INNOVATIVE CULTURES AND
ORGANIZATIONS
Edgar H.Schein
90s: 88-064
November 1988
®1988 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Management in the 1990s
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Manaqement in the 1990s
Management in the 1990s is an industry and governmental agency supported
research program. Its aim is to develop a better understanding of the
managerial issues of the 1990s and how to deal most effectively with them,
particularly as these issues revolve around anticipated advances in Information
Technology.
Assisting the work of the Sloan School scholars with financial support and as
working partners in research are:
American Express Company
British Petroleum Company, p.l.c.
BellSouth Corporation
CIGNA Corporation
Digital Equipment Corporation
Eastman Kodak Company
Ernst & Young
General Motors Corporation
International Computers Ltd.
MCI Communications Corporation
United States Army
United States Internal Revenue Service
The conclusions or opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Massachussetts Institute of
Technology, the Management in the 1990s Research Program, or its sponsoring
organizations.
Acknowledgement
The ideas expressed in this paper are the result of extended conversations with
Tom Malone, Diane Wilson, and various other colleagues. Our goal was to
identify the main characters of innovative, adaptive, creative systems and
cultures. Special thanks also to Lotte Bailyn, Marc Gerstein, Randy Davis, Bob
McKersie, Michael Scott Morton, and John Van Maanen for their insightful
comments on an early draft of this paper, and to the Management in the 1990s
project for the financial support that made the research on which this paper is
based possible.
1
Both
increasingly
students
concerned
of
organizations
about
the
and
capacity
adapt to rapidly changing environmental
change in
the technological,
cultural
environments
therefore,
finding
is
of
increasing,
are
to
The rate of
political,
and
today
organizations
conditions.
economic,
it more and more
managers
and socio-
organizations
are,
important to figure out how
to adapt.
Adaptation
minor adjustments
requires
new
even
to the present way of doing
genuinely
products and
new
values
involves
the
change."
in turbulent environments
innovative
services,
and
new ways of
of
Organizations
(Schein,
1980;
"self-designing"
Argyris
things.
the
will
&
new goals,
getting things done,
Most
importantly
capacity
have
than
It often
thrusts--new missions,
assumptions.
development
involves more
to
Schon,
to
adaptation
manage
"learn
1978)
"perpetual
how
and
and
to
to
learn"
become
(Weick, 1977).
The difficulty is that organizations are by their nature
and often
work.
by design oriented
toward stabilizing
Organizations develop
cultures
and
that are
routinizing
expressed
structures
and processes that permit large numbers of
coordinate
their efforts,
members
reinvent
to continue
the
and
people to
that permit new generations of
to perform effectively without having
organization
each
in
time
(Schein,
1985).
How
to
then,
can one conceptualize an organization that can function effectively yet be capable of learning so that it can adapt and innovate
in response to changing environmental circumstances?
How can one
III
2
conceive
of an
organization
dynamic,
that can manage
the
that can
surmount
paradox of
its
own
central
institutionalizing and
stabilizing the process of change and innovation?
In
this essay
questions and
into the
I want to address some aspects of these
to present
dynamics
of
a point of
organizational
view based on my research
culture.
In particular
want to focus on innovation as itself a property of culture.
other words,
what kind of organizational
culture would
I
In
consis-
tently favor innovation?
This
time
question
because of
is
of
the rapid
interest
especial
advances that
field of information technology (IT).
at
the
present
are being made
in
the
There is ample evidence to
suggest that the
introduction of IT into organizations not only
forces cultural
assumptions out
into the open, but that the
potential of IT as a strategic aid to organizations will not be
fulfilled unless,
at the
same
time, those organizations develop
(or already possess) what I will define as "innovative cultures."
The
definition
of
problem.
For purposes
imprecise
definition--new
"innovation"
of this paper
ideas,
is
I will
behavior
itself
adopt
a
major
a broad and
patterns,
beliefs,
values, and assumptions covering any aspect of the organization's
functioning.
In particular
I want
to
insure
that we consider
both 1) "content innovation"-- new products, services, and ideas
pertaining to the mission of the organization, and 2) "role innovation"-- new ways of doing things, new definitions of roles, and
new approaches to performing in roles (Schein, 1970; Van Maanen &
Schein, 1979).
3
Defining what is
In
analyzing
found that
it
(Schein,
any innovation?
define
innovation
of
organization
the
with
culture change
1985).
ultimately by
and
those
something
is
some of
What then had
the
therefore,
really
"new,"
who
its most
Was
is that we must
are
both members
in
interaction
in a position to perceive
informed
then
I
felt
changed?
perceptions of
outsiders
If both insiders and
corporation,
the organization
My sense about this issue
the organization and,
changes.
in a large
really reflected an affirmation of
assumptions
there
is, of course, also problematic.
some of the major changes that
had made
basic
a case of
"new"
outsiders agree
we
are
dealing
that
with
an
innovation.
This
empiricist.
messy.
this
definition
will
satisfy
the
positivistic
Measuring consensus in perceptions is difficult and
However,
if we
are
to understand what
organizational domain,
concepts
not
and
theoretical
and
if we
insights, we
off with the rich and messy
are
are
at
really goes on
in
to develop
better
this stage
better
insights of the ethnographer and
the
clinician (Schein, 1987).
The paper
will
is divided into several parts.
provide my own view of
analyze organizations:
the
central
In
Part I, I
variables needed to
1) A socio-technical paradigm;
2) Culture;
3) Information technology; 4) Structure; and 5) Process.
II,
In Part
I will spell out in hypothesis form what I consider to be the
necessary
assumptions
of
an
innovative
culture.
Part
III
explores some of the key characteristics of IT and states several
hypotheses about
the
relationship of
IT
to
innovative capacity,
III
4
and Part IV states some conclusions and unresolved issues.
to be
order
In
have made minimal
cultural
has
not,
I
on
My goal is not to summarize
innovation.
that
ideas
is a vast literature
into an area of
know, but to be provocative and push
analysis
these
out
laying
to what
references
organization design and
what we
in
efficient
to my
knowledge,
explored
been
very much as yet.
I. A Basic Socio-technical Paradigm for Analyzing Organizations
I will
about
nature
the
available
them are
start
of
the
for
some of
with
my underlying assumptions
analysis
organizational
of
are
There
organizations.
many
models
Many
systems.
of
flawed from the outset, however, because they conceptu-
ally separate the task and technical elements from the human and
organizational
organization
and
For
elements.
design
example,
advocate
and
concept of mission or goal,
as something that
one
should
of
strategy
start
with
a
then design the organization to
The human elements are
fullfill that mission or goal.
thought of
that
models
most
follows
typically
and must be adapted to
the
mission and the technical/structural elements.
In contrast, a socio-technical model
one
must
ones
the
in
integrate
the
mission
product
of
managerial
of
the
human
considerations
initial design process.
and goals
human
roles.
these human
the
of
beings
in
with
initial
organization
is,
entrepreneurial,
The assumptions,
actors will
The
would
limit
beliefs,
and
bias
argue
the
technical
formulation of
after all,
technical,
values,
the
that
and
a
and
biases
technical and
5
structural options considered, and will certainly affect the kind
of organizational design that is evolved.
Furthermore,
if
the
people
who will
be using
(however it may have been invented) are not
system
a given
involved
in
the initial design of the system, all kinds of unanticipated
problems may arise that make the system less effective than its
technical designers had forecast.
We see this especially in the
realm of information technology where the difficulties of implementation far outstrip the difficulties of invention.
For
designed,
example,
the
human
when
an
information
misunderstood or actively ignored.
is initially
either
totally
First a "small"
example
are
consequences
system
often
observed by Lotte Bailyn where the introduction of PCs to an
executive group was slowed down by the frequently discovered fact
that executives do not type and do not like to go into a learner
mode.
