Abstracts
44th Annual Meeting of the
Western Canadian Philosophical
Association: 100 Years of
Pragmatism
University of Saskatchewan
October 26-28, 2007
Pragmatism and the Normative Theory of Rationality
Preston Stovall (Texas A&M University)
Beiser has recently criticized Brandom’s normative reading
of Kant as overlooking the problems uncovered by the
early-20th century neo-Kantians. I defend Brandom’s
program against Beiser’s criticisms, connecting Brandom’s
work to the early-20th century pragmatists’ reconciliatory
view of norms and facts. Inheriting this pragmatic
conception, Brandom both avoids Beiser’s criticisms and
offers an important analysis of philosophy’s engagement
with culture. This paper illustrates how Brandom’s
normative program impels us to derive a should from a
must.
Assessing Rawls’s Proviso
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Friday, October 26
Descartes, Dewey, and the Legacy of the Spectator Theory of
Knowledge: A Reassessment
Adam Hutchinson (Duquesne University)
John Dewey characterized the philosophy of Descartes being in
the thrall of a “spectator theory of knowledge”. For Richard
Rorty Dewey’s reading of Descartes is the defining moment of
pragmatism: it is when pragmatism becomes another antiCartesianism. I interpret Descartes early text Rules for the
Direction of Mind and reconstruct what looks like an “actor
theory” of knowledge While Descartes may end up with a
spectator theory in the Meditations, there is an experimentalist
impulse that pragmatist readings have failed to address.
Mark Capustin (University of Manitoba)
In this paper I examine Rawls’s view that religious persons can
feel free to present religious reasons in public debate subject
to the proviso that they will be able to present, in due course,
arguments grounded in public reason. I argue in some cases it
is impossible to have a justified belief that the proviso can be
met, though it can nevertheless be reasonable to present
contentious religious or moral reasons.
Revamping Reflective Equilibrium as a Dynamic System
Kevin Buzinski (York University)
Part of the appeal of Rawls’ notion of reflective equilibrium is
that it tries to close off moral loopholes, but Rawls goes awry
when he tries to fit it into a top-down approach. I suggest that
taking a bottom-up approach allows us to revamp reflective
equilibrium as a dynamic system. This would allow reflective
equilibrium to be used as a tool by casuists or certain moral
particularists who permit a role for moral principles.
Gettier’s Dichotomy
Definite and Indefinite Articles in Elementary Predicate Logic
David Johnston (University of Victoria)
It is shown that Gettier’s original counter-examples to the
traditional analysis of knowledge depend upon equivocations,
and consequently that these examples do not refute the
traditional analysis. Two further Getter-type examples are
examined, and equivocations are found in these as well.
Kent Peacock (University of Lethbridge)
This paper describes a way of translating into predicate
notation the indefinite and definite articles "a" and "the" which
occur in what Russell [9] called denoting phrases, and
demonstrates some of the applications of this modest
notational innovation to elementary first-order predicate logic
with identity.
Conventions for Illocutionary Silencing
Nicole Wyatt (University of Calgary)
I present a speech act theoretic account of Catherine
McKinnon’s claim that pornography of certain kinds actively
silences women in terms of competing and overriding
conventions. Other attempts to vindicate McKinnon focused on
the notion of uptake: I note various well-known problems with
this analysis and show that a convention based analysis does
not suffer from those same problems.
Levels of Reality
Patrick McGivern and Alexander Reuger (University of Alberta)
According to the standard view of ‘levels of reality’ (i) levels are
populated by entities of varying complexity, (ii) there is a unique
hierarchy of levels, and (iii) the inhabitants of adjacent levels
are related by the parthood relation. Using examples from
physics, we argue that it is more natural to view the inhabitants
of levels as the behaviors of entities, that levels can be ordered
according to different principles, and that the parthood relation
between levels is not the standard ‘spatial’ parthood relation.
We suggest that this account of levels better suits examples of
explanation in science.
