S/2000/455
United Nations
Security Council
Distr.: General
19 May 2000
Original: English
Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
I. Introduction
1.
By paragraph 22 of resolution 1289 (2000) of 7
February 2000, the Security Council requested me to
continue to report to the Council every 45 days to
provide, inter alia, assessments of security conditions
on the ground so that troop levels and the tasks to be
performed by the United Nations Mission in Sierra
Leone (UNAMSIL) can be kept under review. The
present report is submitted in accordance with that
request and covers developments since my third report
on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone issued
on 7 March 2000 (S/2000/186). The present report also
contains short-term recommendations for
the
stabilization of the current situation in Sierra Leone,
including for an expansion of the capacity of
UNAMSIL, beyond the level of 13,000 military
personnel authorized by the Security Council in its
resolution 1299 (2000) of 19 May 2000.
II. Political developments
2.
During the reporting period, the peace process
suffered a very serious setback as the result of the
recent unprovoked armed attacks on United Nations
peacekeepers, the detention of several hundred United
Nations personnel, and the destruction of disarmament
and demobilization camps by fighters of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Regrettably, those
developments in May 2000, which are described in
section VII of this report, overshadowed the limited
progress achieved in the implementation of the Lomé
Peace Agreement through a series of meetings of the
parties and international stakeholders.
00-40722 (E) 190500
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3.
Prior to those events, President Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah convened on 9 March a special meeting of the
National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration attended by the leader of RUF,
Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council/ex-Sierra Leone Army (AFRC/
ex-SLA), Johnny Paul Koroma, the Deputy Defence
Minister and Civil Defence Force Coordinator, Chief
Hinga Norman, UNAMSIL and the Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS). At that meeting, all faction
leaders agreed to grant unhindered access to all parts of
the country to UNAMSIL, the humanitarian
community and the entire population; to relinquish the
territory they occupied and allow the Government to
have full control over every part of the country; and to
allow disarmament to take place in selected areas in the
Eastern and Northern Provinces where disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) facilities were
already in place, and thereafter in the rest of the
country as facilities were made available. As a result of
these efforts, the number of checkpoints maintained by
the factions was reduced, and UNAMSIL was able to
deploy to the RUF stronghold of Kailahun on 16
March. However, RUF fighters continued to obstruct
UNAMSIL deployment to Koidu in the Kono District
and the number of RUF ex-combatants reporting for
disarmament remained very low. In addition, some
checkpoints manned by the factions remained in place
and continued to hinder movement by the humanitarian
community and the general population.
4.
On 20 March, at Freetown, ECOWAS convened a
verification meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee of the
Principal Parties to the Lomé Agreement to follow up
on the decisions reached at the special meeting on
S/2000/455
Sierra Leone held at Bamako on 1 March, which was
covered in my third report. At the meeting in Freetown,
the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, stated that he accepted
that UNAMSIL was the “neutral peacekeeping force”
provided for in the Lomé Peace Agreement
(S/1999/777, annex). This was considered a positive
development, since RUF had previously questioned the
presence of UNAMSIL peacekeepers in Sierra Leone.
5.
The meeting on 20 March of the principal parties
also set up a committee, headed by my Special
Representative, Oluyemi Adeniji, to carry out an
investigation into the seizure in January of weapons
and equipment from Kenyan and Guinean troops by
RUF and from the Kenyan contingent by AFRC/exSLA. The investigation committee held its first
meeting on 31 March, but RUF failed to attend on the
pretext that it was not involved in the seizure of the
Guinean weapons, despite evidence to the contrary.
The three seized Guinean armoured personnel carriers
have been recovered, but the other weapons and
equipment have yet to be returned.
6.
The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping
Operations visited Sierra Leone from 19 to 21 March to
assess the operations of UNAMSIL and to convey to
the parties the strong commitment of the United
Nations to assist them in implementing the Lomé
Agreement. He held meetings with UNAMSIL senior
staff, President Kabbah and other government officials,
Mr. Koroma, Mr. Sankoh, United Nations agencies and
representatives of civil society. The Under-SecretaryGeneral also visited Port Loko and Makeni, where he
inspected
UNAMSIL
troops,
disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration camps and centres for
former child combatants. He also visited Bamako,
where he met with the President of Mali, Alpha Oumar
Konaré, current Chairman of ECOWAS.
7.
At the initiative of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, a high-level donors
conference on Sierra Leone was convened in London
on 27 March, to affirm political support for the peace
process and mobilize additional resources. The
conference was co-chaired by the United Kingdom, the
World Bank and the United Nations, which was
represented by the Deputy Secretary-General. New
pledges totalling some US$ 70 million were made, to
support the peace process, in particular the process of
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as well
as humanitarian assistance. The conference reaffirmed
the international community’s continued and strong
2
support for the implementation of the Lomé Peace
Agreement and sent a strong message to the factions to
fulfil their obligations under the Agreement. In
particular, the rebels were called upon to put an end to
the continuing human rights abuses, to disarm their
combatants immediately, to release women and
children still detained, and to allow safe and
unhindered access for humanitarian assistance to all
areas of the country. The participants also discussed the
issue of elections and undertook to help to organize
free and fair elections in Sierra Leone, as provided for
under the Lomé Peace Agreement, on the clear
understanding that elections would not be possible
without significant progress on disarmament. I
commend the Government of the United Kingdom for
taking this important initiative.
8.
During the reporting period, some progress has
also been made with regard to the functioning of the
various institutions envisaged in the Lomé Agreement.
However, this continued to be hampered by a lack of
resources. The Commission for the Management of
Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and
Development, chaired by Mr. Sankoh, did not produce
a plan of action and there also appeared to be a lack of
political consensus on its role vis-à-vis existing
ministries. The Commission for the Consolidation of
Peace led by Mr. Koroma, however, made a good
beginning and organized several meetings of the parties
and other stakeholders to promote reconciliation and
discuss ways of moving the peace process forward.
From 18 to 23 April, the Commission for the
Consolidation of Peace convened a commanders peace
conference at Bo to facilitate face-to-face meetings
among the commanders of the factions and to build
confidence and promote peace. The conference was
well attended by all factions.
9.
Mr. Sankoh appeared before the Parliament of
Sierra Leone on 15 March to answer questions on
issues impeding the peace process. All political parties
represented in Parliament strongly criticized Mr.
Sankoh for impeding the peace process. In his
response, Mr. Sankoh asserted that he was committed
to the peace process and attributed the current obstacles
to progress, in particular the slow pace of disarmament,
to the weakness of the National Commission on
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; the
lack
of
transportation
facilities,
inadequate
disarmament,
demobilization
and
reintegration
facilities; and to unattractive incentives for the ex-
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combatants. However, Mr. Sankoh claimed that he was
ready to work with Parliament.
10. At various bilateral and multilateral meetings
during the reporting period, Mr. Sankoh and other RUF
leaders complained about certain aspects of the Lomé
Agreement that had not been implemented.
Specifically, they mentioned the fact that no RUF
members had been appointed to positions in parastatal
enterprises, the diplomatic service and any other public
sector, under article IV of the Lomé Agreement. They
also complained that too much attention was being
focused on the disarmament provisions to the neglect
of the political provisions of the Agreement. While
there can be little doubt that the lack of cooperation on
the part of RUF and Mr. Sankoh in particular was the
main obstacle to the effective implementation of the
Lomé Agreement, it is also true that the situation was
not helped by the slow pace of the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration programme, as well as
various political, administrative and other problems.
11. During the reporting period, there were
unconfirmed reports of the formation of a new faction
by a former RUF commander, Sam Bockarie, who was
said to be engaged in the recruitment and training of
rebels in Liberia. The Government of Liberia has
denied these reports. On 22 March, the Government of
Sierra Leone arrested 16 persons suspected of
organizing a group of dissidents to invade Liberia. The
arrests were carried out in the area of the Gola Forest,
close to the Liberian border.