The enthusiastic implementers created a typing program to
deal with this issue and, to provide effective
learners,
arranged to have a bell
feedback to the
ring every time a mistake was
made (on the theory that an aural signal would get better attention than a visual signal).
But, the signal was also public and
no-one wanted others to know when they were making errors, so the
system had to be redesigned with the less vivid but more private
feedback signal.
A "larger" example occurred in one division of an aerospace company.
and schedule
company,
and
The general manager needed detailed performance
information for each project and program in the
designed a system that would provide such detail.
III
6
The
allowed
system
as
problems
soon
to
they
arose,
so
or
schedule
identify
he
performance
check
could
on
what
was
He felt he needed that information to deal with his
going wrong.
outside
as
him
stake-holders.
What
this
manager
did
not
anticipate
that
was
the
feel very threatened by the
project managers and engineers would
knowledge that their day to day behavior was being monitored.
the manager
asked
questions
problem areas,
about
they
If
found
it
difficult to respond because they had not had a chance to look at
the
reasons
for
well
known
in
phenomenon
happens
typically
system
anticipated this problem inasmuch as it
designers should have
a
The
from plan.
the observed deviations
that
is
the
What
psychology of control.
subordinates
who
feel
is
threatened
or
embarrassed by revealed information attempt to subvert the system
by
refusing
protect
the
enter
themselves.
designers
to
cannot
falsified,
be
invent
data
or
feeding
in
false
typically
Such
behavior
more
elaborate
information
leads
information
the
to
system
devices
that
leading to an escalation of resentment and
tension in the organization.
An
become
to
even more dangerous outcome is that the subordinates
dependent on
exercise
(McGregor,
the boss
whatever
1960,
to be
self-control
1967).
"If
the control system and cease
they
had
been
the President has all
exercising
the informat-
ion, we will fix only those problems that he shows himself
to be
concerned about."
The socio-technical solution is
the
people
concerned
in
initially to involve all
the system design.
This was eventually
7
done
above case because
in the
resentment
to create
dysfunctional
a solution.
It was
The
in his subordinates.
into a "redesign" of the
whole organization launched
invented
that it was
the manager realized
concluded
that
system and
the manager
had
a
valid need for the information but he did not need it simultaneSo the project members sugges-
ously with all of the employees.
information as soon as
ted a time delay-- they would get the
it
was available so that they could get to work on any problems that
were
The manager would
identified.
couple
of
problems,
later
days
or
even
so
before
by
that
he
get
the
inquired,
the
time
the
information a
same
he
inquired
about
teams
could
project
tell
him what was wrong and how they were dealing with
time
delay solved
motivated
effective
everyone's problem
organization.
The
and
led to
essential
it.
The
a much more
control
stayed
where the information was-- in the project teams.
Enough
information
and about
cal
is
known
and control
today
systems,
about
about
the
human
the design
problems
of
of equipment,
the human problems of automation to make socio-techniWhat typically stands
design entirely feasible.
in
the way
is cultural assumptions about the role of management and the role
of
technical
It
is
designers
for these
analyzed first
reasons
Figure
1).
1 about here
Insert Figure 1 about here
__________
the
initial
creation of
innovations.
that organizational culture
in defining
innovation (See Fig.
Insert
in
the conditions
must
be
for adaptation and
III
8
The
model
emphasizes
that
one
can study
adaptation and
innovation from the point of view of the organizational processes
that must be present, from the point of view of the organizational structure that must be in place, and from the point of view of
the
information technology that must be
inasmuch as
ultimately
the culture
used,
processes used
and
will determine how
will
influence
both
by the organization,
it
ions underlying innovation that will
elements.
cannot
Adopting
bypass the
available.
of
the technology
the
structure
is the cultural
and
is
the
assumpt-
influence each of the other
a socio-technical
analysis
However,
model
reminds
the cultural and
us
human
that
we
forces
at
work in organizations.
Culture
The overarching determinant of how organizations work is
the
culture that
cope
with
and
their
Culture
tions
the
is evolved
external
internal
can
that
therefore,
problems
problems
be defined
has
in the organization as
worked
as
to be taught
perceive, think, and feel
of
the
well
of
survival
enough
in the
integration
pattern of
to
to new members
environment
(Schein,
learned
be
it's members
basic
considered
1985).
assump-
valid
and,
as the correct way to
in relation to the problems of survival
and integration.
Culture manifests
espoused values, what
culture.
and
itself in overt behaviors, norms, and
can be
thought of
as
the artifacts of
the
Culture is also expressed in some of the less conscious
operational
values
that
members
share.
But
unless
one
9
deciphers the underlying, often implicit and unconscious pattern
of taken for granted assumptions, one has not really analyzed the
culture per se.
Culture
life
daily
Stability
of
predictability
and hence
cannot
Culture,
stabilizes
to what
provides meaning
and
members
for
is essential
the
they do.
the members
Without predicatability they cannot function
of an organization.
and
overt manifestations
its
and
the
avoid
that
anxiety
loss
attends
of
meaning.
therefore, an inherently conservative
once in place, is,
force.
"strength"
The
founders;
organizational
organization;
culture
a
will
be
a
function
of
1) the strengths of the initial convictions of
several variables:
the
of
3) the
2)
the
the
intensity of
group
or
learning experience
in
stability
of
the
terms of number of crises survived and the emotional intensity of
those
shared crises;
4) the degree to which the learning process
has been one of anxiety avoidance rather than positive reinforcement.
will
The more the culture serves to reduce anxiety, the more it
resist change.
assumptions
Cultural
tend
toward
a consistent
paradigm
to the extent that the culture creators have a consistent set of
assumptions in the first place and to the extent that the organization's
learning
experiences
provide
consistency.
If
the
members of an organization learn inconsistent things in order to
survive
possibly
remain
integrated,
they
will
have
ambiguous
assumptions
that
they
can
and
comfortable with
(Martin,
1987).
inconsistent
nevertheless
and
feel
III
10
To the extent that culture is a learned product of group
experience, there will be a culture wherever there is a group, in
the sense of a set of people who share common experiences over a
their
a total culture
can have
then,
sub-
strength varying
as a
will
one
A total organiza-
identified above.
function of the same factors
tion,
have
sub-groups,
them,
in each of
cultures
group
many
into
time
over
themselves
differentiate
organizations
most
as
Inasmuch
time.
of
period
as
as well
sub-
of
a set
cultures, and any given member of the organization will simulta"possess" elements of all of the cultures that he or she
neously
is
of
will,
& Barley,
(Van Maanen
a member of
course,
be
family,
community,
groups that the person belongs to and
And
1984).
some of these
occupational,
and
other
identifies with outside of
the organization.
that members of organizations have multiple group
Given
memberships and that they will identify to different degrees with
these various groups,
culture,
overall
entire
have
it is not at all anomalous to have a strong
yet
have
"deviant"
that
sub-cultures
elements
are deviant
within
it,
or
to
"counter-cultural"
or
because of their external connections such as to a strong professional group or an international union
(Martin & Siehl,
1983).
We know that culture evolves and can be changed, but we
have not
of
and
analyzed carefully enough
any given
culture
innovation.
possible
tive,
Or,
that would more
put
to
to conceive of
that would have
what the
the
or
its
less facilitate
question more
a type of culture
as
characteristics
directly,
that would be
learning dynamic
the
are
change
is
it
innova-
invention of
11
environmentally responsive new solutions rather than conservative
self-preservation?
culture
that
And
would
is
it
favor
possible to conceive of a type of
socio-technical
design
innovations
instead of the traditional technology driven ones?
