The Practice of Non- Alignment: On the Present
and the Future of an International Movement
H. Hveem and P. Willetts
INTRODUCTION
The Lusaka Conference from 8th-10th September 1970 has
created a revived interest in the theory and practice of non-alignment It is the intention of this paper to examine the practice in
order to present an improved basis for understanding and theorising about non-alignment. By the construction of four indices, that
attempt to measure non-alignment, we will look at the profile of the
movement in the contemporary international system. Having described the movement we will then discuss its future.
1
The Concept of Hon-Alignment
Although the concept of non-alignment is often confused with
"neutrality", "passivity" or "non-involvement" by now it has been
quite clearly stated by the "non-aligned" themselves what the concept means. It does not mean adherence to the rule of non-involvement, refusing to take sides in any inter-state dispute to which the
country is not a direct party. Already at the time of the Bandung
Conference in 1955, leaders like Nehru and Sukarno stressed that
they reserved to themselves the right of positive active involvement
in any dispute. They would even go to the extent of taking sides in
the dispute but, as a matter of principle, they declared themselves
against any permanent or long-term involvement on the side of one
or the other of the parties to the Cold War. This would constitute
alignment.
Under the impact of the Cold War, the most important basis of
non-alignment was this "negative" abstention from permanent
alignment with either blocs. Such abstention was primarily denned
in military terms, as is seen from the criteria for membership of
the movement emerging from the first conference of "non-aligned" in Belgrade 1961. Burton summarised the criteria as follows:
That a state,
H. HVEEM A N D , P . WILLETTS
2
3
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
"belonged to neither the Communist nor the Western military
bloc; that it had no bilateral military arrangement with a bloc
country; that it either had no foreign military base on its soil
or was' opposed to those which were there; that it supported
liberation and independence movements; and that it pursued
an independence policy based on 'peaceful co-existence'."
2
Non-alignment does not and did not require politico-ideological
or social-structural differentiation from the two blocs, nor does it
require uniformity in these respects within the movement. Internally, "non-aligned" countries are free to pursue the kind of policies
they wish. They have a right to claim non-intervention in their own
affairs from countries inside as well as outside the movement. To
what extent non-alignment is practical or likely to occur when there
is strong similarity or congruence with the political and social
system of any one bloc member is another matter.
The principle of active involvement in world affairs implied that
the movement, at least in theory, developed certain more or less
specific roles which member states were expected to play. They can
be summarized as follows:
1. Mediation and arbitration in specific inter-state disputes.
2. "Bridge-building" between the blocs.
3. Presenting an alternative, a Third Force, for those bloc
states opposing bloc membership.
4. Active support for liberation movements and acting as
their spokesman in international bodies.
5. Criticism of countries violating peace, i.e. acting as the
conscience of the world, putting blame on those who
deserve iL*
The detente between the Soviet Union and the United States
throughout the 1960*s has strongly influenced the role set of the
non-aligned, making at least roles 1 to 3 less important and thus
less clearly defined. The development of areas of tacit agreement
between the two Big Powers, including a degree of agreement on
"spheres of influence", has to a considerable extent changed the
environment the "non-aligned" find themselves in. Whereas earlier,
under the impact of bloc expansion drives from both camps, they
were openly courted by the two camps now they find themselves
less "attractive" in the old way. Courting still goes on, but it takes
other and more subtle forms, which may considerably blur the
borderline between what is alignment and what is not.
The complexities created by the development of the international
system in the 1960's go even further. As President Nyerere pointed
out in his important speech to the Dar es Salaam preparatory meeting,* the blocs are no longer as monolithic as they were; military
relationships alone are no longer a sufficient indicator of alignment;
and there is much more interaction across the "Curtains". Moreover, the system has changed from a predominantly bipolar to an
increasingly tripolar structure, with China emerging as the third
super power. But Nyerere's interpretation of the concept of nonalignment is not so different from the one which emerged from the
1961 Belgrade Conference and also from the 1964 Cairo Conference. It is,
"a statement by a particular country that it will determine its
policies for itself according to its own judgment about its needs
and the merits of the case. It is thus a refusal to be party to
any permanent diplomatic or military identification with the
Great Powers; it is a refusal to take part in any alliances or to
allow any military bases by the Great Powers of the world".
This interpretation goes further than a simple concentration on
military alliance. It introduces abstention from permanent diplomatic alignment with the Great Powers as part of the definition of
non-alignment, and as a criterion of membership more or less equal
in importance to military relations.
The reorientation that Nyerere seems to introduce is basically
of two kinds. In the first place, he points out that while certain
changes in the international system have taken place, they mostly
affect its structure along the horizontal dimension i.e. the relationship between relatively equal Great Powers. This does not basically
change the vertical dimension, the power structure of the system,
because "even while the power blocs became a little less monolithic, the big states remain big states". The other aspect of the urge
for reorientation is tied up with the first: in order to avoid being
manipulated by the powerful, the weak must unite to defend their
position There will still be unity in diversity. Apart from being
agreed in their opposition to colonialism and imperialism,
"all that the non-aligned nations have in common is their nonalignment; that is, their existence as weak nations, trying to
maintain their independence, and use it for their own benefit
m a world dominated politically, economically and militarily
by a few Big Powers".
4
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
Nyerere in spelling out Big Power dominance in fact goes as far as
to cail for understanding and sympathy toward small aligned
nations on the part of the "non-aligned". Thus he not only underlines the predominance of power in contemporary international
relations, but also virtually suggests the creation of a "trade union
of small powers". Indeed, the 1968 "Conference of Non-Nuclear
Weapon States" was an assertion that all small and medium powers
have some need to work together.
Nyerere goes on to state that the problem is not only the smallness of states, but also their poverty, the fact that they are economically poor and under-developed. This has replaced the realities
of military power, although the two of course are strongly interconnected, as a major concern to the "non-aligned". The "economic weakness (of small states) very often enables the Big Powers
to impose their will without using their military strength at all. With
much less difficulty to themselves—and less danger of getting themselves bogged down in endless anti-guerrilla activities—they can
use their economic strength for the same purposes of reducing our
independence of action. The real and urgent threat to the independence of almost all the non-aligned states thus comes not from the
military, but from the economic power of the big states."
While the "non-aligned" will still receive aid, technical assistance, and loans, and while they will often have to accept the strings
that are attached to such exchange, they should now start working
together in order to limit the possibility of economic domination.
The recipe is economic co-operation in various fields because this
would not interfere with the principle of non-alignment even among
the "non-aligned", a principle which military and/or political cooperation would jeopardize. As is well known, except for some
minor groupings such economic co-operation among developing
countries is very modest
We have dealt with Nyerere's speech at length because it represents in some ways a new approach to non-alignment, a new philosophy behind the movement It is increasingly a trade union of and
for the weak and poor nations, a fact which is partly revealed by
the recruitment policy. Clearly this represents considerable change
from the conceptions held by the leaders of the movement in its
earlier years, most prominently represented by the triumvirate of
Nehru, Nasser and Tito. Their philosophy was more that of middlerange political and military powers struggling to maintain a viable
5
H. HVEEM AND. P. W I I X E T T S
oposition to domination by the big powers on military and political
terms. This aspect is still there, but it seems considerably less important in the new interpretation of the position of the "nonaligned"—in so far as Nyerere is representative of the bulk of
"non-aligned" of today.
The Policy of Recruitment
The movement of "non-aligned" states has grown considerably
over the nine years of its existence. At Belgrade, the number of
participants was 25, at Cairo 47 and at Lusaka it was 54 (while 64
had been invited). The number of observers has also been increasing, being 3, 10 and 10 in the respective meetings. The geographical
breakdown of the membership shows first of all the close correlation between ex-colonies and new recruits in that the most important area for recruitment has been Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 1).
The notable non-recruitment areas are Central and South America
and non-aligned Europe. The only exceptions are the handful of
observers (so far including only Finland from Europe) and Yugoslavia, which is the only relatively developed country which is a
full member of the movement. Countries like Switzerland, Austria,
Ireland and Sweden do not seem to be suitable candidates for
membership.
Table 1.
Geographical distribution of participants in non-aligned conferences
.:
Asia
Africa
..
1961 Belgrade
1964 Cairo
1970 Lusaka
attending
Latin
America
Europe
Total
and
Caribbean
2S
IS
11
29
1
1
1
1
47
16
33
4
1
S4
18
41
4
1
64
12
1970 Lusaka
invited
>
The policy of recruitment among the Americans, which are
under-represented compared to Asia and Africa, is not clear, but we
offer two possible explanations. In the first place, the rationale for
inviting the relatively small Caribbean states of Jamaica, Trinidad
6
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
and Tobago, and Barbados plus Guyana, seems not to be primarily
their smallness (a number of Latin American countries meet that
criterion) but their membership in the Commonwealth. There would
appear to be a strong sense of fellowship amongst the Commonwealth states that caused this bias in favour of those four Caribbean
states. (Equally, Commonwealth solidarity would perhaps explain
Malaysia being invited when the Philippines or Thailand were not).
Our second explanation concerns the 8-10 American countries
invited as observers: they tend to be from among the bigger or
more prestigeous Latin American countries.' Although the "nonaligned" movement so far does not seem to want to expand
membership to the Latin Americans en masse, there seems to be a
certain interest in maintaining contact with the more important
among these states. The new recruitment from the Caribbean may,
however, indicate that an opening for large-scale Central and South
American membership is already in process.