12. During consultations of the heads of State of the
Mano River Union held at Bamako on 2 March, the
President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, was requested to
become personally involved in resolving the obstacles
confronting the Sierra Leone peace process. Pursuant
to that decision, President Taylor extended an
invitation to Mr. Sankoh to visit Monrovia on 12
March for consultations on the peace process.
However, Mr. Sankoh insisted that he would not travel
until the Security Council lifted the travel ban imposed
on him by its resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998.
13. On 18 March, in a welcome development a
ministerial meeting of the Mano River Union member
States was held at Monrovia. The meeting was
followed up by a meeting of the Ministers responsible
for Security, Internal Affairs, Defence and Justice in
Freetown on 17 April. At that meeting, agreement was
reached to set up a Joint Security Committee of the
Mano River Union, which would include a technical
committee to advise the Joint Security Committee and
joint border security and confidence-building units.
The recommendations were submitted for consideration
by the Union at its summit meeting, which was held at
Conakry on 8 May. At that meeting, which was also
attended by President Konaré, the situation in Sierra
Leone was also discussed (see para. 76 below).
III. Security situation before
1 May 2000
14. Prior to the serious attacks on United nations
peacekeepers, which erupted on 1 May 2000 and which
are described in section VII below, the overall security
situation had improved gradually as UNAMSIL troops
stepped up their patrols and deployed to new locations
in the provinces. However, in the areas still under the
control of rebel groups, particularly the RUF and
AFRC/ex-SLA strongholds, the security situation
remained precarious and there were several serious
incidents,
some
involving
United
Nations
peacekeepers.
15. On 21 March, a serious violation of the ceasefire
occurred in the Bafodia-Kabala area, where fighting
erupted between elements of RUF and AFRC/ex-SLA.
UNAMSIL deployed military observers and two
platoons from the Kenyan battalion to the area to calm
the situation. Intermittent fighting continued until 30
March when the AFRC/ex-SLA commander agreed to
the UNAMSIL proposal to disarm. To avert tension, a
total of 292 AFRC/ex-SLA combatants were disarmed
on 30 March and transported to the Lungi
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camp
together with their dependants. A further 139 were
disarmed on 2 and 3 April and also transferred to that
camp. Altogether, some 900 persons were moved. A
company from the Kenyan battalion and a team of
military observers were subsequently deployed at
Kabala, but had to be moved back to Makeni to
strengthen UNAMSIL positions there after the RUF
attacks in early May. In another incident on 8 April,
unidentified persons fired several rounds at Ghanaian
UNAMSIL troops at Kenema. The troops returned fire
and the attack ceased.
16. On 22 April, RUF staged a demonstration against
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
programme at Makeni, in which about 40 armed RUF
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S/2000/455
fighters participated. That group also set up a
checkpoint close to the entrance of the reception centre
of the Makeni disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration camp. The RUF checkpoint was removed
the same day under pressure from UNAMSIL. At that
time, RUF fighters did not hinder the movement of
UNAMSIL or personnel of the United Kingdom
Department for International Development, which is
providing the logistic support to the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process. However,
RUF did harass local Sierra Leonean disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration personnel and forced
them to leave the camp.
17. Also on 22 April, a group of some 20 RUF
fighters prevented UNAMSIL military observers from
entering
the
premises
of
the
disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration reception centre of
Magburaka. They also alleged that UNAMSIL soldiers,
who were providing security at that location, had taken
some ammunition belonging to RUF. A small-scale
scuffle ensued, after which UNAMSIL troops at the
site decided to withdraw temporarily to avoid
escalation. The Makeni/Magburaka area remained very
tense and subsequently became the scene of the first
attacks by RUF on UNAMSIL troops.
18. On 28 April, a scuffle between ECOMOG troops
and ex-SLA members over a stolen vehicle led to
several shots being fired, with one ex-SLA fighter
killed and another seriously wounded. Several ex-SLA
members immediately took to the streets to protest
about this incident. The situation caused considerable
tension in Freetown, but was brought under control by
UNAMSIL. Mr. Koroma helped to restore calm.
Mr. Sankoh, however, gave a press conference on 1
May during which he stated that UNAMSIL had shot
the ex-combatants on 28 April in Freetown. This
inciting statement led to an increase of tension between
RUF and UNAMSIL throughout the country.
19. A serious incident occurred on 30 April, during
which a soldier of the Nigerian contingent in
UNAMSIL was shot and seriously wounded when he
refused to surrender his weapon to a large group of
armed men (presumably ex-SLA) in the Occra Hills
area. His unit of five men was outnumbered and
ultimately forced to surrender their weapons. The
injured soldier was evacuated to Nigeria. A protest
about the incident has been made to Mr. Koroma.
4
20. Other ceasefire violations during the reporting
period included serious abuses against civilians in the
Port Loko and Occra Hills areas, the maintenance of
illegal roadblocks by all factions, and other obstruction
of peacekeeping operations, particularly by RUF
elements. Tension in the Occra Hills area subsided
somewhat after the Government announced that
AFRC/ex-SLA combatants would be able to join the
restructured army, if they met certain criteria. Another
contributing factor to the decrease in tension was the
payment by the Government of transitional safety
allowances to ex-combatants who had disarmed under
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
programme.
21. The Joint Monitoring Commission continued to
hold its weekly meetings under the chairmanship of
UNAMSIL to address ceasefire violations. The
Commission continued to press the factions to comply
with article XIX of the Lomé Peace Agreement which
requires them to disclose the number and location of
their combatants. While the Civil Defence Forces and
AFRC/ex-SLA have furnished this information, RUF
provided only partial information on 25 April. United
Nations military observers convened several meetings
of the district-level ceasefire monitoring committees in
areas where UNAMSIL is deployed.
22. During the period under review, UNAMSIL
contingents destroyed unstable ammunition found in
various areas, as well as that collected during the
disarmament process, the latter in close coordination
with the National Commission on Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration. Some damaged
bridges in the Eastern Province have been replaced or
repaired by UNAMSIL troops deployed in the area.
23. Since my last report, UNAMSIL troops have
deployed to new areas, including the RUF stronghold
of Kailahun, as well as to Zimmi, Joru, Kambia, Mange
and Kabala (see the attached map). Although the
deployment of UNAMSIL troops to Kono district was
obstructed by RUF, military observers and a Kenyan
platoon from Magburaka sent frequent patrols to
Koidu. The deployment of UNAMSIL was
subsequently adjusted in view of the RUF attacks. The
strength of the military component of UNAMSIL as at
15 May had reached 9,251 military personnel,
including 260 military observers (see annex).
24. In accordance with the understanding reached
with the Government of Nigeria, two Nigerian
S/2000/455
battalions and a tank company serving with ECOMOG
were brought under United Nations command and
deployed in Freetown for a 90-day period. On 2 May,
the remaining ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone were
repatriated after handing over their security functions
to UNAMSIL peacekeepers, in particular in Freetown.
IV. Progress towards major objectives
in the peace process
25. In my last report (S/2000/186), I outlined a
number of important objectives or “steps ahead” to
help define priorities and the responsibilities of all
concerned and to provide the international community
with benchmarks by which to measure progress. These
main steps were endorsed by the Security Council at its
4111th meeting. This section describes the progress
made during the reporting period towards these
objectives.
Early disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of ex-combatants
26. The disarmament and demobilization process,
which was making slow but steady progress, came to a
virtual standstill after hostilities erupted early in May.
As at 15 May, a total of 24,042 ex-combatants had been
disarmed: 4,949 from RUF; 10,055 from AFRC/exSLA; and 9,038 from the Civil Defence Forces. The
total figure of ex-combatants includes 1,701 child
combatants who surrendered without weapons. The
number and quality of weapons surrendered remain an
issue of concern. To date, 10,840 weapons have been
surrendered.
