Journal of Peace Research Offprint from No 2, 1968 U N I V E R S I T E T S F O R L A G E T 147 Table 1. Validation FOREIGN POLICY T H I N K I N G I N T H E ELITE A N D THE GENERAL POPULATION A Norwegian Case Study* By H E L G E International Peace H V E E M Research Institute, O s l o considerations are not paralleled by the 1. Introduction T h i s article has two different, but to a m o u n t of elite research actually carried some extent overlapping purposes. T h e one out. T h e r e seems to exist a certain dis- is to present the world picture, or more crepancy between elite studies a n d opinion specifically the surveys, with m u c h stronger emphasis on N o r w e g i a n foreign policy elite. T h e other the latter. T h i s is not to say that this kind is to contribute some new knowledge to of research is unimportant: only that it the peace thinking, of of the position of the elite and the opinion-TTUJ1cer sampks. % Elite Opinionmakers 36 60 12 84 26 36 35 1 9 79 16 46 53 24 7 'Would you say that you have any personal influence on the making of Norwegian foreign policy?' Yes ......•.................................•........••••.• Little or no .........•...................................... 'Have you been or are you at the moment member of any official Norwegian delegation to international organizations?' . Yes, 3 or more Yes, 1-2 ................•...........••........•...•....... No ...............•..••.•..........................•...... 'When you discuss foreign policy matters, would you say that you yourseU most often take contact with others, or are you more often contacted by others?' I most often take the contact myself . Both/it depends ..•......................................... I am mO'it often contacted by others . 12 cision-making structure ; their participation A n o t h e r p r o b l e m is that of a possible the general theory of foreign policy at- should not be carried out to the neglect of in official delegations to international or- methodological bias d u e to different data titudes as a function of social position, elite research, as appears to be the case till ganizations ; a n d their activity in the c o m - collecting methods for the two samples in n o w . Rather, one should concentrate m o r e munication system ( T a b l e 1 ) . large parts of the study. As far as we can developed b y G a l t u n g . 1 4 see from our data, there seems to be no T h e data presented are part of the results on studying the relations between elite a n d O u r assumption is verified on all three obtained from a study carried out a m o n g public opinion, by m o r e extensive c o m - variables: the elite sample scores higher clear two different population samples repre- parative research. T h i s is our second start- on all of them. T h e third variable, h o w - of such a bias. We m a y show this by c o m - ing point or m a i n 'hunch', which will be ever, needs some further c o m m e n t s . paring senting higher strata in N o r w e g i a n society. 2 O n e group, the foreign policy elite, was sampled according to a design used further elaborated below. W e assumed that the opinion-makers t o T h e data were collected in two slightly some extent influenced or tried to tendency or responses indications on items generally which were presented in m u c h the same context a n d in- formula in both the interview guide a n d the questionnaire, a n d comparing, on the policy elite fluence the elite: this is in fact indicated level was interviewed by the author and three by the scores on the question of w h o con- the other h a n d , responses the elite gave between the elite a n d the general public assistants, trained in this technique, from tacts w h o m the most. T a k i n g the ratio on interview a n d the opinion-makers on opinion — educating or forming the latter, February to Ap ril 1 9 6 7 with the use of a between 'contact m y s e l f questionnaire stimuli. A n attempt t o c o m - a n d to some extent influencing the former. mostly pre-coded a n d wholly structured by others', we find that the ratio of the bine T h e sampling procedure is explained in interview guide. This group was also asked elite is 2 / 3 : the elite is m o r e often con- T a b l e 2 . Unfortunately, w e m a y present A p p e n d i x A , together with some data o n to answer some questions on a question- tacted by others than itself contacts others; only two items which were used in both the composition of the two groups. naire. T h e responses of the opinion-maker the position of the opinion-makers is the the guide a n d the questionnaire : the intra- reverse. and by other authors. opinion-maker 3 T h e other group, the group, represented a Elite studies are important for several different sample ways. were T h e foreign given on a questionnaire a n d 'contacted these the t w o approaches inter-individual is m a d e in approach to peace. reasons. T h e cognitions a n d evaluations which, except from a few questions, was Contacts, of course, m a y be taken b o t h of elite persons are of consequence to the pre-coded. T h e opinion-maker study was vertically a n d horizontally. T h e opinion- formation of a country's foreign policy. carried out in the period from A pr il to makers m a y contact the elite — a n d it has about W h a t the been shown that this happens m o r e often on the intra-individual item, the opinionmakers are m o r e positive in b o t h cases T a b l e 2 supports our general conclusion a possible methodological bias: opinion-maker medio June the same year. T h e methodol- strata see a n d believe about the world is o g y used is explained in m o r e detail in than important; Appendix B. makers; in other words: the structural or (81% positional difference is clear. But contact 35 %) ; on the inter-individual item the elite and it even the to some extent d e - the elite contacts the opinion- against 78%, and 4 6 % against termines what the rest of the population Before we proceed, let us briefly validate shall see or believe. Internal structures of the assumption m a d e above that the elite may opinion- elite is the most positive on both cases. If we read the T a b l e vertically a n d look also be taken between a n d the opinion-maker samples do rep- makers. Since the question, however, was the structure of a n d intensity in the rela- resent different social strata. This we do m a d e in a context where the focus was on at the relations between the two items, the tions with the outside world are factors by the policy, trend is also consistent in all four cases (of which work in this direction. variables : the respondents' o w n perception vertical or u p w a r d contact was evidently positive evaluation) : the intra-individual of their position in the foreign policy de- in the minds of most of the opinion-makers. approach is the most preferred. communication a n d decision-making, a n d In our opinion these generally-accepted presenting data on three different top level making of foreign 149 148 Table 2. Test of the data collecting method. % Interview guide8 E OM Individuals educated to peace Better relations between the indiv. Pos 78 56 Questionnaire E OMb Neg Pos 12 81 Neg 12 35 22 51 25 28 46 27 a The data for the opinion-maker sample are based on responses on a questionnaire. The percentages here represent those who think that the item is 'Especially important to peace'. b E = Elite; OM = opinion-makers. Another point to be mentioned in connection with a possible data collecting bias is that no decisive event appeared on the world scene during the time of the opinion-maker data collection to make the scene markedly different from the one the elite (in an earlier period) had before their 'eyes'. 5 2. The Norwegian foreign policy elite: some assumptions H o w does the Norwegian elite perceive and evaluate its international environm e n t ? This is the question which will o c c u p y us here. T h e more general question of h o w elites as such picture the world is — provided there are certain features in elite thinking specific enough and c o m m o n enough — an interesting problem which shall not be dealt with here (and which, by the way, needs a lot of data for comparisons, both among elites and between elites and national public opinion groupings). To point at some possible answers to our question, which we will relate more specifically to the peace thinking of the Norwegian elite, we m a y look into several sets or categories of data: social background, personality, predominant attitude sets. This individual level approach can be compared to or replaced by a national level approach: national characteristics like degree of cohesion or h o m o geneity, culturally, socially, and politically, or social development are examples of variables in this approach; or an international level approach, with use of variables like the rank of N o r w a y in the international system, its memberships in regional groupings with specific culture, ideology, polity, etc. We shall not explore systematically these different possible approaches to an explanation of the Norwegian elite thinking, but merely point to some features we believe basic to such an explanation. Generally, we believe that social background variables so often used in opinion surveys are of little use in this context; this is shown convincingly by Edinger and Searing. Studies using the national level approach show that Norway is a relatively homogeneous, consensus-motivated country, although there is some dispute on the degree and exact 'type' of homogeneity. 6 7 We feel that the international level approach in important respects is the most interesting and possibly the most fruitful in this context. As N o r w a y is a small country (on several variables used to measure magnitude) with little influence on world affairs and peace-or-war matters, her elite or decision-makers are to a large extent influenced, in their thinking and policies, by outside events and actors. It is therefore basic to our problem what position Norway has in the system. Briefly, Norway's position is that of a center country. A center country (as opposed to a periphery one) is centrally placed in the communication network, is rich (high G N P and/or G N P per capita), is urbanized and industrialized (i.e. ' m o d e r n ' ) , is white. Its world view will largely be determined by its position: it has m u c h to defend — greater and more values than the periphery nation. On a 'radical vs. conservative' dimension, it will tend towards the conservative e n d : it will be status quo- more than change-oriented; will prefer stability in international relations and thus tend towards stability in its o w n p o l i c y ; will be gradualistic and not absolutistic. 