Discussion on certain other applications has caused serious disputes. The conference organisers invited both the Lon Nol and the
Sihanouk regimes to send delegations but the Foreign Ministers
meeting before the main conference decided not to seat either
delegation. During the debate 21 countries favoured Sihanouk, 7
favoured Lon Nol, 15 took no sides, while 12 advocated nonadmission of either side. The decision to give the Provisional Revolutionary Government Observer status caused less dissension and
only four African countries, Swaziland, Lesotho, Congo Kinshasa
and Liberia, abstained rather than support the decision. When
Madame Nguyen ThiBinh, the Foreign Minister, addressed the
conference on the last day she received a tumultuous ovation. The
MPLA leader Mr. Nato was also given observer status and on the
last day made an appeal for more material aid for his freedom
fighters.
Although Pakistan actively sought admission to the non-aligned
group and received support from Jordan at the Dar es Salaam
preparatory meeting, India was successful in keeping Pakistan out.
India simply maintained that the criteria used in 1961 and 1964 that
a state could not be a member of any military alliances, with the
Big Powers must still be upheld. On these grounds Pakistan as a
member of both SEATO and CENTO could not qualify for
admission.
H. HVEEM AND P. WILLETTS
i
7
Recruitment is not only a matter of considering whether an applicant fulfils the necessary requirements of military and diplomatic
non-alignment. There is a certain amount of "international nepotism" at work, based on political or even personal relationships. As
we have already said, smallness and under-development seem today
to be very important criteria for membership, perhaps the really
decisive criteria. Another possible if not important criterion may
be race, as only two white countries—Yugoslavia and Finland—
have taken part in the movement. The special position of the Caribbean states among the Americans also seems to point to race as
being of some importance. On the other hand, the race factor is
to a large extent accounted for by smallness and under-development, as the correlation between race and these two is high.
We should of course expect a certain correlation between the
concept of non-alignment put forward and the actual policy of
recruitment. For the purpose of looking into recruitment patterns
we will classify those being invited to Dar es Salaam as (a) Veterans
(attending both prior conferences), (b) Once before members
(attending only one of the two) and (c) Newcomers (those being
invited as new members to Dar es Salaam-Lusaka).
The Practice of Non-Alignment: Its Measurement
What is "true" non-alignment in practice? In terms of an empirical investigation, such as the present one: how is it measured?
Behaviour may be of two types, verbal and non-verbal. We feel
that most emphasis should be put on non-verbal behaviour as an
indicator of non-alignment, as it would be less subject to the kind
of "hp-service" that could be displayed in verbal behaviour. We
have already established two dimensions of non-alignment that
come into the category of non-verbal behaviour. They are military
and diplomatic relations. We will also consider economic relations
as a third aspect of non-verbal behaviour. This has already been
introduced by Nyerere in his strong emphasis on this particular
dimension of contemporary international politics. As data on aid,
technical assistance and loans is not easily accessible, trade seems
to offer a more reliable and equally valid indicator of economic
relations. But verbal behaviour should not be ignored because in
some important respects it represents or reflects the realities of
international politics. The authors propose to use voting in the
United Nations' General Assembly as an indicator of this type of
8
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
8
behaviour. Acting in a setting such as the Assembly, there may be
a certain amount of "lip-service", but it will be considerably restricted by the formality of the proceedings, the political give-andtake in the lobbies, and most importantly, the awareness of the
actors that their behaviour on the whole is expected to be consistent with their foreign policy, as expressed in other settings. Each
one of the four indicators will be operationalized for quantitative
measurement purposes, and will be spelt out and discussed separately. At the end we shall summarize results in an additive index
of non-aiignment, the result of which will constitute the basis for
our final discussion and policy proposals.
For the purpose of comparison, we have included not only the
countries which were invited to the Dar es Salaam meeting, and
which thus at the time were considered as the non-aligned countries. An additional 30 countries are included as the "non-invited"
for use as a control group. They include eleven Latin Americans,
ten Asians, seven West Europeans, Canada and Albania. Some
such as Norway and Denmark might be regarded as fringe members
of their blocs, while Albania has broken away completely. Others
such as Canada have made notable contributions to the United
Nations peace-keeping forces. Some such as Japan and the Philippines are well known as military allies of the United States but do
they show any signs of non-alignment on the other indicators? The
net has been cast widely to see what are the differences between
those invited to the Lusaka Conference and any other nations that
might conceivably have been invited. (For an account of group
membership in each category see Appendix A.)
1
Index of Diplomatic Alignment
As has been pointed out above, a nation cannot be considered
as non-aligned if it has any permanent diplomatic identification
with the Great Powers. In the diplomatic arena the conflict between East and West is permanently being fought. But it is a conflict in which very limited resources are involved compared to the
importance of the prestige factors. As it is possible to accord diplomatic recognition to one or other of the parties to a dispute without
there being any need to exchange Ambassadors, even the very
poorest of the small states may declare its alignments.
There are today four countries in the world that are split between
the opposing camps in the East-West conflict and which have
H. HVEEM AND P. W1LLETTS
9
stabilised into eight separate regimes which exercise de facto
control over their own territory. They are China, Germany, Korea
and Vietnam. Although the history of the four countries is very
different and the regimes are not all of equal import, to have diplomatic relations with one or the other half of these divided countries
is to align oneself in the Cold War. It is therefore possible to produce an index of diplomatic alignment by scoring a nation's
relations with each of the eight regimes. The score may be refined
by differentiating the various levels of diplomatic relations which
are possible.
The diplomatic world has a very hierarchical character but three
categories seem to be important. They are (a) the sending of an
Ambassador (b) the accredition of a non-resident Ambassador and
(c) diplomatic relations below Ambassadorial level, with or without
direct representation. The first category does involve an expenditure of resources. Many small states only send a few Ambassadors
abroad: Uganda for example at the moment only sends 10 Ambassadors or High Commissioners, and some others send even less.
But on the other hand there are very few countries that can afford
to send out as many Ambassadors as they might wish. Thus the
second category involving accredition of a non-resident Ambassador is very common. For example the Uganda Ambassador to
the United States is also accredited both to the United Nations and
to Canada. On the other hand some of the Ambassadors to Uganda
are also accredited to Kenya and live in Nairobi.
As we wish to study the alignment of the small nations we decided to give greater weight, in the scoring, to their decisions on sending Ambassadors compared to the scoring for the Ambassadors
they receive. The resulting scoring system is given below:
•
Resident Ambassador
on-Resident Ambassador
Other recognition
No relations
/~
Sending
Receiving
5
4
2
1
0
3
1
0
There is thus a maximum score of nine for relations with each
of the eight regimes. Relations with one of the Eastern regimes were
given a positive score, while relations with a Western regime were
+36
+15
EAST
. + 25
..... ------_ ..... ",
,
- ...... -- Those at Lusuka.
(Not Observers)..
-
ot
:t-s
' .,
...
...
"
-S
. ,,
,
·10
20
,.I
,•...
The question now arises what deviation from the zero position
we would still consider to be non-aligned? The authors felt that a
nation may have relations with either West Germany or Communist
China and still legitimately claim to be non-aligned. West Germany
is now the world's third largest power in terms of diplomatic activity. It is a major donor of aid and is a convenient centre in
Europe for Ambassadors who will receive multi-accredition. The
D.D.R.'s claims for recognition may be as good as West Germany's
but non-alignment is not so much an absolute concept as a relative
one. Therefore, in view of West Germany's importance and the fact
that it has diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, a nation is
not highly aligned to have relations with West Germany. Similarly,
Communist China is clearly of more importance than Nationalist
China. Although Peking's diplomatic position is relatively weak, it
9
-25
.... .....
...
.... ....
/
WEST
,
,,
,
,,
-IS
I
.,,
I
30.
given a negative score. A nation will then be perfectly non-aligned
if it has an overall score of zero, when the scores for its relations
with the eight regimes are summed. This means that there are two
ways that a nation will be scored as non-aligned. It can either refuse
to take sides in any of the disputes or it can take sides in the different disputes in such a way that it achieves an overall balance between the two sides. Alternatively the maximum possible alignment
is either +36 East or —36 West. This occurs when a nation has
full relations with one side (gaining four scores of nine) and no
relations at all with the other side.
Only nine nations achieved the extreme scores; Japan, Philippines and Thailand were completely aligned —36 West; Afghanistan, Ceylon, Indonesia and Nepal were perfectly non-aligned with
a zero score and Albania and Cuba were completely aligned +36
East. The following graph (Figure 1) shows how all the 103 nations
were distributed on the index. Several important points emerged;
firstly that many more of the small nations are aligned to the West
than are aligned to the East, secondly that the nations invited to
the Lusaka Conference are ranged over the whole spectrum from
being very pro-West to very pro-East and lastly that the small
nations had a much greater chance of being invited to the Conference if they were aligned to the East than if they were aligned to
the West.
1
....
FilM" J
11
3
NwnbCr
States
Polntl indicate the number of atatca within the 'U"$"
Distribution or Diplomatic Alignl11cnt Scores.
All small nOlions.
,
" ,,
...
H. HVEEM AND P. WILLETTS
12
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
has. in our view, the most legitimate claim to represent China. In
addition, both Britain and France have relations with Communist
China and therefore this cannot be considered to detract significantly from a nation's non-alignment. Relations with the two
Koreas and the two Vietnam's are in a completely different category. There is no particular reason why a small state should have
relations with any of the four regimes. Indeed one is inclined to
view such relations as a deliberate expression of alignment. Therefore any scores greater than 9 to either side will be regarded as
expressing alignment. Using this cut-off, the following differences
were found between the various groups of nations.
10
Table 2.
Diplomatic relations by category of non-aligned
LUSAKA ATIENDERS
Invited
Total Total Vete- Once
ew- Non
cans Before com- Attenders
ed
Aligned Wes
(-36 to
-10)
Non-Aligned
(-9 to+9)
Aligned East
(+lOto
+36)
Table 3.