27. Following the attacks by RUF on UNAMSIL and
its movements in the direction of Freetown, many exSierra Leone Army and Civil Defence Force
scombatants have taken up arms and are likely to
remain armed at least for as long as RUF continues its
attacks. While these actions on the part of the ex-SLA
and the Civil Defence Forces would be understandable
in the present context, it is clear that this development,
together with the destruction of disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration facilities by RUF,
could
seriously
complicate
the
disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration programme, which
remains a crucial element of the peace process in Sierra
Leone. There is also concern about the fate of those
combatants, especially children, who had voluntarily
joined the programme and would now be vulnerable to
re-recruitment and possible punishment for desertion
by RUF.
28. In view of the slow pace of disarmament, the
National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration held an emergency meeting on 7
April of all stakeholders in the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process, chaired by
President Kabbah, and agreed on a fast-track approach
to disarmament. This approach included the shortening
of the period of encampment of disarmed combatants at
the demobilization centres from the initial six to eight
weeks to a period of three weeks, and the use of mobile
disarmament teams. The process would take the same
time for all the RUF, AFRC/ex-SLA and Civil Defence
Forces combatants, and was expected to result in a
quicker flow of ex-combatants through the programme.
29. At that meeting, the National Commission also
decided that the disarmament of RUF combatants in the
Kailahun District would start in the Eastern Province.
As a result, on 10 April, representatives from
UNAMSIL, ECOMOG, a group of Parliamentarians
and the press accompanied Mr. Sankoh to a ceremonial
start of this exercise in Segbwema. However, only 89
combatants, including 56 RUF, 28 ex-SLA and 5 Civil
Defence Forces, reported for disarmament and were
subsequently transported to the Daru demobilization
centre.
30. On
17
April,
the
four
disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration camps at Bo,
Moyamba, Makeni and Magburaka became operational.
Civil Defence Forces combatants have since then
disarmed at Bo and Moyamba. RUF, however, did not
participate in the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration process at Makeni and Magburaka and the
overall number of RUF combatants disarmed remained
well below expectations.
31. At the same time, many ex-SLA soldiers as well
as combatants from other factions were reluctant to
disarm for fear that they would not get the chance to
join the new army if they left the demobilization
centres. To allay this fear, the Government clarified
that all former combatants would be eligible to join
Sierra Leone’s restructured army, provided that
candidates met the criteria of the Military
Reintegration Plan.
32. Delays in the payment of allowances for the
combatants
encamped
at
the
disarmament,
5
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demobilization and reintegration centres caused some
disturbances in the camps as well as demonstrations in
Freetown. UNAMSIL took steps to reinforce security
at the camps and, in conjunction with the National
Commission, to expedite the registration and
documentation process for timely preparation of
demobilization activities and payment of allowances.
33. The delays in the disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration programme led to additional costs
and therefore increased the need for financial
assistance from donor countries. Before May, there was
an important shortfall in contributions to the MultiDonor Trust Fund, which is administered by the World
Bank, of $19 million for the year 2000 disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration budget. However, it is
likely that a resumption in due course of the
programme may require additional resources.
34. An additional concern arising in the context of
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
process was the lack of guidelines for the care and
protection of so-called camp followers, or dependants
of ex-combatants. UNAMSIL has initiated policy
discussions and made recommendations on this issue,
including the provision of adequate humanitarian
assistance to this sector of the population, in
cooperation with the Government and relevant
humanitarian agencies.
Extension of State authority
35. During
the
period
under
review,
the
Government’s Task Force for the restoration of civil
authority throughout the country, which is chaired by
Vice-President Joe Albert Demby, started discussions
on plans and strategies for the return of Government
officials and other public officials to the provinces,
districts and chiefdoms.
36. In April, the Government of Sierra Leone decided
to postpone the return of its officials to Makeni
because of security concerns, as most parts of the
Northern Province remain under RUF control. There
was also a lack of basic amenities, including suitable
residence and office accommodation.
National reconciliation and democratization
37. With a view to advancing democratization and
national institution-building, UNAMSIL worked
closely with the Attorney-General, the Minister of
Justice and the High Commissioner for Human Rights
6
in preparing draft legislation for the establishment of
the national Human Rights Commission as foreseen in
the Lomé Peace Agreement.
38. The National Electoral Commission was sworn
into office on 20 March and has commenced work. The
Government was also exploring the possibility of
conducting phased local elections for Paramount
Chiefs, beginning with rebel-free areas.
39. Obviously, the process of national reconciliation
has become even more difficult in the light of the
recent attacks by RUF, which have seriously
undermined the peace process and have further
exacerbated the lack of trust between the signatories of
the Lomé Agreement.
Rebuilding Sierra Leone’s security forces
40. There has been some improvement in the
functioning of the Sierra Leone police force, which
receives assistance from the United Kingdom and
UNAMSIL. However, the restructuring process is
proceeding slowly and is hampered by the lack of
funding as well as the outbreak of hostilities. Changes
have been made in the management structure, crime
prevention methods, and rank structure of the police
force. A Complaints and Discipline Department has
been established to look into corrupt practices, criminal
activities, sexual abuse and violent crimes by the
police. UNAMSIL has also continued to regularly
provide human rights training to the Sierra Leone
police forces. Personnel of the armed Special Security
Division of the Sierra Leonean police have now been
deployed to Moyamba, Kenema, Bo and Lungi.
41. Efforts were also made to implement the Military
Reintegration Plan, which was agreed upon by all
parties. The first phase of the plan would involve an
assessment of Sierra Leone Army officers to ensure
that they, after fast-track training, could be involved in
the training of their own army. I wish to express my
appreciation for the crucial assistance provided by the
United Kingdom in this regard.
42. Regrettably, a key figure in the national security
system, General Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe, Chief of
Defence Staff of the Sierra Leone Army, died on 18
April. The Government of Sierra Leone declared seven
days of mourning.
V. Human rights
S/2000/455
43. The human rights situation in some parts of the
country, especially those areas not under the control of
the Government, remained an issue of very serious
concern. Abductions of civilians for specific tasks such
as hard labour on palm oil plantations continued to be
perpetrated by RUF and AFRC/ex-SLA elements from
the Occra Hills area.
44. In the Northern Province, international nongovernmental organizations seriously curtailed their
humanitarian operations in RUF-held territories
following the detention of some of their international
and national aid workers by armed RUF combatants
near Alikalia on 7 March. In Kabala, there were reports
of the harassment of civilians and looting of villages by
elements of the ex-SLA.
45. The large number of dependants of the AFRC/exSLA combatants who emerged from the bush at Kabala
on 3 April (see para. 15 above) drew attention to the
need to take special measures to protect dependants of
ex-combatants, the majority of whom are women and
children. The majority of “wives” of the combatants
are in fact abductees and, if not interviewed separately
from their “husbands”, would most likely not feel free
to express their wish to return to their original families.
46. The protection of internally displaced persons
remains a source of concern, which needs to be
urgently addressed in a coordinated manner. In the Port
Loko area, internally displaced persons who move
beyond the confines of relatively safe areas to meet
their daily needs often become victims of abduction,
rape and forced labour.
47. The deployment of United Nations human rights
monitors to key locations in the country had to be
curtailed as a result of the recent hostilities. However,
their deployment will proceed as a matter of priority as
soon as security conditions allow.
48. Recent reports of serious human rights abuses,
summary executions and violations of international
humanitarian law, committed during the recent fighting
by RUF as well as by the Sierra Leone Army and
AFRC/ex-SLA, are a cause of grave concern. I call on
all parties and their leadership to refrain from such acts
and restore respect for the rule of law.
Child protection
49. Preliminary reports suggest that child combatants
have been used extensively during the current conflict.
UNAMSIL human rights officers who undertook a
mission to Masiaka on 15 May observed several armed
child combatants, mostly boys, with the Civil Defence
Forces, AFRC/ex-SLA and the Sierra Leone Army.
