Changing Paradigms in Wilderness Ecology:
A View of Academia from Outside
Matthias Diemer
Abstract—In the past, wilderness ecologists concerned themselves
primarily with the enumeration and description of organisms and
their interactions in the natural environment. Within ecology more
emphasis was placed on experimental approaches, often combined
with greatly simplified model systems. Recently, this preoccupation
has been challenged, both from within the biological sciences and
from society as a whole. Wilderness ecologists are faced with
changing societal perceptions of natural areas and the roles of
biologists. They are increasingly challenged by society to voice their
appraisals of global environmental problems, which commonly
involve complex biological, as well as political and philosophical,
issues. While biological issues may be competently addressed,
wilderness ecologists, particularly from within academia, are at
best ill equipped to address the latter. Various approaches have
been advanced to address this dilemma, some of which focus on
reforms within the existing (educational) system. Others, more
fundamental, involve changes in paradigms: Wilderness ecologists
are prompted to realize themselves as part of nature, thereby
relinquishing objectivity. To what extent this new “softer” ecology
will still resemble current ecological research is uncertain. Since it
is unlikely that the continuation of a purely mechanistic understanding of nature will suffice in addressing current and future
environmental changes, alternatives, including possible new paradigms, should be explored.
As with many ecologists (Ingensiep 1997; Futuyma 1998),
an affection for nature was the major impetus for me to study
ecology. Extensive fieldwork in the alpine further influenced
my perceptions and conceptions of myself and nature. Yet in
the course of my career, my preoccupation with data, conferences, and publications tended to suppress these experiences (see also Ingensiep 1997). My current involvement
with experimental ecology (in managed nonwilderness landscapes) and new perspectives of wilderness through experiential education have revitalized these conceptions. With an
“outside” view of wilderness ecology (thematically removed
from wilderness within ecology), I began to question the
current state of ecology, as well as the relationship between
ecological science and nature. This led to an interest in
historical and philosophical aspects of ecology. My paper is
a first and by no means inclusive attempt (1) to grasp
historical and current trends in wilderness ecology, (2) to
interpret them from an ecological and philosophical perspective, and (3) to suggest possible future directions.
In: Watson, Alan E.; Aplet, Greg H.; Hendee, John C., comps. 2000.
Personal, societal, and ecological values of wilderness: Sixth World Wilderness Congress proceedings on research, management, and allocation, volume II;
1998 October 24–29; Bangalore, India. Proc. RMRS-P-14. Ogden, UT: U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station.
Matthias Diemer is Plant Ecologist, Institut für Umweltwissenschaften,
Universität Zürich, Winterthurerstrasse 190, CH-8057 Zürich, Switzerland,
e-mail: diemer@uwinst.unizh.ch
USDA Forest Service Proceedings RMRS-P-14. 2000
What is Wilderness Ecology? _____
I define wilderness ecology as biological research in natural
areas largely unmodified by humans. Obviously, wilderness
ecology involves field-based research in natural places. Among
wilderness ecologists within academia, research in environments largely undisturbed by humans is perceived to be
particularly well suited for deriving underlying ecological
principles (see also Leopold 1949). In contrast to more applied
wilderness research institutions, university-based wilderness ecology uses primarily a descriptive/comparative approach, sometimes termed “natural history.” This does not
imply that wilderness ecologists do not conduct experiments;
however, these are strongly constrained by the wilderness
setting (the presence or absence of organisms, their particular
distributions, and the occurrence of environmental gradients)
as well as external (management) restrictions.
Origins of Wilderness Ecology ____
To begin with, I want to briefly examine the origins of
wilderness ecology, with emphasis on brevity rather than
comprehensiveness. Although a number of lineages can be
identified, most, if not all, of these can be traced back to the
writings of Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) and Charles
Darwin (1809-1882). Aside from the unquestionable scientific merits, it is the thematic breadth that sets the work of
von Humboldt and Darwin apart from 19th and certainly
20th century natural science. Both were naturalists in the
sense that they concerned themselves with all aspects of
nature, namely, botany, zoology, geology, or astronomy and
their interrelationships. Although their theories were derived primarily from observation, particularly Darwin conducted experiments. A. von Humboldt can also be regarded
as a philosopher and historian who integrated these topics
into his perception of nature.