ObserNot
vcrs
Invited
Invited
~8
20
3
10
7
6
9
24
30
20
9
7
4
4
1
4
IS
13
9
3
1
0
0
2
103
S3
21
20
12
10
10
30
Diplomatic relations by geographical area
LUSAKA
Total
Aligned West (-36 to -IO)
on-aligned (-9 to +9)
Aligned East (+10 to +36)
~
~3
Africans
Asians
Others
16
9
7
3
9
4
2
2
32
16
S
1
H. HVEEM AND P W1LLETTS
13
v
Amongst those that attended as full participants there is a distinct
shift towards a more Western alignment in groups that have more
recently joined the non-aligned (Table 2). The largest group among
the veterans that attended both the Belgrade and Cairo conferences
are non-aligned or pro-East while a clear majority of the newcomers are pro-West. The extent of this shift may be measured by
a rank order correlation, (tau/tau =0.48. Amongst those
invited as observers only Finland achieves a non-aligned score,
while all the eight Latin Americans were aligned to the West Indeed as a group the Latin Americans who were invited as observers
are relatively more aligned than the eleven Latin Americans that
were not invited. The eight observers' average score is —23.6 West
compared to —16.9 West for those not invited.
If the 53 nations that attended are examined by geographical
area (Table 3) we find that it is mainly the Africans that contribute
towards the alignment within the group. Half the Africans are
aligned to the West and some such as Gabon, Cameroon and Togo
are very highly aligned. The ex-French African states are generally
pro-West, except for the Central African Republic which is nonaligned and Mauritania and Congo (Brazzaville) which have joined
Guinea and Mali in the pro-Eastern group. Although France has
recognised Communist China, most of her ex-colonies have not
followed suit and still maintain relations with Nationalist China.
The East Africans also form a distinct group. Uganda, Kenya,
Burundi, Somalia and Zambia are all non-aligned although Rwanda
and Tanzania are aligned West and East respectively. Algeria and
the UAR stand out for being highly East aligned. Among the
Asians there is a discrepancy in that Malaysia and Jordan are highly Western aligned and were invited while Maldives and Pakistan
are non-aligned but were not invited. In addition Sweden, Norway
and Ireland could lay claim to being non-aligned.
MAX
Military Alignments
When the Cold War was at its height during the 1950s, great
pressure was put on the small powers to declare their alignment
with America or Russia. Membership of the new multi-lateral
military alliances was a clearly recognised form of alignment.
Equally the refusal by many small powers to join such alliances has
generally been taken as a major expression of their non-alignment.
To an extent it has even been a crude definition of non-alignment.
14
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
Even so we cannot assume that all the so-called "non-aligned"
nations do satisfy this criteria. The membership of seven multilateral alliances with one or more of the "Big four", United
States, Britain, France or Soviet Union, are coded in Appendix A.
The results are shown in summary in Table 4. Again we find that
a large number of the small nations are aligned to the West and
even ten that are supposed to be non-aligned have joined multilateral alliances.
11
15
H. HVEEM AND P. JVILLETTS
Although membership of multi-lateral alliances are well known
and important, the authors believe that bilateral military alliances
should be regarded in most cases as equally important. The difficulty is that a bilateral alliance is not open to a simple objective
definition and data on such alliances is difficult to obtain. Treaty
relationship cannot be the only criterion as the United States tends
to sign treaties even on relatively unimportant matters such as a
small sale of arms or providing a general to head a military
academy. On the other hand the Soviet Union very rarely formalises military arrangements into treaties. The supply of arms may be
said to constitute an alliance but only at the point when there is a
high degree of dependency in the relationship and when it is of
relatively long duration. Rather than avoid these awkward questions the authors have attempted a judgment of the treaty relations
and arms supplies to classify bilateral alliances. The following list
is not above challenge. Alliances with United States: Japan, Philippines, Thailand, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iceland, Canada,
Israel, Ethiopia, Liberia and all Latin Americans except Guyana,
Uruguay and Mexico.
12
Table 4.
Membership of multi-lateral alliances
LUSAKA ATIENDERS
Total Total eto. Once New- Invited
Obs.
rans Be- comNon
Invited
fore en Attended
2 Western
1 Western
o Alliance
Ea.stcm
2
37
0
64
0
47
0
0
0
21
0
103
I 53
21
6
0
3
0
3
17
0
20
Not
Invited
0
4
0
9
6
0
0
1
0
2
18
10
0
12
10
10
30
9
Nine of those ten are African countries that are linked to France
through the Defence Council of Equatorial Africa and the Defence
Agreement of the Conseil de l'Entente. The other is Trinidad and
Tobago which has joined the O.A.S., in alliance with the United
States. Once again we find that as more have been recruited to the
conferences the criteria have been less rigidly applied. None of the
veterans are in any multi-lateral alliances but six of the others are
aligned to the West. Again amongst the Latin Americans there is
nothing to distinguish those that are observers from those that were
not invited. Among the non-invited the case of Pakistan deserves
particular mention. She is a member of both CENTO and SEATO
and is therefore Western aligned. As already indicated, this is the
reason that Pakistan was not invited to the conference. But Pakistan is no longer active in these alliances and in any case the
criteria has not been rigidly applied to other countries. It would
appear that these alliances are being successfully used by India as
an excuse to isolate Pakistan.
With Britain:
Jamaica, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Ceylon and
Mauritius.
With France:
12 former "Brazzaville states" and Togo.
With China:
With USSR:
Albania.
Algeria, UAR, Syria, Somalia, Cuba, Afghanistan,
Finland.
If the multilateral and/or bilateral alliances are considered together then we may produce the following tables.
Table 5. Military alliances by group
LUSAKA ATIENDERS
Not
Obs.
Total Total Veto. Once ew- Invited
Invited
Invited
Non
comBeraIlS
fore en Attended
Aligned West
Non-Aligned
Aligned East
2
7
5
7
9
3
0
0
1
24
5
1
10
30
41
14
33
13
8
6
13
6
7
0
0
103
S3
21
20
12
54
10
16
Table 6.
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
Military alliances by geographical area
I
LUSAKA
Total
Aligned West
lon-Aligned
gned East
II
~
33
6
I
53
Africans
Asian
10
19
12
2
2
3
2
1
32
16
5
2
Others
While in each group of the attenders over half are non-aligned on
this major variable, the record must be regarded as poor. Even
amongst the veterans as many as 38% are military aligned with one
of the great powers. Again we find the shift towards a more Western alignment among the newcomers (tau/tau =0.52). As
with the diplomacy index, the Africans have a high proportion that
are aligned, whereas a small proportion of the Asians that were
invited are aligned. Amongst those not invited there are still four
smaller European countries (Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland) that have no military alignment.
Using Nyerere's definition that a non-aligned country should
have no permanent diplomatic or military alliance with the Big
Powers, we find that only seventeen of the sixty-five countries
invited to the conference came over both hurdles. They were 8
Africans, 8 Asians and Guyana. Two of these seventeen, Burma and
Gambia, did not actually accept the invitation and come to Lusaka.
In addition both Ireland and Sweden should have qualified for an
invitation under this definition of non-alignment. On the other hand
fourteen of those invited are aligned both diplomatically and militarily to the West, while four are aligned in both ways to the East.
MAX
H. HVEEM AND P. WILLETTS
17
alignment. Objectionable partisan proposals from either the East
or the West could be voted down by the small states or might not
even be put to the vote if there is a clear non-aligned majority. To
an extent this has been the situation in the 1960s. For example
Russia never made any headway with the "troika" proposals
designed to destroy the post of Secretary-General. Instead U Thant
in our view has been a truly non-aligned Secretary-General. America has also found that her rigid control of the Assembly has been
slightly weakened. Since 1963 the credentials of the Hungarian
delegation are no longer challenged and since 1961 the question of
China's admission has at least been on the agenda every year. But
in spite of the fact that the Afro-Asians now hold a majority of
the votes in the Assembly, America was uptill recenfly able to
oppose China's admission and maintain her troops in South Korea
under the United Nations' flag.
The votes on these issues have been coded from the three most
recent UN Yearbooks covering the 20th to 22nd sessions. In this
period there was only one other roll-call, on human rights in Tibet,
that could be directly considered as an East-West issue. (The
authors are unable to accept Russett's classification of colonial
issues as East-West issues, simply because they produce similar voting patterns with America and West Europe as opposed to the communist bloc. ) The total of twenty-two roll-calls were then used
to calculate the Lijphart Index of Agreement between America
and each state. A score of 100% indicates a voting pattern identical to America's while a score of 0% indicates a voting pattern
identical to Russia's. The mid-point of 50% represents a nonaligned score, which can be produced either by a high rate of
abstentions or by alternate voting with each side. The cut-off point
between non-alignment and alignment on either side is decided by
choosing a score high enough or low enough that with p.=0.001
it could not have been produced by random voting. The results
are summarised below (Tables 7 and 8).
The conclusions we drew from the earlier indices are again reinforced. Only half of those that went to Lusaka are non-aligned
in UN voting, although one could argue that, because of the nature
of the votes, significant agreement with Russia on these issues does
not constitute an Eastern alignment. A non-aligned nation deciding "on the merits of the issue" how to vote on Korea and China's
admission might justifiably oppose the United States. The issues are
13
14
15
16
UN Voting
For the small powers the United Nations is of great importance.
It is the world's most important diplomatic centre and in formal
terms the small powers have an equal status to the big powers in
the General Assembly. The United Nations may not have mandatory powers backed up by a system of sanctions and rewards but
the General Assembly's resolutions are influential. In many ways
the Assembly would appear to be an ideal forum to express non-
18
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
H. HVEEM AND P. WILLETTS
Table 7.