About 25 per cent of the combatants were under 18
years and some freely admitted that their ages were
between 7 and 14 years. Almost all of them were
armed. Other reports indicate that RUF is using a
similar proportion of child combatants in the front
lines.
50. Prior to the events of May, a total of about 1,700
child combatants, out of an estimated 5,000, had
entered the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration programme. UNICEF estimates that, at
the time of the current crisis, about 800 of the
demobilized child soldiers had been reunified with
their families or placed in foster care, or had run away,
leaving about 900 in interim care centres. These
children remain vulnerable to re-abduction as a result
of the collapse of the programme. Further, there have
been no more releases of children from their
commanders since the start of the crisis. UNICEF and
its implementing partners, with significant support
from key donors, are working to ensure that adequate
protections are in place for these children.
51. Obviously, the delay in the disarmament process
and the renewed hostilities also impacted negatively on
the release of abducted children and women. The
Government of Sierra Leone has agreed to establish a
National Commission for War-Affected Children to
ensure that children’s concerns are addressed at the
highest political levels. This agreement was reached
during the recent visit to Freetown, on 29 and 30 April,
of my Special Representative for Children and Armed
Conflict, Olara Otunnu, and the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy. Mr. Otunnu and
Mr. Axworthy also held separate meetings with
President Kabbah, Mr. Koroma and Mr. Sankoh to
stress the need for special measures to address the
plight of the war-affected children of Sierra Leone and
to assess progress in implementation of the Lomé
Agreement.
VI. Humanitarian aspects
52. During the reporting period, humanitarian access
gradually improved in some areas owing to the wider
deployment of UNAMSIL and the subsequent
improvement of security conditions. Rehabilitation and
7
S/2000/455
reintegration activities continued to operate without
serious difficulties in the relatively stable Southern
Province. However, during the attacks on disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration centres in the first
week of May, international humanitarian staff were
surrounded and harassed by rebel elements in Makeni.
All staff were able to leave the area, but several assets
belonging to humanitarian organizations were looted.
The drastic deterioration of the security situation in
May forced the curtailing of humanitarian operations in
this and other areas of the Northern and Eastern
Provinces, reversing gains made in the past few
months. Food, health, water, sanitation and child
protection programmes continue in Freetown and
accessible areas of the Southern and lower Eastern
Provinces, such as Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Bonthe,
despite limited staffing because of a drawdown in
international humanitarian staff.
53. About 20,000 new internally displaced persons
moved into Freetown following the fighting outside the
peninsula. However, in view of improving security
conditions, many of them are now returning to their
homes in the Waterloo area, where they will receive
assistance. Additionally, plans are under way to
provide assistance to about 9,000 new internally
displaced persons at Lungi. The World Food
Programme, in collaboration with the Government, will
also continue food distributions to about 59,000
internally displaced persons who were already in
Freetown before the start of the current crisis. Further
internal displacements have been reported in areas that
cannot yet be reached, particularly around Masiaka and
Port Loko. Meanwhile, the Office of the United
Nations High Commission for Refugees is providing
assistance to more than 1,000 new refugees who have
arrived in Guinea, which already hosts about 450,000
Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees.
54. Another area of concern is the apparently high
rate of HIV/AIDS infection in Sierra Leone.
Preliminary data suggest that the incidence of
HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone is increasing exponentially,
indicating that the country is in the early stages of a
major HIV/AIDS outbreak. The Government and their
United Nations and non-governmental organization
partners continue to support HIV testing, counselling
and programmes for the control of sexually transmitted
diseases, but much remains to be done in the areas of
sexual education and health programmes. UNAMSIL
8
has taken measures to sensitize its personnel to the
risks of infection.
55. In order to cope with the current emergency,
United Nations agencies have been forced to divert
resources, such as food support for agricultural
programmes, from activities designed to ensure the
nation’s long-term recovery. Further, the recent events
have had a grave impact on the ability of humanitarian
agencies to meet the needs of large segments of the
population.
Should
these
conditions
persist,
humanitarian priorities and needs will have to be reevaluated and prioritized to reflect a new operating
environment. To that end, the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in cooperation
with the agencies, is currently in the process of
updating the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal to
reflect the current situation. The Appeal, which
requests $71 million in humanitarian assistance, is at
present only about 37 per cent funded. However, a
more robust response is required to meet the urgent
humanitarian and rehabilitation needs of the country.
VII. Attacks on and detention of
United Nations personnel
Military developments
56. The present crisis commenced on 1 May, when
RUF ex-combatants approached the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration reception centre at
Makeni in a threatening manner and started firing in
the air. It should be noted that the RUF commander in
Makeni obstructed the disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration process in that area ever since the
camps there, which were constructed to meet the RUF
demands for better facilities, had become operational
on 17 April. Only 10 RUF ex-combatants voluntarily
came forward to disarm. They were demobilized in the
morning of 1 May at the Makeni reception centre.
There have also been incidents at various locations of
RUF forcibly preventing its fighters from disarming.
At the same time, UNAMSIL was about to deploy its
forces to the area of Koidu, which is the centre of
diamond mining operations conducted by RUF. This
planned deployment may also have contributed to the
decision of RUF to attack UNAMSIL in a possible test
of its resolve.
57. On 1 May, the local RUF commander and some
of his fighters approached the reception centre at
S/2000/455
Makeni, which was manned by UNAMSIL military
observers, in an assertive manner and demanded that
the United Nations hand over five of the disarmed excombatants with their weapons as well as the
UNAMSIL military observer who had demobilized
them. The likely motive of RUF was to punish those
ex-combatants
for
joining
the
disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration programme. However,
UNAMSIL prevented the RUF combatants from
entering the UNAMSIL facilities and tried to discuss
the situation with them. In the course of these
discussions, the RUF combatants detained three
UNAMSIL military observers as well as four
UNAMSIL peacekeepers of the Kenyan battalion who
were providing security at that location. The RUF
combatants then proceeded to destroy part of the camp
at Makeni and also started looting in the town. At
Magburaka, a group of armed RUF ex-combatants
surrounded the UNAMSIL team site, which was
protected by a section of the Kenyan battalion.
58. In response to this incident, the Force
Commander met the same day with President Kabbah
to express his deep concern and discuss possible
measures. The Force Commander also spoke with Mr.
Sankoh by telephone to demand the immediate release
of all UNAMSIL personnel. The RUF leader did not
offer any help and accused UNAMSIL of trying to start
a war by forcibly disarming RUF ex-combatants.
President Kabbah then requested Mr. Lamin, the RUFdesignated Minister for Trade and Industry, to try to
convince Mr. Sankoh to give orders to defuse the
situation. According to Mr. Lamin, this was agreed to
by Mr. Sankoh, who, however, remained unavailable to
UNAMSIL during the rest of that day.
59. On 2 May, which date coincided with the
departure of the last ECOMOG troops from the
country, the situation at Magburaka deteriorated
sharply when RUF tried to disarm UNAMSIL troops.
The United Nations troops resisted and an exchange of
fire ensued which continued throughout the day. RUF
used small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and
mortars. Three soldiers of the Kenyan battalion were
injured as a result of the fighting. RUF also destroyed
and looted the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration facilities at Magburaka and Makeni. At
Makeni, RUF attacked UNAMSIL troops, who
returned fire. Two soldiers of the Kenyan battalion
were wounded at that location. RUF also attacked and
overran a 60-man strong unit of the Kenyan battalion
located at the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration camp in Makeni. On 3 May, fighting in
Makeni and Magburaka stopped, with the exception of
some sporadic firing. A large group of the Kenyan unit,
which had not been heard from since the attack at the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camp,
arrived at Mile 91 on 4 May after walking from
Makeni, carrying three wounded. Smaller groups of
this unit managed to join their company headquarters at
Makeni.