WCPA 2007 Abstracts
Saturday October 27
James and Rorty on Truth and Experience
R. Chase Skorburg (Harvard University)
In remembrance of Richard Rorty and on the occasion of the
100th anniversary of James’s Pragmatism lectures, this essay
examines James and Rorty on truth and experience. It
concludes that James’s views are more compelling, despite
Rorty’s claim that he largely shares James’s positions. James’s
richer account of experience and sophisticated correspondence
theory of truth allow him to account for the influence of
subjective context in inquiry without thereby adopting Rorty’s
“ironism” regarding the constraints that objects of inquiry may
provide critical thought.
Martinich: Up to Scratch?
Derek Postnikoff (University of Saskatchewan)
A.P. Martinich’s pragmatic account of metaphor is based on
Grice’s theory of conversational implicature. In this paper,
Martinich’s theory is argued to be deficient; in particular, the
connection between the notion of a dead metaphor and the
literal/figurative distinction is shown to be inadequately
discussed.
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Truth, Lies & Poetics: Collapsing the Standard-Nonstandard
Distinction in Discussions of Metaphor
Diana B. Heney (University of Saskatchewan)
In “A Theory of Metaphor”, A.P. Martinich proposes to divide
metaphors into two categories: standard and nonstandard.
The purpose of this essay is twofold: to explain the distinction
as Martinich sees it; and to show that such a distinction is
detrimental to the philosophical study of metaphor. The
discussion of several examples supports the latter point, and
leads to the suggestion that a genuine taxonomy of metaphor
would be more helpful than the standard-nonstandard
distinction.
emotion, the bearing his theory of emotion generation would
have on modern approaches in psychology is hard to deny.
On-Stage Illocution
Peter Alward (University of Lethbridge)
In this paper, I consider three theories of theatrical speech
acts: the illocutionary pretense account, the sui generis
theatrical illocution account, and the game model. I argue that
the latter two theories run into insuperable difficulties. Finally, I
develop and defend a version of the illocutionary pretense
account.
Reflections on Laws, Metaphysics and van Fraassen
The Battle of the Absolute: Pragmatism, Pragmaticism and
Spinozism
Shannon Dea (University of Waterloo)
Between 1904 and 1909, Peirce repeatedly identified Spinoza
as a pragmatic forebear. This corresponded to Peirce’s coining
of the term “pragmaticism” to distance himself from the
nominalistic, anti-metaphysical variety of pragmatism then in
ascendance. This essay sketches some of the similarities
between Peirce and Spinoza, and some of the differences
between Peirce and James through discussions of (1) Spinoza’s
Peircean synechism, and (2) the so-called “Battle of the
Absolute” waged by James and Royce.
One Hundred Years Later: William James and the Psychology of
Emotion.
Joseph Palencik (University of Buffalo)
This paper addresses the significance of William James’ theory
of emotion in experimental psychology. While many of James’
detractors have pointed to the problems with his definition of
WCPA 2007 Abstracts
Bryson Brown (University of Lethbridge)
Bas van Fraassen has long defended an austerely empiricist
philosophy of science. To allow for the less empirical aspects of
our scientific practice, van Fraassen draws a sharp line
between cognitive and merely pragmatic aspects of
commitment to scientific theories. However, realistic intuitions
are hard to put aside. When we think of examples, certain
counterfactuals (viz. ‘If I had dropped this chalk, it would have
fallen to the floor’) seem straightforwardly true. The height of a
flagpole, together with its geographic circumstances and the
elevation of the sun, seems to explain the length of the
resulting shadow, while the length of the shadow does not
explain the height of the flagpole. Reconciling these intuitions
with empiricist ideas about how we come to know what we
know about the world is difficult. This paper generalizes an
argument van Fraassen directs against the contingent relations
between universals account of laws, and proposes a nonmetaphysical alternative to van Fraassen which does more
justice to our attitude towards laws.
