62
some suegest that the
principal~eason
for the survival of the
C-5A program, which continued even after the tandem PDL program (Fast Deployment Logistical ships) was dropped, was the
influence of Senator Richard Russell.
Senator Russell, then
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, represented
the state of Georgia, where the C-5A was being built. 48
Examples abound of Representatives and Senators whose
ties to the MIC make their objectivity on the "minimum needed"
for defense extremely questionRble.
aerospace or related firrns.49
More than 60 own stock in
Among the reserve officers in
COhgress were Senators Barry Goldwater (R Arizona) Brigadier
General, USAFR, Howard W. Cannon (D Nevada) Brig. Gen., USAFR;
Kenneth B. Keating (R New York) Major Gen. USAR; and Representatives James Roosevelt (D California), Brig. Gen. USMCR; and
Rebert L. F. Sikes (D Florida) Brig. Gen., USAR. 50
Examples also abound of men who have used their seniority,
position, and influence as a principal means of excessively
advancing and enriching their own district through copious
military bases or multi-million and billion dollar contracts •
. Many are familiar with the boasted pork-barrel of men like
Mendel Rivers, Carl Vinson, anti Richard Russell.
Less visible
are examples like Representative Robert L. F. Sikes, whose
district's "many military installations are its most notable
feature •••• The m).litary is the economic mainstay of the district."
Sikes, member of the Appropriations Committee, member
of its Defense Subcommittee, a.nd chairman of the Appropriatj ons
63
Subcommittee on Military Construction, has been able to see to
it that about $460 million dollars in DOD outlays flow into
his district each year. 51
Every state in the union and almost every Congressional
district has defense spending, contracting, and a defense
establishment. 52 The average congressional district has almost
10,000 persons (slightly over 5 percent of the work force)
directly enc;a€;ed in defense work.
Committee
~ember
The average Armed Servjces
has 18,000 defense-related jobs in his dis-
trict (about 10 percent of the work forcc).53
Congressmen,
too, cannot afford to irnore the political power of labor unions
whose
3~
million workers directly involved in defense may be
vindictiyc to the non-cooperative Representative. 54
The result of all of the above-mentioned factors weighs
heavily in favor of fundine: defense monstrously in excess of
national security needs.
While there are few incentives for
Senators and Representatives to defy the power of the PentaFon
and exercise meaningful control over it. there are profuse and
keen incentives to comply with military desires or to support
them actively.
The lack of congressional ability or desire to limit
defense spendine; to rational levels in line with realistic
national s€curi ty needs imposes almost incalculable costs on
society.
Section Seven will consider sane of these costso
64
Section Seven
Alfred Vagts, in his classic work, The History of
Militarism:
Civilian and Military defines militarism as the
domination of the military man over the civilian,
an unoue preponderance of military demands ••• it
means the imposition of heavy burdens on a people
for military purposes J to the neglect of l'relfare
ano_ culture, and the waste of the nation1s best manpower in unproo_ucti ve army service •••• Mili tarism
transcends military purposes, permeates society,
may become domina~t over industry and the arts ~nd
may hamper and defeat true military objectives.
Since 1945 the federal government has spent one trillion
seven hunclred_ billion d_ollars for goods and services.
Of this
amount, one trillion three hundred billion dollars - that's 80
percent - has gone to the military.2
There is no real way to learn how much is spent for military purposes simply by examining the
De~ense
Department budget.
Defense expenditures not recognized as such by the federal
government include:
all veteran1s benefits, compensation, and
insurance; federal maritime subsidies (jillltified on national
defense gro'lmds); interest on the national debt (most of ''lhich
is the result of financing wars); etc. 3 war and military preparedness accounted for about 54 percent
to,f
total federal out-
lays and from 80 to 85 percent of all fer1ierally provided goods
and services during the late 1960s and emrly 1970s0 4 In other
wordS, at least 80¢ out of every dollar
~e
federal government
expended on goods and services \-rent direcit.ly or indirectly
for one program - the military!
Obvious]y, that left only 20¢
of each dollar for all other goods andser-vices the federal
government provided. *
*See
Addendum.
65
Senator Fulbright, adamant critic of the military,
made sevf'ral comparisons in the FY 1970 budget which are very
illuminating.
for defense.
Approximately $80 billion dollars was budgeted
Total federal budget
tion were $3.2 billion.
to 2/3 of that sum.
requ~sts
for all of educa-
The cost overrun of the C-5A was equal
Education was worth, in budgetary terms,
about 30 percent of the F-111 fighter cost overrun!