60. The events at Makeni and Magburaka had
immediate repercussions in other areas under RUF
control where UNAMSIL had deployed its troops. On 2
May, a UNAMSIL helicopter and its crew and
passengers were detained by RUF combatants at
Kailahun. There were four crew members and two
civilian staff members of UNAMSIL. In addition, RUF
set up a roadblock to restrict UNAMSIL traffic in that
area and detained 30 UNAMSIL military and civilian
personnel and a helicopter. A 23-man unit of the Indian
battalion, which was deployed from Daru to join the
company deployed at Kailahun, was intercepted and
detained by RUF at Kuiva, near Kailahun.
61. Also, late in the evening of 3 May, a company of
the Nigerian contingent in Kambia came under fire
from RUF. That company was then briefly detained by
RUF and released on 4 May without their weapons and
uniforms. A platoon of the Nigerian contingent at
Mange also came under fire and was surrounded by
RUF.
62. The Force Commander, Major General Vijay
Kumar Jetley, took immediate measures to reinforce
the UNAMSIL positions at Makeni and Magburaka.
The company of the Kenyan battalion which had been
deployed at Kabala moved to Makeni, while a 100-man
unit of the Indian quick reaction company reinforced
Magburaka. The Zambian battalion was then instructed
to move from Lungi to Makeni, but was stopped at a
strong roadblock erected by RUF, presumably
ambushed and detained by a large group of RUF
fighters. Some 400 United Nations troops, as well as
elements of the Kenyan sector headquarters which
accompanied them, are believed to have fallen into the
hands of RUF, which reportedly moved 200 of them to
its stronghold in the Kono district. At that time, the
Force Commander also began to redeploy United
Nations troops to consolidate the UNAMSIL presence
around Freetown as well as at Port Loko and Masiaka.
9
S/2000/455
The UNAMSIL units at the latter location were later
forced to withdraw for lack of ammunition.
their agreement to airlift the 11 military observers to
Freetown.
63. From 2 May onwards, there were several clashes
between RUF and UNAMSIL troops, as well as
elements of the Sierra Leone Army and the Civil
Defence Forces at several locations in the northern and
western parts of the country, including Makeni,
Magburaka, Lunsar, Rogberi Junction, Port Loko, Mile
91, Masiaka, Songo, Mange and Kambia. At times, the
Government-operated helicopter gunship engaged the
rebel forces. During this period of fighting, UNAMSIL
experienced serious difficulties in obtaining accurate
information about the situation on the ground, which
were exacerbated by a continuous stream of
unconfirmed rumours and reports from the field. There
were also unconfirmed reports about movements of
RUF fighters from neighbouring countries into Sierra
Leone. UNAMSL was forced to conduct frequent aerial
reconnaissance missions to gather information about
the movements of hostile RUF elements.
67. On 15 May, 139 detainees, all members of the
Zambian battalion, were moved to the Liberian border
town of Foya, and 15 of them were transported
onwards to Monrovia. Their release was the result of
the commendable personal involvement of President
Taylor of Liberia, whose efforts are to be commended
by the international community. UNAMSIL is currently
making arrangements to airlift the released detainees
from Foya to Freetown with a stopover in Monrovia.
64. On 9 May, the Indian quick reaction company and
a Kenyan company, which had been surrounded at
Magburaka, broke successfully through RUF lines and
managed to reach United Nations positions at Mile 91.
On the same day, the remaining troops of the Kenyan
battalion broke out of Makeni and managed to reach
areas controlled by the ex-SLA at Kabala and
Bumbuna. Before their breakout, these units stood their
ground and did not surrender in spite of continuing
threats and attacks by RUF, which had encircled their
positions. I wish to convey to the United Nations
troops concerned my admiration for this display of
military courage and determination.
65. It should also be noted that, although RUF
elements at Kailahun have surrounded and detained
United Nations peacekeepers, they have so far
refrained from hostilities against UNAMSIL and have
reportedly been under considerable pressure from the
local population to release United Nations personnel.
66. On 14 May, 18 detainees were moved from
Geima, where they were being held by RUF, to the
compound of the Indian battalion at Kailahun. This
group includes 11 military observers and seven
members of the Indian battalion. Although their
location is surrounded by RUF, the former detainees
are considered to be safe and under the protection of
the Indian battalion, which did not yield to RUF.
Negations continue with the RUF leadership to obtain
10
68. As at 15 May, the total number of UNAMSIL
personnel presumed to be in the hands of RUF stands at
352, comprising 297 soldiers of the Zambian battalion,
29 soldiers of the Kenyan battalion, 23 soldiers of the
Indian battalion and 3 military observers. They are
believed to be held in Kuiva (near Kailahun) and in the
Kono district. As a result of the fighting, a total of 25
UNAMSIL soldiers have been wounded. Fifteen
United Nations soldiers remain missing, and it is feared
that some of them may have lost their lives. RUF
casualties are unknown, although reports indicate that
RUF may have suffered a relatively high number of
casualties.
69. At the time of preparation of this report, the
situation in and around Freetown appeared to have
stabilized, with no significant RUF movements
reported towards the capital. The Government has
mobilized forces which support it, including the Sierra
Leone Army and Civil Defence Forces, to defend
Freetown. A pivotal factor in restoring stability was the
arrival of United Kingdom troops on 7 May and of a
substantial British naval presence offshore a week later.
The deployment of British troops at Lungi airport and
in the western part of Freetown had as its objective the
safe evacuation of nationals of the United Kingdom
and others for whom it was responsible. Nevertheless,
this presence boosted the confidence of the Sierra
Leoneans, and enabled UNAMSIL to redeploy muchneeded troops to areas east of Freetown. It is hoped
that the United Kingdom will be able to maintain a
military presence in the country until UNAMSIL has
received the necessary reinforcements. An additional
stabilizing factor was the arrival on 12 May of 300
well-trained and well-equipped troops from Jordan to
reinforce its contingent in UNAMSIL. The
Government of India too made additional troops
available for UNAMSIL, which will be airlifted soon. I
applaud these countries for their immediate and
S/2000/455
resolute decisions to strengthen the international
community’s presence in Sierra Leone and their
continued support since the beginning of the crisis.
70. As these events were unfolding, UNAMSIL
received strong indications that Mr. Sankoh had given
no instructions to his troops to stop the fighting or to
seek the release of the detainees. On the contrary, Mr.
Sankoh appeared initially to encourage his troops to
take an assertive stand vis-à-vis the United Nations and
later, when hostility against him increased in Freetown,
called on his troops to march on Freetown.
71. On 9 May, the Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations arrived in Freetown as my
special envoy to boost the morale of UNAMSIL and to
consult with my Special Representative and the Force
Commander on their assessment of the situation and to
prepare recommendations for the United Nations
response.
Diplomatic and political efforts
72. Immediately following the outbreak of hostilities,
I contacted leaders in the region and subregion to seek
their assistance in bringing the situation to a rapid and
peaceful resolution. I am grateful for the strong efforts
made in this regard by African leaders, in particular the
President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, current
chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, the
President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, the Leader of the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Colonel Muammar AlQadhafi, the President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konare,
the President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, and the
President
of
Togo,
Gnassingbe
Eyadema.
Representatives of several Governments have been in
touch with Mr. Sankoh to secure the immediate release
of the detainees and to find ways to salvage the peace
process in Sierra Leone. I am grateful for their efforts
and, in particular, to the heads of State of Liberia, the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali and Nigeria, who sent
their personal envoys to meet with Mr. Sankoh in the
period from 3 to 7 May.
73. On 5 and 6 May, my Special Representative met
in Freetown with Mr. Sankoh, who accused UNAMSIL
troops of having precipitated the crisis by forcing RUF
combatants to disarm. The Special Representative
responded that no UNAMSIL troops had ever
attempted to disarm RUF combatants by force and that,
in fact, RUF combatants had in subsequent days
escalated events by attacking UNAMSIL; and
demanded the immediate release of all detained
UNAMSIL troops and their weapons and equipment. In
the evening of 6 May, the Special Representative and
the Libyan Special Envoy, Ali Treiki, met jointly with
Mr. Sankoh. They pressed him to reduce the tension by
ordering the immediate release of the detainees and to
issue a statement that RUF would cease its attacks. Mr.
