San Francisco Chronicle 06-25-06

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San Francisco Chronicle
06-25-06
Idea of strike on North Korea missile assailed as overkill
Clinton-era officials' suggestion 'pours gasoline on the fire'
Matthew B. Stannard, Chronicle Staff Writer
A proposal calling on the United States to consider a military assault on North
Korea if it refuses to mothball a new long-range ballistic missile has roiled the
debate over how best to confront the dangers associated with the North's nuclear
arsenal.
The idea comes from two experts in defense policy: William Perry, secretary of
defense in the Clinton administration and now a senior fellow at Stanford's
Hoover Institution, and his former assistant secretary of defense, Ashton Carter,
now at Harvard University. Writing in Thursday's Washington Post, the two argue
that while the doctrine of pre-emption has been unwisely ballyhooed by the Bush
administration, the White House should still consider a military intervention
against North Korea before it can develop into a mortal threat.
"I have a lot of respect for both of those guys, and I was really surprised" by the
essay, said Daniel A. Pinkston, a Korea specialist at the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey. "My jaw practically hit the floor."
The threat could develop, Perry and Carter warned, if North Korea -- which says
it has developed nuclear weapons -- is permitted to perfect its Taepodong-2
ballistic missile, which could have enough range to reach U.S. soil.
There is some skepticism about North Korea having nuclear weapons, and the
missile's effective range is debated, too, but the White House considers the
threat real enough because it reportedly moved some of the nation's largely
unproven missile interception system to operational footing.
"Should the United States allow a country openly hostile to it and armed with
nuclear weapons to perfect an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of
delivering nuclear weapons to U.S. soil? We believe not," Perry and Carter wrote.
"We should not conceal our determination to strike the Taepodong if North Korea
refuses to drain the fuel out and take it back to the warehouse."
Such a strike could be accomplished with a conventional submarine-launched
cruise missile, the two wrote, which would destroy the rocket -- probably igniting
the rocket fuel as well -- and the test area.
"This is a hard measure for President Bush to take. It undoubtedly carries risk,"
they concluded. "But the risk of continuing inaction in the face of North Korea's
race to threaten this country would be greater."
Perry and Carter have their supporters, most notably former Vice President
Walter Mondale, who said Friday he supports a pre-emptive U.S. strike against a
North Korean missile. He said the Bush administration should tell North Korea to
dismantle the missile or "we are going to take it out."
But Vice President Dick Cheney and national security adviser Stephen Hadley
have both rejected that approach, and a number of analysts, in print and in
interviews, chastised Perry and Carter for minimizing the risk of even suggesting
such a tactic.
"They have poured gasoline on the fire, because they have put use of force on
the table when a week ago it was unthinkable," said John Pike, founder of the
private think tank globalsecurity.org.
"Under the Perry plan of prior notification, you can imagine that rather than
evacuating its engineers from the missile test site, Pyongyang might instead
erect bleachers and bring in schoolchildren to watch the launch," wrote Charles
"Jack" Pritchard, who resigned in August 2003 as special U.S. envoy for
negotiations with North Korea. Pritchard's warning in response was published in
the Washington Post on Friday.
Former U.N. chief weapons inspector David Kay, now a senior fellow at the
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, called Perry's proposal bizarre.
"If I did not know Bill Perry, I would say that here go the Democrats posturing on
a national security issue ... advocating an imaginary, strong action that they know
is impossible for the administration to take," Kay said. "Maybe it's just seller's
remorse at not taking on the North when they had a chance (during the Clinton
years). Whatever the reason, it's the wrong policy."
Kay argued that real stability on the Korean peninsula requires fundamental
change in the North -- wrought not through the stick of military action, but through
the carrot of diplomacy, even if that requires some pretty big carrots.
"It scarcely matters that North Korea might have a long-range missile. Missiles all
come with 'return addresses' ... and so if North Korea ever attacked using one,
retaliation would be swift, sure and overwhelming," noted John Arquilla, professor
of defense analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. "The
best way ahead on the Korean peninsula would be for us to work out a simple
deal: The North Koreans end their nuclear weapons program in return for a 'no
invasion' pledge from us, perhaps along with some kind of economic sweetener,"
he said.
That formula, he noted, "could work with Iran, too."
"Given vastly superior U.S. conventional and nuclear forces, deterrence should
dissuade North Korea from ever using such missiles, except for saber rattling -or worse, selling nuclear weapons or nuclear material abroad," said Dean
Wilkening of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford.
"Kim Jong Il may be a ruthless totalitarian leader, with little regard for the welfare
of his people, but he is not suicidal."
That doesn't mean the North Korean leader won't continue his testing despite
U.S. saber rattling, said Pinkston. The missile program attracts international
condemnation, he said, but it wins Kim points domestically, by placating hawks
within the bloated North Korean military and showing the general public some
concrete rewards for the huge political and economic investment his government
has made in science and technology.
"Internationally, there are certain costs. But domestically, there are certain
benefits," he said. "If you look at it just domestically, it makes complete sense (for
Kim) to launch."
On the other hand, overly harsh U.S. sanctions or military strikes against North
Korea could affect relations with other nations of far greater strategic, economic
and political significance to the United States.
"If you did this, the Chinese would flip out," Pinkston said. "And I would bet you'd
probably end the U.S.-South Korea alliance. For what?"
Sheila Smith, a regional relations specialist at the East-West Center in Hawaii,
said the fallout could spread throughout the region, despite the assertion by
Perry and Carter that the conflict would remain confined to just the United States
and North Korea.
"Other governments in the region, most notably South Korea but also Japan,
would probably not endorse a U.S. strike," she said. "Given the proximity of
South Koreans and Japanese to North Korea, any retaliation for the U.S. strike
would most likely be aimed at these two U.S. allies. In effect, it could put in
motion a series of events that would lead to undermining U.S. alliances, rather
than strengthening them."
Stanford's Wilkening said a North Korean missile launch could plug some holes
in what is known about North Korea's technology and isolate the regime still
further.
"So, what should the United States do on the eve of this flight test? Nothing
beyond expressing its dismay that North Korea appears to favor conflict over
cooperation," Wilkening said.
In the long run, a long-range missile combined with its nuclear arsenal in the
hands of North Korea's unpredictable leader could have negative consequences,
threatening U.S. interests, starting a new arms race with Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan, and rattling nerves from Asia to Africa, said Young Whan Kihl. He is a
professor of political science at Iowa State University and a visiting fellow
at the East-West Center.
But in the short run, Kihl said, the launching of a Taepodong-2 might have a
booster shot effect on the stalemated six-party nuclear talks. And that, he
argued, may be just what North Korea has in mind.
"Kim Jong Il seems to play a crying-baby role, to get attention from George W.
Bush," he said.
E-mail Matthew B. Stannard at mstannard@sfchronicle.com.
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