Fulbright
explained, "Less is proposed for elementary and secondary education than it costs to assemble an attack ea'rrier force; we
have 15 such carriers ... 5
A conservative estimate of military-related spending
in 1967
wa~
$100 billion.
This was a sum greater than all
federal. state, and local expenditures on health, hospitals,
education, old age benefits, welfare, unemployment, and agriculture!6
Yet these are only obvious ccsts; there are other
costs which are just as real, but less easily seen.
its
Think of
the United States could move the wounded marine from the
jungles of Vietnam to the finest medical care in a matter of
minutes; yet today cannot do the same thing for a critically
ill child in the Miss3,ssippi Delta or a child dying of malnutrition on an Indian reservation!
Funds can be found to
replace the unn0eded $18 billion SAGE anti-Soviet-bomber
system with an equally unnecessary and more expensive AWACS
system; yet our country "cannot afford" a decent mass transit
system.
66
About 40 percent of the nation's scientists and engineers are absorbed directly in research and development financed
by the military.?
Obviously, wh~T\ these men and women spend
all of their time developing ultra-sophisticated means of man's
destruction, they cannot be assisting in life's preservation
and improvement o'
The United States ranks 13th among other nations of the
world in infant mortality rates.
On nearly every index avail-
able, the poor and racial minorities fare worse than their
oppositee.
They have shorter lives, they have more chronic
and debili tat1.ng illnesses.
Their infant and reaternal death
rates are higher. They have far less access to health services. 8 For "lack of available money" ten million Americans
are goine- to continue suffering the agony of hunger and chronic
malnutrition.
Twenty-two million will remain below even the
governMent's minimum poverty line, twenty million Americans
are housed in grossly substandard, rat-infested dwellinr;s.9
This writer flatly refuses to believe that the United
States (whose GNP increases every five years by an amount
equivalent to the total GNP of West Germany10) could not had it merely the desire to do so - create a society totally
free from r:unger. uniformly well-educated, and able to eive
medical care to all who need it.
tractor excesses (e.g. the
an
ear~_ier
For example, had just the con-
56% contractor profit mentioned in
section) been eliminated, Head start education
could have been provided for an additional
with
enou~h
2t
million children -
left over to provide school lunches for 20 million
67
children for an entire year. 11 One might only guess what
might have been done with the $9 billion dollars that went
to the F-111 cost overrun.
This
tra~ic
human cost is paralleled by the depletion
of industrial-technologir-al
capabiliti~s.
Examples
in~lude
tt,e following s
1.
The U.S. merchant marine flef't ra'rlks 23rd in t.he
in RFP of shi~8. In 1966 the average-aged
vessel 3n the United States was 21 years old;
Japan's ships averaged less than half that figure.
wo~ld
2.
By the end of the 1960s, U.S. industr.y operated
the world's oldest stock of metal-workin~ m~~hin­
@~y; a]~ost 2/3 was ten years old or mor~.
)0
In the late 19608, the U.S., for the first time,
had to import more machine tools than it exported.
4.
As is widely appreciated, U.s. railroads and mass
transit svstems coulc'l not comnare to Japanese
and most l;;uropean systems .12 -
Meanwhile, More than 50 percent of the nation 's
and as luch 8S 2/3 of
C' J I
are s irhon~cl of'f for tre
p~:r,
~c icntific
rese~~!.'ch
funds,
and eng5 ne')",:,3ng t2J E'n1~
••
1 ~.
m1.1~ tary ... -'
~n"_IJJ'~'~er
••
b~n('f'
ts :1nto
estimated at no more than 10 to 15 percent of total mi!itary
.
14
spendlnr:.High military spendinr; in an inflationary period only
worsens the pro"blem of rising prices.
"Pump-primin£:;" in 8Teas
other than milltary R&D and Procur.ement may be less inflationary
and confer
~0re
benefits in underemployed districtso
Currently,
the correlction between military spending growth and price
increases is too
not to be considered a principal renson, if not the main cause, for inflationo 15
stron~
68
In sum, excessive military spending imposes huge
social costs upon our nation - costs that are morally unjustifiable and pragmatically misguided and irrational.
Defense
from atomic devastation in the age of the interconti.nental
ballistic missile, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and
the thermonuclear warhead is clearly impossible.
The destruc-
tiveness of nuclear wpapons is so enormous that it overwhelms
all possible defenses.
Deterrence, not defense, must be the
aim of strateeic policy.
The important question then becomes,
"How much is enough to deter?"
chological consideration.
The answer is primarily a psy-
But what possible gains could be
worth 60 million, 80 million, or 120 million deaths in one's
own country?
ble.
