AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF
Cheryl J. Reed for the degree of Doctor of Education in Education presented on
November 11. 1997. Title: A Descriptive Analysis of Organizational Transition
Related to Extensive Administrative Change and Its Impact: A Case Study of One
Community College.
Abstract approved:
Redacted for Privacy
Dale Parnell
Using qualitative methodology and a case study format, this study examines
from the inside-out the organizational impact of significant change in leadership at a
mature community college during the initial period of that change. The study
describes and characterizes the nature of change in the organization during the
periods of significant leadership transition, and examines the conceptual links
between the new leadership team and the external and internal forces of change
impacting the college during that time.
The researcher has endeavored to pull significant events, actions, and
circumstances of the new top leadership team in the college selected for study
through a specific theoretical framework to find links of relationship and connection.
That framework defines organizational change as a coalition of interests and a
network of activities within a moving structure impacted by a combination of past
events, pushes arising from the environment, and pulls from dominant coalitions.
A Descriptive Analysis of Organizational Transition Related to
Extensive Administrative Change and Its Impact:
A Case Study of One Community College
by
Cheryl J. Reed
A THESIS
submitted to
Oregon State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the
degree of
Doctor of Education
Completed November 11, 1997
Commencement June 1998
Doctor of Education thesis of Cheryl J. Reed presented on November 11. 1997
APPROVED:
Redacted for Privacy
Major Professor, representing Education
Redacted for Privacy
Director of Scholl of Education
Redacted for Privacy
Dean of GradzS1ite School
I understand that my thesis will become part of the permanent collection of Oregon
State University libraries. My signature below authorizes release of my thesis to any
reader upon request.
Redacted for Privacy
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CHAPTER
I
II
INTRODUCTION
1
Research Questions
4
Background
5
Introduction to Theory
7
Participant Observation
10
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
14
Models of Organizational Change
14
Forces that Set Change Events in Motion
19
Organizational Movement Related to Environment
Organizational Movement Related to Life Cycle
Organizational Movement Related to Political Dimensions
Forms of Change
Identity Change
Coordination Change: Culture and Structure
Coordination Change: Colleges
Control Change: Politics and Coalitions
Leadership Roles in the Change Process
Change Strategists
Change Implementers
19
21
23
24
24
25
27
29
30
30
36
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
Change Recipients
Summary
III METHODOLOGY
37
39
40
Theoretical Framework
41
The Case Study Approach
42
Data Collection
43
Limitations of the Study
46
IV PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION AND FINDINGS
Internal and External Motion
Motion of Environment: The New Seaview
Motion of Life Cycle: The Pulse of Seaview
Motion of Political Dimensions: Night Classes
Managing Change
Identity: New Letterhead
Coordination: Budget Process I
Control: Budget Process II
V SUMMARY, ANALYSIS, AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
48
48
48
54
59
62
63
65
69
72
Purpose of this Study
72
Findings, Recommendations, and Analyses
72
Research Question #1
Research Question #2
Research Question #3
Research Question #4
72
75
78
80
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
Research Question #5
Research Question #6
What Can Be Learned from this Study
88
Conclusion
90
REFERENCES
APPENDIX
82
85
93
101
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSITION
RELATED TO EXTENSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE
AND ITS IMPACT: A CASE STUDY OF
ONE COMMUNITY COLLEGE
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One cannot expect to know what is going to happen.
One can only consider himself fortunate if he can
discover what has happened.
-Pierre de Pont
Most organizations are in a time of rapid change, both in the public and in
the private sectors, and public community colleges are no exception. Private sector
organizations can now survive and thrive only by quick adaptation to market
realities. That adaptation occurs in many ways, some of which are innovative and
transformational in nature, such as the use of new technologies and new
manufacturing methods. Adaptation can also occur through new management
strategies, such as reengineering or reversing market direction. Public community
colleges are no less sensitive to environmental realities because of funding and
political considerations and must also develop ways to adapt and transform from
traditional higher education institutions with high degrees of consistency and
stability to ones of flexibility and responsiveness.
A community college is a distinctly American 2-year publicly funded
institution which stands between secondary education and universities, between
2
developmental education and higher education, and between job exploration and a
trained technical position in local industry. It has a comprehensive curriculum
aimed at a comprehensive mission. Its most marked characteristic is its "open door"
policy; access to community colleges is not limited by scores of admissions
examinations or high school grades. Community colleges serve their local
communities with curriculum geared to local and regional needs and are intended to
be financially feasible.
Community colleges which have been founded in the past few years may
easily shift from one paradigm to another like their fast-moving private sector
counterparts. But what about the community colleges that were birthed during
another era, those that have a history and traditions that are steeped with
significance related to their junior college roots? Those colleges, despite their
comprehensive missions and diverse student bodies, have self-images that reflect
themselves as primarily university models of preparation for transfer to a 4-year
college, in which well-prepared students engage in challenging work with elite
academicians (Baker, 1992; Bryant, 1988). How do those colleges manage
transformation to also survive and thrive?
Preparing for and dealing with the impact of change is a fundamental
leadership task for the community college leaders of today. Dale Parnell (1990)
stated:
The decade of the 1990s will present colleges and universities with rich new
possibilities and opportunities as well as some challenges. Higher education
leaders who can recognize and take advantage of external windows of
3
opportunity and solve some of the internal operating problems will be the
leaders for Dateline 2000. (p. 32)
Complex issues of diversity, quality, accountability, competition, and new
technologies require community college leaders to address the challenges of external
adaptation and internal integration by paying attention to not only mission and
direction, but also to the change process itself. The interrelationships between
leadership and organizational transformation are fundamental to understanding the
complexities and dynamics of organizational change at a community college.
The purpose of this study was to explore the organizational impact of
significant changes in leadership at a specific community college during the initial
period of that change. It was the primary purpose of this research project to broaden
the research on organizational change by describing and analyzing the forces both
externally and internally that impacted the first change efforts of a new senior
leadership team at a public community college, and to describe the impact of the
new team on the organizational change that was occurring around them (Bess, 1984;
Cooper & Kempner, 1993; Kotter, 1995).
Using qualitative methodology and a case study format, the study examined
from the "inside-out" a community college in the northwest United States that had
been stable for almost 30 years before undergoing a massive change in senior
leadership in a short time period. How were this new team's decisions impacted by
the history and environment of the institution? And in turn, how did the new team
affect the organizational change within the institution?
4
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research questions that guided this study are grounded in the literature
of organizational change and transformation and are listed as follows:
1.
What did the research literature reveal about the impacts of change,
especially when new leadership is installed in an organization?
2.
What were the external and internal forces that influenced significant
organizational change in this institution?
3.
What was the impact on the organization of a shift from
organizational stability to one of change?
4.
To what extent did the new senior leadership team influence or
manage organizational change?
5.
How was organizational change implemented by a new senior
leadership team in one community college?
6.
What can be learned from this case study about the impact on a large
and stable community college resulting from a significant change in executive
leadership?
The college in this case study is an organization in a highly unusual state of
flux and transition in which many forms of change were occurring at one time. The
complexities of this transition provided particularly valuable insights into
organizational change from a community college perspective.
5
BACKGROUND
Seaview Community College is an established community college nestled in
an elite suburb right outside of a large metropolitan city. Seaview has been a very
stable institution. The immediate past president began his teaching career there over
30 years ago, and apprenticed under his mentor, who was the president before him.
These two people, with similar values and temperaments, led the college and hired
most of the staff through several decades. Over half of the faculty had been at
Seaview for their entire careers and have received their 25-year pins. The policy
and procedures manual has not been significantly updated in 20 years. Buildings
were old; the trees and shrubs around the campus are mature and beautiful.
The college has prided itself for many years on its academic reputation, and
faculty have been very proud of the excellence of Seaview's many students who
transferred successfully to a 4-year college or university. Seaview was highly
funded by the state for many years, and though no radical internal change was
possible because of not having any extra money, expectations to continue the status
quo were regularly fulfilled because there was usually enough money. There were
few hires, and no terminations of any kind. The leadership was paternal and
autocratic, and tensions between the faculty union and the administration were
normal. While incremental improvements occurred over time, there were few major
innovations, new program development, or growth. There were also few crises.
Things stayed in one place for a very long time.
6
Two years ago, the winds of change began to blow at Seaview, and soon
picked up momentum and force. Enrollment had dipped precariously. The college
was in danger of not meeting its minimum enrollment target, which had dire future
financial consequences. The neighboring community colleges began to get much
attention for their growing enrollments and aggressive market stances. The long-
time president retired amidst much fanfare, and a new president was hired by the
campus with an outcry of "it is time for a change." The new president, who came
from a very successful, growing, fast-moving neighboring college, was given clear
expectations by the Board and his campus constituents that Seaview needed to "get
off its duff," move into the twentieth century, and "go be competitive."
This meant, to the new president, moving the college from the narrow junior
college mission to a broader comprehensive mission involving not only college
transfer, but also substantial growth and innovation in technical education,
developmental education, community service, and economic development.
Because of several twists of fate, several key positions were vacated soon
after the new president was hired, and he found himself in his first year in the
unusual position of hiring four of five new vice-presidents, forming an entirely new
senior leadership team. Additionally, he hired several replacement mid-management
directors and deans.
During the time of this case study, this new leadership team at Seaview had
just begun working together. Enrollment had continued to spiral on a dangerous
downward trend.
7
The tornado had hit. The magnitude and force of the change winds were
shaking the college's foundation. What lessons could be learned from a community
college engaged in such dramatic transformation?
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY
Organizational change is defined by Schein (1970) as the "induction of new
patterns of action, belief, and attitudes among substantial segments of a population"
(p. 4). Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1983) believes that change is defined by the
crystallization of new action possibilities, which include new policies, new
behaviors, new patterns, new methodologies, new products, or new market ideas,
all based on reconceptualized patterns in the workplace. Changes may be brought
about by internal changes, external pressures, or a combination of both. Decisionmakers, via their patterns of leadership, influence both positively and negatively an
organization's internal and external environments, and because of that, are
integrally related to the process and cycles of organizational change (Kilmann,
Covin, Bennis, Mason, & Mitroff, 1988; Kiss ler, 1991).
Noel Tichy (1983) argues that all organizations have three interrelated cycles
of transformation, which are ongoing dilemmas and constantly evolving. The first is
in technical design, in which the organization faces a production problem in which
social and technical resources must be arranged so that the organization produces a
specific desired output. The second is in political allocation, in which the
organization deals with the problem of allocating power and resources. The third is
8
the ideological problem, in which the organization must determine what values need
to be held by what people. At different points of time, any one of them may be in
need of adjustment, and each cycle has associated with it a different set of problem
solving. Organizations vary over time in the amount of energy invested in making
adjustments in each of these cycles, all of which contribute to organizational
transformation.
The studies of Masland (1985) and Tierney (1988) suggest that a better
understanding of the interaction between diverse and changing internal and external
environments is essential to effective functioning of organizations, especially those
working through change processes. Schein (1980) asserts that the magnitude of
organizational change is dependent on two factors: the degree to which the
organization is ready to change as the result of internal or external forces, and
whether the organization is in a developmental stage of growth, organizational mid-
life, or maturity. For the mature organization, the values of the organization
preserve the glories of the past, providing a valued source of defense and selfesteem, and frame-breaking is much more difficult. Schein (1980) indicates in all of
those developmental stages, there are two options for change: transformation or
decline. In transformation, change can be managed or can evolve; in destruction,
change occurs at paradigm levels and through replacement of many key people.
Dyer (1985, 1986) examined change mechanisms in several organizations
and found that they follow several patterns: (a) the organization develops a sense of
crisis and concludes it needs new leadership; (b) there is a weakening of pattern
9
maintenance in the sense that procedures, beliefs, and systems that support the old
ways break down; (c) a new leader and leadership team with new assumptions is
brought in from the outside to deal with the crisis; (d) conflict develops between the
proponents of the old assumptions and the new leadership; and (e) if the crisis is
eased, new assumptions begin to be embedded and reinforced by a new set of
pattern maintenance activities.
Although new leaders might be empowered to initiate change, they are often
not in a position to dictate commitment, especially in academic settings (Austin,
1990; Baldridge & Deal, 1983). In an ideal organization, people understand the
necessity for change and support it accordingly. In real organizations, change can
appear chaotic because outcomes are not predictable (Beckhard & Harris, 1987;
Dent, 1991). Individuals or groups who perceive themselves or their membership as
autonomous are not likely to view coercive power or the power to legislate change
and compliance as friendly (Kotter, 1988).
Organizations are social structures reflecting the characteristics of people
who make up their membership. Change can be perceived as exciting and
unthreatening or intrusive and frightening. The organization's response to change is
governed by individuals who shape or define its context. That context is worth
exploring, since it can influence the ultimate institutionalization of organizational
change (Feldman, 1988; Goodman, 1982).
A growing body of empirical evidence points out that the top management
team may be a more important determinant of an organization's ability to change
10
and adapt than the chief executive officer alone (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1990; Hambrick, 1981; Hurst, Rush, & White, 1989). These and other researchers
have noted that it is the top management team through which critical information is
filtered and by which strategic decisions are made (Hambrick & Mason, 1984;
Norburn & Birley, 1988; O'Reilly, Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989).