8 T h e small center country like N o r w a y will not aspire to a higher rank or position in the system: it will be content with its high rank on several important dimensions (development, etc.) and accept the fact that it is l o w on influence and power, although this points to a certain disequilibration in its total rank. T h e small nation, however, may increase its influence through international co-operation; we expect this assumption to be strongly held among elite persons in a center nation like Norway. Such an assumption may be based on evaluations of co-operation experiences as such; or it may be explained by sheer necessity: N o r w a y is economically (and is at least perceived to be so militarily) dependent on the outside world, more specifically Western co-operation. This fact, together with its general p o sition and the feeling that Norway's influence does not reach very far, means that the Norwegian elite will emphasize middle-range or middle level world perspectives — be regionalistic or subsystem-oriented more than globalistic. 9 10 3. Peace thinking: an elite profile Operationally, we shall think of a profile as a set of responses to stimuli which present concrete aspects of international life. T h e profile has both cognitive and evaluative elements. T h e respondents were asked several questions on the present and the future world situation which inter alia elicited their perceptions and evaluations of international conflict potential and actual or possible threats to peace. Here we shall only note that the Norwegian elite seems rather optimistic about the future world, which it believes will be more integrated, more co-operative, less conflict-dominated, partially disarmed, m o r e dominated by technology, and at least as egalitarian (concerning the gap between rich and p o o r countries) as today, and more developed generally. Before we proceed to the peace profile, let us ' o p e n ' the minds of the elite persons by giving their preferences for an immediate or short-range peace policy (Table 3 ) . T h e y were asked what measures they deemed the most important to-day to secure international peace. T h e responses may be compared with responses on the list of peace proposals which will be presented below and which implies the more principal or long-range preferences of the respondents. T h e short-range preferences may also be used to validate the long-range ones. Table 3. Preferred immediate peace-making measures. % Strengthen international co-operation/the UN 24 Further East-West détente and understanding 17 Keep the balance of power 10 Agreement on non-proliferation treaty... 10 Disarmament and arms control measures. 9 Close the 'gap' between the rich and poor countries/give more TA and aid to development 9 Solve the Vietnam conflict 3 Other 10 NA/DK 8 Total 100 (N) (88) T h e preferences go clearly in the direction assumed: co-operation and stability. Elite preferences for main short-range goals of Norwegian foreign policy underline the tendency: détente and co-operation rank on top (with 2 5 % and 1 7 % , respectively). Let us then turn to the peace profile. 11 151 150 Table 4. Th optiTTUll peace profile of the elite. %& Proposal/ item number 14 4 6 13 9 10 15 8 3 11 2 16 Proposal is: We must strengthen the UN ........ Abolish hunger and poverty in the world ......................... Rich countries must give more help to poor ............................................ Western countries must increase contact with East ......................... General and complete disarmament must be realized ............... There must be a military balance between the states so that nobody dare'! to attack ...................... We must strengthen regional organizations .............................. The military alliances must be preserved ........................ The states must become more democratic ............................... The individual man must be educated to peace ...................... Statelt that naturally belong together must co-operate ....................... Relations between individuals must become more peaceful .......... The World State must be established as soon as possible There must be fewer states in the world ................................... The small countries must have greater influence .................................. The nations must become more similar ....... 12 7 5 & 'Espe- 'Some'Unimdally what portant 'Against impor- importo peace' tant to tant to peace' peace' peace' 0 .............. A/ DK Total 79 17 0 0 4 100 69 21 3 0 7 100 60 31 60 29 4 58 19 4 58 25 3 0 5 100 0 10 100 0 19 100 13 100 42 47 3 0 8 100 38 42 3 4 13 100 36 46 13 0 5 100 35 55 10 0 0 100 28 47 10 14 100 28 33 21 18 100 24 15 18 42 100 10 22 47 20 100 8 7 47 45 23 31 22 16 100 100 0 0 1 N = 72, as 16 of the total 88 in the elite sample did not fill out the questionnaire. A list of peace proposals was presented to the respondents in a questionnaire. This list of 16 items of course does not contain all the important, relevant p r o p o sals which have been put forward, but it does represent a fair sample of such proposals, selected to meet certain purposes. In T a b l e 4 the numbers at the left indicate in what order the proposals were presented to the respondents; these numbers will later be used to represent the particular proposal. T h e proposals are in T a b l e 4 ranked according to degree of favorable responses they got, i.e. according to preference. This ranking gives us the ideal peace-making programme of the elite — what we shall call its 'optimal peace profile'. We see that the results presented in T a b l e 3 to a large extent resemble and thus validate the optimal peace profile. Co-operation (items 14, 15, 8, and 11) ranks high, détente (item 13) also. N e w is that measures connected with the p r o b lems of the developing and p o o r countries rank high (next to strengthening the U N ) in the profile, while they rank l o w on the list of immediate peace-making measures (Table 3) and on preferences for Norwegian foreign policy. This means the developing countries and the ' g a p ' are perceived as more long-range problems; in fact, responses on a question of predictions about future problems or tasks fit very well with this argument. O r : the elite talks about these problems b e cause they are part of a general b o d y of items which one ought to talk about nowadays; but it does not work them into p o l i c y ; or it postpones their policy implications. 12 T h e varying N A / D K responses m a y explain some of the variance in the 'especially important to peace' category, which we use as the basis for ranking. Apart from the disarmament item, h o w ever, most of the items high on N A / D K are at the bottom of the list anyway: they are seen as decisively less important. In general, a high N A / D K score may be taken as a sign of uncertainty as to whether the proposal is peace-making or not. W h a t we have called the optimal peace profile is not necessarily indicative of policy preferences. Before becoming policy, the ideal peace programme passes through a 'filtering' process, or several processes. O n e such 'filter' is the respondents' perceptions of h o w 'the real world' meets the ideal proposals and makes them 'realistic' — applicable or workable — or not. Another 'filter' is the fundamental attitudes or personality structures of the respondents. In fact these and other possible filters influence each other and jointly influence peace thinking; they are isolated for theoretical purposes. T h e use of the c o n cept filter may also be somewhat misleading : in the mere evaluation of the different peace proposals (the optimal profile) both both affective and cognitive factors are at work. T h e cognitions of the respondent m a y have a decisive influence on his preferences, making him prefer what he perceives as realistic, and vice versa. Thus it m a y be incorrect to say that the filter comes in at a second stage in the process of profile building. However, the exact 'place' of the different factors in the processual sequence is not a main problem here, or an especially relevant one. T h e process is schematically presented in Figure 1. T h e end result of the process — the policy outcome — we shall call the 'operational peace profile'. I I (filters) I fundamental II ~I attitudeS'YalUe~ Optimal I<! I peace I profile I t I I I ~ ~:cO&nit::ns,p}rcePtionl (preferences' ideolou) I I Operational peace profile of "real world" (policy) I Fig. 1. Fundamental attitudes which may work as a filter are for instance 'anti-communist' feelings, which 'filter out' East-West détente, or regionalism — strong loyalties to specific regional co-operation frameworks — which will to some extent 'filter out' the globalistic proposals represented by ' W e must strengthen the U N ' (at the cost of ' W e must strengthen regional c o operation'). In fact, both examples are supported by our d a t a . 13 In the following, we shall concentrate on the cognitive filter in the process. It was introduced simply by asking the respondents if the believed that they respective proposals for world peace were 'realistic' or 'unrealistic' — whether or not they might be carried through in the short or in the long run. T h e results are shown in T a b l e 5. By calculating the percentage difference between the preference and the perceived 'realism' of the specific items, we get the 'trust status' of each item. If a highly preferred proposal is seen as highly unrealistic, this proposal represents an extremely (fotrusted peace proposal. A highly realistic proposal which is less preferred might on the contrary be called a trusted peace proposal, etc. We shall 155 I52 Table 5. 5. Perceptions Perceptions of of'realistic' ',ealistu' peace peaee proposals: proposals :the theelite. elite. % % 'Especially important 'Realistic' , to peace' peace r Strengthen the UN ...••..............•..... Abolish hunger and poverty .................• Rich countries help poor ...•..•..•.........• West contact with East .•.................... G & C disarmament •......................• Military terror balance . Strengthen regional org's •........••......... Preserve alliances . More democratic states ......•............... Individual educated to peace ..••........•..•• Co-operation between 'natural partners' ......• Better inter-indiv. reI. ......•.....•...•..•... World State realized as soon as possible .....•.. Fewer states in the world ..................•.. Small countries more infl. . .•................ Nations more similar .................•...... 79 69 60 60 58 58 42 38 36 35 28 28 24 10 8 7 61 42 ·"••lIlm' peru:ptlon « _ 'Un, j . .%. realistic' diHerel realistic difference* U n 7 26 64 7 69 0 / -18 -27 49 10 70 36 3 33 68 6 10 74 63 46 61 I 4 32 25 50 24 10 Medium 14 I 35 74 46 26 7 -18 9 32 25 39 19 68 35 6 19 33 26 40 a 19 60 We shall use another method of grouping, however: a differentiation on each dimension of the c o m b i n e d preference — realism perception scale between three levels: high, medium, and low. This method gives us four groups of proposals: HighjHigh: proposals 13, 10, 6 and 14 High/Medium: proposals 1 5 , 8 , 4 , 1,9 and 11 Medium\Medium: proposals 3 and 2 60 '9 '- -- - -------~~Q- --- --_.