ZEF
Bonn 2005
Working
Paper
Series
1
Hans-Dieter Evers and Solvay Gerke
Closing the Digital Divide:
Center for Development
Research
Department of
Political and
Cultural Change
Research Group
Culture, Knowledge and Development
Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung
Center for Development Research
ISSN 1864-6638
Southeast Asia’s Path Towards a
Knowledge Society
ZEF Working Paper Series, ISSN 1864-6638
Department of Political and Cultural Change
Center for Development Research, University of Bonn
Editors: H.-D. Evers, Solvay Gerke, Peter Mollinga, Conrad Schetter
Authors’ address
Prof. Dr. Hans-Dieter Evers, Senior Fellow
Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn
Walter-Flex-Str. 3, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Tel. 0228-734909; Fax 0228-731972
e-mail: hdevers@uni-bonn.de, internet: www.uni-bonn.de/~hevers/
Prof. Dr. Solvay Gerke, Director
Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn
Walter-Flex-Str. 3, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Tel. 0228-731970; Fax 0228-731972
e-mail: solvay.gerke@uni-bonn.de
Closing the Digital Divide:
Southeast Asia’s Path towards a Knowledge Society1
Hans-Dieter Evers and Solvay Gerke
Center for Development Research (ZEF) and Department of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Bonn
Abstract
The production, dissemination and utilisation of knowledge are essential for development and
the introduction of information and communication technology (ICT) is a precondition for developing a
knowledge society. Countries, regions and populations are, however, divided, in terms of access to ICT.
Socio-economic indicators on Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, the Netherlands and Germany are used to
show that the existing global digital divide and the knowledge gap are widening between developing
countries and the industrial countries and within individual nations.
Some Southeast Asian countries have embarked on an ambitious plan to close the digital divide
and to use knowledge as a base for economic development, by-passing earlier stages of industrialisation.
Some commentators have, in contrast, asserted that it is doubtful that closing the digital divide will let
developing countries leapfrog to higher levels of development as the knowledge economy will deepen the
digital divide between regions and populations and actually expand the gap between rich and poor.
The paper discusses this controversy by arguing that global knowledge has to be localized and
local knowledge utilized in developing a knowledge society. If it seems unlikely that the digital gap
between ASEAN and developed countries will be closed completely at least narrowing the gap at the
lower end should be targeted.
Statistical data on the global absorption of locally produced knowledge are used to measure the
way towards a knowledge society. Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines have relatively high
local social science output, whereas Indonesia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar and Laos have low output
rates. We diagnose four different paths from 1970 to 2000: Indonesia shows a stable high level of
dependence, Malaysia and the Philippines are increasing local output but also increasing dependence,
whereas Singapore is increasing output with decreasing dependence on global social science knowledge.
1
Paper delivered at the Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies public lecture series “Focus Asia”, University
of Lund, Sweden 25-27 May, 2004
1. Defining the Digital Divide
Knowledge Governance
Land, labour and capital are, in classical economics, regarded as the three “factors of
production”. Development policy has been very much oriented towards improving the total and
relative allocation of resources to these factors. Agricultural development, income generating
activities and rural credit schemes are just some examples of a rich arsenal of development
programmes that can be directly related to the conventual’s wisdom that inputs into factors of
production produce development. More recently a new factor of production has been added to
the development debate; a factor that supposedly has overtaken the other factors in
importance: Knowledge is now regarded as the main driving force of innovation and
development.
A by now famous example is cited in the World Development Report of 1998/98. Ghana
and the Republic of Korea started of with almost the same GNP/cap in 1960. Thirty years later
the Korean GNP/cap had risen more than six times, the Ghanaian was still hovering at the same
level (in 1985 prices). Half the gap could be explained in terms of the ‘traditional’ factor inputs,
the other half, according to World Bank experts, was attributed to ‘knowledge’ as a factor of
production (World Bank 1999).
Diagram 1:
Knowledge and Development
Knowledge makes the difference
between poverty and wealth...
8
Thousands of
1985 dollars
Rep. of Korea
Difference
attributed to
knowledge
6
4
2
0
Ghana
1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990
Source: World Development Report 1998/99
Difference due to
physical and
human capital
KGKG-8
Knowledge has since been identified as one of the major factors, if not THE crucial
factor of development. The idea is, indeed, fascinating. If natural resources are scarce, if FDI
does not flow into the country as expected, if land is not fertile or scarce, knowledge can be
introduced and put to effective use. In the almost poetic words of the World Bank, "Knowledge
is like light. Weightless and tangible, it can easily travel the world, enlightening the lives of
people everywhere." (World Bank 1999:1). Knowledge increasingly explains the gap between
developed and underdeveloped, between poor and rich countries, between Singapore and Laos
or Malaysia and Indonesia. Several Southeast Asian countries have thus planned and carried out
strategies to bridge the digital divide, to close the knowledge gap between them and the OECD
countries. They invented a framework to produce and utilize knowledge for economic and social
development and follow an active policy of knowledge governance.