Only a madman would think such casualties feasi-
And a madman cannot be deterred nor defended against in
the therMonuclear age - no matter what the multiples of overkill!
We must stop to consider the costs of pursuing the myth
of total security.
Every gun that is made, every warship launched,
every rocket fired si~ifies, in the final sense,
a theft--from those who hunger and are not fed, those
who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms
is not spending money alone. It is spendin~ the
sweat of its laborers, the ~enius of its scientists,
the hopes of its childreno 1o
WhoEe words are these?
of a naive p "do-gooder" youth?
A leftist radical's?
No.
Or those
These words, spoken over
20 years ago, were those of former supreme Allied Commander in
Europe and Five Star General Dwight D. Eisenhower.
What was of
great concern to him 20 years ago should also deeply concern
69
us all today, when budg:et requests for defense for fiscal 1975
stand at more than 92 billion dollars and the "lack of available money" denies food, clothing, and shelter to millions who
cannot afford lifegs necessities.
Section Eight
The reader by this point must certainly agree that
the problems spoken of above are very serious ones.
no easy solutions or guaranteed answers.
There are
Unlike the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, who in November 1969 eliminated cost
overruns by purging the term from military usage, this writer
does not believe it possible to cause a
probl~m
by erasing the symbols used to label it.
rather in meeting the problem head-on.
to disa9pear
The answer lies
This section will
attempt to give some suggestions to lessen the debilitating
effect of excessive military spending.
The suggestions are
those thought most crucial by this author.
The list is far
from exhaustive.
The first and probably the most important step that
must be taken is this: the public needs to be informed of the
excess of military spending and power.
Americans - rich and
poor, black and white, liberal and conservative - must overcome their conditioned response to buy anything wrapned in the
flag and deemed essential by the Joint Chiefs.
Perhaps if tax-
.payers can be shown what senseless duplication of weapons,
exorbitant c ontractor profits, and mea.nin.gless increases in
70
overkill are costinp: them. in missed opportunities, they will
be lp.ss willing to given the Pentagon a blank check.
If it
were widely realized what could bp. done, citizens would be
more concerned about a $92 billion bude;et for the Defense Department.
(As
one senator reportedly observed, itA billion dollars
here and a billion there, and by gosh, pretty soon it adds up. It)
Charles Schultze, former Director of the Budget, suggests the creation of a Joint Committee of Congress on National
Priorities to act as a forum for debate and reflection upon the
country's goals. 1
The committee would serve as a focal point
of public attention and raise and discuss important questions
of the nation's nep.ds.
Critics who would condemn it as merely
a political arena are exactly right.
But what .a great and
necessary function the arena would serve: to raise issues and
answers which h8.ve for too long been accepted as "given".
New
interest groups must be given the chance to vie for funds.
Committee testimony, findinr;s, and analyses should be widely
publicized and reportedo
Congress must take the first step of independence and
provide
At a
it~
own sources of analysis and budget preparation.
minim\~m,
the funding, staff, and functions of the Gener'3.l
Accounting Office should be increased.
Another possibility is
the establj shment of a sec on~ c oncrcssionnl agency r,odel('(l ['f'ter
the liAr.
roCCOl',-1~:-.:..;
+:0 Richard vauf:rro.n, author e>f
~Lculd hDye the authorltv to detcrminA ()vcrchnrl':cs
and cycer-s nrofi ts on inclividunl contractr;, to require
refune.s, to sl1f;nend goverrrrent "p~:;T.ents, to reform
contrcct n~jcAr; nnd to file civil suits aginst contractors for defaulto2
71
Senate and House Anpropriations and Armed Services
Committees should request larGer staffs of budget analysts
whose -past links with the MIC may be less likely to bias their
opinions.
The functions, authority, funding, and staff of the
Renegotiation Board, which investigates defense contracts for
excess profits, should be significantly enlarged.
This inde-
pendent agency returns each year excess profits equal to 18
times the cost of its operations. 3 The utility of such an
investigatory body for pre'lention, detection, and adjudication
of contractor crimes and fraud cannot be overestimated.
Accounting practices of defense contractors must be
made uniform to greatly increase the difficulty of concealing
padded costs and illegal profits.
Currently, the lack of con-
sistent methods of book-keeping makes the task of corporate
investigation unnecessarily troublesome and may be a considerable impediment to oversight. 4
The military should be forced to develop one
sistent strategic doctrine.
con-
The price-tag of the Defense
Department's wares is preposterously too expensive to allow
the childish aptitude of limine's better than yours" among the
service branches to influence decisions on weapons developed
and procured.