- -40 2 o 70 I L 30 Medium/Low, or Low/Low: proposals 7, 5, 16 and 12 T h e broken lines in the Figure indicate the cuts between the three levels mentioned; the range of the levels are somewhat larger on the 'realism' dimension because of the higher average percentage score on that dimension. T h e cuts roughly are m a d e according to the clustering trends where the distance between t w o items following next to each other on the dimension in question is the greatest. T h e order of listing the different p r o posals also may indicate their relative rank within the cluster or group, since it corresponds roughly to their distance from the broken line indicating the level they are closest to. T a b l e 5 shows that on several items the difference between degree of preference and degree of realism perception is c o n siderable. This largely answers questions about the relation between affective and cognitive aspects in the respondents' thinking. ---- ------ 50 20 Low 12 0 10 160 10 Figure 2 indicates 7 clusters of items, if arithmetical proximity is taken as a measure of clustering: 13, 10 and 6; 14; 1 5 , 1 1 , 1 and 8; 4 and 9; 3 and 2; 7, 5 and 12; and 16. 10 0 0 9 -22 Difference 'Realistic' — 'Especially important to peace'. The average score for all 16 items was 8% higher on the response 'Realistic' than on 'Especially important to peace' — 4 8 % and 4 0 % , respectively. For a better or more direct comparison between the different proposals, we might take a weighted difference score where the average percentage difference is taken into consideration, i.e. — 8% is added to each difference score in the right column. soon return to this problem. Let us first present the operational peace profile of the elite. We do this by 'sewing' the two dimensions — preference and perception of realism — together in one matrix, where the y axis represents realism, the x axis preference. We plot in the percentage of each single item on each of the two axes and get one point in the matrix for each item. This is shown in Figure 2 (next p a g e ) . 13 11 HI&h 20 Low 30 50 -40 Medium 70 60 80 HI&h Preference Fig. 2 A more general test of this difference is the Spearman's rank correlation. Correlating ranks on the preference and the 'realism' perception dimension, we get a rho of 0.33, which gives even better support to the conclusion that the affective-cognitive difference is considerable. How c o n siderable it is, however, must be decided on a comparative basis. Festinger has worked with and given possible solutions to the problem of cognitive dissonance. We believe that m u c h of what has been said about that problem can be applied to the problem of affective-cognitive differences or dissonances. We shall test the hypothesis that the elite, in spite of the difference or dissonance found, is relatively more affective-cognitive consonant than other (or lower) social strata. M o r e generally, the hypothesis is that consonance increases with increasing 14 social position. While we shall not be able to test satisfactorily here this general hypothesis, let us compare the elite and the opinion-makers, on w h o m we have comparable data. T h e basis for the first mentioned hypothesis is the assumption that the elite person 'cannot live with' a very dissonant profile; this is more or less inconsistent with his position. He is largely responsible for policy-making. In the feed-back system of deciding policy, carrying it out, and receiving reactions to it, there will generally be a process of adjusting the cognitive and affective aspects to each other, so that the two sides of the dissonant affective-cognitive structure converge; or so that one side is made more concordant with the other, unilaterally. For example, when policy initiated by the optimal peace profile meets drastically 154 155 a Table 6. Most 'trusted' and 'distrusted' peace proposals Most 'trusted' . 40 32 26 25 17 Abolish hunger and poverty in the world General and complete disarmament . . . Strengthen the UN Establish the World State —27 —22 —18 —18 For explanations and comments, see footnote to Table 5. and/or several times in a sequence of policy initiatives, with a reality which was not presupposed, and the policy does not work, the ideal policy is m a d e more c o n cordant with reality. Another reasoning speaks against the hypothesis. There m a y in a foreign policy elite be some influx of 'quasi-preferences' — peace policies preferred as a tribute to e.g. the democratic structure of the society, but not really felt. M o s t elite persons are representatives of (in some cases dependent upon) other strata — the people, and must pay 'lip service' to peace thinking strongly held in influential parts of the opinion. T h e y compensate for this 'restriction' of their o w n true ideology by degrading the 'tributary' peace philosophies on the cognitive side, i.e. making them 'unrealistic'. This point m a y be seen as another or third filter mechanism. Furthermore, it m a y explain the considerable cognitiveaffective dissonance in the case of our elite sample. We still think, however, that our hypothesis is reasonable. This is also verified, as the opinion-maker sample has a Spearman's rho of — 0 . 1 0 . 1 5 Another expression of the cognitiveaffective dissonance is the 'trust' or 'distrust' of the different proposals, already introduced. T h e measure of trust is the percentage difference between 'realism' perception and preference, as shown in T a b l e 5. In T a b l e 6 we give the most 'trusted' and the most 'distrusted' proposals. T h e last item in each column is not evaluated as having m u c h importance to peace and will be left uncommented here. T h e others point to a clearer picture of the content of the cognitive-affective dissonance and to some propositions for further research. T h a t the 'Start with the individual' approach is so m u c h trusted is probably due to a general ideology in the N o r wegian society, stressing individualism and possibly Christian conceptions of man's duties and deeds. A comparison of the two arms policy items listed in T a b l e 6 — 'Disarmament' and 'Preserve alliances' — indicates that 'tough' proposals are trusted, 'soft' ones distrusted (the two proposals mentioned taken to represent 'soft' and 'tough' policies, respectively). T w o other arms policy proposals — ' K e e p the balance' (tough) and ' M o r e West contact with East' (soft) — do not support such an hypothesis, however, even if they do not go against it (cf. T a b l e 5 ) . This point needs more exploration. That to abolish hunger and poverty all over the world emerges as the most distrusted, is not astonishing. M o r e interesting and perhaps remarkable is that to strengthen the UN — the proposal ranking in the top category of the operational peace profile — ranks number three among the most 'distrusted' proposals. This literally breaks the neat line which the profile is drawing u p : to strengthen the U N , although ranking top on both the optimal and the operational profile, will 'in the real life' of politics or policy-making be a less attractive or useful proposal, i.e. more of the H i g h / M e d i u m type of proposals. Even more convincing is such an argument if we assume — as we feel is quite % Level Optimal profile average Realism perception average Optimalrealistic diHerence average Global . Inter-regional ..............................•... Intra-regional ..........................•...•... ational . Sub-national/indo . 57.5 54.0 35.0 15.25 31.5 36.5 66.0 71.0 31.0 48.0 -21.0 12.0 36.0 15.75 16.5 Most 'distrusted' Co-operation between natural partners Strengthen regional organizations Educate individuals to peace Preserve alliances More influence to small states a Table 7. Level orientation in elite peau thinking. fair — that policy-makers stick to 'realistic policies' if they have to choose between the preferred or optimal and the 'realistic', or if they see that the m u c h preferred but not so m u c h 'realistic' policy line over time is not working or even does not turn out as m o r e 'realistic'. Thus we have to upgrade the 'realist' perception side of the operational profile, which in turn means that the M e d i u m preference/High realism proposals emerge as relatively more operational. A n d — it means that the regionalistic, middle-range proposals, which also are the most 'trusted', b e c o m e the policy. This was exactly what we assumed or hypothesized: regional peace policies are m o r e operational than global ones in the thinking of the elite. ('Alliances' and 'natural partners' generally indicate regionalism.) T h e regional-global dimension moreover, raises a problem of a m o r e general character: whether and to what extent one or more specific level in the total international system is preferred for peacemaking policies. (By the 'total international system' we think of a structure ranging from the global (top) system level to the individual (bottom) intra-personal level.) O n e of the purposes of the choice of proposals presented was that they should represent the different levels of the system. It may be discussed whether or not the representation is the best one or even satisfactory; this will not be done h e r e . Let us briefly show the structural set-up (levels specified) and which items represent the different levels: 16 global items interregionala " intraregional " national " subnational " individual " 1,2,5, 13 3, 4, 6, 8 7, 11 9,14,15,16 I I Item numbers: see Table 4 12 10 a This is separated from 'global' because it stresses relations between specific groupings in the global system, — rich versus poor countries, East versus West, etc.; it may, in that respect, also or even more be separated from the regional (= intra-regional) level. T h e two lowest levels, the sub-national and the individual ( = intra-personal), are c o m b i n e d in T a b l e 7; the distinction b e tween them is not essential to our problem here. We get what m a y be called the level orientation of the elite by taking average scores for all items categorized as shown above. In T a b l e 7, the regional-global dimension is even better evidenced. T h e ' W o r l d state' proposal, which scores extremely low on 'realism' and very l o w on preference, of course contributes heavily to the relative l o w average score on these two variables. Even excluding this item, however, the optimal-realistic difference or discrepancy is not reduced: indeed it is slightly increased (the scores being, in the order indicated in the T a b l e , 6 9 , 4 6 , and 31 % ) . From all this, we m a y conclude that the Norwegian elite in its thinking about peace does not ' g o to extremes': it neither prefers, neither perceives as very realistic 156 157 Table 8. Affective-eognitiDe dissoTIiUIU and personality types Table 9. Elite versus opinion-makers on some selected proposals. % Preference : H~ High 'Realism' perception: UW The consonant or well balanced 'The cynic' or 'The sheer realist' uw 'The sheer idealist'/ 'The disillwioned' the ' W o r l d state' or ' O n e world' approach nor the 'Start with the individual' ( U N E S C O , psychological) or the 'group therapy' (inter-individual, micro-sociological) approach to peace. An operational Norwegian peace policy which seems to put emphasis on the m e d i u m level while the optimal is on the global, reflects again the feeling on the part of the elite that Norway's foreign-policy-making possibilities (and to a certain extent peace-making possibilities generally) are on the regional level. T h e question of affective-cognitive dissonance raises the p r o b l e m : what are the possible or probable consequences of dissonance, especially to individuals with a highly dissonant p r o f i l e ? A m o n g other factors, this depends on the intensity with which the ideas concerned are held, how unrealistic they are thought to be, and for how long such feelings and thoughts exist. 