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Underdetermination Revisited: Salvaging Feminism from the
Obscurity of ‘Vicious Relativism’.
Doing the Will of Beliefs: A Critical Assessment of William
James’ Defense of Religious Faith
Mary Butterfield (University of Victoria)
My purpose in this paper is to delve into the complex nest of
issues surrounding philosophy of science and epistemological
agency. My focus will be on epistemology as somehow a social
enterprise, drawing explicitly on the work of Lynn Nelson in her
paper “Epistemological Communities”. My main opponent in
this discussion is Susan Haack, most notably the monistic
realism expressed in her paper “Science as Social – Yes and
No”. My aim is to demonstrate that there are good reasons to
reject both Haack’s monism and her account of how knowledge
– particularly scientific knowledge – is acquired. I will examine
Haack’s rejection of science as a social enterprise in
relationship to her views about underdetermination, as well as
her individualistic epistemological commitments. Nelson’s goal
in “Epistemological Communities” is to uncover a middleground between empirical objectivism and judgmental
relativism; I argue that Haack’s sweeping assessment of
feminist critiques of science ultimately do not hold up to either
Nelson’s rearticulation of underdetermination or her
subsequent position that it is communities, not individuals, that
are the agents of epistemology.
Chad Hale (University of South Florida)
In this paper, I engage in a brief explication and clarification of
James’ “The Will to Believe” before going on to criticize it on
two points. First, I criticize James for the ethical irresponsibility
of his claim of the epistemic legitimacy of faith in light of the
pragmatic view that belief is always tied up with action.
Second, I call into question the existence of actual cases of
Jamesian indeterminacy by examining whether they ever occur
in real situations and by examining whether we can ever
choose our beliefs in a pragmatically meaningful sense, real
situation or not.
To Be or To Do: A Question in Scientific Realism
Jonah P.B. Goldwater (City University of New York)
A scientific realism in which one distinguishes the ‘nature’ of a
thing from its detectable actions bears a closer resemblance to
religious thinking than scientific; the anti-supernaturalist should
reject this distinction. Three important consequences follow:
The very idea of empirically equivalent rival theories, and the
metaphysical principle that dispositional properties require
categorical grounds, become unintelligible, and intuitions about
the form of, and epistemological access to, truth-bearing
statements may have to be considerably revised.
WCPA 2007 Abstracts
Out of Control: The Motive of Duty and the Kantian Criterion of
Summonability
Shruta Swarup (Simon Fraser University)
Kantians take summonability to be a necessary characteristic
of moral motives. They privilege the motive of duty over
emotional motives on the grounds that it satisfies this criterion
while the emotions do not. I argue that the Kantian is guilty of
equivocating on the concept of summonability, and that the
motive of duty and the emotions are in fact in the same boat
with respect to this criterion when it is properly disambiguated.
A Proof That Egalitarianism Is Either False Or Banal
Paul Viminitz (University of Lethbridge)
In this paper I argue that the only equality that need be
postulated between agents qua heading into a theory of
normative ethics and/or politics is that the agents in question
be equally involved in interactivity in which there’s a
cooperative dividend to which they can have access if and only
if they can bring themselves to (in some sense) cooperate. The
kind of equality to which they’re end-of-pipe entitled, however,
4
is determined by whether or not an egalitarian distribution of
the dividend-type in question between the persons in question
can or cannot be expected to maximize the utility of the
institutor-pair in question. The upshot of this view, then, is that,
our intuitions to the contrary notwithstanding, the notion of
equality can play no interesting role in either ethical or political
thought.
