Desperate for Democracy
Rony Hamaui
Università Cattolica of Milan
CEO Mediofactoring
Boston College
The anomaly of Arab autocracies
 Until the mid-seventies most countries in the world were
governed by authoritarian regimes
 In years to follow, many countries faced an evolution
towards democracy, including the collapse of the Soviet
Empire, many dictatorships in Latin America, Asia and
even Africa.
 This is what Samuel Huntington called the third wave of
democratization
 The Middle East has not experienced a similar evolution
Source: , Center for Systemic Peace “Global Conflict Trends”, 2011
Percentage of non-free countries by region
120
1973
100
2011
80
60
40
20
0
Americhe
Asia-pacifico
Source: Freedom House, 2011
Europa centro orientale
MENA
Africa sub-sahariana
Europa occidentale
The anomaly involved all kinds of freedom
Political
 election
 pluralism
 government effectiveness
 Civilian
 freedom of expression
 freedom of association
 principles of legality
 personal freedoms
 Economics
Freedom in different geographical areas
World
Western Europe
Nord and e Sud
America
Eastern Europe
Asia Pacific
Sub-Saharan
Africa
MENA
Election
7.7
11.8
10.4
7.6
7.4
5.6
3.0
Political pluralism
10.1
15.3
12.9
10.0
9.9
7.6
4.3
Government effectiveness
6.4
11.3
7.9
6.0
6.2
4.7
2.8
Freedom of expression
11.3
15.4
13.9
11.0
10.8
9.7
6.4
Freedom of expression
7.8
11.8
9.4
7.9
7.4
6.3
3.6
Principles of legality
8.4
14.6
9.7
8.3
8.3
6.2
4.0
personal freedoms
9.7
14.9
11.5
10.1
9.8
6.6
6.1
Source: Freedom House, 2011
1. What accounts for this anomaly?
2. Almost two years after the start of the riots, what is
the situation in Arab countries?
8
1. What explains this anomaly?
1. Socio-economic development i.e. the "modernization
theory"?
2. Raw materials i.e. “rentier state”?
3. Institutions i.e. the jokes of history and geography?
4. Is Islam an obstacle to democracy?
5. Ethnical and cultural fragmentation?
Individuals Muslims and Muslim-majority countries value democracy more (or
at least in the same manner) than other people do: Rowley and Smith (2009)
Maselmad van Hoorn (2011)
1. Being democratic: How rich should one be?
 There is a vast amount of literature that shows the
relationship between wealth/education and democracy:
Aristotle, de Condorcet, Weber, Bryce, Lipset, Barro,
Benhabib, Corvalan, Spiegel..
 The richest countries are also more likely to become
democratic when they are not and are less likely to become
authoritarian.
 More unclear is the evidence that democracy causes
economic development: Barro, Tavares, J., and R. Wacziarg,
Rodrick
Democracy and per capita income
8,00
7,00
Indice di democrazia
6,00
5,00
Libano 9,39
4,00
Kuwait 11,04
Marocco 8,16
3,00
Giordania 8,51
Algeria 8,77
Yemen 7,85
Egitto 8,48
Tunisia 8,74
2,00
Bahrain 10,15
Oman 10,09
Iran 9,29
Iraq 8,39
Emirati Arabi 2,80
Qatar 2,80
Arabia Saudita 10,08
Siria 8,23
1,00
Libia 9,84
0,00
5,00
6,00
7,00
8,00
9,00
Reddito Pro Capite (in LOG)
10,00
11,00
12,00
 Almost all Arab countries seem to have reached the
level of per capita income necessary to get
democratic structures (3500-5000 US$)
 This is particularly true for countries producing oil
and gas
 Of course income distribution and cultural level are
also relevant
2. The rentier: ‘Oil is the curse’
 Many authors demonstrate how large natural resources
(non-agricultural) hinder not only economic development
(Dutch disease), but democracy as well (Mahdavy-Balawi,
Huntington, Ross, Barro…)
 Causes:
1. low taxes: no taxation without representation
2. high public expenditure: grants, subsidies
3. heavy spending on defense and security
4. large capital investment, lack of commitment to human
resources
Democracy level and oil income per capita in the
Middle East countries (1960-2002)
Source: Ross, Michael. 2009. “Oil and Democracy Revisited.” UCLA.
