2004 Mansfield Conference, The University of Montana, Missoula
April 18-20, 2004
Emily T. Yeh
University of Colorado, Boulder
“Thinking about globalization and China’s environment: the case of Western China”
China’s environment is very much in the news: Time Magazine1, the New York Times2,
the New Yorker, and National Geographic3 among other popular publications have recently
featured articles. These have covered topic ranging from the controversy over the Three Gorges
Dam, to the dust clouds that have blown in recent springs from the Gobi Desert in northwest
China to the continental United States, where they have obscured views of the Rocky Mountains.
Also in the news has been the new South-North water transfer project, which will move water
from the Yangtze River Basin to the arid north at an estimated 58 billion USD (twice the
expenditures on the Three Gorges)4, major flooding along China’s Yangtze River in the summer
of 1998 that claimed the lives of over 3600 people and caused more than 12 billion USD in
economic losses; and of course, the prominent role of environmental concerns in Beijing’s bid
for the 2008 Olympics, which led city officials to spray-paint brown grass “emerald green” in
preparation for the Olympic Committee’s visit.5
As a result of this burst of recent news stories on China’s environment and globalization,
I want to frame my talk explicitly around popular coverage of the issue. Much of what is
available for the public to read about China’s environment starts with a litany of frightening
facts and scary statistics about “brown” issues – related to industrial pollution, energy production,
waste, and environmental health --- as well as resource-based “green” issues such as
deforestation, soil erosion, grassland degradation, reduction of arable land, loss of habitat and
biodiversity. For example, reading National Geographic, one learns that:
1
Time Magazine Cover, “China Gasps: Foul Air, Poisoned Water, Denuded Forests – the environment is a mess.
But now people are doing something about it.” Time International Edition, March 1, 1999
2
e.g. “Today’s China, in a Rush, Has no time for bikes” September 6, 2002; “China’s boom adds to global warming
problem” October 22, 2003, A1.
33
Becker, Jasper. March 2004. “The Price of Growth in China?” pp. 68-95.
4
“China will move waters to quench thirst of cities” August 27, 2002 The New York Times, p. A1.
5
http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200102/22/eng20010222_63078.html
1
•
China continues to rely on coal for ¾ of its energy, with major implications for global
climate change as well as sulfur dioxide emissions (19 million tons per year vs. 11
million for the US)
•
Partially as a result, outdoor air pollution has been linked to about 178,000 premature
deaths in China every year.6 Only 1/3 of 340 monitored Chinese cities meet national airquality levels, which are themselves below World Health Organization norms.
•
Two-thirds of China’s major cities are now seriously short of clean fresh water, and as
many as 700 million out of China’s 1.3 billion people drink water contaminated with
human and animal waste. Only about 10% of municipal wastewater is treated.
•
Although such estimates are very imprecise at best, all of this air and water pollution has
been calculated to cost China between 3.5 – 7.7% of China’s gross domestic product each
year7 -- drawing into question the meaningfulness of statistics about China’s rapid
economic growth in recent years.
Typically, after being presented with a number of these frightening facts, we then find
expressions of alarm about what will happen to global sustainability as China starts to “catch up”
with overdeveloped, overconsuming countries -- especially the US – in terms of consumption of
resources. As the National Geographic (p81) puts it, again, “How [China] deals with its water
problems could affect us all.”
And finally, having provoked our concern about China’s effects on the globe, most
articles in the popular press end with a message of hope. For example, in reference to the Sloping
Land Conversion Project, and the National Forest Protection Plan which were implemented in
1998 after major flooding on the Yangtze, Songhua and Nengjiang Rivers, National Geographic
(p88) puts it, “Solutions take root. The cost of environmental harm has become clear and China
has taken some action…”
My purpose here is not to critique this particular article, which I find quite useful and
informative. Nor do I want to dispute the need for concern as the increased economic activity
that comes with “globalization” leads to both increased depletion of natural resources as well as
6
Ma, Xiaoying and Leornard Orlanto. 2000 Environmental Regulation in China: institutions, enforcement, and
compliance. Boulder: Rowman &Littlefield. p. 4.
7
World Bank, 1997:23 in Ma and Orlanto, 2000, p. 1.
