REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES
Report commissioned by The Constitution Unit
University Colleqe London
John Hopkins
Faculty of Law
University of Sheffield
ABSTRACT
The following r e p o r t begins by giving brief descriptions of regional
government in six member s t a t e s of t h e E.U.. Accompanying each is a general
commentary on t h e i r history a n d development. The second section of t h e
r e p o r t focuses on t h e relevance t h e s e examples of regionalism have t o any
f u t u r e developments in t h e U.K., specifically England.
I t is my opinion, t h a t regional governments can aid democracy t h r o u g h
decentralisation of t h e central state. European regions a r e evidence of t h i s .
However, it is not clear from t h e English proposals what t h e actual purpose
of t h e region is t o be. Regions a r e a method of government, suitable for t h e
achievement of certain goals. These goals must f i r s t be clearly established
before any discussion of s t r u c t u r e o r form can t a k e place. The English
proposals seem t o have emerged from a need t o answer t h e "West Lothian
Question", raised i n relation t o Scotland. This they can never do and t h e
example of Spain, which is often given a s t h e model for s u c h a solution , in
fact emphasises its inadequacies.
English regionalism if it is established for t h e purposes of decentralisation
must t r u l y decentralise power from t h e centre. Failure t o do s o w i l l leave t h e
regions without a role and with little rationale. This was t h e case in Italy.
They must also be endowed with s i g n s c a n t financial autonomy t o allow t h e i r
meaningful operation independent of t h e state. These two criteria will allow
regions t o develop policies independently from t h e centre, more suitable t o
wishes of t h e regional electorate. I t is f a r from clear, however, whether a
Westminster government would be willing t o tolerate s u c h divergence of policy
within England. If it cannot, t h e n t h e r e seems no rationale, i n my opinion, for
t h e regional level.
Introduction
Part I
1.1
Belgium
1.2
France
1.3
Germany
1.4
Italy
1.5
Portugal
1.6
Spain
Part I1
Regional Government in Europe
-
Lessons for the U .K.
11.1
The Functional Role of European Regions
11.2
Regional Finance
11.3
Regions a s units of Democratic Renewal
11.4
The West Lothian Question
11.5
Implementation Procedure
11.6
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
Over t h e l a s t f i f t y years, Europe has seen a burgeoning of federal or
regional systems of government, y e t t h e U.K. has remained unitary.
In fact
b y 1995, t h e U.K. is t h e only large s t a t e in t h e E.U. not to operate a regional
Debate over regional government is not new t o Britain, b u t it has
level.
generally been restricted to t h e Celtic periphery.
However, t h e Labour
Party's recent proposals have now placed t h e issue on t h e English political
agenda.
The following report examines t h e experiences of six European
regional governments in t h e light of t h e debate in t h e U.K..
There a r e two p a r t s t o t h e report.
Firstly, a brief description of the
regional s t r u c t u r e s in t h e six countries examined (Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy and Portugal).
t
These a r e each accompanied by a general commentary.
The second p a r t examines some particular i s s u e s of regional government on a
Europe wide basis.
By necessity, t h i s work is r a t h e r subjective in its choice of subject
matter.
Time has limited my analysis t o those a r e a s which I feel have '
relevance t o t h e
U.K.'s
debate.
For this reason, t h e content of
commentaries varies from country t o country.
identical s t y l e in t h e basic descriptions.
I have attempted to use an
The need for this subjective
approach is due t o t h e nature of regional government a s a subject.
who s t u d y
11
regional governments
the
a r e often
Those
asked t o comment on their
success" or failure b u t t h i s misunderstands t h e concept.
If a scholar
comparing t h e governance of Britain and France, t h e question "was Britain a
success" would be meaningless.
The variables involved make t h e operation of
t h e country
dependent on
much
more than
government.
This is also t r u e of regions.
the
s t r u c t u r e s of
national
I t is an impossible (and pointless)
t a s k t o define regional success o r failure without looking a t specific policies
i n great depth.
I am no scholar of health manaaement or education, so for
t h i s reason I r e s t r i c t myself to t h e possible benefits of regional government
i n general government terms.
t
There a r e actually eleven "regional" systems, of various t y p e s , within
t h e E.U .. These six were chosen for t h e i r similarity in size t o the U . K . .
The exceptions t o t h e l a t t e r a r e Belgium and Portugal, but their
interesting characteristics, make them worthy of mention.
PART I
The financial portions of
, ,
t h e following descriptions use standard
terminology in t h i s field, a s w e l l as some typologies used in my own work.
To aid t h e reader, these a r e clarified below.
Regional taxation r e f e r s t o taxes collected i n t h e region where the
individual region controls tax rates.
These do not include taxes collected by
t h e region or taxes shared o u t between levels if t h e centre retains control
over their r a t e and application.
Block funding includes taxation raised in t h e region or shared between
levels b u t controlled nationally.
This is because t h e region has no control
over t h e yield and must rely on changes a t t h e national level to increase or
decrease it. In practice these taxes a r e a specific t y p e of block funding, less
open
to
national
nonetheless.
interference
,c-\
.
?
than
grants,
but
nationally
controlled
a
The --latter t y---p e of-----taxes can be divided into two f u r t h e r categories. ,
-.-Ceded taxes a r e those granted t o regions within their own territories. Shared
taxes a r e those shared
between
levels and
equalisation between individual regions.
may involve
a
degree of
All figures a r e 1992 unless stated
other wise.
1-1
BELGIUM
Geoqraphic Information
No.
-
3 Regions (Brussels, Flanders, Wallonia)
3 Communities (Flemish, French, German)
(non contiguous boundaries)
Population
-
(Regions)
Population
-
(Communities)
Brussels
0.96 Million
Flanders
5.77 Million
Wallonia
3.26 MiUion
Figures not readily available and difficult to calculate
Flemish
6.25 Million (approx)
French
3.40 Million (approx)
German
Size
-
(Regions Only)
Brussels
0.07 Million
161 km2
Flanders
13,522 km'
Wallonia
16,844 km2
Structure
Deliberative Bodies
Each Region or Community possesses a parliament (or council) consisting of
between 25 and 124 members (Regional Councils vary between 75 and 118).
The Flemish Community and Flanders Region have amalgamated their s t r u c t u r e s
and their assemblies a r e now known collectively a s t h e Flemish Council. Even
in Wallonia where t h e French and Walloon Councils remain separate, t h e same
representatives sit in t h e two chambers, (although t h e Brussels members only
sit on t h e Community Council).
The Brussels representatives t o t h e Flemish
Council have t h e s t a t u s of non-voting observers on regional matters.
Executives
The executives of these bodies a r e limited under t h e Constitution t o t h e
following maximum numbers. A l l a r e elected by and from t h e relevant council.
Region/Community
Maximum Executive Size
Flemish Region/Community
11
Walloon Region
7
Brussels Region
5
French Community
4
German Community
3
Status
Belgium is a federal state and a s s u c h t h e Regions and Communities a r e equal
t o t h e national level. Together, they comprise t h e highest tier of government.
,
Inter-Governmentdl Relations
Local Government
Regions have competence over local government supervision and may exercise
s u c h power within t h e limits of the constitution.
Certain powers a r e
guaranteed and local government continues t o receive t h e bulk of its finance
from local taxation and central grants. The s t r u c t u r e may not be altered by
t h e Region but due to t h e regions' extensive legislative role, local government
can b e severely effected by regional policy decisions.
There a r e some
linguistic exceptions t o t h i s such a s the German speaking communes, which a r e
supervised directly by t h e federal authorities.
Central Government
Unlike many other federations, t h e equality of s t a t u s enjoyed by t h e Regions
.
and Communities is practical a s well a s theoretical.
Regional decrees (or ,
ordinances in Brussels) a r e equal to federal laws.
When such decisions
--- /
overlap and both have been passed legally
(which in theory should rarely
occur), t h e problem wiU go t o arbitration, a function of t h e Federal Senate.
-
_ __-
-=
-
...
-.
Second Chamber
A s with most federations t h e Belgian parliament includes second chamber- to
.-------- *--
r e p r e s e n t t h e federal units.
Of t h e total composition of seventy one, forty
-- members a r e directly elected from t h e relevant language a r e a s (25 Flemish and
15 French), twenty one a r e appointed by t h e Communities (10 Flemish, 10
French and 1 German) with a final ten being indirectly elected by t h e
senators of t h e major language groups ( 6 Flemish and 4 French).
The role of this body is mainly advisory, except in issues of linguistic
legislation, constitutional amendments, international relations and changes to
the Belgian state structure. In all other matters t h e Senate may delay, amend
and propose legislation b u t t h e final say always Lies with t h e Chamber of
Representatives.
I t s primary role lies in t h e area of resolving conflicts of
- ..--..
. .
i n t e r e s t between federal units (including t h e federation itself).
When such
conflicts arise, t h e senate must focus on compromise a s any agreement wjll
..--
- .
need t h e co-operation of a l l parties.
Reqional Institutions
There a r e no
separate
regional s t r u c t u r e s , (although some police
are
administered locally). The extent of regional legislative power means t h a t t h e
legal regime in one Region/Community can differ from t h a t in another.
I t is my understanding t h a t t h e regions operate separate civil services b u t
I have been unable to confirm this.
Functional Powers
Culture & Educabon
Social Functions
Economic Functions
Economic development
Education (c)
Health (c)
I
Conservation
Sport ( c )
Environmental
Language Policy (c)
(not nuclear or rates)
Protection
(limited in ~ e r m a n )
Employment
Water
Libraries (c)
Agriculture
Help for disabled (c)
Museums (c)
Spatial planning
Child care &
Regional culture and
protection (c)
languaue ( c )
Public works
,?
r-
Energy
-
1
I
Transport
(not rail or air)
(c)
-
Community function
A l l competences a r e legislative though in many areas the federation retains a
supervisory role in co-ordination s t r u c t u r e s across Belgium.
These a r e
restricted t o an absolute minimum and include school leaving ages and
minimum degree standards. In general t h e Regions undertake economic p o k y
while t h e Communities deal with "personal" matters. The federation remains
responsible f o r a r e a s in which a national approach is deemed desirable. These
include Defence, Police; 1Monetary a n d Fiscal policy,
Security.
R a i l transport and Social
I..
International relations is divided between t h e Regions/Communities
and t h e Federation according t o domestic functions.
Financial Resources
others ~ 1 . m
Hcrrowlng C14.
sllecr
rIC Grants
FeulonaI Taxes
Ceded Tax=
~4.6%)
C1.m
(9 .a%)
Fund (my
Regional Taxes
-
Environmental Taxes
Ceded Taxes
-
Gambling and betting tax
(Regional unless
Tax on gambling machines
stated other wise)
Tax on licensed premises
C 67
Inheritance tax
Real estate tax
Property sales tax
Road tax
T.V. & Radio licences (Communities)
An optional regional surcharge may be added to these taxes.
'
-
I ncorne Tax C16.5
sorrwlna C1.9161
Others C 2 0 . 5 % )
V.A.T.
Ceded Taxes
C 2.4961
L
Community Finance (French)
Block Funds
-
Income tax (Regions and communities)
V.A.T. (Communities only)
(shared taxes)
A basic equalisation mechanism (included in t h e income tax share) works
between Regions and t h e Federation dependent on their tax base.
The
Communities have no such scheme a s their V.A.T. share is awarded per capita.
Specific Funds
-
Minimal
specific
funds
for
employment
programmes.
Corn mentar Y
The development of t h e Belgian regional system is rooted in t h e
language divisions t h a t divide t h e country.
A s a unitary state. Belgium was
always an unlikely entity, straddling the ancient language divide of Europe
a s it does.
For centuries, t h e romance and germanic languages have met
along a border which dissects modern Belgium. When the Belgian state was
established in 1830, principally by French speakers in Brussels, this cultural
fact was ignored and a unitary s t a t e was established. The language divisions ,,
within t h e country were f u r t h e r exacerbated by the addition of several
German speaking areas after t h e first world war. From t h i s period onwards,
existing tensions within t h e country steadily intensified. First, t h e extension
of suffrage gave t h e majority Flemish control over the national parliament,
which they used to end discrimination against their language and establish a
language border in 1963.
However, t h e Walloons (French speakers of t h e
south) now felt their economic interests were being ignored by t h e Flemish.
Wallonia, a s one of t h e f i r s t areas of Europe to industrialise, faced serious
economic problems by t h e 1960's. Flanders, in contrast had been largely
agricultural until much later allowing it to expand into newer industries, less
susceptible to t h e recessions of t h e 1970's and 80's (Thomas, 1990). Quite
naturally, t h e Flemish a r e very liberal in economic views while t h e Walloons
traditionally favour left-wing proto-Keynesian policies.
The result of these problems were t h e riots and disturbances of t h e
1970's. Some predicted a very dark f u t u r e for Belgium b u t happily these
doomsday predictions were wrong. That they proved inaccurate is d u e largely ,
t o t h e innovative and complex system of regionalism t h a t now exists in t h e
country.
There a r e a few important points t h a t should be noted in relation to t h e
Belgian conundrum.
Firstly, t h e vast majority of Belgians (of all cultural
groups) do not favour t h e independence of their region.
There is a
widespread (and justifiable) view t h a t s m a l l "independent" s t a t e s of Wallonia
and Flanders would be vulnerable to domination by France and t h e
Netherlands respectively.
The Belgian regions have t h u s more t o lose by
splitting entirely, than they have t o gain.
Secondly, t h e devolutionist
aspirations of t h e individual regions differ markedly.
Despite their majority
in t h e Belgian parliament, t h e Flemish continue t o fear language domination,
due to t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e French language a s a whole.
The Flemish
complaint has t h u s been based on cultural issues. The Walloons, despite their
1
minority s t a t u s do not fear language discrimination but instead call for
economic policies in their region
which differ fundamentalk from those
expressed by the Flemish. Their claims were t h u s based on economic matters.
Finally, t h e German speakers wished a degree of control over their own
affairs, principally in cultural matters.
The claims from all t h r e e language
groups prompted one Belgian Prime Minister t o describe Belgium a s "a happy
country composed of t h r e e oppressed minorities" (Swan, 1988).
To answer
. these varied wishes and t h e problem of Brussels a unique system of dual
regionalism was devised.
The t h r e e Regions and t h r e e Communities comprise, with t h e federal
level, t h e highest level of government in Belgium.
Unique t o t h e Belgian
federation, t h e regional units a r e not contiguous and in some cases have
authority over overlapping
territories.
. -
This occurs because t h e Communities
and Regions a r e responsible for different a r e a s of policy and in theory a t
least their constituencies a r e di££erent.
Regions a r e territorially based
authorities while t h e Community represents t h e individuals who a r e part of it.
A t least i n legal terms neither unit is superior t o t h e other. The Communities
were established ,'1970 t o implement t h e policy of "cultural autonomy"
(Alen A
"& Ergec R, 1990, p10) mostly t o appease t h e Flemish majorities' fears.
, ,,
The
concept of "cultural autonomy" was subsequently extendedL-to "community
autonomy"
a s these units became responsible f o r "personalised"
issues.
Broadly speaking this comprises large areas of social policy such a s Health
and Education a s well a s more "minor" policies, s u c h a s s p o r t and heritage.
The Flemish speakers, French speakers and German speakers make up ,
these t h r e e Communities.
In practice t h e two largest Communities cover
Flanders and Wallonia respectively.
Brussels is divided between t h e French
and Flemish while t h e German Community covers a small area in t h e east of
t h e Walloon region.
f
The regions, also established in 1970, were introduced mainly to satisfy
t h e interests of t h e Walloon minority.
The Walloons (though not t h e French
speakers of Brussels) feared t h e policies of t h e majority Flemish government
discriminated against their traditional industries and wished to pursue their
own strategy.
To satisfy this demand, t h e Regions were assigned authority
over large
areas of economic
_ _ _ .. --. policy, though not monetary and fiscal matters.
The distinction between Community and Region has lessened over time.
I
Flanders and t h e Flemish Community have amalgamated and French Community
and Walloon Regional Councillors, a r e the same individuals (delegates from
Brussels sitting in t h e French Council).
There can be little doubt t h a t t h e regional s t r u c t u r e in Belgium has
achieved its immediate aim.
J
The fact t h a t t h e.'x still is a Belgium is evidence
I
1
of this. There a r e enough links between t h e varied Belgian peoples (the royal
family, a common social security system and t h e football team t o name b u t
t
A good map of this s t r u c t u r e is included in
el mar ti no's chapter.
t h r e e ) t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e state w i l l continue.
The regions, in t u r n , have
given a feeling of security t o t h e "oppressed minorities" t h a t allows the
frustrations t h a t threatened t h e peaceful co-existence of t h e people in this
a r e a of Europe t o be vented t h r o u g h t h e decentralised s t r u c t u r e .
There is
certainly a feeling among some Belgians t h a t they avoided a potential Bosnia.
For this, t h e new s t a t e s t r u c t u r e must take credit.
However, t h e ability of
t h e regions t o actually deliver policies different from t h e previous unitary
s t a t e is not quite a s clear.
The WaUoons hoped t h a t t h e creation of t h e economic regions would
allow them to a d d r e s s their economic difficulties more effectively. In practice,
t h e Socialist dominated Walloon region finally abandoned its policies of state
intervention in 1985.
These had been followed contrary t o t h e national
government's wishes. The national centre-right government was certainly the
winner in t h i s battle.
However, was t h e failure of Wallonia's proto-Keynesian
policy d u e to t h e policy itself o r t h e regional s t r u c t u r e it operated within?
Covell has argued t h a t t h e latter certainly played a part. Her view has been
t h a t t h e t y p e of economic devolution granted t o t h e Regions meant the ,
Regional government was always unlikely t o succeed in operating such a
markedly different policy from t h e centre. This was due to a lack of financial
resources which prohibited a co-ordinated
policy on any
workable scale,
combined with t h e fragmentation of control between t h e Regional and national
levels (Covell, M, 1986, p274).
Since then, t h e economic policy pursued by
t h e Regions and t h e Federal level has been strikingly similar.
T h i s trend is
something Covell has also noted in t h e Canadian federal system.
Since her
s t u d y in 1986, t h e final two phases of Belgian federalisation have been
completed and wider economic powers (notably in t h e major "national" sectors
originally reserved by t h e centre) a r e now available t o t h e regions.
Whether
t h i s now makes them capable of pursuing a policy contrary t o t h e national
one, is a moot point but a s t h e regional tier collectively accounts f o r around_
. of total government expenditure (excluding loan repayments etc.) such a
half
case could be argued.
The by word of Belgian federalism is co-operation. More than any other
regionalised state, t h e regional t i e r s must negotiate with t h e federal level and
vice versa (Deelen, 1994). This is due principally to t h e equal s t a t u s of laws
passed by t h e d a e r e n t tiers of government and t h e impossibility of dividina
competences between regions so they do not overlap. One example in Belgium,
is t h e continuing role of t h e national level in
regulating
immigration.
-
Although this field would seem t o be of no interest to t h e regions, t h e fact
t h a t Community competences include t h e integration of such people into
Belgian society, means they w i l l foot a proportion of t h e bill caused by t h e
national decision.
The importance of co-operation is emphasised in t h e
situation a s r e g a r d s t h e European Union.