Before
answering
these
questions
in
Part
II,
some
attention must be given to the other elements in the model.
Information Technology.
Cultures
technologies
first
that
place.
One
are
built
caused
may
the
as a function of
involved.
Chemical,
high
and
organization
expect
therefore,
and
around
respond
to
be
organizational
heavy
the
created
cultures
the kind of core
tech,
to
core
in
to
the
vary,
technology that is
manufacturing,
financial,
other service industries will each evolve somewhat different
"industry"
cultures
that
will
influence
organizational
cultures.
But all organizations have in common the need to communicate, to get information to the right place at the right time to
make it possible to appropriately divide labor and coordinate the
effort of organization
likened
to
the
members.
life blood of
The
flow of
information can be
the system, and the information
channels can be likened to the circulatory system.
IT
in
use
important
at
any given
determinant
of
time
the
is,
therefore,
organization's
The state of
likely
capacity
to
to
be
an
learn.
What then should be the characteristics of the information system
to maximize the capacity of the organization to learn, adapt, and
innovate?
Information
technology
is
central
to
this
analysis
III
12
because
its own evolution has made possible
extraordinary
magnitude.
innovative
leaps of
Today some organizations are
being
designed on totally different premises by taking advantage of the
capabilities of
IT.
We
can
conceptualize
this best
by distin-
guishing three kinds of utopian visions that have grown up around
IT:
1) The Vision to Automate:
Most of the critical
funct-
ions in the organization are taken over by robots or computerized
systems
run by
highly
skilled and
trained professional
2) The Vision to Informate:
operators.
By building accurate models
of critical processes in the organization it is possible not only
to
automate
such processes but
to make
visible and understandable to everyone
is what
Zuboff
obviously
has
(1988)
tremendous
for managers at all
2a).
calls
the processes themselves
in the organization.
"informating"
implications
the
not
organization,
only
for
workers
the
and
but
levels.
Informating
Up:
In
this
vision,
IT
is used
aggregate and centralize as much information about all
of
This
organization
as
possible
control by top management.
The
to
facilitate
to
the parts
planning
and
organization becomes transparent
to its top management.
2b).
systems
Informating
forces
Down:
an analysis
of
In
the
this
core
processes of the organization and makes
workers.
Instead of
vision
the
production
design
of
and other
those transparent to
understanding only a small
piece of the
total process, workers become familiar with the whole process and
can,
therefore,
make decisions
that previously were
made by
13
various layers of management.
A few organizations think
3) The Vision to Transform:
of
ize
even more radical innovations by asking how one might organthe
basic
work,
the
communication
patterns,
authority
to fully take advantage of the possibilities inherent
relations,
Socio-technical design considerations
in IT.
and
become primary to
integrate the technical and human capabilities.
Such
being
organizations may
form,
a totally different
like complex networks in which communication and
more
shift
around
the task
and
chains
authority
take
requirements
of
and
change
the motivation
to
according
and
skills of
the
the
people.
Adaptation
and
innovation
are
involved
to
varying
in each of these visions, but in the vision to automate
degrees
and the vision to informate up, we are only talking of converting
processes that are already happening into more efficient execution of those same processes.
Thus robots and various other
kinds of machine controlled work are important innovations in the
production
process,
and
sophisticated
information
systems
that
permit high levels of centralized control are innovations in the
degree to which information can be rapidly collected and centralized, but it is only with informating down and transforming that
we get more radical innovation in the nature of the organization
In these instances IT creates new concept of how work is
itself.
to
be
done
defined.
and
how
the
management
process
itself
is
to be
What this means is that the cultural assumptions about
the nature and use of IT will themselves be a crucial determinant
III
14
of how IT will be used to create further innovation.
Organizational
Processes.
Over time
ses,
recurrent events
organization
is
organization
processes
they
every
to
coordinate
problems
punish, and,
above,
but
and
time
visible
given
of
permit the members of
the
with
make
decisions,
the
invisible,
and
are
a
other.
with each
how
Such
other,
they
how
implement
basic
cultural
whereas
the
analysis,
of
the
processes
we
need
that
to
1988).
culture
are
as
largely
evolve
over
fully understand
to
observable
then,
the
assumptions
In order
therefore,
and
(Schein, 1987,
reflection
analyzable.
assumptions
this
each
how they organize work, supervise, reward,
organization,
underlying
purposes
and
procesthe
effectively
primary
of
task of
members communicate
processes
implicit
any
the
in general deal with people
Such
are
develops a set
insure that
fulfilled and that
decisions arrived at,
defined
that
concern how
solve
organization
specify
both
processes.
the question
is what
the
For
kinds of
cultural assumptions must be present to facilitate organizational
processes that will increase the likelihood that the organization
will be able to learn, adapt, and innovate?
Organizational Structure.
Some
rules,
processes become
manuals,
organization
stable
charts,
and
and
are
articulated
other
more
in
permanent
documents reflecting how management feels things should be done.
The
ultimate
division
of
labor
as
embodied
in
job
descriptions
15
and
of
organizational units, the basic organization design in terms
who
reports
typically
to whom
thought
structure.
of
and
as
who
the
is
major
accountable
for
what
elements
the
"formal"
of
are
But as in the case of organizational processes, these
structures are ultimately a reflection of the underlying cultural
assumptions.
One of
the
common misconceptions
in this
area
is
that structure can be analyzed as a factor separate from culture.
If
one starts with a socio-technical model of organizations,
cannot
separate
whether
some
encourage
kinds
of
structure
formal
from culture.
One
structures are more
can,
likely to
however,
assumptions will
favor
the
ask
facilitate or
learning, adaptation, and innovation, and,
cultural
one
if so, what
evolution
of
such
structures?
In
structure,
stable
most
those
but
regarded
are
organizations
one
also
processes
are
observed
supported
that
only
by
implicit
finds
an
to
norms
"informal"
be
relatively
and
are
to be unsanctioned or even to run counter to the
structure.
It is the existence of such counter structures
often
formal
based
on sub-cultures that may be "counter-cultures" that may determine
in important ways what kind of innovation is possible.
The
"parallel"
what
informal
structures
structure
that
includes
are designed to
"compensatory"
structures
or
project
may be
may
teams
be
1988).
relatively
temporary
Such
permanent
processes
in the formal
compensatory
such as
such
or
offset or supplement
may be weaknesses and dysfunctional elements
structure (Schein, 1980,
tees
also
as
or
parallel
standing committask
forces
and
set up to work only on specific and time bound
III
16
tasks.
Most
without
the
informal
effectively,
done
theories
organization
organization
and,
must be explicitly analyzed
understand the
this
paper
the
question
assumptions would
informal
then
favor the
structure
that
the
that
and well
system and
total
simply
things
therefore,
how
most
informal
it works.
becomes
what
favor
fact
would
understood
evolution of
would
the
acknowledge
not
that
get
structure
if we are to
purposes of
For
kind
of
patterns of
learning,
cultural
formal
and
adaptation,
and innovation?
it is my argument that
To sum up,
the
necessary and
in order to determine
sufficient conditions for an innovative organ-
ization, we must specify the characteristics of the culture that
favor
ses,
the kind of
and
formal
information
and
technology, organizational proces-
informal
organizational
structure
that
increases the likelihood of the occurrence of innovation.
II. Characteristics of an Innovative Culture.
Organizational
dimensions.
and
state
cultures
can
analyzed
along
many
I will specify a minimum set, as shown in Table 1,
in hypothesis
innovative capacity.
form the
assumptions necessary for
Table 1 can also be used as a diagnostic
device for analyzing any given culture.