3. The jokes of history…
 Around 800 Europe is economically and politically weak.
The Christian emperor offers Feudal lords greater political
autonomy in exchange for an army. This mechanism ensures
political stability and limits the authoritarian power of the
sovereign. The birth of a rural aristocracy will prove to be
crucial for the emergence of democratic parliaments
(Montesquieu, North e Weingast, Acemoglu..)
 The Muslim sultans were richer and well organized. This
allowed them to pay an army of slaves: the Mamalucchi.
This mechanism favors the survival of authoritarian and
centralized structures (Blaydes and Chaney)
 Autocracies of today depend on the institutions of yesterday
Institutional persistence
…and geography
 The Arabian Peninsula consists of arid lands that no
empire has ever truly wanted to conquer.
 They have never become colonies but protectorates.
 No one has ever wanted to export their own
institutions. In fact, the West often opposed the
processes of democratization
 Tribal structure where the main families share
power.
 Strong ideological and religious cohesion.
 Oil discoveries created another mechanism of social
control
4. Is Islam an obstacle to democracy and
growth?
This question is important because:
1. Few Muslim countries can be defined as democratic
2. Many Arab constitutions make reference to Sharia
3. Muslims are more pious and observant
Weber against Backer
(obstacle to development ≠ religious contiguity )
Democratic and non-democratic Muslim countries
NON DEMOCRATIC
Afghanistan
Djibouti
Algeria
Egitto
Arbaiian
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Gambia
Guinea
Iran
Iraq
Giordania
Kuwait
Libia
Arabia Saudita
Maldive
Somalia
Sudan
Marocco
Siria
Tajikistan
Tunisia
Pakistan
Turkrnenistan
Emirati Arabi Uniti
Qatar
Uzbekistan
Yemen
Totale
DEMOCRATIC
% della pop musulmana
99
97.78
99.54
89
93.41
81.16
88.30
94.89
85.01
99.57
97.03
96.59
75.25
97.06
96.68
100
99.86
73
99.83
86.02
85.10
99.48
94.92
86.91
96.02
95
88
99.89
28
Indonesia
Comoros
Senegal
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Turchia
Totale
% della pop musulmana
87.21
99.31
91.99
89.99
99.25
88.69
99.76
7
No one in Mena
Indices of religiosity
Percentage of people who:
-consider religion very important
Germany
France
UK
Italy US Turkey Egypt Morocco Iran
Jordan
Iraq
11.2
13.0
21.0
34.4 47.4
74.7
95.4
90.6
78.5
94.5
96.1
9.8
11.2
23.3
33.8 57.8
76.2
97.0
87.5
79.7
97.1
91.8
42.9
46.9
48.7
88.0 72.1
82.6
92.5
91.8
83.7
92.2
54.7
8.1
7.2
17.3
31.5 36.0
34.2
55.7
N.D
35.5
92.8
32.8
-consider God very important in their life
-considers himself a religious person
-took part in a religious ceremony at least
once a week
Source: World Value Survey 2005
Is Islam an obstacle to democracy and growth?
From a theological-dogmatic perspective Islam stands for:
1. Less prone to complex dogmatic formulations and more attentive
to legal behavioral provisions (orthodoxy → ortoprassia).
2. Sharia law, has unlimited value to the sphere of the intimate
relationship between man and God, but is also the principles of
good conduct in all areas of public life of the umma
3. The absolute centrality of the group defined as family, clan,
ethnic group.
4. The constant reminder of equality and solidarity.
5. The strong relationship with tradition in every field of human
existence; aptitude to perpetuate, rather than innovating the
constant reminder of the "golden age".
Is Islam an obstacle to democracy and growth?
From an economic prospect Islam stands for:
1. Prohibition of interest payments: riba. Originally common
to all religions.
2. Obstacle to the establishment of financial institutions and
corporate: temporary partnership was the typical form.
3. Centrality of the group, clan, extended family.
4. The very egalitarian inheritance system has prevented the
accumulation of capital (Kuran).