When t h e Council of Ministers meets, t h e Belgian delegation is likely t o
consist of - representatives
of more than one level. When a policy area is
-- . . _ _
. __ _ _
exclusively regional, t h e delegation w i l l comprise regional representatives only,
______-1.1-1-
If t h e issue under discussion is shared
with t h e chief delegate alternating.
ministers will sit with t h e Federal
- - - - - -... -- -minister. In these cases, t h e chief delegate w i l l depend onirole each level
-- 6.
plays. If t h e Federal government t a k e s t h e primary role (eg. transport) t h e n
between levels, t h e Regional/Community
-
.
--
..r.-,IY-
*-d%-_IL
I
this minister w i l l take t h e position. Importantly, despite these musical chairs,
t h e position presented, w i l l still be "Belgian",
advance.
agreed by t h e ministers in
Again, the Belgian system although allowing strong regional
influence forces co-operation on t h e parties concerned.
The result of t h i s
reliance could be a lack of accountability t o t h e regional electorate.
prospect is examined in more detail below, in relation to Germany.
1-22
FRANCE
Geoqraphic Information
No.
-
22 R6gions
(including Corsica)
Population
Size
-
-
Average
2.35 Million
Smallest
0.74 Million
Largest
10.66 Million
Average
24,000 k m2
Smallest
8,280 k m2
Largest
45,348 k m2
(Corsica)
(Ile de France)
(~lsace)
(Rhone-Alpes)
This
I
-
Structure
Deliberative Bodies
-Two Chambers.
One directly elected primary chamber of between 31 and 1 9 7
seats. T h i s chamber is styled t h e " ~ e g i o n dCouncil" except in Corsica where
it is given t h e title of "Assembly".
A second, Economic and Social Chamber,
>
-
-- - - ----
acts in an advisory capacity, in tandem with t h e directly elected assembly.
This is appointed from trade union, professional and employer oruanisations.
Executive
Officially, t h e President elected from t h e Council, is t h e only executive.
In
practice, the bureau of t h e President, consisting of a number of councillors
acts a s a Regional "cabinet".
The vice-presidents of t h i s bureau a r e allocated
specific responsibilities.
Status
Created under ordinary statute.
a form of local government.
No constitutional protection.
-
The region is
-
Inter-Govern mental Relations
-.
~ o c a lGovernment
Regional government is not superior t o other forms of local government.
has no involvement in their structure, supervision or finance.
It
Although t h e
regions a r e not superior, regional policy in land use and economic planning
will restrict DGparternent options. Financial support for Dgpartemental projects
may be withheld if t h e regional priorities a r e not addressed.
Central Govt.
Central government does not exercise an a priori tutelle. Restrictions on
regional policy
a r e limited to
breaches of
law.
These can delay t h e
implementation of a regional decision but t h e final arbiter is the administrative
court. The Regional Prefect remains t h e national representative in t h e region.
They operate t h e post facto tutelle as well a s r u n n i n g most deconcentrated
s t a t e services.
National Policy Involvement
Regions have no official i n p u t into national policy
Resional Institutions
Civil Service
-
Regional officers belong t o t h e "territorial service".
T h i s service covers all those civil s e r v a n t s working
f o r local government.
Members of t h e territorial
service may transfer t o t h e s t a t e service and viceversa.
Functional Powers
Regions have no legislative power but may d i r e c t policy (within varying
constraints) on t h e following matters.
Few regional functions a r e carried out
without t h e involvement of other t i e r s of authority.
Economic
Social
Culture & Education
Regional economic
plan
Spatial planning
(approval of local
plans)
Secondary education
infrastructure
Economic aid
Regional parks
Professional
education
Regional railways
Regional transport
schemes
Regional airports
1
Universities
I
I
I
1
Inland waterways
Research
1
I
I
I
)I
'
I
II
11
I
I
I
I
Tourism
Regions also possess a general
competence t o act, unless another level
- of government has exclusive competence.
The broad interpretation of t h i s
concept h a s allowed Regions t o operate in a r e a s not originally envisac~edb y
t h e central state. The s t a t e h a s recognised some of t h e s e activities in s t a t u t e
(e.g. universities).
1
Financial Resources
Regional Taxes
-
Car registration fee
Property tax
Land tax
Business tax
Residence tax
Regional
-
Surcharges
Borrowing
House sale registration tax
Driving Licences
-
No borrowing restrictions
except on loans above
certain level (outlined in national s t a t u t e )
,
-
Block Funds
V.A.T. reimbursement (for tax incurred by regional
authority )
Grant for
cost
of
decentralised
services
(index
linked)
Specific Funds
-
Professional education Grant
Educational i n f r a s t r u c t u r e g r a n t
Commentary
The development of regiondlism i n France has a long and t o r t u r e d
history. Since t h e revolution, t h e concept of a decentralised France has been
debated between those of t h e Jacobin (centralist) and Girondin (decentralised)
b u t it is only in t h e last fifteen years t h a t t h e l a t t e r view has prevailed.
Nevertheless, during t h i s brief period t h e pace of change has been quite
remarkable, considering t h e traditional opposition t o s u c h concepts amongst
t h e French elites.
Since t h e formation of t h e French s t a t e in t h e sixteenth century, its
r u l e r s have wished for a high degree of control over t h e area within t h e i r
This applied a s much t o t h e ancien regime a s it did t o t h e republican
realm.
The only difference was t h a t t h e latter were immeasurably
era.
successful.
more
The highly centrdlised s t a t e envisaged by t h e Jacobins, was
f u r t h e r enhanced by Napoleon who created t h e Prefectural system, much
copied
by
centralist
regimes
in
other
countries.
This
handed
the
administration of local affairs handed over t o an official, appointed by Paris,
who presided over an artificial c o n s t r u c t , ( t h e Dgpartement).
This had a s
little in common with t h e previous loyalties of t h e populace a s possible.
In
France, t h e legend s u g g e s t s t h a t boundaries were drawn on t h e principle t h a t
t h e Prefect should be able t o ride from his seat of administration to t h e
Dgpartemental boundary and back in a single day (though in some areas, one
s u s p e c t s his horse would have died of exhaustion).
The highly centralised s t r u c t u r e of sub-national government i n France
continued relatively unchanged for t h e best p a r t of two centuries.
This had
much t o do with t h e success of t h e national authorities in imposing their
c u l t u r e on t h e population of France (around half the population did not s p e a k
,
French a t t h e time of t h e revolution), a model again duplicated across the
globe.
Yet despite their best efforts, regional sentiments remained, most
notably in Corsica, Breton and t h e regions of Occitania.
By t h e t u r n of the
c e n t u r y movements defending regional culture and languages were achieving
greater popularity (Beer, 1980).
I t was economic changes in t h e 1960's t h a t laid t h e foundations for the
subsequent reforms. Regional leaders began t o organise into lobb yinu bodies
incorporating
businessmen,
representatives.
trade
unionists,
politicians
and
other
In response t o this, t h e government created centrally
appointed advisory bodies (C.O.D.E.R.), primarily a s a method of controlling
t h e s e "forces vivres" movement (Keating, 1983). This was followed i n 1972, by
indirectly appointed Regional Councils in 1972 a n d a Regional Prefect to
ad minister certain functions now handled regionally.
Most notably t h e new
Regional Prefect completed t h e regional portion of t h e national plan.
In all
cases, t h e "democratic" element in t h e regions acted only i n a n advisory
capacity.
The growth of regional movements throughout France a n d t h e worsening ,
violence in Corsica encouraged t h e left
- t o incorporate democratic regions as
p a r t of their programme for government.
The lack of control over the
existing regional bodies and t h e feeling t h a t their economic- planning
had been
incompetent led t o widespread s u p p o r t f o r t h e i r democratisation. By creating
t h e regions, t h e central government had recognised t h a t s u c h a level should
exist b u t they had no plausible excuse f o r t h e lack of reaional accountability.
When these regional bodies encouraged economic developments opposed by the
local populace (such a s t h e commercialisation of areas of t h e Mediterranean
coast) t h e resentment and perceived need for democratic control was increased
(Keating & Hainsworth, 1983). The insensitivity of t h e central government to
certain regional issues also helped - t h e mood for reform
Corsican rail network)
.
(eg. closing the
Indeed Boisvert has suggested t h a t s u c h blunders
committed by t h e centre a r e inevitable in a centralised regime today, leading
inexorably t o calls for greater local and regional autonomy (Boisvert, 1988).
The left capitalised on these views and incorporated many regional movements
into t h e new P.S..
The success of t h i s new party in 1981 e n s u r e d t h a t
France's history of centralised government would change.
The plans of t h e French Socialists encompassed a broad programme of
decentralisation t h e most radical of which was t h e creation of a tier of
democratic regions with special s t a t u s f o r Corsica. A t t h e h e a r t of t h e project
was t h e creation of democratic Regional Councils a s t h e representative bodies
This body would gain control over a r e a s of government
of t h e region.
previously handled nationally or b y national appointees a n d not by local
governments.
The
sectors transferred
to
the
regions
(and
to
local
governments) were intended t o be self standing "sectors" o r easily definable
a r e a s of them.
For instance, education was t o be divided between all levels.
The maintenance and construction of schools was to be handled by local
governments, while t h e national tier was responsible f o r curriculum, staff
salaries and universities.
Within local government Communes
were given
control of primary, D g p a r t e m e n ts, secondary and Regions, lyckes.
However,
although t h i s division was relatively strzigrht.forward in education, in other
a r e a s t h e divisions proved more dif5cult to define.
In parallel
drastically.
with
t h e s e reforms, t h e
role of t h e
p r e f e c t changed
Firstly, t h e concept of t h e tuteLle was removed from all levels of
local government.
This had previously given t h e Prefect t h e ability t o veto
local decisions on policy grounds.
In t h e Region, t h e Prefect was replaced by
t h e elected Regional President (of t h e Council) a s t h e executive body.
The
Regional Prefects' new role was t o head t h e nationally r u n services in t h e
Region and a c t a s a post-facto constitutional watchdog over t h e decisions of
t h e Council a n d its organs.
Implementation of t h i s reform was remarkably swift, considering its
controversial and radical nature, b u t this was a deliberate policy of t h e
programme's architect, Gaston Defferre.
H e reasoned t h a t t h e formidable
opponents t o t h e reforms should not be given time t o r e - s r o u p a f t e r their
defeat in t h e general election.
Furthermore, t h e r e were enough opponents
within his own r a n k s t o cause trouble, should t h e 0pportunit.y arise.
opposition came from t h e "notables".
Most
These political magnates hold power
t h o u g h t h e cumrrl des mandates system used in t h e French Republic.
This
J
allows one person to simultaneously hold several senior elected posts from
local t o European level.
These powerful individuals could lose power in a n y
decentralisation package especially if t h e DGpartement (their power base) lost
out t o t h e new Regions. Their influence originated from t h e i r ability to fight
f o r local i s s u e s in t h e national arena.
If t h e local/regional councils could
achieve this, their influence would diminish.
To buy off t h e bulk of these
opponents, t h e reform of t h e cumul system was watered down (Schmidt, 1990).
Many other areas of t h e policy saw compromises and t h e final legislation
left many regionalist disappointed with t h e outcome (Kofman, 1985). This was
nevertheless, t h e b e s t Defferre felt he could achieve.
Further criticisms
surrounded some of t h e technical aspects of t h e laws. Their speedy passage
saw minor flaws enshrined in t h e law a s well a s controversy over t h e exact
division of powers. Again, Defferre had realised t h i s and specifically made the
laws vague a n d a
---
mere framework, which could be altered later.
The
important i s s u e f o r Deffere was t o pass t h e basic legislation t o s e t up t h e
regions ( t h e most controversial p a r t of his proposals). In this he succeeded
where countless previous attempts had failed.
Ironically, t h e actual establishment of t h e Regional Councils took until
1985
a s t h e Socialists kept delaying t h e election date.
--.I ,._.
because t h e i r mid-term
This was primarily
unpopularity was likely lead to a poor result in t h e
regional elections.
In fact it was disastrous, with only two of t h e twenty one
mainland regions
returning
P.S.
majorities.
The previously
vocif~rous
opponents of t h e regional reforms now claimed they were being implemented
too slowly. The only significant regio2al reform t h e right actually introd~~cec!,
when t h e y r e t u r n e d t o power, was t o give t h e Commi5sa'res de la R P - ~ u b l i c
( t h e Socialists' new title for Prefect) their old title back (Keating, 1983).
In practice, t h e operation of French Regions has differed somewhat from
original intentions.
The major economic rationale for t h e region had been
their involvement i n t h e national economic planning. The abandonment of t h i s
programme was potentially a serious problem for t h e new reqions.
In fact, i t
merely led t o a shift of emphasis, away from direct investment and towards
encouragement of public/private infrastructural projects, t h e encouragement
of inward investment and loan guarantees for t h e improvement of businesses.
The ability of t h e regions t o undertake t h i s role, relies largely on their
independence of finance.
Since around 80% of regional f u n d s a r e f r e e to be
s p e n t according t o regional priorities this i s not a problem.
However, a s
regions account f o r l e s s than 2% of government spending, their financial
muscle is Limited t o s a y t h e least.
This means t h e reuions must fulfil a co-
ordinatinq role, u s i n ~st.3t.e ;ind lrlcal aovelrnment finance a s well a s n r i v a t p
e n t e r p r i s e t o e n s u r e t h e development of t h e reaion.
One evamrle of this lies
in their role i n constructing regional t r a n s ~ n r t networks, based larcr~lv
around t h e networks of S.N.C.F., which t h e regions harle allthoritv over (with
t h e exception of t r u n k routes).
The reqion has uiven a natural focus for t h e
development of local i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s beyond t h e
without needing national organisation.
regions' role in France.
Dgpartemental level, vet
This latter example is indicative of t h e
A s Michel Rocard said in 1982;
I1
Dans la domaine economiql~e,l a 1-4aion exerce. en principe une funrtion
d e pilote" (Le Monde. 1982)
Overall, t h e regions a r e widely regarded a s a success in Frznce, despite
- - .--
t h e i r financial irrelevance.
Opinion polls suggest t h a t most French wish t h e
regions t o exercise more power and regard them a s t h e qovernment of t h e
Why have French regions received t h i s popularity?
f u t u r e ( ~ r e h l e r ,1992).
Firstly, their role
in education is perceived a s a success, almost without
-_-.C_."l.--
exception.
Despite inheriting a neglected education i n f r a s t r u c t u r e in danger
of collapse under increasing s t u d e n t numbers, t h e regions
revitalise it t h r o u g h innovative investment and tax rises.
were able to
I n t h e latter case
t h e population of most regional electorates, whatever their political complexion
were
willing
t o accept
such
educational s t r u c t u r e .
increases, a s long a s t h e y
The obvious link between t h e
maintenance of t h e lycges may have helped t h i s process.
were for t h e
regions and t h e
F u r t h e r success has
been seen in their a p p a r e n t t.h r --..i f t . With t h e exception of t h e i r much criticised
investment in new assembly buildinus, (ironically, to increase t h e i r profile) t h e ,
regions have been efficient in t h e i r use of public f l ~ n d s . Fureaucracies a r e
small and direct running of projects is r a r e . Instead, reaional initiatives a r e
commonly
undertaken
through
joint
boards,
chaired
by
the
reaional
representatives b u t representing local government and private business.
1-3
--
G -E
.R MA
.- N Y
.-
No.
-
1 6 Lander
Population
-
Average
4.9
Million
Lo west.
0.7
Million (Bremen)
Highest
16.7
Averaae
212.312 km-
Size
-
Smallest
Lar crest.
Million (N. Rhine- Westphalia)
1
404 k m ? (Bremen!
9
70,552 k m - f B a l f e ~ i ? \
Structure
--Deliberative
Bodies
/:.
Each Lander 1s f r e e t o decide on i t s own system of parliamentarv a n v e r n m ~ n t . :
a s outlined in their constitution.
In practice, all opted f o r a sinale chamber
assembly, with t h e exception of Bavaria which has a bi-earnera! system.
-Executive
This is also outlined in t h e respective regional constitutions, b u t cabinets
generally comprise between nine
a n d fifteen ministers. The cabinet is directly
.....
responsible t o t h e regional parliament.
A s p a r t of a federal system, t h e Lander a r e p a r t of t h e highest t i e r o f ,
government.. This equality is partly theoretical, however, a s t h e principle of
Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht u n d e r p i n s t h e constitution
o v e r r i d e s Land law).
( ~ e d e - a 1 lab7
The distribution of potrers is intended t o keec s u c h
conflicts t o a minimum.
I_nerTGo-vernm.eq&l
Relations
Local government is entirely u n d e r t h e control of regional government.
t h i s reason
its s t r u c t u r e varies extensively
between
Lander.
For
National
governments' involvement in Local government affairs is severely restricted.
Central
Government
-----. ..There is no institutionalised
government.
central
government
control
over
regional
National Policy I n v o l v e m g ~ t
The second chamber of t h e German parliament ( ~ u n d e s r a t )is appointed
.
entirely -by
t h e regional governments.
.-
This body plays an important role in
German policy making, including a veto o v e r s t a t u t e s affecting L a n d e r r i u h t s .
Redondl I n s t i t u t i o n s
Regional Banks
-
Each L Z n d e r h a s a regional hank. Representatives of
each sit on t h e board of t h e B u n d e s b a n k .
Regional Civil
-
Each region 0 p e r a t . e ~its own civil s e r v i c e .
-
The role of government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n Germany
Service
Government
Ofices
is merely t o a c t a s a conduit between t h e national
a n d regional levels.
There a r e no national field
services, with t h e exception of t h e Post Office and
t h e Deutsche Bahn.
Police
-
Each region possesses an independent police force
(Bavaria also controls its own b o r d e r police).
is no national force.
Lesal System
-
-
.,
There
.
T h e extensirre n a t u r e of recrional cclmpetences e n s u r e s
differences of lecral regime b e t w ~ e nr e a i o n s .
Legal S t r u c t u r e
-
The c o u r t s t r u c t u r e is entirely r e a i o n a l k e d . with a
final
tier
of
appeal
constitutional
and
courts
operating a t t h e federal level.
Powers
Unlike other regional systems, t h e r e is no definitive list of regional functions.
The constitution gives regions
powers, not specifically allocated t o
federation ( t h e famous subsidiarity clause).
education, c u l t u r a l affairs a n d
local
the
In practice t h i s means police,
government
a r e exclusive
reqional
competences.
In
all o t h e r
a r e a s , t h e L a n d e r a r e responsible f o r
administration of national policy (only limited b y leqal restrictions).
the
I n most
a r e a s of domestic policy t h e r e f o r e a c u l t u r e of co-operation is n e c e s s a r y .
Financial Resources
1
I
1
German Regional Finance (1991)
Regional taxes
-
Local sovernment taxes which a r c r u e t o t h e citv
s t a t e s only.
Ceded taxes
-
P r o p e r t y tax
I n h e r i t a n c e tax
Vehicle tax
Beer tax
Shared taxes
-
Income tax (50%)
Corporation tax (50%)
V.A.T. (35%)
Professional tax (7.5%\
Funds f o r Eastern Lander
Specific f u n d s
-
Restricted f u n d s f o r capital investment
Grants f o r i n f r a - s t r u c t u r a l improvement in Eastern
Lander
Borrowing
-
There
are
no
national
restrictions
on
regional
borrowing
Commentary
The p r e s e n t German s t r u c t u r e d a t e s from t h e post-war constitution of
1948, however German regionalism h a s a much longer history.