Total-
ILUSAKA ATIENDERS
Total Vete- Once New- Invited
Obs.
*Not
rans Be- comNon
Invited Invited
fore ers Attended
I
Aligned West
on-Aligned
Aligned East
4
13
14
0
12
9
53
21
48
38
16
11
28
102
7
3
3
2
20
12
0
9
1
0
21
6
2
10
10
29
7
3
-Excluding Switzerland
Table 8. UN Voting on East-West issues by geographical area
LUSAKA
Total
Aligned West
on-Aligned
Aligned East
-U
Africans
Asians
Others
2
7
2
11
1
14
16
9
3
2
S3
32
16
S
asymétrie as there is no doubt that supporting the United States
does detract from non-alignment. Amongst the new recruits to the
non-aligned conferences we again find a shift towards such a Western alignment ( t a u / t a u = -0.52). Again it is mainly the
African states that are detracting from the claims to non-alignment
made by the invited group. Again the eight Latin American observers with an average score of 98.2% voting agreement with America
cannot be distinguished as more non-aligned than the eleven Latin
Americans not invited, who voted 98.1% with America. Again
there are some non-aligned amongst those not invited.
MAX
Trade with the Communist Bloc
Apart from a brief mention by Russett, the patterns of international trade seem to have received no consideration by political
scientists. Yet, despite the economic theories of comparative
advantage, trade is largely an expression of political relationships.
17
19
UN Voting on East-West issues by groups
This is especially true of trade with the communist countries, which
comes directly under government control. Most of the newly independent nations had practically no trade with the communist bloc
when they attained independence. The extent to which they trade
with the communist bloc is therefore a measure of the extent they
have broken away from previous restrictions and have attempted to
limit the former dominance of the metropolitan countries.
Figures for both exports and imports to and from the communist
bloc are given in the Grand Table, Appendix A. Generally the percentages for imports and for exports are very close (a fact that in
itself would not be likely to occur with such regularity solely by the
operation of economic factors), but there are some surprising discrepancies most notably for Mali and Iraq, which import 31.8%
and 20.2% respectively from the communist bloc, yet only export
1.4% and 0% to the communist bloc.
Only the figures for imports will be used to construct the index
of alignment in trade relations. Imports may be taken to be under
greater control of the receiving country, which can pick and
choose where to buy from. There is much less freedom of manoeuvre in selling exports. They must go to whoever will buy. Thus
Mali and Iraq both of which were aligned to the East in diplomacy
and UN voting will be classified as Eastern aligned on the basis of
their high communist imports rather than Western aligned because
of low exports. Imports are also a better indicator in that they can
and do respond quite rapidly to regime changes; for example during 1964-66 Ghana took 18.5% of her imports from the communist
bloc but in 1967 the year after Nkrumah was overthrown this
figure had dropped to 7.6%.
We have already seen that the Western world dominates international relations in the fields of diplomacy, military alliances and
to a lesser extent United Nations voting. But Western dominance
is even more striking in international trade. Only 11.5% of the noncommunist world's imports in 1965-67 came from the communist
bloc. Thus rather than saying that a country is non-aligned when it
received 50% of its imports from the communist bloc, a situation
that would in fact represent a very high degree of alignment, the
figure of 11.5% must be taken as a norm. There seems to be no
objective way that a range about this norm can be chosen. The
authors therefore decided arbitrarily to use a range of 5% either
way, thus taking anything from 6.5% to 16.5% to represent non18
20
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
H. HVEEM AND P. W H X E T T S
-
21
*
ali_ ed trade relations. This relatively large range will include too
man. rather than too few countries in the non-aligned category.
Th~ results are gi en in tables 9 and 10.
T.
9. Trade
~lations by
group
I
LuSAKA ATIENDERS
Total Total Vete- Once New- Invited
Obs.
rans Be- comInvited
Non
ers Attended
fore
I
~Wes[
-
.
Aligned
.~East
Table 10.
I
71
19
13
I
~I
30
14
9
4
8
9
15
5
0
11
I
0
8
1
1
53
21
20
12
10
9
I
24
4
2
10
30
0
I
Not
Invited
Trade relations by geographical area
-
I
LUSAKA
Total
Ali~
West
'oo-Aligned
AIi!ned East
I
Africans
Asians
Others
30
14
9
22
7
5
3
0
3
7
4
53
32
16
2
5
We find that amongst those at the Lusaka Conference only 14
states, or about one quarter are non-aligned. Even if the definition
of non-alignment were loosened to include a range as large as 3.5%
to 1 9 3 % communist imports, there would still only be 20 nonaligned states. As many as 11 states take only 0.5% or less of their
imports from the communists, while 7 take over 20%. This time
the shift within the group caused by the recruitment of new members is not from a non-aligned to a Western alignment but as nearly
half the "veterans" are Eastern aligned, the shift is from an Eastern
to a Western alignment (tau/tau =0.69).
As with UN voting, there is a certain lack of symmetry in the
index. A state might still claim to be non-aligned even if it has a
relatively high proportion of its trade with the communists, whereas a very low proportion indicates that there has been no attempt
to break free from Western dominance or even that there might be
MAX
a deliberate boycott of communist trade. On this basis we are still
left with the fact that the majority of those attending the conference
are Western aligned and that this is mainly due to the Africans.
Once again there is no appreciable difference between the Latin
Americans invited as observers, which average 1.2% communist
imports (or 0.7% if Brazil is excluded), and those not invited,
which average 0.4%. Pakistan and Austria, amongst those not
invited, again fall into the non-aligned category, as do Turkey and
Iceland which are otherwise Western aligned.
Overall Pattern
We have now examined four indices that measure some of the main
components of the international system. The patterns of relationships that they indicate are remarkably similar to each other. The
conclusions are therefore much strengthened by this repetition. The
figures given in Appendix B for the inter-correlations between the
indices give a statistical measure of the strength of the repetition.
When the relations between the indices, for all the small states, are
considered, the correlations are all about 0.6 to 0.7. Such figures are
quite high for work in the social sciences. (When the correlations
are calculated using solely those invited to the conference there is a
slight drop in most of the figures because removing those not invited removes a large group of 18 nations that perfectly correlate
West on all four indices. But the correlations are still all 0.5 or
more.)
It is now possible to combine the results on the four indices to
give one overall index of non-alignment. A state may be aligned
West on up to four of the indices or aligned East on up to four,
thus gaining a score between -4 West and +4 East. Only 7 of the
103 nations are West on any one index while also being East on
another index. (This is yet another indication of the high correlation between the indices.) Such combinations may be regarded as
cancelling each other out. Burundi and Equatorial Guinea are
diplomatically and militarily non-aligned while being pro-East in
the UN and pro-West in trade. Congo (B) and Mauritania both are
Eastern aligned in diplomacy and at the UN while being Western
aligned militarily and in trade. Their overall score is thus given as
zero, the true non-aligned position.
The most startling results to emerge is that only four nations,
Ghana, India, Nepal and Kuwait, are non-aligned on every one of
22
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
the four indices. But two of these. Ghana and India, have been
most prominent in the "non-aligned" movement. Five more nations
achieve an overall score of zero by having some Eastern and some
Western links. A further 18 of those invited to the conference have
scores of only —1 or + 1 . In addition Guyana might be counted
in spite of a score of —2 because it is non-aligned on the two most
important diplomatic and military indices. Afghanistan and Finland
(as an observer) might also be counted because, although they are
closely circumscribed in their international relations by being
border states to the Soviet Union, their treaty alliances are perhaps
more political than military. This liberal interpretation gives a grand
total of 29 nations that are objectively non-aligned amongst the
64 with full invitations to the conference. (Tables 11 and 12.)
Table II.
Overall result of additive index, by group.
LUSAKA ATIENDERS
Total Total Vete- Once New- Invited
Obs.
rans Be- comNon
Invited
fore
ers Attended
Aligned West
Non-Aligned
Aligned East
Table 12.
59
18
I
9
34
27
11
10
8
12
8
103
53
21
9
Not
Invited
0
8
4
0
8
2
0
0
24
4
2
20
12
10
10
30
I
23
tions to the conference (probably 35 if data was available for
Swaziland) that must definitely be declared by objective standards
to be aligned. The majority of these aligned nations are African
states. Eleven of the ex-French colonies are aligned to the West
while two are aligned to the East. Only two are non-aligned. By
contrast the East Africans, except for Ethiopia and Rwanda, form
a non-aligned bloc. Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Somalia
and Burundi are all non-aligned. The use of the same objective
standards would also suggest that Sweden, Austria, Ireland and
Pakistan should all have been invited to the conference. (The full
country-by-country picture of both the invited and the non-invited
group is given in Table 13. The extent of alignment is also shown
graphically in Figure 2.) Even if we stretch the definition even further by accepting —2 to +2 scores as the limit of non-alignment,
the number of aligned countries is still 27, of which 11 are aligned
on all four indices.
The New Dimension: Relations with South Africa
As has been mentioned above, one of the very few issues on
which the "non-aligned" seem to be completely agreed is antiracialism and anti-colonialism. Obviously, the South African regime
is the most outstanding representative of the practices the "nonaligned" are condemning. Therefore one should expect all or practically all of the "non-aligned" to have no relations with South
Africa. Militarily, there are so far no known relations between
South Africa and any of the "non-aligned" countries, although
recent developments seem to indicate that some such relationships
may be established. Similarly in the United Nations, where the
"non-aligned" form the majority, South Africa is very isolated.
