Journal of
Peace
Research
Offprint from
No 2,
1968
U N I V E R S I T E T S F O R L A G E T
147
Table 1. Validation
FOREIGN POLICY T H I N K I N G I N T H E ELITE
A N D THE GENERAL POPULATION
A Norwegian Case Study*
By
H E L G E
International
Peace
H V E E M
Research Institute, O s l o
considerations are not paralleled by the
1. Introduction
T h i s article has two different, but to
a m o u n t of elite research actually carried
some extent overlapping purposes. T h e one
out. T h e r e seems to exist a certain dis-
is to present the world picture, or more
crepancy between elite studies a n d opinion
specifically
the
surveys, with m u c h stronger emphasis on
N o r w e g i a n foreign policy elite. T h e other
the latter. T h i s is not to say that this kind
is to contribute some new knowledge to
of research is unimportant: only that it
the
peace
thinking,
of
of the position of the elite and the opinion-TTUJ1cer sampks. %
Elite
Opinionmakers
36
60
12
84
26
36
35
1
9
79
16
46
53
24
7
'Would you say that you have any personal influence on the making of
Norwegian foreign policy?'
Yes ......•.................................•........••••.•
Little or no .........•......................................
'Have you been or are you at the moment member of any official Norwegian delegation to international organizations?'
.
Yes, 3 or more
Yes, 1-2 ................•...........••........•...•.......
No ...............•..••.•..........................•......
'When you discuss foreign policy matters, would you say that you yourseU
most often take contact with others, or are you more often contacted by
others?'
I most often take the contact myself
.
Both/it depends ..•.........................................
I am mO'it often contacted by others
.
12
cision-making structure ; their participation
A n o t h e r p r o b l e m is that of a possible
the general theory of foreign policy at-
should not be carried out to the neglect of
in official delegations to international or-
methodological bias d u e to different data
titudes as a function of social position,
elite research, as appears to be the case till
ganizations ; a n d their activity in the c o m -
collecting methods for the two samples in
n o w . Rather, one should concentrate m o r e
munication system ( T a b l e 1 ) .
large parts of the study. As far as we can
developed b y G a l t u n g .
1
4
see from our data, there seems to be no
T h e data presented are part of the results
on studying the relations between elite a n d
O u r assumption is verified on all three
obtained from a study carried out a m o n g
public opinion, by m o r e extensive c o m -
variables: the elite sample scores higher
clear
two different population samples repre-
parative research. T h i s is our second start-
on all of them. T h e third variable, h o w -
of such a bias. We m a y show this by c o m -
ing point or m a i n 'hunch', which will be
ever, needs some further c o m m e n t s .
paring
senting higher strata in N o r w e g i a n society.
2
O n e group, the foreign policy elite,
was sampled according to a design used
further elaborated below.
W e assumed that the opinion-makers t o
T h e data were collected in two slightly
some
extent
influenced
or
tried
to
tendency
or
responses
indications
on
items
generally
which
were
presented in m u c h the same context a n d
in-
formula in both the interview guide a n d
the questionnaire, a n d comparing, on the
policy elite
fluence the elite: this is in fact indicated
level
was interviewed by the author and three
by the scores on the question of w h o con-
the other h a n d , responses the elite gave
between the elite a n d the general public
assistants, trained in this technique, from
tacts w h o m the most. T a k i n g the ratio
on interview a n d the opinion-makers on
opinion — educating or forming the latter,
February to Ap ril 1 9 6 7 with the use of a
between 'contact m y s e l f
questionnaire stimuli. A n attempt t o c o m -
a n d to some extent influencing the former.
mostly pre-coded a n d wholly structured
by others', we find that the ratio of the
bine
T h e sampling procedure is explained in
interview guide. This group was also asked
elite is 2 / 3 : the elite is m o r e often con-
T a b l e 2 . Unfortunately, w e m a y present
A p p e n d i x A , together with some data o n
to answer some questions on a question-
tacted by others than itself contacts others;
only two items which were used in both
the composition of the two groups.
naire. T h e responses of the opinion-maker
the position of the opinion-makers is the
the guide a n d the questionnaire : the intra-
reverse.
and
by other authors.
opinion-maker
3
T h e other group, the
group,
represented
a
Elite studies are important for several
different
sample
ways.
were
T h e foreign
given
on
a
questionnaire
a n d 'contacted
these
the
t w o approaches
inter-individual
is
m a d e in
approach
to
peace.
reasons. T h e cognitions a n d evaluations
which, except from a few questions, was
Contacts, of course, m a y be taken b o t h
of elite persons are of consequence to the
pre-coded. T h e opinion-maker study was
vertically a n d horizontally. T h e opinion-
formation of a country's foreign policy.
carried out in the period from A pr il to
makers m a y contact the elite — a n d it has
about
W h a t the
been shown that this happens m o r e often
on the intra-individual item, the opinionmakers are m o r e positive in b o t h cases
T a b l e 2 supports our general conclusion
a
possible
methodological
bias:
opinion-maker
medio June the same year. T h e methodol-
strata see a n d believe about the world is
o g y used is explained in m o r e detail in
than
important;
Appendix B.
makers; in other words: the structural or
(81%
positional difference is clear. But contact
35 %) ; on the inter-individual item the
elite
and
it even
the
to some extent d e -
the
elite
contacts
the
opinion-
against
78%,
and 4 6 %
against
termines what the rest of the population
Before we proceed, let us briefly validate
shall see or believe. Internal structures of
the assumption m a d e above that the elite
may
opinion-
elite is the most positive on both cases.
If we read the T a b l e vertically a n d look
also
be
taken
between
a n d the opinion-maker samples do rep-
makers. Since the question, however, was
the structure of a n d intensity in the rela-
resent different social strata. This we do
m a d e in a context where the focus was on
at the relations between the two items, the
tions with the outside world are factors
by
the
policy,
trend is also consistent in all four cases (of
which work in this direction.
variables : the respondents' o w n perception
vertical or u p w a r d contact was evidently
positive evaluation) : the intra-individual
of their position in the foreign policy de-
in the minds of most of the opinion-makers.
approach is the most preferred.
communication a n d decision-making, a n d
In our opinion these generally-accepted
presenting
data
on
three
different
top
level
making
of foreign
149
148
Table 2. Test
of the data collecting method. %
Interview guide8
E
OM
Individuals educated to peace
Better relations between the indiv.
Pos
78
56
Questionnaire
E
OMb
Neg
Pos
12
81
Neg
12
35
22
51
25
28
46
27
a The data for the opinion-maker sample are based on responses on a questionnaire.
The percentages here represent those who think that the item is 'Especially important to
peace'.
b
E = Elite; OM = opinion-makers.
Another point to be mentioned in connection with a possible data collecting
bias is that no decisive event appeared on
the world scene during the time of the
opinion-maker data collection to make the
scene markedly different from the one the
elite (in an earlier period) had before their
'eyes'.
5
2. The Norwegian foreign policy elite:
some assumptions
H o w does the Norwegian elite perceive
and evaluate its international environm e n t ? This is the question which will
o c c u p y us here. T h e more general question
of h o w elites as such picture the world is
— provided there are certain features in
elite thinking specific enough and c o m m o n enough — an interesting problem
which shall not be dealt with here (and
which, by the way, needs a lot of data
for comparisons, both among elites and
between elites and national public opinion
groupings).
To point at some possible answers to our
question, which we will relate more
specifically to the peace thinking of the
Norwegian elite, we m a y look into several
sets or categories of data: social background, personality, predominant attitude sets. This individual level approach
can be compared to or replaced by a
national level approach: national characteristics like degree of cohesion or h o m o geneity, culturally, socially, and politically,
or social development are examples of
variables in this approach; or an international level approach, with use of variables like the rank of N o r w a y in the
international system, its memberships in
regional groupings with specific culture,
ideology, polity, etc.
We shall not explore systematically
these different possible approaches to an
explanation of the Norwegian elite thinking, but merely point to some features we
believe basic to such an explanation.
Generally, we believe that social background variables so often used in opinion
surveys are of little use in this context;
this is shown convincingly by Edinger and
Searing. Studies using the national level
approach show that Norway is a relatively
homogeneous, consensus-motivated country, although there is some dispute on the
degree and exact 'type' of homogeneity.
6
7
We feel that the international level approach in important respects is the most
interesting and possibly the most fruitful
in this context. As N o r w a y is a small
country (on several variables used to
measure magnitude) with little influence
on world affairs and peace-or-war matters,
her elite or decision-makers are to a large
extent influenced, in their thinking and
policies, by outside events and actors.
It is therefore basic to our problem what
position Norway has in the system.
Briefly, Norway's position is that of a
center country. A center country (as
opposed to a periphery one) is centrally
placed in the communication network, is
rich (high G N P and/or G N P per capita),
is urbanized and industrialized (i.e.
' m o d e r n ' ) , is white. Its world view will
largely be determined by its position:
it has m u c h to defend — greater and more
values than the periphery nation. On a
'radical vs. conservative' dimension, it will
tend towards the conservative e n d : it will
be status quo- more than change-oriented;
will prefer stability in international relations and thus tend towards stability in its
o w n p o l i c y ; will be gradualistic and not
absolutistic.
8
T h e small center country like N o r w a y
will not aspire to a higher rank or position
in the system: it will be content with its
high rank on several important dimensions
(development, etc.) and accept the fact
that it is l o w on influence and power,
although this points to a certain disequilibration in its total rank. T h e small nation,
however, may increase its influence through
international co-operation; we expect this
assumption to be strongly held among
elite persons in a center nation like
Norway. Such an assumption may be
based on evaluations of co-operation experiences as such; or it may be explained
by sheer necessity: N o r w a y is economically
(and is at least perceived to be so militarily) dependent on the outside world,
more specifically Western co-operation.
