GAO
September 2012
United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Requesters
DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND
SECURITY
Oversight and
Coordination of
Research and
Development Should
Be Strengthened
GAO-12-837
September 2012
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Oversight And Coordination of Research and
Development Should Be Strengthened
Highlights of GAO-12-837, a report to
congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study
What GAO Found
Conducting R&D on technologies for
detecting, preventing, and mitigating
terrorist threats is vital to enhancing
the security of the nation. Since its
creation, DHS has spent billions of
dollars researching and developing
technologies used to support its
missions including securing the border,
detecting nuclear devices, and
screening airline passengers and
baggage for explosives, among others.
Within DHS, S&T conducts R&D and is
the component responsible for
coordinating R&D across the
department, but other components,
such as the Coast Guard and DNDO,
also conduct R&D to support their
respective missions. GAO was asked
to identify (1) how much DHS invests
in R&D and the extent to which DHS
has policies and guidance for defining
R&D and overseeing R&D resources
and efforts across the department, and
(2) the extent to which R&D is
coordinated within DHS to prevent
overlap, fragmentation, or unnecessary
duplication. GAO reviewed information
on DHS R&D budgets, contracts, and
DHS spending on R&D at DOE
national laboratories for fiscal years
2010 through 2012. GAO also
reviewed DHS R&D plans and project
documentation, and interviewed DHS
headquarters and component officials.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not know the total amount its
components invest in research and development (R&D) and does not have
policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources across
the department. According to DHS, its Science & Technology Directorate (S&T),
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and U. S. Coast Guard are the only
components that conduct R&D and, according to GAO’s analysis, these are the
only components that report budget authority, obligations, or outlays for R&D
activities to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as part of the budget
process. However, GAO identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations
by other DHS components. For example, S&T reported receiving $50 million in
reimbursements from other DHS components to conduct R&D. Further, 10
components obligated $55 million for R&D contracts to third parties and $151
million to Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories for R&D-related
projects, but these were not reported as R&D to OMB. According to DHS, it is
difficult to identify all R&D investments across the department because DHS
does not have a department wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing
components how to report all R&D spending and activities. As a result, it is
difficult for DHS to oversee components’ R&D efforts and align them with agency
wide R&D goals and priorities. Developing specific policies and guidance could
assist DHS components in better understanding how to report R&D activities,
and better position DHS to determine how much the agency invests in R&D to
effectively oversee these investments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS develop
policies and guidance for defining,
reporting and coordinating R&D
activities across the department; and
that DHS establish a mechanism to
track R&D projects. DHS concurred
with GAO’s recommendations.
View GAO-12-837. For more information,
contact David C.Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or
maurerd@gao.gov.
S&T has taken some steps to coordinate R&D efforts across DHS, but the
department's R&D efforts are fragmented and overlapping, which increases the
risk of unnecessary duplication. R&D at DHS is inherently fragmented because
S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO were each given R&D responsibilities in law,
and other DHS components may pursue and conduct their own R&D efforts as
long as those activities are coordinated through S&T. S&T uses various
mechanisms to coordinate its R&D efforts including component liaisons,
component R&D agreements, joint R&D strategies, and integrated R&D product
teams composed of S&T and component officials. However, GAO identified 35
instances of overlap among contracts that DHS components awarded for R&D
projects. For example, S&T and the Transportation Security Administration both
awarded overlapping contracts to different vendors to develop advanced
algorithms to detect the same type of explosive. While GAO did not identify
instances of unnecessary duplication among these contracts, DHS has not
developed a policy defining who is responsible for coordinating R&D and what
processes should be used to coordinate it, and does not have mechanisms to
track all R&D activities at DHS that could help prevent overlap, fragmentation, or
unnecessary duplication. For example, S&T did not track homeland securityrelated R&D activities that DHS components contracted through DOE national
laboratories from fiscal year 2010 through 2013; thus, it could not provide
information on those contracts. Developing a policy defining the roles and
responsibilities for coordinating R&D, and establishing coordination processes
and a mechanism to track all R&D projects could help DHS mitigate existing
fragmentation and overlap, and reduce the risk of unnecessary duplication.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
1
Background
DHS Does Not Know Its Total Investment in R&D, and Policies and
Guidance Could Help Define and Oversee R&D Efforts
S&T Coordinates Some R&D at DHS, but DHS R&D Is Fragmented
and Overlapping, Increasing the Risk of Unnecessary
Duplication
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
6
10
18
29
30
30
Appendix I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
32
Appendix II
Federal Government Definitions of Research and Development
36
Appendix III
Department of Homeland Security Research and Development
Obligations, Fiscal Year 2011
37
Role of Research and Development in Supporting the Department of
Homeland Security Acquisition Life Cycle
38
Appendix V
Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
39
Appendix VI
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
42
Figure 1: DHS R&D Budget Authority and Outlays, Fiscal Years
2010 through 2013
Figure 2: DHS R&D Obligations, Fiscal Year 2011
12
14
Appendix IV
Figures
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Figure 3: Avenues for Components to Engage in Department of
Homeland Security’s (DHS) Research and Development
(R&D) Activities
26
Abbreviations
ASOA
ATD
CBP
CFO
C-TPAT
DHS
DNDO
DOD
DOE
FAR
FEMA
FFAS
FMR
FPDS-NG
FRG
HSARPA
ICE
IED
IPT
NAPA
NASA
NPPD
NSF
OHA
OMB
ONL
OSTP
PARM
R&D
RDT&E
S&T
SDD
STICs
STORE
TSA
TTA
USCIS
Page ii
Acquisition Support and Operations Analysis
Advanced Technology Development
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Chief Financial Officer
Customs Trade Partners Against Terrorism
Department of Homeland Security
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Federal Acquisitions Regulation
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Financial Accounting Standards
Financial Management Regulation
Federal Procurement Data System Next Generation
First Responder Group
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Improvised Explosive Device
Integrated Product Team
National Academy of Public Administration
National Aeronautical and Space Administration
National Protection and Programs Directorate
National Science Foundation
Office of Health Affairs
Office of Management and Budget
Office of National Laboratories
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Program Accountability and Risk Management
research and development
Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
Science and Technology Directorate
System Development and Demonstration
Science and Technology Investment Councils
Science and Technology Operational Research and
Enhancement
Transportation Security Administration
technology transition agreements
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
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Page iii
GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
September 12, 2012
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Chairman
The Honorable Susan Collins
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Daniel Akaka
Chairman
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce,
and the District of Columbia
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Conducting research and development (R&D) on technologies for
detecting, preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing
the security of the nation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
conducts research, development, testing, and evaluation of new
technologies that are intended to strengthen the United States’ ability to
prevent and respond to nuclear, biological, explosive, and other types of
attacks within the United States. The department’s Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate conducts research, development,
demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities and also has
responsibility for coordinating and integrating all such activities of the
department, as provided by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 1
Although S&T conducts R&D and has responsibility for coordinating R&D,
other DHS components, including the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO) and the U. S. Coast Guard, conduct R&D in support of their
respective missions.
1
Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 302,116 Stat. 2135, 2163-64 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. §
182).
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Since it began operations in 2003, DHS, through both S&T and other
components, has spent billions of dollars researching and developing
technologies used to support a wide range of missions, including securing
the border, detecting nuclear devices, and screening airline passengers
and baggage for explosives, among others. In May 2004, we reported
that DHS had not completed a strategic plan to identify priorities, goals,
objectives, and policies for the R&D of homeland security technologies,
and gaps remained in its efforts to coordinate with other federal agencies
that conduct homeland security R&D. 2 We recommended that DHS
complete a strategic R&D plan and ensure that the plan was integrated
with homeland security R&D conducted by other federal agencies. DHS
agreed with our recommendation but has not yet implemented it. In June
2009, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) reported on
S&T’s structure, processes, and the execution of its cross-government
leadership role. 3 NAPA reported that although S&T was charged by
statute to provide a leading role in guiding homeland-security related
research, S&T has no authority over other federal agencies that conduct
homeland-security related research, and was in a relatively weak position
to carry out its leadership role. NAPA further reported that the
weaknesses in S&T’s strategic planning increased the risk for duplication
of efforts and recommended, among other things, that S&T follow the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and GAO guidance in
formulating a strategic plan to guide its work. In July 2012, S&T provided
a draft strategy that identifies the roles and responsibilities for
coordinating homeland security science and technology related functions
across the U.S. government to the White House’s Office of Science &
Technology Policy for review, but the White House had not yet approved
that draft. 4
In November 2011, we reported that while S&T developed a 5-year R&D
plan in 2008 to guide its efforts and was finalizing a new strategic plan to
align its own R&D investments and goals, DHS had not yet completed a
2
GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE’s Laboratories for
Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Detection and Response Technologies,
GAO-04-653 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2004).