Perceptual Intentionality: Dretske versus Searle
Victor Rodych (University of Lethbridge)
On John Searle’s account, perceptual “experiences have
Intentionality” because “experiences are as inseparable from
their conditions of satisfaction as are beliefs and desires.” One
cannot, according to Searle, see a yellow station wagon without
understanding what a yellow station wagon is. In his “The
Intentionality of Perception” (2003), Fred Dretske argues, much
to the contrary, for an extensional account of visual experience
such that ‘“S sees x” (like “x killed S”) is extensional because it
describes a causal relation between S and x.’ On Dretske’s
view, “S sees a yellow station wagon” is true provided that the
appropriate causal relation obtains between a yellow station
wagon and S, even if S sees something as (or believes s/he
sees) a brown truck. In this paper, I endeavour to show (1) that
the most important questions for epistemology and learning
theory concern the nature of intensional visual experience (e.g.,
seeing x as a y), veridical visual experience, and unveridical
visual experience, and (2) that unlike Searle’s intensional
account, Dretske’s extensional account does not begin to
address these important questions. Contra Dretske, Searle’s
question “Under what conditions does one take oneself to be
seeing that Sally is in front of one?” is neither illusory nor
unproblematic.
WCPA 2007 Abstracts
Nozick, Parfit, and Platonic Glasses
Wesley Cooper (University of Alberta)
The Closest–Continuer schema of identity is distinguished here
from the Closest–Continuer theory of personal identity, the
latter applying the former to personal identity by reference to
the self’s self-defining activity. Nozick’s “Platonic glasses”
mode of conceptualizing personal identity is defended against
Parfit’s objections and extended beyond hypothetical branching
to the actual branching hypothesized by the “no-collapse”
theories of quantum mechanics. The reader may wish to
consult Lev Vaidman’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
essay, “Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”,
for an accessible and sympathetic treatment of this
interpretation.(Vaidman 2002) See also David Deutsch’s
philosophical essay on what he calls the “multiverse” in The
Fabric of Reality.(Deutsch 1997)
Frege on Number Properties
Andrew Irvine (University of British Columbia)
In the Grundlagen Frege offers seven main arguments,
together with a series of more minor supporting arguments,
against Mill's view that numbers are properties of “external
things.” This paper reviews all seven of these arguments,
concluding that none are conclusive.
Track-Record Arguments and Informal Logic
Patrick Bondy (University of Windsor)
In his paper “An Epistemological Approach to Argumentation”
(2003), Alvin Goldman argues that epistemology can give an
adequate account of what he calls “epistemically circular”
arguments, and informal logic cannot. In this paper, I argue
that although informal logicians have not given an adequate
account of this kind of argument, they have the tools to do so,
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and I give a preliminary account of this kind of argument with
the tools of informal logic.
scientific and philosophical studies of the mind. This runs
directly counter to the phenomenological reading.
Limits on Humor’s Philosophical Function
Pragmatism, Genealogy, and the Value of Truth
Christopher Moore (University of Minnesota)
Humor helps reveal hypocrisy, negative stereotypes, and one’s
own unchallenged assumptions, and so has existential, moral,
and political benefits. But it may also foster hubris,
complacency, and nationalism. I systematize humor’s general
edifying possibilities and their preconditions. Something funny,
no matter how great or wise it is, has no critical or diagnostic
power by itself. I consider in particular levity; satire; the genre
“comedy”; and what I call Socratic humor.
Mark Migotti (University of Calgary)
Humour and Play: Grown-ups at Recess
Robin Tapley (Thompson Rivers University)
The importance of play is not restricted to childhood. Play,
besides being fun, serves several functions. Play puts us into
contact with other people in a way that is friendly, relaxed, and
signals our acceptance. Play hones certain skills that have
adaptive features. Play teaches social skills. All of these
features of play are the same functions and features of
humour. Humour is adult social play.
Why William James Is Not a Phenomenologist
Alexander Klein (University of Toronto)
A prominent reading portrays James’s Principles as a work that
ultimately abandoned mental science for transcendental
phenomenology. In fact, one of that work’s overarching aims
was to show how mental science could operate independently
of transcendental philosophy. Debates had erupted over the
scientific status of psychology, and James responded by
showing how a division of labor could be created between
WCPA 2007 Abstracts
In Truth and Truthfulness, the last book published in his
lifetime, Bernard Williams sets out to legitimate the value of
truth by means of a vindicatory genealogy. Correctly taking
Richard Rorty's dismissive views on truth to be inimical to such
an undertaking, he incorrectly takes those views to by
characteristically pragmatist. In this paper I expose some of the
damage Williams does to his own cause by failing to give
Peircean pragmatism its due.