17 A person with a peace profile high on preference, l o w on realism may be a 'sheer idealist' able to live well with his dissonant peace thinking. Or he may not be able to do that and end in frustration or disillusion, which m a y further result in forms of desperate action, or in inaction. He will perhaps blame the world ('it is rotten, nothing will work') or his leaders ('they don't want peace, really'; 'they are the true causes of w a r ' ) . A study of the British Peace Pledge U n i o n — an organization of 'radical peace activists' — has given some evidence on this. 18 Another position m a y be that of a ' c y n i c ' or 'realist': peace proposals are not highly preferred or evaluated, but the measures or methods they indicate are seen as quite realistic. T h e various per- 'The withdrawer: the out of-this-world man' sonality types we may draw from such reasoning on affective-cognitive dissonance can be listed schematically as in T a b l e 8. Consonant personalities are found on the L o w / L o w to High/High diagonal axis. T h e elite person will generally be found at the High/High end of the axis, while lower social strata will spread to the other four categories. But there are, as has been shown, important exceptions to this picture: a considerable part of the elite is placed in one of the two dissonant High/ L o w categories. T h e opinion-makers, w h o were shown to have a more dissonant profile than the elite, are more free to be dissonant and (at least from some parts of society) probably are expected to be more so. This group, standing between the elite and the general opinion, in some respect must represent both 'sheer realism' and 'sheer idealism': it shall compensate for the lack of such positions or personalities in the elite and at the same time give vent to such more or less manifest attitudes among the general opinion. T h e relative dissonance among the opinion-makers seems to be in particular due to a greater percentage of 'idealists' in the sample. This is indicated by T a b l e 9, which contrasts the elite and the opinionmakers on some selected items. T h e opinion-makers are shown as more 'soft' and more 'idealistic' (believe more in the individual and the W o r l d State approach). Interestingly, while the two samples differ markedly on the preference they attach to the different proposals, there is striking agreement between them as to h o w Keep the balance Preserve alliances Educate individuals to peace Establish the World State . . . . 'realistic' they deem the poposals to b e . This explains m u c h of the relative dissonance of the opinion-makers. 4. The projection hypotheses In 4.1 we test what we shall call the ultra-center hypothesis; in 4.2 we shall test some assumptions about differences b e tween the elite, the opinion-makers, and the general opinion. Data for the test of these hypotheses will cover peace thinking, attitudes toward several important foreign policy dimensions, and attitudes toward disarmament. These data are taken from the author's o w n study, from several general opinion surveys conducted in N o r w a y from 1964 to 1967, and from a youth study m a d e at the end of 1967. 4.1. The ultra-center hypothesis Galtung's theory of foreign policy opinion as a function of social position is n o w well established. O n e specific aspect from this theory will be the object of our analysis: the idea that we may project the opinion of one or more social groups, whose opinion we want to know, from the opinion (which is known) of other social groups, if we know the social position of these last groups and position of the group (s) whose opinion we want, relative to those groups. Social position is determined by use of the Galtung index of social rank. T h e projection idea implies that we literally m a y draw a line through the opinion scores of the rank categories on the scale from 1 to 8. O u r hypothesis is that the foreign policy elite by o p inion is an ultra-center, i.e. by opinion represents a 'prolongation' on the peri20 'Especially important to peace' E OM 58 34 38 22 35 .w 24 36 'Realistic' E OM 68 64 63 61 6 63 59 10 phery-center line of the center (category 8 ) . T h e hypothesis evidently raises several problems and even objections, some methodological, some theoretical. O u r original study was not built on the social position index; consequently, we are not able to assert the position of the elite on that index. We may, however safely say that it is not on the average rank 8, rather something between 6 and 7 . 21 Furthermore, Galtung's theory is built on the conception of society as a system ranging from periphery (0) to center (8) — there is no rank 9 or 10 or anything 'outside' the system. T h e projection idea thus seems both theoretically and logically irrelevant. O u r hypothesis, however, is based not on this conception of the system with definite 'borders', but on the very opinion curves which the system produces. Generally, the problem is this: where does the elite stand in relation to such a curve ? It was mentioned that the elite is not a center group (according to the 8 variables of the Galtung i n d e x ) : does it not follow from this that the hypothesis is unreasonable ? This is not the case. Several dimensions, which may be called structural factors and which do not go into the social position index, explain the point. T h e elite is placed within or close to the society's nucleus of foreign policy c o m munication and decision-making. It c o m municates m o r e extensively and intensively about foreign policy and international political matters, than other (secondary) social groups. Thus, socialization to opinions dominant within the elite is relatively intense and effective; 159 158 M o r e crudely, the center (8) is not structurally sewn together as the elite is — it is a social category, not a social group. Y o u can socialize people in that category because they pay more attention to information and opinions circulated, but y o u cannot exclude deviant persons from it as y o u m a y do through recruitment and promotion in the elite. , ,0" : : // 1 / I :.t:---~ opinion posItiOn 1- _ I I I -_ , I I I I I 8 I -9 c I nnk 8 rank 0 I I I The elite social position Fig. 3 social position Fig. 3 Another p r o b l e m is the question of what implications to society and to the elite itself the opinion position of the foreign policy elite, relative to that of other social strata, might have under specific conditions. T h e problem is illustrated in Figure 3. T h e unbroken line from 0 to rank 8 is arbitrarily drawn. Three possible elite opinion positions are indicated by A, B, and C. T h e y have different consequences for the relations between the elite and the rest of society. W h a t further implications these systems have or m a y have depends on the society — whether it is homogeneous (on other dimensions than foreign policy matters), developed, informed or educated, content with the foreign policy in question and has the means to criticize and sanction the elite etc. — and on the elite — what role it plays or is supposed to play: whether its role is to initiate, to lead or guide the opinion, or to go only as far and as fast as the average opinion is willing to g o . W h a t system is the most stable in the sense that the elite's opinion position is accepted and will be the basis for policy over time? W h i c h system is the more efficient in the way that policies, once decided upon, are carried out and work? In the case of Norway, it is tempting to say that the system B will be the most stable and probably also the most efficient. B avoids an opinion gap which m a y be disastrous in splitting the society, it fits well into a relatively educated and foreign policy interested society, and it avoids challenges to the elite from the center. In system C, we might expect that the center w o u l d produce opposition towards the elite's opinions and policies because they were 'lagging behind' their own, and stand out as an alternative elite, challenging the existing one. 22 Table 10. The ultra-center hypothesis: ratio of positive to negative response Norway should continue in N A T O Norway should become a full member of the E E C * Norway should give help to developing countries that want to build their own merchant marine Norway should give customs duty preferences to developing countries Norway should make closer ties with: NATO/Nordic countries Average ratio CO m u c h the same information is distributed and consumed a m o n g elite persons. Furthermore, individuals are recruited to the elite much on the basis of allegiance to such dominant opinions ; and expectations of within-elite career make for conformity. Generally, there is a relatively strong building-up of consensus. It is definitely not 1 0 0 % : there are some alternative opinion formation channels within the elite, as indicated by the peace thinking differences ; but these generally cover only small minorities, because m u c h of the meaning of an elite set-up with most of the decisionmaking responsibility attached to it is to keep those channels narrow and sparsely populated. A represents the 'autocratic' foreign policy system; the distance between the elite and the rest, including the center categories, is great (measured along the vertical axis; the distance from the point rank 8 to the elite on the horizontal axis is arbitrary and only for illustration purposes); there is an 'opinion gap' between the elite and the different opinion strata. B is the 'guided democracy' model, or the oligarcic model. In this system the elite stands close to the center of society, reflects centrist opinion, is possibly recruited by the center. C is the 'democractic' system where the elite reflects and represents a medium or an average of the opinion of the whole society. 1 3 6 1.5 0.8 1.6 1.0 2.9 1.9 3.6 2.7 Elite 17.2 7.7 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.5 0.5 0.2 0.4 1.2 3.