Investigation at the initial:stages of project development and "concept definition" must scrutinize more closely the
real necessity of each new weapon systemo
Programs stopped at
this level may not only save wasted p&n funds, but will also
72
make decisions less subject ·to narrow interest group
pres~ure
for militarily unjustifiable weapons development.
Further thought should be given to the idea of defense
industry nationalization where firms are predominantly dependent on defense contracts.
John Kenneth Galbraith, proponent
of this concept, does not suggest that such action itself could
reduce the power of the mili tary-industria.l bureaucracy.
In
fact, nationalization would increase the power of the military
by placing selected industry directly under its controlo
Gal-
braith's contention, however, is that there are fl.dvantages in
makin~
obvious what currently constitutes a disguised part of
the bureaucracy.5
The following are suggested as means to restrict in
part excessive weapon system cost escalations
1.
System Acquisition Reports must be upgraded to
eliminate crucial information omissions. 6 (For
examnles, see page 2S.)
2.
Concurrl'''TIt R..I'cD 2nd P!'ocurement "shculd require
explicit anproval by the Secretary of Defense
and full justification to Con~ess. "7
J.
Contractor capital investment mu~t beSconsidered
in profit-determination negotiations.
4.
Estimates of individual total pro~am costs through
development, fieJ.ding, and system life should be
made aVA.ilable to Co'n,n:ress in non-classified form.
Five year projections of total defense costs, as
well as consequences of authorized and nronosed
programs, should be declassified and distributed
to CO!'1gress. 9
5.
Occasional program failure ShOllld be accented., unless it can be shown that progr~m feasihility and
utility were absent from the outseto This su"gestion may, while legitimatinfY' ~ome mistakes,
lower bureaucratic insistance upon proceeding with
project~ obviously doomed to failure but politically more expedient to continue and cover- upo 10
73
6.
Competition among contractors must be stressed
whenever possible. New public-funded research
organizations mir;ht be encouraged to create competing cln.ims for wh2.t are presently virtually
guaranteed funds to the military.
Efforts at negotiated arms limitation - SALT II (Stra-
tegic Arms Limitation Talks) - must be continued and supportedo
Although the second round of SALT talks is apt to be difficult
and slow even at best, the United States and Soviet Union must
recognize the absurdity of arms races and destructive capability
contests and act accordinely.
Strate~ic P~wer
and Nation
As Joseph Coffey, author of
Sec~ri~y,
affirms:
Whatever the difficultes, the dangers, and the
uncertainties of trying to ameliorate the present
conflict amon~ nations, this process is more rewardine than that of continuin~ them. It is also more
likely to promote the n1'rtional security, in the only
meaningful sense of that phrase.
Conclusions
Self-defense is a le!';5. timate, desirable e;oa1..
defense also comes only at a price.
Self-
War and military prepared-
ness make this price exceedingly high. The Cold War has been
the national burden for almost 30 years.
A fundamental fact
about the Cold War, however, is that in conseque""1ce of massive
pre~urnably
outlays
for national
se~urity
($1.3 trillion), true
defense is unattainable for both the United states and Soviet
Union - not to mention the rest of the world.
This writer has stressed repeatedly that the 0nly realistic strateeic doctrine is deterrence - making critical acts
of overt
~.tt~ession
incomparahly less desirabl (' than 'lny
c once j
vabl~
hrm"'fi t~ "l+err''''d 1'1"; fr-om them.
NTeaT1~
n,:ful
of U.S. or Soviet c€'''lt.ructivc c:J.pabilities in the
f"~lrer.i. 1)1" ~
~dvn.nced
t.::
therT"'l')-
nuclear ace is clenrly impl)ssible and exorbitantly expensive.
Nevertheless, the Nixon Administration's stated intent jon is to
re-establish
stratp['"i~
superiority so that the U.S. may nego-
tiate in the SALT Talks from a "pos i tion of strength."
it that all Soviet
att~mpt.s
Why is
to match U.S. military power are
"aggressive," while all American efforts to increase credible
threats to Soviet survival are "defensive" and result only from
peaceful intents?
The r'lesire for
d~fense
or deterrence is only one of the
motivations for extraordinarily high Pentagon spendinr.
coincidence of interests among
indust~y,
The
labor, the military,
and politicians, etc., is the basis for a great portion of the
irresponsible expenditures loosely and unjustifiably excused
under the whitewash of "national defense needs."
of the MIC is inordinately powerful and pervasive.