A Curate’s Egg: “All language is metaphor”
R.E. Jennings and A.J. Hartline (Laboratory for Logic and
Experimental Philosophy, Simon Fraser University)
So-called “pragmatic” accounts of metaphor suggest that in the
ordinary way linguistic productions have a compositional and
more-or-less context independent “literal meaning”, and that in
metaphor this literal meaning interacts with the context of
utterance to produce a new “meaning” that stands somehow
apart from literal meaning. In this picture, language is, as it
were, ’officially’ an instrument for producing sentences with
truth-values. Nevertheless, it remains open to the speaker to
use the language in a range of “tricky” ways, exploiting the
capacity of physical context and a hearer’s experience to
supplant the truth conditions of one production with those of
another. The simple recognition that linguistic production is
primarily a physical intervention has deep consequences for
the larger view of language from which this view of metaphor
arises. The overall shape of the account demanded by the
physicality of language is that of a higher-order physical theory.
In such a theory, the resources of compositional semantics are
6
largely abandoned. Semantic compositionality hypothesizes a
(momentarily) static language in which fixed meanings are
composed into complex meanings. By contrast physical theory
recognizes composition as the principal instrument of language
change. Indeed language change becomes the central object of
investigation. A primary question for such a theory is: how does
the capacity of linguistic productions to produce effects of one
type engender the capacity of later productions to produce
effects of another. A subsidiary question concerns the typing of
such effects. This sort of account does not the view that
language has some context-independent function. Rather, it
accepts only that at a given moment in the history of a
language, linguistic change has eventuated in a complex
neurological and physical preparation for further linguistic
intervention, a preparation available for various kinds of
exploitation. The overall shape of this kind of account is that of
a pragmatic account of metaphor with no hypothesized base
function for language, and a fortiori none envisaged within a
naive compositional semantics. In the end we endorse a
straitened and theoretically disciplined counterpart of the
rhapsodic thesis that all language is metaphor.
What is the Julius Caesar Problem and What is Frege's
Solution?
David G. Laverty (University of Toronto)
In this paper, I defend three theses: (1) the problem posed by
the so-called Caesar Problem for Frege's overall program
derives from his conception of objects; (2) contrary to what
many Frege scholars have said, the explicit definition of
numbers in terms of extensions, carried out in the Grundlagen,
does resolve this problem; (3) in his mature phase, Frege did
not abandon the method of contextual definition.
WCPA 2007 Abstracts
‘Here is a culture that is cheating itself’: Wittgenstein and
Rosenzweig on the Loss of Religious Discourse
Eleanor Akins (University of Regina)
Can any positive aspects of religious discourse be reclaimed, to
refresh our outlook while being intellectually and ethically
sound? A look at Wittgenstein’s ‘religious point of view’ and
Rosenzweig’s ‘new thinking’ investigates this question. Each
regrets the loss of religious discourse and favors a religious
sensibility accenting particularity and pragmatic utility. Despite
similarities in their attention to language, context and dynamic
change, differences are cited as openings for further study.
Schopenhauer, Suffering, and the Value of Life
Julianne Chung (University of Calgary)
In this paper, I will first defend several core elements of
Schopenhauer’s pessimism and show how these elements,
taken together, suggest that life is not worthwhile. I will then
discuss whether or not it is possible to accept these core
elements whilst consistently maintaining, pace Schopenhauer,
that life can be worthwhile.