Since its
inception i n 1864 a n d with t h e exception of t h e period 1933 t o 1948, Germany
has always o p e r a t e d a regionalised s t r u c t u r e .
Nevertheless, t h e c0nstit~l.t-ion
of 1948 saw many differences on t h o s e t h a t had qone before. Primary amongst ,
t h e s e differences was t h e dismemberment of P r u s s i a into several smaller s t a t e s
a n d t h e creation of regional u n i t s with limited regional identities.
exceptions t o t h i s were Bremen, Hamburg a n d Bavaria.
The
Surprisinqly, t h e
creation of t h e s e artificial regions led t o a wide discrepancy i n size a n d
population.
The constitution did give mechanisms for t h e reform of t h e
territorial divisions, b u t a p a r t from a few minor a d j u s t m e n t s t h e boundaries
have remained c o n s t a n t . The constitutional amendment of 1976 which removed
t h e B u n d r s d u t y t o initiate reform of L a n d e r boundaries in t h e Light of
economic realities a n d replaced it with a voluntary ability .to do s o effectively
removed t h e i s s u e from t h e political agenda.
I t is now almost inconceivable
t h a t t h e regional boundaries will be reformed.
The permanence of t h e p r e s e n t s t a t e of affairs is quite remarkable in
considering t.he situation in t h e 1950s. Opinjon ~011si.n t.hi.5 n ~ r - i o d fou17d a
distinct lack of s u p p o r t for t h e federal s t a t e s (Co!s. 1 9 7 5 ) .
However, since
t h i s time, popular s u p p o r t has r i s e n steadilv a n 6 t h n n r s . s ~ n t _S V S ~ S T has
become firmly established in t h e minds of t h e electorate.
T h e allies' purpose in encouranina t h e new C e r m a r !
strl.lct.l.ire
was t o
divide sovereignty between c e n t r e a n d reqion t o e n s u r e no sinqle aovernment
could accumulate enough power t o r e p e a t t h e e v e n t s of 1933. This Averican
concept was not entirely forced upon t h e German delegation at t h e London
conference a n d in most a r e a s , t h e Basic Law reflected t h e preferences of t h e
regional presidents themselves (Johnson. 1990).
I n f a c t t h e German federal system h a s not
led t .o a- clean division of
--legislative authority between levels.
-A s with all o t h e r attempts at. federalism.
- .
t h e overlappinu of functions h a s led t o t h e blurrinq of t h e boundaries
between regional
a n d national
authority.
In
Germany, t h e position
exacerbated by t h e question of "concurrent
powers".
.
. __-----
is
These extensive Dowers,
listed u n d e r Article 74 of t h e Basic Law allow t h e L a n d e r to legislate until t h e
B u n d exercises its r i g h t t o do so.
However, t h e German constitutional c o u r t
h a s been unwilling t o involve itself in t h i s a r e a , instead seeina this a s a
political decision.
Furthermore, once t h e B u n d h a s "occupied t h e field" t h e
L a n d e r a r e excluded from f u r t h e r participation (Blair, 1981).
This leaves
regional legislative powers primarily in t h e a r e a s of education,
.
police. and local
-government.
The weak legislative position of German regions is often overlooked a n d
is often assumed t h a t t h e i r impressive s t a t u s comes from t h i s s o u r c e . A s we
have seen, however, t h i s is not t h e case. Regional power in Germany is based
upon two other a r e a s of authority.
-
Firstly, t h e extensive executive
power.
-,--
afforded t o t h e L a n d e r a n d secondly t h e i r authority in t h e B u n d e s r a t o r
German Senate.
Under German constitutional law, t h e national government is forbidden
from operating field s e r v i c e s in all b u t a few specific areas, namely:
Foreign affairs
Federal finance a d ministration
Federal Railways
Federal Post Office
Armed Forces (Article 87, Basic Law)
In all other a r e a s , t h e L a n d e r exercise executive authority. The ability
of
t h e national
government
to
supervise this
authority
is
limited. - - h y
constitutional restrictions. In most cases, t h e s u p e r v i s o r y provisions must he
made by law and receive t h e consent of t h e B u n d e s r a t . In practice t h e r e f o r e ,
t h e regions must collectively a g r e e t o them. I n most areas. t h e federal s t a t u t e
l a y s o u t t h e policy (often after B u n d e s r a t approval) which t h e reqions must
t h e n implement according t o law.
t h e regional executives.
The methods of implementation a r e left t o
,
Executive autonomy, could b e a v e r y weak freedom f o r t h e German
regions were it n o t f o r t h e i r protection t h r o u g h t h e ~ u n d e s r a t . This b o d y ,
comprising r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e German L a n d e r h a s taken on a n importance
p e r h a p s not envisaged by t h e framers of t h e Basic Law.
B u n d e s r a t must qive its consent t o laws which
of t h e reaions.
Under t h i s , t h e
I
f f e c t t h e interest.? o r d l ~ t i e s
The Sander- i n t e r p r e t e d t h e concept of i n t e r e s t broadly.
In
a s e r i e s of cases, t h e Federal Constitution31 Court azve its hlessincr t.n t h i s
approach a n d t h u s e n s u r e d a L a n d e r veto o v e r many a r e a s of policv.
It h a s
been t h i s power t h a t h a s allowed t h e recrions t o retain power i n t h n fapa nf
many centralising p r o c e s s e s (Blair, 1981, p71).
I,L.. :
One f u r t h e r a s p e c t of t h i s veto power h a s been t h e entrenchment of cooperative federalism.
This s e e s decisions t a k e n increasing'b y LBnder a c t i n g
t o t h e B u n d , a s t h e basis f o r
collectively a n d p r e s e n t i n g a "position"
-
.
This means regional opinions a r e likely t o g e t compromised in
negotiations.
t h e "national" L a n d e r position, leading t o a reduction in regional autonomy,
a n d a n increase i n t h e power of regional elites. This problem h a s been raised
by Bulmer who n o t e s t h e lack of accountability c a u s e d b y t h i s i n c r e a s e i n coMore famously, Scharpf's discussion of
operative p r o c e d u r e s (Bulmer, 1990).
a n d continued operation of joint cot h i s t r e n d pointed t o t h e inefficiency
-- .
operative bodies e v e n when t a s k h a s been completed a s t h e administrative
mechanisms had become e n t r e n c h e d . P e r h a p s most worrying of all, t h e L a n d e r
parliaments have
become increasing
irrelevant
.
.
t o these
inter-executive
......
discussions, often being placed with a £zit accomnli (Scharnf. 1992).
Despite, Germany's f e d e r a l n a t u r e a n d its obvious differences with t h e
4'
U . K . , some of its experiences a r e relevant t o t h e d e b a t e in Enu!=lnd,
Regional
devolution has b r o u g h t new problems of accountability and democracy. These
a r e not insurmountable, b u t must be recognised if a successful s t r u c t u r e is
to be achieved. Any system which involves more t h a n one level of qovernment
(and t h i s includes t h e U . K . t o d a y ) w i l l by definition involve inter-level
bar gaining.
The
parliamentary/councS
importantly, openness.
important
point.
involvement
is
in
the
to
accept
process
this
and
and
ensure
perhaps
most
I t is t h e lack of t h e s e mechanisms which h a v e led t o
t h e democratic difficulties facing Germany today. Nevertheless, one should not
g e t carried away i n criticism of t h e German struct.ure.
seems t o
have delivered
a n economic
miracle.
The
I t is popular a n d
power of
reqional
governments t o a d d r e s s reaional i s s u e s is s u b s t a n t i a l and i n ~ o n t . r a s tw i t h
France or Italy has a p p a r e n t l v m3de
3
differen~e.
No.
-
20 regioni
(15 o r d i n a r y r e g i o n s )
( 5 special r e g i o n s )
Population
-
Average
Lowest
Size
-
2,887,381
115,996
Highest
5,853.902
Average
15,063 kmL
Smallest
3,262 km!
Largest
25,708 k m 2
Valle d'Aost-a
Czm~3ni?!
Structure
Deliberative Bodies
A single r e g i o n d council (of between 30 t o 80 members) is t h e lesislative body
of t h e region.
Executive
-.--- -- . ..A Giunta is elected from t h e regional counril i2 each reqion.
Sizes a r e
outlined i n t h e reqional s t a t u t e s according to nnpulation.
-S
-.-t.-a..t--u-s..
Italian regions a r e inferior t o t h e national level, b u t t h 5 regions do enjoy a
d e g r e e of constitutional protection.
Special Regions each have an individual
constitutiorlally protected, s t a t u t e which outlines t h e i r powers and operation.
Ordinary r e g i o n s also have s e p a r a t e c o n s t i t u ~ o n a ldocuments, althouqh t h e i r
powers a r e identical a n d t h e i r constitutions a r e founded in o r d i n a r y law.
I n t e r -Govern mental Relations
A l l local government (provincial and corn munal) comes u n d e r t h e supervision
of t h e regional a u t h o r i t i e s t h r o u g h t h e Regional Control omm mission.
comprises e x p e r t s appointed b y t h e regional council.
This
A s t h e commission only
a s s e s s e s t h e xlegality of a c t s , t h e members a r e predominantly j u r i s t s a n d civil
-
servants.
Central government no l o n a e r o n e r a t e s an a priori tutelle Qver tho Tt?lian
regions.
I n s t e a d . t h e s t a t e a ~ p o i n t e d reaional cnm mjs.s.inner
regional council t o r e c o ~ s i d e ra orrc.sosal.
The commiscinner
n : ? ~ 2 . ~ 1 a~
t5er! ! ~ b m i t
s u c h a proposal t o t h e constit1rtional court., s h o u l d he Or :he
seil! feel it. is
illegal. If it r a i s e s a potential conflict of i n t e r e s t (with another region or t h e
,
c e n t r a l government) it may be submitted t o parliament b u t t h i s process h a s
n e v e r been used.
Influence on_National Policy
Although t h e second chamber of t h e Italian Parliament
was intended t o
r e p r e s e n t territorial cleavages, its direct election makes it part- of t h e national
political scheme a n d of little importance t o t h e regions.
national policy
Presidents.
is i n s t e a d
directed t h r o u q h
the
Regional influence on
Conference of
F.egional
This body is of5cially recognisec? b y t h e government and is
especially importance
when t r e a t i e s or Eur0pe.n.
leuislat_i.r?n affectinu t h e
regions a r e i.inder discuscion.
More formalised l i n k s exist betweon t h Presidents
~
of t.hs snsci?! r e -!or.
and
t h e c e n t r a l a o v e r ~ r n e n t , T h e v b a v ~t h e r-iqht t o speak i n c a b i n . ~ tv5pn i z ~ ~ o s
of importance t o t h e i r reqions a r p d i s r ~ ? s . s e d .T
vote i n s u c h meetinas.
~ Firiliqn
P
P r e s i r ? = n + m a v even
In practice. t h i s privileqe is rare!:?
enforced.
Ott.~?r
formal powers include t h e r i u h t of all reuions t o place bills before t h e national
parliament.
In practice, however, s u c h approaches a r e r a r e l y fruit.ful.
Regional Institutions
-
civil Service
A s e ~ a r a t ecivil service o n e r a t e s i n each of t h e t w p n t l t
reqions.
Pav a n d conditions a r e see nationallv hilt a r e net
connected
with t h e s t a t e clvil s e r v i c e .
Staff
mot.ilitv
between national a n d regional s e r v i c e s is possible and
manaaed centrally.
Government
-
A Regional Commissioner sits i n each region.
H i s main role
is t o oversee t h e operation of t h e regional authority and
Offices
a c t a s Liaison between them a n d c e n t r a l government.
-
Police
There a r e no resional police f o r c e s , b u t local police a r e
u n d e r t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e region.
-
Legal
Structure
The lecral s t r u c t u r e is u n i f o r ~throl!qhout Italy. with t h e
~ x c e p t i n ncf Sicily, where a s e p q r a t e hiuh
ccllrt.
o~erates.
Powers
I(
I(
Economic
Economic planning
Ij
II
Employment
]
Spatial planning
Environmental
protection
Social assistance
Tourism
ji
Transport
/
I
Education (Sicily)
,
Regional languages
(special regions only) I!
I
iI
i
I1
!
I
i
i
I
i
powers
passed a t t h e national level.
which a r e limited
ii
ii
II
The o r d i n a r y regions enjoy no exclusive legislative a v t h o r i t y .
exercise "concurrent"
I/
I
I
.i
11
II
I!
I
(
I
I
i/
Museums 6 Libraries
I
I
I n d u s t r y & commerce
Culture & Education
1
Health
I
Electricity
II
II
1
1
1
I
I
11 Agriculture
Ii
(
Social
1
Public works
II
I
Iii
II
ii
11
ii
I!
Instead t.hev
b y framework
legislation
In addition, some leaislation outside t h e s e areas
is passed b y t h e national parliament. t o which t h e reqions a r e empowered t o
a d d t h e i r own specific amendments.
Special regions h a v e exc11lsive leaislative auth0rit.y i n all f h e a r e a s Listed
__
---_.
above (with t h e excention nf inl=lnr! waterwavs and electricitv). C.;nsti+-utional
wrangling has r e s t r i c t e d t h e Speci.el r e a i o n s i n t h e exercise of t h e i r a!ithol-itv.
Loans C 9 . 5 M
I
I
Italian "Ordinary" Region Finance (1987)
Financial
Resources
----- -. -.Regional Taxes Ceded Taxes
Circulation tax (electricity & gas)
- Motor vehicle tax
Tax on s t a t e concessions
Tax of' regional concessions
Tax on u s e of public land
Health s e r v i c e contrihutions
Block f u n d s
- Block a r a n t from central aovernment
29
Specfic funds
-
Finance dllocated t o pay f o r specific services e g . transport.
a n d health.
1
I
I
1
1
II
I
I
I
I
x)
Loans C 5 .
Spec I f I c Funds C 3 5 .2%J
Taxes
t Block G r a n t s ( 5 5 . 1 % )
Italian Special Region Finance (1987)
Cpmwntary
..
The development of regional government in t h e Italian s t a t e d a t e s from
t h e establishment of t h e second republic, a f t e r World War Two. Prior t o t h i s ,
Italy had been ruled by a unitary s t r u c t u r e based on t h e constitution of
Piedmont. This was despite s t r o n g regional identities within t h e Italy, caused
in p a r t by its late establishment.
I t must not be forgott& t h a t until 1870,
Italy was nothing more t h a n a geographical expression.
The "unification"
which was achieved a t t h i s d a t e was really t h e expansion of Piedmontese
power throughout t h e peninsular and those who favoured a federal o r region
s t r u c t u r e f o r t h e new s t a t e were unsuccessful.
B y 1945, a t t i t u d e s had changed.
I t was generally accepted, as in
Germany, t h a t decentralisation would protect t h e fledgling republic from a
repeat of 1921.
An important p a r t of t h i s division of sovereignty was to be
t h e institution of a regional level.
In f a c t reaional government was already
i1
i n existence in much of t h e c o u n t r y . The resistance, who were administering
t h e country, organised themselves regionally.
state,
peripheral
areas
such
as
governments independently of Rome.
Sicily
More seriously for the unitary
and
Sardinia
were
operating
The s t r e n g t h of regional identities in
t h e s e areas meant some feared t h e y would opt for secession.
I n response t o this situation, t h e new constitution allowed for t h e
immediate establishment of "special regions" in those peripheral areas where
regional identities were particularly strong. In 1 9 4 8 individual statutes were
negotiated between t h e Italian s t a t e and Sicily, Sardinia, Valle dlAosta and
Trentino-Alto Adige (althouqh-
Sicily had already been granted a special
.
status
s t a t u t e in 1946). In 1963 Fruili Venezia Giulia was also g r a ~ t e d special
---
and i n 1 9 7 1 , Trentino-Alto ~ d i g ewas divided into two autonomous provinces.
i
The two autonomous provinces undertake most resional res~onsibilities.
The wider development of reqions t h r o u s h o u t t h e country was not to
occur until t h e *1970's.
---
The delay was caused primarily by t h e opposition of
those political parties in power t o any dilution of their authority. During t h e
negotiations for t h e
post-war
constitution, t h e Christian Democrats
had ,
championed t h e regional cause, while t h e left had been much more sceptical.
However, t h e unexpected victory of t h e centre-right in t h e first 'elections
changed their stance.
Unwilling t o decentralise po wer from the central
institutions which they controlled, t h e government constantly postponed
implementing t h e legislation necessary for the "ordinary regions1' to become
'
reality (Evans, 1977). Furthermore t h e success of t h e left in local elections
made t h e right even less Likely t o devolve power to Communist controlled
regions, in a "red belt" a c r o s s t h e country.
U n s u p r i s i n f f l ~t,h e left's (and
particularly t h e Com munists') initial. scepticism chansed t o s u ~ ~ o when
r t they
realised their exclusion a t t h e national level had become entrenched b u t their
power in individual reaions remained verv s t r o n a .
Ev t h e 1970's t h chance
~
to exercise power a t a resional level looked v e r v enticina ( Z a r i s k i . I Q87, ~ 1 0 5 1 .
The sta1emat.e was broken b y t h e "o~c?ni.ncrto t.he left1' of t4e 1960's.
This
brief
experiment in
consensus
politics
led
to
t h e long
overdue
establishment of "ordinary regions" in 1 9 7 0 , although t h e extensive reforms
of seven years later changed t h e i r operation markedly.
t
The decision to
The German speaking Tyrolese argued, with some justification t h a t t h e
artificially constructed region (with an Italian majority) did not protect
their interests and was being used t o continue a policv of discrimination
towards them.
.
'
establish a regional s t r u c t u r e produced
"Messianic"
hones amonqst many
Italians (Leonardi, Nanetti and Putnam, 1981, p103) b u t t h e s e were not t o be
fulfilled.
Those a r g u i n g for regional government highlighted t h e need for
/
decentralisation in an over centralised bureaucratic. t h e regional diversity
/i
within t h e country and t h e need for t h e democratisation of many services.
In practice, t h e national government saw regionalisation having only one
purpose, t o democratise t h e planning process.
This led t o t h e granting of
minimal regional authority in most areas and led one commentator to liken them
to "giant municipdlities", though endowed with legislative powers (Giannini,
1984). The lack of authority granted t o regions was f u r t h e r affected by t h e
failure of local government reform to accompany t h e regional legislation.
This
.
--
led t o an inevitable overlapping of functions and rivalries between all levels
of local government, looking t o maximise t h e i r powers (Cassesse and Torchia.
The modern svstem of Italian regions was finally
in 1977.
----_ established
-._ _.
. In t h i s year, t h e Presidential 616 gave a large swathe of powers to t h e
.add
i'
regions, allowing them, a t least. in theory, t o undertake policy outwith t h e ,
control of t h e centre. This differentiates them from t h e local ffovernment
units which a r e not seen a s units of policy
administration.
making, b u t r a t h e r
local
The a r e a s granted to regions a r e listed above but t h e ability
of regions t o actually undertake policy in t h e s e a r e a s is still open t o debate.
Ordinary Regions a r e subject t o framework laws which can be very s t r i c t i n
t h e leeway t h e y g r a n t t o t h e regional level.