3
National Academy of Public Administration, Department of Homeland Security Science
and Technology Directorate: Developing Technology to Protect America (Washington
D.C.: June 2009).
4
We did not review this draft strategy as part of our work on DHS R&D efforts.
Page 2
GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
strategic plan to align all R&D efforts across the department, as we
previously recommended in 2004. 5 We also reported that S&T had
undertaken a series of efforts related to its organizational structure and
underwent a new strategic planning process, developed new strategic
goals, and conducted a reorganization intended to better achieve its
strategic goals as a result of the NAPA study. We also reported that these
efforts had only recently been initiated, so it was too early to assess their
effectiveness. 6
Not having a department-wide strategy for managing R&D has raised
questions about the extent to which R&D investments and efforts are
being overseen and coordinated effectively across DHS. As a result, you
requested that we conduct a review to determine how DHS oversees
R&D resources and coordinates R&D efforts across the department.
Specifically, this report addresses the following two questions:
1. How much does DHS invest in R&D and to what extent does it have
policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D
resources and efforts across the department?
2. To what extent is R&D coordinated within DHS to prevent overlap,
fragmentation, and unnecessary duplication across the department? 7
To determine how much DHS invests in R&D and the extent to which it
has policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D
resources, we reviewed DHS’s budget and congressional budget
justifications to identify R&D investments reported from fiscal years 2011
through 2013. To identify DHS’s reported R&D budget authority, we
analyzed R&D budget authority included in budget submissions to OMB
5
GAO, DHS Research and Development: Science and Technology Directorate’s Test and
Evaluation and Reorganization Efforts, GAO-12-239T, (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2011).
6
We did not assess the effectiveness of S&T’s strategic planning process or
reorganization as part of this review.
7
Fragmentation occurs when more than one federal agency (or more than one
organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad area of national interest.
Overlap occurs when programs have similar goals, devise similar strategies and activities
to achieve those goals, or target similar users. Duplication occurs when two or more
agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities or provide the same services to
the same beneficiaries.
Page 3
GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
from fiscal years 2010 through 2013. 8 We also analyzed S&T, DNDO,
and Coast Guard budgets to identify budget authority for R&D activities in
non-R&D budget accounts. Further, we analyzed data from the Federal
Procurement Data System Next Generation (FPDS-NG) to identify DHS
R&D-related contracts for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. We also
obtained data from the Department of Energy’s (DOE) national
laboratories from fiscal years 2010 through 2012 to identify how much
DHS components obligated for R&D-related work at the national
laboratories. We assessed the reliability of the data we used by
reconciling it with published data, and interviewing officials responsible for
overseeing the relevant data systems about, among other things,
applicable quality control procedures to maintain the integrity of the data.
We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of this report. Further, we interviewed S&T, Coast Guard, and DNDO
budget officials to determine what portions of their budgets would
appropriately capture total R&D activities, as well as DHS budget officials
to discuss R&D spending, how DHS oversees R&D funding, and DHS’s
policies and guidance related to defining, overseeing, and coordinating
R&D efforts. We also interviewed other DHS component officials to
discuss the extent to which components conducted R&D, captured R&D
activities in their budgets, and coordinated with S&T. We compared DHS
efforts to develop policies and guidance with GAO’s Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government. 9
To determine the extent to which R&D is coordinated within DHS to
prevent overlap, fragmentation, and unnecessary duplication, we
reviewed data on about 15,000 federal procurement contract actions
coded as R&D in FPDS-NG made by DHS components from fiscal years
2007 through 2011 to identify contracts that were overlapping or
duplicative of other contracts issued by different components. 10 We
selected 50 R&D contracts that appeared to contain overlap and
interviewed the officials of the six components that issued them to discuss
the nature of those contracts. We could not determine the full extent of
8
Budget authority is authority provided by federal law to enter into financial obligations that
will result in immediate or future outlays involving federal government funds.
9
GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).
10
This was the total number of DHS contract actions taken from fiscal years 2007 through
2011.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
duplication or overlap occurring in the department, because, among other
things, the FPDS-NG data system captures only a portion of the total
R&D activities occurring at DHS. We also used our past work on
fragmentation, overlap, and duplication across the federal government, 11
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 12 and our prior
work related to federal collaboration to assess DHS’s coordination of R&D
across the department. 13 We also interviewed S&T leadership, technical
division directors, and DHS component officials to discuss S&T and
DHS’s R&D coordination processes. More details on our scope and
methodology can be found in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2011 through
September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the
audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We
believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
11
GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and
Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012); Follow-up on 2011 Report: Status of Actions Taken to Reduce
Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue,
GAO-12-453SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012); Employment for People with
Disabilities: Little Is Known about the Effectiveness of Fragmented and Overlapping
Programs, GAO-12-677 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012); and Justice Grant Programs:
DOJ Should Do More to Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication and Enhance
Program Assessment, GAO-12-517 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012).
12
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
13
GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain
Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005);
Cybersecurity: Key Challenges Need to Be Addressed to Improve Research and
Development, GAO-10-466 (Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2010) and Homeland Security:
DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE’s Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Detection and Response Technologies, GAO-04-653 (Washington, D.C.:
May 24, 2004).
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Background
Definition of R&D in the
Federal Government
OMB requires agencies to submit data on R&D programs as part of their
annual budget submissions. Specifically, agencies are to provide data on
investments for basic research, applied research, development, R&D
facilities construction, and major equipment for R&D. OMB provides one
definition of R&D that all federal agencies are to use to prepare budget
estimates (see app. II for a list of federal R&D definitions). According to
OMB, R&D activities comprise creative work undertaken on a systematic
basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of
man, culture, and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to
devise new applications. 14 R&D is further broken down into the following
three stages, as defined by OMB. 15
•
Basic research is a systematic study directed toward a fuller
knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of
phenomena and of observable facts without specific applications
towards processes or products in mind.
•
Applied research is a systematic study to gain knowledge or
understanding to determine the means by which a recognized and
specific need may be met.
•
Development is a systematic application of knowledge or
understanding, directed toward the production of useful materials,
devices, and systems or methods, including design, development, and
improvement of prototypes and new processes to meet specific
requirements.
14
OMB Circular No. A-11 Section 84.4. This definition includes administrative expenses
for R&D, but excludes physical assets for R&D (such as R&D equipment and facilities),
routine testing, quality control mapping, collection of general-purpose statistics,
experimental production, routine monitoring and evaluation of an operational program and
the training of scientific and technical personnel.
15
OMB Circular No. A-11 Section 84 Character Classification (Schedule C) (2011). OMB
has used these or similar categories in its collection of R&D data since 1949 (OMB, Fiscal
Year 2013 Analytical Perspectives, 2013 Budget of the U.S. Government, pg. 368).
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
DHS R&D Investment
There are several mechanisms by which agencies such as DHS are
required to report their investments in R&D, and investments can be
described in the following ways:
•
Budget authority is the legal authorization to obligate funds.
•
Obligations are binding agreements for the government to make a
payment (outlay) for goods and services ordered or received.
•
Outlays are payments to liquidate obligations and represent the
amount actually expended.
For R&D activities, OMB directs agencies to submit information on budget
authority and outlays for each year. Because the executive branch and
Congress generally make budget decisions in terms of budget authority,
budget authority can provide insight into relative priorities within the
annual budget process and changes in budget policies. 16 Agencies report
obligation data to OMB by object classification. Object classes are
categories that present obligations for items or services purchased
according to their initial purpose. For R&D-related obligations, OMB has a
separate category for R&D contracts (object class 25.5). OMB also
includes some advisory and assistance services for R&D in a separate
object class category (object class 25.1). 17
DHS is one of nine federal agencies that reported a total of $5 billion in
budget authority in fiscal year 2011 for homeland security R&D. 18
According to DHS, S&T, DNDO, and the Coast Guard are the three
components that conduct R&D within the department, with S&T by far
16
GAO, Budget Account Structure: A Descriptive Overview, GAO/AIMD-95-179
(Washington, D.C.: Sept 18, 1995).
17
GAO has reported in the past that using object class data is not reliable because the
categories are not mutually exclusive. GAO, Budget Object Classification: Origins and
Recent Trends, GAO/AIMD-94-147 (Washington, D.C.: Sept 13, 1994). Although OMB
defines a separate category for R&D contracts (25.5), there is some overlap with the
Advisory Services category (25.1). OMB object class 25.1 for advisory and assistance
services is not exclusive to R&D and can be used for other types of services.
