requirements for tactical aircraft are being revisited as
a result of the accident last year, performance carding for pilots, certifications for new pilots.
There is a need to for each pilot to be able to produce a verification of total time in each aircraft,
and how this is accomplished is still up in the air. Inspectors have found vendors lying about
pilot’s time. The accident involving PSD Operation in Texas revealed that the pilot had only 300
hours. Procurement is looking at regionally contracting for medium helicopters in addition to the
national process that exists now.
Competitive sourcing for aviation resources is underway for the Forest Service. Bob Kuhn will
head up this for the agency, and will be working out of Boise. There are at least 500 positions that
need to be studied. Everyone is being considered in the study including pilots, smokejumpers,
rapellers, etc. The Aviation Safety Manager is the only position identified by the executive board
that won’t be considered in the study. The Exhibit 300 is ongoing and will tell us what
organization should look like. OMB is the agency that looks at this to give an approval or not.
Jon is heading a group to come up with an Aviation Doctrine for the FS. Contracted aircraft will
have to be calculated the stresses for our use which impacts their 135 operating certificates.
Airworthiness; 17 Airtankers were available this season, P 3 is limited to 19,000 hours, P-2V has
a wing inspection program which runs $3,000 to $ 500,000 per aircraft as well as a 15,000 hour
limit. The Beechcraft King Air flight manual states that the aircraft can’t be used outside their
design intent. Raytheon is charging $30,000 to provide this. There is a feasibility study
underway for 20 S-3 aircraft to be used as airtankers. An Aviation business system is being
proposed. Bob Roth is looking at interconnected applications to populate numerous forms. It will
be nice when we get there.
Regional updates; 10 pilots on staff with 2 vacancies that will be held until the 300/competitive
sourcing is completed, Mike Cook from Alaska received a lateral transfer to the Maintenance
position in behind Mike Brady, who passed away this summer from natural causes. The Cert for
Avionics Maintenance position held presently by Dennis Morentin, who is planning to retire is
available. The Helicopter Program Manager Position (vice Kim Reed) is on the street now.
Aviation Security – assessments are needed. Eric Schilling will come up with a needs analysis. .
BLM
Greg Loper is detailed in. Flight hours are down from the 5 year average. Three of the four
exclusive use helicopters got assignments out of the region this year. There is a budget proposal
from NAO for reduced budgets for aircraft to save money. Next week this will be spent working
through the details in Boise. BLM anticipate some cuts and compromises to be made from the
original proposal. A module for a task force was used this year and will be used as a model for
future developments. What was the success of this task force? Tactically was great were it went
and was supplementing what the units already had. It was hard to track were or why they were
being sent. The proposal really complicates interagency agreements.
BIA
The northwest had a pretty quiet year consisting of a number of small fires. BIA took a $5 Million
cut this year that took $200,000 off each unit’s budget. Exclusive use contracts are looking to go
to CWN as a result. There will be a reallocation of SEATs to other areas. Yakima may have one
next year. Warm Springs is being looked at for having one assigned.
FWS
Had a busy season and could have used the scoopers if available. Flew more this year than last
two years combined. We can’t obligate money to AMD anymore for contracts. The money got
Page 4 of 5
away from them in the budget process and they may be back to severity to support the SEAT.
They are committed to upgrading their program.
NPS
Clay is the new Regional Aviation Manager for the Pacific West Region. Most of the work with
the Park Service will be for non-fire applications. The North Cascades National Park is trying to
validate their Short-haul program. Mount Rainer is going out for a CWN contract for SAR. IN
September North Cascades, Mount Rainer and Olympic Parks completed a Mountain Goat
collaring project that went well.
The next meeting will be January 10, 2006 at the Gifford-Pinchot Supervisors Office in
Vancouver, WA.