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.5 1.3 0.7 1.8 2.0 6.4 * The data for the rank categories are taken from a national survey made in 1964 which gave a total of 4 4 % for, 3 3 % against a Norwegian application for full membership in the E E C . A similar survey made in 1967 gave 5 4 % for and 2 1 % against. Thus the ratios for the rank categories are higher now, probably much like those given on the question of N A T O . Considering that Norwegian foreign policy generally has not been and is not very m u c h disputed, it is equally tempting to hypothesize that the Norwegian system actually is of type B, and that the elite as an ultra-center thus is not too 'far' from the center. Let us n o w turn to the data to explore this further. In T a b l e 10, this ultra-center hypothesis is tested. Five items on w h i c h we have data both from the rank categories and the elite are presented. For each item, the responses of 4 ranks — 1, 3, 6 and 8 — are given together with the elite responses in ratios of positive to negative response. 23 T h e hypothesis is clearly verified in all five cases. If we take the average ratio on all items, the curve drawn through the opinion scores represented by the ratios is quite steep: it points to the 'autocratic' model. M o s t of the difference between the center category (8) and the elite is, h o w ever, due to two items — N A T O and E E C membership. These are key foreign policy questions in N o r w a y , in the opinion of the elite itself. O r , more generally: Western co-operation is the key field and very much the policy-determining field in the framework of Norwegian foreign p o l i c y . It is part of the elite's role to keep this field as 'clean' or intact as possible and to secure as great a consensus as possible on it, 24 hence the high positive-negative ratios. On the other questions related to foreign aid, the differences are m u c h smaller between the elite and the rest. We get further indication of the i m portance of these questions by comparing the decision-makers' attitudes towards them, with those of the elite. T h e decisionmaking b o d y within the elite m a y be seen as an even stronger consensus-building b o d y when it comes to the crucial foreign policy questions. Although it is undesirable to carry the ultra-center idea too far, we shall test the hypothesis that the decision-makers within the elite in those questions which the elite estimates as the most crucial ones, constitute an ultraultra-center. To designate the decision-maker group we had to use subjective criteria — the respondents' o w n evaluation of their position within the decision-making framework. Certain objective criteria, which will not be dealt with here, seem to give a fairly positive validation of the subjective judgment. In T a b l e 11, the 5 items used in T a b l e 10 are presented together with responses on the question of whether the respondents agreed upon the principle that parts of the national military forces should be placed under U N c o m m a n d and whether they agreed that Norwegian aid to the developing countries should be increased. 161 160 Table Table 12. The optimism vs. pessimism dimension: t~e .case of disarmament consequences. Ratio of optimistic to pesstmutu: responses II. The ultra-ultra center hypothesis: ratio of positive to negative responses Continued NATO membership ....•.•..............•..•.• Full EEC membership ...........•..........•.........•. Parts of the National forces under UN command •..•...••... Increased orwegian aid to the developing countries . Merchant marine assistance to the developing countries ...•.. Customs duty preferences to the developing countries ..•..... Closer ties with: NATO/Nordic countries ..•....•........... T h e hypothesis is again satisfactorily verified. As expected, the distance is the greatest on the two most crucial questions, N A T O and the E E C . In one case — the question of merchant marine assistance to developing countries — there is g o o d reason to say that rejection of the general trend towards a higher ratio for the decision-makers confirms the hypothesis: the merchant marine is the most valuable branch of Norwegian exports of goods and services, especially in securing a fairly favorable balance of payment. Such considerations of this fact m a y well underlie the attitude of the decision-makers. Disarmament We shall n o w proceed to the disarmament data. Several questions asked in a national opinion survey in 1964 were included in our present study. O u r purpose here is partly to test the projection hypothesis, partly to shed some light on the relations between 'leaders' and 'masses' with respect to three specific dimensions, the theoretical basis of which has been given by Galtung. - T h e y are these: the optimism-pessimism dimension, measured by the respondents' expectations about the consequences of disarmament; the gradualism-absolutism dimension, which gives the respondents' preference as to h o w the disarmament process should be started and carried out ; and the confidence versus distrust dimension — the perceptions of or expectations about the parties involved in a disarmament process and their behavior. 2 5 T h e results are presented as ratios, largely because in our study we included Total elite 17.2 7.7 7.7 5.0 1.5 3.7 2.0 Decision-makers 31.3 15.0 15.0 6.7 0.8 4.5 7.0 a middle (ambivalent) response category not used in the 1964 study, and this m a d e the percentage scores as such less c o m parable. T h e questions are listed as they appeared before the respondents (in the opinion study in an interview guide, in our study in a questionnaire). On the prospects of achieving disarmament in the future, the elite is more optimistic than the general o p i n i o n . Does this mean that the elite also is m o r e optimistic about the international c o n sequences of disarmament? Generally we w o u l d expect the opposite: elite persons are less inclined to expect great results from even important measures; international problems are not 'that easy' — disarmament is not a panacea to those problems. We find it difficult to present any hypothesis on this basis. T a b l e 12, where the data are given, in fact justifies this. 26 T a b l e 12 shows no clear tendency: what seems to be a 'promising' trend on the question of e c o n o m i c consequences is broken by a contrary trend on the other item. Perhaps the elite sees the e c o n o m i c differences as too great to handle even if one transfers arms expenditures to development (the logical thought in this c o n n e c tion) and even m o r e so than the other groups; at the same time the elite sees no contradiction between the idea that the world will b e c o m e more stable after disarmament and the idea that conflicts m a y still o c c u r : in fact several elite respondents say s o ; and the score on the middle response category on this question is 2 2 % . Evidently we need m o r e data to clear up the point. A. Economic differences will disappear throughout the world if disarmament is achieved 0.7 Economic differences will exist even if disarmament is achieved. B. Disarmament will create greater stability and peace-keeping possibilities in the world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Serious conflicts may arise even if disarmament is achieved in the world. 3 6 8 Elite 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.5 0.7 0.5 1.2 N=IOOO In Galtung's study, the hypothesis that the center is gradualistic, the periphery absolutistic, was relatively well established. This gives us reason to believe that a projection, as has been made on other dimensions, is safe also in this case. O u r hypothesis then is that degree of gradualism increases from the periphery through the center to the elite. T h e results are shown in T a b l e 13. In only one case — question B — is the projection hypothesis verified, although the trend in the remaining two cases is in the expected direction. T h e results on these two items point to the 'democratic' model presented a b o v e : the center (8) category is extremely gradualistic, m u c h more so than the elite. M a y this be taken as some kind of a 'warning' to the elite from the center that arms policies ought not to be experimented w i t h ? We should mention that the phrasing of the response alternative in some in- stances was modified or moderated in our study, relative to that used in the opinion study. This was done because the pre-test showed a certain annoyance on the part of elite respondents towards a too absolutistic content or phrasing in the alternatives. (See example in footnote to T a b l e 13.) This 'gradualism' in the very response alternatives m a y of course account for some bias in the responses, making the absolutistic (moderated) alternative more acceptable to the elite persons. Generally, however, such a bias is not believed to have had any decisive influence, and it can hardly account for the extreme center gradualism. T h e third dimension we intend to explore is the confidence vs. distrust dimension. Galtung calls it the 'simplicity vs. distrust d i l e m m a ' . This implies that he combines t w o somewhat separate dimensions in o n e : first, the perception of the disarmament process as easy or difficult (once started); second, the perception 26 Table 13. Absolutism versus gradualism: the projection hypothesis. Ratio of gradualistic to absolutistic responses A. We should be careful and take one step at a time ...... We should try to carry out disarmament as quickly as possible. B. We should start with some selected areas of the world ... We should disarm throughout the whole world at once. C. We should start with some weapons, for instance atomic ones, and then take other weapons afterwards .......... We should try to abolish all kinds of weapons at the same time. a I 2.0 3 1.6 6 1.8 8 5.7 Elite 2.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.2 2.8 2.8 4.1 18.6 5.3 aThe alternative was in our study phrased' - in a shorter time span' instead of 'at the same time'. 162 Table 14. The paMcea problem: ratro 163 of 'disann first • to 'confidence first , responses 1 We should start with disarmament to create confidence. . .. . We should create confidence first and then disarm. 1.0 3 1.0 6 0.8 8 0.6 Elite 0.4 hypothesis, although some cases do give support to it. T h e three dimensions explored show no clear picture either. 