This fact, together with its general p o sition and the feeling that Norway's
influence does not reach very far, means
that the Norwegian elite will emphasize
middle-range or middle level world perspectives — be regionalistic or subsystem-oriented more than globalistic.
9
10
3. Peace thinking: an elite profile
Operationally, we shall think of a profile as a set of responses to stimuli which
present concrete aspects of international
life. T h e profile has both cognitive and
evaluative elements.
T h e respondents were asked several
questions on the present and the future
world situation which inter alia elicited
their perceptions and evaluations of international conflict potential and actual or
possible threats to peace. Here we shall
only note that the Norwegian elite seems
rather optimistic about the future world,
which it believes will be more integrated,
more co-operative, less conflict-dominated,
partially disarmed, m o r e dominated by
technology, and at least as egalitarian
(concerning the gap between rich and
p o o r countries) as today, and more developed generally.
Before we proceed to the peace profile,
let us ' o p e n ' the minds of the elite persons
by giving their preferences for an immediate or short-range peace policy (Table 3 ) .
T h e y were asked what measures they
deemed the most important to-day to
secure international peace. T h e responses
may be compared with responses on the
list of peace proposals which will be presented below and which implies the more
principal or long-range preferences of the
respondents. T h e short-range preferences
may also be used to validate the long-range
ones.
Table 3. Preferred immediate peace-making
measures. %
Strengthen international co-operation/the
UN
24
Further East-West détente and understanding 17
Keep the balance of power
10
Agreement on non-proliferation treaty...
10
Disarmament and arms control measures.
9
Close the 'gap' between the rich and poor
countries/give more TA and aid to development
9
Solve the Vietnam conflict
3
Other
10
NA/DK
8
Total
100
(N)
(88)
T h e preferences go clearly in the direction assumed: co-operation and stability.
Elite preferences for main short-range
goals of Norwegian foreign policy underline the tendency: détente and co-operation
rank on top (with 2 5 % and 1 7 % , respectively). Let us then turn to the peace
profile.
11
151
150
Table 4. Th optiTTUll peace profile of the elite. %&
Proposal/
item
number
14
4
6
13
9
10
15
8
3
11
2
16
Proposal is:
We must strengthen the UN ........
Abolish hunger and poverty in the
world .........................
Rich countries must give more help to
poor ............................................
Western countries must increase contact with East .........................
General and complete disarmament
must be realized ...............
There must be a military balance between the states so that nobody
dare'! to attack ......................
We must strengthen regional organizations ..............................
The military alliances must be preserved ........................
The states must become more democratic ...............................
The individual man must be educated
to peace ......................
Statelt that naturally belong together
must co-operate .......................
Relations between individuals must
become more peaceful ..........
The World State must be established
as soon as possible
There must be fewer states in the
world ...................................
The small countries must have greater
influence ..................................
The nations must become more similar
.......
12
7
5
&
'Espe- 'Some'Unimdally
what portant 'Against
impor- importo
peace'
tant to tant to peace'
peace' peace'
0
..............
A/
DK Total
79
17
0
0
4
100
69
21
3
0
7
100
60
31
60
29
4
58
19
4
58
25
3
0
5
100
0
10
100
0
19
100
13
100
42
47
3
0
8
100
38
42
3
4
13
100
36
46
13
0
5
100
35
55
10
0
0
100
28
47
10
14
100
28
33
21
18
100
24
15
18
42
100
10
22
47
20
100
8
7
47
45
23
31
22
16
100
100
0
0
1
N = 72, as 16 of the total 88 in the elite sample did not fill out the questionnaire.
A list of peace proposals was presented
to the respondents in a questionnaire.
This list of 16 items of course does not
contain all the important, relevant p r o p o sals which have been put forward, but it
does represent a fair sample of such proposals, selected to meet certain purposes.
In T a b l e 4 the numbers at the left indicate
in what order the proposals were presented
to the respondents; these numbers will
later be used to represent the particular
proposal.
T h e proposals are in T a b l e 4 ranked
according to degree of favorable responses
they got, i.e. according to preference. This
ranking gives us the ideal peace-making
programme of the elite — what we shall
call its 'optimal peace profile'.
We see that the results presented in
T a b l e 3 to a large extent resemble and
thus validate the optimal peace profile.
Co-operation (items 14, 15, 8, and 11)
ranks high, détente (item 13) also. N e w is
that measures connected with the p r o b lems of the developing and p o o r countries
rank high (next to strengthening the U N )
in the profile, while they rank l o w on the
list of immediate peace-making measures
(Table 3) and on preferences for Norwegian foreign policy. This means the
developing countries and the ' g a p ' are
perceived as more long-range problems;
in fact, responses on a question of predictions about future problems or tasks
fit very well with this argument. O r :
the elite talks about these problems b e cause they are part of a general b o d y of
items which one ought to talk about nowadays; but it does not work them into
p o l i c y ; or it postpones their policy implications.
12
T h e varying N A / D K responses m a y
explain some of the variance in the
'especially important to peace' category,
which we use as the basis for ranking.
Apart from the disarmament item, h o w ever, most of the items high on N A / D K
are at the bottom of the list anyway: they
are seen as decisively less important. In
general, a high N A / D K score may be
taken as a sign of uncertainty as to whether
the proposal is peace-making or not.
W h a t we have called the optimal peace
profile is not necessarily indicative of policy
preferences. Before becoming policy, the
ideal peace programme passes through
a 'filtering' process, or several processes.
O n e such 'filter' is the respondents'
perceptions of h o w 'the real world' meets
the ideal proposals and makes them
'realistic' — applicable or workable — or
not. Another 'filter' is the fundamental
attitudes or personality structures of the
respondents.
In fact these and other possible filters
influence each other and jointly influence
peace thinking; they are isolated for
theoretical purposes. T h e use of the c o n cept filter may also be somewhat misleading : in the mere evaluation of the different
peace proposals (the optimal profile) both
both affective and cognitive factors are at
work. T h e cognitions of the respondent
m a y have a decisive influence on his preferences, making him prefer what he perceives as realistic, and vice versa. Thus it
m a y be incorrect to say that the filter
comes in at a second stage in the process
of profile building.
However, the exact 'place' of the different factors in the processual sequence
is not a main problem here, or an especially
relevant one. T h e process is schematically
presented in Figure 1. T h e end result of
the process — the policy outcome — we
shall call the 'operational peace profile'.
I
I
(filters)
I fundamental
II
~I attitudeS'YalUe~
Optimal I<!
I
peace
I
profile
I
t
I
I
I
~
~:cO&nit::ns,p}rcePtionl
(preferences'
ideolou)
I
I
Operational
peace
profile
of "real world"
(policy)
I
Fig. 1.
Fundamental attitudes which may work
as a filter are for instance 'anti-communist'
feelings, which 'filter out' East-West
détente, or regionalism — strong loyalties
to specific regional co-operation frameworks — which will to some extent 'filter
out' the globalistic proposals represented
by ' W e must strengthen the U N ' (at the
cost of ' W e must strengthen regional c o operation'). In fact, both examples are
supported by our d a t a .
13
In the following, we shall concentrate
on the cognitive filter in the process. It
was introduced simply by asking the
respondents if the believed that they respective proposals for world peace were
'realistic' or 'unrealistic' — whether or
not they might be carried through in the
short or in the long run. T h e results are
shown in T a b l e 5. By calculating the percentage difference between the preference
and the perceived 'realism' of the specific
items, we get the 'trust status' of each item.
If a highly preferred proposal is seen as
highly unrealistic, this proposal represents
an extremely (fotrusted peace proposal.
A highly realistic proposal which is less
preferred might on the contrary be called
a trusted peace proposal, etc. We shall
155
I52
Table 5.
5. Perceptions
Perceptions of
of'realistic'
',ealistu' peace
peaee proposals:
proposals :the
theelite.
elite. %
%
'Especially
important
'Realistic'
,
to peace'
peace
r
Strengthen the UN ...••..............•.....
Abolish hunger and poverty .................•
Rich countries help poor ...•..•..•.........•
West contact with East .•....................
G & C disarmament •......................•
Military terror balance
.
Strengthen regional org's •........••.........
Preserve alliances
.
More democratic states ......•...............
Individual educated to peace ..••........•..••
Co-operation between 'natural partners' ......•
Better inter-indiv. reI. ......•.....•...•..•...
World State realized as soon as possible .....•..
Fewer states in the world ..................•..
Small countries more infl. . .•................
Nations more similar .................•......
79
69
60
60
58
58
42
38
36
35
28
28
24
10
8
7
61
42
·"••lIlm'
peru:ptlon
«
_
'Un, j . .%.
realistic'
diHerel
realistic
difference*
U n
7
26
64
7
69
0 /
-18
-27
49
10
70
36
3
33
68
6
10
74
63
46
61
I
4
32
25
50
24
10
Medium
14
I
35
74
46
26
7
-18
9
32
25
39
19
68
35
6
19
33
26
40
a
19
60
We shall use another method of grouping, however: a differentiation on each
dimension of the c o m b i n e d preference —
realism perception scale between three
levels: high, medium, and low. This
method gives us four groups of proposals:
HighjHigh: proposals 13, 10, 6 and 14
High/Medium: proposals 1 5 , 8 , 4 , 1,9 and 11
Medium\Medium: proposals 3 and 2
60
'9
'- -- - -------~~Q- --- --_.-
-40
2
o
70
I
L
30
Medium/Low, or
Low/Low: proposals 7, 5, 16 and 12
T h e broken lines in the Figure indicate
the cuts between the three levels mentioned; the range of the levels are somewhat larger on the 'realism' dimension
because of the higher average percentage
score on that dimension. T h e cuts roughly
are m a d e according to the clustering
trends where the distance between t w o
items following next to each other on the
dimension in question is the greatest.