Attachments;
Lessons Learned from R-340
2005 ODF Airtanker Fire Statistics
Interagency Aviation Strategy from the NIAC
NIAC Conference Call Notes from 10/7/05
PNWCG Aviation Policy Matrix
Page 5 of 5
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Date document finalized: September 2, 2005
LESSONS LEARNED FROM R-340 MEDIVAC INCIDENT
Second HUD Incident, July 13, 2005
Introduction
This document follows review and examination of a medivac incident that occurred on
July 13, 2005 on the Second HUD wildfire, located in Northeast Region. The intention is
to highlight specific areas in which DNR can and will make planning, operational and
logistical improvements for the purpose of improving safe and effective fire aviation
operations.
The principal author of the discussion section was Paul Balfour, and Dan Boyle provided
a preliminary investigation report. Other contributions came from Loren Torgenson,
Gary Berndt, Dave Doan, Roger Autry, Joel Rogauskus, and Joe Shramek.
Background
On July 13, 2005, WADNR Helicopter 340 (Rotor 340) was on detail assignment in
Northeast Region, with the helicopter and helitack crew based in Omak. The helicopter
had been released from the Second Hud incident but was used on occasion for bucket
drops for the Type 3 Organization. Control and dispatching of the helicopter was to have
been through WADNR Northeast Region (NE) dispatch.
At approximately 1630 hours a fire fighter became “unresponsive” with heat exhaustion
on the fireline. In an effort to transport the firefighter to a medical facility as quickly as
possible, a Division Supervisor (DIVS) assigned to the incident made direct radio
communication with Rotor 340 and requested a medivac mission be flown. No attempt
was made to contact NE dispatch and no communication took place with Command on
the incident. The pilot and crew accepted the assignment and responded to the incident.
The crew included two EMTs.
Rotor 340 was directed to land at a previously used area for dropping blivets. As Rotor
340 attempted to land at the helispot, the DIVS approached the helicopter before it
touched down from the right aft area carrying the fire fighter “fireman” style. The pilot
and crew directed the DIVS to the front and left of the aircraft and the patient was loaded
and flown to the Brewster Hospital. Omak hospital was a closer medical facility, but
Brewster was listed first in the ICS 206 Incident Medical Plan.
On July 14, 2005, Dan Boyle was assigned to gather information needed by management
to assess and respond to those issues. His report was completed on July 18th. On the 18th ,
Loren Torgenson and staff began to gather additional information, and Paul Balfour was
tasked with compiling a summary “Lessons Learned” report. That report was completed
on July 22nd .
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Date document finalized: September 2, 2005
What follows is largely based on Paul’s report. It is limited in scope to learning
opportunities and recommendations, and does not represent the full suite of actions taken
by DNR in response to this incident.
Discussion
1) “Was an emergency air evacuation warranted given the
circumstances?”
Comments: Based on reports of the incident, fire line personnel clearly believed the fire
fighter’s condition to be life threatening. Given these circumstances and the fact that it
would have been at least two hours for ground transport to the nearest hospital, it was a
rational decision to seek transport by air.
Lessons learned: EMTs and fireline personnel were notified and made patient
assessments by radio. Decisions based on these radio conversations were made to
extract the patient by air and not by physical examination of the fire fighter. With
the limited information and knowledge on scene, this was the right decision for this
situation!
2) Given the decision to transport by air, were procedures followed to
insure the DNR helicopter was the appropriate available resource and
was the mission possible and safe?
Comments: Fire line personnel made the decision to transport by air, however no
communication with NE occurred to determine the availability of mission specific
aircraft with medical specialist and an ETA. Other aircraft may have been available, but
apparently were not considered.
When Rotor 340 was contacted and requested for a medivac mission it does not appear
there were communications between fire line personnel, aircraft managers and pilot to
plan the mission, i.e. who was ground contact, when and who would load the injured fire
fighter, who would control and manage the landing zone, etc.
Also having a DNR rotor performing missions for an incident but not assigned to the
incident team produced confusion both from the aircraft personnel and incident
management personnel with respect to who really had control of the aircraft.