The influence
The success
of MIC's n2rrow interests means shockingly high contrp.ctor nrofits, critic'='llJy deficient weapon performance, senseless duplication of efforts, distortion of national priorities, and
incalulable social costs.
Real control of the military macnine has been lost.
Bureaucratic inertia and Executive and Congressional compliance
with the MIC's goals trample over rational decisions concerning adequate defense levels and strain itcoward the nihilistic
land of Overki 11 Unlimi ted. Absent are des,ires to discllss and
debate in any significant way the true mecessity of current
75
defense expenditures.
Wrap it in the flag; remind them of the
enemy threat; recall for them the economic benefits of a new
weapon - you're half-way home to meaningless increments in
overkill and assured multi-billion dollar cost overruns!
America must recognize its greater willingness to amass
the means of destruction and killing than to develop and utilize
the means of building and healing.
The United States must come
to grips with the fact that giving the military an unlimited
leash
m~v
mean societal stagnation or strangulationo
America
must learn not to equate its every interest with the incentives
of the Military-Industrial Complex and must revise its national
priorities - for on this depends the closer attainment of social
justice, international cooperation, and the hopes of parents
for their children for generations to come.
Addendum
Because overall federal expenditure's have very recently (FY 1973, 1974, and requested 1975) experienced such
dramatic increases, the military component of the budget has
declined relative to spending for other programs.
However,
it is crucial that the reader not be lulled into the belief
that defense expenditures are actually declining.
DOD requests
for FY 1975 (plus FY '74 defense supplements) stand at over
$92 billion -- or about $12 billion more than FY 1974
estimates.
This writer was unable to find the most current data
on how general spending hikes affect the Pentagon's share
of total goods and services provided by the federal government.
It would seem largely unjustified, nevertheless, to
assume any significant change in this proportion -- especially
since more than half the overall increase from FY '74 to
FY '75 came in the form of transfer payment additions.
Sig-
nificantly, "seed moneyll in the form of R&D expenditures
1s
slated to rise 20 percent to $8.4 billion - (see pages 7-8,
and 31-32.)
In thinking of relative national priorities,
one might consider the following:
the wasted effort of
developing and procuring the F-lll was equal in dollar terms
to about 600 percent of the total FY 1975 Budget requests
for all federally sponsored medical research efforts. *
* (Source: The Buc1eet of the United States, Fiscal Year l.212,
Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, pp ll~.)
Footnotes
Section One
I Me1m 8.n, Seymour, Pent~~ CanitRli~m: The Poli~..ical
Economy of War, New York, McGraw-Hill Book 8 0 ""1pany, 1970,
pp. 242-21.'j:) ~
2Comnton, James, V. (ed.), America and the Ori~ins of
the Cold ylar, Boston, Hou{'"hton r,~ifflin, Co;,1972 p. 8:3Kissinger, Henry A., "American Strate~ic Doctrine and
Diplomacy," !h~ Th?Qry gnsi. Er~cticp. of H8d:,. HovTard, Michele,
(ed.), New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966, p. 279.
4schilling, Warner, Hammond, Paul, Snyder, Glenn, Stratef,V,
Politics, and Defense Bud~ets, New York, 1962 p. 8.
5Ibid • t p. 9.
6coffey, Joseph I., strate~ic Power and ~ati...2n~.l Securi t.y,
uni y~e:r_~J t~: _of Pi,tt~]Jll.:r:g l'~_e_~g, 197"1 ;-1):-22.7j:bid., p. 23.
8 Ibid ., p. 22.
9 Ibid ., p. 24.
10Kissinger, Henry A., Nuclear We8Po~~ and Foreig,n Policy,
New York, Harper and Brothers, 1957, po 92.
llKissinger, The Theory and Practice of ~ar, p. 276.
12Halperin, Morton H., Defense strater-ies for the Seventies,
Boston, IJittle, Brown and Company, 1971, p. 52-013 Melman, 22. cito, p. 137.
14Coffey, £Q. cit., p. 170.
15Melman,
.QQ.
cit.• , p. 1090
16Ibid • , p. 165.
17Ibid., p. 110.
18K loSS
" l.nn:er, mlheory
~nd
•
PrRctl.Ce
of
¥lIar, p.
282.
19Kaufman, RichDrd F., 'rhe War Profiteers, New York, Doubleday and Company, 1972, pp. rm::4
s.-
--
20 Ibid ., p. 41-42.
21co~~ Gr()~!:h in Majo£.W~anon SYstems, Comptroller.Ger;eral
of the Unl t0d states t Washl.n~ton, D. C., Govern111ent Prlntlng
Office, March 26, 1973,{B-16305 B ). p. 1.