/
This has led ,ko Sanantonio t o
conclude t h a t t h e regions suffer from a distinct lack of autonomy.
In t h e
area of health he a r g u e s t h a t t h e national ministry, t h r o u g h these framework
powers, has actually "increased and regained" powers theoretically lost to
regional o r local levels (Sanantonio, 1987). This analysis would be supported
by Hine who described Italian regionalisdion as, "merely ...t h e devolution of
t h e ad ministration of central1y -deter mined policies" (Hine, 1993).
The legislative restrictions of t h e ItaLian reniorls a r e compounded hs.
their
financial
weakness.
Althollffh they
anzcount for
~ r o ~ l n 20%
d
qf
government expenditure, very Little of this 1s f r e e for reqions
- -. t o spend ( E n a e l
& Ginderachter, 1993).
In 1987. nearlv 82% of ordinary recrional e ~ ~ e n d i t i ~ r - e
was allocated t o specific areas b y t h e central uovernment.
Althouah 1 1 . ~ p 9 ~ i a ! "
regions were in a much better situation, relyinq on specified a r a n t s for ~ q l v
39% of expenditure, voluntary nature of t h e h v ~ o t h e c a t e d a r a n t s means
regions must follow national policies o r risk serious financial difficulties
(Cassese & Torckia. 1993). Much depends
on these qrants.
The
OF
t h e restrictions t h e centre places
f
opposing
vieci
h.as
been
expressed
hv
L e o r ~ r d i . whr? has
consistentlv a r g u e d th=rt t h o Italian reuiqns have heen a dvnamic force in
Italian economics. H i s work on Emilia-Romaana a r a u e s t h a t innovatjve r@crion?l
policies in t h e s p h e r e s of economics and environment in particular have been
responsible for t h e success of t h e region (Leonardi & Nanetb, 1991).
With s u c h divergent opinions on t h e Italian regions it is di££iclilt
to
come t o any s y n t h e s i s on their overall operation. There a r e nevertheless some
comments t h a t can be made.
Firstly, few doubt t h a t t h e Italian state has
t r e a t e d the regions a s i r r i t a n t s r a t h e r than democratic partners.
The s t a t e
h a s attempted t o l i m i t t h e role of regions by several means, notably financial
b u t also by bypassing them and granting powers t o local authorities directly.
This prima-facie s u p p o r t for local democracy obscures t h e centre's ulterior
motive which recognises t h a t local governments a r e less able t o resist q r a n t s
i n aid p r e s s u r e s t h a n a r e t h e regions.
The r e s u l t was t i g h t e r control of
policy rather t h a n decentralisation. The centre's attempts t o restrict reaional ,
action has meant that. regions have relied on ingenuity t o achieve any po1i.c~
autonomy.
T h i s h a s been aided b y t h e powers devolved t o t h e reuions in
1977, which althoush believed t o be irrelevant a t t h e time, have t u r n e d out
t o be of vital importance. (notably professional education and spakia! plannj.nq)
(Cassesse and Torchia, 1993: Leonardi, Nanetti & Putnam, 1981). Overdl, any
regional "success" has been achieved in suite of t h e central aovernment not
because of it.
P O R-T
-- U G A L
No.
-
2 Autonomous F.eqions
Population
-
A znres
236.709
Mzidei1-3
353,045
1991 saw t h e reform of t h e It.alian reainnal finance scheme. The new
scheme g r a n t s Health Service contributions t o t h e reqion. In ~ r a - t i c e
this c h a n a e s little except for e n s u r i n a more stable finance than when
regions relv on government g r a n t s .
-
Size
2,334 krn2
Azores
759 km2
Madeira
Madeira possesses a sinale, directlv elected. leaislative council.
The A z o r s c
has a bi-camera1 system, with t h e second chamber r e p r e s e n t i n q individu?!
islands.
This a d v i s o r y chamber ( f u r t h e r powers can be delegated to it) i s
appointed by t h e island executives, although elected councillors may also
a t t e n d a s non-voting observers.
Executive
Officially, executive authority lies i n t h e Minister of t h e Republic, a central
government appointee.
In practice, t h e Regional President, elected from t h e ,
regional parliament u n d e r t a k e s t h i s role.
H e o r s h e appoints t h e regional
cabinet a n d r u n s most executive functions.
St a tus
.-
The Portuguese regions are guaranteed b y t h e naticnal constitution but re~*!-!
inferior t o t h e national level.
which cannot b e altered
Each possess a seosrate constit_uti~r.s!st.at.ute
~rithoilt t h e conse~-it of t h e individual reaional
government.
1nter:Gove-r_n-mental
Relations
Local
Government
--. .- - .- -. ..-.- - -. . -..
-
Local government is supervised b y t h e regional t i e r .
Basic legislatior! on
finance and orqanisation is dealt with nationallv.
Central Government.
T h e r e is no c e n t r a l aovernment r o n t r o l , h!.it the Minister of t h e Republic mav
delay regional legislation.
To o v e r t u r n s u c h a decision r e q u i r e s a n overall
b..
majority of the' regional assembly .
Natlo-nal Pglic y_ Influence
T h e r e is no institutionalised mechanism f o r t h e elected reaional r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
t o influence t h e nat-ional sovernment..
Nevertheless. the Ministers (sf t h e
Republic a r e Cabinet Ministers a n d a r e eunectsd t o r e ~ r e s e n treaiona! oninior:
a n d i n t e r e s t s i n Cabinet d i s c u s s i a ~
s.
Regional Civil
-
Each region h a s a n i n d e ~ e n d a n tcivil service.
Mlrlimum
conditions a r e regulated b y national leuislation and it i z
Service
possible t o t r a n s f e r between s t a t e a n d regional s e r v i c e s .
Government
-
Offices
The Minister of t h e Republic o p e r a t e s a s t h e governmental
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n t h e region
a n d administers t h e
few
powers not allocated t o t h e reqional level.
Powers
I
Economic
I
Agriculture
ii
I
Nationalised
11 i n d u s t r i e s
I
Fi~alt-h
I
Spatial ~ l ~ n n i n a
!
II
1
Economic development
ij
Regional i n d u s t r i e s
Culture b Education
I
i
zdu~;l.t;o~
I
P ~ c 1 i q ~ a r. 1i ~ ] t l ~ v p
11
I
11 Monetary F. forelan
11 exchange policies
I Environ~ent
I
I
I
M I I S ~ I I V C . F, T l]>l:a.rlec
1
Hous.i.na
I
1
11 Fisheries
I
I
I
I
Mineral r e s o u r c e s
1
11
ii
i
I
1
I!
II
I1
I
I
!I
II
I
Social s e c u r i t y
11
-
I
/
11
11
II
'
I
I
Transport
ij
)
I
ii
I
Social
!I
1 -
11
I
il
I
II
I
II
Employment
I
water
The above list is not exclusive.
i
Reaional aovernments also have a a e n e r a l
r i g h t t o leqislate on matters of reqional interest..
The above powers a r e
(among o t h e r s ) specifically mentioned i n t h e regional s t a t u t e s .
The only
r e s t r i c t i o n s o n regional laws concern freedom of movement (except on health
g r o u n d s ) , equality a n d workers' r i g h t s .
ZC-.-
Financial Resources
-
Ceded Taxes
Income tax
Stamp d u t y
V.A.T.
Tax on vehicle sales
Tobacco taxes
-
Block f u n d s
Borrowina
Block t r a n s f e r s from c e n t r a l uovernment
-
There a r e no borrowing restrictions on regions f o r domestic
loans except t h a t t h e y may only be used f o r capital
projects.
International borrowing may b e vetoed by t h e ,
national parliament.
Specific
-
Grants t o cover t h e operation of national s e r v i c e s i n t h e
regions.
-
Charges, f i n e s a n d penalties.
funds
Others
Com
-- .. .- -mentary
.-----
The P o r t u g u e s e island reqions a r e among t h e most independer.t in
Europe.
This r e s u l t s from t h e i r extreme isclatjon and t h e s t r o n a renionalist
( a n d s e n a r a t i s t ) s e n t i n e n t s clresent amoncrst t h e i r c l o ~ u l a t i o n s . Desnite t h e i r
unusual a e o g r a p h y
,
the reainn s t r u r t u r e used t o i n c n v p o r a t ~them int.r; to
Portuaal h a s two points of relevance t o t h e U.K..
Des~itet h e hiqh autonomy
g r a n t e d t o t h e archipelagos, t h e P o r t u g u e s e mainland remains u n i t 3 r v .
The
f a c t t h a t 5% of t h e Portuguese population have a completely different system
of government t o t h e r e s t does not c a u s e a strain within t h e constitution a s
a whole (Scotland a n d Wales make u p a r o u n d 15% of t h e U.K.'s population).
Secondly, t h e government appointed Minister f o r each island still r e p r e s e n t s
t h e t e r r i t o r i e s i n cabinet, r a t h e r like t h e Secretary of State i n t h e U.K..
That
.-,-'
i/;'jFh...-
~ n r w n a tal n a l runas r.1/.2%3
Spec1 f
c I/
v/ ///,4.4'4A.
/
/
A.
Ptherg C d 5 v
~ e a e at a x e s
Y //// ////A
/ '
lc U - a n t s i d .la3
VlI !/!
-
..
*,_
_*
-
.
.
-.,.
I!!
/!I
I// /!V
- -
F!
,--,-.7,
I
d'
Finance - Azores
I
t- i na nc i ng of
Made i r a
I
I
II
I
I
Finance
-
Madeira
t h e Minister h a s a role in a devolved s t r u c t u r e is a p r e c e d e n t f o r the
continuing role of a Secretary of State for Scotland or Wales, post devolution.
These points a r e obviouslv more relevant t-o Scctland and Vales t h a n
England.
However, t h e mainland of Portugal is intended t o be split into
democratic regions according to t h e constitution. t h o u a h t h i s section has
n e v e r been implemented.
The recent election of t h e Socialists is unlikely to
change this.
One final point of i n t e r e s t concerns taxation. Although some taxes vary
on t h e islands (notably V.A.T.), t h e r a t e s continues t o be s e t in Lisbon.
1-6
SPAIN
Geographic Infor mation
No.
-
1 7 Autonomias
Population
-
Averase
Lowest
Size
-
2,279,297
263,434
Highest
6,940.522
Averaae
26,691 k m ?
S mallest
5,014 k m'
Largest
87,268 km2
(Rioja)
(P-ndalusia)
Structure
Deliberative Bodies
Although not stipulated i n t h e constitution, each Autonomous Community (A.C.)
h a s opted f o r a single legislative chamber-. The size of t h e s e chambers ranges
from t h i r t y t h r e e (Rioja) t o one hundred and t h i r t y five (Catalonia).
Execu!4-!_e._Bod Y
The J u n t a consists of a number of ministers appointed by t h e President, who
is himself elected by t h e reuional parliament.
in Catalonia a n d Euskadi (17
The l a r a e s t executives evistd
members) b u t elsewhere t h e number rarely
exceeds t e n .
t a t--u-.s.S
Each A.C. h a s a s e p a r a t e constitution o r s t a t u t e . neaotiated between t h e
national a n d regional levels a t t h e o u t s e t of autonomv. These documents v a r y
widely dependina on t h e soecific reaion.
A s statlltt?: ? r e "nrcrzni- law" t h e v
need t o p a s s t h r o u q h a specified system t o be altered.
makes them extensions of t h e national. constitution.
In aractice, this
Althouah not classed
2s
local government, t h e r e q i o n s a r e still inferior t o t h e national level, despite
t h e i r constitutional protection.
Inter-Governmental
-
Relations
-.
Local Government
Local government i n Spain comprises of a t least two levels (provinces a n d
municipalities), although some r e g i o n s have additional t i e r s .
Many also have
special authorities more s u i t e d t o t h e i r own needs (eq. island councils o r
metropolitan authorities).
Local government levels a r e s u p e r v i s e d by some
regions (with t h e exception of t h e Provinces), includinq t h e i r boundaries a n d
structures.
In
addition.
regions
mav
introduce
new
levels
of
local
govern ment/ad ministration ( e c . Cornarcas in Catalonia).
Regional government involvement i n local a o v e r n n e n t affairs must a d h e r e to
t h e national constitution ( a n d s t a t u t e s associated with it).
In practice t h i s
e n s u r e s local authorities retain a g e n e r a l competence and a r e f u n d e d mostlv
t h r o u g h t h e i r own taxes a n d s h a r e s of central taxes.
Government
-- -Central .-Although t h e A . C . s a r e not of equal s t a t u s with t h e national level, in a r e a s
where t h e y have exclusive power, t h e c e n t r a l government c a n n o t intervene.
I t may only t a k e matters before t h e constitutional c o u r t if it feels t h e
legislation of a n A.C. h a s i n f r i n g e d its s t a t u t e .
A national r e p r e s e n t a t i v e is
p r e s e n t i n each reaion but remains only t o administer t h o s e services st-ill
u n d e r direct s t a t e control and t o Liaise with t h e institutions of t h e &.C..
Nationdl Policy
Regional influence on national policy is institutionalised t h r o u g h t h e Spanish
Senate.
However, a s t h e regionally appointed members of t h i s body account
-
-
_ -
_ -_---
f o r only 47 members ( o u t of p r e s e n t total of o v e r 270), t h e i r influence 'minimal
r-
-..---.."
-1-
I
/
compared with t h e directly elected members.
/
R-ee'iog-g- En stitution s
Civil Service
-
Each region h a s a n i n d e ~ e n d e n trlivil service. The national
level lays down minimum conditions of service.
Police
-
Euskadi a n d Catalonia h a v e t h e i r own police forces (in
addition t o t h e national force).
Legal
-
The c o u r t
s t r u c t u r e is regionalised.
Catalonia h a s
a ,
s e p a r a t e judicature ( t h o u g h appeals can
be made t o t h e Spanish system).
Legal System
-
Catalonia h a s a Limited Civil Code which applies in t h e
t e r r i t o r y a n d uniquely t o citizens of Catalonia in o t h e r
regions o r countries (if t h e y wish it to).
This applies
mostly t o personal i s s u e s .
Government
Offices
-
Each A . C , h a s a aovernment office t o liai.sq with t h e
recrional acvern men?. a n d ad rnjqister t h e r ~ m a i n i na f ~ l n c t i o n r
of central crovsrn rnent.
-
3
-Powers
11
1
1
I
I
I
Public works
i
Railways 6 roads
/
1
Health
fI
Ii
Education ( h )
II
I
Spatial planning
I
Regional language
I
Ports and airports
(non-com mercial)
Environmental
protection
Sport
Agriculture & f o r e s t s
Social assistance
Museums & Libraries
I
I
I
1
Mineral resources
11
Education 6 Culture
I
I
Water
I
I
Social
II
11
I
Economic
ii
li
II
'I
1
II
1
'i
I
I
I
Huntinu & fishing
I
1
Economic development
11
II
II
Tourism
!
-
hiuh autonomy regions only
(h)
.
I
11
Although all A . C . s enjoy some authority over t h e s e fields (with t h e exception
of education), t h e degree of autonomy varies considerably between regions.
Broadly speaking t h e r e a r e two t y p e s of Spanish regions, those with high
autonomy (Andalusia, Catalonia,
Euskadi, Galicia a n d Valencia) and those with
---. low autonomy. The former group r u n their own health and education
systems
-
-
with
minimal involvement of
the
central
s t a n d a r d s and comparability of educational awards).
also r u n their own police force.
-
government (national
minimum
Some of t h e s e regions
The latter generally have less legislative
authority even, in t h e general a r e a s listed above.
Financial
- .-- -- - ..Resources
- ..- .. ...
-.
Resional Taxes may be established in anv area not already crranted t o another
level of government..
T h ~ s ealreadv established are:
[
REGIONAL TAX
I
1
I(
I Catalonia. Galicia. Murcia.
I Cantabria. Valencia. Castilla-La
Bingo
I
Mancha, Balearic Islands
/
Catalonia
I
Water Civil Engineerin:
Projects
I
I
1 Canary I s l a n d s
Petrol
)I Hunting
1
AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY
II
I
1
Extremadura
I
Environment (Clean-up Levy)
/
Balearic I s l a n d s
II
11
ii
II
11
I1
//
II
/III
I/ 1I
A land tax, i n t r o d u c e d i n Andalusia (and t h e n Extremadura and Asturias) has
been t h e s u b j e c t of l e n g t h y litigation and h a s not y e t been implemented.
-
Ceded taxes
Gamblinu taxes
Stamp d u t i e s
Death d u t i e s
Wealth tax
Property t r a n s f e r tax
S u r c h a r g e s may b e a d d e d t o t h e s e taxes a t t h e discretion of t h e Autonomc?us
Community.
The regions may also add a s u r c h a r g e t o income tax.
Block F u n d s
-
(Shared taxes)
Specific
Funds
Income tax
Block g r a n t s
-
G r a n t s f o r t r a n s f e r e n c e t o provinces
Health g r a n t s
Investment agreements
Grants f o r investment in u n d e r developed regions
Administrative sllbsidies
E.U. g r a n t s
The development of reaiona! qovernrnent in S ~ 7 i t - ii s closely linked t o t h ?
evolution of Spanish democrac y . The diverse n a t u r e of t h e Spanish ~ e n i n s u l z r
makes in virtually impossible t o govern t h e t e r r i t o r y democratically without
some form of regionalism o r federation.
The previous two attempts at
Speclf 1c Grants C 4 4 . 5 9
ISpanish Regional Finance (1992)
i
democracy (1874 & 1931-39) both involved reuional sovernment. The collapse
of both t h e s e reqimes also saw t h e collapse of t h e regional exoerim~nt-s. The
l a s t period of Spanish dictatorship was uncompromisin q in its suppression of
all opposition, especially regional identities.
Nevertheless. opposition t o
Franco's regime was concentrated in Euskadi ( t h e Basque c o u n t r y ) and
Catalonia.
In
t h e case
of
t h e Basques, t h e
opposition had
a
violent
manifestation, i n t h e form of E.T.A.. I t was E . T . A . ' s assassination of Prime
Minister Admiral Blanco t h a t effectively ended t h e dictatorship's long term
f u t u r e by leaving Franco without his heir.
When King Juan Carlos made it clear he was i n f a v o u r of a r e t u r n to
democracy, t h e problems f o r t h e new s t a t e were enormous.
centralised with a highly inefficient bureaucracy.
Spain was highly
Social problems
were
immense and illiteracy r a t e s i n t h e south were among t h e highest in Europe.
To compound t h i s , large numbers of Catalans and Basques were calling f o r
independence. In response t o o v e r centralisation a n d t h e s e p a r a t i s t claims of
some t e r r i t o r i e s a unique system of regional reform was introduced into t h e
Spanish constitution.
This allowed t h e oraanic d e v e l o ~ m e n t of
reaional
government b u t only when t h e population desired it.
The intention behind
t h i s was t o g i v e immediate
autonomy t o t h e "historic communities" while o t h e r
regions were expected t o o p t f o r indirectly elected co-ordinating bodies o r n o
regional s t r u c t u r e although a few were expected t o p u s h f o r t r u e democratic
regions.
This prediction proved t o be v e r y wide of t h e mark.
Under t h e Spanish constitution t h e r e a r e two routes to autonomy,
though a t r a n s i t o r y disposition t o t h e constitution allowed a t h i r d r o u t e . The
easiest way t o autonomy was u n d e r Article, 143.