Insert Table 1 about here
__________
be
17
1.
Organization-environment Relationships.
THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
C.
HYPOTHESIS
IT ASSUMES
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT
ITS
THAT
ENVIRONMENTS
ARE
CONTROLLABLE, CHANGEABLE, AND MANAGEABLE.
Organizations can be distinguished by the shared assumpthey hold
tions
about
the
their existence
and
act
and
fatalistic
that
feel completely dependent and assume
is out of
survival
are
in
passive
are
At one extreme we have
dominated by their various environments.
organizations that
they dominate or
to which
degree
They
their own control.
the
face of
environmental
They accept whatever niche the environment provides.
turbulence.
At the other extreme we have organizations that hold the
shared
assumption that
extent
of
survival and
that
and
environment
their own behavior will
to which they actively are able
environment.
their
progress
and
Implied
improvement
is
the
possible,
are
are
growth
influence the
a function
to dominate
further
a
of
the
some aspects
assumption
basically
that
optimistic
orientation toward the environment.
Innovative
members
assume
that
capacity
will
innovation
to
increase
is possible
the
extent
and necessary,
that
which
derives from their optimistic assumption that the environment can
be
Organizations
influenced.
that
they
are
dominated
environments are
by
fixed will
that pessimistically assume either
others
and/or
assume
that
their
find it difficult to conceive of new
ideas and will find it even more difficult to marshall the energy
III
18
to try out new ideas.
2. The Nature of Human Activity.
HYPOTHESIS C2.
THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES THAT THE APPROPRIATE HUMAN
ACTIVITY IS TO BE PROACTIVE,
ORIENTED TOWARD PROBLEM SOLVING AND
IMPROVING THINGS.
All
organizations
make
implicit
assumptions
about
whether the appropriate behavior of members is to be 1) reactive,
fatalistic, and oriented to getting what pleasure one can out of
one's
lot
in
life
(Dionysian),
and oriented toward improving
a
middle
ground
of
trying
2) to
be
proactive,
things (Promethean),
to
harmonize
and
optimistic,
or 3) to take
compromise
between
one's own needs and whatever environmental constraints and possibilities exist
are
(Apollonian).
As will be
the individual level counterpart to
noted these assumptions
the assumptions relating
the organization to its environment.
An
innovator
in
the
people will find it virtually
midst
of
reactive
or
harmonizing
impossible to get even an audience
much less a commitment to new ways of doing things.
or Apollonian
organizations,
whistle-blowers,
neutralized.
innovators are
likely
In Dionysian
to be
called
boat rockers, or trouble makers, and thus to be
And
if
the
culture
is
too
fatalistic
it
will
of
course not attract or retain innovators in the first place.
One may wish
to
speculate whether there
is
an upper
19
limit
If there are too many innovators
to activity orientation.
and if the culture strongly encourages innovation will that cause
other
problems
unpredictable?
and
innovation
by
not,
I believe
In other words, if the organi-
innovation to a tolerable level.
enable
undermine
invent and evolve processes and structures that reduce
tion will
control,
is going out of
zation
will
innovation becomes a problem, the organiza-
too much
if
because
end,
the
in
chaotic
too
life
making
that,
its own
innovativeness will
to invent mechanisms to achieve greater discipline and
it
control.
The
passive
stagnate
or
reverse
fatalistic
until
it
not
is
cannot
fails
or
An
true.
invent
is taken
organization
"proactivity."
over by
too
is
that
It will
others who
will
forcibly change the culture by massive replacement of people with
a different activity orientation.
I am hypothesizing,
therefore,
that one cannot have too much innovativeness but one can have too
much conservatism and passivity.
3.
The Nature of Reality and Truth.
THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
HYPOTHESIS C3.
INCREASE
TO
THE
EXTENT
ARRIVED AT BY PRAGMATIC
they
hold
whether something
IT ASSUMES
THAT TRUTH
TO
BE
degree
to
IS
(VS. MORALISTIC) MEANS.
Organizations
which
THAT
shared
can be distinguished
assumptions
is true or not.
by the
about how one determines
When a complex decision has to
III
20
be made involving uncertain
validity,
what
futures and
criteria does
the
information of uncertain
organization use
to determine
when it has enough and the right kind of information to make the
decision?
At
dogma,
one extreme one finds a heavy reliance on tradition,
the
elders.
either
authority
At
in
of
moral
principles,
the other extreme
a search
error
attitude
ical
(England,
for
one
finds
the
If
or
a trial
and
is not possible or pract-
the decision
verification by physical means
wisdom of
pragmatism embodied
scientific verification
if formal verification
1975).
or
is
in a domain where
is not possible,
pragmatism would
imply that the decision makers debate out the issues and subject
each
alternative
to
sufficient
scrutiny
that
the
one
that
sur-
vives can be accepted with some measure of confidence.
In
various
organizations
sorts
it
is
not
dominated
by
only difficult
dogma
to
or
authorities
articulate
new ideas
but even more difficult to get the sanction to try them out.
exception is,
of
An
of course, the situation where the innovator is the
person in authority, a situation that arises from time to time in
history
tion
but that
or
to
is hard to
predict.
To
specify as an organizational condiincrease
the
generally,
a positive value must be
tradition,
on trying out new things even if
such a value must be
innovative
capacity
put on novelty, on breaking
they are
risky, and
supported by an underlying assumption that
"the truth" is not already known.
The
positive
pragmatic end of the continuum also
attitude
toward
trial
and
error,
risk
implies a more
taking,
and
the
21
of
acceptance
that
procedures
for
in
The message
succeed.
new things
fail,"
the
take
only
if you
moralistic
such
it will
be
innovation
to
the harder
for
is
organizations
sure you will
are
and
systems,
rules,
necessary
risks
the
more
The
failures.
institutionalized,
become
to
members
or
dogmas,
to
committed
is
organization
efforts
unsuccessful
"try
not break rules or
a prescription for conservatism and playing it safe.
4. The Nature of Time.
HYPOTHESIS C4A. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
TO THE
INCREASE
EXTENT
IT
THAT
IS
ORIENTED TO
THE
NEAR
FUTURE
(VS. PAST, PRESENT OR FAR FUTURE).
HYPOTHESIS C4B. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT USES MEDIUM LENGTH TIME UNITS
SHORT
ONES
THAT
DONT
INNOVATION
ALLOW
TO DEVELOP OR
(VS.
LONG ONES
THAT MAKE INNOVATION DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE).
All
organizations
hold
implicit
assumptions
about
the
relative importance of the past, the present, and the future, and
all organizations have implicit assumptions about the appropriate
length of
time units for different kinds of tasks.
in
zations
measure
themselves
months,
some use
intermediate
and
some
use
longer units
short
units
Some organi-
such as
weeks
or
units such as quarters and years,
such as
5 or
10
year
spans.
All
organizations use all of these units for various different purpo-
III
22
ses, and, as Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) pointed out years ago the
different functional units of an organization such as sales and
R & D will have very different assumptions about what it means to
be "on time" and how long units of work are.
It
will
be
units.
is likely
found
that
in each organization's
assumptions about the
"really
culture
there
important"
The actual size of the relevant time units will vary from
company to company, so the determination of what is "past,"
sent,"
time
"near
future,"
and
"far
future"
must
be
"pre-
determined
for
each organization studied by getting members' consensus on these
units.
core
The
size
of
technologies
development
of
such
that
time
the
units
is
also
organization
new products,
for
is
example,
influenced by
working
with.
takes much
the
The
longer
in
the pharmaceutical industry than in the consumer goods industry.