T h e order of listing the different p r o posals also may indicate their relative rank
within the cluster or group, since it corresponds roughly to their distance from
the broken line indicating the level they
are closest to.
T a b l e 5 shows that on several items the
difference between degree of preference
and degree of realism perception is c o n siderable. This largely answers questions
about the relation between affective and
cognitive aspects in the respondents' thinking.
---- ------
50
20
Low
12 0
10
160
10
Figure 2 indicates 7 clusters of items,
if arithmetical proximity is taken as a
measure of clustering: 13, 10 and 6; 14;
1 5 , 1 1 , 1 and 8; 4 and 9; 3 and 2; 7, 5 and
12; and 16.
10 0 0
9
-22
Difference 'Realistic' — 'Especially important to peace'. The average score for all 16 items
was 8% higher on the response 'Realistic' than on 'Especially important to peace' — 4 8 % and
4 0 % , respectively. For a better or more direct comparison between the different proposals, we
might take a weighted difference score where the average percentage difference is taken into consideration, i.e. — 8% is added to each difference score in the right column.
soon return to this problem. Let us first
present the operational peace profile of
the elite.
We do this by 'sewing' the two dimensions — preference and perception of
realism — together in one matrix, where
the y axis represents realism, the x axis
preference. We plot in the percentage of
each single item on each of the two axes
and get one point in the matrix for each
item. This is shown in Figure 2 (next p a g e ) .
13
11
HI&h
20
Low
30
50
-40
Medium
70
60
80
HI&h
Preference
Fig. 2
A more general test of this difference is
the Spearman's rank correlation. Correlating ranks on the preference and the
'realism' perception dimension, we get a
rho of 0.33, which gives even better support
to the conclusion that the affective-cognitive difference is considerable. How c o n siderable it is, however, must be decided
on a comparative basis. Festinger has
worked with and given possible solutions
to the problem of cognitive dissonance.
We believe that m u c h of what has been
said about that problem can be applied to
the problem of affective-cognitive differences or dissonances.
We shall test the hypothesis that the elite,
in spite of the difference or dissonance
found, is relatively more affective-cognitive
consonant than other (or lower) social
strata. M o r e generally, the hypothesis is
that consonance increases with increasing
14
social position. While we shall not be able
to test satisfactorily here this general
hypothesis, let us compare the elite and
the opinion-makers, on w h o m we have
comparable data.
T h e basis for the first mentioned hypothesis is the assumption that the elite person 'cannot live with' a very dissonant profile; this is more or less inconsistent with
his position. He is largely responsible for
policy-making. In the feed-back system
of deciding policy, carrying it out, and
receiving reactions to it, there will
generally be a process of adjusting the
cognitive and affective aspects to each
other, so that the two sides of the dissonant
affective-cognitive structure converge; or
so that one side is made more concordant
with the other, unilaterally.
For example, when policy initiated by
the optimal peace profile meets drastically
154
155
a
Table 6. Most 'trusted' and 'distrusted' peace proposals
Most 'trusted'
.
40
32
26
25
17
Abolish hunger and poverty in the world
General and complete disarmament . . .
Strengthen the UN
Establish the World State
—27
—22
—18
—18
For explanations and comments, see footnote to Table 5.
and/or several times in a sequence of
policy initiatives, with a reality which was
not presupposed, and the policy does not
work, the ideal policy is m a d e more c o n cordant with reality.
Another reasoning speaks against the
hypothesis. There m a y in a foreign policy
elite be some influx of 'quasi-preferences' —
peace policies preferred as a tribute to
e.g. the democratic structure of the society,
but not really felt. M o s t elite persons are
representatives of (in some cases dependent
upon) other strata — the people, and must
pay 'lip service' to peace thinking strongly
held in influential parts of the opinion.
T h e y compensate for this 'restriction'
of their o w n true ideology by degrading
the 'tributary' peace philosophies on the
cognitive side, i.e. making them 'unrealistic'.
This point m a y be seen as another or
third filter mechanism. Furthermore, it
m a y explain the considerable cognitiveaffective dissonance in the case of our elite
sample. We still think, however, that our
hypothesis is reasonable. This is also verified, as the opinion-maker sample has a
Spearman's rho of — 0 . 1 0 .
1 5
Another expression of the cognitiveaffective dissonance is the 'trust' or 'distrust'
of the different proposals, already introduced. T h e measure of trust is the percentage difference between 'realism' perception and preference, as shown in
T a b l e 5. In T a b l e 6 we give the most
'trusted' and the most 'distrusted' proposals. T h e last item in each column is not
evaluated as having m u c h importance to
peace and will be left uncommented here.
T h e others point to a clearer picture of the
content of the cognitive-affective dissonance and to some propositions for
further research.
T h a t the 'Start with the individual'
approach is so m u c h trusted is probably
due to a general ideology in the N o r wegian society, stressing individualism and
possibly Christian conceptions of man's
duties and deeds.
A comparison of the two arms policy
items listed in T a b l e 6 — 'Disarmament'
and 'Preserve alliances' — indicates that
'tough' proposals are trusted, 'soft' ones
distrusted (the two proposals mentioned
taken to represent 'soft' and 'tough' policies, respectively). T w o other arms
policy proposals — ' K e e p the balance'
(tough) and ' M o r e West contact with
East' (soft) — do not support such an
hypothesis, however, even if they do not
go against it (cf. T a b l e 5 ) . This point
needs more exploration.
That to abolish hunger and poverty all
over the world emerges as the most distrusted, is not astonishing. M o r e interesting and perhaps remarkable is that to
strengthen the UN — the proposal ranking
in the top category of the operational
peace profile — ranks number three
among the most 'distrusted' proposals.
This literally breaks the neat line which
the profile is drawing u p : to strengthen the
U N , although ranking top on both the
optimal and the operational profile, will
'in the real life' of politics or policy-making
be a less attractive or useful proposal, i.e.
more of the H i g h / M e d i u m type of proposals.
Even more convincing is such an argument if we assume — as we feel is quite
%
Level
Optimal
profile
average
Realism
perception
average
Optimalrealistic
diHerence
average
Global
.
Inter-regional ..............................•...
Intra-regional ..........................•...•...
ational
.
Sub-national/indo
.
57.5
54.0
35.0
15.25
31.5
36.5
66.0
71.0
31.0
48.0
-21.0
12.0
36.0
15.75
16.5
Most 'distrusted'
Co-operation between natural partners
Strengthen regional organizations
Educate individuals to peace
Preserve alliances
More influence to small states
a
Table 7. Level orientation in elite peau thinking.
fair — that policy-makers stick to 'realistic
policies' if they have to choose between
the preferred or optimal and the 'realistic',
or if they see that the m u c h preferred
but not so m u c h 'realistic' policy line over
time is not working or even does not turn
out as m o r e 'realistic'. Thus we have to
upgrade the 'realist' perception side of
the operational profile, which in turn
means that the M e d i u m preference/High
realism proposals emerge as relatively
more operational. A n d — it means that
the regionalistic, middle-range proposals,
which also are the most 'trusted', b e c o m e
the policy.
This was exactly what we assumed or
hypothesized: regional peace policies are
m o r e operational than global ones in the
thinking of the elite. ('Alliances' and
'natural partners' generally indicate regionalism.) T h e regional-global dimension
moreover, raises a problem of a m o r e
general character: whether and to what
extent one or more specific level in the total
international system is preferred for peacemaking policies. (By the 'total international system' we think of a structure
ranging from the global (top) system level
to the individual (bottom) intra-personal
level.)
O n e of the purposes of the choice of
proposals presented was that they should
represent the different levels of the system.
It may be discussed whether or not the
representation is the best one or even satisfactory; this will not be done h e r e . Let
us briefly show the structural set-up (levels
specified) and which items represent the
different levels:
16
global items
interregionala "
intraregional
"
national
"
subnational
"
individual "
1,2,5, 13
3, 4, 6, 8
7, 11
9,14,15,16
I
I Item
numbers:
see
Table 4
12
10
a
This is separated from 'global' because it
stresses relations between specific groupings in
the global system, — rich versus poor countries, East versus West, etc.; it may, in that
respect, also or even more be separated from the
regional (= intra-regional) level.
T h e two lowest levels, the sub-national
and the individual ( = intra-personal), are
c o m b i n e d in T a b l e 7; the distinction b e tween them is not essential to our problem
here. We get what m a y be called the level
orientation of the elite by taking average
scores for all items categorized as shown
above.
In T a b l e 7, the regional-global dimension is even better evidenced. T h e ' W o r l d
state' proposal, which scores extremely low
on 'realism' and very l o w on preference,
of course contributes heavily to the relative
l o w average score on these two variables.
Even excluding this item, however, the
optimal-realistic difference or discrepancy
is not reduced: indeed it is slightly increased (the scores being, in the order
indicated in the T a b l e , 6 9 , 4 6 , and 31 % ) .
From all this, we m a y conclude that the
Norwegian elite in its thinking about
peace does not ' g o to extremes': it neither
prefers, neither perceives as very realistic
156
157
Table 8. Affective-eognitiDe dissoTIiUIU and personality types
Table 9. Elite versus opinion-makers on some selected proposals. %
Preference :
H~
High
'Realism' perception:
UW
The consonant or well balanced 'The cynic' or 'The sheer realist'
uw
'The sheer idealist'/
'The disillwioned'
the ' W o r l d state' or ' O n e world' approach
nor the 'Start with the individual'
( U N E S C O , psychological) or the 'group
therapy' (inter-individual, micro-sociological) approach to peace. An operational
Norwegian peace policy which seems to put
emphasis on the m e d i u m level while the
optimal is on the global, reflects again the
feeling on the part of the elite that Norway's foreign-policy-making possibilities
(and to a certain extent peace-making possibilities generally) are on the regional level.