This qives anv province or
.
.
,
a
--
group o; provinces (similar t o t h e Enolish ~ o u n t v )t h e r i a h t to establish a
t
region or Autonomous Community.
To i n s t i t u t e t h e Drocess e i t h e r all t h e
provincial councils o r t h r e e q u a r t e r s of t h e municipalities have t o agree.
t h e process is initialised.
a constitutional com mission of reqional
If
M .P.st
s e n a t o r s a n d provincial councillorsf d r a i t s a s t a t u t e (constitution) f o r t h e
region.
After t h i s p r o c e s s is completed, t h e d r a f t is s e n t t o t h e Cortes
(Spanish parliament) f o r ratification.
These regions then receive u p t o t h e
minimum functions as outlined above but h a v e t o wait f o r a five y e a r period
t o extend t h e i r competences.
have often been
The functions g r a n t e d t o t h e s e "lesser" regions
belittled, (and I have h e a r d them compared
with local
government f u n c t i o n s i n t h e U.K.) b u t legislative control o v e r a wide r a n g e
of
subjects
including
regional
railways,
regional
roads,
environmental
protection a n d public works is well beyond a n y t h i n g evident in t h e U.K. local
government s t r u c t u r e .
In tandem with this "slow"
route a f a s t e r r o u t e was offered u n d e r
Article 151. This uavo Provinces t h i s r i u h t t o initiate t h e establishment of a
region if all t h e followins bodies/referenda s u p p o r t e d t h e move:
a)
All provinces councils
b)
T h r e e q u a r t e r s of all municipalities in each province
c)
An absolute majority of t h e electors in each province
....
-T.-----,-
--
If t h i s was achieved t h e n a period of negotiations between t h e assembly
of t h e region (formed a s above) a n d t h e Constitutional Committee of t h e
national parliament would follow. Finally a simple majority of electors in each
t
1
Regions n o t f i t t i n g within t h e Provincial s e t u p were permitted b u t only
with t h e permission of t h e central government,
Since Provincial councils a r e indirectly elected from munid-~alitiest h i s
effectively means local i n t e r e s t s a r e r e p r e s e n t e d .
Province would be asked for t h e i r approval.
If any Province rejected t h e
a region a s originally
s t a t u t e , .then
t h e o t h e r s could continue t o establish
-- .-- - - - - . -, .
planned. These article 151 regions were not r e s t r i c t e d b y t h e minimal powers
imposed by Article 148.
Instead these regions may not encroach on the
minimum powers of t h e state, outlined i n Article 149.
Unlike Article 143
regions, t h e s e regions a r e obliged t o operate certain institutional structures.
Basically, a single Legislative chamber with a President elected from it and a
'I-
High Court t o head t h e regions' judiciary.
These a r e minimal safeguards t o
ensure
quite
the
powers
transferred,
being
democratically and under t h e r u l e of law.
extensive
are
exercised
In practice, these regions enjoy a
slightly wider definition of t h e powers outlined in Article 148 and t h e addition
of Health, Education and sometimes Police t o t h e i r authoritv.
The first two Autonomous Communities (Euskadi and catalonia] were
created in 1979
under t h e t h i r d method, a t r a n s i t o r y d i s ~ o s i t i o nof t h e new
-A.
constitution.
-
They were shortly followed by Galicia under Article 151. U D to
t h i s point t h e evolution of t h e Spanish s t a t e had uone roughly a s expected.
These t h r e e regions had a history of independence and each retained a '
regional language, widely spoken in their territories.
Indeed, t h e s e had been
t h e t h r e e regions attempting t o gain autonomy in 1936, when t h e Civil War
intervened.
Less expected was t h e application of Andalusia f o r full autonomy
under Article 151. Andalusia had never experienced statehood and had not
previously exhibited a regional identity, although local identities a r e strong.
During
the
constitutional
negotiations
of
the
late
1970's
Andalusian
representatives ensured t h a t s u c h a route f o r high autonomy would be open
t o them, in Article 151 (Donaahy & Newton, 1987, ~ 1 0 3 ) . Despite this t h e
centre-riuht government had made it clear during t h e neqotiations over t h e
Galician s t a t u t e t h a t n o other reaion would be allowed t o a t t g n t.he hiah
a ~ t o n o r n v aranted i ~ n d e r arkicli.? 151., instead havinc; to re171 on the s!nw
process o ~ ~ . t l i nin~ darticle 143.
The strsnat-h of fealina in T-.ncl;.,l.1~1.:~
fnyr-cl
t h e central government. t o back down and i t received high level autonomv in
1981 (Tarnames & Clegg, 1984).
To f u r t h e r complicate matters t h e Spanish government was psnicked by
t h e attempted coup of 1981 into putting t h e brakes on f u r t h e r reuional reform.
Although more and more regions were applying for low autonomy, some wished
t h e higher autonomy offered by article 151.
i n t e r e s t s was t h e L.O.P.C.A. of 1982.
The result of t h e s e conflicting
This law, agreed by all t h e national
parties, attempted to end t h e article 151 route t o autonomy, but substantial
p a r t s of it were r u l e d un-constitutional b v t h e constitutional c o u r t ( 1 4 of 36
clauses) (Gonzales, 1987).
The final compromise aave hicrh autonomv t o a
f u r t h e r t h r e e regions (Valencia, Canary Islands and ~ a v a r r e )b u t effectivelv
removed t h i s option f o r a n y o t h e r reaions.
The other unusual r e s u l t of t h e
compromise was t h e creation of regions in t h e final few a r e a s where regional
government had not been established, despite local opposition i n Castilla y
Leon and Madrid (Cuchillo. 1993).
The government hoped t h e s e "pro-centre"
regions would a c t a s a balance against t h e more independently minded
territories.
The government's panic, although understandable i n relation t o t h e coup
of 1981, was in r e t r o s p e c t r a t h e r unnecessary.
A s with all qovernments, t h e
loss of power t o lower t i e r s of government can be a b i t t e r pill t o swallow.
Ironically, t h e l a t e s t p a c t agreed between t h e national parties s u u a e s t s t h e v
The c u r r e n t agreement is t o
have finally bitten t h e bullet completely.
encourage t h e remaining article 14.3 reeinns t o move towards higher autonomv,
t
though excluding health services.
accompanied b y a
decrease i n
This new policy seems t o have been
natjonallreaional tensions.
If
one
uses
applications f o r judicial review a s a rnear.s of measurinq s u c h tension t h e r e
has been a n undoubted d r o p in r e c e n t years.
From a peak of 56% of central
laws being challenged b y one o r more regional governments in 1988, t h e r e
were no challenges i n 1991.
Central challenges have always been l e s s
(probably d u e t o t h e l a r g e r number of a c t s passed b y regional governments
collectively) b u t t h e y too have dropped from 11%in 1988 t o 1.8% in 1991
(Zaldivar & Castells, 1992).
P e r h a p s a s Zaldivar and Castells a r g u e , "Spain
may be a t t h e e n d of a long historical journey".
Whether t h i s is t h e case will
depend on t h e final s t r u c t u r e t o accommodate t h e aspirations of t h e Basques
and Catalans.
The o t h e r regions will n e v e r reach t h e s t a t e of autonomy g r a n t e d t o t h e
article 151 reaions and those created h v t h e transitory d i s ~ o s i t i o nand t h i s
could prevent t h e recently ~ o ~ l l l "leap-fraa"
ar
theory from becominu realit.,.
This assumes t h a t t h e B a s a ~ ~ eacn d Cat3laq.
cii!l
a l v ? ~ ? :w i s h t o h = i i ~m ~ t - e
autonomy t h a n t h a t enioved b v o t h e r reaions. This I believe. -'stoo simn!istic
The Catalan and Euskadi aovernments h a v e mad^ n r c n c r e t of +.he f
~ the-:
~ t
wish f u r t h e r powers, whether t h e v a r e crra?t.ed t.o ~ t h e rrreaions cr not.
notably in t h e field of bankina and internatlona! relations ( P l n > n r l a l T ~ T ~ Q T
-- t
-
Regions do not wish t h i s
accompanying it.
authority t r a n s f e r r e d
d u e to t h e
debt
1993). They h a v e achieved much of what. t h e v wish w?h c l e 7 ~ eur s e of p r i v a t e
Most n o t a b l y , however. t h e moderate nat_;ma!Sct n=irties i n t h a w two
law.
r e q i o n s n o l o n g e r talk explicitlv of i n d e p e n d e n c e , r a t h e r s e o i n a th-sir goal a?
a t t a i n i n g s t r o n a e r i n f l u e n c e i n Spair? and Turone
r e g i o n s a r e willincr t o
worlc
(J,3.1:regl.~!'.1993).
That t h e s e
w i t h i . ~ t h e system i s p e r h a p s th.o
ureatgst
testimony t o its s u c c e s s .
--- - - IN- EUROPE
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT
--
-
.
--
-.
-
- -
.....-
--
-
L E----S- S --O- N- S-FOR
THE
U.K.
--.- .
--
-
. .--
--
--
-.
-
..
..-.. .
A s t h e a b o v e s t u d y h a s s h o w n , reqional a o v e r n m e n t s i n Eur0t.e a r e
d i v e r s e . This s e c o n d section a t t e m p t s t o p u t t h i s i n t o a U.K. p e r s p e c t i v e .
To
do t h i s , five specific a r e a s where t h e U . K . d e b a t e could b e n e f i t from reqion.31 ,
developments i n E l ~ r o o ea r e a d d r e s s e d .
European
reuions:
financial
These a r e : t h e f u n c t i o n s held bv
a r r a n n e m e n t . ~ ' t.hei):
c7~eratior.
2
!~ri.ts
clf
democratic renewal: addressincr of t h e "West Lothi.an Oi.iest.on" a n d f i n a l l v , t h e
methods used t o i r n ~ l e m e n tt h e initial reform.
To complete t h e r e ~ o r t : I ad<! my own conclusions on t h e Euronear!
experience of reaionalism.
I n makinq t h e s e cornments I d r a w or,
m.7
three
y e a r s experience working i n t h e field a s well a s t.he r e p o r t i t s e l f .
11.1 The-Fuun_edioon&
-Role of E u r o p e a n Regions
Any d i s c u s s i o n of r e g i o n s must f i r s t s t a r t with t h e r o l e t h e v a r e tr,
There is Little point t o r e q i o n s if t h e y cln not. actually d o somethina.
fulfil.
The f i r s t section i n t h e p a r t of r e p o r t will f o c u s on t h e f u n c t i o n s rnerfnrrn Ir
t h e countries studied.
S e c o n d l v , t h e auestion of h n w t h e y ur.dert.ake t h e s e
f u n c t i o n s is a d d r e s s e d .
Reqions u n d e r t a k e a multj.t.1-~deof activities wl.t.hin t h e Euronean Union.
-
b u t i t / n o t e w o r t h v t h a t in some a r e a s t h e y plav n9 role whatsoever.
Pefenre.
social securit.? a n d i m ~ i a r ~ k i ohn? _ w no reai.ond ?o!icv i n !rrslvernent.
P ~ r h a ~ s
l
most importantlv national rnonetarv a n d f i i ~ ( ~ ?nnlicv
r~criqnal
hands.
ic:
ant-ire!v
C I I of
~
This i n c l u d e s a s w a t h e of m a c r o - ~ c o n n r n i!~O V ~ Y C j~c!i.irji.nc7 i t ~ t o r e s t
r a t e s , c u r r e n c y a n d money s u p p l y .
The only slight exception t o t h i s is in
Germany, where r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e reaional banks sit on t h e Bundesbank's
strateqic
board.
This
hardly
amounts
to
reqional
policy,
Nevertheless, it is p e r h a p s s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h i s List of
reaional involvement i n E u r o ~ eis i~ fact s o shark..
however.
~ 0 l i d . ewith
~
no
ForeS.an relatjons o r
police, for examnle a r e not included.
~ n .tynes
There a r e wide di5c.-en~-1ciesh o t ~ ~ e the
b y individual r e u i o n s .
lines.
nn!j?v a d ~ i n i q t e r e c l
r?f
Hosrever . t h e s e lrariations do not
foll2 w clc~s+;+.~r+.!~~?!
For example. some Spanish reaions onerate police f o r c ~ s :while t h e
Belgian regions' role i n t h i s a r e a remains minimal (thol.~ahrecentlv arai--ted a
few powers i n t h i s a r e a ) .
The following t a b l e qives a silmmarv of individual
regional involvement i n a few k e y policy areas:
1-
I
Education
I
X
X
X
I
X
H
c
i
a
III Portugal
j
I1 (islands)
l11 S p aHn
1II
l1
i
.U
(151)
S- 7
Y
I
I
x
I
I
I
X
I
Y
I
I
1
I
(143)
X
I
I
II
I1
11
II
II
1
x
X
X
I
1
i
I
I
I
I
X
I
I
1
I [not ~ l l ) I
I
I
I
1
i
I
i
1 voluntary 1
I
I
I
1
x
X
I/II '
X
II
X
x
I
I
I
x
j
-
I
I
I
----
II
II
Il
I1
II
II
1
I
II
I
( n o t all)
IIII
II
1
I
I
I
I1
I
I
I
I
I
.
II
I
x
X
I
I
X
x
I
X
I Planninq
1
X
I
I
x
II
I
I
X
France
1 Police
Transport
Health
X
- --I
II II
II
II
l
The above comparison shows clearly t h a t certain functions a r e reaional
in all (or most c o u n t r i e s ) .
a s regional functions.
T r a n s p o r t and planning a r e u n i v e r s a l l ~r e q a r d e d
Education a n d Health have reuional involvement in all
countries, t h o u g h not i n all r e q i o n s within them.
The S ~ a n i s harticle 143
regions will join t h i s cgroup if t h e nresent. reforms are .successful (see above).
Police. on t h e o t h e r hand has only been a r a n t e d to reqions in c a s e s where
s u c h devolutior? was deemed necessaryr.
Tn Germanv t h i s
~73s
hacause
regionalism was created t o e n s u r e t h e division of t h e o r g a n s of t h e s t a t e to
protect democracy. I t s t a n d s to reason t h a t police should be a power removed
from t h e centre in t h i s case.
regions
(specifically
The Spanish article 151 o r their equivalent
Catalonia
and
Euskadi)
had
problems
of
mistrust
concerning t h e national force, under Franco and t h u s were uranted police
powers a s a means of restoring faith in law and o r d e r .
region, Valle
d'Aosta
( t h e only
one
Finally, t h e Italian
with exclusive police
powers)
administered its own police force, prior t o granting of autonomy.
had
In all cases,
t h e granting of police powers has not been easily accepted b y t h e national
authorities.
I t is clear t h a t European regions have expanded t h e i r influence since
t h e i r inception.
The auestion remains, however, how involved a r e regi,ons in
actual decision making?
A t one extreme t h e r e a r e now policies, which in some
countries a r e only decided
by
resions.
On
t h e other
hand, resional
involvement in some cases is limited in ~ r a c t i c et o s t r i c t administration of
national decisions.
The weakest reaions in t h e leaislative sense a r e t h e French.
bodies
have
no
leaislative
administrative acts.
authority
whatsoever
and
only
These
~romulqate
A l l o t h e r regions have legislative power, b u t t h e power
t o use it varies enormously.
Italian regions can make laws but they must be
within t h e frameworks established b y t h e state.
A s mentioned above, t h e s e
can be strictly defininu, especially in t h e a r e a of health.
A t t h e other
extreme, Belgian Regions (and Communities) have absolute legislative authority
in t h e areas of policy granted to them.
This includes if they conflict with
s t a t e laws. Unlike Germany where regional law is inferior (Bun desrecht brich t
~ a n d e s r e c h t- Article 31. Basic Law), Belgian reqional leqislation i s equal to
t h a t of t h e federal level (Ginderachter, 1 9 9 4 ) .
This forces regions and t h e
federal level to neaotiate.
In ~ r a c t i c ~
even
.
tho I.scl.le of r,~hether a reaion
power can he ~ T . I Q ~ c ~ ~ I ? gl!r-!.?a
c~.
r'.v
£01-ir
w r > r L jl-1
~ ? - ~ ~ . r i n i ! , ;
D Q Y . Y ~ S S ~ Sleniglpti~rp
t l - j i ~qr=q T ~ . , q t e h l i s h o c ]
methodoloaies which a a T r e a better c l . t s ~ r i ~ + iof
~ nrecriqnal
.
activityr in a
given area.
T h ~ s ea r e out.bned h n ! ~ ? + ~ :
Region O n l y
-
This is self e>c~lan.~P.orv,
with t h e reuional tip.: makina
the only ~ o l i c vin t h e aiven a r e s .
Regional Policy
-
Reqions introduce pohcy in these areas. but t h e
national level is also active.
-
National
Framework
Regions make policv within guidelines established h v
t h e national level.
Regional Admin.
-
Regions u n d e r t a k e t h e a d ministration
of
national
policies.
The following table places t h e same policies examined above, within t h e
above categories:
I
I
II
Region Only
Regional
I National
Regional
II
P olic y
Framework
Ad min.
I
Belgium
III
Transport
II
Health
Transport
Economic
I!
11I!
Environment
II
I
1 Transport
1 Economic
I! Education
II
II
I
dev.
I Environment
I 'Jp.3.lth
I
II
II
I!
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I Transport
I Plannina
I
Italy
I
Health
Portugal
(islands)
Police
Economic
dev.
I
Education
Health
ransport
I1I T
Planning
I Economic
dev.
I
-
(I Spain (151) 11 E d u c a t i ~ q
II
I! Health
I
I
II
II
I
I!
II
I
I!
I
I
I
I
I
1 dev.
I Plannina
Environn'nnt
I
I,
III
II
I
I
I
I
I
II
I Transport
I Economic
I
'
II
II
II
Environment
Italy
(special)
I
1
1
1
I!
II
II
I
I1
I!
I
l?rg!i.rn
--
I
I
I
I
This is a necessarily s u b j e c t i v e division. but it a i v e s a clearer ~ i c t u r e
of t h e functional operation of recrions in t h e countries s t u d i e d .
Belaium
clearly emerges a s t h e most devolved of European c o u n t r i e s . with reuions
being t h e only. t i e r of government involved in many a r e a s .
In f a c t t h e i r
competence i n t h e a r e a s t h e y
control e v e n extend t o full international
relations.
To sum up, social powers (ie. e d ~ ~ c a t i o nhealth
,
a n d environment) a r e
f u n c t i o n s most commonly placed reaionallv.
This h a s o c c u r r e d t o t h e extent
t h a t policy i n t h e s e a r e a s can no longer always he described a s national.
This does not necessarily mean t h a t poliicies differ.
Reaions c a n use t h e i r
freedom, t o conform (Smith, 1985).
A s f a r a s England is c o n c e r n e d , t h e r e is no prospect of regions beina
t h e only a c t o r s i n a n y policy field, however t r a n s p o r t , economic development,
environment a n d health a r e all a r e a s which could b e decentralised t o a
regional level.
The ability f o r s u c h a r e a s t o b e decentralised i n Europe a t
l e a s t shows t h e possibility of s u c h a move.
Regional finance is o n e a r e a where a n y U.K. regional reform, must, I
believe, l e a r n from European experience.
of t h i s i s s u e i n t h e U.K..