18
The other agencies conducting homeland security R&D included the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, and Health and Human Services; the National
Aeronautical and Space Administration; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the
National Science Foundation.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
being the largest R&D entity. DHS reported $512 million in budget
authority and $752 million in outlays for R&D in fiscal year 2011. 19
R&D Roles and
Responsibilities at DHS
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established S&T within DHS and
provided it with responsibility for, among other things:
•
conducting basic and applied research, development, demonstration,
and testing and evaluation activities relevant to any or all elements of
DHS;
•
establishing and administering the primary R&D activities of the
department, including the long-term research and development needs
and capabilities for all elements of the department; and
•
coordinating and integrating all research, development,
demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities of the department. 20
S&T has six technical divisions responsible for managing S&T’s R&D
portfolio and coordinating with other DHS components to identify R&D
priorities and needs. 21 As of September 2012, S&T had approximately 79
active R&D projects. Most of S&T’s R&D portfolio consists of applied and
development R&D projects for its DHS customers. It also conducts other
projects for additional customers, including other federal agencies, first
responders, and industry, among others.
19
Because outlays are payments to liquidate obligations, they may not occur in the same
fiscal year as the budget authority under which the obligation was made. As a result,
outlays generally do not equal budget authority in any given fiscal year. In addition, for the
purpose of this report, we do not include outlays or budget authority for R&D facilities.
20
Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 302, 116 Stat. 2135, 2163-64 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C.
§ 182).
21
These divisions are the Borders and Maritime Division, Chemical/Biological Defense
Division, Cyber Security Division, Explosives Division, Human Factors/ Behavioral
Sciences Division, and the Infrastructure Protection and Disaster Management Division.
In addition, S&T’s First Responder Group (FRG) identifies, validates, and facilitates the
fulfillment of first responder requirements through the use of existing and emerging
technologies, knowledge products, and the development of technical standards, according
to S&T FRG officials.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
In addition to S&T, DNDO and the Coast Guard conduct R&D activities. 22
After its establishment in 2005, DNDO assumed responsibility from S&T
for certain nuclear and radiological R&D activities. DNDO is the primary
federal organization responsible for developing, acquiring, and supporting
the deployment of an enhanced domestic system to detect and report on
attempts to import, possess, store, transport, develop, or use an
unauthorized nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or radiological
material in the United States. 23 As of August 2012, DNDO officials
estimated that they have 30 R&D projects and plan to obligate $75.9
million for R&D in fiscal year 2012. According to Coast Guard officials, the
Coast Guard R&D Center conducts R&D projects to support the Coast
Guard’s priorities, primarily focusing on maritime safety-related projects.
As of August 2012, Coast Guard officials estimated that they have 60-70
applied research projects and have spent about $30 million on R&D in
fiscal year 2012 so far.
Our Work on
Fragmentation, Overlap,
and Duplication
In 2010, Congress directed us to identify programs, agencies, offices, and
initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within departments and
government-wide and report annually to Congress. 24 In March 2011 and
February 2012, we issued our first two annual reports to Congress in
response to this requirement. 25 The annual reports describe areas in
which we found evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication among
federal programs. Using the framework established in our prior work on
addressing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, we use the following
definitions for the purpose of assessing DHS’s R&D efforts:
22
DNDO was established by National Security Presidential Directive 43 - Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 14 and the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of
2006 (SAFE Port Act). Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 501(a), 120 Stat. 1884, 1932 (codified at 6
U.S.C. § 591). When the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred Coast Guard to the
newly established DHS, it provided that the Coast Guard is to be maintained as a distinct
entity within the department and that the authorities, functions, and capabilities of the
Coast Guard to perform its missions are to be maintained intact. Pub. L. No. 107-296, §
888, 116 Stat. 2135, 2249 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 468).
23
Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 501(a), 120 Stat. 1884, 1932 (2006) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 592).
24
Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 21, 124 Stat. 29 (2010), 31 U.S.C. § 712 Note.
25
See GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs,
Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP (Washington, D.C.: March 1,
2011) and GAO-12-342SP.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
•
Fragmentation occurs when more than one federal agency (or more
than one organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad
area of national interest.
•
Overlap occurs when multiple programs have similar goals, engage in
similar activities or strategies to achieve those goals, or target similar
beneficiaries. Overlap may result from statutory or other limitations
beyond the agency’s control.
•
Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are
engaging in the same activities or providing the same services to the
same beneficiaries.
DHS Does Not Know
Its Total Investment in
R&D, and Policies and
Guidance Could Help
Define and Oversee
R&D Efforts
DHS Does Not Know Its
Total Investment in R&D
DHS does not know how much all of its components invest in R&D,
making it difficult to oversee R&D efforts across the department.
According to DHS budget officials, S&T, DNDO, and the Coast Guard are
the only components that conduct R&D and, according to our analysis,
they are the only components that report budget authority, obligations, or
outlays for R&D activities to OMB as part of the budget process.
However, we identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations by
other DHS components. Further, we found that DNDO did not report
certain R&D budget data to OMB, and R&D budget accounts include a
mix of R&D and non-R&D spending, further complicating DHS’s ability to
identify its total investment in R&D.
R&D Obligations Not Reported
as R&D
Our analysis of the data that DHS submitted to OMB found that DHS’s
R&D obligations were underreported because other DHS components
obligated money for R&D contracts that were not reported to OMB as
R&D. Specifically, for fiscal year 2011, our analysis identified $255 million
in obligations for R&D that DHS did not report as R&D contracts in the
object classification tables. These obligations included DHS components
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providing S&T with funding to conduct R&D on their behalf and
components obligating funds through contracts directly to industry,
universities, or with DOE’s national laboratories for R&D. Specifically:
R&D Outlays and Budget
Authority
•
S&T reported receiving $50 million in reimbursements from other DHS
components, such as U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the
Secret Service, the Office of Health Affairs, Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) to conduct R&D projects. 26 These obligations were not
identified as R&D in these components’ budgets.
•
Our analysis identified 10 components, including CBP, TSA, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), that obligated
approximately $55 million for R&D contracts that were not reported as
R&D. 27
•
Our analysis identified that DHS components, outside of S&T, DNDO,
and the Coast Guard, obligated $151 million to DOE national
laboratories for R&D-related projects (44 percent of total DHS
spending at the national laboratories in fiscal year 2011). 28 For
example, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)
obligated $83 million to DOE national laboratories in fiscal year 2011
(see app. III for R&D obligations by component).
Our analysis of the data that DHS submitted to OMB also showed that
DHS’s R&D budget authority and outlays were underreported because
DNDO did not properly report its R&D budget authority and outlays to
OMB for fiscal years 2010 through 2013. Specifically, for fiscal years
2010 through 2013, DHS underreported its total R&D budget authority by
at least $293 million and outlays for R&D by at least $282 million because
DNDO did not accurately report the data. 29 In fiscal year 2011, S&T and
26
This figure excludes reimbursements from DNDO and the Coast Guard to S&T.
27
We analyzed and identified DHS R&D contracts in FPDS-NG categorized as basic
research, applied research and exploratory development, and advanced development.
28
DHS provided data on obligations to DOE national laboratories.
29
DNDO budget officials told us that they accounted for their R&D spending in the object
class codes of Schedule O of MAX A-11, but did not enter it into Schedule C of MAX.
OMB reports the R&D budget authority and outlays from Schedule C.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
the Coast Guard reported $512 million in R&D budget authority and $752
million in outlays, but DNDO did not report $56 million in R&D budget
authority or $80 million in outlays. 30 DNDO officials gave us the data for
the missing years as depicted in figure 1 along with S&T and Coast
Guard data.
Figure 1: DHS R&D Budget Authority and Outlays, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2013
Notes:
Figures do not include spending on R&D facilities.
Outlays are actual expenditure of funds and may occur many years after the funds were authorized
and obligated.
DNDO budget officials told us that they are aware of the omission and
confirmed that the OMB submission will be corrected in fiscal year 2013.
DHS budget officials agreed that DHS underreported its R&D spending
30
DNDO’s R&D budget authority for fiscal year 2011 does not include the funding for the
DNDO Transformational and Applied Research (TAR) Programs because the TAR
program had been proposed to be transferred to S&T, but the Department has since
reexamined that position and TAR has remained in DNDO, as reflected in the fiscal year
2012 and 2013 budgets.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
and when asked, could not provide a reason why the omission was not
flagged by DHS review.