22proxmire, William, News Release, July 16, 1973.
23Modern Science and Modern Man, New York, Columbi.a University Press~)2p pp. IIb~lT7~-quoted by Kaufman £2. cit.,
pp. 92-93·
Section Two
1Edelman, Murray t The §;rmbolic Uses .2.~ Poli t5.cs t Urbana,
Illinois, University of Illinois Press, 1904, p. 155.
2Kissinger. Nuclear Weapons and Forei~ Policy, p. 58.
3Schillin~, Q~' cit •• p. 108.
4 carey , Omar C., (ed.), The rIlili tary-Ind'lstrial Comnlcx
and U.S. Foreil'1l Policy, Washinr:;ton state Universir-y Press.
19b9~
b30
'
5Kissinger, Nucleqr vleapons and ForeiPTl Poljcy, pp. 27. 58.
6Huxley, Aldous, ~~ NE"w World Revisited, Evanston,
Harper & ROW, Publishers, 19% p. 51.
7McConnell, c. R., FconOMics, Princinles, Prorlems, 3nd
Policies, Nrow York, et. :=ll., McGt'aw::Hill Book Company, 1972,
p. 689.
-- -8KaUfTP8.n, .21?' c it., p. 1)1-132.
o .
/IblC'1., p. 207.
10StRt~a nf thp. ftcnu5~5.t~~~
s,,·~tc~;:-~C'-~'"\~~O"0Y' r."'''''··r''''
_0.............
n:-c:;-u.s.
lo.,
•• "
.....
••
_
__. _
~
_
~J,,_
ro.'"
\,.'.
Governmn.nt Prjnting
(B-163058), p. 1.
l1 P Y'0xmire, ~.·!i11i2.m, Pennrt ~rom th0 W~~Tf'la""'~; .~l~er; C8'S
Complex, New York-;-i'raeB;er---;-i97o-, p-;--7~ -
Miljt0.-U-I~rlustrial
12Ninety-first Con~e~s, first session, Sllbcomrnittcr: on
Economy in Govr:rnment, Joint Economic Committee, "The r.'Iilitary
Budget and National Economic Priorities," Part 2, 1969, p. 510.
13proxmire, Report from the Wastelanq, p. 7 and IX.
14"The Economics of the Military-Industrial Complex,"
Pevj eVJ: Pa-pers and Proceedin!,;s, Menasha,
Wis., r.ryay 1972-;Pp:--280-281.
-Ameri~81"1 ECOY'Jl!"lic
15personal letter from J. H. Stolarow, Deputy nirector of
Procurement and Systems Acquisition Division of United States
General Accounting OfficE', February 14, 1974.
16Kaufman, ££. cit., p. 47.
17Ibid "
p. 11.
18nefense Industry pY'nfit Studv, ComptrolJer General of
the United states, Washington, D. c., u.s. Government Printing
Office, March 17, 1971, (B-159896), p. 37.
19Melman,
Ope
cit.•• p. 180.
20proxmire, Renort from the Wasteland, p. 63.
21Melrnan, Q£. cit., pp. 63-64.
22Kaufman, £2. cit., p. 120.
23Defense Industry Profit Study, p. 20
24Kauf}'T'!an, Richard F., "MIRVing the Boondoegle I Contracts f
Subsidy, anti 1,4feJ.f"lre in the Aerospqce Industry, A1J'er~.9g!l
Econord.c ?cview: Papers and ProCeedlnl'"S, Menasha, WJ.s •• May
1972, po 290.
It
25Ibid., p. 291.
26Kaufrran, The W~r Profiteers, p. 11.5.
27Statement by John Kenneth Galbraith before the Subcommi ttee on Ec onomy i.n Government, "The Mili t?..ry Budp:et and
National Economic Priorities,"Part 1, Washington, D. C., 1969,
pp. 5-6.
28 Carey, QQ.
°t
~
•• p. 11 •
29Kaufman, 1 he ~ar E!ofiteers, p. 70.
30Ibid.
31Prox~irc, Report fro~ ~~e Wasteland, p. 15.
2
3 "'1'he Economics of the Military-Industrial Complex," .2l2.
cit., p. 284.
33 Jbirl •• p. 283.
J4 Defense
Industr~T
Profit study, p. 28
35Kaufman, The Wr:tr 'Prof:1:f":pprs, p. 160.
36Ibido, p. 65.
37Cos t Growth of ~ajor Weqpon Systems, pp. 20-210
38Kaufman, The W?r Profiteers, pp. 70-71.