2
sinks for the waste products of economic activity and throughput. However, I do want to step
back and ask: what kinds of assumptions and unasked questions are embedded within this typical
framing of globalization and the environment? To give just one example of the importance of
“framing,” notice that our questions about globalization always take the form of: ‘what are we
going to do when China catches up with the US in terms of consumption? What should we do to
mitigate the ways that this will affect us?’ rather than, ‘What should we do to reduce US
consumption and the US per capita ecological footprint to be closer to China’s current levels?’
In other words, what are the politics of the possible embedded within our framings of questions
about globalization?
In the rest of this paper, I will focus on some of the things that are often missing in the
general and global-scale discussions of Chinas environment with which the public is most
familiar. I will begin by sketching out the logic of what I will call the “conventional wisdom” or
a crude ecological modernization8 approach to China’s environment and globalization. Next, I
consider what sorts of questions and factors get left out of this approach, and which could be
incorporated into a political ecology framework of analysis; and finally, I turn to a few brief
examples of what issues and questions we might want to raise. China’s environment and
globalization is, of course, a topic that is more appropriate for an entire semester than for a
twenty minute talk. Thus, I will try to be neither comprehensive nor thorough in this paper.
Instead, my goal is only to offer a few provocations – a little bit of food for thought.
The conventional wisdom
The conventional wisdom about China’s environment and globalization can be rephrased
as follows:
8
Here I use “crude ecological modernization” as a shorthand to refer to the optimistic view that technological
innovation that come with modernization can be environmentally beneficial by increasing efficiency and decreasing
pollution. I also refer to an approach that adopts a favorable attitude toward the free market and free trade, an
orientation toward analysis at the level of nation-state, and an evolutionary perspective. Ecological modernization
theory is now a substantial body of literature with considerable diversity and debate, which I do not address here
(see work by Arthur P.J. Mol, Gert Spaargaren, Maarten Hajer, Marin Janicke, Albert Weale, David Sonnenfield,
Joseph Huber, etc). Among the more important themes of more recent work in ecological modernization are the
changing role of science and technology, increasing importance of market dynamics and economic agents,
transformations in the role of the nation-state, and the changing role and ideology of environmental social
movements (see Mol and Sonnenfield, 2000, “Ecological modernization around the world: an introduction.)
3
“We should be concerned about China’s environment because of its effects on global
sustainability. In the short term, China’s environment is suffering from the industrial pollution
and resource degradation caused by economic development, because poor developing countries
like China don’t care as much about the environment as they do about economic growth.
However, as China’s population grows wealthier and more sophisticated, thanks to the same
forces of globalization that caused the pollution and degradation, China’s growing middle class
will demand a better quality of life, which includes a clean environment. Furthermore, the
combination of NGO and international pressure, together with a better legal system and more
economic resources will cause the government to start enforcing environmental regulations.”9
In other words, globalization Æ pollution but at the same time globalization Æ more
respect for law, a more democratic, open society, more wealth Æ greater demand for
environmental goods and services Æ better environment. Once again, we can turn to National
Geographic for an example. The article concludes, “ Some Chinese now want to enjoy a cleaner,
healthier environment, and they’re willing and able to pay for it. That may not sound like the
stuff of a stirring revolutionary slogan, but, just think: What if the all 1.3 billion Chinese shared
the same wish?” This logic is essentially that of an environmental Kuznets curve – an inverted
U-shape between environmental degradation and per capita income. At low levels of income,
there is little economic activity and thus little environmental degradation. As income increases,
so does environmental degradation, but as income increases still more, people start to want a
clean environment and are willing to pay for it, and thus environmental quality is improved.
This model makes intuitive sense. But I want to suggest that its “common sense” appeal
should cause us to think carefully about what it leaves out in its simplicity. Here I draw your
attention to the following:
(1) It only looks at environmental questions at the aggregate national, or even global, scale.
This is important and necessary, of course, but if we focus exclusively on this scale, we
do not get to ask: What are the effects of “globalization” on rural vs. urban areas, east vs.
west, minority vs. Han, industry vs. agriculture?
(2) There is no a priori reason to assume that all of the elements of the changes and processes
we call “globalization” act in the same manner on different peoples, places, or resources.
9
See Williams, James. 1994. “Reform and the future of China’s environment.” Unpublished paper, on taking apart
this conventional wisdom.