Lessons Learned: Basic Risk Management and Risk Assessment procedures were
not in place to determine the most appropriate method of extraction. Basic
procedures are developed and used to maintain firefighter safety! Clear lines of
resource allocation and responsibility are needed to determine the appropriate
available resource. Pre-planning of medivac missions with the 5 Ws could help to
make the Risk Management and Risk Assessment process more successful.
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Date document finalized: September 2, 2005
3) “The serious issues with how people on the ground approached the
helicopter as it came into the landing zone…”
Comments: Symptomatic of this was the DIVS carrying the firefighter, approaching
Rotor 340 from the aft prior to R-340 being set down on the ground. No one on the
ground appeared to be in charge of the landing operation of R-340. The helispot had been
used to sling in blivets prior to this incident, but never had R-340 actually landed at the
site.
Lessons Learned: As an incident within an incident, there was no one person who
seem to have command of the situation. Everyone seemed to have their “head down”
and not taking a step back to look at the big picture of the exposure, risk and
mitigation to the firefighters within the incident. Our exposure of firefighters
working around DNR helicopters has increased 50-60% since we have expanded our
fleet. As an example to mitigate this, Northeast Region has provided the
BEHO/SAF training on a limited basis to our Highlands 20 and the North Columbia
handcrews.
4) “Incident medical plan lacked some important information that could
have helped in this situation.”
Comments: Formal medical plans are not required on Type 3 incidents. However,
Northeast Region has developed a template plan for use on Type 3 incidents by District,
and is commended for doing so. These plans can be modified at each incident to provide
the most efficient procedure to accomplish the specific medical need After reviewing the
medical plan of the IAP for Second HUD, 07/11/05, it appears some additional
information would have helped in this situation:
a) Hospitals listed by priority, closest first,
b) Latitudes and longitudes for each facility. This would allow a pilot to pre-program
GPS and identify. When an incident occurs they would just punch up the name or
location of the hospital, point and fly.
c) Other boxes not checked, i.e., travel by airtime, travel by ground time, helipads
(yes, no), Burn Center (yes, no).
A Medical Unit Leader or someone with medical background should be involved in
completing the ICS 206 to have a comprehensive plan.
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Date document finalized: September 2, 2005
Lessons Learned: Medical Plans are not detailed enough for each specific Type 3
Organization. It would be beneficial to add information to the Medical Plan such as
closest hospital first, Lat/Long for each hospital, travel time by air, travel time by
ground, helipads and their size, radio frequencies, and location of the nearest burn
centers. This information will help engage fireline personnel, helicopter managers,
pilots into developing scenarios on how incidents like these should be carried out
safely.
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National Interagency Fire Center
3838 S. Development Avenue
Boise, Idaho 83705
August 12, 2005
Interagency Aviation Strategy
The National Fire and Aviation Executive Board (NFAEB) has directed the National
Interagency Avia tion Council (NIAC) to develop a strategy that will guide the
acquisition and use of aviation resources in supporting the wildland fire operations
requirements of the federal wildland fire agencies for the next 15-20 years. This will
necessitate a three-phase approach:
Phase 1: Overview of existing aviation doctrine; overall mission requirements, and
diversity of aviation assets available to complete the mission; the role of the
federal and state governments in the utilization and management of aviation assets;
and infrastructure and technology needed into the future.
Phase 2: Development of alternatives for an interagency aviation program
including looking at the diversity of assets available as well as an analysis of
impacts of Government-owned/ government operated (GOGO), government
owned/contractor operated (LOCO) and contractor owned/contractor operated
(COCO) models of management. This will include an analysis of the economics
and trade-offs of these options.
Phase 3: A detailed analysis of alternatives to determine appropriate numbers,
mix of aircraft types as determined by identified mission requirements,
infrastructure to-support the aviation operations, methods to fully integrate state
cooperators, desired improvements in technology, and improvements to the
command and control structure, process and procedures.