Organizations that live in the past or present will find
it difficult to place a value on novelty because they are focused
on what has worked or is working now.
be
dismissed
easily because
organization
likes
organization
is
to
think
focused
on
their
ideas
about.
On
the
launch any innovation because
plenty of
People with new ideas can
far
it
time to try things
do
not
"fit"
the other hand,
future
it may be
the
future."
if
the
the
unable
is assumed that there
"in
what
to
is always
A near
future
orientation should, therefore, be most favorable to innovation.
It
is
also
clear
that
too
short
a time
orientation
will always make innovation difficult because one can always show
that short-run costs are too high to justify continuation of the
trial
and
error
involved
in
innovation.
On
the other hand,
if
23
the
time units are too long, some innovations that are failures
will be allowed to continue too long, the organization will lose
money,
and
the
whole
innovation process will
be undermined
because people will remember how they were hurt by past innovations.
The ability of the organization to develop a sense of an
optimal length of time for an innovation thus becomes a very
important determinant of its learning capacity.
This optimal length of time will be subjectively defined
in most organizations, and must be measured within each organization, as indicated above.
The precise length of the units is not
as important as the members' ability to recognize that giving an
innovation too little or too much time is equally destructive to
the overall innovation process.
Optimal
length
time
units
play
also
a role
in
the
selling of an innovative vision, whether that comes from leaders
or from other innovators in the organization.
The vision of the
future cannot exceed the ability of members of the organization
to understand what is proposed, nor can it promise benefits that
will only be realized by the next generation.
To be motivated to
implement something new, people have to be able to see what
benefits that will bring them within their own "lifetime."
As
Jaques has argued
(1976,
1982)
the
length of
time
over which organization members have "discretion" appears to vary
with organizational rank.
On the shop floor supervisors check on
employees by the hour or the day.
At lower managerial levels one
has discretion over weeks, and so on up the ladder until the most
senior
management
is
supposed to define
its tasks
in terms
of
III
24
In
years.
communicating
it becomes critical
tions
the
future
of
impact
proposed
then to consider over what
innova-
time units
in this
"Optimal" time units,
the audience is used to thinking.
are partly defined by the actual innovative task that is
context,
being proposed or undertaken.
5. The Nature of Human Nature.
HYPOTHESIS C5. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES THAT PEOPLE ARE ULTIMATELY
NEUTRAL OR GOOD, AND, IN ANY CASE, ARE CAPABLE OF IMPROVEMENT.
Organizations
make
assumptions
implicit
about
both in terms of whether it is ultimately good,
nature,
neutral,
or evil, and in terms of how malleable or fixed it is.
are
nizations
they
will
cynical
about
not encourage
nature
innovation
In
Theory
X)
will mistrust
such
organizations
innovative
capacity often is devoted to defeating organizational
life
invent elaborate
easier for
efficiency
Dickson,
themselves
(Argyris,
1964;
assumptions
listen
at
processes
and
the expense
McGregor,
devices
to make
of organizational
1960;
Roethlisberger
&
1939).
On the other hand,
expect
motives.
worse,
orga-
as
Workers
ulterior
or,
(McGregor's
If
innovators
goals.
having
human
human
about
people
human
to be
if the organization holds optimistic
nature
innovative,
(McGregor's
Theory
will encourage
Y),
it
will
innovation,
will
to new ideas, and will be more likely to trust them.
At
25
the
same
time,
members must
that
one's
knows one
for
feel
innovation to
that
and
personality
can grow and
are
they
all
be encouraged
"perfectible"
contribution
improve,
organization
is
in the
not fixed.
sense
If
this knowledge (assumption)
one
acts
as a powerful stimulant to personal development and innovation.
6. The Nature of Human Relationships.
HYPOTHESIS C6A. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATIONN TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES THE IDEAL OF INDIVIDUALISM
AND THE PURSUIT OF INDIVIDUAL DIVERSITY.
HYPOTHESIS
C6B.
BUT,
IF
AN
ORGANIZATION HAS
INDIVIDUALS WHOSE IDEAS ARE ADOPTED,
A
FEW
INNOVATIVE
IT CAN IMPLEMENT SOME TYPES
OF INNOVATIONS FASTER TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES THE IDEAL OF
GROUPISM.
HYPOTHESIS C6C.
THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES THAT COLLEGIAL/PARTICIPATIVE METHODS OF DECISION MAKING ARE THE MOST APPROPRIATE.
HYPOTHESIS C6D.
BUT, IF AN ORGANIZATION HAS INNOVATIVE PEOPLE IN
SENIOR LEADERSHIP ROLES,
IT CAN IMPLEMENT SOME INNOVATIONS FASTER
TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES AUTHORITARIAN/PATERNALISTIC METHODS
OF DECISION MAKING.
This
dimension of
culture has
to do with
prevailing
III
26
assumptions
about the
ideal
human
relationship.
Two dimensions
are involved here:
1) The degree
ideal
from
of
to which the
"individualism"
(that
individual effort)
ultimately come
or
The degree
good
assumes
ultimately
(that all good
the
come
things
implying that ultimately all
themselves to the group),
to which ideal
collegial/participative
things
"groupism"
from the group,
individuals must subordinate
2)
all
organization
(implying
and,
relationships are
that
power
and
seen as
influence
in
decision making is a function of who has what expertise relevant
to any given task to be accomplished) or as
istic
(implying
that
power
and
influence
autocratic/paternalreside
in
positions,
statuses and roles, or are a function of the specific personality
of the individual).
The
complex
and
hypotheses
contingent
around
these
because under
two dimensions
certain
conditions
tion could occur anywhere along these two dimensions.
values
innova-
Basically
a culture
that
have more
ideas to draw from and create more incentives for ideas
to be put forward.
individuals
are more
and
individual
diversity will
However, when it comes to acceptance of ideas
and implementation, the strongly individualistic organization may
be at some disadvantage.
In other words, in a groupist organiza-
tion it will be harder to get new ideas to be articulated, but if
they are adopted, such an organization will be far more effective
in
implementing
suppress
them
their dissent
because
for
individuals
the sake of the
who
may
dissent
will
total group's welfare.
In such organizations the burden of
innovation probably
27
falls
on
in that
leadership
the
likely
the most
are
they
to
be
What the deter-
able to get an idea adopted in the first place.
minants are of innovativeness in the leaders of groupist organizations then becomes the secondary but critical question.
Collegial/participative
to
decision making
is
likely
more
identify the relevant areas in which innovation is needed,
ideas,
good
surface
stimulate
to
everyone understands the
affairs where
state of
and
creativity,
to
produce
to
a
idea so that it
This assumption is central because
will be properly implemented.
collegial/participative decision making influences so many phases
of the total innovation process from invention to implementation,
particularly
if
the new
on
the
idea
or
is
process
complex and
hard
to
understand.
If,
innovative
leader has
too complex
hand,
other
an
autocratic
if the ideas are not
ideas that are sound,
to communicate,
or paternalistic
and if the socio-technical implicatit
ions have been correctly thought through,
is possible for the
organization to implement such ideas more rapidly and totally.
leader
will
this situation
danger in
The
impose an
threefold:
is
1) That the
idea that is wrong under conditions where
subordinates are neither motivated nor rewarded for pointing out
the potential problems;
2) That the idea will not be successfully
communicated leading to paralysis and
idea will
discover
she
had
be
that
implemented
innovation.
incorrectly because
subordinates
in mind
and/or
frustration; or 3) That the
did
did
not
fully
not accept
the leader did not
understand what
the
consequences
he
of
or
the
III
28
One additional point bearing on this assumption needs to
be
brought out.