One study of the United Nations 20th session, in which colonialism
and apartheid were the dominant issues, showed that South Africa
only managed to achieve significant agreement (p=0.001) with ten
Western states, Canada and Bolivia. (But Bolivia was actually
one of the Latin American states invited as an observer.) We are
thus left with diplomatic and trade relations with South Africa to
be considered.
Acording to the information collected and presented in Appendix
A only one of those that received full invitations to the conference,
Malawi, has diplomatic relations with South Africa through reciprocal missions at ambassadorial level. But 6 out of the 9 observers
19
Overall result, by geographical area
Aligned West
Non-Aligned
Aligned East
H. HVEEM AND P. WILLETTS
LUSAKA
Total
Africa
Asia
Others
18
27
8
14
14
4
2
12
2
2
1
2
53
32
16
S
After making allowances for some degree of alignment by accepting all scores of -1 to +1 and thus slightly stretching the definition of non-alignment, we are left with 34 of those with full invita-
20
24
HORlZO S OF AFRI
DIPLOMACY
•+
rj
c;
..
;;;
E
'"
<
\
......o
.8:1
E_
H. HVEEM AND P. WILLETTS
25
Table 13. The distribution of individual countries according to overall additive Index
Attended Lusaka
ai '
.><~
au
::l
.
Invited 00- ttenJed)
and Observers
ot Invited
~
...l u
M
c;~
:t
0°
.cz
en _
o
0
-4
WEST
Dahomey. Ivory
Coast. Madagascar.
Niger. U. Volta.
Barbados and 8
Latin Americans all
as observers
Japan. Philippines.
Thailand. Iran.
Israel. Malta,
Canada. and 11
Latin Americans.
Cameroon. C.A.R.•
Chad. Senegal.
Rwanda. Ethiopia,
Botswana, Lesotho.
Malay ia, Jamaica.
Trinidad & Tobago.
Malawi
Turkey. Denmark.
Iceland.
Congo (K). Libya.
Nigeria, Cyprus.
Guyana*
Mauritius. Saudi
Arabia
Maldives.
Ireland*, Norway,
Switzerland.
Sierra Leone,
Morocco. Tuni ia.
Kenya*. Uganda*,
Zambia*, Indonesia*
Laos·, ingapore*.
Jordan. Lebanoo·.
Gambia*.
Pakistan, Austria,
Sweden*.
Gabon, Togo.
Liberia
-- ,-
1---
,,
,
\
·N
h
+.
\
-
-3
WEST
+
:l '"
Z~
..,
c
,
,,,
o
-2
WEST
,
-
I
~,
I
I
'\
'\
,.,
,
,,
,,
'\
,
,
,,
•• ,
'\
"\
,
,,
0
i
j
~CI
0
....
I
"
-+
Somalia, Sudan*.
Tanzania. South
+r=
"\
"'.
Z
~
Burundi·, Congo (B:),
Mauritania. Eq.
Guinea*, Ceylon,
Ghana*. India·,
Nepal·, Kuwait*,
EAST
I
+3
EAST
+4
EAST
-
,
Bunna·
-
Yemen. Yemen.
Algeria.
Afahanistan
Guinea, Mali, Iraq,
Yugoslavia.
U.A.R., Syria,
Cuba.
-
Finland (as observer)
-
-
Cambodia
(Sihanouk)
-
Albania.
*Both diplomatically and militarily non-aligned.
26
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
(Table 13 Continued)
Sumber of countries with each score
I Total
Attended Lusaka
I
Othcrs Invited
Not Invitcd
I
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
":"1
4-2
3
+4
I,
.I
I
I
35
15
11
3
Jl
5
14
1
2
18
3
4
15
9
6
11
9
5
1
0
1
3
0
0
2
-4
3
I
0
0
0
1
1
3
5
4
I
I
invited have diplomatic relations, while 5 of the 29 nations not invited also had diplomatic relations. Amongst the Latin Americans
there is a contrast that should cause concern. All the Latin Americans that have relations with South Africa were invited as observers
while none of those not invited have relations. This can be explained by the fact that South Africa has established relations with the
biggest and most important Latin American states. We have already suggested that these states were invited to the conference
because of their size and noi because of their supposed "nonalignment".
South Africa's trade relations are more extensive. During the
period 1965-67, South Africa was still trading with 51 of the 104
nations under consideration. This is in spite of continued calls by
the United Nations for a boycott of South Africa. What is even
worse is that 27 of the "non-aligned" and five of the observers
were still trading with South Africa. Even as many as 17 of those
trading with South Africa were African countries. For the majority
South Africa trade accounts for less than 1% of their total trade
which is obviously not much. As the data is not up-to-date, there
is a possibility that some of them have by now completely cut off
their trade with the racist republic, but this will not be the case for
all of them.
Among the 10 countries for which the South African trade
accounts for more than 1% of their total world trade, Malawi
stands out as it has also top-level diplomatic relations with the
regime. A number of the countries mentioned are neighbours or
ft HYEEM AND .P. WILLETTS
27
graphically close to South Africa and have developed trade with
to over many years. These relations in some cases, the most prominent being Zambia, are difficult to break down and replace overnight. as to do this would do considerable damage to the economy
of these countries. On the other hand, it is the declared policy of a
country like Zambia to bring her South African trade to nil, a fact
which is accepted by the "non-aligned"; this factor therefore did
not have any impact on the decision on the venue of the summit.
With other countries it is difficult to know to what extent economic factors are a genuine constraint It is the view of the authois
and we think our view is in accordance with what was said by
President Nyerere in his much quoted speech, that to maintain and
even strengthen diplomatic and trade relations with the present
regime in South Africa must clearly be contrary to the principles
and expressed policy of the "non-aligned" movement. It does not
matter that the South African trade may amount to very little; if it
is very little, it should be quite easy to cut it off entirely.
Contrary to the general belief that it is only the most pro-Western states that support South Africa we find that there is little
correlation between the overall East/West score, and the existence
of trade with South Africa. (The correlation for all states
tta/tau
= 0 . I 9 and for the Lusaka attenders the cerrelation
a soil only 0.25.) Even four of the states that are Eastern aligned
have some trade with South Africa.
M A X
Ttbk 14. Overall alignment and trade with South Africa
Total
Lusaka
Attendce
Non
Attended
Observcr
Not
Invited
21
0
u
"0
~
!.
z0
!
34.
28
13
17
~
4
22
'I
8
u
'0
u
~
0
'0
;:.
u
u
'0
'0
'0
u
"0
l!
F-<
u
'0
~
0
Z
e
!-t
Z
~
~
z
;:.
11-
9
3
5
4
5
16
9
10
16
0
0
0
3
0
2
6
0
0
2
S
19
11
31
'3 23
*Including Swaziland
0
0
4
6
,
0
28
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
H. HVEEM AND. P. WILLETTS
Some Conclusions
Both on the separate indices and on the overall additive index,
we have been able to show that the "non-aligned" movement consists of a number of truly aligned countries. Even if we stretch the
definition of non-alignment quite considerably, the fact still remains
that over half of the countries invited to attend and exactly half
of the countries that did attend the Lusaka conference are aligned
in any meaningful interpretation of the concept. If Nyerere's definition is applied, nearly three quarters of those invited are aligned.
Another striking fact is that, contrary to what we expected, the
movement increasingly has been taking aligned countries into its
ranks: as is seen from Table 11, there is a decreasing degree of
non-alignment from the "Veterans" through the "Once Before"
to the "Newcomers". Moreover, there is a considerable change of
balance between East and West. Formerly those that were aligned
were split between an Eastern and a Western alignment. Now the
West predominates completely.
The explanation seems to be that the movement really, as Burton
puts it, has remained an "open club". It recruits new members willingly if they meet at least two criteria: that they are under-developed or developing countries, and that they are relatively small.
The movement has maximised membership at the expense of nonalignment. We suggested in our introduction to this paper that an
analysis of Nyerere's speech indicated that the movement was shifting its emphasis. Nyerere seemed to lay less stress on the movement
being a "third force" in the East-West conflict and more stress on
anti-colonialism and the problems of development. We have now
found that the recruitment policy also is contributing to such a
change in the nature of the non-alignment movement.
A rapidly expanding movement like the "non-aligned" may seem
to be doomed to failure because it is without any structure or any
institutional set-up. This need not necessarily be true. There is
hardly any doubt that the movement has had and still has an informal structure based on the leadership of a group of "Veteran"
and "Once Before" countries. Membership in the committees of
the Dar es Salaam conference may be taken as an indicator of a
leading role in the movement. Tanzania, Ceylon and Indonesia
were members of the Standing Committee, the Economic Cooperation Committee and the ten-country group of the President
and Vice-Presidents. Algeria, Burundi, India, Syria and Yugoslavia
23
29
were members of two of them. If one adds to these the summit host
country, Zambia, UAR (which seems less active in the movement
now than it used to be), Ethiopia and a couple of other countries,
one has what may be called the leaders of the movement. Out of
the eleven mentioned, seven are Veterans and six are non-aligned.
Four of them are East aligned, which to some extent may counterbalance the "drift to the West" which was reported above.
These points are further supported if one looks at the relationships between the international rank or prestige of the invited and
their position on the alignment index. Using the international
"centre-periphery" index developed by Hveem and classifying
the "non-aligned" in groups of High, Medium and Low rank (or
"centrality") we find a distribution as shown in Table 15.
24
Table 15. The relationship between international rank and alignment position
(Ranks in the international system ranging from 0 to 16).