The Production of New Knowledge and the Growth of ICT
New knowledge is produced at an unprecedented pace. The growth of scientific
knowledge production, supported by advances in information and computer technology, has
been primarily responsible for the explosive rate of increase in knowledge. “There is a
widespread consensus today that contemporary Western societies are in one sense or another
ruled by knowledge and expertise” (Knorr-Cetina 1999). This knowledge is governed, managed,
monopolised or shared throughout the industrialised countries, but also increasingly in parts of
Asia. In a recent survey (of the Economic Intelligence Unit of the Economist, 18 April 2004) the
‘E-readiness’ of individual countries is measured in terms of their ICT infrastructure and the
popular acceptance of digital equipment. Singapore is the ‘shooting star’ of knowledge
governance: It improved its position on the ranking order from rank 12 to rank 7 close to
Sweden, Denmark and the UK between 2000 and 2003.
Knowledge is increasing with every patent granted and every paper, journal article or
book written on a particular subject. If we consider only those articles that have been accepted
in international journals and have been officially recognised or ‘authorised’ by inclusion into a
major databank, we see a steep rise not only in natural science and engineering knowledge but
also of social science work on Southeast Asian countries during the boom years of the 1980s
and 90s (Evers and Gerke 2003) . Of particular interest is the rising local social science
production, as it indicates a rising concern for social and cultural processes under conditions of
globalisation and an increase in ‘reflexive modernization’(Beck, Giddens et al. 1994). We observe
that the concern for the direction of social and cultural processes, particularly of the emerging
education-conscious middle classes in Malaysia, Indonesia and elsewhere (Gerke 2000)
stimulates local knowledge production on society and culture.
Information and communication technology (ICT) is also growing fast, though at
different rates. In 2001 in Northern Europe and North America between 40 to 60% of all
households had internet access (OECD 2002). In some countries, like the UK or Portugal the
number of internet subscribers more than doubled between 2000 and 2001. The use of
handphones has also increased substantially world wide, particularly in some of the Asian
countries.
Diagram 2:
Use of the Internet, ASEAN 1996-2000 (total number of internet subscribers)
4000000
Malaysia
3500000
3000000
Indonesia
2500000
Laos
Myanmar, Brunei
2000000
Philippines
1500000
Singapore
1000000
Vietnam
500000
0
96
97
98
99
2000
Components of the information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure and
of institutions of knowledge production and dissemination are, however, unevenly distributed. In
the year 2000 in the United States about a third of the work force was employed in ICT related
sectors, in Korea only 4% or about half a million workers and much less in most of East and
Southeast Asia. About 30% of R&D expenditure worldwide is spent in the European Union, Asia
and the United States respectively, a small proportion in the rest of the world (UNESCO 2000).
The result is a widening digital divide, which mirrors the income differences between developed
and underdeveloped economies (World Bank 1999). There are nodal points where digital
equipment is concentrated, where knowledge is produced and from where it is globally
distributed. Research on Indonesia, for example, may be extensively done by foreign scholars,
affiliated to universities or research institutions around the globe, rather then Indonesian
nationals or scholars attached to its local institutions (Evers 2003). This raises the issue of how
far knowledge is produced to meet local needs rather than the interests of a global community
of scholars or the R&D interests of multi-national corporations.
The unequal production and distribution of knowledge is widening the knowledge gap
between highly productive and less productive countries. The distribution of ICT and the
production of knowledge are interrelated, but the exact nature of this connection is far from
clear. An ICT infrastructure can only be developed if the necessary scientific knowledge and
expertise is locally available. The production of new knowledge is, however, not primarily
dependent on the availability of ICT, though being on the wrong side of a digital divide reduces
the chances for innovative knowledge production.
The Growth of Ignorance and the Destruction of Local Knowledge
The growth of knowledge also implies the growth of ignorance (Evers and Menkhoff
2004). With each new insight new open questions are created. The more we know the more we
also know what we don’t know. In this sense ignorance or “known not-knowing” increases at a
faster rate than confirmed knowledge. This creates a feeling of insecurity and increases risk
awareness, because outcomes of technological advances become less certain with knowledge
about the complexity of the natural and socio-cultural world. For example the spread of ICT is
based on research and development efforts and the production of new knowledge on digital
data processing technologies. At the same time possible hazards of “electro-smog” have become
a known possibility but their health hazard has not been proven beyond doubt. Research on
electromagnetic fields under transmission lines and communication channels is under way,
health hazards are a possibility, but the exact risks are still largely unknown.
The production of knowledge takes place in a framework of markets and power
structures and is not necessarily guided by the use-value of knowledge to poor people. New
insights may make old knowledge obsolete and lead to its replacement, but useful local
knowledge may also vanish before the onslaught of knowledge systems thought to be superior.
Research does not only produce new knowledge but also destroys old knowledge. In this sense
ignorance rather than knowledge is enhanced. The digital divide has an impact on the
distribution of knowledge and ignorance. The transaction cost of transmitting knowledge
through ICT are much lower than communicating by much slower traditional means of
communication. A new conception of time has evolved. Composing, writing and mailing a
conventional letter takes more time than dashing off an e-mail. Digitalised global knowledge
therefore tends to spread much faster than local knowledge.
The Digital Divide
The digital divide refers to the uneven distribution of information and communication
technology (ICT) between and within nations. In each country there are people who have access
to modern communication technology while others are not enabled to make use of telephone
connections, the internet and other ICT features. There is no doubt that such a digital divide
exists but its severity and depth is evaluated differently according to the indicators used to
measure it. The knowledge gap is a more complex phenomenon and refers to the uneven
intensity of knowledge production, availability and dissemination world wide. There appears to
be a connection between the two: The digital divide determines to a large extent the capacity of
producing and using new knowledge. Overcoming the digital divide and narrowing the
knowledge gap between and within countries has become a prime target of international
development agencies as well as of some national governments.