In addition, within S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO, it is difficult to
identify all R&D funding because their R&D budget accounts fund both
R&D and non-R&D investments. For fiscal year 2011, we estimated that
78 percent of S&T’s Research, Development, Acquisition, & Operations
account, 51 percent of DNDO’s “Research, Development, & Operations”
account, and 43 percent of the Coast Guard’s R&D budget account fund
R&D activities. Figure 2 provides the various S&T, DNDO, and Coast
Guard budget accounts and budget activities and what percentage of
each account was obligated for R&D in fiscal year 2011.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Figure 2: DHS R&D Obligations, Fiscal Year 2011
Notes:
Percentages might not be exact due to rounding.
For budget activities that officials told us were solely for R&D, such as S&T’s Research, Development
and Innovation and University Programs and DNDO’s Transformational R&D, we counted the total
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
obligations from the activity as R&D obligations. For budget activities with both R&D and non-R&D
obligations, we analyzed object classification tables, specifically object class 25.5 R&D contracts, to
identify obligations for R&D from each budget activity.
A portion of Coast Guard’s obligations for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) is
made for personnel compensation and benefits. Obligations for this purpose are identified in the
object classification tables in the budget justification. For FY2011, Coast Guard obligated $11.4
million for personnel compensation and benefits. Subtracting this from total obligations for the RDT&E
budget account gives us the total obligations for Coast Guard mission R&D activities, $9 million.
DHS’s budget director recognized that spending in areas that cut across
the department, like R&D, are difficult to manage and told us that DHS
does not have oversight of R&D across the department. DHS is taking
some steps to address this, including identifying R&D as a budget line in
DHS’s proposed unified account structure, which was submitted to
Congress in the fiscal year 2013 budget for approval.
In 2007, we reported that appropriators rely on budget exhibits to inform
the decision to authorize and appropriate funds for many programs; thus,
accurate classifications of program and projects by budget activity are
needed for decision makers to readily understand how projects are
progressing and how money is being spent. 31 Specifically regarding R&D,
we reported that decision makers use the Department of Defense’s
(DOD) budget reports, which detail a project’s stage of development, to
assess how much is being invested in fundamental science and
technology and to determine the future capabilities of U.S. military forces.
Policies and Guidance for
Defining and Reporting
R&D Could Improve
Oversight
DHS does not have a departmentwide policy defining R&D or guidance
directing components how to report R&D activities. As a result, it is
difficult to identify the department’s total investment in R&D, which limits
DHS’s ability to oversee components’ R&D efforts and align them with
agencywide R&D goals and priorities. DHS officials told us that DHS uses
OMB’s definition of R&D, but the definition is broad and its application
may not be uniform across components, and thus, R&D investments may
not always be identified as R&D. For example, DHS officials told us that
test and evaluation is generally not considered R&D because the purpose
is to test how an existing technology fits into an operational environment.
However, S&T’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) told us that S&T reports
test and evaluation activities as part of its R&D budget authority.
31
GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Research and Development Budget Requests to
Congress Do Not Provide Consistent, Complete, and Clear Information. GAO-07-1058
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2007).
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Further, DHS officials told us that there is no distinct line between capital
investments and the R&D for technology development. For example,
NPPD officials told us they consider its cybersecurity system to be a
capital investment, and not R&D, but they consider R&D of new
technologies as an important aspect of this system. The variation in R&D
definitions may contribute to the unreliability of the reporting mechanisms
for R&D investments in budget development and execution, as discussed
above. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state
that policies and mechanisms are needed to enforce management’s
directives, such as the process of adhering to requirements for budget
development and execution and to ensure the reliability of those and
other reports for internal and external use. 32 Additionally, we previously
reported that agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts
by defining and articulating a common outcome and establishing
compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across
agency boundaries. 33 Such definitions could help DHS better identify its
R&D investment.
Other agencies that have conducted R&D longer than DHS, like DOD and
the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA), have
recognized the need to develop policies to better define what efforts
constitute R&D and manage their R&D activities. For example, DOD’s
Financial Management Regulation defines seven stages of technological
maturity for R&D activities and links them to the budget process to
increase transparency and oversight of R&D throughout the department. 34
Similarly, NASA has a directive that outlines its “cohesive management
process” for its R&D activities, which illustrates program and project life
cycles and defines the roles and responsibilities of key management
personnel. 35 DHS officials stated that the Chief Financial Officer’s (CFO)
office has oversight of R&D across the department through monthly
reports submitted by components. For example, S&T provides monthly
reports on R&D obligations to the CFO that detail obligations by individual
32
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
33
GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain
Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
34
DOD FMR, DoD 7000.14-R, Volume 2B, Chapter 5.
35
NASA Procedural Requirements: NASA Research and Technology Program and Project
Management Requirements. NPR 7120.8 (Effective Date February, 05, 2008).
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
appropriation accounts for R&D activities. However, those reports include
R&D that is reported as R&D obligations in the budget process and do not
provide financial details for the R&D investments made by components
other than S&T, DNDO, and the Coast Guard, as described earlier in this
report.
The challenges DHS faces in managing its R&D efforts are similar to the
challenges the department has faced in managing its acquisitions. In
September 2008, we reported that DHS had not integrated the acquisition
function across the department and did not have adequate oversight of all
of its acquisition programs. 36 DHS officials agreed with our findings and
the agency has taken steps to implement policies and guidance to ensure
that components follow consistent acquisition practices and that a
process exists to oversee acquisition programs, as outlined in Acquisition
Management Directive 102-01 (AMD 102-01). 37 Officials at DHS’s
Program Accountability and Risk Management office (PARM) agreed the
department has not developed policies or guidance on how components
should define and oversee R&D investments and efforts. They stated that
they are in the process of updating AMD 102-01 to include additional
sections pertaining to nonacquisition investments and that such R&D
policy and guidance could be incorporated into such updates in the future.
(See App. IV for an illustration of how R&D supports all four phases of
DHS’s Acquisition Life Cycle as defined by AMD 102-01). Such an update
could establish policy and guidance for defining R&D consistently across
the department and outline the processes and procedures for overseeing
R&D, which would provide more oversight into the R&D investments
across the department.
36
GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress and Continuing Concerns with
Acquisition Management, GAO-08-1164T, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2008), and
Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions,
GAO-10-588SP (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010).
37
AMD 102 defines policy and provides guidance for managing and tracking DHS’s
acquisition programs.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
S&T Coordinates
Some R&D at DHS,
but DHS R&D Is
Fragmented and
Overlapping,
Increasing the Risk of
Unnecessary
Duplication
S&T has coordinated R&D efforts across DHS to some extent, but the
department’s R&D efforts are fragmented and overlapping, which
increases the risk of unnecessary duplication. We identified 35 instances
of overlap among contracts that DHS components awarded for R&D
projects, but did not identify instances of duplication among these
contracts. Additionally, DHS has not developed a policy defining who is
responsible for coordinating R&D and what processes should be used to
coordinate it, and S&T does not have mechanisms to track all R&D
activities at DHS. Developing a policy defining the roles and
responsibilities for coordinating R&D, and establishing coordination
processes and a mechanism to track all R&D projects could help DHS
mitigate existing fragmentation and overlap, and reduce the risk of
unnecessary duplication.
S&T Has Taken Some
Actions to Coordinate
R&D across DHS
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, among other things, requires that
S&T coordinate and integrate all research, development, demonstration,
testing, and evaluation activities within DHS and establish and administer
the primary R&D activities of the department. 38 To carry out these
responsibilities, S&T developed coordination practices that fall into four
general categories: (1) S&T component liaisons, (2) R&D agreements
between component heads and S&T, (3) joint R&D strategies between
S&T and components, and (4) various R&D coordination teams made up
of S&T and component project managers.
S&T Component Liaisons
S&T officials stated that one of the primary ways that S&T mitigates the
risk of overlap and duplication is through component liaisons staffed at
S&T and S&T officials staffed at component agencies. Component
liaisons became a primary coordination mechanism under the former
Under Secretary who requested a Coast Guard official to work at S&T as
a deputy division director. According to S&T officials, these component
liaisons have been integral to S&T’s coordination efforts. As of July 2012,
S&T had eight liaisons from TSA, CBP, ICE, NPPD, the Secret Service,
and the Coast Guard. In addition, S&T had seven employees detailed to
other components, including CBP, the Secret Service, DHS’s Office of
Policy, DHS’s Tactical Communications Program Office, DNDO, and
TSA, as well as two liaisons at FEMA and DHS’s Office of the Chief
Financial Officer. According to S&T, liaisons help S&T maintain
38
6 U.S.C. § 182.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
communication with components on R&D needs and related activities.