Two outstanding modern exponents who perpetuated this
thematic breadth were the ethologist Konrad Lorenz (19031989) and the naturalist Aldo Leopold (1887-1948). Konrad
Lorenz is best known for his studies on imprinting in birds,
but also concerned himself with human psychology and
philosophy. One major criticism of his work was that he
relinquished objectivity in his famous study of the grey goose
(Anser anser) (Ingensiep 1997). Yet as Ingensiep (1997)
aptly put it, while Lorenz attempted to learn “goose language” our present day anthropocentric approach is to teach
a chimpanzee to use human language.
Aldo Leopold was a wildlife ecologist who is perhaps best
known for his book, “Sand County Almanac” (Leopold 1949).
In his essay, “The Land Ethic,” Leopold provides an ecological-evolutionary based environmental ethic that is considered valid even today (Callicott 1996), with the incorporation of recent ecological developments. Three points seem
37
particularly important to me with respect to wilderness
ecology: (1) Leopold emphasizes our kinship with all organisms, (2) he argues that the evolution of a land ethic is both
an intellectual and an emotional process, and (3) he calls for
more ecological education, although he stresses that “an
understanding of ecology does not necessarily originate in
courses bearing ecological labels.”
Present Trends in Wilderness
Ecology _______________________
Current mainstream ecology seems to differ appreciably
from the approaches and perceptions of von Humboldt,
Darwin, Lorenz, and Leopold. Thematic breadth and the
perception of being a part of nature seem to have given way
to reductionism and anthropocentrism. In my present field,
biodiversity, Naeem and Li (1997) have published an important paper about using artificial microcosms to experimentally verify that species-rich communities have higher reliability than depauperate communities. Surprisingly, despite
its apparent artificialness, this experiment is one of the few
pieces of evidence supporting the diversity/stability hypothesis. To my knowledge, this hypothesis has never been tested
in natural settings. The approach of Naeem and Li (and its
success), as well as similar studies, suggest that in many
instances underlying ecological principles can only be tested
using highly simplified and controlled conditions, yet efforts
to derive general ecological theories from experiments have
been for the most part futile (Weiner 1995).
This reductionism is not entirely due to experimental
constraints. A second motive is related to an economic
paradigm that has found wide acceptance in science, namely
the valuation of science through numbers and quality of
publications (see also Ingensiep 1997). My experience from
Europe and the United States indicates that, as in other
fields, the “publish or perish” syndrome is alive and well in
all fields of ecology. We are made to believe that impact
factors and publication lists are objective measures of scientific productivity. Consequently, highly productive scientists are rewarded with grants and promotions. An undesirable side effect of this development is that research is driven
by the likelihood of publishable results, rather than curiosity or genuine interest in nature. This (emotional) detachment from the study of objects is in fact desirable, since one
of the tenets of science is objectivity; however, science is by
no means as objective as it pretends to be.
Where do these current developments leave wilderness
ecologists? Obviously we are also subject to publication
pressures, yet at a disadvantage since our approach (and
study objects) does not lend itself to the reductionism pursued in mainstream ecology. Furthermore, the descriptive/
comparative approach inherent in field ecology is looked
down upon by the growing majority of ecologists who pursue
the experimental/manipulative route. In the pecking order
of ecology, field ecologists (termed “naturalists” by Futuyma)
occupy the lowest position (Futuyma 1998). However, as
early as 1974, Passmore proposed a re-evaluation of this
status quo (Valsangiacomo 1998). Support has been provided by the current concern for biodiversity loss and conservation issues (Futuyma 1998; Noss 1997) and by J. Weiner
38
(1995) who maintains that “most of the major advances in
ecology have been made by scientists with either an extensive background in field natural history or at least a very
large treasure of biological knowledge in their heads.” Nevertheless, wilderness ecologists find themselves in the dilemma of either attempting to join the mainstream ecological bandwagon or carrying on in relative obscurity.