Usually the concept of a “digital divide” is used to relate to the technological aspect of
the knowledge gap. “The term ‘digital divide’ refers to the gap between individuals, households,
businesses and geographic areas at different socio-economic levels with regard to their
opportunities to access information and communication technologies (ICTs) and their use of the
Internet. It reflects differences among and within countries” (OECD 2001). Access to telephones
appears to be the basic factor, because internet use per telephone subscriber does not differ
very much between countries (Dasgupta, Lall et al. 2001). In general the concept “digital divide”
is biased towards high technology and need to be reconceptualized to pay greater attention to
social exclusion and inclusion (Warschauer 2003).
The debate about the impact of the digital divide on development has given rise to
diametrically opposed views. “Some believe that information and communication technologies
(ICT) can be mechanisms enabling developing countries to ‘leapfrog’ stages of development.
Others see the emerging global information infrastructure as contributing to even wider
economic divergence between developing and industrialized countries” (Braga 1998).
In any case, closing the digital divide and the knowledge gap are regarded as necessary
steps towards economic development. Knowledge is the most important factor of production
and its growth is essential to propel a country into self-sustained growth. Development agencies
like the World Bank, GTZ or DFID have been the outspoken proponents of the gap-closing
strategy. Singapore and Malaysia have taken the lead in arguing the case in Southeast Asia and
other ASEAN nations, like Thailand and Vietnam are following.
The Widening Knowledge Gap
Optimistic commentators argue that the fast expansion of information and
communication technology (ICT) has improved the access to knowledge. Especially the spread of
personal computers and the internet has connected millions of people to the knowledge
resources of the world-wide-web. In Malaysia e.g. the number of internet users has risen from
40 thousand to 3.7 million from 1995 to the year 2000 and the number of computers has risen
from 37.3 per thousand people to 103.1 during the same period. For comparison: in the whole
region (East Asia and the Pacific) the ratio was 21,7 people in 2000, putting Malaysia far above
the average. (Source: Development Data Group, World Bank). But access to ICT resources is not
equally distributed and the digital divide has increased.
More and more people gain access to global knowledge resources and a fair proportion
is probably making use of them. Comparing countries critical commentators are, however, not
convinced that “the knowledge revolution will let developing countries leapfrog to higher levels
of development…. In fact, the knowledge gap is likely to widen the disparities between rich and
poor, imprisoning many developing countries in relative poverty” (Persaud 2001). It is equally
uncertain that the new knowledge technologies will bolster democracy just on the basis of
better access to information and improved knowledge of political issues.
The digital divide as well as the knowledge gap are widening, because some regions
within countries develop faster than others and some countries are on a faster track towards a
knowledge society than the less endowed. Statistical indicators show that the global knowledge
gap has been widening. This holds true for comparisons within as well as between countries and
within and between ASEAN countries as well.
The knowledge gap is deliberately or inadvertently widened by the monopolisation of the
application of knowledge through patents and the insistence on securing intellectual property
rights by powerful organisations, especially the WTO. The TRIPS Agreement, concluded in 1995,
determines rights over intellectual property and grants temporary monopolies for innovations
and inventions. Poorer countries and people are excluded from access to vital ‘knowledge
goods’, such as medicines, seeds, and educational materials (Oxfam 2001). Selling knowledge in
the form of licenses, franchising and overseas education have developed into a multi billion
dollar business for the OECD countries, which capitalise on the knowledge gap between them
and the developing world.
The digital divide and the knowledge gap are constructs within the world of
development cooperation, but they can also be seen as the result of a global marketing strategy
of the industrialised countries, especially the United States. The knowledge gap is constructed in
such a way, that it cannot be closed. Developing nations are instructed to follow a strategy of
improving their knowledge base by investing heavily in ICT and by following the model of the
most highly developed knowledge-based economies in the North. As this model is changing fast,
the developing countries (and a large part of the other industrialised economies) are engaged in
a futile race of catching-up, instead of trying to improve their competitive advantage by
stressing local knowledge resources, occupying niches, and forming strategic alliances among
themselves and with selected others.
We shall now have a closer look at the knowledge gap and the digital divide and its
creation.
The Cultural Construction of the Digital Divide and the Knowledge Gap
During the debate on the emergence of knowledge societies, knowledge-based
economies and the widening knowledge gap, the “GAP” has become essentialised. In other
words, the existence of a gap between those that possess knowledge and those that are less
endowed is taken for granted, and is not deconstructed into its components or succumbed to
critical evaluation. We shall therefore have a closer look at the concept itself and analyse its
meaning.
First of all we have to recognise that knowledge gaps are not evil by themselves. In fact,
knowledge gaps are a precondition for any development of knowledge, science, research and
human development. It is obvious that adults are supposed to know more than children, a
university student should know more than primary school pupils, a physicist can be expected to
know more about nuclear fission than a sociologist, and an expert should know more than a
laymen. These categories of people are all separated by knowledge gaps regarding their
respective fields of specialisation. Often new knowledge is created out of the cooperation
between specialists without closing the knowledge gap between them. In fact all
interdisciplinary research makes sense, if a knowledge gap exists between the cooperating
scientists. Without knowledge gaps there is no progress in research and development.