39Ibid ., pp. 70-71.
40 Melman, £E. cit., p. 180.
41proxmire. Rennrt from. the Wasteland, p. 61.
42~.j;.§I.tus. of Selectpo r,IT~,ior:' Weapon SystpT'I'S,
£g.
cit., no 17.
43 Ibid ., p. 20.
44cos~ growth of Major Weapon Systems,
.£!l. cit.,
'1')'
24.
45proxmire, William, News Release, March 8, 1973.
46Schultze, Charles, eta al., Sett~nr National Priorities;
Bl)dr;et, Washington, D. C' t The "Brookings-Institution,
'f1h~ 1Q?,
197"2 -;-P:- 134.
-
47Cost Growth of Ma..i.?.r. Weg:Qsm
§.yste~f
.2.2' cit., p. 17.
48 Ibid ., p. 15.
49 Ibid ., p. 17.
Section Three
1
Carey,
.2]2.
cit., p. 33.
2Kaufman, Th~ WaL Prof~teer~, p. 12@.
3McConnell, QQ. cit., po 702.
4Kaufman, !hg W~r Profiteers, p. 1220
5 Ibid ., p. 1960
6McConnell, on. cito, p. 702.
7Kaufman, The War 'Profiteers, p. 24)..
8 Ibid ., p. 136.
9Kaufman, "MIRVing thE' BoondoglZle,· p. 2890
1 0proxmire, Renr,.!"t f'r0..!J tht' Wastf'18nd, p. 11th
11KaufmQn, The W~r Prof'~teers, pp. 1@~-167.
12Status of Se lr.~+(\0 Maj or Weanor: Systems, Q.r.. c it. ,
pp. 7, 9, 15.13Kaufman, Thp. Wa.r PrOf:l. t0crs, p. 86.
ll~.
"
Ibld., p. 1 2'-1'.
15Cost Growth ~f Major Weapon Systems, £2. ~it., p. 22.
16Kaufman, The VIa.£. Profiteers, p. 97.
17proxmire, News Release, March 8, 1973.
Section Four
1"Arming to Dis2rm in the Age of Detente," rri:rr:e l\hp-8zine,
103:15-24, February 11, 1974.
2Status of Selec7.cd Major Weapon S;Tste~s, .2n.
ci1.,
pp. 34-, 36.
3Ibid ., pp. 35-36.
4Coffey, .QE.. cit., Appendices 2 & 4.
5Halperin, QQ. cit., p. 15.
6BouldinQ:, Kenneth E., ('>-1:. "'J.., National Priorit5es:
Milit8rv. Fe cnomic, and Soc iar, V/ashinr-ttUlM, D. C., Public
Affair~?ress, 1969,-r: ITl-.--7Cos t Growth of ~ry8jor Ttlp.?pon Sys~~, p. 1.
8Statu~ of Se lee ted fV:a;i.<:'~ y.r canon S',-rstems,
9~ Growtl-t 2f. M~dor Weanon S'ystC'1Tf5.'.
p. 27.
1'. 2.
10~[bid.
l1 Ibid ., p. ?5.
12 Ibid ., p. 27.
13 Ibid •
14
.
"Lockheed 's Casualties in the Defll!''nse Controversy,
Ma~azine, M~y 30, 1969, pp. 76-77.
15Cos t Growt:.=lJ: of Mnj or Weqnon Systens, p. 11.
II
Time
16Defe1"1sP Industry Profit St~dy, pp. 50-51.
17Ibid •• p. 23.
18Kaufman, The War Profiteers, pp. 105-1060
19DF'fE"!1sf> Indust!';v Profit Study, pp. 42-450
20Kaufman, The War Profiteers, p. 130.
21Kaufman, "MIRVing the Boondoggle," p. 289D
Section Five
lKanter, A., "Conp;ress and the Defense Budget: 1960-1970,"
PE"view, 66:129-43, March 1972, p. 131.
Americ~n PnJj.t:j~r-ll Scie!'1~f>
2Kaufn;an, V/r-lr ProfitE"ers, PD 178-179.
3Eighty-sixth Congress, first. session, Senate Armed Services Committee, Preparedness Investip-atinf" Subcommittee,
"Maj or Defense l\'"~ttE'rs." Part 2, p. 2420
4Melm a.n,
.Q:Q.
r:i t., p. 181.
5Kaufman, ~ar Prof5teers, p. 179.
6proxmire, Renort from the Wasteland, po 79.
7Kaufman, War Profiteers, pp. 180, 183.