4.2. Differences between the elite, the opinion- These findings lead into the remaining three indicators used to test the confidence versus distrust dimension. From what has been found so far, the most reasonable hypothesis w o u l d be that the elite is less confident than the rank categories, between which Galtung found no clear difference ; thus we may not hypothesize any projection in this case. to be g o o d reason to distinguish between the two dimensions included in the 'simplicity versus distrust' index and to treat them separately; the data indicate this. T h e elite seems to be definitely more distrustful on the question of h o w the process should be dealt with once started (the inspection question), while it is more confident than the opinion categories c o n cerning to what extent the actors in the process can be trusted (not to attack or 'cheat' the others). This perhaps reflects the double position of the elite: on the one hand, it is responsible for the management of a disarmament process and has no interest in telling the world that this is an easy task; on the other hand, the elite deals with elites in other countries, and this tends to create a certain possibly unconscious feeling of solidarity: the elites of other actors are to some extent defended against the suspicion of one's o w n public opinion. T h e tendency is not very clear, however; on the question of hiding weapons the elite is also rather suspicious. Interestingly, the elite o n c e more places itself close to the model we have called the 'democratic' one. T h e hypothesis is not satisfactorily verified in T a b l e 15. We would not say that it has been rejected, however: there seems In general, the data presented in this section on attitudes towards disarmament do not support satisfactorily the projection of relevant actors in the process as to what extent they should be trusted or not. Although the former may be seen as a 'technical', the latter a 'moral' aspect of the process, the two go very m u c h together and shall be seen together in this context as predominantly an expression of the respondents' trust or confidence in their international environment. Galtung used the problem 'confidence first, or disarmament to create confidence' as an indicator of the degree of a panacea perception in his study. T a b l e 14 shows to what extent this panacea perception is backed by the categories. Here there is a projection trend, which was expected. T h e conclusion drawn concerning the elite rejection of disarmament as a panacea to international problems is supported by the result in T a b l e 14. 27 Table 15. The distrust versus confuIence dimension: ratro of distrust on confidence responses A. Disarmament demands much inspection .............. Disarmament demands little inspection. B. All nations really want to disarm but hesitate to do so before other nations Some nations have acquired weapons not only to defend themselves, but also to attack. C. Some powers will try to hide weapons during disarmament It is not probable that some countries will try to hide weapons. ..................................... 1 4.3 3 3.3 6 5.0 8 4.6 Elite 10.8 1.5 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.4 3.5 1.3 1.5 2.5 1.9 maker level, and the general opinion Contrary to the theory of foreign policy opinion as a function of social position, the problems which will be taken up in this section are not based on a theoretical framework. Thus we have no really g o o d starting-point for examining the relations between the three groups or levels, the differentiation of which is not based on any social background data, but applied from a scheme presented by R o s e n a u . As has already been shown, however, an exploration of data on some structural factors makes it safe to say that the elite stands ' o n top of the opinion-maker sample in the system of foreign policy communication and decision-making. 28 Furthermore, the opinion-makers (because they through active participation in foreign policy activities to a large extent are members of that system) are ' o n top of the general public opinion in the pyramidal structure, which is the logical i m plication of the reasoning we n o w present. T h e lack of a safe theoretical and methodological basis evidently means that we ought not carry such reasoning too far. T w o questions will be further explored by the use of data: First, to what extent may one use the opinion projection idea on the relations between the general opinion, the opinion-makers and the elite? Second, where is the opinion-maker group placed in the society ? If it a bridge between the elite and the general public, as indicated already ? Or is it closer to the elite by backing its opinions and thus not filling its task, which also is to represent the general public opinion before the elite ? A n d : is the opinion position of the opinion-makers very m u c h similar to that of the center, making them possible partners contra the elite? From our data on the opinion-maker sample's distribution on the Galtung index variables, we find that the opinion-maker sample is less 'centrist' than the elite sample; its mean rank would probably be about 5 or 6. T h e data which will be used cover peace ideology and attitudes towards the more important foreign policy questions (cf. Tables 10 and 11) T h e peace ideology of the three groups is presented in T a b l e 16. T h e general opinion is not really a sample of the Norwegian population, but is taken from a youth study which represented the population between 15 and 40 years. Twelve of the peace proposals used in our study were included in the youth study with much the same content and phrasing. In the youth study, h o w ever, the proposals were presented in questions which asked for the respondent's approval or rejection of the proposal. To make the two sets of data comparable we added the two response categories 'Especially important to peace' and 'Somewhat important to peace' used in the questionnaire in our study (cf. T a b l e 4) Although the questions were not all identical, and despite necessary reservations as to the operation just described, we think it reasonable to say that the data are comparable. In 6 out of 12 cases the projection hypothesis holds. In one case (inter-individual relations) the trend is contrary to the hypothesis, in 4 there is a ' l o o p ' in the sense that the youth sample is breaking or reversing the trend (Abolish hunger and poverty, and M o r e democratic states) or in the sense that the opinion-maker sample is ' o n top' (Disarmament, and W o r l d State). On the one remaining item (States should b e c o m e more similar) the scores are practically even. This is not a bad result although it is not quite satisfactory. T h e single-item reversal of the dominant trend and the four loops may be due to several factors. It is perhaps especially interesting that the 164 165 Table 16. Peace ideology and the projection hypothesis. Elite Strengthen the U .........•..............• Rich countries help poor ....•............... Abolish hunger and poverty . Educate the individuals to peace . More West contact with Eastb •..••.••.••••••• More democratic states . Preserve military alliancesc . General and complete disarmament ........•.. Better inter-individual relations . . Small countries should have more influence States should become more similar ...........• Establish the World State . 96 91 90 90 89 82 80 77 61 55 52 39 % approval Table 17. Basic foreign policy attitudes and the projection hypothesis. Ratios Youths Hypothesis coniinned 89 85 85 87 60 + + 81 70 87 Opinionmakers 87 75 60 94 84 40 83 64 79 52 48 51 47 52 71 + + + + 27 a Questions in the youth study interview guide generally started with the words 'To obtain peace — should —'. In the youth study, this question ran: 'To obtain peace we should have increased trade, exchange, and co-operation also between countries that are not on friendly terms.' In the youth study, this question ran: 'To obtain peace countries should be members of mi litary alliances so that no country or group of countries dare attack others.' b c trends on the two 'sub-national' approaches — the intra- and the interindividual — are so markedly contrary to each other. This might be explained by an increasing group-orientation with decreasing social position: those at the b o t t o m of society (the periphery) place m o r e emphasis on interaction between individuals, because that part of life or society — whether local, national, or international — is more meaningful and i m portant to them. T h e opinion-maker ' l o o p ' is, in the case of the ' W o r l d State' proposal, due to what has already been said about the relatively greater influx of 'idealist' or world federalist thinking a m o n g interest g r o u p opinion-makers. T h e score on disarmament is more problematic, but is probably explained by the relatively high percentage of 'leftists', w h o usually stress disarmament in their arms policies. As to the relative youth preference for 'Abolish hunger and poverty' and ' M o r e democratic states', this can be due to a stronger impact of 'moralistic' thinking a m o n g youth. Or youth is more occupied with catastrophic trends, which they are m o r e exposed to through mass media and the world communication revolution; and they are more truly democratic, due to socialization of democratic values (the elder have also been socialized to these, but have 'forgotten' since their socialization was long ago) and possibly due to a certain opposition toward the more central, more influential strata (which the elite and the opinion-makers represent). T h e relations between the three groups m a y also be explored by rank correlation. T h e difference is not great; for all three pairs it runs like this: Elite 'Should Norway continue in NATO, or should we withdraw?' 'Should orway apply for full membership in the EEC or not?' . . . . . . . .. 'Should orway increase its total aid to the developing countries?' ..... 'If a developing country asked for our help to build up a merchant marine, should we give such help? . . . . . . . . . .. 'Should we give the devel· oping countries customs duty preferences on some of their products ?'c. . .. 'Should we give our developing aid on a multilateral or bilateral basis, primarily?' . . . . • . . . . .. 