If predictions about the ultimate
impact of
IT
are correct, then leaner, flatter, more highly networked organizations are the likely consequence
Such
organizations
managers are
degree
effectively,
or paternalistic assumptions
authority in
of
work
however,
skill
or
such networks
expertise
that
(Schein,
if
their
will more
any given
1989).
likely be
member
given moment in time relative to the task to be done.
authority
1987).
still operating from hierarchical models buttressed
by autocratic
basis of
cannot
(Drucker, 1988; Malone,
will
mean
function better
very
little.
Obviously
such
has
at
The
the
any
Positional
systems
if they hold collegial/participative
will
assumptions
in the first place.
7. Sub-cultural Diversity.
HYPOTHESIS C7.
THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO
INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ENCOURAGES DIVERSE BUT CONNECTED
SUB-CULTURES.
As
organizations grow and mature they develop
tures as well as overarching cultures.
of such sub-cultures will
capacity.
However,
the
sub-systems with their
it
to
manage
is a homogenizing force.
organization contains within
enough diverse
can
The nature and diversity
influence the organization's innovative
For any given group, culture
if
sub-cul-
innovate
its
total
system,
own diverse sub-cultures,
by empowering
people and
ideas
from
29
those sub-cultures that are most different from the "parent" yet
best
adapted
to a changing environment.
sub-cultures is,
and
Drawing
on diverse
in fact, the commonest way that cultures evolve,
this process,
if
properly managed,
is therefore
one of
the
most important sources of potential innovation.
The
sub-cultures must be connected and part of a parent
culture or their elements will not be seen as relevant
duced
into the parent.
decentralized
For example,
organization
new
if intro-
in a highly geographically
ideas
may
well
spring
up
in
an
overseas subsidiary, but those ideas are only importable into the
parent
organization
genuinely part of
if
the
subsidiary
the larger culture.
If
is
perceived
the
ideas are brought
to
be
in via transfer of people from the subsidiary, those people will
only
have credibility and influence
if
they are perceived to be
part of the larger culture and sympathetic to it.
It
for so many
is
this
is
that
loose
be
within
unity
theme
that
accounts
current management statements that the effective
organization
can
diversity
one
that
and
can
both
tight at
the
centralize
same
time.
and
decentralize,
To restate
the
point, diversification and decentralization are effective as
innovative forces only to the extent that the separate units are
perceived to be and feel themselves to be connected to the whole.
If
they do not
feel connected
innovate on behalf of the whole.
they will
not be motivated to
If they are not perceived to be
connected, their ideas will not be perceived as relevant.
11
30
Summary.
in order to be innovative an organization-
To summarize,
al culture must assume:
1) That the world is changeable and
an be managed,
2) That humans are by nature proactive problem solvers,
3) That truth is pragmatically arrived at,
4) That the appropriate time horizon is near future,
5) That time units should be geared to the kind of
innovation being considered,
is neutral or good and is,
6) That human nature
in any
case, perfectible,
7)
That
human
are
relationships
based on
individualism
and the valuing of diversity,
8) That decision making is collegial/participative,
9)
diverse
That
sub-cultures
encouraged,
but
that
are
an
asset
sub-cultures
have
to
to
be
be
connected to the parent culture.
Having stated these conditions for what must be true in
the
what further conditions must be present
overall culture,
in
the state of information technology?
III. Characteristics of an Information Technology for Innovation.
I am making
function only
if
channels
assumption
it can take
process information.
ation
the
are
that any open system can
in, move around,
and appropriately
Information is the life blood, and informthe
circulatory
system of
the
organization.
If the organization is to be capable of innovation, what must be
true of the information system?
31
Parenthetically, I am assuming that if the above specified cultural conditions are not present, the organization is not
likely to develop or implement an ideal information system, or if
such a system should for
some reason be present,
the system in ways that I will detail below.
it will misuse
So having an ideal
system from a technological point of view will not by
solve the problem of innovation.
to
things
happen.
innovation
in the
However,
culture,
itself
Technology alone will not cause
given
it
right
the
is possible
conditions
to specify
for
how an
information system will enhance the chances for innovation.
1. Networking capacity.
HYPOTHESIS IT1.
THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT HAS TOTAL NETWORKING CAPACITY.
My
new
assumption here
ideas and
the capacity to
at any given point
I am not assuming
at all
is
the capacity to
implement
innovations may require
that those
Especially
connections have to be operational
it will favor innovation if the capacity
important
will
be
cultures so that
new ideas that may arise
chance
perceived
of
being
invent
in time connecting everyone to everyone else.
times, only that
there.
is that both
by other
channels
between
sub-
in sub-cultures have a
sub-cultures
and
the parent
culture.
The
exist in
network does
not have
to
be electronic.
It
can
the form of frequent meetings that involve everybody, a
III
32
heavy travel schedule that gets everyone to all parts of the organization,
an
system,
technologies
sophisticated
The more
mail
efficient
a good
system,
phone
become more
etc.
relevant as
the
constraints of time and space become more costly.
2. Routing and filtering capacity.
HYPOTHESIS
IT2A.
THE
CAPACITY
OF
AN
ORGANIZATION
TO
INNOVATE
WILL INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT CAN OPEN AND CLOSE CHANNELS
AS NEEDED.
HYPOTHESIS
IT2B.
CAPACITY
THE
OF
AN
ORGANIZATION
TO
INNOVATE
WILL INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT CAN FILTER INFORMATION IN THE
CHANNNELS AS NEEDED.
My
assumption here
not desirable at
certain
ent
to
is that a fully connected network is
For certain kinds of
all times.
stages of the innovation process,
keep open only
those channels
tasks and for
it may be more effici-
that are
necessary
for
The organization must have the process
efficient implementation.
capacity to diagnose its information needs but it must also have
the technical capacity to implement its diagnosis in the sense of
opening and closing channels as needed.
In
arguing
authoritarian
for
system,
closes
channels
can be
available
as
this
i.e.
needed.
capacity
some higher
I am not
reverting
authority
I am suggesting
in a collegial/participative
that
to an
opens
or
that such capacity
system as well in
33
that members can choose to open and close channels themselves as
they perceive this to be appropriate.
Just as the organization needs the technical capacity to
open
and
close
information
overloads,
channels,
flows
2)
to
so
it
along given
prevent
needs
channels
the
capacity
to
inappropriate
1) avoid
information
to
filter
information
getting
to
some members, and 3) to insure that appropriate information gets
to those members who need it.
capacity
again,
along
it
reverting
with
implies
to
an
the
that
Again this
technical
such
capacity
filtering
authoritarian
can
implies diagnostic
of
the
be
hierarchical
system,
and
designed
without
system.
A
good
example of such a system is the Information Lens and Object Lens
technology
developed
by
Malone
that
allows
the
members
of
network to specify rules for routing and filtering that are
automatically
implemented
(La
&
Malone,
1988;
Malone,
the
then
et
al,
1989).
3. Connectivity to Environment; "Openness" of the system.
HYPOTHESIS IT3.
THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT HAS MULTIPLE OPEN CHANNELS TO AND
FROM ITS ENVIRONMENTS.
Organizations are open socio-technical systems embedded
in
multiple environments.
If they cannot
is
going on in those environments
accurately track what
they cannot
which innovation is more or less important.
identify areas
in
Similarly, they can-
W11
34
not
assess
if
efforts
the effects
they
behavior on
the
observe
cannot
innovative and adaptive
their own
of
of
effects
the environment that are
those parts of
innovative
their
intended
to
be impacted.
the environment are necessary, but
Multiple channels to
they
also be
must
but
knowledge
the
stays
incoming
Many organizations
appropriately.
processed
appropriate
the
so that the
the organization
within
to
connected
in
departments
that
decision points
information can be
know a great
deal
effectively
cannot
integrate, and act on the knowledge (Schein, 1980).
utilize,
4. Capacity to evolve own IT system technologically.
HYPOTHESIS IT4.
THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT HAS THE CAPACITY TO FULLY UNDERIMPLEMENT INNOVATIONS IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ITSELF
STAND AND
AS
THESE MAY APPLY TO
VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE ORGANIZATION'S
TASKS.
What
is
implied here
own use of
IT as
modify
its
and as
new ideas arise on how
capacity to
is the organization's
new possibilities
become
available
to use existing technology.
This
means that somewhere in the total system must reside good information
on
current
possibilities.
external
sources,
capacities
Such
but
and
good
information
the
may
information
places to be acted on approptiately.
information
come
has
to
from
get
on
future
internal
to
the
or
right
Various aspects of IT such
35
as
office automation,
understood,
but must
CAD/CAM,
be
and
flexibly
so
adopted
mission of the organization (Thomas,
IV.
on must not only be well
to
support
the
basic
1988).
Interaction of Culture and Information Technology
Implied in the above analysis is that cultural assumpt-
ions can and will limit the degree to which IT can be and will be
used.
The
simply not
kind of
be
proactivity,
information network
installed
in
and
above will
in organizations that do not believe
mastering
decision making,
described
their
so on.
environment,
But
that
is
not
in
in
participative
the
whole
story.
The technology itself can and will gradually affect organizational
cultures by what
it makes possible,
interaction between the
culture and
and in some cultures the
the technology will,
in the
long run, be destructive to adaptive capacity and innovation.
In
order to examine these interactions we must first examine some of
the
properties
of
I.T.
and
show how
those can become
forces to
unfreeze the present culture.
I.T.
as a force unfreezing culture.
If one thinks of the information technology community as
itself a sub-culture, one can identify certain of its assumptions
that,
if
implemented
lead
to
assumptions.
Specifically,
intrinsically
good
for
the
unfreezing
of
other
IT community assumes
organizations
more widely distributed,
designers of
the
and more
to
have more
that it
rapidly disseminated.
IT increases:
is
information,
IT are therefore likely to highlight the
properties of the technology.
cultural
The
following
II]
36
1)
can more
people
more
Accessibility:
access
easily
information that is electronically available in a network;
information
2) Rapidity:
and
feedback can be
obtained
much more rapidly by electronic means in computer based networks;
information can be presented to large
3) Simultaneity:
numbers of people simultaneously even though they are geographically dispersed and are in different time zones;
4) Presentational flexibility:
information can simulta-
neously be presented in different ways to different people;
factors
relationships
complex
5)
Complexity:
in
information
can
be more
easily
and
contextual
with
represented
computer aided systems (e.g. three dimensional modelling);
6)
System
awareness:
requires accurate modelling
become
transparent
to
of processes,
information users
systems
information
creating
and
these
models
then
(the essence of what
Zuboff means by "informating");
7)
possible
System/network
for all members
accountability:
to become
dependence, of the fact that there
networks make
aware of their mutual
it
inter-
is no necessary higher author-
ity in the network, and hence that all members of the network can
be simultaneously accountable for network output;
8) Team work capacity:
the combination of simultaneity
it possible for real
team work
to occur where every member realizes his or her part,
and where
and
network accountability makes
all contributions
are transparent,
thus forcing mutual trust
(i.e. any abuse by any member is immediately visible to all other
members of the network);
37
9) Task based authority:
possible
to designate
given moment
authority
decision
in a functioning network it is
making
power
to whoever
at
any
in time has the most relevant information, and this
can
rotate
among
members
of
the
network
as
the
task
changes;
10)
Self-designing capacity:
psychologically possible
itself
and
to
adapt
for
the
to changing
it is technologically and
network
to constantly redesign
circumstances
if
the
necessary
power and flexibility have been built in initially.
As can be seen, these characteristics introduce a strong
bias toward collaborative team work in that such work becomes not
only
much more
more
appropriate
will face
feasible
to
in
the
an
electronic
complex
tasks
environment,
that
most
but
also
organizations
in the future.
What all of this means is that the introduction of IT is
a force that may stimulate culture change by first of all forcing
some
cultural
about
by
assumptions
out
into
the
(i.e.
assumptions
formal authority and managerial prerogatives),
and second,
clearly making alternative methods
Thus
if
either
sub-culture
the
within
leadership
the
networks, this will
of
a
organization
open
of coordination
total
organization
introduces
force cultural
possible.
or
some
sophisticated
IT
re-examination and reveal
which cultural assumptions will aid or hinder further utilization
of IT.
the
The further implication of
introduction of
IT may
be one
this line of argument is that
of
the most powerful ways of
unfreezing a culture and starting a process of change toward more
innovative capacity in general.
38
1. Presence of an IT subculture.
HYPOTHESIS
I/C
1:
THE
CAPACITY
OF
AN
ORGANIZATION
TO
INNOVATE
WILL INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT HAS SOMEWHERE WITHIN ITSELF A
FULLY
FUNCTIONING
CAN BE A
TECHNOLOGICALLY SOPHISTICATED
DEMONSTRATION OF
I.T.
SYSTEM THAT
I.T. CAPACITY AND A SOURCE OF DIFFUSION
TO OTHER PARTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
In
the
with
other words,
organization
the
at
assumptions
least
of
the organization where
such
a
sub-culture
condition
for
there must be
is
one
IT or
there will
only
2. Destructive I.T./culture
THE
sub-cultures of
that
not be
is
congruent
any place
within
IT can be appropriately utilized. However,
a
organizational
I/C 2A:
the
sub-subculture
necessary
and
innovation,
culture may prevent diffusionn of the
HYPOTHESIS
among
not
because
a
sufficient
the
larger
innovation.
interactions.
PROVISION OF
I.T.
FOR PURPOSES OF AUTOMA-
TION TO A MANAGEMENT THAT OPERATES BY THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THEORY X
WILL
THE
IN
LONG
THE
SHORT
RUN
RUN
WILL
PRODUCE
PRODUCE
PRODUCTIVITY
EMPLOYEE
IMPROVEMENTS
DEPENDENCE
AND
BUT
ANXIETY
IN
THAT
WILL REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF INNOVATION.
HYPOTHESIS
INFORMATING
I/C
2B:
TO A
THE
PROVISION OF
MANAGEMENT THAT
I.T.
OPERATES
FOR
BY
PURPOSES OF
UPWARD
THE ASSUMPTIONS OF
39
THEORY
X
CONTROL
LION,
WILL ALLOW SUCH MANAGEMENT A
THAT
WILL
REFUSAL TO
ALIENATE
USE THE
EMPLOYEES,
SYSTEM,
LEVEL OF
CAUSE
SURVEILLANCE AND
RESISTANCE,
FALSIFICATION OF DATA
REBEL-
ENTRY
IF
POSSIBLE, AND ULTIMATELY, TOTAL DEPENDENCY AND ABDICATION
OF
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
HYPOTHESIS
I/C 2C:
TING
TO
DOWN
THEORY X
GAINS,
A
THE PROVISION OF
MANAGEMENT
WILL PRODUCE
BUT WILL,
IN
THAT OPERATES
SHORT RUN
THE
I.T. FOR PURPOSES OF INFORMA-
LONG
BY
THE
ASSUMPTIONS
PRODUCTIVITY AND
RUN,
BE
SUBVERTED
BY
NEED TO CONTROL AND TO ASSERT WHAT IT REGARDS TO BE
OF
INVOLVEMENT
MANAGEMENT'S
ITS
PREROGA-
TIVES AND RIGHTS.