Manv myths p e r v a d e t h e discussion ,
b u t primary amonust t h e s e a r e t h e verceptions
s u r r o u n d i n g regional taxation.
I n f a c t t h i s is laraelv i r r e l e v a n t . with t h e
major exception of France.
The f i r s t observation t o make is t h a t German r e a i o n s possess no
i n d e p e n d e n t tax raising powers. Al! German taxes a r e set. nationallv, with t h e
exception of
local government t a x e s
municipalities not regions.
which
do
vary.
These accrue t o
The only exceptions t o t h i s a r e Bremen and
Hamburg where t h e dual s t a t u s of t h e r e s i o n (it both a local a n d reqional
government) means t h e y control t h e local taxes t h e v a r e entitled to.
This
anomaly seems t o c a u s e t h e more general confusion over regional taxation in
Germany.
The Portuguese i s l a n d s a r e i n t h e same situation with no reqional
t a x autonomy. Italy follows, with regional taxation in t h e i r c a s e accounting f o r
l e s s t h a n 1%of t h e i r overall income.
I n Spain a n d Belgium, however, t h e
regions' powers t o r a i s e new t a x e s do mean t h e possibility of siqnificant
reliance on reaionally controlled taxes.
Spanish regions h a v e t h r e e significant powers in t h e a r e a of taxation.
Firstly, t h e y may i n t r o d u c e t h e i r own taxation; secondly, t h e y may introduce
s u r c h a r q e s on t h e taxes which a c c r u e t o them within t h e region. b u t t h e r a t e s
of which a r e s e t nationallv.
Finally, t h e v msv add a s u r r h a r a s t o income t a r ,
t h e proceeds of which would a c c r u e t o the region concerned. Belaian reaionc
h a v e similar powers. In b o t h c a s e s , t h e ability t o raise new resional taxes is
made practically meaningless by t h e caveat t h a t s u c h t a x e s must not be levied
on items o r activities
c u r r e n t l y taxed b y a n o t h e r level.
In practice, t h i s
means t.he regions a r e r e d u c e d t o taxing peripheral activities a s t h e lists
supplied i n t h e
national
studies,
emphasise.
I n d e e d . a p a r t from
the
environmental "taxes" a l r e a d y levied by all t h e Belqian reqions, research h a s
f o u n d t h e rental of video t a p e s a s t h e only activitv untaxed b v t h e r e s t of
~ covered
s
bv
t h e Belgian s t a t e in one way o r a n o t h e r ( b u y i n 4 Video t a ~ is
V.A.T.) (Delmartino, 1993).
The second power has been u s e d . b u t s ~ ~ r i n u ! v .
The reason for t h i s is t h a t t h o s e taxes ceded t o t h e resions a r e l a r a e l ~ r
peripheral in n a t u r e a n d reliance on them is unlikely t o lead to a .sianif;lcant
improvement i n income.
The small reliance on t h e s e s o u r c e s of income also
produces t h e r a t c h e t effect.
This means t h a t reqions have t o raise r a t e s b y
a disproportionate amount t o i n c r e a s e revenue. For example, if a region relied
on its own taxation for 1%of its finance, t o i n c r e a s e its revenue by
I%, it
would have t o r a i s e taxes b y 100%. If it relied on regional taxation f o r 2% of
income, t h e r i s e would be only 50% (Smith, 1985).
The final option open t o t h e Spanish a n d Belgian regions is t o impose
a s u r c h a r g e on income tax.
This is by f a r t h e most obvious source of e x t r a
finance, should it be r e q u i r e d .
I n f a c t , n o region, with t h e exception of
Euskadi h a s e v e r introduced s u c h a s u r c h a r g e . Euskadi, is a special case a s
t h e s u r c h a r g e was i n t r o d u c e d a s a temporary measure ( f o r one year) to pay
f o r damaae caused b y s e v e r e floodins.
Th2 only ot-her &tempt to raise s u c h
a tax was in Madrid, where politjcal o ~ o o s i t i o nforced t h e reaional aovernment
t o back down.
The reason f o r t h e failure to
llse
t h i s wntrer is fsar
competition and t h e ~ o l i t i c a lfallout. from s u c h a move.
r7f
t.ax
Indeed t h e Flemish
government hardlv publishes a p r e s s release without a s s e r t i n a t h e i r firm
s t a n c e on keepinq tax a t t h e national level.
The problem has been t h a t if
regions wish t o qain e x t r a finance it h a s been e a s i e r f o r them to borrow,
r a t h e r t h a n rely on t h e politically f r a u g h t course of tax rises.
The only resions with s i s n i f i c a n t tax raisina powers a r e t h e French.
French regions accrue o v e r half
t h e i r income from t h i s source and a r e
g r a n t e d a variety of taxes which t h e y can control.
Once again t h e s e a r e
generally peripheral, b u t t h e small size of French regional b u d g e t s means t h e y
a r e significant. The ability of t h e F r e n c h r e a i o n s t o control t h e i r income ( a n d
expenditure) t o a large d e g r e e means t h e y operate
relativelv i n d e p e n d ~ n t l ~
- despite t h e i r lack of constitutional protection.
P J ~ v e r f h e l e s s t. h e s i ~ eof t.heir
budgets (around 2% of national expenditure in 1992) gives them little financia!
power.
Most regions a r e largely financed t h r o u g h centrally controlled tax
assignments a n d g r a n t s from central authorities. The former account f o r t h e
l
ensure
vast majority of regional finance i n Germany, Belgium and ~ o r t u g a and
a relatively s t a b l e revenue base from year t o year.
for all t h e s e
government.
The most important taxes
regions a r e V.A.T. and income tax, a s with a n v
national
Italy and Spain rely more heavily on g r a n t f u n d i n g . but this
hides t h e differences in finance between these two systems.
T h e vast
majority af Italian regional fund.inq is allocat.ed bv t.he s t a t e t o specific
sectors. In addition, s t a t e s u i d ~ 3 n e smust h e followed in t.hese sect.ors if t h e
g r a n t s a r e t o be awarded.
t h e regions a r e r u n .
In effect t h i s qives t h e state a h u a e s a v in how
Spzin, b v contract. relies mostlv on block a r a n t s for i t s
regional finance, giving reaions lee-way t o pursue spendina policies under
t h e i r own priorities.
However, t h e block g r a n t is not necessarily a soll~tion
t o t h e financing of regional government, either, In Spain, although t h e g r a n t
is
allocated
through
a
formula, t h i s
controversial n a t u r e of its allocation.
cannot
disguise
the
essentially
Most variables i n t h e formula a r e
relatively easy t o define (ie. tax yield, spendina on core projects, etc.). The
exception is n, representing needs. The definition of t h i s concept is obviously
a hugely subjective issue and a s s u c h will lead t o controversy each time t h e
f o r mula is re-negotiated (around every five years).
Finance is also a constant source of conflict in t h e German system.
Here, problems c e n t r e on t h e equalisat.ion mechanisms used t o even u p t h e
financial weaknesses inherent in certain reaions.
T h e dehates over this
system have become so bitt-er that. t h e c u r r e n t svstem h a s contir?1led i n force.
s
ths in+.-ndi!ct_inn nf + h a n e w
despite t h e realisation or! 211 s ! ' . ? ~ , that.
I,?~?lpv
makes its operation f a r from perfect.. No alt.ernat.i.v4 s v s t ~ lr l ~~ l l . l r ? h p ? r r ~ - e w l
upon.
T h e final source of finance o w r ! t o r e g i o n s i s borrowina a n d , n z ~ h ~ ~ . ;
surprisingly, t h e i r i n d e ~ e n d e n c ein t h i s area is s u r ~ r i s i l ? a l vh i a h ,
'..!it4 t h e
exception of t h e "golden rule" tie. borrowinq must not exceed investment.
expenditure) and l i m i t s on international credit finance, regions a r e larqelv
unrestricted in t h i s area.
This has led t o t h e curious situation in Spain
where it was easier for regions t o borrow than to raise taxes.
This was
because t h e regions did not inherit t h e d e b t s of t h e s t a t e , allowing them to
" s t a r t from scratch".
In t h e event, a compromise has been reached whereby
Spanish r e g i o n s will c u t back t h e i r borrowina ( a s mart of t h e c o n v e r a e n c e
criteria f o r t h e s i n g l e c u r r e n c y ) i n r e t u r n for o r o a t e r funding .from t h e s t a t e
i n certain a r e a s (O.E.C.D., 1993).
Overall, f i n a n c e is a n d will remain a c a n t e ~ ~ t i o ui sss u e amonast European
regions.
The only solution would seem to b e financing regions a s much a s
possible t h r o u g h t h e i r own taxation.
In practice, nation-states a r e unlikelv
t o sanction s u c h decentralisation, d e s p i t e t h e weak economic a r u u m e n t s against
t
it.
Unless t h i s is d o n e , regions (and local authorities) w i l l constantly blame
t h e s t a t e f o r r e s t r i c t i n g t h e i r finances while t h e s t a t e in t u r n is likely to
criticise them f o r o v e r s p e n d i n a .
I t should h e noted, however, t h a t t h i s
situation o c c u r s with a n y level of qovernment below t h e nation-state
(or
indeed above it s i n c e t h e a d v e n t of t h e E.C.).
11.3 Regions as units of democratic renew21
As u n i t s of democratic renewal a n d acrnl.1nt3hil;.tv t h e r e g i o n s have h a d
mixed f o r t u n e s i n t h e c o u n t r i e s st.udied.
Tn .c,?sain. Ttalv 292
C , a r - ~ f i ? ~tvl l, p
regions were given t h e power t o c r e a t e dnmocratic institut.tnns withcllt: h a v i n a
t o follow a n y model.
I t was hoped t h a t t h i s wo~.~!d.lead t o innovation a n d
experimentation.
practice
In
regional institutions have, almost
without
exception, mirrored t h e national level s t r u c t u r e s .
In Italy, t h e r e were a t t e m p t s a t more participative democracy a n d
consensual government, b u t t h e s e eventually failed.
However. a s Zariski
points out, t h e r e c o r d of t h e s e s y s t e m s of sovernment is generally r a t h e r
The only exceptions t o t h e mould have o c c u r r e d in
poor (Zariski, 1987).
Euskadi a n d Bavaria. I n Euskadi, t h e traditional u n i t s of Basque government
have had significant powers devolved t o them from t h e reai-or,,leading t o even
greater democratic accountabilitv
a n d decentralisakon.
In Bavaria. t h e
parliament h a s a s e c o n d chamber, b u t this ic: hsrcllv
rnaior ir.nnv?ticn.
Ironicallv. t.he one t.rulv i.r?nov3f.ive st?:~r-tl,?.~->
pvjr.t..c ir: F r a n r ~ ~,.l?-,erp
.
= e.eccnd
(advjsorv) reaiona]
r
-n-.=jc,+~ c f
r e p r e s e ~ ~ t a t i v eofs s e v e ~ a li n t a r n s t
etc.).
This chamber ens1.11-es the
nrc711Dc:
r>l~\vai.c
f;!>.-!l~din r!
-
2
-
..
~ . j - > i r -.,. .v i q t c
znA
~ 1 - a f c r ~ . r , ; c l~~bc=. : - ; t . j s c
~ q y t i r i . ~ ? t~6
i ?~
~r r r ? r . =
~ n;rl~ ~
c.nri.?I -?f-st?yc
i n t h e making of regional ~ o l i c va n d introdl,.~cesnr! element nf ~art_iric?ti,.c?n
democracy r a r e l y s e e n nationa!lv.
t
Denmark gives income tax r a i s i n a Dower t o 311 its local authorit-ie:
without damaging t h e i n t e r n a l market of t h e c o u n t r y .
One a r e a ..There r e a i n n s h s v e not helped d o m r ~ r ~ t decer.tr?!isat.ion
ir
i n relatian t o local crovernvent.
Reu!-cns
~;)I:P
many Eurogean c o u n t r i e s . T h i s i s ne1-bans
n1:il.t~
I-c:.~n
r",?^.ct e.i:ident
where loc3! a o v e r n m ~ n t.ql.i+hnri+-.rir! 5ame recior, 7 is
two German reqions t h e Countv
of r o y , t r ? ! i c ? t i n n
i n t.he
i c
in
r,andaj-
C--lrrn?-
~ a ~ r ~ r qr l~ v~
+ r . i r t o r lT r l
+ ~ . P Y ~ ? ~ n c l ~ t j l :;?re
r r , .still T ~ C + V ~ ! ! V
annnirtod.
while i n all t h e larqet- s t a t e s , these hodies a r e entirelv u n d e r regional control
(The two city s t a t e s have no l o c d aovernment a t all). The example cf North
Rhine Westphalia, where all t e a c h e r s a r e appointed t h r o u g h a single office in
Dusseldorf, is often cited a s a manifestation of t h i s (Paterson & Southern,
1991, p161).
Direct control by t h e Lander is also exercised o v e r t h e police,
schools inspectorate, a u d i t commission a n d i n d u s t r y
o t h e r s ) t h r o u g h t h e region's o r g a n , t h e District.
supervision, (among
F u r t h e r regional control is
exercised t h r o u g h t h e d i r e c t financing of r o a d s . education a n d housing either
t h r o u g h local a u t h o r i t i e s o r directly t o p r i v a t e c o n t r a c t o r s .
What local
autonomy t h a t does exist is f u r t h e r limited b y the consistent. under-fundinq
of t h e local level. Althoush t h e y provide most. puhlic s e r v i c e s , t h e local h e r
receives a r o u n d only 1.3% of tax rPv+nues. The rpc.llltant sh?rtfall is. nade
i n g r a n t s from t h e Bund and L?iud,sr. b t ! - nf
~ ~ ? . , : , 7 1a7r 4
n.?r--m?~!r~?
IJD
r
f37-
specific p r o i e c t s ( S c h ~ ~ r e i z n~ rt .z ! . 1 0 Q ? I .
I n Belsium, Spain a n d Italv. conflict. h;is ?,rise? b e t w ~ ~
t nh reuicnal
~
and
provincial (or
count^.^)
tiers.
Cataloria a.+.ternrf-ed t r ? al,c?lish t h e ~~c~.:i~rles
e n t i r e l y , t h o u u h t h i s was r l ~ l ~unconstit.ution~!.
d
Tr,
t h e v e n t . t h e recrion
a t t e m p t s t o i g n o r e them, d e d i n a instead. with recrigna!ly created cfi1ln.t~ i ~ n i t ~ .
The s t a t e in t u r n u s e s t h e province t o b y p a s s t.he recrion.
I n Italv a similar
situation has developed, with t h e reaion r e l u c t a n t t o devolve authoritv
downwards, leading t h e s t a t e t o f u n d p r o j e c t s directly.
This in fact causes
centralisation a s t h e local s o v e r n m e n t s a r e l e s s able t o withstand a r a n t s in
aid p r e s s u r e t h a n a r e smaller local authorities.
The position i n Belcrium h a s
affected t h e Belsium provinces t o s u c h a n e y t e n t t h a t Pelrnarti~lo~ommont.ec!.
II
a s a n i n d e p e n d e n t policy hodv. t h e i r r o l ~i s over".
A l t h n u s h some r e c i o n s halre d e c e n t r ; ? l i s 4 ( n o t a b l v ":skadi!.
seems t o be t h e o t h e r crav.
T h i s is n c t
qovernment itself b u t a comhi?a+inn of
+..i,~r)
FI
n e c e s s a r v failil-n
f>,-tnyc
~irqt
wish. t.0 retain t h e a r ~ & e s ct o n t r o l ncl~sj.hleand ~ r n n dt h . 0
between local a ~ c reai-anal
!
o n v e r n m e ~ tr, l
p r o p e r l y assiuned loczllv.
3 ~!4?d
t h o trend
~f
reai~n=,l
p q ~ r n v n m n n t q
rnnfl~ci!-nnf
tn rp-<i.-,rbe
e n t a v i n ~= r c l c
The c e n t r a l ~ l n ~ r emr anr l +
t74b~
mc>-a
w he77 rreatlq cr r ~ ' ? i n c:r
must give them t h e policy ~ o w e ~ nr es c e s s a r v t c u n d e r t a k a t . b a ; ~t 3 q L vithnllt
i n t e r f e r i n g i n local affairs.
t h e local levels.
1 '
The system must afford a d e q u a t e protectiycjl
to
The b e s t examnle of t h i s is p e r h a p s France.
/
They have not.
encroached on local affairs (nor do t h e v h a v e t h e Powiir t o ) b u t hayre been
relatively sllccescful in t h e i r role of ~ n l i c vcn-ordinat.or xithin a a i v ~ nreg;-on.
.
_ _
..
-
11.4 The West Lothi2n 0uesti.on
This conundrum is p e r h a p s t h e s i n a ! ~mcs+ discussed questien in t . h ~
c u r r e n t regional debate.
F i r s t formulated b y Labour M.P. Tam Dave11 in t.he
l a t e 197OVs,t h i s raised t h e question of whv a propcsed Scottish parliament
could vote on Scottish i s s u e s , while Scottish M.P.s would still b e able t o vote
on English i s s u e s a t Westminster.
This seems a question without a n s w e r ,
without t h e creation of a federal system, b u t t h i s i s s u e a r i s e s in all t h e
regional systems discussed above, with t h e exception of Germany.
In this
section, t h e i r r e s p o n s e s a r e examined.
The first option open t o a regional system faced with t h i s question is
t o i g n o r e it. This is i n f a c t what h a s o c c u r r e d i n Belgium, France. Portuqal
P e r h a p s s u r p r i s i n g l y , it is not a n active i s s u e i n any of t h e s e
a n d Italy.
systems.
I n France, Portugal a n d Belqium, it is p e r h a o s u ~ d e r s t a n d a h l et h a t
t h e question can be sidelined. I t only affects small a r e a s of t h e total rloantrv.
Corsica a n d t h e overseas r ~ c i o n s have
c o u n t e r p a r t s u n d e r t h e F r e n ~ h svstnm.
rnnre c o v e r t h &
1
their
H o ~ ~ e v e t.he
r , is.si.!.es dez!t
n1ainlanT-l
wlth hv
r e g i o n s in t h e s e a r e a s a r e not l ~ c i s l a t i v eand frh!!.~can 5.. 3 ~ 9 ~ ~ ! ! 1bir
9 dthe
national aovernment.
Also, i n French e v e s t h e s e t e r r i t o r j e s .?re larqely
i r r e l e v a n t , minimising +.he i s s u e i n F r a n c e ,
In Belqiurn t h e ~ r o b l 2 r ? onlv
a f f e c t s t h e German Community a n d its small size, makes t.his less of a problem.
I n Italy, t h e case of t h e "special regions" is much more significant.
These regions account for 15% of Italy's population (a similar proportion t o
Scotland a n d Wales i n t h e U . K . ) , yet t h e g r e a t e r legislative a u t h o r i t y of t h e s e
a r e a s is not a political i s s u e in Italy.
The f a c t t h a t two of t h e l a r g e s t
"special regions" a r e amonast t.he poorest i n Italv (Sardinia a n d Sicily) should
also qive r i s e t o t h e i s s u e , if Tam Dayell's analysis is correct.