A brief exploit into the philosophy of nature: how
ecologist-philosophers perceive this dichotomy—In
17th and 18th century Europe, natural science was closely
linked with religious beliefs as scientists attempted to discover or document the inherent diversity and order of God’s
creation (Valsangiacomo 1998; Wilber 1998). Throughout
th
the 19 century, these perceptions slowly changed, leading
to a paradigm shift that coincided with the acceptance of
Darwin’s ideas in the sciences in the 1870’s (Valsangiacomo
1998). Evolution as a mechanism driving speciation and
extinction displaced creationism. Concurrently, a divergence occurred between what Valsangiacomo (1998) terms
“natural science” and “natural history.” “Natural history”
uses a descriptive (observational)/comparative approach,
and as inherent in its title involves a historical perspective.
“Natural science,” on the other hand, is in a sense historical,
hence theoretical, and relies on an experimental/manipulative approach. According to Valsangiacomo (1998) “natural
science,” which, aside from mainstream ecology, also encompasses physiology, molecular biology, and genetics, relies
primarily on experimental/manipulative methodologies. This
approach necessitates reduction or abstraction to reduce the
complexity of interactions and interrelationships inherent
in nature. In their extreme forms, reductionism leads to
laboratory microcosms, whereas abstraction leads to cybernetic representations of communities and the biosphere.
Furthermore, abstraction places ecology in the vicinity of
“pure sciences,” such as physics, and by association may
assume a mechanistic or deterministic functioning of nature.
Other authors have termed this natural “science/history”
dichotomy “functional” and “evolutionary” biology (Mayr
1991), whereas Begon and others (1990) refer to these
approaches as attempts to discover “proximate” (functional)
and “ultimate” (evolutionary) causes. Weiner (1995), in his
assessment of the state of ecology, acknowledges a “centrifugal force” separating what he terms “theoreticians” from
“empiricists.” I will use the terms “wilderness (or field)
ecology” and “mainstream ecology” because Valsangiacomo’s
usage of “natural history” and “natural science” carries the
connotation that natural history is “unscientific.” Some
mainstream ecologists (and philosophers) may however agree
with this connotation.
As we have seen, wilderness ecology stands somewhat
isolated from mainstream ecology. This isolation is due to
historical developments, but also to current trends prevalent in academia. However, wilderness ecology is not merely
an academic discipline, rather it also figures prominently in
societal concerns for the environment.
Societal Demands on Wilderness
Ecologists _____________________
The two most relevant challenges for wilderness ecology
arise from (1) human-caused global environmental changes
and (2) issues pertaining to wilderness use and management.
USDA Forest Service Proceedings RMRS-P-14. 2000
The Ecological Crisis
It is generally agreed that human-induced environmental
changes are not merely a concern for the future; they are
presently occurring. Aside from atmospheric changes (climate change, CO2 rise), which are global, the oceans and
land area have been impacted by human activities to a great
extent. Vitousek and others (1997) estimate that up to 50
percent of the Earth’s land surface has been transformed by
human action. Media attention to global environmental
changes and associated losses in biodiversity has raised
public awareness of the biological sciences. Concurrently,
there is a growing public belief, fostered by scientists, that
science (including ecology) may provide solutions for mitigating environmental impacts if underlying effects are
known.
Widely diverging estimates of future rises in sea level,
ranging from scenarios of widespread coastal flooding (associated with extensive melting of polar ice sheets) to current
estimates of little or no change despite global temperature
increases of 2 to 3 oC, have provoked scepticism over the
validity of such prognoses by scientists and many nonscientists. The failure of science to resolve such fundamental
questions, combined with the spectacular failure of other
high-profile prognoses (for example, the proposed largescale forest dieback of Europe and the potential effects of
warming or elevated CO2 on plant communities) casts real
doubt on the ability of purely technocratic approaches to
address the abatement and reduction of environmental
impacts. These approaches are likely to fail because
(1) underlying principles are poorly understood and (2) current research paradigms are unsuitable (for example, “scaling,” and reliance on models). Attempts to extrapolate from
results of experimental plot studies to natural communities
seem at best highly unrealistic, but many ecologists studying the effects of elevated CO2 in the 1980’s, including myself
(Körner and Diemer 1994), committed this fallacy—and
others may do so in the future. Furthermore, it is unlikely
that the stereotypic cry for further data (and funding) will
lead to a comprehensive understanding of immediate and
long-term effects of human impacts on the Earth. This is due
to the inherent complexity of organisms and their interrelationships among themselves and their environment. I do not
imply, as some deep ecologists might, that current climatechange research should be stopped, but I am concerned by
the inherent optimism suggesting that once the underlying
mechanistic principles of an ecosystem are known, we will be
able to manipulate (reconstitute or cure) it.