Similar arguments may be brought forward in regard to the digital divide. High-tech
industries or computer software developers require different kinds of communication
technologies than students or farmers. The needs of users have to be the guiding principle for an
evaluation of the digital divide. Only if the requirements of industries and the digital needs of
the population are not met a digital divide exists.
But how do we deal with the gap in knowledge between industrialised knowledge
economies and the developing countries? This, after all, is the crucial issue at hand. The concept
of a “gap” indicates a hierarchy between haves and have-nots or haves and have-less. If this is
the case we have to consider about which type of knowledge we are talking: knowledge about
specific branches of science, knowledge about kinship terminology, knowledge about Islamic
religious ritual, knowledge about survival under harsh ecological conditions? The value of
knowledge is determined by experts, mainly from the industrialised knowledge economies and
by processes in powerful organisations like the big transnational corporations, government
departments, UNESCO, the World Bank and other large organisations. They determine what
knowledge is essential and what is not. They construct the knowledge gap and the digital divide.
2. Closing the Digital Divide and Developing Local Knowledge
Southeast Asian Visions of Localising Global Knowledge
Most ASEAN leaders and governments have developed visions of developing a
knowledge-based economy and a knowledge society as a way to achieve parity with Western
nations. These visions are invariably directed at using global knowledge to achieve economic
progress.
In 1991 Malaysia’s Prime Minister proposed in a much-publicised speech that Malaysia
should become a fully industrialised country by the year 2020 (Evers and Gerke 1997; Evers
2003). Meanwhile the transition from a newly industrialising to a fully industrialised country
has become less attractive. The “Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020)”, as the Prime Minister’s speech is
known, had to be up-dated and Malaysia, or at least its government, has made the move
towards a knowledge-based society and economy its primary target. In the words of Dr.
Mahathir: “In our pursuit towards developing the K-economy, knowledge has to replace labour
and capital as the key factors of production in our economy. The challenge for Malaysia is to
develop this knowledge amongst our citizens so that our success will be due to the
contributions of Malaysian talents and knowledge workers” (Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad,
Putrajaya 8 March 2001 – advertisement in the New Straits Times 13-04-2001).
Indonesia has followed suit where it has also become fashionable to pronounce “visions
and missions” as a first step in the national and local planning process. “Terwujudnya
Masyarakat Telematika Nusantara Berbasis Pengetahuan di Tahun 2020” (“Creating a Nusantara
Telematic Society by the Year 2020”) is the vision statement of the KTIN (Kerangka Teknologi
Informasi Nasional), the National Framework for Information Technology. The document is
broad-based, extending from support for e-business to good governance and e-democracy. This
vision and the appended action plan are directed, however, at information technology (TI) and
not at knowledge per se, on which information technology has to be based. Little has been done
so far, to put this plan into action.
Singapore launched it’s start into a knowledge society in 1992. By now Singapore has a
very well developed knowledge infrastructure in terms of ICT, research institutes and knowledge
workforce (Toh, Tang et al. 2002). Considerable research is being conducted by scientists and
researchers in Singaporean institutions of higher learning and research centres especially in the
areas of biotechnology and the life sciences which the Singapore government is promoting in its
bid to stay economically competitive in the knowledge-based economy (Singapore Economic
Development Board 1999). Universities, like NUS, NTU and SMU strive for recognition as world
class research centres, and institutions like A*Star are set up to carry out cutting-edge applied
research. If we look at local knowledge production in terms of the level of patenting activities,
we will see a 34% increase in the number of patents applied in Singapore between 1999 and
2000 alone (A*Star 2002) and also, as discussed below, a steep increase of papers published by
Singaporeans in international journals..
The emphasis on impression management, like changing the names of statutory boards
to make them more appealing to an international audience, the invention of visions and
missions, the use of culture-bound place names like Cyberjaya indicate that an attempt is made
to create an epistemic culture (Knorr-Cetina 1999; Evers 2000), a culture of knowledge
production. The creation of a knowledge-based economy is therefore not just ICT driven, but has
developed into a social and cultural process as well. Social science research is part of this
process. It is significant as it creates knowledge on a particular society and its processes of
change and development.
The Digital Divide between Southeast Asian and European Countries
Singapore and Malaysia have been singled out for their success in promoting economic
development through stringent development policies, including support for the growth of a
knowledge-based economy and the formation of knowledge societies. Statistical indicators
show, however, that the digital divide has deepened, both within ASEAN and between single
ASEAN countries and the EU, the US and Japan.
The divide is measured by indicators, selected by development professionals and large
organisations. By constructing these indicators, they also define the digital divide and the
knowledge gap. Often small countries are compared with the US, which is used as bench mark
for comparative indicators. It does not make much sense to compare the largest and industrially
most advanced country with much smaller ones without taking the specific conditions for
creating a knowledge society into account. We have therefore opted to compare ASEAN
countries among themselves and Malaysia and Indonesia with countries of similar population
and geographical size. We should, however, never forget that the gap is constructed by
interested parties and depicts a virtual world of development.
There are many indicators that may be used to describe a knowledge society. We shall
look at a few of them and then try to locate Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s position in comparison
to selected industrialised and knowledge-based economies. The Malaysian Economic Planning
Unit has calculated a Knowledge Development Index to monitor Malaysia’s position in relation
to other countries. The ranking list is topped by the USA and Japan. Looking at the five countries
under consideration, Malaysia and Indonesia took the 17th and the 21st place out of 22 countries
in the year 2000.