T h e question of affective-cognitive dissonance raises the p r o b l e m : what are the
possible or probable consequences of dissonance, especially to individuals with a
highly dissonant p r o f i l e ? A m o n g other
factors, this depends on the intensity with
which the ideas concerned are held, how
unrealistic they are thought to be, and
for how long such feelings and thoughts exist.
17
A person with a peace profile high on
preference, l o w on realism may be a 'sheer
idealist' able to live well with his dissonant
peace thinking. Or he may not be able to
do that and end in frustration or disillusion,
which m a y further result in forms of
desperate action, or in inaction. He will
perhaps blame the world ('it is rotten,
nothing will work') or his leaders ('they
don't want peace, really'; 'they are the
true causes of w a r ' ) . A study of the British
Peace Pledge U n i o n — an organization
of 'radical peace activists' — has given
some evidence on this.
18
Another position m a y be that of a
' c y n i c ' or 'realist': peace proposals are
not highly preferred or evaluated, but the
measures or methods they indicate are
seen as quite realistic. T h e various per-
'The withdrawer:
the out of-this-world man'
sonality types we may draw from such
reasoning on affective-cognitive dissonance can be listed schematically as in
T a b l e 8.
Consonant personalities are found on
the L o w / L o w to High/High diagonal axis.
T h e elite person will generally be found
at the High/High end of the axis, while
lower social strata will spread to the other
four categories. But there are, as has been
shown, important exceptions to this picture: a considerable part of the elite is
placed in one of the two dissonant High/
L o w categories.
T h e opinion-makers, w h o were shown
to have a more dissonant profile than the
elite, are more free to be dissonant and (at
least from some parts of society) probably
are expected to be more so. This group,
standing between the elite and the general
opinion, in some respect must represent
both 'sheer realism' and 'sheer idealism':
it shall compensate for the lack of such
positions or personalities in the elite and
at the same time give vent to such more
or less manifest attitudes among the
general opinion.
T h e relative dissonance among the
opinion-makers seems to be in particular
due to a greater percentage of 'idealists'
in the sample. This is indicated by T a b l e 9,
which contrasts the elite and the opinionmakers on some selected items. T h e
opinion-makers are shown as more 'soft'
and more 'idealistic' (believe more in the
individual and the W o r l d State approach).
Interestingly, while the two samples differ
markedly on the preference they attach
to the different proposals, there is striking
agreement between them as to h o w
Keep the balance
Preserve alliances
Educate individuals to peace
Establish the World State
.
.
.
.
'realistic' they deem the poposals to b e .
This explains m u c h of the relative dissonance of the opinion-makers.
4. The projection hypotheses
In 4.1 we test what we shall call the
ultra-center hypothesis; in 4.2 we shall test
some assumptions about differences b e tween the elite, the opinion-makers, and
the general opinion.
Data for the test of these hypotheses
will cover peace thinking, attitudes toward
several important foreign policy dimensions, and attitudes toward disarmament.
These data are taken from the author's o w n
study, from several general opinion surveys
conducted in N o r w a y from 1964 to 1967,
and from a youth study m a d e at the end
of 1967.
4.1. The ultra-center hypothesis
Galtung's theory of foreign policy
opinion as a function of social position
is n o w well established. O n e specific
aspect from this theory will be the object
of our analysis: the idea that we may project the opinion of one or more social
groups, whose opinion we want to know,
from the opinion (which is known) of
other social groups, if we know the social
position of these last groups and position
of the group (s) whose opinion we want,
relative to those groups. Social position is
determined by use of the Galtung index of
social rank. T h e projection idea implies
that we literally m a y draw a line through
the opinion scores of the rank categories
on the scale from 1 to 8. O u r hypothesis
is that the foreign policy elite by o p inion is an ultra-center, i.e. by opinion
represents a 'prolongation' on the peri20
'Especially
important to peace'
E
OM
58
34
38
22
35
.w
24
36
'Realistic'
E
OM
68
64
63
61
6
63
59
10
phery-center line of the center (category 8 ) .
T h e hypothesis evidently raises several
problems and even objections, some methodological, some theoretical. O u r original
study was not built on the social position
index; consequently, we are not able to
assert the position of the elite on that
index. We may, however safely say that it
is not on the average rank 8, rather something between 6 and 7 .
21
Furthermore, Galtung's theory is built
on the conception of society as a system
ranging from periphery (0) to center (8)
— there is no rank 9 or 10 or anything
'outside' the system. T h e projection idea
thus seems both theoretically and logically
irrelevant. O u r hypothesis, however, is
based not on this conception of the system
with definite 'borders', but on the very
opinion curves which the system produces.
Generally, the problem is this: where does
the elite stand in relation to such a curve ?
It was mentioned that the elite is not
a center group (according to the 8 variables
of the Galtung i n d e x ) : does it not follow
from this that the hypothesis is unreasonable ? This is not the case.
Several dimensions, which may be called
structural factors and which do not go into
the social position index, explain the point.
T h e elite is placed within or close to the
society's nucleus of foreign policy c o m munication and decision-making. It c o m municates m o r e extensively and intensively about foreign policy and international political matters, than other
(secondary) social groups. Thus, socialization to opinions dominant within
the elite is relatively intense and effective;
159
158
M o r e crudely, the center (8) is not
structurally sewn together as the elite is
— it is a social category, not a social group.
Y o u can socialize people in that category
because they pay more attention to information and opinions circulated, but
y o u cannot exclude deviant persons from
it as y o u m a y do through recruitment and
promotion in the elite.
,
,0"
:
:
// 1
/
I
:.t:---~
opinion
posItiOn
1- _
I
I
I
-_
,
I
I
I
I
I
8
I
-9 c
I
nnk 8
rank 0
I
I
I
The elite
social position
Fig. 3
social position
Fig. 3
Another p r o b l e m is the question of what
implications to society and to the elite
itself the opinion position of the foreign
policy elite, relative to that of other social
strata, might have under specific conditions. T h e problem is illustrated in Figure
3. T h e unbroken line from 0 to rank 8
is arbitrarily drawn. Three possible elite
opinion positions are indicated by A, B,
and C. T h e y have different consequences
for the relations between the elite and the
rest of society.
W h a t further implications these systems have or m a y have depends on the
society — whether it is homogeneous (on
other dimensions than foreign policy
matters), developed, informed or educated, content with the foreign policy in
question and has the means to criticize
and sanction the elite etc. — and on the
elite — what role it plays or is supposed
to play: whether its role is to initiate, to
lead or guide the opinion, or to go only
as far and as fast as the average opinion
is willing to g o . W h a t system is the most
stable in the sense that the elite's opinion
position is accepted and will be the basis
for policy over time? W h i c h system is
the more efficient in the way that policies,
once decided upon, are carried out and
work?
In the case of Norway, it is tempting to
say that the system B will be the most
stable and probably also the most efficient.
B avoids an opinion gap which m a y be
disastrous in splitting the society, it fits
well into a relatively educated and foreign
policy interested society, and it avoids
challenges to the elite from the center.
In system C, we might expect that the
center w o u l d produce opposition towards
the elite's opinions and policies because
they were 'lagging behind' their own, and
stand out as an alternative elite, challenging the existing one.
22
Table 10. The ultra-center hypothesis: ratio of positive to negative response
Norway should continue in N A T O
Norway should become a full member of the E E C *
Norway should give help to developing countries
that want to build their own merchant marine
Norway should give customs duty preferences to
developing countries
Norway should make closer ties with:
NATO/Nordic countries
Average ratio
CO
m u c h the same information is distributed
and consumed a m o n g elite persons. Furthermore, individuals are recruited to the
elite much on the basis of allegiance to
such dominant opinions ; and expectations
of within-elite career make for conformity.
Generally, there is a relatively strong
building-up of consensus. It is definitely not
1 0 0 % : there are some alternative opinion
formation channels within the elite, as
indicated by the peace thinking differences ; but these generally cover only small
minorities, because m u c h of the meaning
of an elite set-up with most of the decisionmaking responsibility attached to it is
to keep those channels narrow and sparsely
populated.
A represents the 'autocratic' foreign
policy system; the distance between the
elite and the rest, including the center
categories, is great (measured along
the vertical axis; the distance from the
point rank 8 to the elite on the horizontal axis is arbitrary and only for
illustration purposes); there is an
'opinion gap' between the elite and the
different opinion strata. B is the
'guided democracy' model, or the oligarcic
model. In this system the elite stands
close to the center of society, reflects
centrist opinion, is possibly recruited
by the center. C is the 'democractic'
system where the elite reflects and
represents a medium or an average of
the opinion of the whole society.
1
3
6
1.5
0.8
1.6
1.0
2.9
1.9
3.6
2.7
Elite
17.2
7.7
0.5
0.5
0.7
1.0
1.5
0.5
0.2
0.4
1.2
3.7
0.4
0.7
0.4
0.7
0.5
1.3
0.7
1.8
2.0
6.4
* The data for the rank categories are taken from a national survey made in 1964 which gave
a total of 4 4 % for, 3 3 % against a Norwegian application for full membership in the E E C . A similar
survey made in 1967 gave 5 4 % for and 2 1 % against. Thus the ratios for the rank categories are
higher now, probably much like those given on the question of N A T O .
Considering that Norwegian foreign
policy generally has not been and is not
very m u c h disputed, it is equally tempting
to hypothesize that the Norwegian system
actually is of type B, and that the elite as
an ultra-center thus is not too 'far' from
the center. Let us n o w turn to the data to
explore this further.