Liberal theory and First Nations’ Indigenous Rights
Sandra Tomsons (University of Winnipeg)
According to political philosopher Will Kymlicka, Canada’s
Aboriginal people must accept the political reality that their
Aboriginal rights are not theirs to define. Non-Aboriginal judges
and politicians have the power to “protect and enforce”
Aboriginal rights. They do so presently presuming a liberal
theory which understands them “...as matters of discrimination
and/or privilege, not of equality.” Consequently, Aboriginal
rights must be understood as “...an essential component of
liberal political practice.” Aboriginal rights will only be secure if
they can be seen from the non-Aboriginal perspective (i.e.
7
liberalism) as consistent with, rather than competing with,
liberalism. My paper challenges Kymlicka’s claims about
political reality and the constraints he imposes on how
Aboriginal rights can be understood. I argue that the national
minority account of Aboriginal rights Kymlicka constructs to find
a space for these rights in liberal theory is inconsistent with
liberal theory. The reasoning that refutes his account also
reveals that liberal theory supports the claim that Aboriginal
people are entitled to define their rights.
Aristotle’s Pragmatic Methodology for Ethical Inquiry
Martin Tweedale (University of Alberta)
Aristotle has a pragmatic view of ethical inquiry in the sense
that he takes the ultimate aim of it to be the improvement of
our lives, as opposed to viewing it as aimed at knowledge.
Given this I claim that it is not surprising nor objectionable if he
ends up holding some sort of limited relativism in ethics, and in
fact I argue that he does indeed leave his inquiry open to that
result.
Locke and Boyle on the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinctions
or Why the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction Isn't
Jack MacIntosh (University of Calgary)
Many philosophers in the early modern period, with Locke as a
paradigmatic example, offered distinctions which it is
customary to refer to as the distinction between primary and
secondary qualities. In this paper I argue that there is not such
a single distinction, and that attention to the texts reveals that
the various distinctions on offer are quite distinct distinctions.
They may be interesting, ingenious, or philosophically
interesting, but they are not one distinction.
WCPA 2007 Abstracts
Can Babies Read Minds? Infant Theory of Mind: An
Understanding of Mental States or Behaviour
Serife Tekin (York University)
Onishi and Baillargeon (O&B), in a study on infant cognition,
relying on the results of a non-verbal false belief task, propose
that 15-month old infants understand false beliefs. I argue that
the infants’ behavioural response in the study may be an
indication of their recognition of the discrepancy in the
behaviourial regularity, not their understanding of mental
states. Thus, I argue that O&B’s attribution of false belief
understanding to 15-month old infants is problematic.
Sunday October 28
Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis
Justin C. Fisher (University of British Columbia)
Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis (PCA) is a proposed empirical
methodology for doing philosophical analysis. PCA suggests
that we think of our shared concepts as having whatever
application conditions they would need to have in order best to
continue delivering benefits as they have regularly delivered
benefits in the past. I argue that PCA reveals not only the
application conditions we ought to use for our concepts, but
also the correct application conditions they already have.
Neopragmatism and Normative Pragmatism in Semantics
Jaroslav Peregrin (Charles University)
While the traditional view was that in order to understand
language and our linguistic practices we must explain meaning,
the 'pragmatic turn' emerging within the writings of various
philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century caused
a basic change of the perspective: the tendency to concentrate
8
directly on explaining the linguistic practices and leave the
need for explaining meaning to emerge subsequently. In the
paper I want to distinguish between approaches to meaning of
neopragmatists like Quine and normative pragmatists like
Brandom. I will try to show that it is the latter that is able to
elucidate the concept of meaning in a truly illuminating way.
Basic Logical Knowledge and Justification
David Boutillier (University of Western Ontario)
The paper has two goals. The first goal is to explain what the
problem of basic logical knowledge is. The second goal is to
present a sketch of an approach to the problem. The approach
sketched employs a transcendental argument aimed at helping
to show how it is possible for a basic logical knowledge to be
justified. The approach avoids appeal to intuition, convention,
and psychology.