'What international organization or unit do you think you have most in common with/think that Norway should establish closer ties with?' ..... Opinion makers General opinion Acceptance of hypothesis ContinuefWithdraw 17.2 3.5 2.6 + Should/Should not 7.7 5.5 2.6& + Should/Should not 5.0 6.0 O.lb Should/Should not 1.5 0.7 0.7 Should/Should not 3.7 16.8 0.4 Multilat.fBilateral 3.0 1.8 1.5 + NATO ordic countries 2.0 1.3 0.5 + 7.1 7.0 'The UN should dispose of parts of the national armies to form an international peace-keeping force' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Should/Should not + + a National survey, July 1967, by Norwegian Gallup A / S . N is about 1600. National survey 1965. N= 1751 The question in the general opinion survey was 'Imagine that the best way to help a developing country would be to buy manufactured goods from it, for instance textiles, but that this would lead to difficulties for Norwegian factories. Do you think Norway should buy such products or not?' From the youth study 1967; the question in this study was ' T o obtain peace we should have a strong international peace-keeping force that can stop aggression from any country or group of countries'. b Elite — opinion-makers: rho = 0.89 Opinion-makers — y o u t h : rho = 0.80 Elite — y o u t h : rho = 0.63 It is greatest between the elite and the youth sample, and greater between the opinion-makers and the youth, than b e tween the elite and the opinion-makers. This indicates that the opinion-maker sample lies in-between the two other groups, but somewhat nearer to the elite than to the youth sample, o r : closer to the center than to the m e d i u m or peripherydirected groupings. T h e second set of data is a compilation of eight items representing attitude toward c d N A T O , the E E C , aid and assistance to the developing countries, and international co-operation. These data are presented in T a b l e 17 a b o v e . T a b l e 17 offers an acceptance of the hypothesis in six out of the total eight cases. T h e rejection cases are on the foreign aid items, where the opinion-maker sample makes another ' l o o p ' . This ' l o o p ' is explained by the fact that the opinion-maker sample generally is m o r e positive toward foreign aid and the developing countries. This is shown by a higher preference for these aspects of foreign policy and international politics among the opinion-makers than is the case in the elite. On the other 29 167 166 hand, one of the items — merchant marine assistance — shows a departure from this general trend difficult to explain. It might be due to a more 'realistic' conception of the danger of competition that merchant marines in the developing countries (or in other countries generally) represent to N o r w a y (which is highly dependent on its merchant marine i n c o m e ) , although it is difficult to explain w h y the opinion-maker sample, on several other dimensions more 'idealistic' than the elite, should be more 'realistic' on this item. If we take the average ratio for the opinion-makers on the five items used in T a b l e 10, we get a ratio of 6.8, which in fact is higher than the average ratio calculated for the elite on the same items. O n e single item — customs duty preferences — of course explains very m u c h of this (as N A T O explained very much the high ratio of the elite). But an over-all comparison with the center category shows that the opinion-makers are not close to the center. Even on the two items which indicate attitude towards Western c o operation — an idea the 'leftists', w h o are relatively numerous in the opinion-maker sample, strongly reject — the opinionmaker sample shows a m o r e positive attitude than the center. This, in our opinion, again supports the assumption that several structural factors are very important in the foreign policy opinion formation: in some instances (as probably in the case of N A T O and the E E C ) these factors reduce or counteract the impact of the periphery to center opinion formation trend; in others (which perhaps o c c u r more often) they underline or reinforce this trend. policies, and 'tough' policies. T h e general idea was ventured that this is the profile of the elite in a small and center nation. This idea, and of course other findings and attempts at generalizations, invite similar comparative research. T h e important hypothesis set forth by Galtung in his theory of opinion as a function of social position formed the basis of the ultra-center hypothesis which was confirmed on some dimensions found to be of special importance in the framework of Norwegian foreign policy. On other attitudinal dimensions, however, the hypothesis was not clearly supported. This points towards two related c o n clusions. First, we need to explore more thoroughly the general hypothesis by more extensive studies. Second — a rather tentative conclusion, more a proposition for further testing — there is no general projection of foreign policy or international political opinion in the society from the periphery through center to the elite (or decision-makers) ; such a projection exists and may be anticipated only in questions which are of some policy importance, have been the subject of a minimum of general information and socialization a m o n g the public, and have existed as topics for discussion and opinion formation over some time. These three criteria may explain w h y the disarmament data did not fit the general hypothesis nor possibly the more specific personality hypotheses which were tested. These and other factors, already m u c h explored by Galtung and others, ought definitely to be studied further. APPENDIX A 5. Conclusion This article has given a portrait of the peace thinking, or more generally the international political thinking, of the Norwegian elite. We found the profile of the elite to be in particular oriented towards stability, status q u o , regionalistic The sampling method T h e elite sample was selected a m o n g four groups of people w h o m we though to be possible influentials in the Norwegian foreign policy communication and decision-making system: the Parliamentarians, the administration (Foreign service, Trade Ministry, and Ministry of Defense), the mass media, and the main interest organizations. A total of 25 from each group — research funds and capabilities did not allow a higher number — were selected, partly by formal position, partly by the use of judges with both political and personal knowledge about the top political level. A m o n g the Parliamentarians, we included all the 24 members of the extended Foreign Relations Committee in the Storting plus one MP from the Socialist People's Party; the selection of people from the administration was made by three judges independently, and 15 from the Foreign, 5 from each of the two other ministries were included; from the mass media — the press and radio — we selected the foreign editors of the dailies and weeklies appearing in O s l o or, in those cases where there was no foreign editor, the chief editor, and from the r a d i o / T V we included the heads of the news and foreign departments and their 'second hands' (redaksjonssekretærer) plus the news commentators (journalists, editors, or researchers); and among the interest organizations we included the administrative heads from the main organizations in four different fields: Norwegian branches of international organizations ( W A W F , R e d Cross), general political organizations ('Atlanterhavskomiteen', the N o r d i c Association, e t c . ) , economic interest organizations (Norwegian Shipowners' Association, etc.) and the peace or defense organizations ( W a r Resisters and 'Folk og Forsvar'). science ('samfunnskunnskap') in the secondary school and the universities. T h e party committee members were all included, except in two cases: half of the committee of the Socialists People's Party was selected randomly, as the committee was relatively m u c h more numerous than the committees of the other parties; and the Communist Party 'excluded' themselves by not responding when we asked for a list of members of the party's foreign relations committee. In the case of the Center Party, we had to include the party's executive committee, since it had no special committee on foreign relations. T h e people in the press were — as mentioned — selected randomly. We used a catalogue of all papers appearing weekly or more often. T h e number of respondents to be contacted was determined by the official data on the paper's circulation. Papers with a circulation below 12,000were excluded. In most cases only one respondent — the editor — was included from each paper, but in the case of the biggest papers, a larger number (from 2 to 5, depending on circulation) was included. T h e interest organizations were selected by the use of a catalogue of Norwegian associations and interests organizations, Jorolv M o r e n , Oppslagsboken norske organisasjoner, Oslo, T a n u m , 1967. All organizations with a membership total a b o v e 500 and which were relevant to foreign policy or international political matters were included, and one respondent was chosen from each organization. T h e secondary school and university Totally, we got interviews with 88 perteachers were chosen randomly from a list sons on a practically even distribution of members in the History Section of the between the four groups. No reserve Norwegian Secondary School Teachers' sampling was made to replace those with Association. w h o m we did not get an interview. T h e total number of respondents selected The opinion-maker sample was also selected was 290, and the number in each of the partly by formal criteria, partly by the four groups varied from 65 to 80. T h e total use of judges, but in two cases — in the response was 45 % or 130 respondents, case of mass media and the teachers — somewhat lower than what m a y be said randomly. Four groups were included: to be quite satisfactory. members of the political parties' committees on foreign policy matters (standing or the last ad hoc committee), journalists on the APPENDIX B foreign 'desk' in the Oslo press and editors The data collecting method of 'province' newspapers (appearing outAs mentioned in the text, the elite side Oslo) plus all employed in the radio/ responded to a structured interview guide, T V ' s t w o relevant departments (those partly to a fixed questionnaire. T h e w h o were not included in the elite sample), opinion-maker sample responded to a administrative heads (or in the cases where mailed questionnaire, mostly fixed. T h e there were no such permanent heads: the questions asked the two samples were chosen chairman) of relevant interest organipractically the same (some were excluded zations which were not included in the elite in the opinion-maker study). In fact, the sample, and teachers in history and social 168 169 elaboration of the elite interview-guide and the responses we got on it b o t h were used in the elaboration of the opinionmaker questionnaire, especially in the question of pre-coding answers. T h e interview guide was prepared from September 1966 to February 1967. Extensive discussions of several drafts were held, mainly at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, a m o n g its staff. Explorative interviews based on an unstructured guide were m a d e a m o n g a n u m b e r of people estimated as g o o d informants. A preliminary draft of a structured guide was pretested by the author and three student colleagues at the Institute for Political Science, University of O s l o . At the same time, a preliminary draft of the questionnaire to be used later on was mailed to a group of persons, chosen very m u c h on our o w n subjective evaluations but at the same time to cover most of the political spectrum of an opinionmaker level. T h e interviewing was carried out by the three students a n d the author. A l l were trained in interviewing, though not on foreign policy questions. T h e respondents were contacted personally or by telephone beforehand, after they had received an introductory letter from the head of the Institute for Political Science. T h e interviews took from 1 % to 2 hours and were conducted mostly in