The roles and contributions of wilderness ecologists (from
academia) that are most commonly associated with global
environmental changes concern biodiversity and conservation biology. In fact, “natural history” may see somewhat of
a resurgence, since skills in identifying organisms are in
demand, particularly within the currently booming field of
biodiversity research and perhaps in rare plant conservation (see also Noss 1997). An additional, hitherto undervalued, skill is a genuine grasp of not only the organisms, but
their environment, phylogeny, diversity, and “idiosyncracies” (Futuyma 1998).
A number of naturalists are also directly involved in global
change research. Some of them may feel a certain disillusion, as I did, because infrastructure and experimental
USDA Forest Service Proceedings RMRS-P-14. 2000
constraints demand more attention than the object of study,
or because they perceive the model systems employed to be
too simplistic or reduced. Others may feel uncomfortable
with “delivering the goods” in the form of short-term results,
greatly simplified model parameters, or extrapolations.
While many wilderness ecologists are successfully involved in global change research, others are ill equipped,
incapable, or unwilling to provide the remedies to ecosystem
health expected by society. A part of the problem is the fact
that all “remedies” involve complex political and ethical
decisions. Questions such as “How much biodiversity is
desirable?” actually lie outside the realm of natural science
because as G. E. Moore has pointed out (Birnbacher 1991),
morals or ethical decisions cannot be derived from nature
(the so-called naturalistic fallacy). Thus, ethically, a
eutrophicated lake with two algal species is no better or
worse than an intact lowland rain forest. I do not mean to
imply that wilderness ecologists should not concern themselves with these issues. But we must be aware of inherent
value judgments masked by “scientific objectivity.”
A second exploit into the philosophy of nature: how
th
th
objective is natural science?—In the 18 and 19 centuries, humans were perceived as parts of nature and, along
with inanimate objects, members of the “great chain of
being” (Valsangiacomo 1998). As we saw above, this belief in
a higher order was displaced by an evolutionary paradigm
during the latter part of the 19th century, giving rise to an
experimental/manipulative approach. Inherent in this new
approach was an emotional detachment from the former
study subjects to objects of study. Objectivity and empirical
evidence became the most fundamental assumptions of
science. Although the methodologies employed by naturalists and natural scientists alike may be objective, the motives leading to scientific questions (and research projects)
certainly are not. Hence, according to Meyer-Abich (1997),
natural science certainly is not as objective as it pretends to
be. This criticism undermines the credibility of science, since
scientists are not the detached observers that they pretend
to be. Consequently, Meyer-Abich postulates an inevitable
paradigm change within natural science, which in some
ways related to the 19th century notion that perceived
humans (including scientists) as integral parts of nature.
Although the logic may differ, this paradigm change has
also been suggested by Leopold (1949) in his “kinship with
nature” argument, as well as by various post-modernist
movements, including deep ecology and ecofeminism. Wilber
(1998) severely criticizes these “new paradigms,” because by
attempting to infuse science with holism or spirituality one
commits a category error. Since empiricism (and reductionism) is fundamental to science, the proposed paradigm
change in effect eradicates science. According to Wilber
(1998), it is not the scientific method that “constitutes the
disaster of modernity,” but the fact “that all higher modes of
knowing have been brutally collapsed into nomological and
empirical science.” He suggests that natural science should
expand from narrow “sensory” empiricism to a broader form,
incorporating all forms of experience (including morals and
spirituality). Yet it is unclear to me how his “deep science”
with a unifying approach to matter, morals, and spirituality
can be practically realized. Furthermore, I am doubtful how
(and when) it will address the current problems of wilderness and mainstream ecology. So as we can see, although
philosophers acknowledge that all is not well with natural
science, Meyer-Abich and Wilber diverge fundamentally
about the causes and the necessary remedies.