Hi&b
(Scores 8-16)
Wcst~
NOIHIipcd
EasH5ped
Medium
(Scores 4-7)
Low
{Scores (}"'3)
Total
Invited
2
S
S
16
27
12
2
29
8
U
29
64
What is shown in the table is first of all the tendency among the
West-aligned countries to come from the lower rank categories, (or
from the less "central" parts of the international system) while the
East-aligned are found in the higher categories. This then means
that the "proletariat" of the world of nation-states leans not towards East, but toward West.
To some extent this is due to the above mentioned fact that a
large part of the non-Veteran groups has been recruited from SubSaharan Africa. They consist of some of the smallest and least
developed states (size and level of socio-economic development
being two major dimensions in the "centre-periphery" index).
They are also the most recently decolonized states, the majority of
which have not gone very far in breaking the external relations
established by colonial rule. The recruitment of all these aligned
states to the movement might make sense, if and insofar as these
30
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
countries show a tendency in practice to detach themselves from
the dominant colonialist relationships. We suggest that this, in
many instances, is not the case. Many are still completely Western
aligned even after ten years of independence.
While the Observer Latin Americans are all firmly West aligned
and, as has been shown above, they are even more aligned on the
average than the Non-Invited Latin Americans, Guyana, Jamaica
and Trinidad and Tobago are all less West aligned than the Latin
Americans. Our suggestion that their invitation as full members was
due to culturo-linguistic bias on the part of the hosts in favour of
the Commonwealth thus seems to carry less weight. It might be
that these four states should be invited in order to help them avoid
being sucked in to America's orbit.
In practice the Lusaka Conference was more non-aligned than
the invitations would suggest. The overall bias towards pro-Western countries in the recruitment policy was considerably diminished
by the absence of six African countries. Dahomey, Ivory Coast,
Madagascar, Niger, Upper Volta and Malawi were all invited in
spite of their being highly aligned. The five ex-French colonies were
aligned with the West on all four indices and Malawi on three, the
exception being military relations. In addition Gabon and Togo,
-4 West and Chad -3 West did not show themselves to be very
keen members of the non-aligned movement, as they attended the
Lusaka Conference but did not attend the preparatory meeting in
Dar es Salaam. Thus of the 35 nations that are completely proWest, 8 of which were invited, only Liberia was a full participant
at both Dar es Salaam and Lusaka.
On the Future of the Movement
An impressionistic judgement on the development of the international system and the behaviour of the "non-aligned" would
indicate that the movement plays a less important role now that it
used to. The rapidly growing number of members of the movement
may have been one device used to increase its importance. We
suggest however that this device has only partly succeeded and has
not been able to compensate for the loss of influence or importance
suffered on other counts. It is difficult to assess what is the most
important, in explaining this trend—the changes in the structure
of the system and the lessening of the "Cold War", or the behaviour of the "non-aligned" themselves. It seems appropriate to
H. HVEEM AND P. W1LLETTS
31
put more stress on the former factors but obviously the two are
inter-related.
Many of the reasons for problems, which the movement finds
itself in at present, must be sought in the group's own behaviour.
The large number of aligned countries being recruited and the
difficulties in agreeing on matters which to outsiders would seem
less important, seem to carry the movement well beyond the bounds
of flexibility. There is not only a considerable heterogeneity in
internal domestic policies and practices, but in external ones as
well. There must be a limit to disunity and it seems that this limit
is now very close. Rather than gaining flexibility the movement is
in danger of losing shape and coherence.
Disunity may take different forms. The conflicts may be mutually re-inforcing which means that there is the same group clustering,
among the members, on all or most dimensions of conflict between
them. On the other hand they may be cross-cutting or overlapping,
which means that conflicting groups change from one issue to another. The contemporary "non-aligned" movement clearly is
closest to the latter model. But cross-cutting conflicts may have an
integrative effect and this is probably true with the "non-aligned"
movement. Two African countries may differ on the question of
seating the PRG of South Vietnam but at the same time agree on
the Middle East question, or vice versa. How great this effect is,
however, is difficult to say, but it cannot solve the problems of the
movement
We do not think that a break-up is imminent, as some comments
have alleged." But there is a very real danger that the "nonaligned" movement will drift without much purpose and direction
if it does not seriously face the problems and challenges that lie
before is. Without such steps being taken the movement is bound
to became a very loose gathering of states, convening conferences
whenever some of its leading members can get enough support.
Then not much more will be achieved than agreeing agendas,
receiving some new members and making policy statements on a
few issues on which they are all agreed beforehand. Such functions
can easily be taken care of in the formal and informal structure of
co-operation and co-ordination which is established among AfroAsian members of the United Nations. On the other hand, the
movement cannot move from being a club into becoming a bloc
of states, tightly knit together and claiming monopoly in the co-
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
ordination of the policies and behaviour of member states. It is all
too clear, as Nyerere has pointed out, that this would split the
movement and most probably break it up altogether.
Where then is the optimal point on which the movement could
in the not too distant future find a viable way of continuing? What
can yield benefits to the members (or a majority of them) and give
the movement more influence on world affairs? In answering this
question, one has to consider at least three problems: how and in
what direction the movement's aims may be reoriented; to what
extent and in what sense the concept of non-alignment should be
reconfirmed; and what consequences the answers to both these
problems would have for the structure of the movement and its
membership. They all add up to one single question: how can the
movement become truly and effectively non-aligned?
The Dar es Salaam meeting endorsed the definition of nonalignment which was offered by President Nyerere and which mentions diplomatic relations besides military ones as criteria of
membership. Our definition has included two more criteria, one of
which seems to be well supported by the reorientation of the
policies of the movement suggested by Nyerere. What he said about
economic co-operation and about making some short-term sacrifices in order to reach long-term goals of more independence, certainly brings in trade as an important criterion in any conception
of non-alignment for the future.
Trade as an indicator of economic relations becomes perhaps
even more important if reorientation is going to develop the movement into some kind of an international "trade union" of small
less developed countries. What such a trade union would see as its
primary aim would be to achieve radical redistribution of wealth
through changes in the world economic structure. Such changes
could not come unless the trade union improved its bargaining
position, which means that it has to use political and diplomatic
activity as well as the economic. But it could not achieve what it
aims without changing the pattern of economic relations; hence the
importance of such relations to a definition of non-alignment. The
importance of economic relations becomes even greater when it is
remembered that trade is the one indicator among the four we have
employed which shows the least degree of non-alignment among the
invited states and the largest degree of alignment in the dominant
direction, towards the West. This is of even more concern when we
H. HVEEM AND P. W1LLETTS
33
remember that the variable was stretched very far "in favour of"
a non-aligned or East-aligned position, in the way it was operationalised.
What are the options for the "non-aligned" movement in the
future? This question relates to another question: what are the
practical consequences to be drawn from a reorientation of the
purpose of the movement along the lines brought out above? Given
the present large number of members, and given the new impetus
implicit in the proposals made by Nyerere, it is hard to see how
the movement can possibly develop into an effective, although still
flexible, force in international politics without establishing some
kind of a permanent, institutionalized structure of its own. There
is already a feeling among at least some members that this would
be more effective and not much more expensive than the present
practice of having first a council meeting and then a full-scale preparatory meeting before the summit. A permanent executive body
and /or secretariat for the preparation, co-ordination and execution
of the activities of the movement would seem to be a necessity if
it is to be strengthened.
Another option is to take a second look at its ranks and put the
definition of non-aligned, which the movement itself has reconfirmed, into practice. It might not be realistic to opt for a cut in membership by asking the permanently aligned countries to back out
An alternative would be to develop an "inner core" of truly nonaligned countries plus those aligned ones which clearly are aiming
and moving towards a non-aligned position. This core group could
meet more often (e.g. within the United Nations context) and act
more conceitedly. This option is also rather unsatisfactory as it
would smack of factionalism with a "class A" and "class B"
membership. It might seriously damage relations which the core
group would wish to maintain with the "outer group" in other
contexts and for other purposes.
A third option would be to make the most aligned countries
back out of their own accord by forcing them to take a stand on
an issue which clearly brings out their alignment and puts them in
a conflict situation. But this is not particularly well established in
diplomatic circles as a way of practising international co-operation.
In particular the "non-aligned" movement seems to be trying to
avoid such show-downs by compromising and postponing decisions.
In a major reorientation of the movement it might be appropriate
26
34
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY'
to consider whether it is going to continue to work on a "minimum
common denominator" basis in the future.
Assuming that the present membership is going to be maintained
there are at least three ways in which the movement could become
more truly non-aligned. First, it could concentrate on developing
trade among its own members, which eventually should lead to a
lessening of the present dependence on the West and help several
more countries to be truly non-aligned. However, trade of the four
dimensions examined is probably the most difficult one to restructure.
Restructuring may be more easily achieved on other dimensions
such as United Nations voting and diplomatic relations. A number
of countries could compensate for alignment on trade and military
alliances by being non-aligned or aligned the other way on other
dimensions: they could balance their alignments so as to achieve
overall non-alignment. This also is rather unlikely to happen: it has
been shown above that there is a considerable correlation between
the four variables. Few countries could possibly manage to maintain a diffuse alignment profile for long; sooner or later it would
be subject to pressures which might tip the balance. The modern
history of a country like Congo-Brazzaville which is East-aligned
on two, West-aligned on the other two variables, is evidence of this.
The optimal strategy is to lessen alignment bonds on all of the
four variables jointly and to aim at achieving a profile of nonalignment on all of them. As was shown above, only four countries
today maintain such a profile, and it is going to take a lot of time
for the rest to achieve the same degree of non-alignment. A number
of them, perhaps even the majority, will probably never achieve it.