The strategy will enable the NFAEB to answer four key questions on our aviation
program:
1. How many and what type of assets do we need to meet the agencies' mission?
2. How will we contract or p rocure aircraft?
3. How do we fund these aviation assets?
4. How do we best organize and manage the assets of an interagency aviation
program?
5.
Operational guidance and management will flow from this strategy.
Interagency Aviation Strategy-Phase 1
This document defines the broad strategy that will guide the acquisition and
use of aviation resources in supporting the wildland fire operations requirements of
the federal wildland fire agencies f o r the next 15 -20 years.
Subsequent phases of this strategy will identify organizational, procurement
and management options, and a detailed implementation strategy.
Doctrine
The following is the doctrine that will guide the acquisition and management
of aviation resources for wildland fire operations.
Aviation resources are one of a number of tools available to accomplish
fire related land management objectives. Their use has value only if that
use serves to accomplish the mission.
In order to maximize e ffectiveness and efficiency, aviation resources must
be centrally controlled and de -centrally executed.
Aviation resources very seldom work independently of ground based
resources. When aviation and ground resources are jointly engaged, the
effect must be complimentary and serve as a force multiplier
The effect of aviation resources on a fire is directly proportional to the
speed at which the resource (s) can initially engage the fire, and the
effective capacity of the aircraft. These factors are magnified by flexibility
in prioritization, mobility, positioning, and utilization of the versatility of
many types of aircraft.
Aviation use must be prioritized based on management objectives and
probability of success.
Risk management is a necessary requirement for the use of any aviation
resource. That risk management process must include the risk to ground
resources, and the risk of not performing the mission, as well as the risk to
the aircrew.
Aviation Mission Requirements
Aviation performs services in support of the wildland fire management
program. All of these missions can be performed by non-aviation assets. However, in
many situations aviation provides the most effective, most efficient and safest method
to complete the mission.
Intelligence Gathering: This mission includes: fire detection, ongoing fire
assessment, fuels assessment, resource location and placement and safety lookout.
Supply Delivery: This includes delivery of food, water, pumps, hose, gas, etc.
by helicopter and fixed wing.
Personnel Movement: This includes helicopter movement of crews, overhead,
helitack and rapp ellers, as well as smokejumpers from fixed wing.
Suppressant/Retardant Delivery: Fixed wing (Large Airtankers OATS), Single Engine
Air Tankers (SEAT'S), water scoopers) and helicopters can deliver water, water with
foam or other water enhancer and water with retardant to the fire line. These products are
intended to either extinguish the fire or retard fire growth.
Command and Control: This mission utilizes Lead Planes, Aerial Supervision
Modules (ASM) and Air Tactical Group Supervisors (ATGS) to provide command and
control of aerial resources assigned to the fire, as well as coordination and direction of
ground forces engaged in suppression operations.
Aerial Ignition : Using Plastic Sphere Dispensers (PSDs) or helitorchs,
helicopters conduct aerial ignitions in both suppression and prescribed fire
operations.
Sources
The current federal fleet is a mix of government owned government operated and
vendor owned/vendor operated aircraft. This fleet is often supplemented by state
operated aircraft.
There are relatively few government owned/ government operated aircraft in the
agencies' fleet. These are most often special use aircraft such as smokejumper and lead
planes. Having a small number of government owned aircraft aids contracting officers in
contract negotiations with private vendors.
There are currently a few aircraft operated as vendor owned -government
operated; and there are no government owned-vendor operated aircraft in the federal
fleet.
Vendor owned and operated aircraft provide the bulk of the aviation
resources. These are procured through a variety of contracting methods with the
major categories being exclusive use and call when needed (CWN). Exclusive use
aircraft are the base organization, with CWN being used for surge capability.