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION
A particularly important part of this research study was the element of
participant-observation. As one of the new vice-presidents hired on the new senior
leadership team, the researcher's voice in the decisions of that team became
necessarily part of the context of the study.
Participant observation is a legitimate way to collect data, particularly in
case study methodology (Jorgenson, 1989). It allows a view of the research
variables from a particularly unique perspective, from the inside-out. In this case
study, unrestricted access to relevant documents, people, and situations would have
been impossible without being a participant-observer. Another distinct advantage
for this type of single case-study that is not usually referenced is the opportunity of
the participant-observer to observe in many more situations than that of an outside
researcher who must only view the organization on specific days, times, or in
specific meetings or interactions. The ability of the participant-observer to be
flexible and adaptive in working with key respondents to gain information and
perspective is another benefit. It was much easier to be at the right place at the right
11
time as a participant observer, and thus the picture gained through the research was
much richer, less artificial, and more contextually holistic than it might have been if
the research had been confined to more restrictive parameters. This was especially
important because of the interwoven variables of organizational change; there is no
distinct start or stop that cleanly divides more traditional quantitative research.
Being a new administrator at the college also allowed the researcher a
natural opportunity to ask open-ended questions about the campus, its history, the
research subjects' roles at the college, their perspective about the changes, and their
predictions for the future.
A potential problem for research involving participant-observation is the risk
of biased results (Becker, 1958). Being new to the campus, this risk was mitigated
somewhat, since the researcher was observing with fresh eyes. A bigger risk was
the possibility that respondents would be influenced by a hierarchical position in the
institution and their responses might therefore be screened. The possibility of this
occurring was considered in the design study, and alleviated by two decisions.
First, respondents in the interviews were purposefully selected who had no
reporting relationship to the researcher. Second, while the researcher did participate
as a member of the senior leadership team, the specific events and decisions studied
in the research were not within the researcher's specific area of responsibility at the
institution.
For the purposes of this study, field notes were kept as a critical component
of the data collection and analysis process. Analysis occurred concurrently with the
12
data collection, allowing a continuous refinement of focus. As a participant
observer, the researcher was able to be included in many discussions and meetings
that provided rich information. During these meetings, detailed field notes were
developed including verbatim comments that were related to the impacts of change.
Changes were noted in perspective, decision-making, verbal and nonverbal
behaviors from all participants. It was important to engage in persistent observation,
or keeping oneself open to multiple influences throughout the period of study, in
order to obtain the most objective information.
The practical significance of this study is that by analyzing the experience of
one established community college undergoing substantive administrative change
while also experiencing changed external variables, insights could be gained about
the interrelationships between leadership transitions and organizational change.
Chapter II of this case study reviews the existing research related to
organizational change and changes in senior leadership. Chapter III describes the
design of the study and the methodology employed. This case study used a
combination of participant observation, in-depth interviews, and selected document
review to gather empirical data. Chapter IV of the study reports the findings, and
chapter five analyzes the fmdings in the case and presents overall patterns related to
the research that may be reflective of the link between organizational change and
senior leadership transition.
The theoretical concept of organizational change is still in its infancy. The
findings from this exploratory study provide direction for future research in higher
13
education and contribute to the growing hypotheses about the connection between
senior leadership transitions and organizational change.
14
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Schein (1970) defines organizational change as the "induction of new
patterns of action, belief, and attitudes among substantial segments of a population"
(p. 4). Tichy (1983) defines it as the nonroutine, nonincremental, and discontinuous
change which alters the overall orientation of the organization.
All definitions of organizational change are problematic. Most assume that
we can differentiate between states of change and stability. In fact, organizations are
always changing, often in subtle or incremental ways.
Each conceptual or theoretical approach to organizational change highlights
an important aspect or variable of change in an organization. Change affects and is
affected by individual skills and attitudes. Change alters formal patterns of roles and
relationships. Change attracts and stimulates issues of power and conflict. Change
alters and is influenced by culture, and serves both operational and symbolic
purposes. There is a dynamic interplay among all of the various elements of any
organization in transition.
MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
Intellectual themes interweave as they form frameworks for organizational
change. Many models of organizational change are based on the original thinking of
Kurt Lewin (1958). According to Lewin (1958), a pioneer in the field of social
15
psychology of organizations, the first part of any change process is to unfreeze the
present pattern of behavior. The second step, movement, is to take action that will
change the social system from its original level of behavior or operation to a new
model. The third refreezing step involves establishing a process that will make the
new level of behavior relatively secure against change (Lewin, 1958).
Edward Schein (1987) elaborated on Lewin's (1958) model by defining the
first step, unfreezing, as that of creating motivation and readiness. Organizational
members are not likely to embrace change unless they experience some need for it.
Unfreezing involves employees experiencing dissatisfaction with the status quo,
induction of guilt or anxiety about the future, and the creation of psychological
safety. The second stage Schein (1987) labels as "cognitive restructuring," that is,
helping people to see things differently and to react differently in the future. He
identified two main processes for accomplishing this task: identification with a new
role model, mentor, or boss in order to begin to see things from another point of
view, and scanning the environment for new and relevant information. The final
stage entails both taking the new, changed way of doing things and making it fit
comfortably into a personal self-concept, as well as engaging with others about the
new way of doing things to help them see why the change is better than the old
way.
Noel Tichy (1983) is a strong voice in organizational change research,
primarily because of his contention that there have been three dominant yet fairly
distinct traditions guiding the practice of organizational change. The technical view
16
is rational, based on empiricism and the scientific method. The political view is
based on the belief that organizations have dominant groups, and bargaining is the
primary mode of change. The cultural view is the belief that shared symbols,
values, and "cognitive schemes," as Tichy (1983) labels them, are what tie people
together. Change occurs by altering norms and the cognitive schemes of
organizational members. According to Tichy (1983), all three of these modes must
be adjusted and realigned for successful organizational change.
Burke and Litwin (1992) provide a model that includes cause (organizational
conditions) and effect (resultant performance). In their view, the variables of
conscious strategy, leadership, and culture have more weight than the variables of
structure, management practices, and systems in predicting the success of
organizational change.
An important consideration in reviewing the literature of organizational
change is that most models assume change strategies that are explicit, purposefully
developed, and planned in advance. But in "real life," change has both intentional
(explicitly planned for) and unintentional (emerged out of the situation) aspects.
Kanter, Stein, and Jick (1992) posit that organizations are always in motion.
Organizations do have some central thrust or direction reflecting a combination of
past events, pushes arising from the environment, and pulls arising from the
strategies embraced by the organization's dominant coalitions. However, the
activity clusters, such as task units, divisions, projects, interest groups, and
17
alliances, are also in motion, and their movements at any time may or may not be in
step with each other or with the overall direction.
Kanter et al. (1992) broaden their change model to include three kinds of
motion, three forms of change, and three primary roles in the change process. Of
the three kinds of movement, the first is described as the motion of the whole
organization as it relates to movement in its environment; the second is the motion
of the parts of the organization in relation to one another as the organization grows,
ages, and progresses through its life cycle; and the third is the movement that
focuses on the political dimensions.
These three kinds of movement help to distinguish three basic forms of
organizational change: identity, coordination, and control. Identity changes are
caused through reformulation of an organization's relationship to its environment as
environmental movement presents pressures and opportunities for change.
Coordination changes relate to the problems of shape and structure of the internal
array of parts in the organization that emerge as it grows and ages. Changes in
control stress the political dimension, such as which set of interests predominates in
the organization.
These three kinds of organizational changes are tied to three basic roles
inherent in the change process. The change strategy role often occurs at the
beginning of a change sequence, and is usually the responsibility of top leaders.
That role is one of concern with the connection between the organization and its
environment and with the organization's overall direction. The change implementor
18
role is often associated with mid-managers, who often have the responsibility for
the development of the change effort and its internal coordination. The change
recipient role includes those who are strongly affected by the change and its
implementation, but who do not have much opportunity to influence those effects.
The three kinds of organizational motion can lead in very different
directions, and the three action roles may not just reflect different responsibilities,
but also different perspectives and interests that can interfere in any one group's
ability to realize its intention perfectly. The multiple possibility theory of Kanter et
al. (1992) is not as simple or linear as other research models, and because it
assumes much that is unpredictable, could therefore be seen as less useful.
Operationally, however, understanding the multiple forces and variables involved in
organizational change can help leaders be more effective in a world of complex
motion and real multiple possibilities. "Ultimately, despite the limits upon what
people can control, it is still up to people to act, and in acting, they do more than
predict the future, they invent it" (Kanter et al., 1992, p. 18).
Kanter et al.'s (1992) model also provides a framework to understand and
apply other research related to organizational change. The rest of this chapter is
organized into headings using Kanter et al.'s (1992) model as a frame: three kinds
of organizational forces that set change events in motion, three forms of
organizational change, and three roles in the change process.
19
FORCES THAT SET CHANGE EVENTS IN MOTION
Organizational Movement Related to Environment
Beckhard and Pritchard (1992) define five forces that serve as the focus to
fundamental change: change in the mission, change in the identity or outside image,
change in relationships to key stakeholders, change in the way of work, and change
in the culture. Although one focus of change may be the primary driver of the
organizational change, the others will inevitably be affected as well. For instance,
when leadership decides that the mission or purpose of the organization must be
changed, subsequent decisions about changes in the way of work, outside image,
and organizational design and structure will also have to be considered (Haveman,
1992).
Transformational organizational change implies a change of systems, not just
a change in systems (Cameron & Ulrich, 1986). This fundamental change results in
a new way of interpreting reality, in a different set of motives, in a higher vision of
possibilities, not merely the implementation of alternative actions or plans (King,
1974). Goodstein and Burke (1991) indicate that organizational transformation
occurs when an organization faces the need to survive and must do things
differently to continue to exist. Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli (1985) define
frame-breaking organizational change as involving simultaneous and sharp shifts in
strategy, power, structure, and controls due to dramatic shifts in the organization's
environment.
20
Burke and Litwin (1992) explain in a causal model that transformational
organizational change occurs as a response to the external environment and directly
affects organizational mission and strategy, the organization's leadership, and the
culture. In turn, the transactional factors of structure, systems, management
practices, and climate are affected. These transformational and transactional factors
together affect motivation, which in turn, affects performance.
A key aspect in the definition of organizational change is the paradigm shift
a dramatic rejection of old beliefs and acceptance of new ones (Burke, 1993,
1994). Paradigms have three main characteristics. First, there is a social matrix
consisting of everyone who accepts a certain way of looking at the world and
practices a way of doing things consistent with that world. Second, the paradigm
includes a way of looking at the world. For members of an organization, this would
include images of the organization, beliefs about how things work in the
organization, and values about organizations and how things work in them. The
third aspect of a paradigm is a way of doing thingsmethods that indicate ways of
action (Ledford, Mohrman, Mohrman, & Lawler, 1989).
According to Kuhn (1970), there are three stages to a paradigm shift: a
period of normalcy under the present paradigm, a period in which changes begin to
accumulate that put the paradigm at risk and create a growing sense of crisis, and
finally a period in which the old paradigm is replaced by a new one. A new
paradigm might emerge if the organization's ways of looking at the world and ways
21
of doing things no longer address the problems and realities of the organization and
its environment.
David Nadler and Michael Tushman (1989) state that organizational change
initiated in anticipation of future events is called reorientation, and change
introduced in response to immediate demands is called re-creation. Research on
patterns of organizational life and death in several industries has provided insight
into the patterns of strategic organizational change (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985)
and include three major points:
1.
Strategic organizational changes are necessary when various factors,
including technology, competition, and market demands drive the organization
either reactively or in anticipation to make changes. Organizations that do not
change under these circumstances do not survive.
2.
Re-creations are risky. Fewer than 1 in 10 re-creations succeed, and
those that do, usually entail changes in the senior leadership of the organization,
frequently involving replacement from the outside.
3.
Re-orientations are associated with success. When reorientations are
initiated in advance of external events, continued organizational growth is more
likely. Again, many of the successful reorientations also involve change in the CEO
and executive team.
Organizational Movement Related to Life Cycle
Kimberly and Quinn (1984) state that there are essentially three types of
organizational transitions. Emergence transition defines the transition from when an
22
organization is implying a possibility to its identifiable creation. Transformational
transitions are those that punctuate the stages of mid-life of organizations. The
termination transition signals the beginning of decline. Transformational transitions
are only possible when certain external enabling and internal permitting conditions
exist.
Larger organizations that are also older organizations have often developed a
consistent set of responses, standard operating procedures, and habits that have been
reinforced by success in their environment (Leford et al., 1989). Significant change
in that kind of setting requires interventions powerful enough to cause
organizational members to question what they think they know and to engage in
learning processes that may come as a shock. These changes are made even more
difficult because the assumptions underlying existing organizational practices will
have, over time, become almost completely forgotten from the consciousness of
organizational members.
Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli (1986) also indicate that as organizations
grow and become more successful, they develop internal forces for stability.