4
In fact, one of the defining features of globalization may be precisely to have a
differentiating effect. (In the discussion following the second panel on the first day,
several speakers insisted that “China isn’t just one thing” and “There’s more than one
China.” This is also what I’m referring to here. It suggests that we should look at local,
regional, and national scales, as well as the connections and relationships between them.)
(3) For example, if we consider only a particular city, it may be that “globalization” –
marketization, the need to attract foreign investment, the increased presence of
environmental NGOs, etc – might indeed look like it’s leading to more sustainable
environmental outcomes, but if widen the scale of analysis to the county, province, or
region, and find that polluting industries have merely been moved to poorer ones, we
might come to the opposite conclusion. Jim Harkness gave an example of the
displacement of environmental problems and the need to consider a variety of scales in
his discussion of how China’s “logging ban” has affected forestry in other countries.
I want to suggest, then, that we consider political ecology as an alternative framework for
thinking about the effects of globalization on China’s environment:
(1) This means, first and foremost, highlighting the political nature of the environment. By
politics, I mean asking, along the lines of what Professor Belsky suggested in her
introduction to globalization: who has access to and control over resources, and how is that
likely to change? This refers to forms of power and control that are both formal and informal,
and at all scales (from within the household to the international geopolitical sphere).
(2) Who are the winners and losers – economically, politically, socially, and ecologically—
from particular market or privatization measures and from particular measures to protect the
environment? For whom is a given phenomenon an environmental problem – defined how,
and on what sort of temporal and spatial scale?
(3) What does this problem look like at different spatial scales of analysis? In a related vein,
we should place and non place-based factors into account. That means not assuming that a
particular village’s environmental problems begin or end in that village, but rather looking at
how they are affected by everything from intra-household gender relations to the trade
decisions that result from the WTO.
5
(4) How can an understanding of the history of resource use and environmental management
inform our predictions and policies for change?
(5) What sorts of unintended ecological and social consequences might particular measures
have? For example, who benefits from a nature reserve – the people who live around it, or
rich tourists who consume far more resources than local peoples? How can those imbalances
be redressed? Similarly, does the need to attract foreign investors under “globalization mean
that local officials will comply with environmental standards, or will the unintended
consequence of market competition be a “race to the bottom” that causes pollution (and
occupational health) to become much worse?
(6) Finally, is “globalization” really one thing monolithic force that looks and acts the same
everywhere? Many people talk about globalization as if it were diametrically opposed to the
strength of the state. But does this accurately describe what is happening in China?
Putting it together in a few cases
Recycling in Beijing
Where does this framework lead us? What alternative understandings and questions might it
suggest? I will start with a brief example of recycling in Beijing.10 The “Washington consensus”
or neoliberal model of globalization calls for private firms to produce ever-more goods, to be
consumed in ever-greater quantities. This in turn requires the development of ever-increasing
disposability and the production of more and more garbage. The optimistic story of “ecological
modernization” predicts that along with this economic development will come a desire and
demand for a better environment, which leads to recycling, which in turn improves the quality of
the environment. In other words, globalization Æ economic growth Æ more garbage Æ BUT
also demand for environmental services Æ recycling Æ better environment.
Even a cursory examination of the problems with overconsumption and recycling in this
country would show how flawed this model is.11 Rather than looking comparatively, however,
we can also simply examine the history of recycling in Beijing. A historical look reveals that
recycling was not invented by rich consumers, as the environmental Kuznets curve might
10
The information in this section comes from a (draft) paper by Joshua Goldstein. 2003. “The everyday recycling of
urban citizenship: 100 years of recycling in Beijing.” Association of Asian Studies annual meeting, presentation.
11
See for example Thomas Princen, Michael Maniates, Ken Conca. 2002. Confronting Consumption. MIT Press.
6
predict. Instead, poor, rural scavengers have eked out a living collecting garbage and
refashioning it into handicraft products for sale, in Beijing and other Chinese cities for more than
a century. In 1957, the PRC became one of the first governments in the world to institute
recycling on a permanent, nationally administered basis. From the 1950s to late 1970s, very
little waste was discarded. In the 1980s and early 1990s, as economic reform took off, the
amount of waste disposed of increased dramatically. At the same time, however, the state
recycling bureaucracy became more interested in getting rich through land speculation than with
recycling, and stopped taking and processing “daily life wastes.” Only with the loss of profits the
economy overheated in 1994, and the realization that migrant collectors were making profits, did
the state once again become interested in recycling. This time, using new environmentalist
language (calling the migrant recyclers, “a form of population pollution”), it took over migrant
recycling markets for itself, and have tried to completely kick urban migrants out of the business.