Generally exclusive use aircraft contract availability and flight rates are less
expensive than those for t he same make/model CWN aircraft. The vendor fleet is
provided by a variety of companies, ranging from a vendor with one aircraft, to
vendors that supply multiple aircraft. This situation makes contrac t
administration, inspections , carding and monitoring of operations more labor and
time intensive than contracting with one entity to provide all aircraft. The diversity
of vendors does allow for more flexibility in acquiring aircraft that are a better fit
for the geography, fire behavior, topography and length of season, than would a
single vendor.
Diversity of Aircraft Types
Diversity of the fleet means a mix of types of aircraft with specific mission
strengths that provide a toolbox for fire managers to use with specific fire situations
they face. Factors which determine which aviation resource are utilized on a
particular fire include: speed, range, and capacity, suitability for the terrain,
operating altitude and suitability for the mission. The diversity model allows managers
to apply the "right tool to the job".
*Large Air Tankers (LATS), including C -130 equipped with Modular Airborne
Fire Fighting Systems (MAFFS), have the advantage of speed and capacity to the
target. Their range allows for rapid dep loyment over long distances enabling them to
re-enforce operations across geographic boundaries. They also deliver large amounts
of water/retardant in one mission, often in locations where other options are
unavailable.
*Single Engine Airtankers (SEATS) have the advantage of mobility and
maneuverability. The infrastructure required to fuel and load SEATs is relatively
minimal in terms of size and cost. This allows SEATs to operate close to the fire,
shortening turn-around times and thereby increasing effectiveness. Due to their
small size and aerodynamics, SEATs are capable of great accuracy in rough terrain.
*Water Scoopers have the advantage of speed and capacity, when there are
appropriate water sources close to the fire site.
* Smoke jumper aircraft have the advantage of range, mobility, accuracy and
are able to be easily positioned close to known or expected fire activity. They
deliver firefighters and supplies quickly, especially to remote fires. Their mobility
allows for rapid re-enforcement of emerging fires.
* Helicopters have the advantage of large and sustained capacity for personnel
and cargo movement. Helicopter delivery of firefighters, either helitack or rappellers,
and supplies has the advantage of speed and a ccuracy. Helicopters have the versatility
for multiple missions including personnel and cargo movement, command and control
and aerial ignition operations.
*Helicopter delivery of water/retardant has the advantage of accuracy, speed
and capacity, if water sources are close to the fire site.
*Recon/Aerial Supervision aircraft have the advantage of speed, range, flight
time and accuracy.
Diversity of Make/Model
In acquiring aircraft, through purchase and/or exclusive use contracting, diversity
of make and model is critical. Allowing any single element of the aviation resource
list to he dominated by one make and model of aircraft puts that entire element at
danger of shutdown when and if an airworthiness issue is raised with that particular
make and model of aircraft. Reliance on one make/model aircraft also limits the
leverage the government has in managing contract costs with vendors. The
maintenance, parts supply and other efficienci es that private enterprise might gain
from operating one make and model aircraft are unlikely to be achieved in a fleet of the
size and composition of the one that wildland agencies manage.
Role of the Federal Government
Given the amount and distribution of federally managed land nationwide that is
susceptible to wildland fires, and the need to efficiently move resources across state
lines in response to actual and predicted fire occurrence; acquiring, organizing, and
managing aviation resources on a national basis under leadership of the federal
government is the most effective and efficient method. A more thoughtful division of
labor between the various agencies: Forest Service, BLM, BIA. NPS, FWS and DDINational Business Center (NBC), as well as State an d Military Partners, in contracting,
inspection, carding, administration and program management will result in greater
efficiency for all agencies. An example of this efficiency is the current system whereby
the Forest Service performs all these functions for large airtankers, and DOI performs
all these functions for SEATs.
Role of State Governments
State governments are autonomous: therefore they will always he constrained to
some degree by state policies, law, and political realities in their ability to fully
integrate with a national system. However, standardization of necessary interagency
agreements, inspection procedures and requirements, pilot and aircraft requirements,
funding arrangements and operational procedures will result in greater effectiveness
and efficiency of states resources when a state is willing and able to make them
available. Federal hurdles to maximum standardization must be quickly addressed, and
resolved, to the extent possible.