Organizational structures and systems become so interlinked that they allow only
compatible changes. Further, over time, employees develop a sense of competence
in knowing how to get work done within the system. These self-reinforcing patterns
of behavior, norms, and values contribute to increased organizational complacency,
and over time, to a sense of organizational history. This organizational complacency
is functional as long as the organization is stable. If the organization must change,
23
this momentum cuts the other way. Organizational history is a source of precedent
and pride which are, in turn, anchors to the past. "A paradoxical result of long
periods of success may be heightened organizational complacency, decreased
organizational flexibility, and a stunted ability to learn" (Tushman, Newman, &
Romanelli, 1986, p. 37).
Thus older organizations that are in an ultra-stable state may be unable to
adapt quickly to new circumstances (Kimberly & Miles, 1981; Sheldon, 1980).
Because changing any dimension is threatening, they change none. These
organizations function as closed systems, rejecting any information they receive that
implies their failure, in whole or in part, because acceptance would destroy their
stability (Neumann, 1989). In this state, keeping constant who they are and what
they do is more important than any other consideration. Members of the
organization collude to avoid any questioning of their ideology, and an illusion of
unanimity is created, in which any deviation from the norm is regarded as betrayal
or desertion (O'Toole, 1995; Riley & Baldridge, 1977).
Organizational Movement Related to Political Dimensions
Even though leaders may have created a readiness to change, changes of the
magnitude of transformations are resisted in organizations because they destroy
things. The magnitude of this kind of change requires giving up certainty for
ambiguity, security for risk, stability for instability, and predictability for
opportunity. Resistance of many kinds tends to emerge (Cameron & Ulrich, 1986).
24
"Paradigmatic change requires a radical change in world view
often
accompanied by mourning because the old world is felt to be dying" (Sheldon,
1980, p. 64). Tichy (1983) categorized resistance forces into three different types:
technical, political, and cultural. Technical resistance emerges from the structure
and interaction patterns that exist in organizations. Change is often resisted, for
example, because it threatens habitual social interaction patterns and interpersonal
relationships (Argyris, 1993). Political resistance emerges from a disruption in
critical organizational resources, such as power, money, and recognition. When a
loss of rewards is threatened, resistance forces will be strong. Cultural resistance
emerges from the values, norms, biases, and underlying assumptions that develop in
organizations. These underlying dynamics in organizations create a special identity
and sense of uniqueness for the organization. Cultural resistance is especially
difficult to overcome because it is often unarticulated and unrecognized even by
those who are resisting. It is the taken-for-granted nature of culture that makes it
both powerful and difficult to change (Parilla, 1993).
FORMS OF CHANGE
Identity Change
Large-scale organizational change is described by Ledford et al. (1989) as a
lasting change in the character of an organization that significantly alters its
performance. This definition comprises two constructs: change in character and
change in performance. Organizational character includes changes in patterns by
25
which the organization relates to its environment, including behavior and energy
and information flows, such as communication, decision-making, participation and
politics. Changes in character are qualitative changes, like damming a river or
altering its course, and require changes in the organization's designs and processes,
such as formal structures, information and decision-making systems, and human
resource systems. Organizational performance relates to the system's effectiveness
as measured on a number of dimensions, such as economic performance, customer
relationships, or product orientation.
At the most basic level, organization changes can be thought of as a move
from a current state to a preferred future state, moving through a transition state.
Larger-scale changes, according to David Nadler (1988) have four characteristics:
(a) they have multiple transitions, in which changes occur with many transitions,
some of them explicitly related to each other, others that seemingly are unrelated;
(b) they have incomplete transitions, in which many of the transitions that are
initiated are not completed because events or other changes overtake them; (c) they
have uncertain future states, in which there are so many unknowns that
organizations have limited ability to predict or describe the future; and (d) they have
transitions over a long period of time, which is often necessary with large and
complex structures.
Coordination Change: Culture and Structure
Another interpretation of change comes from ideas about the role of culture
in organizations. Each organization has its own character, identity, and climate; it
26
also has its own unique patterns, organization, and system of attributes that make it
stand out in some way from other organizations of its type.
Most research is similar in defining organizational culture as a phenomenon
that involves beliefs and behavior; that it exists at a variety of different levels in
organizations; and that it manifests itself in a wide range of features of
organizational life such as structures, control and reward systems, symbols, stories,
and organizational practices (Pettigrew, 1990).
Attempts to purposefully manipulate culture point to one of the paradoxical
qualities of culture. While difficult to change, culture is constantly evolving because
of ongoing interactions and the infusion of new people and new ideas. Thus, culture
does change. Over time, however, the substantive changes in an institution's culture
are not necessarily predictable or controllable (Kuh & Whitt, 1988).
Cultural change often happens because of external influences or influx of
newcomers, often a new leader (Deal, 1986). But individuals become attached to
values, heroes and heroines, rituals and ceremonies, and key cultural players. When
change breaks the attachment, individuals experience loss akin to that if a close
friend or relative dies. This loss triggers two impulses: one to cling to the past, the
other to rush "pell mell to embrace the present or future" (Deal, 1986, p. 120).
The past is important in organizational change. Warren Bennis (1989)
asserts that there can be no change without history, without continuity.
What I think most of us in institutions really want and what status,
money, and power serve as currency for is acceptance, affection,
and esteem. Institutions are more amenable to change when they
preserve the esteem of all members. . . . [Organizational members]
27
are much freer to identify with the adaptive process and much better
equipped to tolerate the high level of ambiguity that accompanies
change when these needs are heeded. (p. 115)
A successful organization creates strongly held shared assumptions and
therefore also a strong culture (Schein, 1992). If the internal and external
environments remain stable, this is an advantage. However, if there is a change in
that environment, some of those shared assumptions can become a liability precisely
because of their strength. Members of the organization are likely to want to hold
onto them at all costs because they justify the past and are the source of pride and
self-esteem. The assumptions operate as filters that make it difficult for people to
understand alternative strategies for organizational renewal.
Coordination Change: Colleges
In relation to colleges, Tierney (1988) suggests that culture is a complex set
of context-bound, continually evolving properties that potentially include anything
influencing events and actions in a college or university. The core of culture is
comprised of assumptions and beliefs shared by members of the institution that
guide decision-making and shape major events and activities.
A college culture is particularly unique, and colleges are proud of that image
(Kuh, 1993). They are often extraordinarily resistant to abandoning or modifying
the programs that have historically defined their distinctiveness (Heath, 1985).
Change can become very difficult for colleges that have become prisoners of the
success of what Burton Clark (1971) calls their saga, their collective understanding
of unique accomplishment that provides a unified sense of history. Simsek and
28
Louis (1994) report that college organizations are defined by their paradigms, the
prevalent view of reality shared by members of the organization, and that radical
change in organizations is construed as a discontinuous shift in this socially
constructed reality. They found that revolutionary changes do not occur rapidly in
colleges, and may incorporate elements of the old paradigm rather than fully
rejecting them as change occurs.
Smart and Hamm (1993) in a study of 2-year colleges, found four dominant
types of organizational culture. Clan cultures emphasize shared values, goals, and
the development of human resources. Their interactions with the external
environment are characterized by reactive, implementor-type strategies. Internal
transactions are guided by congruence of beliefs, trust, and tradition. The leader is
generally considered to be a mentor, sage, or father figure. Adhocracy cultures in
2-year colleges emphasize entrepreneurship, growth, and adaptability. Their
interactions with the external environment are characterized by proactive,
innovative, strategies and boundary spanning activities. Internal transactions are
guided by a commitment to innovation and the importance of the task being
undertaken. The leader is generally considered to be an entrepreneur, an innovator,
or a risk taker. Hierarchy cultures emphasize the norms and values associated with
bureaucracy, such as order and uniformity. Their interactions with the external
environment are characterized by reactive, defender-type strategies. Internal
transactions are governed by formally stated roles and enforced through rules and
regulations; the leader is considered to be a coordinator or administrator. Finally,
29
market cultures emphasize competitiveness, environmental interaction, and
customer orientation. Their interactions with the external environment are
characterized by proactive, market-centered initiatives. Internal transactions are
governed by beliefs that competent performance directed toward desired
organizational outcomes will be rewarded, and the leader is considered to be a
producer, a technician, or a hard-driver.
Control Change: Politics and Coalitions
Most organizations do not have just a single culture, but at any point in time
may have a variety of different sets of beliefs and assumptions that make up
subcultures (Schneider, 1990; Tierney, 1990). Tension about the future
development of the organization is often expressed in terms of the language and
political positioning of these different subcultures.
From a political perspective, change always will have its winners and losers,
its contests and conflicts, its exchanges of power (Deal, 1986). It assumes that
interests can be identified, that power can directly influence outcomes, and that
conflicts will decide winners and losers. People enjoy their stature and power in
organizations, and have self-interests they want to protect. When those interests are
threatened, they form coalitions whose struggles determine whose interests will
prevail in an area of conflict (Beer, 1980; Trice & Beyer, 1993).
Schein (1992) posits that changing the composition of the organization's
dominant groups or coalitions can change shared assumptions. The most potent
version of this change is a new CEO and a new management team
30
The new CEO usually brings in some of his or her own people and
gets rid of people who are perceived to represent the old and
increasingly ineffective way of doing things. In effect this destroys
the group or hierarchical subculture that was the originator of the
total culture and initiates a process of new culture formation.
(Schein, 1992, p. 323)
Dyer (1985) describes this phenomenon in a series of patterns. First, the
organization develops a sense of crisis because of some kind of environmental
change and decides it needs new leadership. At the same time, procedures, beliefs,
and symbols that support the old culture break down. A new leader with new
assumptions joins the organization, and conflict develops between the proponents of
the old assumptions and the leadership. If the sense of crisis is eventually eased, the
new assumptions begin to be embedded and reinforced by the new sets of patterns in
the organization. Members who continue to cling to the old ways are either forced
out or leave voluntarily because they no longer feel comfortable with the direction
the organization is taking and how it does things (Nadler, Shaw, & Walton, 1995).
LEADERSHIP ROLES IN THE CHANGE PROCESS
Change Strategists
Nadler and Tushman (1989) assert that successful change efforts are
dependent on the availability of a broad range of individuals who can perform
critical leadership functions during periods of significant organizational change.
They state that there are three leverage points for the extension of leadership:
building the senior leadership team, broadening the senior management, and
developing leadership throughout the organization. There are at least five actions
31
important to building the senior leadership team as an effective element of
leadership in reorientation of organizations.
According to Nadler and Tushman (1989), first there must be visible
empowerment of the team, in which the team functions as an extension of the
individual leader. There are two different aspects to this empowerment: objective
and symbolic. Objective empowerment involves providing team members with the
autonomy and resources to serve effectively as leaders of elements of the
reorientation. Symbolic empowerment involves the creating and communicating of
messages telling the organization that these executives are indeed extensions of the
leader and key components of the leadership as an institution. Symbolic
empowerment can be done through the use of titles, organizational structures, or
ceremonial roles (Huber & Glick, 1993; Mohrman, Mohrman, Ledford,
Cummings, & Lawler, 1989). Second, there must be individual empowerment of
team members. A big problem in many organizational reorientations is getting
senior team members to deal effectively with increased ambiguity and uncertainty.
One role of the CEO is to coach, guide, and support executives in developing their
own personal capacities for credible leadership during times of change. Third,
attention must be given to composition of the senior team. Successful orientations
involved significant changes in the makeup of the senior team, and this may involve
importing different people with different skills, capacities, styles, and value
orientations from outside the organization. Fourth, there must be some sort of
inducement for strategic anticipation. A reorientation is a strategic organizational
32
change that is initiated in anticipation of external events which may demand
strategic change later on. Reorientation occurs because the organization's leadership
thinks it can gain competitive advantage from initiating the changes earlier rather
than later. The senior team can be helpful in scanning the environment and in
successful organizations, has a major role in initiating, sponsoring, and leveraging
the process of anticipation (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Fifth, and finally, the senior
team must operate as a learning organization (Chawla & Renesch, 1995; Watkins &
Marsick, 1993). For a senior team to benefit from the involvement in the leadership
of change, it must become an effective system for learning about the business, the
nature of change, and the task of managing the change. The challenge is to bond the
team together while also preventing insularity and conformity. People on the team
must believe that the team's success will, in the long run, be more salient to them
than their individual short-run success (Wagner, Pfeffer, & O'Reily, 1984).
From a college perspective, when a new president of a college takes office,
it is certainly conceivable that an administrative structure may be unsuitable to the
president's style or needs (Leslie & Fretwell, 1996). Changing the executive team
structure may achieve particular operational goals. At the same time, by changing
that structure the president also signals to the college community that life as it
previously existed will change (Reyes & Twombly, 1987). From this perspective,
the president's action accounts not only for structural change, but also for the
perception of change (Tierney, 1989).
33
A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that the top management
team may be a more important determinant of an organization's ability to change
and adapt than the chief executive officer alone. It is the top management team
through which critical information is filtered and by which strategic decisions are
made (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli, 1992).