In T a b l e 10, this ultra-center hypothesis is tested. Five items on w h i c h we have
data both from the rank categories and
the elite are presented. For each item,
the responses of 4 ranks — 1, 3, 6 and 8
— are given together with the elite responses in ratios of positive to negative
response.
23
T h e hypothesis is clearly verified in all
five cases. If we take the average ratio
on all items, the curve drawn through the
opinion scores represented by the ratios
is quite steep: it points to the 'autocratic'
model.
M o s t of the difference between the
center category (8) and the elite is, h o w ever, due to two items — N A T O and E E C
membership. These are key foreign policy
questions in N o r w a y , in the opinion of the
elite itself. O r , more generally: Western
co-operation is the key field and very
much the policy-determining field in the
framework of Norwegian foreign p o l i c y .
It is part of the elite's role to keep this
field as 'clean' or intact as possible and to
secure as great a consensus as possible on it,
24
hence the high positive-negative ratios.
On the other questions related to foreign
aid, the differences are m u c h smaller between the elite and the rest.
We get further indication of the i m portance of these questions by comparing
the decision-makers' attitudes towards
them, with those of the elite. T h e decisionmaking b o d y within the elite m a y be seen
as an even stronger consensus-building
b o d y when it comes to the crucial foreign
policy questions. Although it is undesirable to carry the ultra-center idea too far,
we shall test the hypothesis that the
decision-makers within the elite in those
questions which the elite estimates as the
most crucial ones, constitute an ultraultra-center.
To designate the decision-maker group
we had to use subjective criteria — the
respondents' o w n evaluation of their
position within the decision-making framework. Certain objective criteria, which
will not be dealt with here, seem to give
a fairly positive validation of the subjective
judgment.
In T a b l e 11, the 5 items used in T a b l e
10 are presented together with responses
on the question of whether the respondents
agreed upon the principle that parts of
the national military forces should be
placed under U N c o m m a n d and whether
they agreed that Norwegian aid to the
developing countries should be increased.
161
160
Table
Table 12. The optimism vs. pessimism dimension: t~e .case of disarmament consequences. Ratio of optimistic
to pesstmutu: responses
II. The ultra-ultra center hypothesis: ratio of positive to negative responses
Continued NATO membership ....•.•..............•..•.•
Full EEC membership ...........•..........•.........•.
Parts of the National forces under UN command •..•...••...
Increased orwegian aid to the developing countries
.
Merchant marine assistance to the developing countries ...•..
Customs duty preferences to the developing countries ..•.....
Closer ties with: NATO/Nordic countries ..•....•...........
T h e hypothesis is again satisfactorily
verified. As expected, the distance is the
greatest on the two most crucial questions,
N A T O and the E E C . In one case — the
question of merchant marine assistance
to developing countries — there is g o o d
reason to say that rejection of the general
trend towards a higher ratio for the
decision-makers confirms the hypothesis:
the merchant marine is the most valuable
branch of Norwegian exports of goods and
services, especially in securing a fairly
favorable balance of payment. Such
considerations of this fact m a y well underlie
the attitude of the decision-makers.
Disarmament
We shall n o w proceed to the disarmament data. Several questions asked in a
national opinion survey in 1964 were included in our present study. O u r purpose
here is partly to test the projection hypothesis, partly to shed some light on the relations between 'leaders' and 'masses'
with respect to three specific dimensions,
the theoretical basis of which has been
given by Galtung. - T h e y are these: the
optimism-pessimism dimension, measured
by the respondents' expectations about
the consequences of disarmament; the
gradualism-absolutism dimension, which
gives the respondents' preference as to h o w
the disarmament process should be started
and carried out ; and the confidence versus
distrust dimension — the perceptions of or
expectations about the parties involved in
a disarmament process and their behavior.
2
5
T h e results are presented as ratios,
largely because in our study we included
Total elite
17.2
7.7
7.7
5.0
1.5
3.7
2.0
Decision-makers
31.3
15.0
15.0
6.7
0.8
4.5
7.0
a middle (ambivalent) response category
not used in the 1964 study, and this m a d e
the percentage scores as such less c o m parable. T h e questions are listed as they
appeared before the respondents (in the
opinion study in an interview guide, in
our study in a questionnaire).
On the prospects of achieving disarmament in the future, the elite is more optimistic than the general o p i n i o n . Does
this mean that the elite also is m o r e
optimistic about the international c o n sequences of disarmament? Generally we
w o u l d expect the opposite: elite persons
are less inclined to expect great results
from even important measures; international problems are not 'that easy' —
disarmament is not a panacea to those
problems. We find it difficult to present any
hypothesis on this basis. T a b l e 12, where the
data are given, in fact justifies this.
26
T a b l e 12 shows no clear tendency:
what seems to be a 'promising' trend on
the question of e c o n o m i c consequences is
broken by a contrary trend on the other
item. Perhaps the elite sees the e c o n o m i c
differences as too great to handle even if
one transfers arms expenditures to development (the logical thought in this c o n n e c tion) and even m o r e so than the other
groups; at the same time the elite sees no
contradiction between the idea that the
world will b e c o m e more stable after disarmament and the idea that conflicts m a y
still o c c u r : in fact several elite respondents
say s o ; and the score on the middle
response category on this question is 2 2 % .
Evidently we need m o r e data to clear
up the point.
A. Economic differences will disappear throughout the world
if disarmament is achieved
0.7
Economic differences will exist even if disarmament is
achieved.
B. Disarmament will create greater stability and peace-keeping possibilities in the world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1
Serious conflicts may arise even if disarmament is
achieved in the world.
3
6
8
Elite
0.5
0.3
0.3
0.2
1.5
0.7
0.5
1.2
N=IOOO
In Galtung's study, the hypothesis that
the center is gradualistic, the periphery
absolutistic, was relatively well established.
This gives us reason to believe that a projection, as has been made on other dimensions, is safe also in this case. O u r
hypothesis then is that degree of gradualism increases from the periphery through
the center to the elite. T h e results are
shown in T a b l e 13.
In only one case — question B — is the
projection hypothesis verified, although
the trend in the remaining two cases is
in the expected direction. T h e results on
these two items point to the 'democratic'
model presented a b o v e : the center (8)
category is extremely gradualistic, m u c h
more so than the elite. M a y this be taken
as some kind of a 'warning' to the elite
from the center that arms policies ought
not to be experimented w i t h ?
We should mention that the phrasing
of the response alternative in some in-
stances was modified or moderated in our
study, relative to that used in the opinion
study. This was done because the pre-test
showed a certain annoyance on the part
of elite respondents towards a too absolutistic content or phrasing in the alternatives. (See example in footnote to
T a b l e 13.) This 'gradualism' in the very
response alternatives m a y of course account
for some bias in the responses, making the
absolutistic (moderated) alternative more
acceptable to the elite persons. Generally,
however, such a bias is not believed to have
had any decisive influence, and it can hardly
account for the extreme center gradualism.
T h e third dimension we intend to explore is the confidence vs. distrust dimension. Galtung calls it the 'simplicity vs.
distrust d i l e m m a ' . This implies that he
combines t w o somewhat separate dimensions in o n e : first, the perception of
the disarmament process as easy or difficult (once started); second, the perception
26
Table 13. Absolutism versus gradualism: the projection hypothesis. Ratio of gradualistic to absolutistic
responses
A. We should be careful and take one step at a time ......
We should try to carry out disarmament as quickly as
possible.
B. We should start with some selected areas of the world ...
We should disarm throughout the whole world at once.
C. We should start with some weapons, for instance atomic
ones, and then take other weapons afterwards ..........
We should try to abolish all kinds of weapons at the
same time. a
I
2.0
3
1.6
6
1.8
8
5.7
Elite
2.7
0.4
0.5
0.5
0.8
1.2
2.8
2.8
4.1
18.6
5.3
aThe alternative was in our study phrased' - in a shorter time span' instead of 'at the same time'.
162
Table 14. The paMcea problem: ratro
163
of 'disann first • to 'confidence first , responses
1
We should start with disarmament to create confidence. . .. .
We should create confidence first and then disarm.
1.0
3
1.0
6
0.8
8
0.6
Elite
0.4
hypothesis, although some cases do give
support to it. T h e three dimensions explored show no clear picture either.
4.2. Differences between the elite, the opinion-
These findings lead into the remaining
three indicators used to test the confidence
versus distrust dimension. From what has
been found so far, the most reasonable
hypothesis w o u l d be that the elite is less
confident than the rank categories, between which Galtung found no clear difference ; thus we may not hypothesize any
projection in this case.
to be g o o d reason to distinguish between
the two dimensions included in the
'simplicity versus distrust' index and to
treat them separately; the data indicate
this.
T h e elite seems to be definitely more
distrustful on the question of h o w the
process should be dealt with once started
(the inspection question), while it is more
confident than the opinion categories c o n cerning to what extent the actors in the
process can be trusted (not to attack or
'cheat' the others). This perhaps reflects
the double position of the elite: on the one
hand, it is responsible for the management
of a disarmament process and has no interest in telling the world that this is an easy
task; on the other hand, the elite deals with
elites in other countries, and this tends to
create a certain possibly unconscious feeling
of solidarity: the elites of other actors are
to some extent defended against the suspicion of one's o w n public opinion. T h e
tendency is not very clear, however; on
the question of hiding weapons the elite is
also rather suspicious. Interestingly, the
elite o n c e more places itself close to the
model we have called the 'democratic'
one.
T h e hypothesis is not satisfactorily verified in T a b l e 15. We would not say that
it has been rejected, however: there seems
In general, the data presented in this
section on attitudes towards disarmament
do not support satisfactorily the projection
of relevant actors in the process as to what
extent they should be trusted or not.