However, what one would hope for is that present aligned members
move in the direction of non-alignment on all or most of the indicators employed in our definition of non-alignment. If a particular
strongly aligned country clearly fails to adopt such a policy of
slowly moving towards non-alignment after some years of political
independence and if it is not in a position, geographically and/or
strategically, where it has little freedom to change, its membership
in the movement should be discontinued.
The other side of the coin is this: that by admitting certain
strongly aligned countries into the movement, such countries may
be saved from completely becoming satellites of the big powers. If
this is already or is going to be in the future a deliberate policy of
H. HVEEM AND 1». W1I.LETTS
35
the movement, we still fail to see how it can possibly be effective,
without strengthening the movement in the other ways that have
been brought out in this paper.
We suggest that the non-alignment movement needs to:
1. Create some degree of permanency and some form of institutional structure in the preparatory, decision-making and leadership machinery of the movement.
2. Reorient the aims and purposes of the movement in order to
bring it into new spheres of activity, especially into the field
of economic co-operation.
3. Reaffirm that the concept of non-alignment excludes permanent political, military, diplomatic or economic alignments
with any big powers as incompatible with it.
4. Adopt a dynamic view on the question of membership which
demands that present (and future) members at least practice a
policy which leads them toward non-alignment.
APPENDIX A
Lusaka Altenden.
"Orand Tablc" with all data employcd
e
~
~
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.!a!
iii
z
E
0
Q.
is
:>
0
U
Algeria
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
CAR
Chad
Congo (8)
Congo DR
Ethiopia
Eq.Ouinea
Oabon
Ohana
Ouinea
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Mali
Mauritania
Morocco
Nigcria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Tuni ia
Uganda
UAR
zambia
Afshanistan
Ceylon
Cyprus
India
Indonesia
uos
Malaysia
Nepal
.:
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=
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1
2
3
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6
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+22
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-14
+16
-14
-10
+9
-23
- 9
+18
- 8
0
0
0
0
I
I
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0%
96.4
1.8
62.S
881
7S.0
0
90.0
36.4
22
14
14
16
21
20
19
10
22
4.9
2.S
9S.2
40.9
6.8
31.3
21
22
22
16
1
z
3
-04
5
-10
-16
-14
+20
+12
-11
-10
-14
-19
-10
+2
+9
+16
-18
-12
- 9
+23
+S
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
100.0
88.1
59.S
0
4.8
33.3
28.S
868 )
32.1
S2.4
26.9
18.2
20.5
100.0
43.2
21.1
15.9
13.6
14
21
21
19
21
18
21
19
14
21
13
22
22
22
22
19
22
0
0
-14
+ 2
0
- 1
-27
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
31.8
31.6
58.8
47.7
46.4
93.8
100.0
29.S
22
19
17
22
14
16
21
22
!Xl
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ci
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1.8
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4.2
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1.2
0
0.1
2.8
0
20S
O.S
7.6
0.6
14.7
#:
3.8
ti
7
II
-
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-
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-
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0.1
31.8
2.8
9.8
4.6
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4.9
7.1
10.1
15.2
6.6
S.9
8.8
S.4
28.9
0.4
1.4
0
0.1
2.2
0
0
0.1
0.4
16.8
7.1
0.8
100S
7.4
SO.7
2.4
53.S
19.7
6.3
9.7
0
33.9
17.6
11.7
17.6
10.4
7.7
7.1
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#:
-
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W
~ 0~
10 11
12
E W +2
W (W) -3
E (W) 0
N W -3
W W -3
N W -3
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0
N W -2
N W -3
(E) (W) 0
W W -4
N N
0
E (E) +3
N W -1
12
W (W) -3
-4
N W -2
E E +3
0
E W
N N -1
N W -2
W W -3
N W -3
N N -1
N N +1
E N +I
N N +1
W W -4
N N -1
N W -1
E E +4
N W -1
W W W W
W
E
E
W
W
W
W
W
N
N
E
W
W
N
E
N
N
N
W
N
N
N
W
N
N
N
W
N
N
N
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1
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2
1
2
2
3
3
2
2
3
·2
3
2
3
3
2
3
3
2
1
3
Appendix A
(ComlnU«i)
3
4
5
6
7
-4
+J4
-22
- 5
- 9
+11
+20
+J5
- 7
-13
-4
+36
+11
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
J
0
0
0
0
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0
0
0
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0
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35.7
JI.4
70.5
42.9
57.1
7.9
20.2
J1.3
7.6
0.8
2.8
25.5
7.4
0
4.1
4.5
13.6
91.7
65.9
91.7
0
9.)
14
22
22
14
21
0
22
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12
22
18
22
22
l.5
2
3
4
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- 2
-18
-18
+3
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0
1
0
0
0
1
1
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0
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1
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1
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0
\
-
8
9
JO
II
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N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
W
E
N
N
W
W
E
(N)
W
W
W
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E
-I
+3
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0
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+1
+4
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-2
-3
-3
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11
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N
N
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(E)
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N N
N W
W N
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0
73.4
28.9
0
0.3
0
70.9
38.1
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N
N
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E
N
W
N
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6
7
8
9
3.6
10.6
0.7
0.2
0
:F
:F
:F
:F
W
N
W
W
W
N
W
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N
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N
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W
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W
N
N
W
:F
-
6.0
:F
33.3
-
e
13
14
16
15
- .- ----_.... 1.4
J
- 0.2
3
- 0.05 2.0
0
2
- 0
2
- 0
0.Q3
1.1
3
- 0.5
I
4.4
-
0
0
-
-
0
0
0
0
0.02
12
13
14
-4
-
0
0
0
0
6.89
8.8
0
0
-
3
3
0
0
0
0
0
I
I
I
3
3
Invited but did Dot attend.
1
Dahomey
Gambia
Ivory Coast
Madagascar
Malawi
Mauritus
Nijer
Upper Volta
-13
-2
-20
-23
Bunna
~ud\A ...."""
97.2
18
100.0
12
93.2 22
100.0 ·22
100.0 21
-
-
97.6
84.1
29.5
21
22
22
0.3
4.1
0.3
17.9
6111
17
1.2
1.1
0
0
O.
15.0
0
10
W W
W N
W W
W W
W W
(N) W
W W
W W
N E
N
W
-I
-4
-4
-
-3 RS
-2
-4
-4
+1
-
2
IS
16
:F
0
0
0
0
3.59
0.1
0
0
0.13
2
1
1
I
2
1
1
1
3
0.02
0.30
3
COuntry
I
BarbadOl
Finland
Argentina
Bolivia
-12
+9
-31
-18
Brazil
-34
Chile
Mexico
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
-22
-20
-20
~1
1
0
1
1
1
J
I
I
-25
1
-19
I
0
1
I
1
I
1
0
I
0
I
1
2
J
-23
I
2
2
0
0
1
J
0
1
0
I
1
1
I
1
J
4
85.7
36.4
100.0
100.0
97.7
95.0
93.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
.5
7
22
22
22
22
20
22
19
22
22
6
--
19.4
0.3
1.2
5.1
0.3
0.3
0.3
2.0
0.3
7
-
20.5
10.8
0
5.8
-g
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
I
W
W
E
W
W
W
(W)
(W)
E
-
-
-
RS
RS
RRS
R-
-
0.25
0.14
0
0.06
0
0.02
0
014
0
0.64
0.17
0
0.64
0
0.08
0
0.61
0
IS
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
-4
+2
-4
-4
-4
-4
-4
-4
-4
-4
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
-4
-1
-3
-4
-4
-4
-4
-2
-
0.13
3.5
:F
0.23
0
0.60
1.47
0.15
0.29
N
W
W
W
W
0.6
1.9
2.3
7.0
W
:F
W
W
W
W
N
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
-
-
R-
H. HVEEM AND P. WILLETTS
AppoodJA A (CfMI,
ObJervcn lDvited
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
2
38
Sinpporo
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
South Yemen
Syria
Yemen
Guyana
Jamaica
Trinidad+T
Cuba
YuaosJavia
J
Not Invited
Country
Iran
Pakistan
Turkey
Israel
Japan
Philippines
Thailand
Maldives
+ 6
-34
-14
-36
-36
-36
-9
4
81.8
31.8
100.0
97.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
66.6
6
-,
22
22
21
21
22
22
22
9
6.2
7.1
11.7
2.1
6.2
0
1.0
2.9
12.5
15.8
3.8
4.9
0
0.4
-
-
W
W
W
W
N
W
N
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
N
N
W
W
W
N
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
N
(W)
-
-S
-
-
-
_.
0
0.48
2.02
0.14
0.28
-
-
39
5
40
HORlZO S OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
.,.,
....
~~~~~~~~~
S~~
~
:!;
~~~~~~~~~
~~:8
S
........
....
N
a: I 1 I
11-.. . . .
a: a: a: 1 I I I I I I 1 I I I I 1
NN ....
I I I I I
N~~~~~~~~~~~~~
....
I I I + I I I I I I I I I I 1+
~Z~Z~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~
~ZZ~~ZZ
l~l.Il~~~~~~~~~~~~
0\
~Z~~Z~ZZ~~~~~~~~~~~~~Z
00
~~~~ZZZ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~l.Il
10
\Of'M~C"""\Ilt"\-OOc:cO
f'I")'"
f""l-f"'),.....O\-"'l:t"""''''''''IlIf''\O
t---
O~"::jO..;,,:,,:,,:gg..;OO"':OO1
v\o":t'i"':";":t'io...:t'iooooo
...
!
1(1)(1)(1)
....
....
r--
'"
100000
o~oooooooooooooo
1(1)
-
0000 :;
I....
....
OOOO~
0\
Iv>
O\NNNNNN
-NNNNNN
•
00.,.,00 .... - ''''' 000 .... 0000000
...8~g88~~
_....