Sankoh agreed to issue a statement to that effect, which
was read out that evening on national television by the
Special Representative. Mr. Adeniji and Mr. Treiki also
spoke to President Kabbah and urged him to reduce
tension and, in particular, to call on the organizers of
the planned demonstration on 8 May to avoid
approaching Mr. Sankoh’s house.
74. However, on 8 May, an estimated crowd of
30,000 went to Mr. Sankoh’s house to protest against
the RUF attacks on UNAMSIL. When the crowd tried
to approach the house, armed members of RUF fired
into the crowd from Mr. Sankoh’s residence and killed
several people and injured dozens more. The
UNAMSIL troops stationed at Mr. Sankoh’s home were
overwhelmed by the huge crowd. In the panic and
confusion, Foday Sankoh disappeared with some of his
body guards. Several members of RUF were shot and
killed by armed elements within the crowd; the house
was ransacked and looted. The whereabouts of Foday
Sankoh remained unknown until 17 May, when he was
apprehended as he returned to his residence by
elements of AFRC/ex-SLA who turned him over to the
custody of the Government.
75. In the same period, Mr. Koroma, the Chairman of
the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace and
leader of AFRC/ex-SLA, made several public
statements in which he urged his followers and other to
take up arms and defend Freetown. Armed elements of
the Sierra Leone Army, ex-SLA and the Civil Defence
Forces started patrolling the town and arresting
members of RUF, actions which contributed to an
increase in tension in Freetown and beyond.
76. On 8 May, at the summit meeting of the Mano
River Union held at Conakry, the Presidents of Liberia,
Guinea and Sierra Leone were joined by President
Konaré of Mali as Chairman of ECOWAS and my
Special Representative in Sierra Leone in a special
discussion on Sierra Leone. The summit condemned
the attacks on and detention of United Nations
personnel and mandated President Taylor to involve
11
S/2000/455
himself personally to ensure the release of the
detainees and the resumption of the peace process.
77. On 9 May, a summit meeting of the ECOWAS
Committee on Sierra Leone, consisting of Burkina
Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali,
Nigeria and Togo, met at Abuja. The meeting strongly
condemned RUF and called for the immediate and
unconditional release of the detainees. In this regard,
the meeting approved the mandate given to President
Taylor (see para. 76). The summit also warned the
leadership of RUF that their amnesty under the Lomé
Peace Agreement could be revoked and that they could
be tried for war crimes if they continued to flout the
Lomé Peace Agreement. Participants reaffirmed their
total support for the peace process in Sierra Leone as
set out in the Lomé Peace Agreement, which remains
the most appropriate framework for the resolution of
the conflict. They also expressed their determination to
use all means at their disposal, including the military
option, to foil any attempt to take over power through
the use of force, and to defend democratic institutions
in Sierra Leone. The ECOWAS Executive Secretary
was directed to convene a meeting of Ministers of
Defence and Chiefs of Staff on 17 May at Abuja to
consider, in the event of new involvement of
ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, the practical modalities of
such involvement.
78. A meeting of the Joint Implementation
Committee was held at Freetown on 13 May, chaired
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali and
attended by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Liberia
and representatives of Ghana, Guinea, the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya and Sierra Leone, as well as of Canada, the
United Kingdom, the United States of America, OAU
and UNAMSIL. Mr. Koroma also attended the
meeting; RUF was not represented. The meeting agreed
that a dual approach should be pursued to resolve the
current crisis, namely, exerting strong diplomatic
pressure on RUF and displaying military strength by
enhancing the operational capabilities of UNAMSIL to
enable it to perform its functions more efficiently.
79. As at 15 May, there have been few indications
that the leaders of RUF are willing to change their
course of action, although some individual members of
RUF have conveyed their willingness to disarm. At the
same time, RUF continued to detain hundreds of
UNAMSIL personnel and also to attack UNAMSIL and
Sierra Leonean troops at various locations in the
12
country. It would therefore be important to continue to
bring strong pressure to bear on the RUF leadership.
VIII. Recommendations for immediate
measures
80. I very much welcome the efforts made at the
subregional, regional and international levels to
express the international community’s condemnation of
the attacks perpetrated by RUF and to seek the
immediate release of the peacekeepers detained by
RUF, which remains the Organization’s highest
priority. At the same time, it would be important that
political pressure be supported by a strong military
posture, including on the part of the United Nations, to
deter RUF from pursuing the military option.
81. To this end, UNAMSIL should be reinforced
immediately to enhance its capability to defend its
positions at Lungi airport, on the Freetown peninsula
and at other strategic locations in the western and
southern parts of the country. This immediate
reinforcement, which is currently under way, would
bring the military strength of UNAMSIL from its
present strength of 9,250 to a level of up to 13,000,
including 260 military observers. Once this key
objective has been attained, UNAMSIL should be
further expanded, which would enable it to gradually
increase its presence, with sufficient military strength,
and to stabilize the situation in Sierra Leone.
82. From the beginning of the crisis, the Secretariat
has been working closely with those Member States
that had agreed to contribute military units to
UNAMSIL, in order to expedite the preparations for
their deployment. With airlift support provided by the
Governments of Canada, the Netherlands, the Russian
Federation and the United States and with financial
support provided by the Government of Germany, it is
expected that up to 3,600 additional military personnel
will arrive by the end of May or early June. It is also
envisaged that the fourth Nigerian UNAMSIL
battalion, which was due to be repatriated by the end of
May, would be retained.
83. As I stressed in my previous reports on
UNAMSIL, the troop strength authorized under
Security Council resolution 1289 (2000) was
predicated on the cooperation of the parties and a
generally permissive environment. Clearly, this crucial
condition for any progress towards the Mission’s key
S/2000/455
objective of assisting the parties in the implementation
of the Lomé Agreement is now lacking. All efforts
should therefore be aimed at the restoration of
conditions conducive to a resumption of the peace
process. The first priority in this regard is the
consolidation of UNAMSIL units, both those currently
on the ground and those scheduled to arrive shortly, at
strong positions at Lungi airport, on the Freetown
peninsula, and at other strategic locations on the main
access roads to the capital. The main objective of this
consolidation is to ensure the protection of the civilian
population in Freetown and the security of Government
institutions, as well as maintaining a sufficient strength
in the areas under Government control to deter and, if
necessary, repel further attacks by RUF.
84. Once these initial objectives have been attained,
UNAMSIL will then seek to stabilize the situation in
the country and assist the Government to restore law
and order in the areas outside the control of RUF. To
this end, UNAMSIL would be further strengthened and
would begin to gradually deploy forward. It would do
so in strength and with adequate equipment, in order to
secure strategic locations in the western and southern
parts of the country, including Port Loko, Rogberi
Junction, Masiaka, Mile 91, Moyamba, Kenema and
Daru. Such a deployment would make a significant
contribution to the restoration of a measure of
normalcy in the areas outside RUF control, the
resumption of the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration process, and the extension of Government
authority to the provinces. This deployment would also
allow the Government of Sierra Leone and the
international community to reassess the necessary steps
that will be required to promote a durable peace in
Sierra Leone.
85. In determining the military strength needed to
reach these objectives, it should be borne in mind that
RUF elements may continue to employ guerrilla
tactics. As the recent history of Sierra Leone has
shown, the topography of the country lends itself well
to such a modus operandi, especially during the rainy
season. To counter the threat posed by RUF and to
attain the objectives described above, it would
therefore be necessary to deploy with due care and
preparation, in sufficient numbers and backed up by
adequate military means to deter attacks and, if
necessary, respond decisively to any hostile action or
intent.