For example, CBP requested an S&T liaison to provide technical
expertise to its acquisition division. However, S&T does not have liaisons
with every component.
Component R&D Agreements
S&T signed agreements with two components—CBP and the Secret
Service—to help coordinate R&D activities. Under those agreements,
S&T is working with the components on high-level “Apex projects” that
are intended to solve components’ strategic operational problems within 2
years. For example, S&T and the Secret Service have an Apex project
called the Science and Technology Operational Research and
Enhancement project that was initiated in June 2010 to provide
technology solutions for the Secret Service to define, establish, and
document the near- and long-term R&D strategy for the protection of
national leaders, visiting heads of state and government, designated
sites, and national special security events. S&T officials stated that the
Apex project required development and testing of about seven
technologies which the Secret Service plans to incorporate into its
operations. As of July 2012, S&T officials reported that all seven
technologies were in the developmental stage and will undergo testing in
late 2012. For the CBP Apex project, S&T is overseeing the development
and evaluation of new technology and infrastructure to help CBP create
Secure Transit Corridors. 39 S&T officials stated that, as of July 2012, the
project was on track to be completed in 1 year. S&T officials stated that it
can accommodate only three or four Apex projects at any given time
because of the time and resources required, but that it anticipates starting
future Apex projects with FEMA and ICE. As a result, these high-level
partnerships are not intended to address all customer needs at DHS.
Further, S&T provided us with three memorandums of agreement it
entered into with DHS components as a means to coordinate R&D efforts.
Specifically, S&T has agreements with CBP to develop a rapid response
39
The Secure Transit Corridors will allow Customs Trade Partners Against Terrorism (CTPAT) Tier III members with supply chain routes originating in Mexico or Canada. The CTPAT is part of CBP’s approach for overseeing the security of containerized cargo and the
flow of international goods by developing a voluntary antiterrorism partnership with
importers; customs brokers; air, sea, and land carriers; and other logistics service
providers such as freight consolidators and nonvessel common carriers. Tier III members
receive certain program benefits, such as expedited release of cargo in U.S. ports, upon
validation that members demonstrate sustained commitment to maintaining security
measures and supply chain security practices.
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prototype, the Coast Guard to develop a test bed, and TSA to coordinate
the transition of the Transportation Security Laboratory from TSA to S&T
which, was completed in 2006. S&T is also currently working with TSA on
an Aviation Security agreement that is to result in S&T supporting TSA in
various areas (as outlined in the agreement) and providing technology to
address capability gaps. S&T plans to initiate similar partnerships first
with CBP, then with ICE and FEMA.
S&T also works with DHS components to ensure that it meets their R&D
needs by signing technology transition agreements (TTA) to ensure that
components use the technologies S&T develops. S&T has 42 TTAs with
DHS components. For example, TSA agreed to integrate automated
intent detection technologies to better detect unknown threats before they
enter the country into its behavior detection-screening program once S&T
successfully demonstrated that the technologies met performance
requirements. Additionally, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
(USCIS) agreed to deploy rapid DNA-based screening technologies to
determine kinship to use in the refugee and asylum eligibility
determination process upon S&T demonstrating that the technology
meets certain performance criteria. According to S&T officials, none of
these TTAs has yet resulted in a technology being transitioned from S&T
to a component.
Component R&D Strategies
In March 2011, S&T and TSA issued a joint R&D strategy for aviation
security that identifies TSA’s R&D priorities. That plan was a result of an
internal planning process that prioritized capability gaps and focused on
the work between TSA and S&T’s Explosives and Human
Factors/Behavioral Sciences Divisions. According to TSA officials, the
joint R&D strategic plan does not represent a TSA-wide R&D strategy
because it does not include surface transportation security capability
gaps. Rather, the officials said that TSA uses the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan and an R&D working group with S&T to identify those
capability gaps. S&T officials stated that it is currently updating its R&D
Strategy with TSA. S&T is also planning to work with the Secret Service,
CBP, ICE, and FEMA to build component-specific R&D strategies that are
linked to component acquisition programs. 40
40
We did not receive information on when S&T planned to complete those R&D strategies.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
R&D Coordination Teams
S&T’s previous Under Secretary instituted the Capstone Integrated
Product Teams (IPT) process to coordinate R&D efforts between S&T
and components. IPTs served as S&T’s primary mechanism for
coordinating R&D and consisted of members from S&T and component
agencies. In S&T’s 5-year R&D plan for fiscal years 2008 through 2013,
S&T identified 12 IPTs, each of which was focused on a different topic
and brought together decision makers from DHS components and S&T,
as well as end users of technologies. 41 Additionally, the IPT process
included teams to coordinate R&D at the project level among S&T and
components. IPTs solicited input from components to identify and
address technology gaps and needs and were intended to assist
operational units in making decisions about technology investments,
based on S&T’s understanding of technology and the state of applicable
technology solutions. For example, members of the cargo security IPT
determined that the capability gap that should be addressed was
enhancing cargo screening and examination systems through detecting
or identifying terrorist contraband items, like drugs or illegal firearms. As a
result, S&T identified CanScan, a nonintrusive inspection system as a
means for addressing that gap.
According to S&T division directors and officials we interviewed, the IPT
process is no longer in place to coordinate R&D activities at the
component level, but IPTs are being used by the division directors to
coordinate R&D activities at the project level. 42 In July 2011, S&T
announced the creation of a new process, called Science and Technology
Investment Councils, which would coordinate R&D activities at the most
senior levels of each component, rather than at the program manager
level. However, S&T later decided not to implement the councils and
instead began implementing two new coordination teams in the fall of
2011—a cross-functional team composed of S&T personnel focusing on
strategic priorities and an integral partner team—led by S&T’s newly
created Acquisition Support and Operations Analysis (ASOA) division to
41
IPT areas were border security, cargo security, chemical/biological defense, cyber
security, counter improvised explosive device (IED), transportation security, incident
management, infrastructure protection, information sharing/management, interoperability,
maritime security, and people screening.
42
We interviewed directors of divisions responsible for coordinating R&D activities
throughout the department. These included Borders and Maritime Division, Chemical and
Biological Division, Cyber Security Division, Explosives Division, Human Factors/
Behavioral Sciences Division, and Infrastructure Protection Division.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
focus on components’ operational needs. 43 According to S&T division
directors, these new teams are not yet fully implemented and they are still
using established relationships with components through the IPT process
to identify components needs and coordinate R&D. Additionally, S&T still
maintains IPTs with TSA on surface transportation.
DHS R&D Is Fragmented
and Overlapping,
Increasing the Risk of
Unnecessary Duplication
R&D at DHS is inherently fragmented because several components within
DHS—S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO—were each given R&D
responsibilities in law, and other DHS components may pursue and
conduct their own R&D efforts as long as those activities are coordinated
through S&T. Fragmentation among R&D efforts at DHS may be
advantageous if the department determines that it could gain better or
faster results by having multiple components engage in R&D activities
toward a similar goal; however, it can be disadvantageous if those
activities are uncoordinated or unintentionally overlapping or duplicative.
To illustrate overlap and the potential for unnecessary duplication, we
reviewed data on about 15,000 federal procurement contract actions
coded as R&D taken by DHS components from fiscal years 2007 through
2012. 44 See appendix 1 for details on our methodology for identifying
overlap. Of those, we identified 50 R&D contracts issued by six DHS
components—S&T, TSA, FEMA, the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), the
Coast Guard, and CBP—that appeared to have similar activities with
another contract and interviewed component officials about those R&D
activities. We obtained 47 of those 50 contracts and reviewed their
statements of work. 45 On the basis of that analysis and our interviews with
components, we identified 35 instances of overlap where components
awarded R&D contracts that overlapped with R&D activities conducted
43
ASOA works with the Under Secretary for Management to aid the components in
developing high-fidelity, testable operational requirements for their acquisitions; aid in
executing an analysis of alternatives to ensure that the most appropriate technical
approach is taken; and partner with the components throughout an acquisition so that user
needs are translated into real capabilities that can be validated upon delivery and
deployed without delay.
44
In some cases, contracts were initially awarded prior to 2007 but had contract actions
taken—whether changes to contracting officials, extended period of performance,
changes to tasks requested, or other modifications—during fiscal years 2007 through
2012. These modifications to initial contracts were included in our analysis.
45
The Coast Guard, OHA, and DHS were unable to provide 3 contracts that we requested.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
elsewhere in the department. We also found that DHS did not have
tracking mechanisms or policies to help ensure that this overlap be
avoided and better coordinated. 46 For example:
•
S&T awarded four separate contracts to develop methods of detecting
ammonium nitrate and urea nitrate for the counter-IED program. TSA
also awarded a contract to a private vendor to investigate the
detection of ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate-based
explosives. These contracts were similar in that they all addressed the
detection of the same chemical.