39
Utility of Wilderness
The second major challenge for wilderness ecologists concerns wilderness. It is widely known that wilderness and
seminatural areas serve a number of consumptive and
nonconsumptive human uses. Aside from the use of resources (timber and game) they are important for esthetics,
recreation, and education. Leopold (1949) also advocates a
utility of wilderness for science, serving as a norm to judge
ecosystem health.
Wilderness also has an important role in shaping human
behavior. This assumption forms the basis of experiential
education, which originated from K. Hahn (Heckmair and
Michl 1998; see also contributions by J. Hendee, K. Russell
and others, this proceedings). Gaard (1997), a leading
ecofeminist, reaches a similar conclusion:
... if a wilderness orientation alters human perceptions of
nature and culture, it may also alter human conceptions of
appropriate ways of structuring the relationship between
culture and nature, and through these conceptions, it may
alter behaviors as well.
Hence, wilderness is important in shaping human identity.
In a sense, the relationship between humans and wilderness needs to be redefined: Do we protect wilderness from
humans or do we permit interactions between humans and
wilderness? (Today it seems obvious that we need not protect
humans from wilderness.) Should these interactions be
restricted spatially or temporally, or rather, as Gaard (1997)
suggests, should wilderness areas be expanded to suit human needs? As mentioned above, these decisions are political, and as Gaard (1997) points out, ethical as well.
Wilderness ecologists, both from academia and particularly from more applied research institutions (governmental
agencies and non-governmental organizations), play an
important role in evaluating acceptable limits to wilderness
use, presently and in the future. Yet, the definition of limits
of acceptable change (LAC) and ethical decisions concerning
the preservation of endangered species are important premises that lie outside the realm of “natural science,” but rather
with society or social science. It is the role of wilderness
ecology to inform, monitor, and manage societal requirements of wilderness. Wilderness ecologists may perceive
this new redefined role as a “subjugation” to society, social
science, and ethics; and similar to colleagues within global
environmental change research, they may well become disillusioned about their work. Hence it is time to look ahead for
possible remedies.
“Muddling Through” or in Search of
“New Paradigms” _______________
Before we can attempt to examine possible solutions to the
present dilemma, let’s first recapitulate the problems: There
is a general tendency within mainstream ecology toward
reductionism with an emphasis on frequent and rapid dissemination of results (publication pressure), which involve
the extrapolation of results of greatly simplified and controlled experiments to higher orders of complexity and
diversity. These trends run counter to the natural history
approach pursued by most wilderness ecologists, which
40
involves a comprehensive view of organisms, their evolutionary history, and environmental setting.
These difficulties become even more severe in the light of
human-caused environmental changes, which demand remedies that are often beyond the scope of ecology. Similar
problems arise with respect to the appropriate use of wilderness. As we saw, purely scientific answers are insufficient
for solving ethical questions. So, let’s examine three possible
responses:
1. Muddling through—This response is in effect no response, rather it is the attempt to carry on and to hope that
somehow the situation will get better. In fact, there is
evidence that at least the status of natural history within
natural science may improve. Recently, the evolutionary
ecologist D. Futuyma (1998) examined preconceptions of
naturalists in the United States, as well as the important
contributions of naturalists to modern evolutionary theory.
Like Noss (1997), he emphasized the need for increased
emphasis on natural history in university education and a
broadened perspective comprising both descriptive and reductionist approaches. He concludes: “In fact, perhaps the
‘ologist’ (that is, natural historian) best has the opportunity
or the need to integrate the biological sciences” (Futuyma
1998).
Weiner (1995) proposes that increased communication
between natural history and ecology is not sufficient, rather
he advocates a fusion of the two, meaning “... individual
ecologists should attempt to be both theoreticians and empiricists.”
How this fusion will come about and to what extent the
fundamental differences between experimental/manipulative (mainstream ecology) and descriptive/comparative approaches (natural history) can be resolved is unclear.
Futuyma’s and Weiner’s ideas have initiated a discussion
among ecologists, which is also one of my primary objectives
here. However, while these discussions within ecology may
facilitate contacts and reduce tensions, they will not alleviate what I perceive to be fundamental problems.
A final exploit into the philosophy of nature: how
can natural science change?—As we saw above, philosophers of nature widely disagree about the causes and remedies of what they perceive to be the crisis of natural science.