86. However, after receiving the reinforcements
currently under way, UNAMSIL would not have the
necessary resources to fulfil its mandate in the present
hostile environment in Sierra Leone and would need
additional troops as well as the necessary force
multipliers to do this. In this context, it is estimated
that UNAMSIL would require, in addition to the
immediate reinforcements described above, two
infantry battalions (a mechanized battalion and one air
transportable battalion for rapid reinforcement), a
logistic battalion, a light artillery unit, additional air
transportation assets and armed helicopters, and a
maritime unit of six armed patrol boats, as well as the
necessary medical, communications, intelligence and
command personnel. The total military strength of an
expanded UNAMSIL would be up to 16,500 military
personnel, including 260 military observers.
87. It is envisaged that this force would comprise a
total of 15 infantry battalions, which would tentatively
be deployed to the following areas: the Freetown
peninsula; Lungi airport and peninsula; Port Loko,
Rogberi Junction and Lunsar; Masiaka, Moyamba and
Mile 91; Bo, Kenema and Daru. UNAMSIL would also
maintain a sizeable force reserve, which would provide
it with the capacity to react rapidly to serious military
threats throughout the country. It is understood that the
deployment of troops and their modus operandi would
need to be revised in the light of the situation on the
ground and the time of arrival of the additional troops.
88. The envisaged expansion of the force up to a
level of 16,500 military personnel would also require a
commensurate increase in the civilian administrative
and logistical support staff of the Mission. The
financial implications of the envisaged increase in
strength will be submitted to the Security Council in an
addendum to the present report.
89. For the time being, I believe that the mandate
entrusted to UNAMSIL under resolution 1289 (2000)
provides the force with sufficient authority to conduct
the necessary operations in support of the aims
described above. In that resolution, the Security
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
authorized UNAMSIL, within its capabilities and areas
of deployment and in the light of conditions on the
ground, to take the necessary action to (a) provide
security at key locations and Government buildings, in
particular in Freetown, important intersections and
major airports, including Lungi airport; (b) facilitate
the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian
13
S/2000/455
assistance along specified thoroughfares; (c) provide
security in and at all sites of the disarmament,
demobilization
and
reintegration
programme;
(d) coordinate with and assist, in common areas of
deployment, the Sierra Leone law enforcement
authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities;
(e) guard weapons, ammunition and other military
equipment collected from ex-combatants and assist in
their subsequent disposal or destruction. In that
resolution, the Security Council also authorized
UNAMSIL to take the necessary action, in the
discharge of its mandate, to ensure the security and
freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its
capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford
protection to civilians under imminent threat of
physical
violence,
taking
into
account
the
responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone. On
the basis of that mandate, the present robust rules of
engagement of UNAMSIL enable it to use force,
including deadly force, in self-defence against any
hostile act or intent. In the present circumstances, it is
obvious that the use of force against all elements that
continue to display a hostile intent towards the United
Nations would be warranted and justified. At the same
time, UNAMSIL would be ready to enter into
discussion with all those who would be willing and
ready to pursue a peaceful solution.
90. To ensure proper control and unity of command, I
believe that all international forces in Sierra Leone,
with the exception of those sent for a brief period for
strictly national purposes, should be integrated into
UNAMSIL. It is also of the utmost importance that the
United Nations forces coordinate closely with the
Sierra Leonean Army and other elements allied with
the Government, in particular the Civil Defence Forces
and AFRC/ex-SLA, to avoid any misunderstandings
which could lead to incidents. To this end, it is
envisaged that UNAMSIL will place military liaison
officers with the military command of the groups and
units involved. UNAMSIL would also ensure close
coordination with the British force while it remains in
Sierra Leone.
Public information
91. As was noted in my third report, it would be
necessary for UNAMSIL to set up a countrywide
public information campaign. In that connection, the
Department of Public Information conducted an
assessment, from 13 to 20 March 2000, of public
14
information needs. On the basis of the team’s
recommendations, efforts are currently under way to
significantly increase the capacity of the UNAMSIL
public information office as a matter of priority.
92. It is clear that UNAMSIL will face a significant
challenge in disseminating information on the peace
process in a country where the infrastructure has been
damaged by years of warfare. In order to reach all parts
of the country, UNAMSIL intends to set up its own
radio station. The necessary equipment, donated to the
United Nations in 1998 by the Government of
Denmark, has been transferred to UNAMSIL. Radio
UNAMSIL is expected to play a significant role in the
Mission’s efforts to inform the people of Sierra Leone,
independent of any party or affiliation. The UNAMSIL
public information office would also include units for
liaison with the media, video and print production and
community outreach.
IX. Observations
93. The overall situation in Sierra Leone remains
tense and critical. The deliberate and unprovoked
attacks by RUF fighters on United Nations
peacekeepers and the detention of large numbers of
United Nations personnel are unacceptable acts which
have been unequivocally condemned by the
international community. Given the suffering the
country has endured during the past decade, it would
be unforgiveable to thwart the hopes of the Sierra
Leonean people who had just begun to see some
modest improvement in their situation. The
international community should not allow any group,
and in particular the RUF leadership, to deny to the
people of Sierra Leone their legitimate aspirations to
live in peace and rebuild their country.
94. Of immediate concern is the safe return of all
those United Nations personnel currently being
detained by RUF, an end to the hostile acts of the RUF
fighters, and their full cooperation in retrieving the
dead, wounded and missing. In this regard, I should
like to acknowledge the efforts made by regional
leaders, including President Taylor of Liberia, whose
personal involvement led to the release of a significant
number of detainees. However, I demand that the
leadership of the RUF take urgent steps to ensure that
all remaining United Nations personnel in their hands
be released immediately and unconditionally. I also call
upon those with influence on RUF to continue to work
S/2000/455
towards this end. In addition, the Security Council may
also wish to consider a strengthening of the sanctions
regime, including measures which would prevent RUF
commanders from reaping the benefits of their illegal
exploitation of mineral resources, in particular
diamonds.
95. While part of the responsibility for some of the
recent events may lie with local commanders of RUF, it
is clear that Mr. Sankoh has failed to take any action to
prevent, curb or stop the actions of his troops. On the
contrary, there is some evidence that he may well have
encouraged, if not planned, some of these acts. The
international community should hold Mr. Sankoh
accountable for his actions and those of RUF, and for
the safety and well-being of all those who have been
detained.
96. At the same time, the international community
should not lose sight of the overarching objective of
helping the people and Government of Sierra Leone to
establish a durable peace in their country and
rekindling their hope. Their plight has become a crucial
test of the solidarity of the international community,
rising above race and geography, which is a basic
guiding principle of this Organization. The United
Nations has not abandoned and will not abandon Sierra
Leone. It should continue to provide humanitarian aid
and the required assistance in taking the many steps
needed on the path to peace, national reconciliation and
development.
97. In this regard, I believe that active political
efforts to assist the people of Sierra Leone to change
the course of events in their country must, in the
present circumstances, be supplemented by credible
military force. At the outset of the crisis, I called upon
those Member States with the capacity to deploy welltrained and well-equipped troops to constitute a rapid
reaction force to provide UNAMSIL with the necessary
deterrent capacity. In this regard, I very much welcome
the decision made by the United Kingdom to deploy a
spearhead battalion and other assets which, although
sent for national reasons, was instrumental in restoring
calm in Freetown and helping UNAMSIL by ensuring
the defence of Lungi airport.
98. I also deeply appreciate the commendable efforts
made by troop contributors, other Member States, and
United Nations logistical personnel to accelerate the
arrival of the troops which had already been committed
to serve with UNAMSIL, as well as the arrival of
additional units made available by Member States. This
will enhance the capability of UNAMSIL to defend the
Freetown peninsula, Lungi airport and other strategic
locations on the main access roads to the capital.