Table 1
Knowledge Development Index, 2000
Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Germany, Netherlands Compared
Country
Indonesia
Malaysia
South Korea
Germany
Netherlands
KnowKnowComputer
ledge
ledge
InfraIndex
Index
structure
Score
1,518
21
2,645
17
4,053
15
4,615
12
4,777
10
Infostructure
21
17
16
12
10
Education and
Training
20
17
11
13
9
R&D
and Technology
21
17
16
12
13
21
16
13
7
8
Source: Third Outline Perspective Plan, Malaysia 2001, Chapter 5, pp.131-130. For a calculation of the index see
p.129 of the plan
Malaysia is doing well on some ICT indicators, like mobile phones per 1,000 people.
According to the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission in March 2001 there
were 254 mobile phone subscribers/1000 population in Malaysia, i.e. more mobile phones per
inhabitant in Malaysia than in Germany. On two other indicators, namely R&D researchers per
million inhabitants or patents filed, Malaysia still trails far behind Korea, Germany, the
Netherlands and other OECD countries, but is ahead in comparison with other ASEAN countries,
like Indonesia.
The more important question would be, however, whether the gap is narrowed. Looking
at time series data, this does not seem to be the case at present. The knowledge gap, in fact, is
widening.
Diagram 3:
Researchers per Million Inhabitants, 1980-1996:
Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, Germany, Netherlands
3500
3000
Germany
Netherlands
2500
2000
1500
1000
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysi
500
.1
98
.1 0
98
.1 1
98
.1 2
98
.1 3
98
.1 4
98
.1 5
98
.1 6
98
.1 7
98
.1 8
98
.1 9
99
.1 0
99
.1 1
99
.1 2
99
.1 3
99
.1 4
99
.1 5
99
6
0
Source: (Evers 2003) based on UNESCO Statistics. Arrows show the increasing knowledge gap between
Malaysia and South Korea, 1985 and 1995
The picture does not change dramatically, when we use other indicators, like the
expenditures for R&D. Korea is still increasing its investment in applied knowledge production,
the Netherlands remain stable, Germany has settled on an even keel at a high level, but
Malaysia is on a downward trend during the 1990s, long before the Asian financial crisis broke.
For Indonesia we have not been able to obtain later data, but it is very unlikely that the number
of research personnel has increased in recent years (Gerke and Evers 2001). In 1980 there was
almost no knowledge gap between Korea and Malaysia, by 1995 the gap had widened
dramatically, if measured by expenditure on R&D (see the following diagram).
Diagram 4:
Expenditure on R&D as Percentage of GDP, 1990-1997
3
2,5
Netherlan
2
1,5
1
Korea
Malaysia
Indonesia
0,5
.1
98
0
.1
98
1
.1
98
2
.1
98
3
.1
98
4
.1
98
5
.1
98
6
.1
98
7
.1
98
8
.1
98
9
.1
99
0
.1
99
1
.1
99
2
.1
99
3
.1
99
4
.1
99
5
.1
99
6
0
Source: (Evers 2003) based on UNESCO Statistics
The declining rate of relative R&D expenditure and the number of researchers have,
among other factors, reduced Malaysia’s competitiveness in relation to other countries.
Closing the Internal Digital Divide: Malaysia
The attempts at closing the digital gap have been slowed down by the Asian financial
crisis in the 199os. High tech industries have not moved their R&D divisions to Malaysia as
expected and large transnational corporations have developed their knowledge base much faster
in their headquarters than in Malaysia. But also the uneven development of the ICT
infrastructure, i.e. the digital divide within the Malaysian economy, may explain the fact that
Malaysia has fallen back in the competitive global race towards a knowledge society in
comparison to the industrialised economies. Indeed there is an internal digital gap within WestMalaysia, because the development of the infrastructure of a knowledge economy has been
concentrated in and around the capital Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya, leaving other areas behind.
In Peninsular Malaysia there is still a wide gap between rural and urban areas and
between the West-coast and East-coast states. There are large differences in educational
attainment and the number of technicians, researchers in the labour force and ICT
infrastructure. The access to telephone lines (“teledensity”) is seen as an essential precondition
for the development of a knowledge society, as data and news transmission and the use of
computers depend mostly on telephone technology. A similar digital divide is shown, if we
measure the number of internet subscribers by state.
What may be the reasons for the internationally widening knowledge gap in Malaysia
during the 1990s? Government policy has been very supportive. The building of the Multimedia
Super Corridor (MSC), the founding of new research institutes and universities and various
programmes assisting innovation in industries have been important steps towards building a
knowledge economy. Malaysia has a large highly skilled workforce and a good system of public
and private higher education. Part of the problem may be the measurement of the knowledge
gap, which is constructed in such a way that local knowledge factors are undervalued and
global ones overvalued. As we have argued above, the knowledge gap is not given, but is
constructed by governments and experts. If the comparative frame of our analysis is changed
and we compare Malaysia to its fellow members of ASEAN, the picture changes dramatically.
Knowledge gap indicators show that Malaysia’s knowledge strategy has paid off and Malaysia is
moving ahead of all other ASEAN states. The knowledge gap is widening, but in favour of
Malaysia. Two indicators are used to show the widening Knowledge gap between Malaysia and
the other ASEAN countries.