The Municiple Bi-Laws of Thought
Dave DeVidi (University of Waterloo)
What I want to consider today is logical pluralism: in particular, I
want to investigate the question of whether there is any sense
in which it is both interesting and true that there is a plurality of
logics.
Priest on the Hooded Man
Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)
In Towards Non-Being Graham Priest offers a novel resolution
of the Hooded Man paradox (as well as its modern guises in the
work of Gottlob Frege, Saul Kripke, Nathan Salmon, and
others). Millians and Fregeans have offered familiar solutions
to this paradox, but Priest’s solution promises the virtues of its
familiar competitors without the attendant costs. The goal of
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this paper is to evaluate Priest’s proposal. I argue that the
proposal should not be accepted.
When Racial Slurs Fail to Express: A Reply to Boisvert
Brandon Johns (University of Southern California)
In “Expressive-Assertivism and ‘The Embedding Objection’,”
Daniel Boisvert offers an ethical expressivist-cognitivist hybrid
view called Expressive-Assertivism (EA). On EA, utterances of
moral sentences both express a mental state and assert a
descriptive fact about the world. One virtue Boisvert claims for
EA is that it is capable of solving The Objection from Missing
Expressives (OME). Key to Boisvert’s solution is his comparison
of moral terms to pejorative language. In this paper, I argue
that supertrue pejorative sentences fail to express contempt.
And so Boisvert’s appeal to pejorative language in order to
solve OME will not succeed.
Does the Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of Confirmation
Really Support Bayesianism?
Brian Laetz (University of British Columbia)
Bayesians seem to present their solution to the paradox of
confirmation as grounds for preferring their theory to Hempel’s.
They point out that, unlike Hempel, they can at least say that a
black raven confirms that all ravens are black more than a
white shoe. However, I point out that if this is an advantage
over Hempel’s approach, it is cancelled out by the fact that
Bayesians are equally committed to the claim that black ravens
confirm that all non-black things are non-ravens more than
white shoes, unlike Hempel. In light of this, I reexamine the
dialectic between Bayesians and Hempel at length.
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What is Carnap's Logical Empiricism?
Sam Hiller
In this talk, I describe a unique interpretation of Rudolf
Carnap's philosophical position at the time of his seminal work,
The Logical Syntax of Language. After outlining this position,
which I call "language engineering," I then proceed to show how
Carnap's major philosophical tasks fit within this framework. I
close by examining how two of Carnap's principle philosophical
commitments - the principle of tolerance, and empiricism must be understood.
Friendship, Complacency, and Non-Reductive Utilitarianism
Andrew Peter Ross (Queen’s University)
Contemporary utilitarianism has drawn repeated criticism over
its apparent inability to accommodate the value of friendship.
Many recent replies to this objection have attempted to
indirectly justify friendship by arguing that pro-friendship
dispositions are actually conducive to the greater good. In
response, critics have argued that this strategy does nothing to
solve the problem of “alienation”. This paper will consider
Elinor Mason’s reply to this objection. It will be argued that
Mason’s strategy places overtly repressive conditions for
sacrificing friendships, forcing moral agents into states of
ethical complacency. Following this, I will advocate what I call a
"non-reductive" strategy to avoid that will avoid the
complications introduced by Mason's argument.
Against Intrinsic Value
Ryan Tanner (University of Calgary)
In this paper I argue against a certain standard view of intrinsic
value. I begin with distinguishing three ways in which we tend
to describe things as valuable, arguing that only two of them
actually refer to intelligible, or at least demonstrable, ways in
WCPA 2007 Abstracts
which a thing has value. Then, taking Irwin Goldstein’s case for
the intrinsic badness of pain as a good example of an attempt
to demonstrate the existence of intrinsic value in the sense at
issue, I argue that in fact intrinsic value is at best a trivial
concept, and at worst is unhelpful and grossly unsubstantiated.