Not only does this constitute a loss of livelihood, but it has also done nothing at all to address the
trend toward greater disposability and the production of more total garbage (despite recycling).
In sum, under globalization migrant laborers lose while the state captures part of their previous
profits; meanwhile, environmental quality is not necessarily improving.
Xibu da kaifa
Here, I want to turn to the case of the “Xibu da kaifa” program, which is variously
translated as the “Great Development of the West” or the “Go West” campaign. This program
was first launched with great fanfare by Jiang Zemin in 1999, purportedly to focus on economic
development in the “western” part of China, defined to include six provinces (Sichuan, Gansu,
Qinghai, Yunnan, Guizhou, Shaanxi), five autonomous regions (Tibet, Xinjiang, Ningxia,
Guangxi, and Inner Mongolia) and Chongqing municipality. Together these twelve
administrative units occupy 56 percent of China's land area and are home to 23 percent of its
population, but produce only about 18% of the nation’s GDP.12 This region is also tremendously
rich in a variety of natural resources. For example, the official estimate of total recoverable
hydropower in those provinces is 270 million kW, about 72% of the country’s total.13
The state’s two main priorities for the Project center are
12
Economy, Elizabeth. “China’s Go West Campaign: Ecological construction or ecological exploitation.” China
Environment Series, Issue 5. 2002, pp. 1-10.
13
http://www.chinatradenews.com.cn/20000413/06.htm
7
(1) investing in major infrastructure projects – railroad, highways, airports, gas pipelines, and
power generation -- with the intention of establishing conditions to attract private and
foreign investment in enterprises linked to the global economy; and
(2) an emphasis on environmental protection in the form of nature reserves, afforestation and
pasture restoration programs; these are usually referred with the term “ecological
construction.”
The high-level attention given to Xibu Dakaifa has led to a flurry of books about it; these
are frequently found in bookstores right next to the books on China’s entrance into the WTO.
Among the projects which have come to be featured as part of the Xibu Dakaifa program are the
West to East Electricity Transfer Project, the building of the first-ever railroad link to the Tibet
Autonomous Region, the Sloping Land Conversion Project (“Grain for green”) and National
Forest Protection Plan (“logging ban”), and a number of nature conservation/protected area
efforts in the West, such as the new Yunnan Great Rivers Project The Nature Conservancy.
How should we understand what’s driving this emphasis on environmental protection at
this particular point in time? At first glance, this Project appears to be a perfect example of the
ecological modernization model -- that is, foreign investment, increased marketization,
economic development, and environmental improvement go together in the globalization
package. But recent work by a number of scholars that looks more closely at both the goals and
effects of these projects suggest that this might not be the case. In fact, I argue that in many
ways globalization facilitates, rather than works against, tighter state integration and control of
peripheral areas; and that at the same time, particular forms of state environmentalism associated
with Xibu Dakaifa are both socially and ecologically problematic. Below, I examine several of
these projects from a perspective that takes both history and winners and losers into account.
:
(1) The West-East Electricity Transfer Project14
The WEETP, officially launched in November 2000, involves 3 major west-east conduits
for power. The southern conduit, to be built first, is to add nearly 30,000 mW of western power
to China’s installed capacity, with 60% to be generated by dams. The discourse of environmental
awareness with which this program is begin touted is encapsulated with slogans such as, “Clean,
14
Oakes, Tim. 2004. “Building a Southern Dynamo: Guizhou and state Power.” The China Quarterly (in press).
8
cheap, high quality, dependable western electricity lets you enjoy green living” and “Western
electricity to the east: both east and west win.” Indeed, as part of this project, the prosperous
coastal province of Guangdong is to shut down some of its old, dirty coal-fired plants and
replace them with the new installed capacity, roughly one-third of which is slated to be delivered
from the poor interior provinces of Guizhou, Yunnan, and Guangxi.
But what is really going on? For one thing, Guangdong will thus be forced to relinquish
some of its independence in power generation, which it has thus far been unwilling to do.