Although the former may be seen as a
'technical', the latter a 'moral' aspect of
the process, the two go very m u c h together and shall be seen together in this
context as predominantly an expression
of the respondents' trust or confidence in
their international environment.
Galtung used the problem 'confidence
first, or disarmament to create confidence'
as an indicator of the degree of a panacea
perception in his study. T a b l e 14 shows to
what extent this panacea perception is
backed by the categories. Here there is a
projection trend, which was expected.
T h e conclusion drawn concerning the elite
rejection of disarmament as a panacea to
international problems is supported by the
result in T a b l e 14.
27
Table 15. The distrust versus confuIence dimension: ratro of distrust on confidence responses
A. Disarmament demands much inspection
..............
Disarmament demands little inspection.
B. All nations really want to disarm but hesitate to do so before
other nations
Some nations have acquired weapons not only to defend
themselves, but also to attack.
C. Some powers will try to hide weapons during disarmament
It is not probable that some countries will try to hide
weapons.
.....................................
1
4.3
3
3.3
6
5.0
8
4.6
Elite
10.8
1.5
0.8
0.8
1.3
0.4
3.5
1.3
1.5
2.5
1.9
maker level, and the general opinion
Contrary to the theory of foreign policy
opinion as a function of social position,
the problems which will be taken up in
this section are not based on a theoretical
framework. Thus we have no really g o o d
starting-point for examining the relations
between the three groups or levels, the
differentiation of which is not based on
any social background data, but applied
from a scheme presented by R o s e n a u . As
has already been shown, however, an exploration of data on some structural
factors makes it safe to say that the elite
stands ' o n top of the opinion-maker
sample in the system of foreign policy
communication and decision-making.
28
Furthermore, the opinion-makers (because they through active participation in
foreign policy activities to a large extent
are members of that system) are ' o n top of
the general public opinion in the pyramidal structure, which is the logical i m plication of the reasoning we n o w present.
T h e lack of a safe theoretical and
methodological basis evidently means that
we ought not carry such reasoning too far.
T w o questions will be further explored
by the use of data: First, to what extent
may one use the opinion projection idea
on the relations between the general
opinion, the opinion-makers and the
elite? Second, where is the opinion-maker
group placed in the society ? If it a bridge
between the elite and the general public,
as indicated already ? Or is it closer to the
elite by backing its opinions and thus not
filling its task, which also is to represent
the general public opinion before the
elite ?
A n d : is the opinion position of the
opinion-makers very m u c h similar to that
of the center, making them possible
partners contra the elite? From our data
on the opinion-maker sample's distribution
on the Galtung index variables, we find
that the opinion-maker sample is less
'centrist' than the elite sample; its mean
rank would probably be about 5 or 6.
T h e data which will be used cover
peace ideology and attitudes towards the
more important foreign policy questions
(cf. Tables 10 and 11) T h e peace ideology
of the three groups is presented in T a b l e
16. T h e general opinion is not really a
sample of the Norwegian population, but
is taken from a youth study which represented the population between 15 and
40 years. Twelve of the peace proposals
used in our study were included in the
youth study with much the same content
and phrasing. In the youth study, h o w ever, the proposals were presented in
questions which asked for the respondent's
approval or rejection of the proposal.
To make the two sets of data comparable
we added the two response categories
'Especially important to peace' and 'Somewhat important to peace' used in the
questionnaire in our study (cf. T a b l e 4)
Although the questions were not all
identical, and despite necessary reservations as to the operation just described,
we think it reasonable to say that the data
are comparable.
In 6 out of 12 cases the projection hypothesis holds. In one case (inter-individual relations) the trend is contrary to the hypothesis, in 4 there is a ' l o o p ' in the sense
that the youth sample is breaking or reversing the trend (Abolish hunger and
poverty, and M o r e democratic states) or
in the sense that the opinion-maker sample
is ' o n top' (Disarmament, and W o r l d
State). On the one remaining item (States
should b e c o m e more similar) the scores are
practically even.
This is not a bad result although it is
not quite satisfactory. T h e single-item
reversal of the dominant trend and the
four loops may be due to several factors.
It is perhaps especially interesting that the
164
165
Table 16. Peace ideology and the projection hypothesis.
Elite
Strengthen the U
.........•..............•
Rich countries help poor ....•...............
Abolish hunger and poverty
.
Educate the individuals to peace
.
More West contact with Eastb •..••.••.•••••••
More democratic states
.
Preserve military alliancesc
.
General and complete disarmament ........•..
Better inter-individual relations
.
.
Small countries should have more influence
States should become more similar ...........•
Establish the World State
.
96
91
90
90
89
82
80
77
61
55
52
39
% approval
Table 17. Basic foreign policy attitudes and the projection hypothesis. Ratios
Youths
Hypothesis
coniinned
89
85
85
87
60
+
+
81
70
87
Opinionmakers
87
75
60
94
84
40
83
64
79
52
48
51
47
52
71
+
+
+
+
27
a
Questions in the youth study interview guide generally started with the words 'To obtain
peace — should —'.
In the youth study, this question ran: 'To obtain peace we should have increased trade, exchange, and co-operation also between countries that are not on friendly terms.'
In the youth study, this question ran: 'To obtain peace countries should be members of mi
litary alliances so that no country or group of countries dare attack others.'
b
c
trends on the two 'sub-national' approaches — the intra- and the interindividual — are so markedly contrary
to each other. This might be explained
by an increasing group-orientation with
decreasing social position: those at the
b o t t o m of society (the periphery) place
m o r e emphasis on interaction between
individuals, because that part of life or
society — whether local, national, or international — is more meaningful and i m portant to them.
T h e opinion-maker ' l o o p ' is, in the case
of the ' W o r l d State' proposal, due to what
has already been said about the relatively
greater influx of 'idealist' or world federalist thinking a m o n g interest g r o u p
opinion-makers. T h e score on disarmament is more problematic, but is probably
explained by the relatively high percentage of 'leftists', w h o usually stress disarmament in their arms policies.
As to the relative youth preference for
'Abolish hunger and poverty' and ' M o r e
democratic states', this can be due to a
stronger impact of 'moralistic' thinking
a m o n g youth. Or youth is more occupied
with catastrophic trends, which they are
m o r e exposed to through mass media and
the world communication revolution; and
they are more truly democratic, due to
socialization of democratic values (the
elder have also been socialized to these,
but have 'forgotten' since their socialization was long ago) and possibly due to a
certain opposition toward the more central,
more influential strata (which the elite
and the opinion-makers represent).
T h e relations between the three groups
m a y also be explored by rank correlation.
T h e difference is not great; for all three
pairs it runs like this:
Elite
'Should Norway continue
in NATO, or should we
withdraw?'
'Should orway apply for
full membership in the
EEC or not?' . . . . . . . ..
'Should orway increase
its total aid to the developing countries?' .....
'If a developing country
asked for our help to
build up a merchant
marine, should we give
such help? . . . . . . . . . ..
'Should we give the devel·
oping countries customs
duty preferences on some
of their products ?'c. . ..
'Should we give our developing aid on a multilateral or bilateral basis,
primarily?' . . . . • . . . . ..
'What international organization or unit do you
think you have most in
common with/think that
Norway should establish
closer ties with?' .....
Opinion
makers
General
opinion
Acceptance
of hypothesis
ContinuefWithdraw
17.2
3.5
2.6
+
Should/Should not
7.7
5.5
2.6&
+
Should/Should not
5.0
6.0
O.lb
Should/Should not
1.5
0.7
0.7
Should/Should not
3.7
16.8
0.4
Multilat.fBilateral
3.0
1.8
1.5
+
NATO ordic
countries
2.0
1.3
0.5
+
7.1
7.0
'The UN should dispose of
parts of the national
armies to form an international peace-keeping
force' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Should/Should not
+
+
a
National survey, July 1967, by Norwegian Gallup A / S . N is about 1600.
National survey 1965. N= 1751
The question in the general opinion survey was 'Imagine that the best way to help a developing country would be to buy manufactured goods from it, for instance textiles, but that this
would lead to difficulties for Norwegian factories. Do you think Norway should buy such products
or not?'
From the youth study 1967; the question in this study was ' T o obtain peace we should have
a strong international peace-keeping force that can stop aggression from any country or group
of countries'.
b
Elite — opinion-makers: rho = 0.89
Opinion-makers — y o u t h : rho = 0.80
Elite — y o u t h :
rho = 0.63
It is greatest between the elite and the
youth sample, and greater between the
opinion-makers and the youth, than b e tween the elite and the opinion-makers.
This indicates that the opinion-maker
sample lies in-between the two other
groups, but somewhat nearer to the elite
than to the youth sample, o r : closer to the
center than to the m e d i u m or peripherydirected groupings.
T h e second set of data is a compilation
of eight items representing attitude toward
c
d
N A T O , the E E C , aid and assistance to the
developing countries, and international
co-operation. These data are presented
in T a b l e 17 a b o v e .
T a b l e 17 offers an acceptance of the hypothesis in six out of the total eight cases.
T h e rejection cases are on the foreign aid
items, where the opinion-maker sample
makes another ' l o o p ' . This ' l o o p ' is explained by the fact that the opinion-maker
sample generally is m o r e positive toward
foreign aid and the developing countries.
This is shown by a higher preference for
these aspects of foreign policy and international politics among the opinion-makers
than is the case in the elite. On the other
29
167
166
hand, one of the items — merchant marine
assistance — shows a departure from this
general trend difficult to explain. It might
be due to a more 'realistic' conception of
the danger of competition that merchant
marines in the developing countries (or
in other countries generally) represent to
N o r w a y (which is highly dependent on its
merchant marine i n c o m e ) , although it is
difficult to explain w h y the opinion-maker
sample, on several other dimensions more
'idealistic' than the elite, should be more
'realistic' on this item.