the office of the respondents. T h e interviewers were instructed to make extensive notes where extra information c o u l d be obtained, and they were told to p r o b e on those questions were they felt this to be useful or necessary. T h e interviewees were asked to state their personal opinions a n d were assured that their identity w o u l d be confidential. By and large, we think that the interview situation was satisfactory considering these different problems. T h e questionnaire was mailed together with the introductory letter and a letter from the author. T w o reminders were mailed after periods of 15-20 days. T h e respondents were asked to give extra comments, criticisms etc. on an o p e n space besides each question. T h e questionnaire totally included 120 different ( o r some related) items; some of the respondents found it too extensive. T h e elite responses were c o d e d by the author, the opinion-maker data by a coding assistant at the P R I O ; this c o d i n g was controlled by the author. T h e data were filed on cards. N O T E S * This is a much revised version of a paper presented in outline at the Third Nordic Peace Research Conference at Orenås, Sweden M a y 19-21, 1968, here published as P R I O publication no. 16-7. I am much indebted to director Johan Galtung, P R I O , and to Associate Professor Nils Ørvik of the Institute of Political Science, University of Oslo, for stimulating advice and criticism, and to Steinar Wigtil and Anne Lisa Frostad, who helped me with the data processing. Johan Galtung, 'Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position', Journal of Peace Research, no. 3 - 4 , 1964. Cf. my magister thesis for the Institute of Political Science, University of Oslo, Fakta og verdier i utenrikspolitikken. En undersøkelse av et norsk elite-utvalg. Oslo 1967. This thesis was based on the elite data only; the data on the opinion-maker sample are studied now, and a report on both parts of the study will appear. Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, New York: Praeger, 1965; Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, France, Germany and the Western Alliance. A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics. New York: Charles Sciibner's Sons, 1966. See Johan Galtung, Theory and Methods of Social Research. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1967. Published in the United Kingdom by George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. London and in the United States by Columbia University Press, New York. pp. 111-128. The last 5 - 6 questionnaires received from the respondents were returned at the time of the final escalation and the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war, 1967. Cf. Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing, 'Social Background and Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry', American Political Science Review, Vol. L X I June 1967, No. 2 pp. 428-445. Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy. A Study of Norway. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. Cf. also comments to this book by Erik Allardt and Ulf Torgersen in Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget) no. 2/3, 1967. We shall not develop a center-periphery index for the international society, although this might be both possible and fruitful. The parallel with the Galtung index of course is apparent. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 On the problem of rank disequilibration, see Johan Galtung: 'Norge i verdenssamfunnet', Det norske samfunn, Oslo 1968. Norway's export of goods and service makes up 4 0 . 4 % of its total GNP,^and its imports are on the same level (1965 figures, cf. UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1966. Helge Hveem, Fakta og verdier i utenrikspolitikken, p. 123. ibid. p . 89. ibid. pp. 141-145. Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, New York: Harper & Son, 1957. In a 1967 study of Norwegian youth, the respondents besides giving their preference for several peace proposals were asked to state which of the proposals they believed most likely would lead to peace. This of course is not quite the same as being asked about the 'realism' of the proposals, but we think that the responses at least may give some indications of the cognitions of the respondents. Unfortunately, data on this question are scarce, the N A / D K scores are high, so that a comparison by the rank correlation method is not possible. The data we may use, however, do indicate a rho which is even more to the negative side than in the case of the opinion-maker sample, that is: the cognitive-affective dissonance is greatest among the general opinion. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 See for a discussion of the level analysis problem J. David Singer, 'The Level of Analysis Problem', in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, The International System, Princeton University Press, 1961. An article which deals with related problems is Hans and Shulamith Kreitler, 'Crucial Dimensions of the Attitude towards National and Supra-national Ideals', Journal of Peace Research, no. 2, 1967 pp. 107-124. Unpublished material from a study made by Herman Schmid at the Institute of Sociology, Lund University, Sweden, in 1966-67. Members of this organization were asked what would be more important for creating peace: that we get more peace-oriented leaders, or that the international system be changed. 51 % thought that peace-oriented leaders was more important, 3 4 % system changes, a result which very clearly contrasts with the thoughts of the Norwegian elite. On a question which asked if peace could be better secured if or when the political leaders were changed or educated to peace, 2 9 % of the elite sample was in favor of the idea, 4 4 % against it. The respective percentages in the opinion-maker sample were 4 9 % and 2 0 % (while the two Norwegian samples were in nearly complete agreement as to the idea of raising individuals generally to peace). This seems to indicate some differences due to stratification or different social position. 17 18 The British sample of peace activists, on the other hand, is far more anomic than the Norwegian samples: it favors extra-parliamentary action to promote its policies, ideas that are not represented among the elite and hardly so among the opinion-makers. Members of the two left socialist parties in Norway, the Socialist People's Party and the Communists, usually are strong opponents to central parts ot Norwegian foreign policy, at least after Norway became a member of N A T O . These two parties make up 4% of our elite sample, but 17% of the opinion-maker sample. In the latter, there is also a stronger influx of persons engaged in the more 'idealistic' of humanitarian activities, like the peace organizations, the W o r l d Association of World Federalists (En Verden), the Red Cross, etc. Galtung, 'Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position'; and 'Social Position, Party Identification and Foreign Policy Orientation: A Norwegian Case Study', in James Rosenau (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press, 1967 pp. 161-193. Some data which we have, may give an indication of the point; the data cover the age, the sex, the income, the education, and the job of the respondents: A g e : Less than 34 years (young) 5% 45-54. 67% More than 55 28% Sex: 96% are men. Income: All but 1% above median Norwegian wage earner income. Education: 9 5 % have more than primary, the rest have primary education. Job: Some few among the parliamentarians in the sample are originally (that is before they became MP's) blue collar. Cf. Galtung, 'Foreign Policy Opinion' — p. 217 on the classification of the index. Cf. Nils H. Halle, 'Social Position and Foreign Policy Attitudes', Journal of Peace Research, no. 1, 1966 pp. 4 6 - 7 4 which shows that the Norwegian public compared with the French and the Polish is the most informed about international matters. Galtung, in Rosenau (ed.), op.cit. This was established by asking the respondents which political attitudes and opinions in their (domestic) foreign policy opponents' programme they felt were most wrong or criticisable: the 19 20 21 22 23 24 170 policy towards N A T O was mentioned by 3 2 % , the E E C policy by 10%, while foreign aid and UN policy (in general) ranked next (although mentioned only by a few). Johan Galtung, 'Attitudes towards Different Forms of Disarmament. A Study of Norwegian Public Opinion', Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association's Inaugural Conference, Assen: V a n Gorcum, 1966 pp. 210-238. *• According to a 1964 national survey, 3 4 % of the general opinion believed partial or total disarmament would be achieved within 20 years, while 59% of the 1967 elite sample believed that this would be achieved by the year 2000 (we assume that difference in the time period ahead does not play any role for the difference in expectations, since the question really is whether or not people believe that disarmament will happen in the not too distant future). ' Galtung, op.cit. pp. 225-226. James Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, New York: Random House, 1961. For instance, 3 2 % of the opinion-makers looks upon the 'gap' between the rich and poor countries and the problems of the developing countries, as the most important problem of the world to-day, while 9% of the elite does the same; aid and assistance to the developing countries are seen as the most important foreign policy goal of Norway in the present situation by 12% of the opinion-makers and only 2% of the elite. 25 2 28 29 SUMMARY This article presents a profile of the peace thinking of a Norwegian elite sample, and tests some hypotheses derived from Galtung's center-periphery theory. Data were collected in 1967 by interviews and questionnaires, mostly structured, a m o n g a foreign policy elite sample and — for comparative purposes — a m o n g a so-called opinionmaker sample. These data are to some degree c o m p a r e d with Norwegian opinion survey data. T T h e main findings are that the elite's peace thinking, as shown by its operational peace profile, is centered around stability, evolutionary change, and gradualistic peace policies. Middle-range or regionalistic policies are preferred to long-range (globalistic) and short-range (intra-national or individual); tough policies to soft (or 'idealistic') ones. T h e so-called projection hypothesis derived from the center-periphery theory is given substantial backing, and it is established — although with some important modifications — that the elite m a y be seen as an ultra-center of society. HpaTHoe COAepl«aHHe. )J;aHHaJI CTaTbfl AaeT B npOqlHJIe paaMHmJIeHHfI 0 np06JIeMaX MHpa CpeAH npeACTaBHTeJIell HOpBel«CKOA 8JIHTbI H nOABepraeT paa60py HeHOTOpble nOJIOl«eRHfI, BaflTble H8 TeOpHH ranTyHra o "I\eHTpe-nepHqlepHH". 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