99. However, in the present circumstances this will
not be enough to create conditions which would be
conducive to the establishment of a lasting peace. I
therefore recommend an increase of the Force’s
strength up to a level of 16,500 military personnel, as
outlined in paragraphs 80 to 90 above, for the purpose
of stabilizing the situation in Sierra Leone under the
present mandate of UNAMSIL. Once these additional
forces have arrived in Sierra Leone and countered the
threat posed by RUF to the peace process, it would be
appropriate to consider additional steps which I will
present to the Security Council after a thorough
assessment of the political and military situation in
Sierra Leone. Such steps may involve a strengthening
of UNAMSIL, above the proposed strength of 16,500,
which could be necessary to establish the security
conditions throughout the country required for the
successful implementation of aspects of the peace
process, including disarmament and the holding of
democratic elections.
100. At the 4139th meeting of the Security Council on
11 May 2000, many Member States advocated that
UNAMSIL should be given a strong peaceenforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter.
As I indicated in my statement at that meeting, I am not
opposed to such a mandate in principle, as long as the
United Nations is able to obtain, from Member States
with ready capacity, the necessary resources to carry
out the tasks that such a mandate implies. In addition,
it would be essential for the international community to
demonstrate the necessary will and resolve to sustain
such a commitment to impose peace in Sierra Leone. If
such conditions cannot be met, any effort to strengthen
the mandate of UNAMSIL would unduly raise
expectations, increase the risk of loss of life, and
undermine the credibility of the Organization.
101. Some West African Governments have, in
principle, offered to make troops available in an effort
to restore peace in their region. I naturally welcome
these offers. They have however indicated that their
offers would be contingent on strong financial and
logistical support from other Member States.
102. Looking ahead, it is clear that the Government of
Sierra Leone, other parties to the Lomé Agreement and
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the international community will need to reflect on the
future of the peace process. The recent events raise
serious questions about the role of RUF and of Foday
Sankoh in particular. ECOWAS, during its meeting of 9
May 2000, reaffirmed its support for the peace process
in Sierra Leone as set out in the Lomé Peace
Agreement, which remains the most appropriate
framework for the resolution of the conflict. I too
believe that the Lomé Agreement contains many
elements which contribute to a durable peace, in
particular the disarmament of all factions, national
reconciliation, the holding of democratic elections, and
the creation of an effective national army and police
force. In this regard, I call upon the leaders of those
factions fighting on the side of the Government to
exercise restraint, to respect the rule of law, and to
refrain from any acts of harassment or revenge against
RUF members of sympathizers, which could
complicate efforts at reconciliation and restoring
confidence. At all times, there should be full respect
for the rule of law and human rights.
103. The process of disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration, which is the cornerstone of the peace
process, has come to a virtual standstill. Many of the
ex-combatants belonging to AFRC/ex-SLA and the
Civil Defence Forces have taken up arms again in
defence of their country, which will seriously
complicate their disarmament. Obviously, this aspect of
the peace process requires a re-evaluation of its
assumptions,
organization
and
implementation
mechanisms, which is to be undertaken in full
coordination
with
national
and
international
stakeholders.
104. Ultimately, a lasting resolution of the crisis can
only be found through political means; it cannot be
imposed by military force alone. Nor can a solution be
the result of international involvement alone. The
Government of Sierra Leone has a particular
responsibility to actively design and implement the
necessary steps towards peace in consultation with its
regional and international partners. Of special
importance in this regard would be the continuation of
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
process, together with the restructuring of Sierra
Leone’s armed forces. As I have stated in previous
reports, the assistance of the international community
to Sierra Leone cannot be open-ended and the
Government should do its utmost to ensure that it can
16
maintain a stable democracy and guarantee the security
of its territory and institutions.
105. Looking back on recent events, it is obvious that
the United Nations will have to draw lessons from its
experiences in Sierra Leone. The force, which had been
designed, equipped and deployed as a peacekeeping
force, was quickly forced into actual combat with one
of the parties that had pledged to cooperate with it. In
the course of these events, many problems emerged
within the Mission, including with regard to command
and control, cohesiveness of the force, the flow of
information, equipment and preparedness of troops,
and coordination between and within the various
components in UNAMSIL. In this respect, the
Secretariat is taking urgent steps to assess these
problems and to address recognized equipment
shortfalls, in close coordination with the troopcontributing countries. This is no reflection on the
leadership of the Mission. My Special Representative
has handled a very difficult situation effectively. I also
wish to acknowledge the Force Commander’s quick
reaction,
personal
courage
and
military
professionalism. Nor does this imply criticism of the
troops on the ground, many of which displayed
considerable courage and professionalism in defending
themselves and their mandate. At the same time, I am
deeply saddened by the casualties inflicted on
UNAMSIL troops, who had come to assist a peace
process, but were attacked and forced to engage in
combat to defend themselves in a situation that
resembles war. I pay tribute to those who have died or
were injured while performing their duties to serve the
cause of peace in Sierra Leone.
106. In our focus on Sierra Leone, it would be
important not to lose sight of the regional dimensions
of the peace process, in particular in respect of the
neighbouring countries, Guinea and Liberia. In this
regard, I very much welcome the efforts taken by the
States Members of the Mano River Union to enhance
their cooperation. I should also like to encourage
further efforts by ECOWAS and regional leaders to
bring their influence to bear on the parties to the Lomé
Agreement, in particular the Revolutionary United
Front, and convince them that a durable peace in Sierra
Leone requires their full cooperation and respect for
the provisions of the Lomé Agreement.
107. I should like to express my gratitude to all
Member States contributing troops, military observers,
civilian police or other assistance to UNAMSIL for
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their unwavering support, resolve and commitment in
the face of a very difficult situation. Their willingness
to stay the course and to strengthen UNAMSIL, despite
the adverse conditions on the ground, are an example
to the international community. At no point during the
crisis did the city and population of Freetown suffer
casualties and destruction, which was not the case in
January 1999. United Nations contingents have stood
firm throughout in defence of the capital.
108. I should also like to express gratitude for the
invaluable role played by ECOWAS and, in particular,
by ECOMOG, which has now left the country after
years of sacrifice and service to the people and
Government of Sierra Leone. I pay tribute to the brave
men and women in ECOMOG and their Governments
for their defence of a democratically elected
Government. Troops from ECOWAS continue, of
course, to play an essential role as part of UNAMSIL.
109. I also take this opportunity to express my deep
appreciation to my Special Representative, Oluyemi
Adeniji, the UNAMSIL Force Commander, Major
General Vijay Kumar Jetley, and the military and
civilian personnel of UNAMSIL, as well as of United
Nations programmes and agencies, the World Bank and
other institutions working in the country, for their
perseverance, courage and dedication in their work to
fashion a better future for the people of Sierra Leone.
17
S/2000/455
Annex
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone: contributions as at
19 May 2000
Military
observers
Bangladesh
Staff Officers
Troops
Total
12
12
Bolivia
4
4
Canada
5
5
China
Croatia
6
6
10
10
Czech Republic
5
5
Denmark
2
2
10
10
Egypt
France
3
3
Gambia
26
26
Ghana
4
Guinea
12
3
776
791
India
14
18
1 644
1 676
Indonesia
10
Jordan
5
Kenya
11
Kyrgyzstan
3
776
783
10
13
1 131
1 136
858
882
2
2
10
10
Mali
8
8
Nepal
6
6
New Zealand
2
2
Nigeria
4
Malaysia
14
3 217
3 235
Norway
5
5
Pakistan
10
10
Russian Federation
15
15
Slovakia
2
2
Sweden
3
3
Thailand
5
5
United Kingdom
15
United Republic of Tanzania
12
12
Uruguay
11
11
Zambia
11
3
776
790
260
57
9 178
9 495
Total
3
18
Civilian police deployed (28): Bangladesh (2), Gambia (2), Ghana (3), India (1), Jordan (3),
Kenya (1), Malaysia (3), Mali (2), Norway (2), Senegal (2), Namibia (1), Nepal (4),
Zimbabwe (2).
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