5. Ban the printing of all books and journals: Firman of 1483
the caliph Beyazit II, revoked, with the exception of the
Koran, in 1727 by Achemet III. The first printers only came
into operation at the beginning of 1800
Is Islam an obstacle to democracy and growth?
But …
1. Today, these impediments are no longer in operation: there are large banks and
large corporations
2. The Prophet Muhammad was a successful merchant who had more sympathy for
the rich than for Jesus
3. Wealth is seen as a sign of good will
4. Private property is protected
5. Islam is seen as a social contract between the rich merchants and the poor
disenfranchised (Michalopoulos, Naghavi and Prarolo)
6. For many centuries, Islamic countries were among the most advanced in the
world in terms of living standards, scientific and technological progress .... then
the decay ... when Muslims became the majority (Chaney)
7. Also in political terms "the Caliph of the ancient becomes the Sultan; the primus
inter pares becomes the state itself, embodying in itself the law, the
administration and the executive" (Backer)
The empirical evidence on growth
Islam is an obstacle to growth
Porta, Lopez, Shleifer e Vishny,(1997)
Barro e McCleary (2003)
Guiso, Sapienza e Zingale (2002)
Islam is not an obstacle to growth
Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer e Miller, (2004)
Noland (2003)
Gheeraert (2008)
Islam is neutral
Pryor
(2007)
23
The empirical evidence on democracy
Islam is an obstacle to democracy
Barro e McCleary (1999)
Porta, Lopez, Shleifer e Vishny,(1999)
Fish (2002)
Rowley, e Smith (2009) ,
Maseland e van Hoorn (2009)
Potrafke (2012).
Islam is not an obstacle to democracy
Noland (2003) Noland (2008)
Islam is neutral
Pryor
(2007)
24
Conclusions
 Neither analysis of doctrine, nor historical and econometric
analysis are able to give definitive answers.
 It would seem, however, that Islamic countries present
very different socio-economic situations that are dependent
upon geographical location and their historical
background.
 Indonesia is a typical case that has managed to engage the
wagon of the Asian Tigers, and that of Turkey, which
maintains strong ties with Europe
5. The age-old divisions in the Islamic world
• Ethnic, linguistic and cultural fragmentation can be a major
obstacle to economic growth and creation of democratic
institutions.
– More difficult to sign a social contract
– Obstacle to a more equitable distribution of income
– Minor mutual trust
Easterly e Levine;
La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer e Vishny;
Barro;
Alesina A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat e R.
Wacziarg
The age-old divisions in the Islamic world
• Apparent homogeneity of the Arab world:
–
–
–
–
–
a strong majority religion, Muslim
one Semitic language, Arabic, with Iran as the clear exception
a relatively homogeneous geography;
a population, the Arabs, of Semitic origin;
and above all a culture shaped over fourteen centuries by the
Muslim empire (with the Umayyads and Abbasids dynasties) and
then by the Ottoman Empire, which collapsed less than a century
ago.
Distribution of population by religious affiliation
The map of Islamic schools
Map of Arabic dialects
The fragmentation in different geographical areas
Latin America
Sub-Saharan Africa
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
South Est Asia
Middle East
Ethnical
0.405
0.658
0.366
0.177
0.306
0.453
Linguistic
0.179
0.625
0.320
0.196
0.353
0.330
Religious
0.442
0.496
0.491
0.311
0.457
0.346
Source: A. Alesina, A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat and R. Wacziarg, Fractionalization, (2002),
Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper Number 1959
The fragmentation in different countries
Etnica
0.3394
Algeria
Arabia Saudita 0.1800
0.5021
Bahrein
0.1836
Egitto
0.6684
Iran
0.3689
Iraq
0.5926
Giordania
0.6604
Kuwait
0.1314
Libano
0.7920
Libia
0.4841
Marocco
0.4373
Omar
0.7456
Qatar
0.5399
Siria
0.0394
Tunisia
0.6252
UAE
Yemen
Linguistica
0.4427
0.0949
0.4344
0.0237
0.7462
0.3694
0.0396
0.3444
0.1312
0.0758
0.4683
0.3567
0.4800
0.1817
0.0124
0.4874
0.0080
Religiosa
0.0091
0.1270
0.5528
0.1979
0.1152
0.4844
0.0659
0.6745
0.7886
0.0570
0.0035
0.4322
0.0950
0.4310
0.0104
0.3310
0.0023
Source: A. Alesina, A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat and R. Wacziarg, Fractionalization, (2002),
Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper Number 1959
Looking to the future
 The riots have taken on different characteristics
 Civil war with thousands dead in Libya, Syria and Yemen
 Bloody demonstrations in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain
 Almost bloodless demonstrations in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan,
Kuwait
(for a Political Economics Model that considers fragmentation and oil
revenue see Roland 2012)
 The Arab uprisings are nothing new
 Every year over the past 60 years, there has been at least a "change or
attempt to change the government" in an Arab country (Menaldo 2011)
 In some of those years there were as many as five insurrections, with
three remaining the yearly average
33
Number of uprisings in countries MENA:
1950 - 2006
34
Soure: Victor Menaldo, 2011“The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs”,University of Washington working
The monarchies are more stable
 The monarchies have registered a % of revolutions significantly
lower than that seen in republican countries.