•
S&T awarded four separate contracts to develop advanced algorithms
for explosives detection, while TSA also awarded contracts to develop
algorithms to evaluate images for explosives. We determined that
these R&D contracts overlapped because both components were
involved in developing algorithms for explosives detection.
•
S&T awarded a contract to a private vendor for support and analysis
for seismic hazards, while FEMA also awarded a contract to a private
vendor to develop seismic guidelines for buildings in the event of an
earthquake. These contracts overlapped because they were both
similar in scope.
Although the contracts we selected overlapped, we determined that they
were not duplicative based on our analysis and our interviews with
component officials. For example, TSA officials stated that all TSA R&D
contracts we requested were initially awarded when TSA still conducted
transportation security-related R&D and were managed by the
Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL), which moved into S&T in
2006. 47 As a result, TSA did not have oversight into those contracts.
Additionally, TSA officials stated that some of the contracts may have
overlapped in the scope of work but were focused on different operational
missions. S&T officials agreed with TSA, stating that some of this overlap
occurred during a period of time when TSA was still conducting R&D
46
We also examined about 1,000 task orders sent to the national laboratories by DHS
components, but the data did not include sufficient detail to use for this analysis.
47
The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2006 DHS appropriations act
provided that certain funding was for consolidating all of DHS’s R&D efforts except the
Coast Guard’s R&D efforts into S&T. H. Rep. No. 109-241, at 82 (2005). That
consolidation took place in 2006.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
through TSL and during a time when S&T did not have the level of
contract oversight that it has now. FEMA officials stated that FEMA’s
research projects are related to earthquake hazards, rather than to
multiple hazards like S&T’s research projects. They stated that FEMA’s
coordination with S&T is dependent on prior personal relationships rather
than through an established coordination process.
According to S&T officials, a process does not exist at DHS or within S&T
to prevent overlap or unnecessary duplication but that relationships with
components mitigate that risk. They also stated that S&T has improved
interactions with components over time. For example, S&T officials stated
that when CBP requested mobile radios to improve communication
among its field staff, S&T knew that the Secret Service and ICE were
already working in that area. To address this technology need, S&T
provided a senior official to lead the Tactical Communication Team to
address communication among different operational components and
better coordinate those efforts.
In conducting this analysis, we recognize that overlapping R&D activities
across similar areas may not be problematic. However, the existence of
overlapping R&D activities coupled with the lack of policies and guidance
defining R&D (as mentioned previously) and coordination processes is an
indication that not all R&D activities at DHS are coordinated to ensure
that R&D is not unnecessarily duplicative. As a result, DHS could
increase oversight of R&D, and improve coordination of R&D activities to
ensure that any duplication in R&D activities is purposeful rather than
unnecessary, as discussed later in this draft. Overlap and the associated
risk of unnecessary duplication occur throughout the government, as we
have reported previously, and are not isolated to DHS. 48 However, when
coupled with consistent programmatic coordination, the risk of
unnecessary duplication can be diminished.
48
GAO-12-342SP.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Policy and Tracking
Mechanism Could Improve
Coordination and Reduce
Risk of Unnecessary
Duplication
DHS and S&T do not have the policies and mechanisms necessary to
coordinate R&D across the department and reduce the risk of
unnecessary duplication. First, as noted earlier in this report, DHS does
not have the policies and guidance necessary to define and oversee R&D
investments across the department. While S&T has taken steps to
coordinate R&D, DHS has not developed a policy defining who is
responsible for coordinating R&D and what processes should be used to
coordinate it. Specifically, while S&T has R&D agreements with some
components, S&T officials rely on the former IPT process to coordinate
with components. For example, S&T division directors cited the IPT
process and personal relationships as the primary means to coordinate
R&D activities with components and generally felt that they were
coordinating effectively.
However, other component officials we interviewed did not view S&T’s
coordination practices as positively. Specifically, we interviewed six
components to discuss the extent to which they coordinated with S&T on
R&D activities. Four components stated that S&T did not have an
established process that detailed how S&T would work with its customers
or for coordinating all activities at DHS. For example, one component
stated that S&T has conducted R&D that it thought would address the
component’s operational need but, when work was completed, the R&D
project did not fit into the operational environment to meet the
component’s needs. In addition, without an established coordination
process, the risk for unnecessary duplication increases, because
components can engage in R&D activities without coordinating them
through S&T (see fig. 3).
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Figure 3: Avenues for Components to Engage in Department of Homeland
Security’s (DHS) Research and Development (R&D) Activities
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that
policies and procedures ensure that the necessary activities occur at all
levels and functions of the organization—not just from top-level
leadership. This ensures that all levels of the organization are
coordinating effectively and as part of a larger strategy. Additionally,
internal control standards provide that agencies should communicate
necessary information effectively by ensuring that they are
communicating with, and obtaining information from, external
stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving
its goals. DHS and S&T could be in a better position to coordinate the
department’s R&D efforts by implementing a specific policy outlining R&D
roles and responsibilities and processes for coordinating R&D.
Furthermore, S&T and DHS have not developed a mechanism to track all
ongoing R&D projects conducted across DHS components. Specifically,
neither DHS nor S&T tracks all ongoing R&D projects across the
department, including R&D activities contracted through the national
laboratories. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS the authority
to use DOE laboratories to conduct R&D and established S&T’s Office of
National Laboratories (ONL) to be responsible for coordinating and using
Page 26
GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
the DOE national laboratories. 49 Additionally, DHS Directive 143 further
directs ONL to serve as the primary point of contact to recommend
contracting activity approval for work by the national laboratories, and
review all statements of work issued from DHS and directed to the
national laboratories. According to S&T, the purpose of that review is to
ensure the proposed work is within the scope, and complies with the
terms and conditions, of the prime contract between DOE and the
national laboratories. We identified 11 components that reimbursed the
national laboratories for R&D between fiscal years 2010 and 2013, but
ONL could not provide us with any information on those activities and told
us it did not track them. 50 According to S&T, ONL's ability to provide
information on activities across the department is limited by components
inconsistently operating within the DHS Directive 143 process for working
with the national laboratories. According to the Director of ONL, to identify
activities not reported through the DHS Directive 143 process, S&T uses
other means such as relationships with components and S&T, as well as
reviewing task orders sent to the laboratories from DHS, visiting
laboratories, and laboratories self-reporting their work to ONL.
We previously reported in 2004 that DHS faced challenges using DOE’s
laboratories and balancing the immediate needs of users of homeland
security technologies with the need to conduct R&D on advanced
technologies for the future. 51 DHS agreed with our recommendation to
create a strategic R&D plan to identify and develop countermeasures to
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist
threats and to ensure that it detailed how DHS would work with other
federal agencies to establish governmentwide priorities, identify research
gaps, avoid duplication of effort, and leverage resources. DHS noted that
such a plan was critical to the success of the department, and stated that
S&T would complete a strategic planning process in 2004 that would be
reviewed and updated annually. To date, DHS has not yet developed a
departmentwide strategic plan for managing R&D, although S&T has
developed its own plan.
49
Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 309, 116 Stat. 2135, 2172 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 189).
50
We received obligations data for fiscal year 2010 and 2011; funding data for fiscal year
2012, and projected funding data for fiscal year 2013.
51
GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE’s Laboratories for
Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Detection and Response Technologies,
GAO-04-653 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2004).
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that
controls are needed to provide reasonable assurance that, among other
things, reliable data are obtained, maintained, and fairly disclosed in
reports and agencies comply with laws and regulations. In addition, in
June 2010, we reported that R&D information should be tracked in a
consolidated database in order to fully coordinate cybersecurity R&D
activities to provide essential information about ongoing and completed
R&D. 52 We recommended that the Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) direct its subcommittee on Networking and
Information Technology Research and Development to exercise its
leadership responsibilities by, among other things, establishing and using
a mechanism to keep track of federal cybersecurity R&D funding. 53 OSTP
agreed with our recommendation. Additionally, we previously reported
that agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by,
among other things, agreeing on roles and responsibilities and developing
mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results. 54
DHS officials agreed that such mechanisms to track R&D activities were
necessary, and said they have faced similar challenges in managing
investments across the department. DHS has attempted to address those
challenges by, among other things, creating a database called the
Decision Support Tool that is intended to improve the flow of information
from component program offices to the DHS Management Directorate to
support its governance efforts. 55 The Decision Support Tool could provide
an example of how DHS could better track ongoing R&D projects
52
GAO, Cybersecurity: Key Challenges Need to Be Addressed to Improve Research and
Development, GAO-10-466 (Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2010).