Yet t h i s is n o t
f /
t.he case. This has n e v e r been a d d r e s s e d b v scademics. b u t a few hvpotheslse
can h e presented. F i r s t l v . until r e c e n t l v , r e q i o n s had verv little identitv a n d
perhaps the
Italian
e l e ~ t c r a t e h?d.
T".C)YP
jrn~ortant.
~SSIJPS
ti) consider.
Secondlv, t h e Italiari st.ate had little choice i n +.he matter a t ].east in. t h s nerio.1
immediately after
tho
f?l!
of fssrirv.
T h a rhn;crc
r,7qro
1-ha s e c e ~ c i n qof nart-~
,
The l a t t e r was decided
of Italy, federalism o r variable qeometry regionalism.
c
as t h e l e s s e r of t h r e e evils.
Even t o d a y , federalism is v e r y c o n t r o ~ r e r s i a l
i s s u e and the "west Sardinian Ouestion" is ~ e r h a p sa ngcessarv evil f o r t h e
continuinq stability of t h e Italian s t a t e .
A s tho unofficial
motto of Italian
system s t a t e s , "....but it works".
I~?,
The second optior: open t o 3 rrt~.ign=l!s t a t e is a sinqlp S ~ Y ~ - I C ~ I , fpd3r81
o r otherwise. This was a c r ~ n t . e ~i ?n Germ=lnv a n d F r a r c a h1l.k v ? l l ! j k . ~
unlikely t o wnrk in t h e
V.V..
The G ~ r m a r !? , V F + ~ FG T ~ C :irI3T2r)~pa I I D ~ T !2 !.l:ae!v
s u s p e c t s t h a t sl.lch a vniform svst.em could not !-53ve h e a n , i n n o s e d i.n n ~ y y ? ~ l ,
* "f*-
'
times (even i n 1 9 4 8 , Savaria r e j e c t e d t h e new constit~i.+ionb!!f.,fnrced t c accept
I
it).
The French rn~inlanc! also went dawr, t h i s road of a si.nqle l~niform
s t r u c t u r e , despite region.4 movements i n Brittany and Occitania.
T h e abilitv
t o do t h i s was d u e t o t h e weak a n d f r a c t i o u s n a t u r e of t h e s e organisations.
This is not t h e c a s e i n Scotland o r Wales.
The final option is t h a t u s e d by Spain. This unique method, relied on
t h e organic development of a regional s t r u c t u r e .
The constitution merely ,
outlined t h e methods b y which regional governments could b e c o n s t i t u t e d .
Interestingly, it d i d not e v e n include a plan of where t h e s e possible reuions
would so.
This final method obviously h a s relevance f o r a n y prospective
system i n t h e U .K.. I n e s s e n c e t h e "West Catalonian Ouestionf' is answered h v
I
aiving t h o s e r e s h n s e h e c t e d b v it, t h e ability t o resolve t h e p r ~ h l e m . I t also
i
enslires t h a t reqlons h3ve a n inhililt s u p a o r t i n t h s loca!
interc-pc] 2nd s.?-ne
a moot.
syeqc
i.,:pYp
whether 711 OF
F n r ~ s . . - l ?-.r y o y i q ? = l i , - s
Snai-
had t h e central a n v a r n . r ~ n tnnt
ciolilrl
have
before t h e v e r p
d ~ c n i tn
. r~l y r - ~ c i t i r r - j
Tt
i c
t h e rp~i.o?.;l! n a t h
vny!-r!
n a ~ ~ ; r , l r aj v~ l :qc1
3rn3
~ ~ I J T ?
~t i,:
p n + . ~ - r a 7 ~ lhnn, ~ ~ c r r a ~ -
t h a t t h e West Lothiar! Ouesticn h?s fai!~c! t o berorno a political i c s ~ t ?r l ~ s n i t . ~
t h e Catalan i n v o l v e m e n t in t h e n a t . i ~ ) ? >n~?l: r ~ v r l m ~ n t . . s h o u l d t h e
rt3?~"+
nart
be implemented, t h e onlv a r e a open t o the West L,othian Ouestion
will be
health, a competence. which t h e remainin a low autonomy rections do not. desi-re.
Although t h e Spanish system may b e a temptina r o u t e for t h e rJ.K. t o
follow, it is important t o bear i n mind t h r e e Doinks.
Firstlv. t h e S ~ a n i s h
system does not solve t h e ~ r o b l e m I - ~ n l e s sequal aut.onomv is o a e n t o all
regions.
Secondl:~, i t w a ~n p v e r i n t e n d e d to.
established t o d e f u s e t h i s i s s u e .
T h e S ~ a n i s hcvst9m was n o t
Final!-J, t h e West. Lothian crvestion. o r its
,f'
Spanish equivalent h a s n e v e r been,>aheen raised e i t h e r before o r d u r i n g t h ~
,'-
regional process.
The conclusi/on one must draw from t h i s is t h a t t h i s
peculiarly British concept must have a British cause,
11.4 1mplem.entation. Procedure
The methods of implementation used t o establish European r e a i o n s car!
O n t h 5 one h a n d . Reluium. Germanv 3nd
b e placed in two broad c a t e a o r i e s .
Portugal s e t i n place precise s t r u c t u r e s definin a t h e o ~ e r z t i o n .of recrirna!
government.
I n t h e words of Gi.nderxhte:-:
t h e rnarriaqe c o n t r a c t inc+ll:dc.rl p +
11
trust,b u t also 3~p_rific.dthe
nr1:-7 t h o - 1 1 ~ 4ns
7 1
~~ F j l n n
l q~l r a
r,r>yn?,m-
of
an.4
-1 7 l r l r s n
t'r.3 - n l n ~ l r . -
r-f
+!-
ar
;
EI.
*
hair and eves."
In
contrast.
France,
and
Spain
It.?] YJ
r r - e a t . 4 crelera!
!e?i~?=tivn
frameworks in which t h e l a t e r complexities of irnnlementation r..lers e t . t l 9 d
fi
t h e principle legislation h a d been a a r e e d .
founded.
aftpr
'
The reasons f o r haste erere c~e!!
By r u s h i n g t h e legislation t h r o u a h , t h e principle was a c c e r ~ t e d
before opposition was able t o muster itself.
The vague n a t u r e of t h e plans
also allowed controversial i s s u e s t o be avoided and t h u s a r e a t e r conspnsus to
b e achieved.
The drawbacks f o r t h e l a t t e r method were t h e confi~siont h a t s u r r o u n d
practical implementation. This is evident. ir! t h e B a s a u e and C?.ta!an ~ t a t . u t e s
in Spain ( J a u r e s u i , 1993) a n d much of t h e irnr?len~~rt.at.jon
leuislation i n France
cnlir-ts.
al
a n d Italy. This IPI? t o t e n c l i o n ~a n d a mzior role f:.~rt h e r n ~ ~ + i + l ! + i r ) n
Tn Ttdv t.h.is F>v~i.ir~T!
t h o centr31 ~vthnritj-c:
rernainP.d
b113n~0,-l.. T
n
bqth
thi:
t h . 0 ~3170 rji.4 in. C Q V . ~ ~ ; ) ~ - Io\n. t h 9
nr\ir\innr
.-
n t h > > - h:,n -1
reqion>!isation t.0 o t r l j r . ?nrnnth<nCI~ ; h i r ! l >4"
tho
+!-,G
->al,f
F r a n c e , c o u n t l ~ s sp r e v i c l ~ s s c h e n e s h a d fpi!ef-!
t a k e n twenty t h r e e years (2nd manv fa!?o .:tarts\.
ii-
rtl!li.le
2r.l
~ r \ . , v +
n
n
s
.c.r=r
i?
~
tbp
Sp2i.r
~-n,rir.-l
p
nf
217
Itelv
~ n l l r t
/==
r r r r r - ; , ?
yclsn:--m
d;.l
;~l?nr,r
=.,-.)-,in::c,;-,..-~~~
T?.
the r ~ f ~ s r nh -a ?
Cllr.the~.mnyp~ L I F .r - e s ~ ~n! ~ ; ~
c o n s e n s u s led t o t h e reaions' a c c e ~ t . a n ~b ey all m a i n r poMical a c t o r s .
I t is difficult t o a o ~ l v t h e s e im~!ementat.ion rnpthods t o Enqlqnd's
situation d u e t o t h e differences in lesal structl.ire. Lackinq a c o n . ~ t i t ~ ~ t i .an
on,
organic system could onlv b e i r L c c r r ~ o r a t e in
d clrdinarv lac!, allowina ch?nae
a t a n y point.
The Spanish governments' c h a n s e s of h e a r t would h a v e been
much
na.qir.r
tc! i m n ! s ~ o n t h a d
Cho
p r i - - ~ ! ~ . ~ jnf
n l a n ; 1 ~ j i > m q n t 3 r ~ ~rrrr=rairr.-.t~.~
~
..
appl.i.ed i n S n e n . The r~s11.1tip.ln
svc::-m
r,jnijld
?-n2-
:o.-c
. .
devolved t h a n t h a t whirl? n c l ~ le v j s t c .
P ~ l r j i ~ ~i.5p l 3190 n!?? =rnnli~?!7!e e n
+J.-
U.K.
h3iro 3 1 m n . c t
,-
.avt;tinlx:
3
system a s t h e 1020 neqqtiat.ions
t.c
doc-irle t h ~m i n u t i r - l
rJnrp
nn!v
meaninaful because t h e resultina com~romjs;. r-?!.!!d not c h a ? c e d -1wiirp!nli+ t.hn
agreement of all p a r t i e s .
I n t h e TJ.K.. arost pains cnl-lld b e taker! t o e n s u r e
a well balanced English recional s t r u c t u r e onlv f o r a c h a n a e of n d i ~ vat t h e
national level t o sweep it away.
The only method which could apply t o Encrland was t h a t used i n France.
By u s i n g a framework loi. Defferre ensi.ired t h a t t h e main n r i n c i ~ l e s were
established before opposition could wreck them.
This allowed t h e bu!?.: of
f u r t h e r c h a n g e s t o be a d d r e s s e d t h r c u a h deleaqted leaislatiqn.
The re21
problem h e r e is v h e t h e r s!.~chdecision? should be left t.o the e r r - m t i . r e by???!-:
a n d t a k i n g t h i s p a t h !'.n Ena!.nd
miaht
Drnyrn
?~ng~nl?!rlr,
1r-r-v
11.5 Conclllsions - Recrinn21 C o v t ? r ~ m e r fand
t
t h e T1.P
The above, ad,mittedlv ssle.~t.i~.re.
y t l l d v rf
~ o n i ~ n in
c:
Flly-r-;
L--
he 1-
based on t h e premise t h a t thn 1 J . K . and specificallv Enaland can ltr2rn f r ~ m
t h e experiences of o u r European p a r t n e r s . Tn t h i s fin?! secb'or, 1 shall a i v s
my impression of how t h e European experience can inform t h e d e b a t e a s i t
s t a n d s i n England.
These concli~.sionsa r e based on t h r e e y e a r s workinu i n t h e field, rat-her
t h a n j u s t t h e brief discussions above.
Over t h i s time I h a v e c o n e to t h e
opinion t h a t reqional aovernment c a n perform manv beneficial functions.
However, when a resional aovernment is established. it
p u r p o s e is t o be.
mi-1st.
be clear whzt i t s
Different recrions of E u r o ~ e .see t.he r e a s o n s for t h e i r
existence i n entirelv different. terms. This ocr=l.~r-s
even within si.nn!s n ~ t i 3 3 s t a t e s . T h i s e m ~ h a ~ i s et hs e m i n t t h a t reciona!is.n in itself is
is a n y system of cr:7:re.-nmon+, it is on]!.
,
a
rna??c
t ~ ?r>
,
i n E u r o n e . t.h~,:e e ~ \ . , ? c?1!5t be eq+.ahli.ch-& 5 ~ f q l - pb
suhstancp
~
r
tr!
p
I:? a r l d ~ a r c ~ Jb l 2 n
of t h e U.V..h l . ~ t h o
f9r i t .
tr
noop14 i n z + . r
r e c ~ 1 1 t j n . rn
~r p n r ) c q ! y ,
will
h
T I
1
~~ , i i i i n~~. P c ; I I ~ .P C
=i-yi,a
do?mi~rl
:-::,q,
mr:i?~lj.n~rl~_cc.
( 2 ~
nn
fpi- t h o
-clr..;r-.-,
3 -
fLnrT =r,.cl
lll.-=t:,7.-
r . r l . ~ \ r +hn~,i
. > r 2
~v . - . ; 7 7 - 1 n
:
Reuional rationales
T h e creatinn
n+ P1!'qg->n
v p r v + , ~ r , -h x c .
1\
Micronati.c>zli.c;n
2)
Democratic! enhancemer,t
3)
Decentralisation
4)
Economic development
haun
?jprleyt=lrFr,fnr.
3
nF
t ~ . , ~ - ; c + . r
The f i r s t rationale applies t o t h e "special" r e g i o n s of Italv, t h e article
151 regions of
Spain, t h e Belgian
Communities
Brussels), t h e P o r t u g u e s e i s l a n d s a n d Corsica.
!and
Regions, excludino
These regions have been
g r a n t e d extensive powers coverinu a broad r a n q e of policies.
Ir! f a c t , t h e s e
micronationalist communities wished t o have as much "home rule" a s t h e y can
negotiate with t h e c e n t r a l s t a t e .
The c e n t r a l uovernment will, h v c o n t r a s t .
invariably give a s little a s is necessary t o s e c u r e t h e ccntinuat.ion of t h e
nation-state.
For t h ; ~ : r p ? s v Corsica h a s l?ttle Dower, while t h o Bnlc7-3n
r e g i o n s a r e eaua! i n s t a t u s with t h e f e d e r q t i m .
"nations",
thouah
t.h~nl.~.ah
reg:-onalism
and
Those recrions ?re a3airina
t,he
Ei.!rnn~?n
+'-,ir
rTni?l?
aspirations c2n he contained within a weakened nzt-iional s t t - u c + t ~ r e .
The second typolocr.-- c+ reqions,l svstem a!--t h i s case, it is its nrime D~.!I-?osek2 do so.
r ~ p a k p ? st h e
n-ntrz
hilt
in
Thn German s v c t e n . (and t h a
constitutional ~ r o p o s a l sin Italy) nrcvided f o r a division of s t 2 t ~D q r . T a r t n
p r o t e c t democracy.
For t h i s r e s s o n , s t a t e control rnerhmisms were divided
between t h e national a n d regional levels.
An 2uthoritari.an takeover t h o l ~ c ~ h
democracy would b e more difficult if education a n d police a r e o u t of national
hands.
The
prime
p u r p o s e of
t h e constitution
is emphasised
hv
the
constitutional r i g h t t o r e s i s t a t t a c k s on th? c o n s t j t ~ k i o n (article 20( 4)G .G.).
The focus of t h e German system was primal-ilv t.o a ~ r o i da r e n e a t o f 1933 3nd
t h i s directed t-h? division o f a ~ l t h o r i t vbetween t i e r s .
M e m h e r s h i ~of t h e t h i r d a r o u r , is l e s ~r l p q ~C I J ~ . . T h e s n = l n i ~ hartirle
1 4 3 r e s i o n s crould come u n d e r t.his catecrorv i?!thoi?gh Issi-1~3~:
PF r I ~ m ~ r r ; l t . i ~ j
protect.ion
r,,lpr-e r3i.yed r ) l ! r i n 5
t b 3 Sr,zqish
Italian 2nd F r p n ~ hr e g i ~ p r~. .,~ r ) ! ~ l;llqr!
rj
the time of thei."
r l n n c t i t ~ ~ t i n n qr l a b z t a e ,
T n r j = : r
tho
glyrt,x},l~.r F211 jn.t.9 + h i - . - ~ = t . ~ . ~ ~ ~h,, -, :t ~ > L
i r ~ l r ~ ! ~ r p a r . t h~i tc i ~r , , 1 3 ~
..n+
tL,a
r,~q,c\
The
~-,,T~..JLYT~-
t-
c , ? ~ ~ - . -
government is deemed too f a r from t h e problems.
t r a n s p o r t i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e s is a n crhvious examgle a s
The c r e a t i ~ nof reai.on?!
i5
soatisl 3lanninc n r i ~ b
t r a i n i n q . The distin quishinq f e a t u r e is t h a t t h e s e ailthorities ere more aerier?!
p u r p o s e ( a ~ di n t h a t wav resemble t h e tr,icro-naticnalist. ? r e a i v , s ) , but o r - l ~in
"peripheral" a r e a s .
The final aro!.lp c:7mn:-jse French rpajo!-i: a n d +!-!oi~Tt,zl(?.-. ''rr?ir, 3r-v"
counterparts.
.
.
F.lt.houah no1.1 pynh,?bl Y within t h e !.?.t++e
crr,l!n th.-.ir nrli:--,
3'
intention w n s t.0 e n c o ~ ~ ? - ae rqr ~
?r:qmi
( - ~ , + V P ~ OmDg g f .
The yn+ra-2L. f!-r?m
state
o~.~+.side
t h ; ~-=,;f.
involvement i n t h i s a r e a led them t o exnand t h ~ i ?inf1,iencp
t o become t h e more aeneral p u r p o s e a u t h o r i t i e s w e
SEIP t n d a v .
Np~re;-th.~!~?ss.
t h e boundaries, f u n c t i o n s a n d f i n a n c e s qiven t o then? reflected t h e i r ~ri:::;:~g!
role a s economic act.ors.
Regions i n Europe have been established i.n Europe a s a means, not a n
e n d i n themselves.
The t y p e of regional s t r u c t u r e h a s reflected t h i s .
Other
functions have been a d d e d b u t t h e regional d e s i g n s continue t o reflect t h e i r
primary role.
When commenting on t h e European lessons f o r Encxland, it is
difficult t o define what t h e p u r p o s e i n Enqland is. The Liberal-Democrsts a r e ,
certainly clear i n a r g u i n g t h a t a t r u l y f e d e r a l s t a t e is a aood t h i n a in itself
( b y enhancinq d e m o c r a c ~ )b u t Labour's proposals a r e r a t h e r op2aue.
tTn1.e~~
t h e p u r p o s e of a reqion is established t h e n t h e r e is no ncint d e b a t i n a t.be
s t r u c t u r e it should t a k e .
The "West Lothian O1.lec+i9n1'a? a rat.ir\na!a for rerllnn?!icm
A,n
n ~ . l t , s i r ~j ~h c e y v e vmi ah+
p i I r ~ ~ a tch3t.
t
(with t h e nossihle e l . : ~ s r + i o nof the PJnrth)
Lothian crcuest.ion. mentioned atmve.
are
t h . ~C q gli s h r - n ; - n
-,I
n,-~-.?-q?!c
? t . t _ ~ pt~n +3.r.c.r.rov+ h =
I t is t o t h i s issce t h a t 'I sh.a!l
TJ-t
now
t u r n . The f i r s t point. t o nnte is t.hat. t h e i n t r o d ~ l c t i o n~f rei?crion?l. a o v ~ ~ r . m a n t i n Enalan? cijll n o t answer t h e West. Lothian cr1.1estion.