Utilization of Aviation Resources
The very nature of aviation resources (speed and mobility) makes local control of
these resources a less than optimal model. Organizing under the doctrinal principle that
aviation should be centrally controlled and decentrally executed will yield maximum
flexibility, effectiveness and efficiency. A centrally controlled process relics on
intelligence monitoring of the numbers and types of aircraft operating, the make-up of
the surge capability, the observed fire occurrence and fire behavior, and the predicted
tire occurrence in order to allocate resources on a reasoned priority basis. Once
assigned to an area or incident, the tactical application of those resources will be
decentrally executed. However, to maintain the flexibility necessary to respond to
changes in the fire environment and related priorities, central control must have the
ability to re-assign resources as necessary. Current command and control
organizations (including dispatch systems), philosophy, and procedures will be
modified in order to maximize this efficiency.
Aviation resources are utilized on all types of incidents, from small two person
smokejumper fires to mega-fires. As with all suppression resources, aviation resources
have their most effect and are most efficient while engaged in initial attack ( I.A.)
operations. The effect of their speed to target, and mobility is maximized in these I.A.
operations. The cost/benefit ratio is much less clear when aircraft are engaged in
extended attack and large fire operations. Current operating procedures allow these
fires to order and receive essentially unlimited aviation resources until such time as
few or no such resources are available. Few tools exist to adequately analyze those
cost benefit relationships. These relationships are further complicated by the different
roles aircraft play on large incidents. Helicopters are used for both
personnel/equipment movement and bucket work. Analyzing the trade offs between
moving personnel/equipment by ground versus air is relatively easy. Assessing the
relative value of helicopter bucket work, and CAM's and S I A I - retardant delivery is
much more difficult. Analytic tools capable of focusing on this particular issue need
to be developed.
Infrastructure
The infrastructure necessary to support any of the aviation elements must be
included in any decision as to the numbers, location and utilization of that particular
resource. Aviation resources that require significant capital investment, software,
analysis and training in order to be fully functional are by nature less flexible than
those that require little or no investment. Analysis of the optimum mix and number of
aircraft will include these costs. Adopting the model tha t maximizes mobility and
flexibility has a direct impact on the necessary infrastructure. In this model, air tanker
bases and helibases, become less permanent homes and more temporary filling stations
that may not see an aviation resource for long portions of the fire season, if at all.
Capital improvements and staffing will be designed based on this reality.
Emerging Technology
Opportunities exist to improve effectiveness and efficiency of aviation
operations by aggressively pursuing new technology.
Unmanned Aviation Vehicles (UAVs) hold potential for use in fire detection ,
perimeter mapping, fire behavior assessment and command and control operations. A
unified interagency effort to define the needs, integrate with technology providers and
evaluate proposals should be initiated as soon as possible.
The current system for evaluating and qualifying retardant/ foam/water enhancers
is in need of review. The current process to obtain certification for any particular product
is viewed by some as unacceptably slow and cumbersome. Processes to evaluate and
review new products must be simple, responsive, and not redundant to studies done by
other governmental agencies. The goal is to provide safe, effective chemicals for
delivery from aerial platforms as soon as practical.
Effective centralized control is predicated on timely and accurate intelligence.
Current methods do a poor job of providing such intelligence. Knowledge of how many
hours each aircraft is flying is central to the ability to prioritize that aircrafts use.
Automated reporting of flight time is a necessary tool for both command and control and
contract administration.
Additional improvements in automated load calculations for helicopters and
automatic helicopter ordering tools are currently underway and need to be brought to
fruition.
Summary
Aviation will remain a critical element of fire operations for the foreseeable
future. When exercised within established doctrine; the use of aviation resources
complements the actions of grou nd resources, multiplies the effect of those resources on
the suppression action, provides a critical margin of safety and lowers total suppression
costs.