53
The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Subcommittee
is a multiagency coordination body responsible for providing leadership in coordinating
cybersecurity R&D.
54
GAO-06-15.
55
The Decision Support Tool collects data from existing data systems, including
information technology, capital investment data and out-year planning and budget data
from all component agencies’ data systems in order to centralize and standardize the
management of resources. This includes information technology data from the Next
Generation Periodic Reporting System, capital investment planning data from the
Investment Management System, and financial data from the Future Years Homeland
Security Program. The Future Years Homeland Security Program provides a summary
and breakdown of DHS program resources over a 5-year period, including resource
alignment by goals, component appropriations, and component programs, as well as
program descriptions, milestones, performance measures, and targets.
Page 28
GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
occurring in the department. DHS’s PARM officials stated that they
recently added new data fields to capture more detailed information on
component activities, such as additional financial data, at a low cost to
DHS, and that such data fields could be added to collect information and
track R&D activities across DHS, such as contracts with private
companies or universities and the associated costs. However, we
reported in March 2012 that DHS executives were not confident enough
in the data to use the Decision Support Tool to make acquisition
decisions, and that DHS’s plans to improve the quality of the data in this
database were limited. 56 We also reported that DHS had limited plans to
improve the quality of the data because PARM only planned to check the
data quality in preparation for key milestone meetings in the acquisition
process. That could significantly diminish the Decision Support Tool’s
value, because users cannot confidently identify and take action to
address problems meeting cost or schedule goals prior to program review
meetings. As a result, improvements to the Decision Support Tool’s data
quality before expanding its use could improve the collecting and tracking
of R&D information and could be used as an example of how to better
track information occurring across components. DHS is taking actions to
address the limitations to the Decision Support Tool’s data quality by
working to validate the Decision Support Tool’s associated acquisition
data. A policy that defines roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D
and coordination processes, as well as a mechanism that tracks all DHS
R&D projects, could better position DHS to mitigate the risk of
overlapping and unnecessarily duplicative R&D projects.
Conclusions
Conducting R&D on technologies is a key component of DHS’s efforts to
detect, prevent, and mitigate terrorist threats and is vital to enhancing the
security of the nation. Multiple entities across DHS conduct various types
of R&D in pursuit of their respective missions, but DHS does not have a
department-wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing components
how to report R&D activities and investments. As a result, DHS does not
have the ability to maintain oversight of its total investment in R&D across
the department, which also limits its ability to oversee components’ R&D
efforts and align them with agencywide R&D goals and priorities.
Establishing policies and guidance for defining R&D across the
department and outlining the processes and procedures for overseeing
56
GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Continued Progress Made Improving and
Integrating Management Areas, but More Work Remains, GAO-12-365T (Washington,
D.C. Mar. 1, 2012).
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
R&D would provide more oversight of R&D investments across the
department. Furthermore, DHS has taken some steps to coordinate R&D
efforts across the department, but does not have a cohesive policy
defining roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D and mechanisms
to track all DHS R&D projects. A policy that defines roles and
responsibilities for coordinating R&D and coordination processes, as well
as a mechanism that tracks all DHS R&D projects, could better position
DHS to mitigate the risk of overlapping and unnecessarily duplicative
R&D projects.
Recommendations for
Executive Action
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
To help ensure that DHS effectively oversees its R&D investment and
efforts and reduces fragmentation, overlap, and the risk of unnecessary
duplication, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security
develop and implement policies and guidance for defining and overseeing
R&D at the department. Such policies and guidance could be included as
an update to the department’s existing acquisition directive and should
include the following elements:
•
a well-understood definition of R&D that provides reasonable
assurance that reliable accounting and reporting of R&D resources
and activities for internal and external use are achieved,
•
a description of the department’s process and roles and
responsibilities for overseeing and coordinating R&D investments and
efforts, and
•
a mechanism to track existing R&D projects and their associated
costs across the department.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment.
DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix
V, and concurred with our recommendation. DHS also described actions
it plans to take to address the recommendation. Specifically, according to
DHS, it plans to evaluate the most effective path forward to guide uniform
treatment of R&D across the department in compliance with OMB rules
and is considering a management directive, multi component steering
committee, or new policy guidance to help better oversee and coordinate
R&D. DHS plans to complete these efforts by May 1, 2013. Such actions
should address the overall intent of our recommendation. However, it will
be important that whatever DHS chooses to do, its actions address the
specific elements we outlined in our recommendation, including
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
developing a definition of R&D, defining roles and responsibilities for
oversight and coordination, and developing a mechanism to track existing
R&D projects and investments.
DHS also provided written technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested
parties. This report is also available at no charge on GAO’s website at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix
VI.
David C. Maurer
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
This report answers the following questions:
1. How much does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) invest
in research and development (R&D) and to what extent does it have
policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D
resources and efforts across the department?
2. To what extent is R&D coordinated within DHS to prevent overlap,
fragmentation, and unnecessary duplication across the department?
To determine how much DHS invests in R&D and the extent that it has
policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources
and efforts across the department, we reviewed DHS’s budget and
congressional budget justifications to identify R&D investments reported
from fiscal years 2011 through 2013. We analyzed R&D budget authority,
outlays, and obligations included in budget submissions to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) reported for fiscal years 2010 through
2013. We also analyzed Science and Technology Directorate (S&T),
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and Coast Guard budgets to
identify obligations for R&D funded by non-R&D budget activities as
identified in object class tables that present obligations by the items or
services purchased (e.g. personnel compensation and benefits,
contractual services and supplies, acquisition of assets, grants and fixed
charges). In addition, we assessed DHS’s management and oversight of
its R&D spending against criteria in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control
in the Federal Government. 1
We analyzed data from the Federal Procurement Data System Next
Generation (FPDS-NG) to identify R&D-related contracts across DHS for
fiscal years 2007 through 2011. We filtered these contracts to include
only those R&D stages coded as basic research, applied research, and
exploratory development and advanced development, which align more
closely with recognized definitions of R&D. We excluded the other four
stages (engineering development, operational systems development,
management/support, and commercialization) of R&D because these
activities are linked more closely to procurements rather than R&D
activities. We also analyzed data from the Department of Energy’s (DOE)
national laboratories from fiscal years 2010 through 2012 to identify how
1
GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
much DHS components obligated for R&D-related work at the national
labs.
To determine the extent that R&D is coordinated within DHS to prevent
overlap, fragmentation, and unnecessary duplication, we
•
Reviewed component R&D plans and project documentation. We also
reviewed department and S&T division strategic plans.
•
Interviewed officials from DHS, DNDO, the Coast Guard, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Office of Health
Affairs (OHA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the
National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), and the Secret
Service to discuss, among other things, their R&D efforts, R&D
budgets, and coordination with S&T. We interviewed DHS budget and
acquisition oversight officials to discuss how DHS oversees and
manages its R&D resources.
•
Interviewed S&T’s budget official and Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) officials, including directors
from each of the six technical divisions, to discuss how they
coordinated with components and prioritized R&D resources.
•
Used a data-collection instrument to collect information on S&T R&D
projects, associated costs of R&D projects, and division customers
from each HSARPA director and interviewed the Director of S&T’s
Office of National Laboratories, responsible for coordinating S&T and
DHS’s R&D work conducted at the DOE national laboratories to
discuss DHS’s spending at and use of these laboratories.
•
Compared DHS’s coordination efforts against the relevant legislation
and criteria, including federal internal control standards as well as
GAO’s recommended practices for collaboration and coordination to
identify efforts to meet certain provisions and potential areas for
improvement. 2
To seek examples of potential overlap and duplication, we
2
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (11/99) and Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can
Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
•
Reviewed data on about 15,000 federal procurement contract actions
coded as R&D in the Federal Procurement Data System Next
Generation (FPDS-NG) made by DHS components from fiscal years
2007 through 2012 to identify contracts that were potentially
overlapping or duplicative of other contracts issued by different
components. This was the total number of DHS contract actions taken
from fiscal years 2007 through 2011.
•
Established 32 key words based on our knowledge of the likely areas
of overlapping R&D related to component missions in order to identify
areas where components may have issued contracts that were similar
in scope and to eliminate areas where duplicative activities were likely
to be present but acceptable (e.g., personnel support and
management services). We searched for the key words in the FPDSNG data set to identify contracts containing the same key words
issued by more than one component.
