Appendix F
STATE AND LOCAL DOMESTIC
PREPAREDNESS NEEDS
This appendix summarizes the results of three separate assessments
of state and local preparedness: a 1995 survey of state and local preparedness by RAND; a 1997 National Institute of Justice survey of
unmet technology needs; a 1997 study by FEMA; and a 1999 study by
the Institute of Medicine and National Research Council.
RAND’S 1995 ASSESSMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL
PREPAREDNESS
A 1995 RAND report revealed that, although there is concern about
domestic preparedness issues, states and localities have limited
resources for addressing the emerging threats:
The case studies confirm in detail what the survey revealed in general terms. That is, communities perceived potential terrorism
problems and have an interest in confronting terrorism before it
erupts but in many cases are forced by budgetary, manpower, and
other constraints to limit their terrorism preparedness. In such
instances, cooperation with the FBI, through regular communication, training, and guidelines, is highly valued. Despite the
resource and other constraints noted, the case studies reveal that a
variety of successful terrorism preparedness formulas exist in
communities both large and small. Large municipalities, such as
New York City and Miami, have developed significant terrorism
programs in close cooperation with the FBI and its regional joint
terrorism task forces, whereas smaller communities, such as Kootenai County and Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, have worked to stay ahead of
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nascent terrorism threats by forging close regional alliances and
capitalizing on available FBI resources.
More generally, the case study findings suggest that a community’s
size, its resources, and the nature of the terrorism threats it confronts will influence both the strategic and tactical law enforcement
response. Communities value the intelligence and support that the
FBI provides, and municipalities highly value their communication
with federal authorities. Localities are interested in adopting a
strategic approach, in which intelligence, planning, and advance
preparation are used to combat terrorism but lack the resources in
many cases to maintain this more expensive approach. (Riley and
Hoffman, 1995, p. x.)
The principal implications are as follows:
•
The federal government is likely to be the principal source of
resources for improving domestic preparedness.
•
Localities see great value in assistance in planning, training,
equipping, and exercising local capabilities.
•
Localities see great value in access to federal law enforcement
organizations, particularly the FBI, and are likely to value highly
threat warning information, as well as access to relevant strategic, tactical, and operational intelligence.
NIJ’S 1997 SURVEY OF UNMET TECHNOLOGY NEEDS
The National Institute of Justice sponsored a study in 1997 that
interviewed 195 individuals representing 138 agencies from 50 states
and the District of Columbia about unmet technology needs for
combating terrorism (National Institute of Justice, 1999). The top 15
identified technology needs are described in Table F.1. The list
suggested a continuing need for
•
technologies with improved performance characteristics (e.g.,
detection, assessment, communications, robots, personal protective equipment);
•
technologies that, because they are currently very expensive or
purchased in bulk quantities, need to be made more affordable
State and Local Domestic Preparedness Needs 253
Table F.1
Top 15 Technology Needs of State and Local
Law Enforcement
National intergovernmental information system with current
intelligence on terrorism
Improved means of detecting explosives
Improved and more readily available secure communications
Improved means of detecting and categorizing NBC threats
Improved interagency communications
Improved robots for disarming and disabling explosive devices
Improved affordable protective gear
Improved nonlethal weapons
Improved “see-through-the-wall” capability
Improved long-range video monitoring
Improved detection and tracing mechanisms for countermeasures for cyber attacks
Improved electronic listening devices
Improved training to combat terrorism
Improved containment vessels and vehicles for explosive
devices
Improved night vision devices
SOURCE: National Institute of Justice, 1999, p. 4.
(e.g., detection and assessment equipment, personal protective
equipment); and
•
improved communications and training.
THE 1997 FEMA STUDY
According to the 1997 Report to Congress on Response to Threats of
Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, FEMA was assigned
by the NSC to review the adequacy of the FRP to respond for WMD
events (DoD, 1997). As described by the report:
FEMA has been tasked by the NSC to review the adequacy of the
FRP to respond to nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) WMD
terrorism incidents and to identify and remedy any shortfalls in
stockpiles, capabilities, or training that would affect [the] ability to
respond. Scenarios describing NBC WMD incidents were used to
help Federal, State, and local responders focus on the capabilities
that would be required and to assess the adequacy of current capabilities to meet response requirements. The Federal effort included
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Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security
a review of the coordination of consequence management activities
with crisis management activities, an examination of the relationships among existing Federal interagency emergency plans, an
assessment of the capabilities of the FRP to respond to an NBC
WMD incident, the availability of medical capabilities for terrorism
response, and procedures for military support of medical facilities
and decontamination activities.
The assessment of the FRP and Federal capabilities focused on
identifying shortfalls in stockpiles, capabilities, and training that
would affect the Federal Government’s ability to respond. In conducting the review and subsequent assessment, FEMA sought input
from the 29 departments and agencies supporting the FRP. Comprehensive scenario-specific information was provided by key
responding agencies including DoD, DOE, HHS, and EPA.
The DoD report then went on to summarize the findings of the FEMA
report.
THE 1999 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE/NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL STUDY
In 1999, a study on chemical and biological terrorism was published
by the Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. It
provided an assessment of civilian capabilities for medical care in
chemical and biological incidents. The capability areas in Table F.2
have been ranked in declining order of need at the local and state
levels (i.e., the least capable areas are found in the top rows of the
table).1
Although the table sheds little light on what performance improvements and costs might be associated with additional investments,
the five areas given the lowest capability ratings for the localities and
states were as follows:
•
Preincident intelligence and threat warning information.
______________
1 The rank-ordering was based on the number of times a capability was given a low
rating in the first six columns (i.e., for local responders, initial treatment facilities, or
state responders).
State and Local Domestic Preparedness Needs 255
Table F.2
Relative Capabilities for Response to Civilian Chemical and Biological
Incidents at Four Levels of Medical Care
Local
Responders
Capability
Receipt of preincident intelligence
Detection and measurement of agent
exposure in clinical
samples
Methods/procedures
for decontamination
of those exposed
Availability, safety,
and efficacy of drugs
and other therapies
Detection, identification, and quantification of agents in the
environment
Personal protective
equipment
Safe and effective
patient extraction
Methods for recognizing symptoms and
signs in patients
Methods for recognizing covert exposure
in populations
Mass-casualty triage
techniques and procedures
Prevention, assessment, and treatment
of psychological
effects
Initial
Treatment
Facilities
State
Federal
Chem
Bio
Chem
Bio
Chem
Bio
Chem
Bio
L
L
L
L
S
S
S
S
L
L
L
S
L
S
H
H
S
S
L
L
L
L
S
S
L
L
S
S
L
L
S
S
S
L
L
L
S
S
H
S
S
S
L
S
L
S
S
S
S
S
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
S
S
S
S
S
S
L
L
S
S
N/A
N/A
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
L
L
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
NOTE: H = highly capable; S = some capability; L = little or no capability; and N/A = not
applicable.
SOURCE: Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, 1999, p. 24.
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Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security
•
Detection and assessment equipment for environmental analysis
and clinical samples.
•
Mass decontamination capabilities.
•
Vaccines and therapeutics.
•
Personal protective equipment.