Subsequent phases of this strategy will identify the appropriate number and mix
of aircraft by mission type. the infrastructure required to support operations, methods to
fully integrate state cooperators, desired improvements in technology, and improvements
to the command and control structure, process and procedure,
PNWCG Aviation Policy Standards Matrix
Revised October 18, 2005
Document summarizes interagency operations policy and guidance. The Matrix is a living document that is updated
continually. In-house (single-agency) operations may vary with in each agency. It is imperative that aviation personnel
receive a thorough briefing on agency policy prior to the operational implementation of aircraft on any incident or project.
Questions regarding these policies should be directed to Working Team Members and reference to specific agency policy
documents.
GENERAL AIR
OPERATIONS
Policy/Procedure
Project Safety Plans
IHOG Adopted as:
Pilot Quals:
4
Federal aircraft/pilot approval
Agency Fleet Aircraft
Exclusive Use Contracts
CWN/non -reimbursable/Coop/ANG/COMPAC
Regular Military3
Flight Crew Hours:
Flight/Duty/Rest Days Off
Aircraft Refueling:
Hot refueling w/approved tank
and closed circuit system
Splash Refueling (not closed
circuit) 5
Flight Following:
DOI
ODF
USFS
WDNR
350-354 DM & OPMs
Yes
1
Policy
Av Procedures Manual
District Safety Plan
Guidance
5700 Manual
Yes
2
Policy
Agency Plan
No
Guidance
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Not Always
Not Always
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Not Always
Not Always
Usually Not
Usually Not
Usually Not
Usually Not
8/14/10 2/14
8/14/10 2/14
8/14/10 2/14
8/14/10 2/14
*7 on the hook
Per Contract
Yes
Per Contract
Yes
Per Contract
Yes
Per Contract
No 6
FAA or 15 min
agency
15 min
FAA or 15 Minutes
agency/AFF
15 min
FAA or 30 Minutes
agency
15 min
Large fire crew
transport per IHOG
Fire Crews
Large fire crew
transport per IHOG
Fire Crews
Per FAA
Exemption
49 CFR 172-175
Per FAA
Exemption
49 CFR 172-175
Yes9
No
Yes9
No
8
No
No
No
Manager/Module
PIC Responsible
Manager/Module
PIC Responsible
Gusts limits by type
Per IHOG
PIC Decision
Gusts limits by type
Per IHOG
Steady 30 knots or 15
knots gust spread
General Flights
Per Bureau
Special Use (higher hazard)
PPE requirements for
helicopter flights:
Nomex flight suit or Nomex
pants and shirt, leather boots,
gloves, and flight helmet7.
Hard Hat may be substituted
for flight helmet for these
exceptions;
Per Bureau/not>1hr
Hazardous Materials
Helicopter Manager/Module
required per each
helicopter
Crew Members Allowed on
Bucket/Sling Flights
Supervised
Landing/Unloading
High Wind Limitations
No
8
8
1
IHOG is Fire Aviation Policy for a ll Bureaus’ i.e. FWS, BLM, BIA, etc., but compliance of individual tribes is tied to federal funding.
Helicopter Flight Manager position does not meet Forest Service standards for helicopter management and is not to be used for any
Forest Service helicopter operations. (Ref: FSH 5109.17).
3
Military and National Guard pilots are required to have a minimum of 500 hours in accordance with the Military Operations Handbook.
4
Federal Employees may only fly aboard aircraft that meet Federal Approval.
5
When approved in the contract and only when ordered by the government.
6
WDNR allows splash hot refueling only in life threatening emergencies only.
7
WDNR allows observation flights when only headsets are available on contract aircraft until flight helmets become available.
8
Aircrew members essential to the activity may be transported internally while carrying external loads under certain circumstances with
approval
9
Managers may manage multiple helicopters w/approval of State/Regional Aviation Manager IAW IHOG.
2
Disclaimer:
This is a working tool only for PNWCG Geographic Area Clarification should be obtained from AWT representative
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