Although Guangdong’s air will, indeed, be cleaned up, much of the pollution is simply being
moved to the poorer province of Guizhou. Furthermore, as Oakes (2004) has recently argued,
this tying of Guizhou as a supplier of power to Guangdong makes it even harder for it to
diversity its economy in the face of China’s WTO accession – thus making it even harder to
attract the foreign capital investment that the state also says it should be trying to capture at this
moment. A historical perspective suggests that this program can easily be interpreted as simply
an extension of a long history of internal colonialism and resource extraction in provinces like
Guizhou. What seems to be at stake, then, is regional political and economic autonomy from the
center, being struggled over through environmental discourse, while environmental
improvements themselves are only realized at the expense of poorer, peripheral areas.
For the West, China’s WTO accession will be more of a challenge than an opportunity, as
prices for raw materials and agricultural products continue to drop. The Chinese state is currently
trying to use megaprojects like the WEETP to induce foreign-investment – but whether or not it
can succeed, -and whether or not foreign investment can indeed help, remain open questions.
(2) Sloping Land Conversion Project
As Jim Harkness discussed, major flooding in 1998 catalyzed the announcement of the
the Natural Forest Protection Program (NFPP), which stipulated the protection of natural forests
throughout the country, and complete ban on logging in the upper reaches of the Yellow and
Yangtze Rivers; as well as an erosion-prevention program named the Sloping Land Conversion
Program (SLCP). The latter called for the revegetation of 31 million hectares of land on steep
slopes (greater than 25°). The state promised to subsidize 2.55 tons of grain per year to farmers
for every hectare of such cropland converted to forestry around the upper reaches of the Yangtze.
9
Made possible by recent national grain surpluses, these subsidies are to last for five years if cash
crop trees (e.g. nuts and fruit) are planted, and eight years if species such as pine, fir, and cedar
are planted. In addition, SLCP promises farmers a one-time small cash subsidy of 750 yuan/ha
for purchasing seedlings or seeds. To qualify for all of this, farmers who plant the trees are to
guarantee a seedling survival rate of 85% by the first year.15
SLCP or “grain for green” has also been touted as a win-win environmental solution, but
here again there are numerous social as well as environmental reasons to be concerned. For
example, given China’s poor record of policy implementation, it is quite possible that
compensation – even if it is actually getting to the intended recipients – may be inadequate
particularly for poorer farmers. In Tibetan areas in particular, there is evidence that officials
have enclosed areas used for grazing, thus depriving herders of land needed for livelihood. The
program also puts farmers at risk of having to find their own markets for new tree products –
thus it exposes farmers to the volatility of the market. Furthermore, there’s no provision of what
will happen after 5-8 years – even if farmers are compensated for now.
At the same time, China’s history of failed tree-planting campaigns suggests much
caution is needed before accepting this as an ecologically beneficial move. Very few trees
planted as part of past afforestation campaigns have actually survived. Even more worrisome is
the possibility of planting trees in inappropriate places. As Hong Jiang16 has noted, past
campaigns that have used groundwater for irrigation, particularly in sandy pastoral areas (such as
are found in Inner Mongolia) have lowered the groundwater level and can cause the
disappearance of some species (like Salix) in between sand dunes, thus causing sandy areas to
expand rather than contract. That is, efforts to increase vegetation have actually led to further
environmental degradation.
(3) State Environmentalism in the Tibet Autonomous Region
15
See “In Pursuit of a Sustainable Green West” Newsletters of the CCICED Western China Forest Grasslands Task
Force, and case studies, see http://www.foresttrends.org/keytrends/trends_mgmtgovcert.htm#4; also, Winkler,
Daniel. “Forest use and implications of the 1998 logging ban in the Tibetan prefectures of Sichuan: case study on
forestry, reforestation and NTFP in Litang County, Ganzi TAP, China.” The Ecological Basis and sustainable
management of Forest Resources (eds. Z Jiang, M. Centritto, S. Liu, and S. Zhang) Informatore Botanico Italiano
134 (Supplemento 2), 2003. “Ecological construction, Chinas ‘Go West’ campaign and globalization” Nayna
Jhaveri, unpublished paper, AAG presentation 2003.
16
Hong, Jiang. unpublished draft. “Politics, culture and grassland management in Inner Mongolia, China.”
Presented at AAG, New Orleans, March 2003.