Diagram 5:
ASEAN Digital Gap: Internet Users 1996-2000
4000000
3500000
Malaysia
3000000
Brunei
2500000
Indonesia
2000000
Lao PDR
1500000
Myanmar
Philippines
1000000
Singapore
500000
Vietnam
0
1
2
3
4
5
Source: Development Data Group, World Bank 2002 and Third Malaysia Perspective Plan, various tables.
Diagram 6:
Personal Computers per 1000 Population, ASEAN 1996-2000
120
Malaysia
100
Brunei
80
Indonesia
Lao PDR
60
Myanmar
40
Philippines
Thailand
20
Vietnam
0
1
2
3
4
5
Source: Development Data Group, World Bank 2002 and Third Malaysia Perspective Plan, various tables.
Creating Local Knowledge by Closing the Digital Divide: Singapore
Small countries with no or only limited natural resources have to rely on knowledge as a
major asset for development. Singapore launched its policies to close the digital divide and
develop a knowledge-based economy in 1992. By now Singapore has a very well developed ICT
knowledge infrastructure in terms of ICT, research institutes and knowledge workers (Toh, Tang
et al. 2002).Considerable research is being conducted by scientists and researchers in
Singaporean institutions of higher learning and research centres especially in the areas of
biotechnology and the life sciences which the Singapore government is promoting in its bid to
stay economically competitive in the knowledge-based economy (Singapore Economic
Development Board 1999). Universities strive for recognition as world class research centres,
and government research institutions are set up to carry out cutting-edge applied research. If
we look at local knowledge production in terms of the level of patenting activities, we will see a
34% increase in the number of patents applied for in Singapore between 1999 and 2000 alone
(A*Star 2002). There was also a steep increase of papers published by Singaporeans in
international journals. Local social science output accounted substantially more than indexed
documents on Singapore produced elsewhere (Evers and Gerke 2003).
Diagram 7:
Local and Global Social Science Production on Singapore, 1970-2000
Singapore 1970-2000
80
documents/year
70
60
50
local
l
40
global
30
20
10
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Source: Sociological Abstracts 1970-2000 (Evers and Gerke 2003)
2000
3. Local and Global Knowledge on Southeast Asia
Social Science Knowledge
Social Science research is part of an epistemic culture. As an illustration on how the
epistemic landscape of Southeast Asia is structured we shall present some data on social
science research on Southeast Asia as it is carried out under global conditions. We shall then
focus on research on the area done by Southeast Asians themselves.
Social science knowledge differs from other fields of knowledge in so far as it constructs
an image of society and social processes. Up to which extend this image reflects reality or is a
‘social fact’ of its own has been debated by social scientists since Emil Durkheim. The same is
true of the question how far concepts and theories used for the construction of society have an
impact on social action and eventually on the structure of future societies. Thinking and writing
on one's own society is part of a ‘reflexive modernization’ which implies the frequent
construction, de-construction and reconstruction of images of society. It is essential, how far
this process of reflection on social processes and structures happens within a society or
elsewhere. Outer-directed reflection creates dependent modernity or cultural dependency or
‘dependent cultural globalisation’. Orientalism, as analysed by Edward Said or the ‘Myth of the
Lazy Native’ explained by Syed Hussein Alatas are descriptions of dependent cultural
globalisation (Alatas 1977; Said 1978). But how can we analyse, let alone measure the degree of
‘dependent or independent modernity and globalisation’?
The measurement of knowledge production is beset by many problems especially when
knowledge is in its tacit or secret form – in this case we will not be able to measure it as it is
not published and made accessible to a wider public. In our study we have applied bibliographic
measures, i.e. use data stored in selected databanks as a database for our purpose. This entails
the intensive search of databases for Social Science (taken as an umbrella of disciplines which
include Sociology, Geography, Political Science, Anthropology etc.) such as the Social Science
Citation Index and Sociological Abstracts, which have been selected because of their good
coverage in terms of social science publications, and current as well as back issues of these
publications. Published text, their authors, and their institutional affiliations have been adopted
as variables in determining the locus of social science knowledge production. Data from these
variables have been tabulated over a 30+ year period (1970 – 2002) which have been analysed
in line with the time-series analysis adopted by Stahl, Leap & Wei to obtain the rate and
measures of global and local knowledge production (Stahl, Leap et al. 1988).
Diagram 8:
Global and Local Social Science Research on Southeast Asia, 1970-2000
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
local
global
19
70
19
73
19
76
19
79
19
82
19
85
19
88
19
91
19
94
19
97
20
00
documents
Local and Global Knowledge on Southeast Asia
Source: Sociological Abstracts. The lines depict the total number of documents published each year referring to at least one Southeast Asian
country, whose author is writing from a Southeast Asian institution (local knowledge) or from elsewhere worldwide (global knowledge).
Local Knowledge of Southeast Asia
How much knowledge is produced on Southeast Asian societies and cultures, and which
proportion of this knowledge is produced locally? The knowledge on Southeast Asian societies is
increasing with every journal article or book written on the area. If we consider only those
articles that have been accepted in international journals and have been officially recognised or
‘authorised’ by inclusion into the Sociological Abstracts, we see a steep rise of work on
Southeast Asia world wide during the years 1970 and 2002 (see diagram 9). Most of social
science articles are still written by foreign scholars, affiliated to universities or research
institutions around the globe (Dahm 1975), but our data show that an increasing proportion of
these internationally recognised articles are written by Southeast Asian nationals or by scholars,
attached to Southeast Asian institutions 2.