If we take the average ratio for the
opinion-makers on the five items used in
T a b l e 10, we get a ratio of 6.8, which in
fact is higher than the average ratio calculated for the elite on the same items.
O n e single item — customs duty preferences — of course explains very m u c h
of this (as N A T O explained very much
the high ratio of the elite). But an over-all
comparison with the center category shows
that the opinion-makers are not close to
the center. Even on the two items which
indicate attitude towards Western c o operation — an idea the 'leftists', w h o are
relatively numerous in the opinion-maker
sample, strongly reject — the opinionmaker sample shows a m o r e positive attitude than the center.
This, in our opinion, again supports the
assumption that several structural factors
are very important in the foreign policy
opinion formation: in some instances (as
probably in the case of N A T O and the
E E C ) these factors reduce or counteract
the impact of the periphery to center
opinion formation trend; in others (which
perhaps o c c u r more often) they underline
or reinforce this trend.
policies, and 'tough' policies. T h e general
idea was ventured that this is the profile
of the elite in a small and center nation.
This idea, and of course other findings and
attempts at generalizations, invite similar
comparative research.
T h e important hypothesis set forth by
Galtung in his theory of opinion as a
function of social position formed the
basis of the ultra-center hypothesis which
was confirmed on some dimensions found
to be of special importance in the framework of Norwegian foreign policy. On
other attitudinal dimensions, however, the
hypothesis was not clearly supported.
This points towards two related c o n clusions. First, we need to explore more
thoroughly the general hypothesis by more
extensive studies. Second — a rather tentative conclusion, more a proposition for
further testing — there is no general projection of foreign policy or international
political opinion in the society from the
periphery through center to the elite (or
decision-makers) ; such a projection exists
and may be anticipated only in questions
which are of some policy importance, have
been the subject of a minimum of general
information and socialization a m o n g the
public, and have existed as topics for discussion and opinion formation over some
time.
These three criteria may explain w h y the
disarmament data did not fit the general
hypothesis nor possibly the more specific
personality hypotheses which were tested.
These and other factors, already m u c h
explored by Galtung and others, ought
definitely to be studied further.
APPENDIX A
5. Conclusion
This article has given a portrait of the
peace thinking, or more generally the
international political thinking, of the
Norwegian elite. We found the profile of
the elite to be in particular oriented
towards stability, status q u o , regionalistic
The sampling method
T h e elite sample was selected a m o n g
four groups of people w h o m we though
to be possible influentials in the Norwegian foreign policy communication and
decision-making system: the Parliamentarians, the administration (Foreign service,
Trade Ministry, and Ministry of Defense),
the mass media, and the main interest
organizations. A total of 25 from each
group — research funds and capabilities
did not allow a higher number — were
selected, partly by formal position, partly
by the use of judges with both political
and personal knowledge about the top
political level.
A m o n g the Parliamentarians, we included all the 24 members of the extended
Foreign Relations Committee in the Storting plus one MP from the Socialist
People's Party; the selection of people
from the administration was made by
three judges independently, and 15 from
the Foreign, 5 from each of the two other
ministries were included; from the mass
media — the press and radio — we selected
the foreign editors of the dailies and weeklies appearing in O s l o or, in those cases
where there was no foreign editor, the chief
editor, and from the r a d i o / T V we included
the heads of the news and foreign departments and their 'second hands' (redaksjonssekretærer) plus the news commentators
(journalists, editors, or researchers); and
among the interest organizations we included the administrative heads from the
main organizations in four different fields:
Norwegian branches of international organizations ( W A W F , R e d Cross), general
political organizations ('Atlanterhavskomiteen', the N o r d i c Association, e t c . ) ,
economic interest organizations (Norwegian Shipowners' Association, etc.) and
the peace or defense organizations ( W a r
Resisters and 'Folk og Forsvar').
science ('samfunnskunnskap') in the secondary school and the universities.
T h e party committee members were all
included, except in two cases: half of the
committee of the Socialists People's Party
was selected randomly, as the committee
was relatively m u c h more numerous than
the committees of the other parties; and
the Communist Party 'excluded' themselves by not responding when we asked
for a list of members of the party's foreign
relations committee. In the case of the
Center Party, we had to include the party's
executive committee, since it had no
special committee on foreign relations.
T h e people in the press were — as
mentioned — selected randomly. We used
a catalogue of all papers appearing weekly
or more often. T h e number of respondents
to be contacted was determined by the
official data on the paper's circulation.
Papers with a circulation below 12,000were
excluded. In most cases only one respondent
— the editor — was included from each
paper, but in the case of the biggest papers,
a larger number (from 2 to 5, depending
on circulation) was included.
T h e interest organizations were selected
by the use of a catalogue of Norwegian
associations and interests organizations,
Jorolv M o r e n , Oppslagsboken norske organisasjoner, Oslo, T a n u m , 1967. All organizations with a membership total a b o v e 500
and which were relevant to foreign policy
or international political matters were included, and one respondent was chosen
from each organization.
T h e secondary school and university
Totally, we got interviews with 88 perteachers were chosen randomly from a list
sons on a practically even distribution
of members in the History Section of the
between the four groups. No reserve
Norwegian Secondary School Teachers'
sampling was made to replace those with
Association.
w h o m we did not get an interview.
T h e total number of respondents selected
The opinion-maker sample was also selected
was 290, and the number in each of the
partly by formal criteria, partly by the
four groups varied from 65 to 80. T h e total
use of judges, but in two cases — in the
response was 45 % or 130 respondents,
case of mass media and the teachers —
somewhat lower than what m a y be said
randomly. Four groups were included:
to be quite satisfactory.
members of the political parties' committees
on foreign policy matters (standing or the
last ad hoc committee), journalists on the
APPENDIX B
foreign 'desk' in the Oslo press and editors
The
data collecting method
of 'province' newspapers (appearing outAs mentioned in the text, the elite
side Oslo) plus all employed in the radio/
responded to a structured interview guide,
T V ' s t w o relevant departments (those
partly to a fixed questionnaire. T h e
w h o were not included in the elite sample),
opinion-maker sample responded to a
administrative heads (or in the cases where
mailed questionnaire, mostly fixed. T h e
there were no such permanent heads: the
questions asked the two samples were
chosen chairman) of relevant interest organipractically the same (some were excluded
zations which were not included in the elite
in the opinion-maker study). In fact, the
sample, and teachers in history and social
168
169
elaboration of the elite interview-guide
and the responses we got on it b o t h were
used in the elaboration of the opinionmaker questionnaire, especially in the
question of pre-coding answers.
T h e interview guide was prepared from
September 1966 to February 1967. Extensive discussions of several drafts were
held, mainly at the International Peace
Research Institute, Oslo, a m o n g its staff.
Explorative interviews based on an unstructured guide were m a d e a m o n g a
n u m b e r of people estimated as g o o d informants. A preliminary draft of a structured guide was pretested by the author
and three student colleagues at the Institute for Political Science, University of
O s l o . At the same time, a preliminary
draft of the questionnaire to be used later
on was mailed to a group of persons, chosen
very m u c h on our o w n subjective evaluations but at the same time to cover most
of the political spectrum of an opinionmaker level.
T h e interviewing was carried out by the
three students a n d the author. A l l were
trained in interviewing, though not on
foreign policy questions. T h e respondents
were contacted personally or by telephone
beforehand, after they had received an
introductory letter from the head of the
Institute for Political Science. T h e interviews took from 1 % to 2 hours and were
conducted mostly in the office of the
respondents. T h e interviewers were instructed to make extensive notes where
extra information c o u l d be obtained, and
they were told to p r o b e on those questions
were they felt this to be useful or necessary.
T h e interviewees were asked to state their
personal opinions a n d were assured that
their identity w o u l d be confidential. By
and large, we think that the interview
situation was satisfactory considering these
different problems.
T h e questionnaire was mailed together
with the introductory letter and a letter
from the author. T w o reminders were
mailed after periods of 15-20 days. T h e
respondents were asked to give extra
comments, criticisms etc. on an o p e n
space besides each question. T h e questionnaire totally included 120 different ( o r
some related) items; some of the respondents found it too extensive.
T h e elite responses were c o d e d by the
author, the opinion-maker data by a
coding assistant at the P R I O ; this c o d i n g
was controlled by the author. T h e data
were filed on cards.
N O T E S
* This is a much revised version of a paper presented in outline at the Third Nordic Peace
Research Conference at Orenås, Sweden M a y 19-21, 1968, here published as P R I O publication
no. 16-7. I am much indebted to director Johan Galtung, P R I O , and to Associate Professor
Nils Ørvik of the Institute of Political Science, University of Oslo, for stimulating advice and
criticism, and to Steinar Wigtil and Anne Lisa Frostad, who helped me with the data processing.
Johan Galtung, 'Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position', Journal of Peace
Research, no. 3 - 4 , 1964.
Cf. my magister thesis for the Institute of Political Science, University of Oslo, Fakta og verdier
i utenrikspolitikken. En undersøkelse av et norsk elite-utvalg. Oslo 1967. This thesis was based on the
elite data only; the data on the opinion-maker sample are studied now, and a report on both parts
of the study will appear.
Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, New York: Praeger, 1965; Karl W.
Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, France, Germany and the
Western Alliance. A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics. New
York: Charles Sciibner's Sons, 1966.
See Johan Galtung, Theory and Methods of Social Research. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1967.
Published in the United Kingdom by George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. London and in the United
States by Columbia University Press, New York. pp. 111-128.
The last 5 - 6 questionnaires received from the respondents were returned at the time of the
final escalation and the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war, 1967.