10
Finally, I want to turn to similar contradictions and complications at work in the case of
emergent state environmentalism in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Xibu Dakaifa calls
for developing Tibet into the "world's largest eco-environmental protection base." In fact
"strengthening construction of the ecological environment" is one of six "important strategic
points" defined by the TAR government for the 'Go west campaign.' This again seems to suggest
the recognition of the importance of the environment that comes with globalization. However, it
turns out that another of six “important strategic points” is “to speed up the pace of prospecting
and developing important mineral resources.” How do these two things go together and what are
the environmental implications?
One place where we can see the relationship is by examining the current Xibu Dakaifa
project of constructing a railway linking the TAR to the rest of China. This railroad has actually
been planned since the 1950s, but has been thwarted by immense technical difficulties of
building at such high altitudes.17 Maps drawn by the Lhasa Planning Department in 1980 depict
the terminus for the railway in Ne’u (Liuwu) township just outside of Lhasa, in plans for the year
200018 but in fact the decision to build the 695 mile rail line linking Golmud in Qinghai province
to Lhasa was not officially made until June 2001, after considerable debate over four possible
lines. That year, the project, which is slated for completion in 2007 at a cost of US 3 billion, was
listed as a key infrastructure project in the central government budget.
Despite its inclusion in the Xibu Daikafa, however, the building of the railway link makes
little sense economically, let alone ecologically. There are clearly other reasons for building it.
The Vice Minister of Railways stressed its strategic importance in political, economic, and
military terms, adding that the railway showed the central government's "special concern for the
development of western regions and for minorities"19 The Tibet Daily was even more explicit,
reporting “The unity of the nationalities and consolidation of national defense necessitate the
urgent construction of a railway linking Tibet with the hinterland.”20
17
almost 90% of the route is at more than 4000 meters in altitude, through permanently frozen soils
18
“Lhasa Municipal Planning maps” . Tibet information network. http://www.tibetinfo.org/ accessed February 18,
2003
19
Xinhua News Agency, March 7, quoted in "Wheels in motion: China to foot the bill for Qinghai-Tibet railway." China Online.
March 8, 2001.
20
December 12, 2002. cited in “China set to build railway to Tibet,” TIN, accessed 2/18/03 About 86% of the railway,
which the government estimates will cost US 3 billion, will be a tremendous technological challenge to build, as much of it will
be at or over 4000 meters, through areas of permanently frozen soil.20 Aside from increased trade, the Golmud-Lhasa line, which
is scheduled to be completed by 2007, will significantly ease travel into Tibet for Han migrants.
11
Other reports say, for instance that, "Beautiful as it may be. ..Tibet lags behind other
areas of China...it is obvious that if Tibet is to develop and catch up with other areas of China, it
must have a railway."21 Despite the state’s happy rhetoric about the railway, local residents in
Lhasa are frightened, not pleased, by the prospects. Tibetans in Lhasa already have a very
difficult time competing with migrant Han Chinese in the urban job market, and almost all
believe that their economic prospects will only get worse. In the words of one young Tibetan
woman living in Lhasa, “In five years, we’re finished…” adding “Tibet will become just like
[the rest of] China”
This suggests that one of the most important goals of Xibu Dakaifa is actually to integrate
areas populate by minorities – like Tibet – more tightly into the country, not just economically
but also politically. The fact that the state is promoting free markets and foreign investment as a
way of quelling ethnic minority dissent suggests that we should think carefully about
assumptions that globalization means the weakening of or decreasing importance of the nationstate.
However, we should also pay attention to the fact that official reports about the railroad
have almost uniformly claimed that protecting the “delicate local ecology” around the tracks is a
top priority.22 For example, the central government is purportedly investing 1.2 billion yuan to
plant cold-resistant grass on both sides of the railway to "form a great green wall" to stabilize the
soil23 Furthermore, China Today claims that the 20,000 workers on the construction site, who
will generate 5 tons of garbage daily, will not affect the local ecology because the garbage will
either be buried or transported out, and "daily sewage [will be] sprinkled to let it evaporate." In
fact, the government has gone so far as to claim that the railroad, far from damaging Tibet's
ecology, will improve its environment by increasing coal and petroleum imports into Tibet and
thus decreasing the cutting of trees for fuel.