Recognition of the importance of the top management team should not be a surprise
since the ability of an organization to anticipate and respond to changes in the
environment rests on the decisions not just of the CEO, but of the entire executive
group. Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli (1986) capture the critical role of the
senior team's impact when they note:
The data are consistent across diverse industries and companies, an
executive team's ability to proactively initiate and implement framebreaking change and to manage divergent change seem to be
important factors which discriminate between organizational renewal
and greatness versus complacency and eventual decline. (p. 15)
One role of the senior management team is to ensure that the organization
adapts to changing circumstances (Priem, 1990). As shifts occur in environmental
conditions or strategies, new competencies and perspectives are often required. If
executive teams persist in old modes of conduct in fundamentally altered contexts,
failure is likely (O'Reilly, Snyder, & Boothe, 1993). During stable periods,
executive teams must be able to continually and incrementally improve by getting
better at those things that offer them a competitive advantage. During change, teams
should recognize when to reorient themselves and shift to new processes and
competencies. Hambrick (1987) suggests that "the amounts of open-mindedness,
34
perseverance, communication skills, vision, and other key characteristics that exist
with the team clearly set the limits for how well the team
and in turn, the firm
can operate" (p. 2). Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli (1986) affirm that framebreaking change requires direct executive involvement in all aspects of the change,
including motivating constructive behavior, shaping political dynamics, managing
control during the transition period, and managing external constituencies.
Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli (1992) explore CEO succession and
executive-team changes as important mechanisms for organizational adaptation in
turbulent environments. They found that, while CEO succession or executive-team
change by themselves can be resisted by recalcitrant and conservative organizations,
the combination of CEO succession and executive team change alters team
demographics enough to enable the senior team to take substantive action in
turbulent environments. Further, they indicate that the effects of executive-team
change on organizational outcomes are accentuated when these revised teams
simultaneously initiate system-wide organization change. Executive succession
coupled with reorientation signals the end of the old order and tends to legitimize
sweeping organization change and system-wide learning (Bartunek & Ringuest,
1989).
Research indicates that the integration and functioning of the top
management team is at least partly affected by the demographic composition of the
team. Hambrick and Mason (1984) offer a series of propositions linking the
demography of the senior team to organizational outcomes. They propose that
35
homogeneous teams in terms of length of service will make strategic decisions more
quickly than heterogeneous teams. O'Reilly and Flatt (1989) argue that homogeneity
in the executive team may be a critical way to achieve the high levels of
interdependence necessary for organizational innovation. Homogeneity based on
length of service can promote identification with the large goals of the organization
and reduce resistance to change by diminishing misunderstandings and political
dynamics within the team. They find that homogeneity is positively associated with
organizational innovation. In a 1993 study, O'Reilly, Snyder, and Boothe found that
homogeneity in terms of length of service is associated with positive organizational
outcomes during times of change. Homogeneity fosters cooperation, mutual trust,
and an effective blend of personalities. These positive team dynamics contribute to
increased adaptive change, reduced turnover among team members, and decreased
frequency of political changes.
Individuals who entered the organization during approximately the same
time interval may have two additional significant impacts. First, the existence of
well-defined cohorts may lead to conflict among groups over issues such as resource
allocation and control. Second, the existence of groups of individuals who identify
with each other and who perceive themselves to be distinct from other
organizational members may affect the way individuals interact and perform within
organizations (McCain, O'Reilly, & Pfeffer, 1983). To the extent that the cohorts
become associated with ideologies prevalent at the time of their entry into the
36
organization, it can be argued that organizational change is a process much affected
by the organization's management demographic structure.
Change Implementers
Nadler and Tushman (1989) believe that moving beyond the executive and
the senior team to include the senior management of the organization is also an
important step to successful organizational reorientation. This group would include
people one or two levels down from the executive team, and is usually regarded as
the operating management in most organizations. This group may be particularly
problematic during times of change since they may be more embedded in the
current system of organizing and managing than some of the senior team, and may
be less prepared to change. They have often modeled themselves to fit the current
organizational style, and can easily feel disenfranchised by the strong executive
team set above them, particularly if that team has been assembled by bringing in
people from outside the organization. Nadler and Tushman (1989) assert that the
answer is to help this group feel part of the change, such as creating structures such
as councils and committees to signify their participation as members of senior
management, and to involve them in the early diagnosing of the need to change and
the planning of change strategies associated with the organization's reorientation.
Maintaining a constant stream of open communication to and from this group is
important, since the lack of information and perspective disenfranchises the
members psychologically and makes them feel excluded.
37
In an empirical study of large-scale change from the perspective of
stakeholder groups, Covin and Kilmann (1989) found that middle-level managers
play an extremely important role in change efforts, and that lack of support and
commitment of middle-managers has an extremely negative impact on the success of
large-scale change efforts. Other responses indicated that the role of mid-managers
should be one of skilled leadership, not passive commitment.
Change Recipients
Change recipients often feel differently about the changes occurring within
their organization than their managers would predict. This may be especially true in
a college environment (Corbett, Firestone, & Rossman, 1987). A few recent studies
underscore the differences in faculty and administrator beliefs and perceptions about
their organizations. In a study of individual perceptions of organizational goals in
higher education, Birnbaum (1987) did an analysis of the responses of senior
administrators and faculty leaders on 32 campuses. He concluded that there is great
inconsistency toward goals among institutional participants, with respondents in
universities and community colleges expressing the least consistency in articulations
of the goals of their institutions. Blackburn and Lawrence (1990), in a
representative national survey of faculty and administrators, found consistent
differences between faculty and administrator views of the organization on several
dimensions, including views of the organizational climate, academic workplace, and
administrative supportiveness. Administrators appear to place more stress on values
as the primary educational purpose, view the nature of the organization as slightly
38
more entrepreneurial, see a more supportive organizational and administrative
climate, and have a more favorable view of faculty motivation (Peterson & White,
1992). "Incremental change is compatible with the existing structure of an
organization and is reinforced over a period of years. In contrast, frame-breaking
change is abrupt, painful to participants, and often resisted by the old guard"
(Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986, p. 32).
In another survey of nearly 4,000 college faculty and 500 college
administrators from around the country, data showed that administrators believe
they can be trusted to act in good faith for the betterment of their institutions.
Faculty, however, indicate they lack the same level of faith in their administrators
(Blackburn & Lawrence, 1990; Cameron, 1981). Curry (1992) explained the
important relationship of change recipients to the overall organizational change:
Although leaders might be empowered to initiate change, they are not
often in a position to dictate commitment. In an ideal organization,
people understand the necessity for change and support it
accordingly. In real organizations, commitment follows discussion
and often follows debates that help create the setting for change by
facilitating reconciliation of differences and helping to further
development of innovation. The exchange of ideas, often
accompanied by much enthusiasm, conviction, and frequently
acrimony, makes it more difficult for organizations to return to
business as usual. This part of the process of change has been
described as chaotic, in part because it is uncomfortable for some
people and because it often leads to unpredictable outcomes. It could
be, however, that the catharsis that also takes place during debate
permits movement forward. (p. 42)
39
SUMMARY
It is apparent that large-scale organization changes are risky, hard, complex,
unpredictable, and emotionally intense. All of these characteristics become more
severe as the change becomes more pervasive, and as the depth of change increases,
the risk, difficulty, and intensity of the change also become greater.
Chapter III will describe the methodology utilized in this case study, which
was based on a single-case descriptive design, its limitations, and the form of the
analysis used. The data are "pulled through" a specific theoretical framework in
Chapters IV and V to explore the conceptual linkages between the new senior
leadership team at Seaview Community College and organizational change. The
study analyzed specific events to determine how the forces of change impacted the
college and the new leadership team and the extent to which the team was able to
consciously affect organizational change through their leadership actions and
decisions.
40
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
This study explored the organizational impact of significant change in
leadership at a mature community college during the initial period of that change.
The case study describes and characterizes the nature of change in the organization
during the periods of significant leadership transition, and examines the conceptual
links between the new leadership team and the external and internal forces of
change impacting the college during that time.
This study does not purport to test theory. Rather, through a detailed and
rich descriptive analysis of several key events and decisions, it describes and
characterizes the nature of change in the organization during the period of
significant leadership transition. As in all qualitative research, there are no
recommendations or applications to this data other than what is contained in this
study, but there are patterns that might suggest hypotheses that merit further
discussion or research. Those patterns are discussed in Chapter V.
While outside forces of change are important to consider in organizational
change, it is also a fact of life that organizations also have power to shape behavior.
This is not the work of just culture, but rather the formal aspects of the
organization, such as its distribution of roles and responsibilities, authority to
commit resources, existing procedures and processes, information access, and
41
reward and recognition systems. These elements, when shifted, can change the
behavior of an organization.
This study endeavored to pull significant events, actions, and circumstances
of the new top leadership team in the selected college through a specific theoretical
framework to find links of relationship and connection. That framework defines
organizational change as a coalition of interests and a network of activities within a
moving structure impacted by a combination of past events, pushes arising from the
environment, and pulls from dominant coalitions.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Rosabeth Moss Kanter asserts that three clusters of forces create motion in
and around organizations that triggers change (Kanter, Stein, & Jick, 1992). The
first is the relationships between organizations and their environments. The second
is organic, growth through the life cycle of an organization. The third is political,
the constant struggle for power. All three occur outside of strategic intention. They
represent the forces that keep the organization in constant motion and require a
response if the organization is going to proactively attain its official organizational
goals.
Thus while the organizational leaders are trying to act, the organization is a
moving target. It is blown around by environmental winds, it grows and ages as
players move in and out of the organization, and it is shaped by internal power
42
struggles. Sometimes the forces are long-term and slow; sometimes they are acute
and cause crises.
But organizations can also change their relationship to their environments by
restructuring or redefining their identity and boundaries. They can change the ways
in which they operate, the ways people and units relate to each other, through
changes in internal coordination. They can change the nature of their control
structures that govern the organization and determine how benefits are distributed
among them. These are shifts in organizational form that change strategists and
leaders within an institution can productively act on to effect change.
In viewing the specific events at Seaview Community College through the
lens of Kanter's framework (Kanter et al., 1992), this study analyzed how the forces
of change impacted the college and the new leadership team, and how the team was
able to consciously affect organizational change through their leadership actions and
decisions.
THE CASE STUDY APPROACH
The case study methodology has come under increasing acceptance as a
research strategy that complements other scientific approaches and contributes to
theory development (Miles & Huberman, 1984). Robert Yin (1994) says that a
"case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon
and context are not clearly evident" (p.13). According to Yin (1994), the case study
43
method is a comprehensive research strategy that is most appropriate for the
situation that has many more variables of interest than data points. The case study
approach is particularly relevant for this study because of the complex and
overlapping issues, forces, and events inherent in large-scale organizational change.
The single-case design of this study was utilized because the case
represented a particularly unique set of circumstances. Seaview Community College
experienced the turnover of a president, four of five vice-presidents, and multiple
mid-level managers all within a 12-month time period. Seaview had been relatively
stable internally and externally for over 30 years, making the changes all the more
significant. It would be difficult to fmd another 2-year college in the country in
which those circumstances could be replicated for study.
DATA COLLECTION
Data collection procedures in case study methodology are not routinized
(Yin, 1994), but specific protocol was designed to increase the reliability of the
research. Planning and conducting the fieldwork was especially crucial given the
global nature of the research questions and the need to use multiple sources of
evidence (Fiedler, 1987).
Research included the review of documents, archival records, direct
observations, participant observation, and interviews (see Appendix). Document
review included the examination of letters, memos, agendas and minutes of
meetings, newsletters, media reports, and selected college-wide documents that
44
provided background or insight. These documents also promoted an understanding
of the atmosphere and perceptions that surrounded the administrative changes.
Because the institution involved in the research had a 30-year history, it was useful
also to study some archival records that described past administrative structures and
budgets. The college also produced a monthly or quarterly internal magazine for
virtually that entire time period, and past archived issues were searched for cultural
and historical patterns of organizational behavior.
Two types of interviews were used in the research design. The first was
open-ended and situation-based, in which information was gathered in natural
settings through notation and analysis of spontaneous actions and reactions
regarding events or decisions as they occurred. These subjects were randomly
selected based on their connection and proximity to the change process. Careful
field notes were kept noting responses.
Focused interviews also were used, in which six employees of the institution
at varying levels from different departments were separately interviewed. The six
respondents were selected because they were known to have specific and important
historical roles in the institution and represented diverse jobs, perspectives, and
classifications within the institution.
As a qualitative case study research project, no formal query instruments
were utilized. To attain a rich description of a culture and campus that was being
clearly impacted by change unusual in its history, a structure that allowed the
research subjects to tell their stories without judgement or restraint, was employed.
45
The following questions were used to guide the subject into talking about the issues
related to the study:
1.
Tell me about your history with the college.
2.
There have been a lot of changes in the past year here. Could you
talk about that? What are your perceptions of those changes?
3.
Can you tell me a story or example of how the college is impacted by
these changes?
4.
How do you think these changes affect you?
5.
How do you feel about the changes?
6.
How do you think the changes are impacting the college as a whole?
7.
How have the changes made you feel?
8.
What do you think is going to happen at the college now?