Cf. Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing, 'Social Background and Elite Analysis: A
Methodological Inquiry', American Political Science Review, Vol. L X I June 1967, No. 2 pp. 428-445.
Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy. A Study of Norway. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1966. Cf. also comments to this book by Erik Allardt and Ulf Torgersen in Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget) no. 2/3, 1967.
We shall not develop a center-periphery index for the international society, although this
might be both possible and fruitful. The parallel with the Galtung index of course is apparent.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
On the problem of rank disequilibration, see Johan Galtung: 'Norge i verdenssamfunnet',
Det norske samfunn, Oslo 1968.
Norway's export of goods and service makes up 4 0 . 4 % of its total GNP,^and its imports are
on the same level (1965 figures, cf. UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1966.
Helge Hveem, Fakta og verdier i utenrikspolitikken, p. 123.
ibid. p . 89.
ibid. pp. 141-145.
Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, New York: Harper & Son, 1957.
In a 1967 study of Norwegian youth, the respondents besides giving their preference for
several peace proposals were asked to state which of the proposals they believed most likely would
lead to peace. This of course is not quite the same as being asked about the 'realism' of the proposals, but we think that the responses at least may give some indications of the cognitions of the
respondents. Unfortunately, data on this question are scarce, the N A / D K scores are high, so that a
comparison by the rank correlation method is not possible. The data we may use, however,
do indicate a rho which is even more to the negative side than in the case of the opinion-maker
sample, that is: the cognitive-affective dissonance is greatest among the general opinion.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
See for a discussion of the level analysis problem J. David Singer, 'The Level of Analysis Problem', in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, The International System, Princeton University Press, 1961.
An article which deals with related problems is Hans and Shulamith Kreitler, 'Crucial
Dimensions of the Attitude towards National and Supra-national Ideals', Journal of Peace Research,
no. 2, 1967 pp. 107-124.
Unpublished material from a study made by Herman Schmid at the Institute of Sociology,
Lund University, Sweden, in 1966-67. Members of this organization were asked what would
be more important for creating peace: that we get more peace-oriented leaders, or that the international system be changed. 51 % thought that peace-oriented leaders was more important, 3 4 %
system changes, a result which very clearly contrasts with the thoughts of the Norwegian elite.
On a question which asked if peace could be better secured if or when the political leaders were
changed or educated to peace, 2 9 % of the elite sample was in favor of the idea, 4 4 % against it.
The respective percentages in the opinion-maker sample were 4 9 % and 2 0 % (while the two Norwegian samples were in nearly complete agreement as to the idea of raising individuals generally
to peace). This seems to indicate some differences due to stratification or different social position.
17
18
The British sample of peace activists, on the other hand, is far more anomic than the Norwegian samples: it favors extra-parliamentary action to promote its policies, ideas that are not
represented among the elite and hardly so among the opinion-makers.
Members of the two left socialist parties in Norway, the Socialist People's Party and the
Communists, usually are strong opponents to central parts ot Norwegian foreign policy, at least
after Norway became a member of N A T O . These two parties make up 4% of our elite sample,
but 17% of the opinion-maker sample. In the latter, there is also a stronger influx of persons engaged in the more 'idealistic' of humanitarian activities, like the peace organizations, the W o r l d
Association of World Federalists (En Verden), the Red Cross, etc.
Galtung, 'Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position'; and 'Social Position,
Party Identification and Foreign Policy Orientation: A Norwegian Case Study', in James Rosenau
(ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press, 1967 pp. 161-193.
Some data which we have, may give an indication of the point; the data cover the age, the
sex, the income, the education, and the job of the respondents:
A g e : Less than 34 years (young)
5%
45-54.
67%
More than 55
28%
Sex: 96% are men.
Income: All but 1% above median Norwegian wage earner income.
Education: 9 5 % have more than primary, the rest have primary education.
Job: Some few among the parliamentarians in the sample are originally (that is before they
became MP's) blue collar.
Cf. Galtung, 'Foreign Policy Opinion' — p. 217 on the classification of the index.
Cf. Nils H. Halle, 'Social Position and Foreign Policy Attitudes', Journal of Peace Research,
no. 1, 1966 pp. 4 6 - 7 4 which shows that the Norwegian public compared with the French and the
Polish is the most informed about international matters.
Galtung, in Rosenau (ed.), op.cit.
This was established by asking the respondents which political attitudes and opinions in their
(domestic) foreign policy opponents' programme they felt were most wrong or criticisable: the
19
20
21
22
23
24
170
policy towards N A T O was mentioned by 3 2 % , the E E C policy by 10%, while foreign aid and
UN policy (in general) ranked next (although mentioned only by a few).
Johan Galtung, 'Attitudes towards Different Forms of Disarmament. A Study of Norwegian
Public Opinion', Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association's Inaugural Conference, Assen:
V a n Gorcum, 1966 pp. 210-238.
*• According to a 1964 national survey, 3 4 % of the general opinion believed partial or total
disarmament would be achieved within 20 years, while 59% of the 1967 elite sample believed that
this would be achieved by the year 2000 (we assume that difference in the time period ahead does
not play any role for the difference in expectations, since the question really is whether or not
people believe that disarmament will happen in the not too distant future).
' Galtung, op.cit. pp. 225-226.
James Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, New York: Random House, 1961.
For instance, 3 2 % of the opinion-makers looks upon the 'gap' between the rich and poor
countries and the problems of the developing countries, as the most important problem of the
world to-day, while 9% of the elite does the same; aid and assistance to the developing countries
are seen as the most important foreign policy goal of Norway in the present situation by 12%
of the opinion-makers and only 2% of the elite.
25
2
28
29
SUMMARY
This article presents a profile of the peace thinking of a Norwegian elite sample, and
tests some hypotheses derived from Galtung's center-periphery theory. Data were
collected in 1967 by interviews and questionnaires, mostly structured, a m o n g a foreign
policy elite sample and — for comparative purposes — a m o n g a so-called opinionmaker sample. These data are to some degree c o m p a r e d with Norwegian opinion
survey data.
T
T h e main findings are that the elite's peace thinking, as shown by its operational
peace profile, is centered around stability, evolutionary change, and gradualistic peace
policies. Middle-range or regionalistic policies are preferred to long-range (globalistic)
and short-range (intra-national or individual); tough policies to soft (or 'idealistic') ones. T h e so-called projection hypothesis derived from the center-periphery theory is
given substantial backing, and it is established — although with some important
modifications — that the elite m a y be seen as an ultra-center of society.
HpaTHoe COAepl«aHHe.
)J;aHHaJI CTaTbfl AaeT B npOqlHJIe paaMHmJIeHHfI 0 np06JIeMaX MHpa CpeAH npeACTaBHTeJIell
HOpBel«CKOA 8JIHTbI H nOABepraeT paa60py HeHOTOpble nOJIOl«eRHfI, BaflTble H8 TeOpHH ranTyHra
o "I\eHTpe-nepHqlepHH". MaTepHaJIH 6b1JIH c06paHH B 1967r. npH nOllfO~H HHTepblO H aRKeT,
rJIaBHHM 06pa80M, npeAHa8Ha'leHHHX AJIfI npeACTanHTeJIeA 8JIHTbI, HHTepecYIO~XCfI np06JIeMalIlH nHeWHeA nOJIHTHHH H, n ~eJIflX CpaBHeHHfI, AJIfI npeACTanHTeJIeA, HOTOpHX npHHflTO
C'IHTaTb C08AaTeJIflMH 06I1.\eCTBeHHOrO 1IIHeHHfI. 8TH MaTepHaJIH 6b1JIH n H8BecTHOA Mepe CpaBHeHbl
C MaTepHaJIaMH onpoca OOIl.\eCTBeHHOrO MHeHHfI B HOpBerHH.
OCHOBHble nbIBoAbl AaRHOA CTaTbH nOKaabIBaJOT, 'ITO paaMblWJIeHHR: npeACTaBHTeJIeA 8JIHTbI 0
npOOJIeMax MHpa OrpaRH'IHBalOTCfI nOUpOCaMH cTa6HJIbHOCTH, 8nOJIIOl.\HOHHHX nepeMeH H nocTeneH'IecKoA MHpHOA nOJIHTHHH. MHpHaJI nOJIUTHKa, paCC'IHTaRHaJI Ha npeMfI CpeAUell npoAOJIl«HTeJIbUOCTH HJIH OXBaTblBaJO~aJIUeaUa'lHTeJIbHble npOCTpaRCTBa (perHOHaJIbHaJI nOJIHTHKa)
npeAenO'lHTaeTCfI nOJIHTHKe 60JIbWeA npOAOJIl«HTeJIbHOCTH (rJIOOaJIbHaJI nOJIHTHKa) H HpaTHOBpeMeHHHA (n Mel«AYHapOAHOM HJIH OAHHO'IHOM MaCWTa6e); rnepAaJI nOJIHTHKa npeAUO'lHTaeTCll
IIlf1rKolt H
yCTyII'lHBCA
(HJIH
"JiIAeanHcTH'IecKOA").
TaK
UaabIBaeMaJI rHUOTeaa npOeK~HB,
H8BJIe'leUHaJI Ha TeOpHH 0 "l\eUTpe-nepHqlepHH", HaxOAHT B CTaTbe cy~ecTBeHHYIO nOAAepl«Ky.
B
CTaTbe YCTaRaBJllUJaeTCfI TaHl«e. XOTfI H C HeHOTOpbIMH Bal«HblMH OrpaRH'IeHHflMH, 'ITO
npeACTaBHTeJIH 8JIHTbI MoryT paCCMaTpHBaTbCfI B Ka'lecTBe CBOeOOpa8HorO CBepXl.\eHTpa 06II.\eCTBa.