The output of Southeast Asian social scientists has increased considerably over the past
four decades. Based on our preliminary data on social science research by Southeast Asian
authors, we see that the number of social science articles written by scholars from Southeast
Asian countries has more than tripled 3 when comparing the 1970s with the 1990s. This
indicates that the epistemic culture of Southeast Asia is quite strong as far as the social
sciences are concerned and appears to be increasingly recognised by the global epistemic
community of social scientists. There are, however, considerable differences between countries,
both in terms of the knowledge available about them and the contribution of local social
scientists to that knowledge.
2
We are not yet able to identify foreign nationals, working at local institutions. It remains an open question how
far they will do research from a local point of view.
3
From 229 (from 1970 to 1979) to 770 documents (from 1990 to 1999)
Regional Differences in Knowledge Production
Southeast Asian countries can be divided into two groups, those about which a large
global knowledge base exists and those with only limited knowledge resources.
Table 2:
Indicators of Local Knowledge Production and the Global Social Science Knowledge Stock on
Southeast Asian Countries 1970 – 2000
rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Singapore
Brunei
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
Indonesia
Cambodia
Local K
Stock
Indicator
53.5
35.7
25.1
24.1
18.8
7.1
2.9
8
9
10
Vietnam
Myanmar
Laos
2.4
1.9
0.8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Philippines
Vietnam
Indonesia
Thailand
Singapore
Malaysia
Cambodia
Global
K-Stock
Indicator
0.32
0.26
0.24
0.23
0.20
0.20
0.03
8
9
10
Myanmar
Laos
Brunei
0.03
0.02
0.01
rank
The Global Knowledge Stock Indicator (GKSI) measures the volume of social science
documents on a particular country in relation to all documents in the data base. It shows the
strength of the research interest in different countries. Personal preferences of authors and
gatekeepers, like peer reviewers and editors of journals, officials of funding organisations,
international organisations and government agencies have probably had a decisive impact on
what social science knowledge is produced and added to the global fund of accessible
knowledge. Diagram 9 shows that globally the Philippines are the most researched country in
Southeast Asia.
Diagram 9:
Indicator of Global Knowledge Production on all ASEAN Countries 1970-2000
Global Knowledge Indicator, ASEAN 1970-2000
0.35
0.32
0.3
0.26
0.24
0.25
0.23
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
Philippines Vietnam
Indonesia Thailand
Source: Sociological Abstracts 1970-2000
Singapore Malaysia
Cambodia Myanmar
Laos
Brunei
The Local Knowledge Stock Indicator (LKSI) -locally produced documents as percent of
all documents available on a particular ASEAN country- measures the strength of local social
science (see diagram 10). There is a knowledge gap between two groups of countries, namely
Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand in the upper group and Indonesia,
Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar and Laos in the lower group. It can therefore be said that ASEAN
countries are stratified into an upper and a lower knowledge class 4.
Diagram 10:
Indicator of Local Knowledge Production, all ASEAN Countries 1970-2000
Local Knowledge Production Indicator, ASEAN 1970-2000
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Singapore Brunei
Malaysia Philippines Thailand Indonesia Cambodia Vietnam Myanmar
Laos
Source: Sociological Abstracts 1970-2000
The Development of Social Science Knowledge
The production of local and global knowledge has varied over time. This may be due to a
number of factors which will have to be analysed. Southeast Asian countries have different
political systems, have followed different development strategies and have experienced different
impact of the financial crisis of the 1990s. A look at the time series of knowledge production
between 1970 and 2000 shows different long-term trends.
4
There seems to be a high correlation between GNP/pc and the local knowledge indicator, yet data cannot be
presented here.
Diagram 11:
Trends of Local Social Science Knowledge Production on Selected Southeast Asian Countries,
1970-2000
Local Social Science Knowledge
90.0
% of documents
80.0
SINGAPORE
70.0
MALAYSIA
INDONESIA
PHILIPPINES
SIN
MAL
PHIL
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
INDO
10.0
00
20
97
19
91
94
19
19
85
88
19
19
79
82
19
19
76
19
73
19
19
70
0.0
Source: Sociological Abstracts 1970-2000. Trends are shown by bold linear regression lines.
We hypothesise that the higher the percentage of globally produced documents the
greater is the dependence on outside sources for the interpretation and construction of ones
own society. If social science production is mainly carried out elsewhere the process of
“reflexive modernization” is impeded. (Beck, Giddens et al. 1994). Our data do not contain most
of the locally published research results and are therefore deliberately biased 5. But still we may
be allowed to argue that a knowledge gap or “knowledge dependence” is either widened or
closed. The diagram 12 shows four different paths of local knowledge development. Indonesia
has a low but stable output of local knowledge, Malaysia and the Philippines have relatively
high but declining local output and Singapore has a high and increasing local knowledge
production.