The majority of interviews were not tape-recorded, as it was quickly
discovered that participants were much more willing to be candid, and were able to
be more fluid in their thinking, without the recorder. However, careful field notes
were developed. Each interview lasted 1 to 2 hours, and what was surprising was
the extent to which the researcher was thanked for allowing them to talk frankly
about their feelings in a both exciting as well as challenging time in the college's
history. The interviews were semi-structured, and while the conversation was
guided the conversation generally in the direction of their perceptions of change at
the college, there were no limits or parameters imposed on their feedback. This was
46
primarily because it was important to gain information on the informal, as well as
formal, impacts of change, and that is often measured from an emotional standpoint.
By triangulating document research with observation and interviews, it was
possible analyze not only the formal ways the college was changing, but more
importantly, the vital informal, and often unwritten, parts of any large change
process.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Any research design possesses inherent limitations and shortcomings. The
methodology employed in this study is not exempted from this risk. As a qualitative
study, it is open to bias from researcher interpretation, especially as a participant
observer, as described above. It is the researcher's belief that because of the
variation of data-gathering techniques as well as having some objectivity as a new
player in the institution, some of this bias was mitigated.
The case study methodology was chosen because of its suitability to the
research of organizational change. The in-depth look at the variables studied
provided the needed context to assess the applicability of the general models in
organizational change. The nature of qualitative research, however, implies reliance
on subjectivity. Assumptions and values are difficult to quantify. Informant
memories pose the obstacle of becoming dimmed or blurred over time.
Triangulation by using multiple sources of data helped to combat these problems,
but such challenges are inherent in thick and descriptive research studies.
47
Chapter IV contains the full case study description of organization change at
Seaview Community College using the theoretical construct of Kanter et al.'s (1992)
three organizational forces of change and three forms of change. Chapter V seeks to
answer the research questions and analyze and interpret the findings as well as
suggest further research.
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CHAPTER IV
PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION AND FINDINGS
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL MOTION
Kanter focuses on three kinds of movement, both internal and external, that
influence organizational change (Kanter et al., 1992). The first movement is the
motion of the organization as a whole as it relates to motion in its environment,
change that is macroevolutionary, historical, and frame-breaking in its influence.
The second movement is the motion of the parts of the organization in relation to
one another as the organization grows, ages, and progresses through its life cycle,
change that is microevolutionary, developmental, and typically related to shape and
process. The third kind of motion is the struggle for control among individuals and
groups with a stake in the organization to make decisions to enjoy benefits as an
expression of their own interest, change that focuses on political dimensions.
Kanter's three forces (Kanter et al., 1992) are used to frame, reflect, and
describe some of the circumstances that influenced organizational change at Seaview
Community College before and during the time of the research study.
Motion of Environment: The New Seaview
In Kanter's model (Kanter et al., 1992), the motion of the whole
organization as it relates to movement in its environment is the first force of
change. Seaview Community College's environment was changing significantly.
49
For almost 30 years, students with the goal of transfer to a 4-year college or
university had poured through its doors. Enrollment concerns had never been an
issue, and faculty often touted Seaview's reputation for excellence as the reason
their classes had always been full. In fact, Seaview's reputation for academic
education in the local school districts and neighborhoods had indeed been strong,
and many families had chosen to send their children bound for baccalaureate degree
programs to Seaview for 2 years prior to transferring. In any case, Seaview had
never had any reason to institute a marketing budget, nor do any special
programming based on community needs. The traditional junior college reputation
and operational expectations to match had resulted in a stable student population.
There were not even any professional-technical programs at Seaview until the
decade of the 1980s, and there was much faculty discussion about the need and
appropriateness of technical education programs becoming a part of Seaview's
offerings. There were few evening offerings, and almost no afternoon classes.
Which classes were offered, and at what times and days, were chosen by the faculty
who were teaching them. If there was a conflict because of space, seniority
prevailed.
But in the first 5 years of the 1990s, many things had begun to look different
for Seaview. Unexpected competition for students was the first. Seaview is a
suburban college in a large metropolitan area, and most students can drive to at
least six community or technical colleges within an hour's commute from their
homes. These other colleges who did not have the luxury of resting on a reputation
50
like Seaview's had begun to proactively solicit input and partnerships from their
communities, and had been rapidly developing new programs and services in
response to those efforts. They were paying more attention to customer service,
while students at Seaview continued to wait in long lines for registration along with
similar other frustrations. Other colleges had marketing budgets and used them.
They also were forming relationships with their local business and industry bases
and with their local school districts. Based on population demographics, there were
simply fewer students of traditional college-age alive at that time, which would have
impacted Seaview's enrollment even without any other variables. But other colleges
were also beginning to attract the students that Seaview had traditionally expected.
At the same time, state funding for community colleges was becoming a
significant problem. There was more competition for fewer dollars, and the
standard allocation model on which community colleges had depended for many
years was restructured to give colleges more money for technology, professional
technical programs, and serving basic skills students. There had been several recent
political wins in which some large sums of money were allocated to community
colleges, but their use was limited for use with specific constituent groups, such as
laid-off workers, and colleges received the money primarily through an RFP
process for new programs. Partnerships with external groups of labor and business
were a strong criteria for receiving the funding, so colleges that had already built
those relationships scooped up most of the available dollars.
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Seaview Community College had always taken pride in their faculty who
were highly recognized in their academic fields, and technology had largely been
viewed as impersonal and artificial compared to the high-touch advantage of
student-centered faculty. There were few computer labs, no Internet access, and few
faculty either had an up-to-date computer on their desk or knew how to use the one
that did. However, the K-12 system in the state had been focusing on technology as
both a vehicle for student learning as well as a tool needed to prepare students for
the workplace. The suburban school districts were especially well funded via local
levies, and the school district in Seaview's area became a technology model and
center. Suddenly, 17-year-old students were showing up in Seaview's first-year
courses demanding computer access and knowledge to which faculty were unable to
respond.
The geographical area itself was also changing. Seaview had several affluent
bedroom communities that still sent many of their students to the college, students
that Seaview was familiar with serving who were well-prepared academically and
emotionally for traditional higher education. But these students no longer were the
largest population at the college. Instead, large populations of non-native refugees
were taking advantage of housing that was much cheaper than in the city, and they
and their families were showing up in the front of the college registration line. Laidoff older workers needing rapid retraining were asking about programs. And
finally, more and more students who were not baccalaureate degree-bound but who
expected to enter the workplace upon finishing a 2-year degree were coming to
52
campus. Faculty were perplexed that they seemed to be unable to serve these new
populations well through traditional classes and services. The mission of Seaview
was changing, even though no formal decree had been issued.
The city of Seaview also incorporated, lending definition for the first time to
a real sense of community for the college. As the incorporation progressed, the
college was recognized as the area's highest employer, and its presence and voice
began to be noticed. Many questions from the community began to float over the
campus walls that reflected some intellectual curiosity about what the college was
doing inside its classrooms, and why.
In the midst of these environmental changes, the previous president of
Seaview Community College retired amongst many accolades. A new president was
hired who had a reputation for collaboration, vision, and forward-thinking. During
his first year at Seaview, he spent most of his time doing two things: pulling
together his administrative team and scanning the external environment. Because of
retirements and some restructuring, 14 of the 24 total administrators at the college
changed during a short time period. More significantly, he hired in that first year
four of five new vice-presidents, all from the outside, thereby creating an entirely
new top leadership unit. The hires were not without controversy, and there was a
clear rumbling heard in many hallways reflecting fear of the unknown.
During his first few months, the new president also formed strong
relationships with all of the new city government officials, business and industry
leaders, school district personnel, and local legislators. On campus, he formed a
53
strategic planning committee comprised of key leaders on campus from every
constituent group and asked them to develop a strategic plan for the college in a 9-
month period. He hired a recently retired vice-president of student services to
facilitate the effort, and while the president did not sit on the committee, he did
offer input into each part of the process, including a section in the plan on
environment, which he suggested might drive the direction of the plan. Though the
president had been explicit in the need for Seaview to move out of its traditional
box, he wanted the impetus for change to come from the internal constituency.
The Strategic Planning Council, as it was now called, was given a budget
and high visibility, and soon they were taking their job very seriously. Their first
task was to describe the future environment in which Seaview would operate, and
then to define Seaview's core values that were important to consider in developing a
strategic plan. The first line of the document was written to say, "The environment
in which Seaview Community College operates is changing and will continue to
change significantly in the future." Many realities of the changing environment were
listed, along with their implications.
Blending the core values with the realities of the changing environment was
the beginning of new organizational movement. Faculty and staff at Seaview saw
themselves as being the "premier community college in the region," and in fact,
those words comprise the new vision statement. But what did that mean?
In the interviews conducted for this research, participants were asked to
describe the changes taking place at the college. Every participant spoke proudly
54
about the historical reputation of Seaview's high-quality programs, departments,
and teaching. Past students of Seaview were cited who, after graduating from the
local university, said their classes or teachers at Seaview were more challenging or
difficult than at the university, and they had thus learned more at Seaview. The
participants used anecdotal examples illustrating the pride of faculty commitment to
students, including a story about a science instructor who was teaching in an old
classroom with no equipment who was still rated best teacher by a student speaker
at commencement.
Most of the participants did see the environment influencing changes at
Seaview, but many were concerned about it. The following quote from a faculty
member reflects this feeling:
The reason many students have come here is because of its
reputation. I think we still have high-quality programs, but we are
being pressured, I think, to be a different sort of college. The
students we now have are just not ready for what we can give them,
so we have to alter the way we teach, and sometimes even what we
teach. Maybe it's good to think differently, but I'd hate to see
Seaview's identity of the best college in the area diminish because we
are trying to be too many things to too many people.
Motion of Life Cycle: The Pulse of Seaview
The change in the motion of the parts of the organization in relation to one
another as the organization grows, ages, and progresses through its life cycle is the
second type of organizational movement in Kanter's model (Kanter et al., 1992).
Early in September 1996, the new leadership team had been fully formed at
Seaview. The president believed that in order to accomplish the goals that were
55
driven by funding and external variables, he and his top leadership team would need
to understand the internal wiring of the culture of the institution.
They began by hiring a consultant team to facilitate a workshop to which all
administrators were required to attend. Prior to the first session, participants were
asked to interview five people
students, faculty, and staff
to obtain their
perceptions about several items. The five questions they were to ask were:
1.
After the changes of this past year, what are the three most
significant challenges facing Seaview community College during the upcoming
year?
2.
What three institutional processes/procedures are most in need of
change at Seaview Community College and should be changed during the upcoming
year?
3.
What are the three most important strengths of Seaview Community
College?
4.
In order to find solutions to the issues that require change at Seaview
Community College, should the institution (a)move more slowly, (b) pick up the
pace, (c) move much faster, or (d) continue at the current pace?
5.
As Seaview Community College continues to deal with change, what
are your three most important concerns or fears as we begin this next academic
year?
Most managers came prepared with extensive notes from their interviews.
The group was broken into small groups of mixed managerial styles to share their
56
findings about each of the five questions, and agree on five significant issues facing
Seaview, five opportunities for Seaview, and suggested solutions or actions to each.
The results of this kaleidoscope exercise are summarized below by theme
uniformity.
Question 1. After the changes of this past year, what are the three most
significant challenges facing Seaview community College during the upcoming
year?
1.
Improve enrollment. If we don't get more students in the door, our
status quo will be threatened.
2.
Improve morale, trust, campus communications, and develop a
governance model that reflects our values.
3.
Identify the roles and responsibilities of the Vice-Presidents and the
reporting structure.
4.
Develop an organization that can understand and deal with change in
a trusting and positive manner.
5.
Successfully complete a good faculty contract negotiations process.
Question 2. What three institutional processes/procedures are most in need
of change at Seaview Community College and should be changed during the
upcoming year?
1.
Establish a new governance structure for the college.
57
2.
Develop clear college budgeting procedures, including time lines and
how funds are allocated.
3.
Develop clear personnel hiring procedures including time lines and
involvement of college constituents.
4.
Develop better college communications procedures, including how
college information is disseminated.
5.
Develop better processes for class schedule development and use of
facilities.
6.
Clarify campus-wide planning and decision-making procedures.
Question 3. What are the three most important strengths of Seaview
Community College?
1.
The college has a dedicated faculty, staff, and administration.
2.
The college has a positive reputation and strong educational
programs.
3.
The college values diversity, has a beautiful campus physical
environment, and rich student involvement.
4.
There is a genuine concern for student success at the college.
Question 4. In order to find solutions to the issues that require change at
Seaview Community College, should the institution (a) move more slowly, (b) pick
up the pace, (c) move much faster, or (d) continue at the current pace?
1.
The college must pick up the pace of change, but think first.
58
2.
Somewhere between current practice and pick up the pace of change
with more time for analysis must be provided.
3.
The college must move much faster, but with regard to specific
issues only.
Question 5. As Seaview Community College continues to deal with change,
what are your three most important concerns or fears as we begin this next
academic year?
1.
What are the consequences of change: change just for change sake,
job insecurity, lack of direction, lip service versus follow-through.
2.
There is a sense of loss of a feeling of family community, history,
and trust, including a possible lack of inclusion in decision-making.
3.
Some long-time college programs might be dropped; established
policies and procedures and usual links of communications feel weak.