The stated goal of "strengthening the construction of the ecological environment" has
several effects. First, it displaces attention away from the more distant but ultimately more
significant environmental implications of migration and resource exploitation-- in this case the
acceleration of the gold mining industry and the exploitation of recently discovered oil reserves
21 21
(China internet information centre. www.china.org.cn)
Thus, while acknowledging that the railway has the potential to have a negative environmental impact, the
government has announced that "the Qinghai-Tibet railway was designed and is being built using methods to protect
soil, vegetation, animal and plant resources along its length" (China Daily, 12/12/2002, www.china.org..cn)
23
(China Daily, 12/13/2002 www.china.org.cn)
22
12
in Nakchu county, north of Lhasa, along the new train route. This framing of the "construction of
the ecological environment" assumes that local residents must be taught to rationally and
scientifically manage their environment. It thus becomes a new way in which the state can
legitimately direct or manage local livelihoods through restrictions of access to resources.
A similar process is at work in a wetland nature reserve on the outskirts of Lhasa, the
capital of the TAR. This 6.2 square kilometer marsh, called the Lhalu wetland, has received a
great deal of attention as an environmental protection success story in the past few years. In the
first half of the twentieth century, it provided habitat for abundant wildlife, including the
endangered black-necked crane, as well as serving as a source of fodder for government
livestock. But in the early 1960s the PLA drained much of it in an attempt to reclaim it for
agriculture. Agricultural production failed, but the marsh was partially desiccated by drainage
canals. After Lhasa’s urbanization took off in the 1980s, much of the remaining marsh was
drained for new roads and buildings. Then, in 1992, a municipal government project built
another canal around the perimeter of the wetland for “city beautification.” Unfortunately, the
level of the canal was lower than the marsh, and thus further drained it. Indeed, by then, the
marsh was more of a pasture than a wetland.
However, in 1999, with the new emphasis on environmental protection, the TAR
government approved the formation of a nature reserve and has pledged spending 1 billion yuan
-- mostly from the Central Government -- on its protection and restoration. The municipal
government has also forcefully adopted a discourse of "environmental protection" But thus far,
environmental protection has emphasized the "education" of local residents - through nature
reserve signs - and the limitation of their access to marsh grasses, especially through the building
of this new wall around much of the wetland . This is the case even though the impact of marsh
grass collection is minimal compared to that of the canal.
More telling is a statement by a mid-level official in the TAR Environmental
Protection Bureau, setting this project in the context of Xibu Dakaifa. According to this official,
who was one of the chief architects of the protection plan, the new wall is only the first step in
the transformation of Lhalu. The ultimate goal will be the conversion of the Lhalu wetlands into
a “tourist attraction" which will attract visitors from other parts of China. In his words: “ … It
is going to be wonderful. The marsh will be restored and it will become beautiful. It will become
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a tourist attraction. In the future, tourists won't just come to Lhasa because of its religious relics,
they will come to see the beautiful wetlands.” In fact, up to 1/3 of the funding from the central
government will be used to "build the wetland area into a tourist attraction and pave roads
around the wetland."
It seems that globalization has come just in time for nature to be turned into a resource
for those tourists to consume. And it is Tibet’s pristine and protected environment – not its
sacred sites, or rich religious history – which are now to attract the visitors. This, it seems to me,
far outweighs any small steps toward environmental improvement that have resulted. In other
words, the way in which the state environmentalism that has accompanied globalization has
focused around highly visible and publicized projects like nature reserve and the corridor around
the railroad tracks, can help to obscure other important ways in which the ecology of the plateau
will be affected, particularly through natural resource extraction and increased consumption.
Furthermore, far from breaking down state power, the drive to attract foreign investors has had
the effect of tighter state incorporation in the ethnic minority west.
Conclusion
In closing, I hope that my somewhat contrarian view about hidden problems of
globalization has not encouraged a sinking into incapacitating depression. I do believe that there
are some very hopeful changes happening for environmental quality, and environmental and
social justice, at multiple scales. However, what I have tried to do here is to caution that
globalization is a simple label for a complex set of processes that work in different and
sometimes contradictory ways at different scales, and that we always need to take both intended
and unintended environmental and social consequences into account, and ask ourselves: who
wins, who loses, and why? Hopefully, you’ll have some new questions the next time you read
about China’s environment in the paper.
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