 In fact the monarchies manage to:
 create a better political culture that promotes consensus and reassures the
elite
 better coordinate the interests of the major families, ethnic groups.
 create more effective mechanisms for the distribution of income (oil)
 provide mutual aid (GCC)
 use religion as an element of legitimacy
 the kings of Morocco and Jordan claim to be the descendants of the
Prophet (Sharifs)
 those of Saudi Arabia bearing the title of custodians of their sacred
mosques
35
Constitutional regime in MENA countries
from 1950 or from the date of their independence
MONARCHIE
Bahrain
Giordania
Kuwait
Marocco
Oman
Qatar
Arabia Saudita
Emirati Arabi Uniti
NON MONARCHIE
Algeria
Egitto (dal 1952)
Iran (dal 1979)
Iraq (dal 1958)
Libano
Libia (dal1969)
Tunisia
Yemen (dal 1962)
Source: Wright (2008), Goemans et al. (2009).
36
The oil monarchies are even more reluctant towards
democratic development
 This does not mean that the Gulf states are not affected by the
uprisings in the Arab world. They were:
 In 1952, when Nasser overthrew King Faruq and proclaimed a Egyptian
Republic : Saudi Arabia was the biggest opponent to those movements
 In 1979, the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution which led the Saudi
monarchs to support the Salafists more strongly and invigorate the
opposition between Sunnis and Shiites ("Arab Cold War")
 Today, they have:
 given money to their citizens and increased public spending: $130 billion in SA
 violently suppressed the riots
 financially assisted ($5 billion) Jordan and Morocco’s proposal to enter the GCC (Gulf
Cooperation Council)
 Intervened militarily in Bahrain under the banner of GCC
Nothing has happened in terms of greater freedom
37
The use of violence
 The civil wars rarely end quickly, lasting 6 years on average, in some cases
lasting up to 20 years
 The probability that a democratic regime emerges from a civil hovers
between 35% and 70%.
 The probability of these countries becoming democratic is higher





most are rich
fewer are exporters of raw materials, oil in particular
fewer are fragmented
more wars are inspired by political factors
fewer wars are waged for ethnic, cultural or religious reasons
 Democracies emerging from civil wars are on average less respectful of
civil and political rights (Cervellati, Fortunato and Sunde (2011))
38
Civil liberties around periods of transition to
democracy
39
Source: Matteo Cervellati, Piergiuseppe Fortunato e Uwe Sunde, 2011, “Democratization and Civil Liberties: The Role of Violence
During the Transition” IZA DP No. 5555
40
The Arab revolutions after almost two years
– The area as a whole has not made much progress
– Significant improvements are observed in Tunisia (now
partly free), Libya and Egypt. Less marked in Morocco and
Jordan
– The situation appears to be stable in Iraq and Oman
– Deterioration occuring in all other countries. Particularly
marked in Bahrain, Yemen and Syria
– Sharia has become the legal basis for many countries
(Kuran Lusting 2012)
In terms of freedom, the Arab countries are still
an anomaly in the international view
41