4.
In the midst of all of this change, it is not clear that there is a master
plan and a sense of direction for the college that honors our reputation for
excellence. Are we trading quality for dollars?
5.
We may lose knowledgeable staff, experience faculty burnout, and
have to deal with ambiguity about the meld of past and present practices, all of
which lessens trust in the workplace.
59
Motion of Political Dimensions: Night Classes
Kanter's third kind of organizational movement is reflected in the struggle
for power and control among individuals and groups with a stake in the organization
to make decisions to enjoy benefits as an expression of their own interests (Kanter
et al., 1992).
As Seaview's enrollment continued to dip, the president and the top
leadership team began to focus on more aggressive actions to combat the downward
spiral. One strategy was to increase the number of night classes and services
offered. This was relayed to the division chairs, who were asked to discuss it in
greater detail in their monthly division meetings. (These division meetings had not
occurred before the new president mandated them. Heretofore, communication had
occurred informally in the hallways during the afternoons when there were no
classes or students.) After the division meeting had taken place, the senior
leadership team received a memo signed by all division chairs articulating the
desperate need for better lighting on campus at night. Faculty had universally
expressed a strong sense of being unsafe at Seaview at night; there were too few
lights on campus, and the mature trees on the beautiful Seaview campus blocked the
lights that were there. Both students and faculty were at risk of hurting themselves
by not being able to see clearly, and students described the atmosphere as "creepy."
Night classes would clearly not be successful until there was a remedy for the
security issue.
60
The president's team considered the options. The logical first choice was to
trim or cut down the trees that were blocking the existing lights. The president
asked the facilities director to do an analysis and bring back the findings. The
subsequent analysis showed that while most of the trees could be significantly
trimmed, several trees had simply grown beyond the capacity of the space they were
in to support them, and by removing them, it would provide not only more light,
but more room for the trees beside them to thrive. The team agreed to give the
facilities director the approval to implement that plan.
The landscape contractor arrived with a truck on the following Monday
morning, which is the regularly scheduled time for the president's team to meet.
Midway through the meeting, a secretary interrupted the group to report that there
was a group of faculty and staff standing outside blocking the work of the
contractor. The president went outside to investigate, and was told by the group that
no trees would be cut that day on that campus. The group indicated that they were
angry that they had not been a part of this decision that clearly impacted the entire
campus, especially since the president had said that he was committed to inclusive
decision-making. They also described their personal investment in these trees.
More than 30 years ago, when the fledgling Seaview campus was nothing
more than dirt and rocks, the president at that time issued a heartfelt plea to the
faculty and staff to donate a weekend to help plant tiny tree seedlings on the multi-
acre campus. In a burst of cooperative team spirit, most of the campus personnel
accepted the invitation and planted trees together all day in the sun while the
61
campus band played and the president's wife served Kool-Aid. The people standing
in front of the contractor's truck had carefully set those seedlings in the earth 30
years before.
The current president thanked them for their care and concern, and went
back to his president's team meeting. They considered options again. If trees were
not cut down, then perhaps a few additional lights could simply be installed adjacent
to the trees.
The following Monday, the facilities director reported that more large lights
could indeed be installed, but in doing so, it would violate the energy conservation
agreement that had been implemented a decade ago. This energy agreement had
been a part of a faculty environmental committee recommendation, which had gone
to cabinet for approval, and ultimately to the board of trustees. The president's team
recommended that members of that committee be contacted to give input into the
decision to change the agreement so that the lights could be installed and evening
classes could commence.
The members of the committee were contacted, met separately as a group,
and the following week, the item appeared on the cabinet agenda. The discussion
was heated and centered around not only the lights and the energy agreement, but
also around the decision-making process. Since a sub-unit of cabinet had originally
had the responsibility for the campus environment, shouldn't that unit, and cabinet,
be the decision-makers for this problem? Moreover, if the board of trustees had
once approved the policy, they would need to approve any changes
and all policy
62
changes traditionally were sent through cabinet prior to approval. Questions about
governance appeared in that week's faculty union newsletter, along with a thinly
veiled editorial comment about a question of trust in the new administration.
On Monday, the president's team met again. While the president was
untangling the issue in cabinet, the vice-presidents agreed to ask their respective
staffs for input and suggestions regarding the lighting problem. By this time, a short
and a long-term solution was needed if night classes were going to be implemented
the next quarter. One of the suggestions brought to the table was stringing small
twinkle Christmas lights around the darkest edges of campus, thereby creating at
least an illusion of light and safety while a permanent solution was explored. The
lights were priced reasonably and could even be used afterwards for special events.
The president's team gave the go-ahead.
The following Monday, the president's team opened the student newspaper
to find an editorial sharply criticizing the administration for not considering the
cultural impact of using lights manufactured in support of the Christian religion.
The local community media regularly receives copies of the student newspaper, and
later that day, a reporter called the president asking him to comment on the
situation.
MANAGING CHANGE
Kanter's three kinds of movement help distinguish three basic forms of
organizational change (Kanter et al., 1992). Identity changes are the changes in the
63
relationships between the organization as an entity and its environment.
Coordination changes involve the internal array of parts and processes constituting
the organization. Control changes stress the political coalitions, or set of interests
that drive the organization.
The new leadership team at Seaview implemented many decisions during
their first few months. This case study uses Kanter's three forms of organizational
change (Kanter et al., 1992) to describe the context and results of three separate
actions intended by the team to influence or manage organizational change at
Seaview.
Identity: New Letterhead
In Kanter's model (Kanter et al., 1992), organizational movement related to
environment usually leads to organizational change in identity. Identity changes are
caused through reformulation of an organization's relationship to its environment as
environmental movement presents pressures and opportunities for change.
Letterhead supplies for the college were running short during this first year
of change at Seaview, and the president heaved a secret sigh of relief. The logo for
the college had been in existence for many years, and although it was originally
designed to be a symbol incorporating Native American beliefs, it resembled a
nuclear reactor in design. The paper color of the letterhead was a pale avocado
green, with matching accompanying envelopes.
The president asked the public information office to come up with some
alternate designs for a new logo and stationary, and after looking at several, the
64
leadership team selected one. They asked the public information office to send a
memo to about 30 selected faculty and staff inviting them to a short meeting at
which the new stationary design would be presented for feedback and input. The
letter was sent, and only two people came to the meeting, neither having any strong
feelings about the change. The clean new logo design and white stationary was then
officially approved, although the president asked that all existing supplies of paper
for the college be used up before ordering the new. The new logo began to appear
gradually and quietly on business cards for new employees, on new signs, and on
invitations to special events, and no comments about it were heard.
Three months later, the supply of existing letterhead ran out, and new
letterhead was finally ordered for the entire campus. A cheery memo was sent from
the public information office to all campus departments informing them that they
would be receiving new paper soon, and gave instructions on what should be done
with any unused green envelopes or paper.
Within 2 hours of the memo being received, the phone lines of the entire top
leadership team, including the president, lit up. The head of the faculty union called
enraged that the president's campaign promises of collaboration were obviously a
lie. The art department faculty called the vice-president for instruction to ask why
they had not been consulted. The registration staff were frantic that the new
letterhead and their existing informational brochures, which they still had many of,
did not match. The vice-president for business was asked repeatedly how money
had been allocated for this expense. The student newspaper called, politely
65
inquiring why the new administration was no longer honoring the cultural diversity
reflected in the former logo. The former president of the college, whose wife was
still a tenured faculty member at Seaview, called to suggest some design
improvements.
Coordination: Budget Process I
Organizational movement related to life cycle often is reflected through
organizational change in coordination. Coordination relates to the problems of shape
and structure of the internal array of parts in the organization that emerges as it
grows and changes
in other words, how the units of the organization work
together to execute their tasks. The need to change the organization's internal
configuration, rather than simply let it evolve, may ultimately result in deliberate
reshaping or revitalizing.
Seaview had long had a budget process that was controlled exclusively by
the president and budget officer, was unrelated to any program assessment, and had
a reputation of being arbitrary based on who the president's favorite people or
causes were. After thoughtful consideration and much feedback from many campus
constituents, the president and senior leadership team decided to implement a new
budget planning process that was tied to program review and assessment.
The leadership team carefully formulated a plan that would change the
budget process to one that would be driven from the bottom-up, allowing for
maximum input. Each department in the college would first receive a copy of its
base budget. Many had never seen their own budgets since expenses had only been
66
tracked at the macro division or area level. They would receive instructions on how
to begin to assess their own department effectiveness, which could include
measuring such things as number of students served, student-teacher ratios,
employment statistics, and other data. Then they would meet as a department to
prioritize their next year's budget requests together, and that single list would then
go to the division level. The department heads in each division would meet as a
group to prioritize their division budget request into a single list. The division
directors or deans in that area would then meet to meld their area's priorities into a
single list that would be submitted to their vice-president. The vice-presidents
would then work together to formulate the single campus budget priority list that the
president and board of trustees could approve.
This process took 6 months to complete. The top leadership team made
themselves available to talk through the process many times with important
constituent groups. More than any other administrative change thus far, this new
process felt unsettling to many on campus. The following comments, the first from
a faculty member and the second from a classified staff member, represent the
concerns and misperceptions that were shared by many at the college:
As a faculty member, I think it's great that we finally get some input
into the budget process. I mean, who knows better what the science
instructors need than science teachers? Still, I am nervous about this
program review stuff. My second year biology course historically has
a low count. Are they going to cancel classes now unless they are
packed to the gills? Also, I've heard a rumor that some programs
could even be totally thrown away through this process because their
student count is so low, or because graduates aren't getting jobs in
that field. I can't believe that would actually happen, though, given
67
the quality faculty we have here
would be such a waste of talent.
doing away with a total program
Coming from financial aid, I think this new change is super. We will
finally have an opportunity to get what we need! And we will be able
to decide that, NOT the president who doesn't know me from Adam.
I don't know about the program assessment pieces, though. Maybe
that's a better fit for instruction. I just hope they don't measure us on
those stupid customer service surveys or whatever. You know, most
people who fill those out are just mad that they didn't get their way.
At any rate, we've needed new furniture in our area for literally
decades, and it will be a breath of fresh air to finally get some.
As the process unfolded, the senior leadership team began to get calls from
departments. Though everyone had conceptually understood the process, actually
operationalizing it was now turning up some unexpected surprises, and not a little
consternation. It appeared that coming up with one prioritized list in each
department required decision-making techniques that were unfamiliar. In years past,
the president had simply made the budget decisions, and department personnel
would share much common dissatisfaction with the way their department was
treated in that process. Strong collegiality within the department grew with shared
commiseration.
Now, however, the new process required the department to come up with
one single list together. Putting one person's priority over another's was
uncomfortable and felt like competition with colleagues. They were disconcerted by
the inherent value implications: how can a microscope be more or less important
than a new computer? The struggle continued at the next level of the process in
which department heads painfully developed one single list for their division. The
department head of dental hygiene complained that she had to give up on several
68
other priority items because her department had one very large cost item that she
had to lobby to put at the top of the list. She was concerned about the equity of this,
given that her department had higher cost equipment and needs than most of the
others in her division. The department head of physical education wondered if, even
though they were in the same division, it was fair to put his department in
competition with heath-related departments, since their focus was so different. He
wondered if physical education could be considered separately.
The division directors and deans felt the hardest emotional hit, because
merging their lists into one meant that they would need to figure out how to balance
the politics of the decisions with the reality of the process. The academic division
chairs met from 9:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. on one day to come to closure on the list
that they would submit as a unit. The following quote from a division chair
describes the process.
I can't believe how hard that was to do. I know every single item on
my division's list was so carefully thought about by the department
and faculty involved for a long time that day, I couldn't accept that
ANY of my division's priorities shouldn't be totally funded. But
ultimately I realized that that is the process, and I had to buckle
down. However, I am not looking forward to going back to the
English department and telling them that tools for the Automotive
program ended up higher on the Instruction list than their
developmental English software, which they've only wanted for
about 20 years or so. They'd make good use of it, too, I know, and it
would be great for students. They'll all probably think I was a total
mouse. But the automotive program has gotten such high press lately
because of being chosen best vocational program in the whole
country and all that, and my English friends are such notorious poops
about doing any little extra thing, it was hard in that environment to
argue anything other than the way it came out. Still, I'm not sure it's
right. And I sure as hell can't tell them all that.
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Control: Budget Process II
An organization consists of many actors with divergent interests,
preferences, and criteria for organizational goals and performance. As the
organization experiences movement in its political dimensions, emerging changes in
control follow. Control determines which sets of interests predominate in the
organization.
The decision about the number of new faculty to hire or replace had been
extrapolated earlier in the process so that the recruitment process could begin on
time, and division chairs had come to agreement using the same process. Through
that process, the science division had not gotten a much-desired math lab faculty
position. When the department heads from science met later to come up with their
prioritized list for the division, the division director suggested putting the math lab
position at the top of the division list, since surely each division would at least get
their first one or two priorities funded. Others pointed out that the faculty decisions
had already been decided earlier, and it might not be in their best interest to put
something at the very top of their list that might be ignored. The division director
assured them that he, "knew how to play this game
just trust me on this one." But
when the division lists were ultimately merged, that item was not considered.