~0888~8&88888°
....
- 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 ........ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0
N
o o - - o - o o - o - - ........ - ___
....
~~~=0\c:c~~N~~2~N~N~~~~~~
I ~~~n::l~:!;~~~~~N~!:;
....~
I I I I I I I I I
oS
+
_
_
""""1
____
~_~o
I I I I I I I 1 I I 1+
~
~ "S
.~
< oS b'
:a
0
=
:::l
z 8
&
c::o.
<
'0
ci.
..
J~ a: .c.g ~ 5 J!:§
~
"S .- S - ~ ~ ~ ~ 'a § S
~<~~]z~~ <8
~~o=~z ~a
~
!
....
•
Q
co
-S ~ ~
'0
~
:; Q -
....
~ 5] ~
. ~8~
_ ....
...
='S
41
AppendiX A (Continued)
0000000"':00000000 100000
I
H. HVEEM AND P. W1LLETTS
O~!~
..
"C
~
='
__ 'O
(I)
Q
~
>. .-
E
Notes to Appendix A
Call:
Minus indicates a pro-West score, plus a pro-East
score.
indicates a state that was not a UN member.
o represents complete disagreement with the United
States.
Cals. 6 and 7, 14 and 15: Ghana's trade for 1967 (post-coup) only.
Dahomey, Gambia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger,
S. Yemen and Cuba trade for 1964 to 1966. Indonesia 1963-65, Albania 1962-64. Tanzania shows
trade for mainland only.
- indicates data not available
o indicates no trade
i'indicates trade less than 0.01 %, but not zero.
Cols 8 to 11: W=Aligned West, N=Non-Aligned, E=Aligned
East. A bracket indicates that data was not available
and authors made an assessment.
Col 12:
Minus indicates a pro-West score, plus a pro-East
score
o indicates a "completely non-aligned" overall score.
ColB:
R=receivcs an Ambassador, S=sends an Ambassador.
Col 16:
1= Ney.'comer, 2=Once Before, 3=Veteran.
Cols.4+5:
-
42
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
APPENDIX B
Correlations between the indices:
W
W
44
Diplomacy
E
2
M'
W
N
E
8
'tary
14
19
8
1. lms paper was writt-=n before the Lusaka Conference.. The tabl~ have
UN Voting
E
0
3
5
W
42
6
0
N
15
21
2
E
0
3
13
Communist
Trade
W N
E
50
8
0
17
9
4
4
2
9
U Voting
TraM
Trade
40 12 2 49 4
1 43
5 o UN Voting
8 23 9 21 14 6 21 13 4
0 3 5 1 1 6 6 1 9
tau/tau
MAX
Diplomacy
Diplomacy
Military
0.608
0.712
0.592
Voting
Trade
(b)
Military
0.608
0.661
0.720
UN
0.712
0.661
Trade
0.592
0.720
0.640
0.640
UsiIfg Just those invited to the Conference (n=63)
Military
Diplomacy
W
N
E
W N
14 12
5 17
2 7
UN Voti1l8
Communist
Trade
W N E
21
5 0
13 8 3
4 2 7
E W N
E
0 13 13 0
2 5 16 3
4 0 2 11
UN Voti1l8
W
Military
N
E
Communist
Trade
W N E WN E
11
8 2 19 1 1
7 21
8 18 13 5 UN voting
0 2 4 1 1 4
Communist
Trade
W N E
15 3 0
17 II
3
6 1 7
tau
MAX
Diploma..--y
Military
Voting
Trade
Diplomacy
0.504
0.713
0.552
Military
0.504
0.492
0.715
43
REFERE CES
(a) Using? the whole universe of small nations (n = 103)
Military
H. HVEEM AND P. WILLETTS
UN
0.713
0.492
0.496
Trade
0.552
0.715
0.496
been revised since the conference but not all the POUlts made Ul the
text take full account of the events at Lusaka. In addition most of the
data, because of the data sources that are available, refer to the situation one or two years ago.
2. Burton, J. W.," on-Alignment" (London: Andre Deul3ch, 1966), p. 19.
3. Hveem, H., "Blame as International Behaviour: A contribution to
Inter-state Interaction Theory" Journal of Peace Research No. I, 1970.
4. Printed in exJellSO in The Nationalist. 14 April, 1970.
5. Schwartzman, S. and Aranjo, M. M., "The Images of International
Stratification in Latin America", Journal of Peace Research No.3,
1964, pp. 225-243.
6. Hveem, H., op. cit.
7. Although Cambodia has long been a member of the non- . • <l mO~'e­
ment, no representative of either the Lon 01 or Sihanouk regimes was
allowed to take part. Therefore Cambodia has been included amongst
the "non-invited" in all the tables.
8. The Statesmen's Yearbook was found by the authors to be unreliable
and did not even cross-check internally. The Europa Yearbook 1969
was therefore used to code diplomatic relations.
9. Alger, C. F. and Brams, S. J., "Patterns of Representation in National
Capitals and Inter-governmental Organisations" World Politics. Vol. 19,
pp. 646-663.
10. Throughout this article the tables only include 40 not 41 African states,
53 not 54 "attenders" and 63 not 64-"invited" to the conference, as
no information could be obtained on Swaziland. For 13 other countries
either the trade data was missing or they were new UN members so a
guess had to be made at their alignment. In addition Switzerland is not
a UN member and thus is excluded from the relevant tables.
11. The alliances coded are NATO, C&'lTO, SEATO, OAS, Warsaw Pact,
Defence Council of Equatorial Africa, and the Defence Agreement
between France and the Conseil de l'Entente. Other multilateral
alliances such as the Congo-Burundi-Rwanda Mutual Security Pact are
not coded because they do not include big powers.
12. For example see the UN Treaty Series, Vol. 54, p. 47 or Vol. 29,
p. 349.
•
13. Russett, B. M., ~rends in World Politics", p. 68.
14. The total of twenty two roll-calls con isted of seven in the 20th Session
(2 on China, 4 Korea, 1 Tibet), eight in the 21st Session (2 China,
6 Korea) and seven in the 220d Session (2 China, 5 Korea). The rollcalls on Korea included whether the matter should be on the agenda,
whether North or South Korea should be invited to speak and the
future of UNCURK.
U. The lljphart Index of Agreement I = (f + fs) X 100 where f = the
t
number of votes in which the two states voted in agreement, g = the
number of votes showing partial agreement (Yes/Abstain or No/
Abstain combinations) and t = the total number of votes that both
participated in. See lljphart, A, "Ihe Analysis of Bloc Voting in the
General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal", American Political
Science ~yjew, 1963, p. 902-17.
16. For a discussion of the methodology of constructing sampling distributions fOT the lljphart Index of Agreement see: Willetts, P., The
Behaviour of the African Group in the General Assembly. Unpublished M.Sc. (University of Strathclyde, Scotland). The more votes that
both the tates participate in the less probability there is that they can
achieve high agreement scores by pure chance. The following cut.off
points were used to indicate alignment with America (p<O.OOI).
44
HORIZONS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
o.of
oles
9
10
II
12
13
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
%
Agreemeol
94.4
9S.0
90.9
91.7
88.S
o. of
Votes
14
15
16
17
18
%
Agreemeol
89.3
86.7
84.4
85.3
83.3
%
No. of
Votes
Agroemeol
19
20
21
22
84.2
82.5
81.0
81.8
As America and Russia were directly opposed on each vote, a score
of 10% agreement with America represents 90% agreement with
Russia. Thus the same cut-off points for agreement scores with Russia
indicate an Eastern alignment.
Russett, B. M., op. cit, Ch. 6.
The figures are taken from the 1967 Yearbook of International Trade.
The communist bloc was taken to include Albania, China, North Vietnam and North Korea but exclude Yugoslavia and Cuba. In order to
iron out some of the fluctuations from year to year, the figures given
are weighted averages for the three years 1965-67.
South Africa has been making proposals to some of the Latin American
countries for military co-operation but so far nothing has materialised.
The Nationalist, 30 January, 1970. There seem to be more chances of
another South African scheme succeeding. They propose a "Southern
Oceans Economic Community" including Australasia and Latin America. Daily Nation, 14 July, 1969. There is also evidence that South
Africa may be setting up a military air base at Lilongwe in Malawi,
Observer, 17 May, 1970.
Willetts, P., op. cit, Ch. 4.
The figure of 27 includes 4 countries (Malawi, Mauritius, Burma and
Saudi Arabia) that were invited to but did not attend the Lusaka
Conference.
Although the Yearbook of International Trade did not give data for
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, it is well known that there is quite
considerable trade between those countries and South Africa. They
have therefore been counted in the 10 countries trading over 1% with
South Africa. The other countries for which there is no data in Appendix A have ben given the benefit of the doubt and counted as
having no trade.
Tanzania and Ceylon (the latter most remarkably, as the former being
host, was a "must" member) even sat in the fourth committee, dealing
with the Cambodian question.
The index is an additive index on eight variables representing the size
(population, GDP), level of development (literacy, industrialization)
G D P per capita, age and structural position (geographical centrality,
memberships in international organizations of a nation). The top score
was 16, as each indicator was trichotomized in values of 2, 1 and 0.
Hveem, Helge, International Relations, World Images and Foreign
Policy Attitudes (Oslo: Universitets-forlaget, forthcoming).
This was indicated in The Economist, 25 April-2 May, 1970.
A council meeting of "Special Envoys" was held in Belgrade from
8-11 July, 1969, the UN representatives met together on 26th September, 1969, the Preparatory Meeting was held in Dar es Salaam from
13th-17th April, 1970, and several meetings of a planning committee
were held in Delhi and Lusaka.