Summary
The Southern periphery and European security
Recent conflicts from Kosovo to Iraq have focused attention on
risks emanating from NATO’s southern periphery. The April 1999
Washington summit deepened this interest by identifying the Mediterranean as an area of special security concern and reaffirming the commitment to the existing Mediterranean Initiative. The thrust of Alliance
strategy, however, is defined in functional rather than geographic
terms, with an emphasis on new missions from countering proliferation
to crisis management, all of which are most likely to be performed in
the south.
Risks in the new strategic environment are transregional. European, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian security are increasingly interwoven, and Europe will be more exposed to the consequences of Western
policies outside of Europe. To the extent that the Alliance directs its
efforts to the defense of common interests and power projection, additional attention will be paid to Southern Region members, the
Mediterranean states involved in partnership and dialogue with
NATO, and the wider region where developments can affect transatlantic security. An evolution in this direction will also serve U.S.
strategic interests, encouraging greater European involvement in defense on the periphery, bolstering the relevance of the U.S. military pre sence in and around Europe, and contributing to U.S. freedom of action
in extra-European crises.
Key security relationships require redefinition. Algeria, Bosnia,
and successive crises in the Gulf have played seminal roles in shaping
security perceptions around the Mediterranean and transatlantic cooperation. But key U.S. security relationships, both bilateral and
through NATO, have not adjusted to reflect post–Cold War realities.
These relationships require redefinition to provide a predictable basis
for cooperation in addressing post–Cold War problems. NATO’s new
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N ATO LOOKS SOUTH
Strategic Concept is helpful in this regard, but is not enough. The
United States needs to explore ways of jointly redefining key bilateral
relationships in the Southern Region through more frequent highlevel interaction with leaderships.
The need for redefinition is most acute in Turkey. Internal uncertainties and multiple security risks (the term “threats” still has
relevance for Ankara) make Turkey the new front-line state within the
Alliance. However, there is no transatlantic consensus on policy toward
Turkey, and longer-term uncertainty in Ankara’s relations with the
European Union (EU) places greater pressure on the bilateral relationship with Washington. Turkey has emerged as a far more important, but also much more difficult security partner. In the absence of a
c o n c e rted effort to reengage Ankara in European security affairs and to
reassure Turkey about the solidity of the NATO security commitment,
the United States and the Alliance risk losing a key asset in shaping the
new strategic environment. A new agenda for security relations with
Ankara will need to focus on proliferation risks, counterterrorism, and
energy security—common interests across the Southern Region. It will
also need to address Turkey’s special concerns about pressure from a
resurgent Russia.
Failure to address the risk of a Greek-Turkish conflict jeopardizes
Alliance adaptation and European security. Full implementation of
risk-reduction measures, along the lines brokered in 1998 by NATO’s
Secretary General, is imperative. Strategic dialogue to manage longerterm risks, including disputes in the Aegean and Cyprus, should have
a broad agenda and might embrace arms control, Balkan and Black Sea
reconstruction, and regional crisis management. As a hedge, however,
it is essential that the Alliance—or at least key members—develop
plans in advance to monitor and contain a possible clash in the eastern
Mediterranean.
Expanded NATO involvement in the Mediterranean—Europe’s
“near abroad”—is a logical step toward a broader transatlantic security partnership. T h e re is more support for this within the Alliance than
for more ambitious models of strategy toward common security interests in the Gulf, the Caspian, and elsewhere. Germany is emerging as
a significant actor in the Mediterranean region, and can be a part of
S U M M A RY
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this evolution. The return of France as a full NATO partner would be
a transforming development in strategy toward the south, and should
be a priority objective of U.S. policy.
Greater attention to the south in NATO strategy should imply a
commensurate shift of Alliance resources. Most, and the most likely,
NATO contingencies are in the south, but the vast bulk of Alliance resources remain north of the Alps. Costs associated with the integration
of new members in the east will impose competing demands, and an
expeditionary strategy may offset requirements for permanently based
assets in the south (there may even be benefits to keeping a relatively
large proportion of forces in the rear but available for use on the periphery). At a minimum, however, missions in the south, especially
counterproliferation and air defense, will require improvements to
the undercapitalized and outdated NATO infrastructure across the
Southern Region.
More capable allies—for limited, nearby contingencies. NATO’s
southern allies are in the process of restructuring and modernizing their
militaries to create readily deployable forces. Progress on European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and NATO’s Defense Capabilities
Initiative should give further impetus to this trend, although with the
exception of Turkey and Greece, low levels of defense spending will
place limits on future capabilities. The scale of Turkish modernization
plans suggests that it will emerge as a very capable, regional military
power over the next decade. The southern allies are already capable of
making significant contributions to amphibious and other operations
in their own subregions (e.g., in North Africa and around the Adriatic).
At the same time, and as the Bosnia and Kosovo operations show, the
political will exists to use these forces in regional contingencies.
Implications for Milita ry Strategy and Air Pow e r
Distance, diversity of risks, and Alliance geography give aerospace power a special role on Europe’s southern periphery. The AFSOUTH1 area of regard now stretches from Mauritania and the
1 Allied
Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) is one of two regional commands of NATO’s Allied Command Europe (ACE).