The budget process continued at Seaview. When the overall college priority
list was finally distributed, the top leadership team was requested to attend the next
science division meeting. The division director stood in the corner with his arms
folded. Faculty got up one by one to present cases for outdated equipment,
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classified support positions, technology necessary for programs to stay current in
their fields, and finally, the math lab faculty position. A faculty member of 30 years
stood up with great ceremony to express his feelings:
I am hard pressed to understand how a new college lawnmower got
put on the list as a higher priority than a faculty position, especially
one that is so needed! I mean, with all that the strategic plan has to
say about our environment changing and our student population
changing and you folks have clearly said that the strategic plan is
your recipe for decision-making, you know it seems ludicrous that
a position that would help serve these students would get put behind
all of this other stuff. I would just like to ask you where your
priorities are.
The vice-presidents listened and quietly reiterated the bottom-up process and
philosophy. There was a flutter of whispering in one section of the room, and a
hand shot up from a female chemistry instructor:
I'd like to say one more thing about this new and wonderful process.
I am a dedicated faculty member of this college who, in addition to
teaching, also has to advise, keep up in my field, and be on a host of
committees, along with a jillion other things. This process took a lot
of time out of my schedule, time that I should.have been spending
with students. We are a small department, and it took literally hours
for us to come up with a list, which was sort of stupid anyway
because there are so many things that are broken and that we need
around this place. And then we had to do it all over again for the
division. And I wasn't even very happy with the list that we ended up
with. This is bureaucracy at its best, I think, and I think you better
decide if you want this institution's faculty to be serving students in
the classroom, or doing this kind of stuff.
As much of the research in Chapter II suggested, organizational change
occurs both via strategic intervention by leadership as well as outside of their
control. It is clear through this chapter's descriptions that while organization leaders
are trying to act, the organization is also a moving target. It is blown about by
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environmental winds, it grows and ages, and it is shaped by internal power
struggles. This chapter describes case snapshots of organizational change at Seaview
Community College using the theoretical construct of Kanter's three organizational
forces of change and three forms of change viewed through the lens of specific
events (Kanter et al., 1992). Chapter V will address the research questions as well
as analyze and interpret the findings of the case study.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, ANALYSIS, AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY
This study attempted to analyze the organizational impact of significant
changes in leadership at a specific public community college during the initial
period of that change. The research findings, results, and conclusions of the study
are described through the following discussion of the events discussed in Chapter IV
tied with analyses related to the specific research questions described in Chapter I.
To remain consistent with the rest of this study, the framework of Kanter's change
theory is used as a backdrop for the analysis (Kanter et al., 1992). It is important to
note that, just as organizational change does not occur with distinct starts and stops,
the questions and answers related to this study are interwoven and linked together
by their connection to the whole organizational change process, both in the
literature and at Seaview.
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND ANALYSES
Research Question #1
What did the research literature reveal about the impacts of change,
especially when new leadership is installed in an organization?
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Chapter II provided a comprehensive review of the literature related to
organizational change and leadership roles within that change. Certainly for
Seaview, one of the most significant concepts in the organizational change research
literature is that of the mature organization that is faced with change. Kanter defines
the last life cycle stage as maturity, which often presages decline because the
organization fails to adapt to changing external conditions (Kanter et al., 1992).
Organizational age involves accumulated experience: how much needs to be
invented versus how much is given by tradition and therefore often done
unthinkingly whether it fits the situation or not. Aging presents another inevitable
dynamic: the addition of new people, primarily as replacements for those who
leave. Newcomers are a potential source of enrichment via their new perspectives
brought in from the outside. They also are, however, a potential threat to
established activities because of their inexperience, their ignorance of traditions and
routines, and their lack of relationships.
Organizational age produces both internal and external handicaps related to
the ability to change. One of the problems of age is the dilemma of success. The
same accumulated habits, skills, technical systems, and values that helped an
organization succeed in the past can turn into deeply embedded knowledge sets that
inhibit innovation. The organization's belief in itself and in its distinctive
competencies can become entrenched and unexamined.
The jarring impact of the conflict at Seaview between its maturity gained
from history of excellence rooted in academic tradition and the inevitable forces of
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the environment driving new changes produced two general questions for many on
campus: how do we get there, and is it worth the trip? The aging of an organization
as it proceeds through its life cycle clearly both causes change and also helps to
stifle change.
The results from the team building workshop reflected the common feeling
that something had to change for the organization to continue to support its
students. But it also indicated a hidden unease with all of the new changes,
including the new people, which and who had not been a part of Seaview's rich
history and enduring success.
An institution's ethos integrates history, tradition, values, ecological
context, and individual personalities into an invisible tapestry. In this tapestry, the
affective dimensions of the organization such as loyalty and commitment can
preserve and enhance the social ties across constituent groups by establishing
common belief systems.
The previous administration had supported a clan culture, in which shared
values, goals, and the development of faculty and staff were emphasized. Their
internal transactions were primarily guided by congruence of beliefs, trust, and
tradition. The leader in a clan culture is generally considered to be a mentor, sage,
or father figure, and that was also true at Seaview. While many on campus had
described this culture as stifling and patronizing, the kaleidoscope exercise reflected
current doubts about the new leadership team's ability to build trust within a new
cultural norm of responsiveness and entrepreneurship. What were the new rules?
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And could the social ties be preserved as a new fabric of interactions, decisions, and
relationships was woven?
The new leadership team carefully analyzed the results of the survey as they
began to plan their efforts, and recognized many fears about the implications of
change imbedded in the results. In an effort to respond to the environment, would
respected old programs (or people) be dumped to make room for new ones? Would
changes happen randomly, or would there be a plan for them in which the campus
would have a voice? Would the current administration honor the tradition of
"family" of Seaview? Could they become a part of that family?
There are constraints on top management's freedom to set strategic direction
in the mature organization, and that interferes with the organization's ability to
change. The constraints are often a result of fears that then turn into political
struggles for power and control.
Research Question #2
What were the external and internal forces that influenced significant
organizational change in this institution?
In a relatively stable environment, established institutions can afford to look
inward rather than outward, and to concentrate on protecting existing advantages
rather than innovating. Change can be incremental, consisting of add-ons to the
status quo by established players.
Then the environment shifts. New technology challenges the dominant mode
of production or distribution. The area of competition widens as players from other
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places migrate toward each other's resources. Political changes alter the landscape
of known rules that the organization had previously mastered to become successful.
Innovators from within the industry invade, with new approaches that win support.
At this point, the environment both internally and externally is turbulent.
The competition resulting from the new environment forces the organization to
begin to rethink its contracts, assumptions, and way of doing things. The ways
environmental forces shape the pressures and possibilities for change feel to those in
the organization like a gale-force wind.
The genuine desire to be part of the change process comes when individuals
agree that change is necessary, beneficial, and not harmful to what they believe is
their domain or interest. Organizational leaders play an important role in preparing
their organization for change and for its institutionalization by influencing the
perceptions and attitudes of the organization's members by defming and describing
the environmental forces pushing on the organization.
Forming relationships outside the institution with local leaders helped the
new president to gain credibility in his initial efforts to describe the need for change
to the institution. His decision to create the strategic planning team, charged with a
first task of scanning the external environment, was an important one, along with
his choice not to be an official part of the group. The team, comprised of
representatives from key constituent groups, was able to independently assess the
forces that were impacting Seaview, and because of their influence elsewhere in the
77
institution, were able to communicate the importance of their findings in a way that
was heard as legitimate by the rest of the organization.
Hiring a former vice-president as a facilitator for the strategic planning
group was a risky decision, given the continuing speeches the president was making
related to Seaview's dire economic straits and the necessity for change to create a
safe future for the institution. It could have been interpreted that Seaview really did
have money for extra's, and therefore the president was simply crying wolf. But
instead, the action communicated to the campus community the importance of the
strategic planning effort, since contracted positions were rare at Seaview. Hiring a
retired senior administrator of the former regime also ensured that the president
would gain some help in understanding established cultural values and norms, as
well as assured the campus of some continuity of a familiar face and style during a
time in which an entire new senior leadership team was being recruited and hired.
Finally, since the former vice-president was clearly an advocate for change and for
the new leadership, it formed an emotional bridge for some who were tempted to
equate "old" with "good."
Though the forces of the environment were seen fairly clearly through this
process, there was a conceptual gap in linking the institution's core values with the
changes necessary to respond to the environmental demands. Though many at
Seaview did recognize the strength of the environmental forces impacting them,
they also were socially and psychologically comfortable with the established order
at Seaview and were reluctant to accept the attendant changes that responding to the
78
changing environment would bring. Though they had consciously hired a president
who would help the institution, and therefore them, survive in a changing world,
they were not expecting their own world to really change, and in fact, liked their
institution's elite reputation and insular culture. Their history was part of their
definition of success.
As described in Chapter II, Beckhard and Pritchard (1992) define five forces
that serve as the focus to fundamental change: change in the mission, change in the
identity or outside image, change in relationships to key stakeholders, change in the
way of work, and change in the culture. Although one focus of change may be the
primary driver of the organizational change, the others will inevitably be affected as
well. When the leadership at Seaview decided that the mission and purpose of the
organization must evolve, subsequent decisions about changes in the way of work,
outside image, and organizational design and structure also had to be considered.
Research Question #3
What was the impact on the organization of a shift from organizational
stability to one of change?
Political dynamics are forces for change, but they also produce inertia,
especially for older organizations. The benefits come when political conflict allows
more voices to be heard and innovation to appear. Despite those benefits, however,
moving toward organizational change can be painful in previously stable
organizations.
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As long as there is an assumption of shared values, conflicts can be about
differences over tactics and not ultimate ends. Leaders need to ensure that the clash
of ideas does not result in a formation of firm groupings unable to identify with a
larger shared vision.
The situation involving the lighting on campus at night for night classes
seemed initially to be about logistics. The leadership team thought that they were
doing simple problem-solving. They realized late that issues of politics and culture
related to change were central to the problem.
Institutional culture is difficult to modify intentionally. But leaders can be
knowledgeable about the institution's history and translate stories and lessons so
that they can fit the current organizational picture. The vision and actions of the
leaders must be congruent with the history, traditions, and nuances that flow from
the institution's own particular cultural context.
Obviously the cultural and political values at Seaview related to governance,
structures of decision-making, and historical traditions were stronger than the
externally driven need for increasing enrollment through night classes. The
leadership team was making decisions about lights. The rest of the campus saw
political and cultural wins and losses.
People think they have something to lose if they have something invested in
the system in terms of status, beliefs, or values. Those who have a stake in that
status quo are able to derail innovation, at least temporarily, by attacking the system
at its weakest link: the bond that holds the group together. The group that blocked
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the contractor's truck coalesced by their common history at Seaview and shared
value surrounding the trees. Though the lighting at night might also have been a
concern to them, the political forces created a resistance to change that inhibited
their ability to see the innovation as positive.
At Seaview, all of Kanter's three forces of change (Kanter et al., 1992) were
in motion simultaneously, and reinforced each other. The organization's position in
its environment, combined with its life cycle stage, set the framework for politics
and decisions that both impacted the leaders and helped the leaders to impact the
organization.
Looking at the sources of emergent change assists leaders to view the larger
context in which they are trying to carry out their strategic intentions. Even while
leaders are formulating goals and directions, forces in the environment are pushing
in many directions, and life cycle and political dynamics within the organization are
creating still other challenges.
Research Question #4
To what extent did the new senior leadership team influence or manage
organizational change?
The nature of the ties that organizations have with their key constituencies or
stakeholders is vital. When aspects of relationships with those stakeholders are
altered, either consciously or unconsciously, the organization changes. The degree
to which the change can be managed depends on how much the leadership is aware
of those stakeholder relationships.
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Many people and groups that are not direct parties to transactions that signal
change may feel an emotional stake in them because they sense that their
relationship with the organization may be altered. The focus of identity changes, as
Kanter et al. (1992) describe them, is often on things that are tangible rather than on
how the organization will operate after the change. These changes produce
distractions in the organization and divert attention from the critical focus.
The president and leadership team believed that the campus constituency did
not have a strong investment in the design of the new logo and letterhead. That was
probably true, at least literally speaking, although that was the focus of their
reaction. In reality, the alteration of the institutional relationship with the
stakeholders, implied through the actions of the president and leadership team,
formed the fuel for the fury. The new logo did not matter as much as the perception
of unilateral abandonment of the old letterhead and the values and relationships
associated with it.
One important lesson for leaders is that organizations can claim an identity
change long before their constituents accept it. On a human level, it does not change
all that quickly or easily. The president and leadership team saw the logo decision
as being relatively unimportant and uneventful since there had been so much
discussion about the need for change at Seaview in the previous months. The
campus, however, saw the new executive team as forcibly making the campus into
its own image
and that was clearly not going to happen easily, changing
environment or not.