T h e r e wII! still h ~ '
l a r g e a r e a s of pollcv where t h e Enqlish r e a i o n s will b e excluded 2nd t h e s e 7 - ~ i l !
not b e removed
constructed.
u n l e s s a sinqle s t r u c t u r e (in practice, a federat-ion) is
P
T h i s is t h e case in Spain where t h e o r a a ~ i csvct.em o g r e ~ i o n a l
development, t h o u g h ~ o p u l a rh a s n o t solved t h e i s s u e s r a k e d h y t h e West
,
.+--
Lothian q l ~ e s t i o n . In f a c t In n e v e r c a n , a s s o n ? r e a i o n s will remain with l e s s
autonomy and
t h u s have policies
decided natjonallv
.c.~hicha r e
handled
reaionallv e l s ~ c r h e r e . F3ren if all t h e ~ r p s e n tqrticle 1.41 rern0n.s dr! z r c e p t
hi.crher autonomv, t . l - 1 ~ ~wi!!
7
not he crrart.ed control p:..-er health. ?lJ.nr,:i?n zrti~lc-.
151 deputies t o decide policy on t h e health s e r v i c e s of l e s s ailtonornous
territories,
A s already noted, however, t h i e was not t h e intention of t h e Soznish
system.
I n f a c t t h e "West Lothian" auestion h a s n e v e r been raised i~ t h e
context of Spain.
A r e c e n t misunderstandina h a s s u r r o l l n d ~ r l t h e Catalan
nationalists o p e r a t i n a a s kina m?l<ers in t . t ~resent narljamont..
h,, bne?
T t
s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h i s is t h e West Lnthian alle.stl:aq i n act593 2r.6 +.ha+t.ho
of t h e Catalans b r i l l b r i n a the
keepfthe
~ S S ~ I !'.n.to
F?
f o c 1 . 1 ~ir!
Soanish n n r r e r n ~ s n tin
D?wsr.
k e p t in power thrr31:qh a C7e~tT,rlt)?iqn
Cqai?.
dei-.ite t+
artjn7.c
C?t.,?.i!an ~ ~ ? D ! ? * < P c :
f ? ^ t ti,-+ m = -
1
gf
r!?+i.nn q i p r s 3 t h - : . ~p q n 7 0 tp,
t:r?,*
\
4
been t h e same since t h e v C J ~ V tr,
P
~0l.rG.7,
~ b ~a n r . ~ q l , c~+t r r ~ l - ~ q h n= rl ~e : Yr,
,
*
Andalusia, i n t h e south of S n x i - ~ . T h i s is a h ~ n h21-ltonnrnv relrrinr) 2r.1 r11pS
its own health, education !and. soon p e r h a p s n o l i ~ e>r v i r e s . Vet t.he , ~ 0 c i 3 1 i ~ t ,
deputies who come from t h i s reqion vote on i s s l ~ ~of
c , S ~ g n i s hconcerrn t h l t ??
not apply i n t h e i r own constituencies.
A s t.hic araohicallv i l l v s t r a t . 9 ~. the
Spanish system is not a solution t o West. Lothian b u t t h e n was it r ~ 9 v e r
intended t o be.
Regionalisation can b e a solution t o certain i s s u e s .
It c a n allow t h ?
decentralisation of national government a n d allow t h e policv differences of
regional electorates t o be reflected mcre closelv bv t h e oolicles t h a t ~ P E Z "
them. I t c a n in t u r n lead t.o t h e i n v o l v e m ~ n tof a d i f f e r e n t nrni.!n
not normally as.cri2ted
with u r l l t ; ~ ; l !
cff?m-
to01 to d n l i ~ l e rthn~llj~ercejl:eC!27~gefit-5( L + : c ' ~
._I.
o t h e r brays).
__.
(therr
i.7
qf
nsqpl~
p ~ ~ i d e n c ~f
n this i!~,
r i - ! ~ J d? - p r h x P ~130
r l ~ ~ ; l r:,-.
o,-2~~
It must f i r s t he decidsc! t.hp o l \ r D o s e cf t h s r~fpl:mc tho?
"
to
t.h,-
-
way in which a recrional s t r u c t u r e car! achleve thlq c3n h e
h
ev?tnir~d
I
The r e a s o n s for resionalism in Enal2nd a n d e n t i r ~ l v c l i f f ~ r e n t f r o p
Scotland a n d Wales.
Scotland a n d Wales wish t o h a v e a u t o r l n ~d~l i e
+T!
~=ti-on~
micro-nationalist. tendencies within t h e s e territ.ories ( a s i~ Catalonia. E l l s k a d i .
Flanders. Valle d'llosta, e t c . ) .
This
means t.hev
will d e m a ~ d n
! ! . i l i ~
demanded) wide yznlicv ai!tonornv r!:rer
13rne
3
Enqlish regions show n o si-ans of doincr s o .
~ . : . I T ~ ? ,>f
V
qrpac
r , ~ h i ~ qt l - 1 0
There is alee re rn~==sibi!it.vt h s t
t h e English r e u i o n s would a c h . i e v ~?he sort. pf
*nvissned f n v sqotl.?nd
s~&II.._:
o r Wales a t l e a s t n o t i n t h e f o r e s e o s b l f u t ~ l r e . Frnln the
~ ~ C C U S S ; . C ~%
! bc~re,
it is t h e r e f o r e c l e a r t h a t t h e discussior! of d e ~ o l ~ ~ t ti oo nthe Celtic frir.a+
I
regionalism within England should not. h e confused. If o n e assumes t h a t t h e
regionalism being d i s c u s s e d i n England is concerned with t h e d.ecertrali.satior!
of t h e national s t a t e ( a n d t h i s is b y no means t h e perceived view of all t h n s e
c o n c e r n e d ) it is n o t a n d can n e v e r be a s o l i ~ t i o nto "West L o + h i a ~ " .Tronlcallv
it could deal with t h e u n d e r l y i n s cause.
II
Wes+ Lothia.nfs" importance i n t h e
T J , U ~ t e ~ nfrom
~ .
t h e ;deol.oaira!
divisions i n o u r political system and t.he c n n c ~ n t r a t j o nI-f owo or a t t h o~ ~ n t r ~
T h e powe:: of a f ~ S~ ~ nj t t j ~Mh D . c ? r ) l l l d
i,n~anc,n
n - q 2 t ! ' ~ d;-ri,-1-.J
<yl
Westmrinstar narliament..
T h o v p p ? , l l r j ai1.1~T
u n d e r t a k e racjica! reform.? jp, ~ d l ~ c s t i pt.n~.
. S ~ O ~ ~ Vl
is n o t t h e c a s e on t h e .:ov+ipnpt.
PIT?--^^
c o n s e n s u ~ l and
l e ~ s idsc?loatr=l! t: h 1 1 - 1
i
p
-
h6i-a
~ m x i a - n w n . r , t c .avo
47 ,I
C+:-~Y-
represent.ation e n s u r e s maior s h i f t s i n ~ o l i c von. t h o
W~-!;IT
of
y!yq7,
TJ
tn
-
z ~ m n I i r ~ h t.7
l r ~ ~-nt15---?
r,c,t
Fiyctl~
3
TI-,;
q
n?-;-i.
> v t i o ~=- ,I
~QV~YT-S
fe7.r
The "vest Lothian" auesti.on is nnt d i . z ? l ~ s s e din Snsin. o r Tt-'l~f
is unlikely.
b e c a u s e its effects a r e minimd.
Regionalisation
in
England
This would not. h e t h e c a s e
(if
introduced
3.s
a
means
j i ~the LT .K...
a~neral
c?f
decentralisation) could break down t h i s c e n t r a l i s t power a n d t h u s lessen "West
t s recriona!
Lothian's" effects, b u t n o t in t h e way envisarled b y t h e ~ r o ~ o n e nof
government.
Decentralisatinn a s Rationale f o r Enalish
I \ . s s u ~ ~ ~ ! ct ~ h ~ vlirnnqq
dp?ent,y;t1isat.ion
TY!?
nf
ty8a~
~f
PPl"
' "
-
1
i~p.~yi]l.j.nclne~r
gf n z L j n n ~ l
,-,s
-,
a true
has
hean
one t h a t f o r
t 3 1 ; 1 3 ~
r 3 0 ~ r r , l ~ r ~ - ~,
reai.nn.21
T t jn
ho
tr,
I..,
~ I ~ I - . - . w ;n
~ r
I r, -- . . - .4-1,-
t!-10".3f,??.0 C . - 3 . - i - L l , . b , 7-6
~
q~~r~..!:nment
i c
lm~:-nt
,-,-, n:-,~- ;., r.. .... ,
= ) l i + h , ~ ~ .\ IiTt i ~ ~
to
1..~q{cn.!i~r"
< C
y ~ t i ~ ? - c t >t l+, ;~l ~ c 7:-n
~
lacc.lnc en
, p a j n ~ - n ~ ~ n ? - , ~! ., ~ <
~ t:},,l - \ - t q>-s:-,...:t7
~
-n
reqion3Li.qe
:
l
170
\
fin r.\
,
\.,.>
t1-3
P.,;.,,-,,.,
+
..,-,
.-lfi.-.ii:in,-,
1, :
L -
1 - 1 : 1 t ~ l ~ ~ , - .
~l!rrpc<Flll, th., =t?ti.
n\ll-c
actually d e c e ~ ~ t . r ? L i s ~ .
I t is not clear from L.ahourls p r c 3 n s 3 l s that.
out.
t - h j ~ .hlc-
r3lly h ~ n ntFlr)l.!r:i~t
There absolutely nr, point having t h e min.i,v,?list r ~ a i n n ; r lqt.
i >-pfn?:-ms
u n d e r t a k e n in Italy i n t h e 1 9 7 0 ' s which left t h e reqions f u n r t i o n i n a but.
withni-lt
of a rn?.:.
ypi~.clh
Tf th* aoal i ?
T?"IY~c'c.~.
$ : i c . ~ . o ~ t r = ! i q ? + itnh?P~
R
be s~.tbsta.ntislr!evo!l..~ticn cf nncra?: from tb* c e n t r e .
mi.ist,
th-\vo
?cl?-ies r i r > -F~q r
s l ~ c htreatment w o i ~ l r lbe health. sd!lcatjor. an :.?ironm~)~lt..
t r a n z n n r t 2nd
~r~ljyn,
These a r e t h e s t a p l e d i e t of r e a i o ~ . s or. t h e c,>?tjne?t. h o r q l ~ c e t h q ~.?yo
suitable c a n d i d a t e s f o r POEZVdecisions helow t h s r?ationa! b u t ~ b q v et h e local
level.
If s u c h s i a n f i c a n t ~ o l i c vpowers were
crrar\.t.ed. there r ? l ~ s thn
PO+
s e r i o u s question mark over whether t h e reqions a m n e c e s s a r v (I.n I t d v t h e i r
profile was almost zero in most of t h e country u n t i l rere?tly\.
T h e other
question t o be a s k e d is whether local government could be used t o facilitate
t h e decentralisation process.
There is a corollary reason f o r t h e importance of devolvinq sicrnificant
If t h e reaion is created without a Droner f!inctiog.
power from t h e c e n t r e .
it is likelv t o i n t e r f e r e in t h e workinqs of lccal aovernment in a r attempt t o
find one.
Such reuional recer.+-.raEsation h s keen s e n ir, C e ? - m p ? v , Tt?lv,
Spain and Belqium. Even if reaious
ni.ven s u t h o r i t v d ~ r ~ ? t r 2 l i s e fdr n m
above (and n e t r e ? e n t y l - l i r u . r ] fynn.1 belnr;?) t h i c r l r , a c 7 n t i n - ' + c ~ l F
rf:l?+-~~t+
+-ha
>r,
protect.ion of local.
fulfi-1s t h e
~ 3 ~ p r n r n( ~
p q~ ,p+
T'?
err!-o?rF!
sianificant
;--ni0-3!
alltonom y .
-iilr;iv,-,~o~t
~ n y r . : - . . n
,+i.>r,t
r , \ l lrt
m~qt..
To e n s u r e t h e i n d ~ ~ ~ n d cn rnq rt - a k i q n
requires
on<yr:-e
~ n l n
i+i,q i ~ t n ~ . - I utfi
. - l 1 - -.>'
rJ~-pr\~r,a
nn:I~!3~i!>
q~
b e protect.ed from rociqn?!
,
of
tr
Fajlure
r e m i y r 7 ~ 1 o ? - r n r n.ray!+ a ! ~ . ?
qive
a reaim
stahla
an,-I
i n d e p e n d e n t f u n d i n g will lea? t o a reliance on national a r a n t . . ~a n d t h u s
This h a s been v e r y e v i d e n t in t h e exc?mple
centralisation by a n o t h e r means.
of Italy. Ideally, regions should h a v e t h e i r own taxes, h u t f.?lling t h a t sh2res
of national taxes must be qua-ranteed t o e n s u r e stability of finance.
Finally, t h e operation of i n d e p e n d e n t and powerful regional governments,
although p e r h a p s desirabln, b r i n g s with it new problems of democracv and
accountability.
Primarv amoncrst t h e e a r e t h e i n t - e r - e x e ~ u t i v e a a r e e q e n t s
which are bound t c follow t h e creation of
s u c h ?.,nits.
demncratir c o n t ~ m l@vet. t h e s ? li.nl.:s js
the
st:.-aria,
To e n s u r e t.het.
i n . ~ 1 r l t . 7 h j ! i t l rpf
t?-!om rnllrt
h e r e r o a ~ k e d . T h r o i ~ a hth.9 f n r ~ l l j : < q t i ncf
r t . h ~ . ~r nnn t . a c t s . nrnvici,-,nc:
mqdp
fc\--
raq;n?ql
nf
thai)r
C P Y I ! ~ ; ' :T-
rnilp,:;l.c,
h-,Tr
P-;?ll.-o
q r - n i r n t a h i l : t 1- r - q i c ~ , - 1-,\,
l
tp
q o v e r n ~ e n tir!
tk,ic
(C.-.;-?V-~F
i,
->nd t h o i ?
it?a
h.a=
~ a n -,,-14
\
r\ynhlp.-
fa~rnli~-o,th
l 4c
r t [ , r j :7
F l i . i r ~ n na q d
n ~ r , a v ~p!yhl;r
?
=r.?~n;r31
h-.r
? . - ' ~ Y ~ F+hit
;s
!.1i11 Ipll-l i ~ ~ ~ x r ; + q h ; : t: n
~ -t~l -r R
cchqrr7f
i n d j r a r t l v elp.-:teC1r r ~ j q n qh n
In conc!i,lqjnn
t+c9
2
T!OY.%,T
~ ~ l i c a t i nt.0r t F ! a
c..!,,,=- : ~ Q O T \ \
r j i l l
nnl
-7
'-.'a
The
real
;
E
=.p.,-,,,~
oxi>rror.h-,e-.-]-~t
? > = c i - n x r c > . - : - ~ ~PF
-.-
rT.U,
ha
V.L-.-,-P-
+l
-.
2
~:
.~
-1
.-..J
3:
la.ysqr F.-n,m
~
Europe is t h a t reaional qovern..rent
nli.lst
have
2.
rlear nnrnc9e? b s f n r ~a n v
decision on its oneration can he v=r?e. ~t v r e ~ e n t s. ~ Q ~ ? . R ~ T3! r d
clear
th.?
2bnl.lt.
t h o r o f n r m fLqat,
j ~ ~ y l (?f
?
nothinu
t.0
the
w i l l !-a
- ~ ? ? r l ~ +,A
< 1190?t % p m : , ~ i t h i n t1-10
T?~=I!PS.
rlnien
hl?t
r~!~!-inr.~-!.~i??
h5Li i:r.<>-, t ? > i : , ~ ~ . - . - t i rtr 2~
y+C
. ~, ~
- L t +?-,a
:*
','.
do ~.:ith t h a
must be reconr.ised.
decentralisinc! t.hn sta"
r ~ i a ~ t ; c .pr
n
T
?e:.-rrt7?11~7
r +-.
-.! ; ~ y s ? l . = r r., r j t l - . r -
farr.-.y:,-.. .
7p.yiqF ?.:
a 1 ~ r . qt h e Ij-nc: : ~ fsna:p.
IL.~.~IS
mi,--.
r,,-i~:~-..-~
~-CF-Y
;T??,v*"~;-
r.,
mGTn
c_.-
3:-
- ? ~ +I-.,=--,
t
no clear rationale hohind t.he Lahour n a r t v ' s plar.5 f o r t h i s reform
aqc!
iC
r . ~
ic
l:r?til
t h e i r is it is difficult to see ho~,7they can improve t h e gq;re-.r.ment, of Fncyland,
Men A fi Ergec R (1993) La Belqiqtre f 6 d e r a l ~ a p r P s la nuatriPme rPform de
1'Etat de 199.3, Ministry of Foreian Affairs. B:-1.1ssels
B e e r W R !1980) The
U ~ P X ~ P Crehe]linn
~ C ~
r
Ethnic ~-t_!':rjc
m in
, " ? ; l f ~
DO
. ~
/-
)~T.~
France. N e w York IJniversitv P r e . ? ~ .T_Ty,j+.~d? L ~ + O S
B l a i r P (1981)
Fedpy~zsm end i i ? r l i c i ! r p r 7 i p r . r
-7
Grnct
C=>-rnzn7 .
P l q r a r ,l?n
Oxford
Boisvert P Y ( 1 9 8 8 ) Recrionalistior! and decentra!is~+~on
In Fra P
P ~ .w i t h LC:
=c-r'al
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,
of Manchester
Cassese S b Torchia TJ (1993)
"The meso levp!
i.n Ita!vf', f r o a
!?i.s~of M P F -
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P C O ~ C ~ ~'risi~.
C :
i
q Pnl'~ljl!rn: T h = :1=vi,2h!o
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.~r~l;+i-='
Science, J u n e vo1.19
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~ _r.isa
P
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Crossir?a
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"f
t-he ms?n l ? ~ ~ l V f1r -. r \ ~ ," h a ri?*
~f
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reforms in E u ~ o D ~
sub-national
? ~
~~Litirs:
The
Italian case", p a p e r t o Southerr! PoLiticd Science E s . ~ o d a t i o r .Ivev O r ! n ? r ? ~ .
November
Enqel C
Ginderachter J V ( 1 993) T L - P R ~IT
S r ~ r l z o n a !? r d 10rq7
F;
the E r l r ~ o p l r P m m m r l r ) i t . ?
3mrn
T a>?rra- 9 = I
--
7
ynTrorn
m
--
3 r L
i
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9
fi-ifcrmo ;.-+l:t!lninnnll:
-
n e t 5 int.rr!.'~~"iv-"
f._-,:
Cassese 6 Torchia
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2.t
Lothian Foundation Conference 18 Decem h e r . Euharn , London
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ri3re7~n'7
P ~ r f l ~ ~ p ~ l J
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ir!
( I Q Q n )"T~yl:itn!:..~ ?pel
?-IA!JL??-:I
, S P I - -1-li~,t,,)-.i,--31
~
=T-
~ ~ ~ , P Y I I ~ ; I - I
2''
..- ,
T -
L
.Z
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Keating
M
(1983)
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in
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?--,a
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'!-,d;~~'si.bl.p
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~~-pnrh
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Sanaptionio
E (1 9F7)
"TF-.'~"
fvCm
P ~ n f t . z l 2 - r'
lo.-=rl
N n - r L s v - q
r n ~ r n r~o l
a t .
-,T
( P a w b Goldsmith, E d s ) , S a u ~London
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