HYPOTHESIS
TRANSFORM
THE
I/C
AN
2D:
are
failure
MANAGEMENT
TERMS
MENTALITY
one examines cases
some
but
successful
zation's
CONTROL
IN
X
OF
I.T.
WILL
WILL
NOT
BE
ABLE
CAPABILITIES
PREVENT
THE
TO
BECAUSE
NECESSARY
INVOLVEMENT IN SYSTEM DESIGN AND UTILIZATION.
If
there
THEORY
ORGANIZATION
HIERARCHICAL
EMPLOYEE
A
specific
that
in the
suggest
short
of
patterns
certain
IT
implementation
that
not
only
failure,
explain
interactions which,
run, would be destructive
even
the
if
to the organi-
longer range capacity to innovate and adapt.
These
interactions involve specifically the cultural assumptions around
participation and control, and are shown in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
IN1
40
The various IT visions are shown down the left side and
the
cultural extremes
two
are
control
along
in
terms of
especially as these apply
respect
top.
the
shown
characterized
with
to
can most
easily
be
Theory X and
Theory
Y,
These
McGregor's
and
participation
to the CEO or senior management as
individuals.
stated
The
specific
above.
The
hypotheses
logic
behind
in Table
embedded
the
first
these
of
2 have
been
hypotheses
derives from prior and current research on automation, especially
the
research
of
Hirschhorn
(1987),
which
shows
that
workers
in
highly automated plants become anxious because of their high
level
of
and
responsibility,
the
absence
of
supportive
bosses.
Because they often do not understand the complex technology they
become
highly
stand.
This
dependent
on
combination
psychological
denial
and
the
anxiety level
they do
that
and
of dependency
conditions that may arise.
signals,
information
under-
anxiety can lead to
inability to manage
the
not
any crisis
That is, when the system sends alarm
is
so high
that workers assume
that
the information must be wrong and ignore it.
The
played out
scenario underlying
the second
in a number of organizations,
most dangerous because the sub-culture of
the
assumptions of
the short run there
a control
hypothesis has been
and is potentially the
IT plays directly into
oriented Theory
X management.
In
is the illusion that the IT system has given
management the perfect and ultimate control
tool, especially
the system designers can also be categorized as Theory X.
if
If one
41
has control oriented designers working with control oriented
managers one
is
bound
to get
an organization
that will
perfectly controlled but that will sooner or later fail
of employee commitment and involvement.
look
for lack
And certainly there will
be no motivation or capacity to innovate.
Evidence
for
the
third
hypothesis
comes
from
Zuboff's
study of the paper mill that dramatically increased its productivity
as
workers
learned
the
logic
behind
they were using and discovered that
the
automated
they could run the plant
perfectly well without lots of managerial control.
were not willing to give up this control;
workers
take
to
do
things
that
credit for some of
they
the
system
already
But managers
they started to order
knew
improvements,
how
to do,
and
to
leading workers to
resentfully abdicate and consequently to underutilize the system.
What
implemented
is
important
with
a Theory
to
note
is
Y management
that
the
would
same
have
system
entirely
positive results because the managers would be happy to have
workers
exercise more
control
and
take over the
system.
It
is
only the control need characteristic of the Theory X manager that
produces the destructive negative results.
The
Theory
visions
X
fourth
dominated
in
the
hypothesis
organization
first place,
is
self-evident,
will
not
and will
not
have
in
that
the
transformational
be able
to elicit
the
innovative capacity to start a transformation process.
In summary, the capabilities of IT in combination with a
hierarchically
results
control oriented management will produce
in each of
the
IT visions,
though those
negative
results may not
III
42
show up
initially.
operating
If
the designers of
from hierarchical
control
the
system are also
assumptions
we
have
the
potential of great harm to the organization in terms of its long
run
ability
to
innovate
and
to
adapt
to
changing
environmental
circumstances.
The
implication
is that the cultural assumptions around
employee involvement, the
of control,
nature of
project,
importance of hierarchy as a principle
the prerogatives and rights of managers, and the
authority are
because
the critical
the potential of
ones
IT as
to examine
a force
for
in any
IT
innovation
will not be achieved if those assumptions are too close to Theory
X.
Summary and conclusions.
We can summarize the hypotheses about IT by stating that
an
organization's capacity
to
innovate will
increase
to the
extent that it has:
1) The capacity to connect everyone,
2) The ability to open and close channels as needed,
3) The ability to filter information in the channels,
4) Multiple channels into and from the relevant environments, and to the relevant decision centers,
5) The capacity to use the most advanced IT systems,
6)
At
least
one
fully
functioning
advanced
IT
system
somewhere within the organization,
7)
A
Theory
Y
management
that
will
use
the
applications appropriately and sensitively.
IT
43
We
implement
force
noted
that
IT solutions,
to surface
culture will
but, at the
constrain the
same
time,
IT
and unfreeze cultural assumptions
ability
to
is a powerful
if
it can be
the
cultural
introduced anywhere in the organization.
If
the
favor
assumptions
processes
IT
and
capacity
is
innovation,
structures
that
present
if
organization
will
increase
likelihood
the
will
and
the
develop
of
members inventing and implementing those new ideas that will make
the organization more adaptive in a rapidly changing environment.
The
crucial
point
of
this analysis
is
to
note
that if
such technological and cultural conditions are not present,
pointless
to work on organizational processes and structures
directly.
People
may be necessary.
between culture
will
The
the
design.
and
the
as
resist the
IT capability will
kinds of
changes that
of
the
we get
the long
range
for.
interweaving
essence
of
cultural
and
technological
factors
socio-technical model of organization
I hope that the above hypotheses can stimulate thinking
about how to
serve
simply
Only if we can create the appropriate synergy
benefits we are looking
is
it is
increase the probability of
innovation,
and can
a kind of diagnostic grid to assess in any given group
degree
of
"innovativeness."
Above
all,
I hope
that
by
focusing on culture I have made it clear why resistance to change
and the desire of organizations not to
normal and understandable phenomena.
innovate are entirely
44
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__~~~~~'-
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48
FIGURE
1.
A SOCIO-TECHNICAL MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION
49
TABLE 1
CULTURAL DIMENSIONS THAT INFLUENCE INNOVATIVENESS*
1. ORGANIZATION-ENVIRONMENT RELATIONSHIP
Symbiotic
Environment Dominant
Org.
Dominant
X
2. NATURE OF HUMAN ACTIVITY
Reactive,
fatalistic
Harmonizing
Pro-active
3. NATURE OF REALITY AND TRUTH
Moralistic Authority
4.
Pragmatism
X
NATURE OF TIME
Past Oriented
Near Future Oriented
X
Present Oriented
Medium Time Units
X
Short Time Units
Long Time Units
5. NATURE OF HUMAN NATURE
Humans are basically evil
Human
nature
is
fixed
Humans are basically good
Human nature is mutable
X
6. NATURE OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS
Groupisms
Authoritarian/paternalistic
7.
Low
Individualism
X
Collegial/Participative
X
SUB-CULTURE DIVERSITY/CONNECTEDNESS
High
X
* The X on each dimension indicates the ideal condition for high
innovativeness.
II]
50
TABLE 2
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN I.T. AND CULTURE
I.T. VISION
THEORY X*
AUTOMATE
Negative
Positive
INFORMATE UP
Very negative
Positive
INFORMATE DOWN
Very negative
Very positive
TRANSFORM
Not feasible
Very positive
THEORY Y*
* Theory X is used here as shorthand for hierarchical, authoritarian control orientation, based on cynicism about human nature.
Theory Y is used here as shorthand for idealism about human
nature and a belief in collegial/participative relationships that
permit high degrees of self-control.