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Another important question was whether the organizational change at
Seaview was allowed to be ad hoc rather than purposeful public policy. The
president, while strongly suggesting that changes needed to occur in direction, did
not formally articulate intended changes in mission or purpose. Is it possible that a
30-year-old campus heard and interpreted his words as campaign promises,
emotion-filled and well-intentioned but devoid of real meaning? In that context, the
subsequent actions of the leadership team would certainly have seemed arbitrary and
arrogant, and would have elicited predictable reactive responses.
Research Question #5
How was organizational change implemented by a new senior leadership
team in one community college?
Leaders in organizations at the mature end of the life cycle often attempt to
dismantle the complex and slow-moving mechanisms that have developed over time
and are now not responsive to the new environmental pressures or to the new
identity of an organization endeavoring to respond to those pressures.
In some cases, coordination changes occur informally without reorganizing
the whole institution. Relationships, communication, and the flexibility to combine
resources are more important than formal channels and reporting relationships. In
other instances, substantive changes in the structure and processes drive the
organizational change.
As fledgling institutions with a desire for quality and standards of
excellence, community colleges invented rules and procedures as they were needed.
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Over time a hierarchy and rules proliferated, giving community colleges many of
the characteristics of a complex bureaucracy. The president and leadership team at
Seaview viewed the budget process as a large-scale way to effect change at the
college. Building a budget from the department level up would give employees at
the lowest levels inclusive opportunities to have a voice in the organization's
decisions. It would encourage objective assessments of programs and data driven by
the external environment and community needs. It would eliminate arbitrary and
confusing processes and procedures, building trust and confidence. It would be tied
to the Strategic Plan, making budget allocations consistent with the new major
thrusts and directions of the institution. To drive transformational change, the team
was endeavoring to alter the parts of the organization in relation to the whole in a
way that would be congruent with the institution's belief systems.
Leaders who are guiding an institution through the process of change can
piece together many of the parts of their organization's beliefs to serve as a magnet
for the building blocks of institutionalizing change. Figuring out what those beliefs
are, however, can be likened to the story of the blind men attempting to describe an
elephant. It involves constructing an organization's history, observing current
perceptions of structure and function, and understanding the coordination of the
separate pieces in relation to the whole. And it is an especially challenging task for
new leaders. Interest groups, managers, and leaders of change are likely to describe
the elephant all differently, depending on what part they were looking at.
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The initial enthusiasm for the new process was misleading. Many people at
the program level believed that having a voice in the budget process meant that their
own budget priorities would be fulfilled, hence the staff member in Financial Aid's
comment about finally being able to get new furniture for their department. When it
became clear that that was not the case, some of them felt betrayed.
The process itself moved without a hitch from the department to the division
level throughout the college. However, the leadership team had not expected the
level of emotional upheaval that the process engendered. The departments and
divisions had, in the past, formed tight collegial bonds through mutual griping about
their department's budget allocation determined unilaterally by the president
a
sort of "us against them" force. Without that process to bind them together,
individual idiosyncrasies suddenly led to petty conflicts and divisiveness that was
disturbing to them.
Resistance to change arises when leadership challenges the comfort of a
group who then resents having the ideology with which they are comfortable called
into question, and they resent even more being forced to question that ideology
themselves. Because the proposed change disturbs the carefully constructed world in
which they have learned to live and have power, the group strikes back with moral
rectitude of established practices and values. Even though the leaders may argue
that the change will not affect the power, prestige, or positions of the group, the
people impacted understand intuitively that change does, in fact, undermine their
ideology, upset their belief system, and cause them general discomfort.
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Research Question #6
What can be learned from this case study about the impact on a large and
stable community college resulting from a significant change in executive
leadership?
When stakeholders or interest groups become dissatisfied with organizational
performance, or when their roles or power change, struggles for control can ensue.
Stakeholders seek control changes when they think management strategies will not
be beneficial to their interests. But control changes can also bring management
changes permitting new ways of thinking. A new leadership team or CEO can find
it easier to define and implement a new strategy on a honeymoon that would not be
tolerated from a more established manager. However, a control shift can only
permit or enable reorganizing or revitalizing. It does not automatically entail the
right moves.
Colleges are professional organizations "where [individuals] can act as if
[they] are self-employed yet regularly receive a paycheck. [They are seemingly]
upside-down organizations, where the workers sometimes appear to manage their
bosses" (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 173). Leaders in such organizations do not control,
instead, they mobilize resources within a network of complex relationships.
Bringing about change requires leaders to understand those relationships and
be able to discern the interests individuals and groups have in supporting or
resisting change. To a large extent, the coordination structures of higher education
institutions influence those interests.
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The division director in the science division at Seaview had learned over
time to win via a political strategy based on the old rules. He knew well how to
manipulate the game so that his division would emerge victorious, and in fact, felt
obligated to protect his division against what he perceived to be predators. The new
budget process negated his hard-won skills, which became clear to him when his
strategy to get the new math lab faculty member failed. He was humiliated and
furious.
He quickly figured out, however, how he might be able to change the
structure back to the one in which he could be successful. By making the budget
process difficult and time-consuming for the faculty in his division, as well as by
placing a few well-timed comments to key faculty, he could suggest implicitly that
the new process was not central to the teaching and learning mission of the college.
The value of teaching and learning was such a central core to Seaview's tradition of
excellence that had reverberated throughout its long history, faculty in the division
were instantly galvanized.
In an ideal organization, people understand the necessity for change and
support it accordingly. In real organizations, commitment to change only follows
discussion that helps create the setting for change by facilitating reconciliation of
differences. The exchange of ideas, often accompanied by both enthusiasm and
acrimony, makes it more difficult for the organization to return to business as usual.
This part of the change process is uncomfortable for all involved, but it is the
catharsis that takes place during the debates that permits movement forward.
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The science division meeting was not the last conversation that faculty had
with the leadership team about the new budget process, and indeed, those
discussions continued even after this study as the process was fine-tuned and
political factions regrouped. But the old way did not prevail, and organizational
change at Seaview continues to evolve.
Changes in identity, coordination, or control of an organization are often
associated with dramatic upheaval. Leaders need to both prevent crises from
spinning out of control and also to keep the everyday activities going that keep the
organization moving toward the intended change. It is often difficult to avoid just
managing the changes others are creating rather than continuing to proactively steer
change in desirable directions.
It is clear that leaders cannot mandate change, nor are they exempt from its
effects. Many stakeholders, relationships, history, and systems impact
organizational change. The challenge of change is not simply a large-scale
conceptual and philosophical issue. It is also a practical issue of choosing actions
and making decisions. Change only looks revolutionary in retrospect. There is no
break between time before change and after change. Major changes in large
organizations are more likely to represent the accumulation of small concrete
actions built up slowly over time, step-by-step. Seaview Community College was no
exception.
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WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THIS STUDY
Some conclusions may be drawn from this study, although as with all
qualitative research, results are not generalizable and are only applicable within the
context of the research.
Because the CEO and the leadership team changed in a short time period at
Seaview, the altered team demographics allowed the senior team to take substantive
action in a turbulent environment. According to the research described in this study,
frame-breaking change requires direct executive involvement in all aspects of
change. In reality, it was often difficult for the team at Seaview to determine at
what level and to what degree their direct intervention was needed, especially when
decisions and events overlapped with one another in the complexity of
organizational life. The old analogy of trying to change a tire while their vehicle
was moving is an apt description for the frustrations of the team.
Also, system-wide organizational change may have been too often viewed by
the leadership team as occurring through formal processes and procedures, rather
than through cultural and political influences. The research in this study suggested
that homogeneity in terms of length of service in a top leadership team is associated
with positive organizational outcomes during times of change, and the Seaview team
did, in fact, move cohesively and without conflict in decision-making. However, the
homogeneity, and the resulting collegiality, also occasionally contributed to a kind
of "group think," in which the president's natural tendency to solve problems
through formal channels and avoid dealing with affective concerns, was not
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counteracted or balanced by his leadership team. They thus missed, on several
occasions, the subtler hints of political and cultural resistance that ultimately
impacted their intended formal changes.
This study also pointed to the importance of mid-level managers in change
efforts, and that lack of support and commitment from them has an extremely
negative impact on the success of large-scale change efforts. The president and the
top leadership team could have involved this group at Seaview to a greater degree,
especially in efforts that would have resulted in a greater philosophical
understanding of the importance of the change of direction at Seaview. People think
they have something to lose if they have something invested in the system of status,
beliefs, or values. The long-time mid-level managers at Seaview were strongly tied
to their historical successes at Seaview, and increased efforts to help them gain
competencies in the new skills required to succeed at the new Seaview might have
eliminated some of the confusion created in the redesigned budget process.
The first year of the new leadership team was significant in its opportunity
for change, but it also created pressure to do things quickly. Some of the changes of
the team were probably implemented too soon, before they could translate the
organization's stories and history so that they fit the current organizational picture.
On the other hand, the new paradigm of change was quickly communicated to the
campus constituency through the team's actions, although whether it was negatively
or positively perceived varied. Could the president have helped by more consciously
articulating the mission change at Seaview? The organizational changes that
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occurred without formal college statements of policy could have been viewed by the
campus as reactive as opposed to conscious, proactive choices, thereby creating
more resistance.
CONCLUSION
Samuel Johnson, the eighteenth century scholar, took his colleague James
Boswell to a performance of a celebrated dog that walked on its hind legs. Boswell
was disappointed and pointed out that the dog didn't walk very well and didn't
always respond appropriately to its master's instructions. Johnson answered, "It's
not how well the thing is done. It's that the thing is done at all."
Seaview Community College provided an interesting glimpse into
organizational change at its most dramatic: a traditional 30-year-old institution
steaming toward the twenty-first century with new leadership who sometimes
guided the huge vessel in making large, slow turns in a new direction, but who also
sometimes just held on tight while the vessel lurched and swayed in the
unpredictable seas of change.
The case study format for the research provided a rich opportunity for
gathering data on organizational change in the community college setting.
Compiling thick descriptive information was made easier by being a participant-
observer; there would have been much subtle information that would not have been
included if access to meetings, conversations, and documents, both formal and
informal, had been more limited. On the other hand, as a participant observer, it
91
was also sometimes difficult to know when enough information had been gathered.
A case study is simply a snapshot that can provide opportunity for qualitative
examination, but as a participant as well as an observer, it was tempting to continue
the descriptive investigation of some complex situations past the point in which
clarity of analysis could be achieved.
Also, while being a participant observer was particularly valuable in this
case study because it provided opportunities to see organizational change from the
inside-out, it also was an unusual situation that could not be duplicated in another
time period. Being one of the new senior leadership team members during the year
of the research, allowed the researcher for this short time to be somewhat objective
in observations, as people on campus had no history or experiences with me that
limited their interactions as data were gathered. After another year or two at this
institution, even were the researcher to intend otherwise, the researcher will also
become a part of Seaview's past and current history, and will no longer be able to
see with a clear perspective. This opportunity for participant-observer research was
unique; the research would not have been effective at another institution or in
another time period.
As with all qualitative research, this study cannot be generalized to other
situations. The fmdings in the study provide support for prior research about
organizational culture and suggest areas in which further exploration is necessary.
The case of Seaview Community College provides some insight into organizational
change. There, a new senior leadership team was beginning to work together to
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change very long historical patterns within a traditional institution. But does change
of this magnitude occur in institutions of higher education with less history and
fewer entrenched traditions? To what degree do the external environmental
pressures influence or limit routine and daily decisions? Can necessary
organizational change occur without the complete replacement of the president and
senior leadership team? Additional research is necessary to place the ramifications
of this study's findings in a larger context.
Organizational change in community colleges will continue to occur, both
driven by the forces blowing it toward the twenty-first century, and by the
leadership encouraging and nurturing new ways of thinking in academic institutions.
Further research in organizational change at community colleges specifically is
necessary to continue to explore how leaders can most effectively use the forces and
forms of change to most positively impact their institutions, their communities, and
their students.
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APPENDIX
102
CURRENT AND ARCHIVED RECORDS AND HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS
REVIEWED FOR THIS CASE STUDY RESEARCH INCLUDED THE
FOLLOWING:
VISTA (internal college newsletter) produced 1967-1997.
Student newspaper (various names) 1967-1997.
Minutes from College Cabinet 1985-1997.
President's correspondence 1978-1997.
AFT newsletter (produced by faculty union) 1970-1997.
Accreditation and self-study reports 1967-1997.
Board Reports 1985-1997.
Specific memos, letters, and reports relevant to the study.
FORMAL INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED WITH:
Faculty member, mathematics, 30 years at institution.
Faculty member, business, 27 years at institution.
Faculty member, liberal arts, 5 years at institution.
Classified staff member, office assistant, 25 years at institution.
Classified staff member, plant operations, 12 years at institution.
Program coordinator, student services, 16 years at institution.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Members of a Board of Trustees, which officially governs each local community
college, are appointed by the Governor in the State of Washington, where this
research was completed. During the time of the research between November 1996
and July 1997, the Board of Trustees at the institution studied was very new. Prior
to the new President's hire and in the subsequent year after his hire, all positions
changed on the Board for various reasons. This is unusual, and it also meant that
the Board did not play as much of a role in guidance or decisions as they might
otherwise, and for this reason, their input was not considered a relevant part of the
research in the study.