•
Independently analyzed the contract descriptions and identified 50
R&D contracts issued by six components—S&T, the Coast Guard,
TSA, CBP, OHA, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA)—that appeared to overlap and interviewed officials from
those components to discuss the nature of those contracts. 3
•
Obtained 47 out of 50 contracts and analyzed each contract’s
statement of work and objectives to determine the type of R&D activity
and to identify whether each contract was overlapping or duplicative
of any of the other 46 contracts. Two analysts independently reviewed
each contract and then came to agreement regarding the presence of
overlap and duplication.
We could not determine the full extent of duplication or overlap in the
department, because the FPDS-NG data system captures only a portion
of the total R&D activities occurring at DHS and we did not review the
documentation for, or conduct a random sample of, all 15,000 R&D
contract actions. However, the results from our analysis illustrate overlap
and the potential for unnecessary duplication. We also used our past
work on fragmentation, overlap, and duplication across the federal
government; Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government;
3
We did not interview officials responsible for the one contract in our sample issued by the
Coast Guard, because they were unable to locate the contract.
Page 34
GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
and our prior reports to assess DHS’s coordination of R&D across the
department. 4
We assessed the reliability of the data we used by reconciling the data
with published data and applicable quality control procedures to maintain
the integrity of the data, and interviewing DHS budget and procurement
officials responsible for overseeing the data systems. In addition, we
reviewed available FPDS-NG documentation, such as the user manual,
and OMB guidance to identify related quality control mechanisms. We
also assessed the reliability of data on DOE’s national laboratory work for
others by interviewing DOE officials responsible for compiling and
reporting those data. We concluded that these data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2011 through
September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the
audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We
believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
4
2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation,
Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28,
2012); Follow-up on 2011 Report: Status of Actions Taken to Reduce Duplication,
Overlap, and Fragmentation, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-453SP
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012); Employment for People with Disabilities: Little Is
Known about the Effectiveness of Fragmented and Overlapping Programs, GAO-12-677
(Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012); Justice Grant Programs: DOJ Should Do More to
Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication and Enhance Program Assessment,
GAO-12-517 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012); GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (11/99); and
GAO-06-15.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Appendix II: Federal Government Definitions
of Research and Development
Appendix II: Federal Government Definitions of
Research and Development
Source
Basic research
Applied research
Development
Office of
Management and
Budget
Systematic study directed
toward fuller knowledge or
understanding of the
fundamental aspects of
phenomena and observable
facts without specific
applications toward processes or
products.
Systematic study to gain knowledge or
understanding necessary to determine
the means by which a recognized and
specific need may be met.
Systematic application of knowledge
or understanding, directed toward
the production of useful materials,
devices, and systems or methods,
including design, development, and
improvement of prototypes and new
processes to meet specific
requirements.
Federal Financial
Accounting
Standards (FFAS)
Systematic study to gain
knowledge or understanding of
the fundamental aspects of
phenomena and observable
facts without specific
applications toward processes or
products.
Systematic study to gain knowledge or
understanding necessary for
determining the means by which a
recognized and specific need may be
met.
Systematic use of the knowledge
and understanding gained from
research for the production of useful
materials, devices, systems, or
methods, including the design and
development of prototypes and
processes.
Federal Acquisitions
Regulation (FAR)
Research directed toward
increasing knowledge in science
with the primary aim being a
fuller knowledge or
understanding of the subject
under study, rather than any
practical application of that
knowledge.
The effort that (1) normally follows
basic research, but may not be
severable from the related basic
research; (2) attempts to determine
and exploit the potential of scientific
discoveries or improvements in
technology, materials, processes,
methods, devices, or techniques; and
(3) attempts to advance the state of
the art.
Systematic use of scientific and
technical knowledge in the design,
development, testing, or evaluation
of a potential new product or service
(or of an improvement in an existing
product or service) to meet specific
performance requirements or
objectives.
National Science
Foundation (NSF)
Survey of Federal
Funds for R&D
Systematic study directed
toward fuller knowledge or
understanding of the
fundamental aspects of
phenomena and observable
facts without specific
applications toward processes or
products.
Systematic study to gain knowledge or
understanding necessary to determine
the means by which a recognized and
specific need may be met.
Systematic application of knowledge
or understanding, directed toward
the production of useful materials,
devices, and systems or methods,
including design, development, and
improvement of prototypes and new
processes to meet specific
requirements.
Department of
Defense Research,
Development,
Testing, and
Evaluation (RDT&E)
Budget Activities (17)
(1) Systematic study directed
toward greater knowledge or
understanding of the
fundamental aspects of
phenomena and of observable
facts without specific
applications toward processes or
precuts in mind. It is farsighted
high payoff research that
provides the basis for
technological progress.
(2) Systematic study to understand the
means to meet a recognized and
specific need. Systematic expansion
and application of knowledge to
develop useful materials, devices, and
systems or methods. May be oriented,
ultimately, toward the design,
development, and improvement of
prototypes and new processes to
meet general mission area
requirements. Applied research may
translate promising basic research into
solutions for broadly defined military
needs, short of system development.
DOD divides development into 5
budget activities:
(3) Advanced Technology
Development (ATD)
(4) Advanced Component
Development and Prototypes
(ACD&P)
(5) System Development and
Demonstration (SDD)
(6) RDT&E Management Support
(7) Operational System
Development
Source: National Science Foundation and the Office of Management and Budget.
Page 36
GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Source: National Science Foundation and the Office of Management and Budget
Appendix III: Department of Homeland
Security Research and Development
Obligations, Fiscal Year 2011
Appendix III: Department of Homeland Security
Research and Development Obligations, Fiscal
Year 2011
Obligations
DHS R&D components
Reimbursements to
S&T
FPDS-NG R&D
contracts
DOE national
laboratories
Component total
R&D obligations
$78,678,160
$93,427,396
$172,105,556
28,529,786
95,427,232
123,959,446
5,876,014
100,000
5,976,014
2,429
113,083,959
188,954,628
302,041,016
4,359,000
705,926
82,882,861
87,947,787
17,593,000
754,979
25,109,607
43,457,585
450,000
8,732,100
28,895,596
38,077,696
15,143,000
5,594,421
1,833,858
22,571,279
Science and Technology Directorate
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
$2,429
United States Coast Guard R&D Center
Subtotal
Other DHS components
National Protection and Programs
Directorate
Customs and Border Protection
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Transportation Security Administration
United States Coast Guard-non R&DCenter
22,046,643
22,046,643
Office of Health Affairs
390,000
U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement
1,275,977
9,246,228
10,912,205
10,534,536
10,534,536
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
7,026,000
7,026,000
Headquarters Operations
4,429,000
4,429,000
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
2,716,215
2,716,215
United States Secret Service
88,000
1,816,506
Operations Coordination and Planning
Federal Protective Service
250,000
2,154,506
2,000,000
2,000,000
850,000
Intelligence and Operations
Subtotal
Total DHS R&D obligations
850,000
380,230
380,230
49,478,000
54,557,532
151,068,150
255,103,682
$49,480,429
$167,641,491
$340,022,777
$557,144,698
Sources: GAO analysis of DHS budget documents and the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation.
Notes:
1. Totals may not add up due to rounding.
2. We analyzed DHS contract obligations coded as basic research, applied research and exploratory
development, and advanced development in the FPDS-NG.
3. DHS conducted a data call to all components for obligations made to the Department of Energy
National Laboratories.
3. We omitted from U.S. Customs and Border Protection FPDS-NG R&D contracts a deobligation of
$12 million for the SBInet program.
4. For the analysis of FPDS-NG R&D contract obligations, we isolated contract obligations made from
the Coast Guard’s R&D Center and the rest of Coast Guard. We were not able to do this for the
national laboratory or reimbursement data because obligations were identified only at the component
level.
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Appendix IV: Role of Research and
Development in Supporting the Department
of Homeland Security Acquisition Life Cycle
Appendix IV: Role of Research and
Development in Supporting the Department of
Homeland Security Acquisition Life Cycle
Page 38
GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Appendix V: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security
Appendix V: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security
Page 39
GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Appendix V: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security
Page 40
GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Appendix V: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security
Page 41
GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
David C. Maurer, (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov
Staff
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Chris Currie, Assistant Director,
and Gary Malavenda, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment.
Emily Gunn and Margaret McKenna made significant contributions to this
report. Also contributing to this report were Katherine Davis, Michele
Fejfar, Eric Hauswirth, Carol Henn, Richard Hung, Julia Kennon, Tracey
King, Nate Tranquilli, Katherine Trimble, and Sarah Veale.
(441009)
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GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
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