One central argument is that the detachment of humans
from nature is the cause of many human-induced environmental problems. Natural science, with its dogma of objectivity, indirectly contributes to this exploitation of nature
(Meyer-Abich 1997). How can we be expected to preserve
nature if we lack concern and compassion?
Nearly 50 years ago Aldo Leopold (1949) wrote: “It is a
century now since Darwin gave us the first glimpse of the
origin of species. We know now…that men are only fellowvoyagers with other creatures in the odyssey of evolution.
This new knowledge should have given us…a sense of
kinship with fellow-creatures; a wish to live and let live; a
sense of wonder over the magnitude and duration of the
biotic enterprise.”
But how do we attain this kinship? I will attempt to
classify the suggestions according to whether they can be
realized within the existing system or whether they require
a new approach to natural science (new paradigm).
USDA Forest Service Proceedings RMRS-P-14. 2000
2. Reformation from within—In agreement with Leopold
(1949), Ingensiep (1997) mandates a reformed natural science, which perceives humans (and scientists) as an integral
part of nature. To facilitate this view, he has made the
following three practical suggestions: (1) intensification of
contacts between scientists and nonscientists, (2) interdisciplinary sabbaticals, and (3) interdisciplinary science education, which includes the history of natural science and
ethics. Some of the problems that wilderness ecologists are
facing stem from historical developments, such as the split
between natural history and natural science (Valsangiacomo
1998). Furthermore, wilderness ecologists are increasingly
confronted with ethical questions and are ill prepared to
address them. These difficulties could be alleviated through
the institutional changes proposed by Ingensiep (1997). In
fact, at least in Europe, there have been real efforts to foster
interdisciplinarity in environmental science research and,
as Ingensiep (1997) has pointed out, these contacts can serve
as a forum for wilderness and mainstream ecologists (as well
as for physiologists, geneticists, and biochemists) to become
exposed to social, ethical, and philosophical concepts.
Yet it is doubtful that institutional changes will influence
personal convictions. My view (albeit external) of the interpersonal dealings within one of the interdisciplinary projects
mentioned above certainly serves as no basis for optimism.
However, there is no a-priori requirement that we have to
extend the questionable “objectivity/criterion” of science
into our perceptions of culture and nature. For example,
Allendorf (1997) advocates the incorporation of the Buddhist
concept of mindfulness into conservation biology. In effect,
various religious and esoteric practices aimed at overcoming
the human/nature dichotomy may be equally suitable for
attaining this conviction.
3. New paradigms—As Wilber (1998) pointed out, many
of the postmodernist “new paradigm” movements (including
deep ecology and ecofeminism in their extreme forms) are, in
essence, nihilistic and anti-scientific (see also Weiner 1995).
Their objective is not a scientific revolution (that is, paradigm change as defined by Kuhn [1962]), but rather the
abolition of natural science.
The most plausible new paradigm is Meyer-Abich’s (1997)
notion of “Mit-Wissenschaft,” which implies a natural science instilled by the personal convictions about our kinship
with nature. It is difficult to predict which topics this new
ecology (“softer” by current standards) in the line of von
Humboldt, Darwin, Leopold, and Lorenz will pursue, and
which methodologies it will utilize. I suspect one major
difference will be the motivation: Rather than primarily by
funding or by publication potential, it will be driven by
genuine concern and curiosity for nature. Realization of this
paradigm will certainly not be easy; however, because it is
based on personal beliefs, it has the potential to become
somewhat of a grass-roots revolution.
Postscript
Although I attempted to use the term “paradigm” in the
sense of Kuhn (1962), I certainly failed by the rigorous
definitions of Wilber (1998). And although I agree that it is
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a buzz-word or even “at present a dead metaphor” (Wilber
1998), I can think of no suitable alternative (which once
established would likely suffer a similar fate).
Acknowledgments ______________
H. -P. Cito Hufenus and A. Habiba Kreszmeier introduced
me to a new experiential perception of wilderness and
encouraged me to examine ecology and spirituality. Christina Ausderau introduced me to environmental ethics and
served as a vital “reality check” in the overwhelming and
novel world of philosophical concepts and reasoning. She,
Markus Fischer, with his background in ecology and physics, and Greg Aplet, with yet another perspective on wilderness, thoroughly reviewed this manuscript.
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