Argued from a global point of view the social science knowledge stock on Indonesia is
stable on a high level of dependence on outside knowledge, Malaysia and the Philippines have
increased their dependence on foreign sources, whereas Singapore has successfully globalised
their social science output. It is, of course, possible that the countries of the lower knowledge
class produce reasonable amounts of local knowledge which is simply not published in
internationally recognised journals and therefore not globalised, but the interpretation and
construction of their own societies is nevertheless based on this globaly not recognised local
knowledge. Therefore the process of reflexive modernisation as stated above would not be
impeded and the hypothesis "the higher the percentage of globally produced documents the
greater is the dependence on outside sources for the interpretation and construction of ones
own society" would be invalid. The fact that only little local knowledge of those countries is
globalised does not yet prove that they depend on global knowledge instead in the process of
interpreting and constructing their own societies, which essentially is a search of their own
identity.
5
A look through the reading lists of social science courses in Southeast Asian universities shows that mainly
international books and journal articles, i.e. “global knowledge” is used as teaching material.
The large differences between ASEAN countries can be exemplified by contrasting
Singapore and Vietnam. The global output on Vietnam is much higher than on Singapore, which
attracts only limited interest among social scientists, but the local contribution of Vietnamese
scholars to global knowledge is still minimal (see diagrams below).
Diagram 12:
Local and Global Social Science Production on Vietnam, 1970-2000 (SA)
Vietnam 1970-2000
80
documents/year
70
60
50
local
40
30
global
20
10
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Source: Sociological Abstracts 1970-2000
Another contrasting case would be Brunei, about which very little is published each year
in international journals, out of which scholars located in Brunei itself have a fair share.
Publications on Laos are also rare, out of which hardly any are produced locally in Laos itself.
The data used in this paper yield rough indicators to diagnose the development of social
science production in the form of internationally recognized journal articles. The indicators are
rough in the sense that they do not give any clue as to the form and contents of the knowledge
contained in the documents, except that they refer in one way or another to a particular
Southeast Asian country 6.
To end on an optimistic note: Southeast Asian researchers have at least kept up their
internationally recognized production of knowledge at the same pace, at the same yearly rates
of increase as outsiders (see diagram 13). The trouble with growth rates is, as the developing
world has experienced that those starting from a high plateau gains more: a gap develops.
Closing the k-gap will not be easy, but looking at the past five years the future looks promising.
6
The scope and contents of Southeast Asian studies has been analysed in Evers, H.-D. (1999). Crisis and Beyond:
Theorising Southeast Asia. 4th ASEAN Inter-University Seminar on Social Development, 15-18 June 1999, Prince of
Songkla University, Pattani.
Diagram 13:
Local and Global Knowledge Production on Southeast Asia 1970-2000
documents pa
Local and Global Knowledge Production on
Southeast Asia
120
500
100
400
80
300
local
200
global
60
40
100
20
0
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Source: Sociological Abstracts 1970-2000. Left scale: locally produced documents, right scale: globally produces documents.
Local knowledge production of Southeast Asian scholars has kept pace with global
knowledge production. Percentage increases from year to year have been similar. In the past ten
years local knowledge production has increased even more than global production. If the trend
remains in tact we can assume that Southeast Asia will move forward in the world of social
science.
4. Conclusions
Knowledge has been widely recognised by economist as the most important factor of
production in a “new economy”. The production and utilisation of knowledge is therefore
essential for development. Some countries, Malaysia and Singapore among others, have
embarked on an ambitious plan to use knowledge as a base for economic development, bypassing earlier stages of industrialisation. Some commentators have, in contrast, asserted “that
it is doubtful that the knowledge revolution will let developing countries leapfrog to higher
levels of development” as “the knowledge economy will actually expand the gap between rich
and poor” (Persaud 2001).
We have argued that the digital divide and the knowledge gap are not natural
phenomena, but are constructed by experts and organisations. Depending on the indicators and
the areas they use for comparison, different conclusion can be drawn. It can be argued that
knowledge gaps are a precondition to development and innovation, and that a knowledge gap
will always be found between and within countries. Drawing on various sources and data-sets
we have shown that the global knowledge gap is widening even in relation to those countries,
whose governments have embarked on a vigorous programme of supporting a knowledge-based
economy. Devaluation of local knowledge by globally operating experts as well as marketing
strategies of large corporations are as much responsible for the widening knowledge gap as
other factors of global development and governance. A comparison within ASEAN or with
comparable countries will, however, reveal the competitive advantage that can be gained by
high investments in ICT combined with local knowledge production and dissemination.
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Mielke, Katja, Glassner, Rainer, Schetter, Conrad, Yarash, Nasratullah (2007). Local Governance in Warsaj and Farkhar Districts.
(Amu Darya Project Working Paper No. 7)
Meininghaus, Esther (2007). Legal Pluralism in Afghanistan.
(Amu Darya Project Working Paper No. 8)
Yarash, Nasratullah, Smith, Paul, Mielke, Katja (2010). The fuel economy of mountain villages in Ishkamish and Burka (Northeast
Afghanistan). Rural subsistence and urban marketing patterns.
(Amu Darya Project Working Paper No. 9)
Oberkircher, Lisa (2011). ‘Stay – We Will Serve You Plov!’. Puzzles and pitfalls of water research in rural Uzbekistan.
Shtaltovna, Anastasiya, Hornidge, Anna-Katharina, Mollinga, Peter P. (2011). The Reinvention of Agricultural Service Organisations in
Uzbekistan – a Machine-Tractor Park in the Khorezm Region.
Stellmacher, Till, Grote, Ulrike (2011). Forest Coffee Certification in Ethiopia: Economic Boon or Ecological Bane?
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