Against Wide Categories: Aesthetic Adjectives and Judgment
Josh Johnston (University of British Columbia)
This paper explores the view of aesthetic ambifunctionality and
the role aesthetic adjectives play in judgment. Aesthetic
ambifunctionality holds that aesthetic adjectives can vary in
their use, that is, they can be used both predicatively and
attributively in aesthetic judgments. Aesthetic empiricism views
adjectives as playing only a predicative role, while aesthetic
contextualism views them as playing only an attributive role.
The ambifunctional view is presented as a compromise
between both of these two extremes.
Naturalism, Death, and Functional Immortality
Charlie Hobbs (Southern Illinois University)
I consider a naturalistic approach to death, seeking to
articulate a naturalistic or “functional” version of immortality.
Making use of John Dewey and other classical American
philosophers, I first articulate the naturalism of this project. I
then discuss what such naturalism means for understanding
the self and its survival. Finally, I consider the existential
question about to what extent such a view of immortality is
satisfying.
Technology and Freedom in Heidegger
Jeff Kochan (University of Alberta)
The themes of technology and freedom run widely and
powerfully through the collected works of Martin Heidegger. In
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this essay, I will discuss his treatment of them in two of his
more well-known and influential works: Being and Time and
“The Question Concerning Technology.” I will argue that, in the
earlier text, Heidegger understands freedom as unfolding within
limits circumscribed by technology, whereas, in the later text,
he understands technology as unfolding within limits
circumscribed by freedom.
Can Someone Choose Hell?
Joel Buenting (University of Alberta)
I propose that theories of choosing hell ought to satisfy these
desiderata: (i) they ought to specify sufficient conditions for
damnation (D1) and (ii) they ought to preserve an acceptably
high ratio of sinners in hell to the blessed in heaven (D2).
Rejecting God (Geach 1977), rejecting God based on fully
informed decisions (Talbott 2005), rejecting God based on wellinformed decisions (Craig 1989) and choosing hell based upon
choosing evil (Walls 1992, 2004) fail in various ways to satisfy
D1-D2.
WCPA 2007 Abstracts
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Symposia
Philosophy, Teaching, and the Art of Living
Douglas R. Anderson (Southern Illinois University)
John Russon (University of Guelph)
Cherilyn Keall (University of Guelph)
Anderson, Douglas R. Philosophy Americana: Making
Philosophy at Home in American Culture. (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2006).
Russon, John. Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis, and
the Elements of Everyday Life. (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 2003).
As a pragmatist, William James believed that teaching and
learning are part of a philosopher’s task. This part of a
philosopher’s task is especially difficult because the
philosopher must teach (and learn) not just any particular
science or skill, but rather the art of living in general. The
pursuit of self-knowledge is an integral part of practicing such
an art, and I propose bringing into dialogue with each other two
books that take up the issue of self-knowledge as it relates
both to philosophy and teaching on the one hand and to the
practice of conducting a human life on the other hand. The
first is Douglas R. Anderson’s new Philosophy Americana:
Making Philosophy at Home in American Culture, which
contains a collection of essays in which Anderson brings James,
Royce and Dewey into conversation with popular culture
including music, teaching, and religious experience. The
second is John Russon’s award-winning Human Experience:
Philosophy, Neurosis, and the Elements of Everyday Life, which
complements Anderson’s book insofar as it shows how the view
of the human situation as developed in Contemporary
European Philosophy is relevant to the practice of conducting a
human life. Together these two books not only demonstrate
WCPA 2007 Abstracts
the truth of James’ view that teaching and learning are part of a
philosopher’s task, but they also provide valuable insights of
their own into how individuals can become more adept at
practicing the art of living.
Propositions and Propositional Acts
James Young (University of Victoria)
Peter Alward (University of Lethbridge)
David Johnston (University of Victoria)
It is argued that semantic theory should replace propositions
with propositional acts in its theoretical ontology. It is shown
that propositional acts are equally capable of accounting for
the various linguistic phenomena that are of interest to
philosophers, and also that a semantic theory based on
propositional acts is more ontologically parsimonious than one
based on propositions.
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