8 Ibid ., p. 180.
9proxmire. Report from the Wasteland, p. 940
10 rbid ., p. 85.
Section Six
1 "The Mili tary Lobb~T - Its Impact on Conpress, NCltion,"
Conqess an4 the riation, ~-1Qf)5, Washington, ConflTessional
QU8r~p .... ly, 19'b); pp. 1582 ..,
?~il~avsky, Aaron, Th~ PoJjtir:~ ~! the Bud~etary Procp.ss,
Boston, Ll.ttle, Brovm, and Company, 1904" pp. 132-153.
3Kaufman, "Boondoggle," p. 294.
4Schilling, QQ. cit., pp. 116-118.
5Carey, £2. cit., p. 61.
6proxmire, Report from
lli
Wasteland, p. 109.
7Cos!: Growth of Ma50r Weapon SysteI'ls, p. 45.
8Schilling,
9~. ci1·, p. 90.
9Tbid ., n. 91.
10 Dye , Thomas, Under?t8!:l_c!ing Public Po]j.SL. Englewood Cliffs,
'0. 212.
N. J., Prentice Hall Inc., 1972,
l1Wildavsky, .QQ.
9_L1.,
p. 101.
12Kanter, A., QQ. cit., pp. 1)0,134, 137.
13 From a.n, Lewi~ A., Thp Conpress'hmal Process: Strategies,
Rules, ProcE'dures, Boston-lui ttle, BrO'fm-; an d--Comp any , 1967, p. 214.
14 Ibid ., pp. 212-213.
15SChl.lling,
.2~. cit., p. 55.
16 Froman, £Q. • £1.._.,
"t
p. 209 •
17Stephens, Herbert W., "The Role of the LegislAtive Committees in the Appropriations ProceSSt A Study Focused on
the Armed Services Committees," Western Political Quarterlv,
24,146-62, March 1971, p. 1610
18"Nixo·n Gets His Trident,"
1973, p. 53·
TJ1~
Econ.9.-mist, London, October 6,
19Wolflnr;er, Raymond, (ed.), "The House Appropriations
Committee 8.8 a Political SystP!n," (article by Fenno, R.F.),
Readinrrs ir ~"''1eric~n p'olit1calBehav"ior. Englewood CliT·fs, N. J.,
Prentic e He'll, Inc., p. 49.
20
Kaufman, W~r Profiteers, p. 254.
21Kanter, QQ. cit., ppo 129-130.
22 Ibtd ., n. 138.
23 Ibld ., p. 132.
24 I bid., p. 1 3 t
25wolfinF,p.r,
0
££.
git., p. 29.
26 Ibid ., p. 30.
27 Ibid •
28 Ibid ., pp. 39-40.
29Ibid., pp. 36-37, 31.
30Tbid., p. 48.
31Fenno, Richarn F., ~he. r.ow~ of the Purse: A12Pronrintions
Politics in Con!"!'E'ss, Boston, Little,
and Company, 196b,pp. 150, 91.
Brown
32Ibid., pp. 182-83.
33 Ibid •
34Ibid.,
T)e
182.
35personal Letter from Stolarow, ££. cit.
3 6The Budp"et of the United Stat8s GovernTI'.ent: FiRcal YPAr
..
1975, ----~AppenriJ.1C, Was1ungton,
D. C., U.S. Government Prlntlng
urrice, 1974, p. 43.
-
.
37Wildavsky, ~. cit •• p. 52; Kanter, .2£. cit., p. 139.
38Kanter, ~. cit., p. 140.
39Carey, 220 cit. p. 58.
40Melman, ~. cit., p. 1810
41wildavsky, ~. cit., p. 61.
42Kanter, EQ.
c~1.,
p. 139.
43schilling, ~. cit •• po 92.
44The Commision on the Orp":?nizatton of the Executi.ve Branch
of Government, Budgeting, and Accounting, House Document, # 84,
81st Congress, p. 1, quoted in The Purse and the Sword, po 403.
45Kaufman, War Profiteers, pp. 185-186.
46Mcconnell, .2l2. cit., p. 697.
47Carey, OUo cit., p_ 580
48Kaufman, WaI Profiteers, p. 187.
49 Carey, ££0 ~.,
.+
p. 58.
5 0 The N!ili tar,y IJobby, ..9l2..- cit •• n. 1.582.
51Barone, 1V!ichael,
tic~, Thp Spnrltor~
J
f:.!- §1., T!1 e . A.lman~(' ~ Ampric~m Poli-
'rhp Rpnres("ntatp!0 - The~_r
p'ecords-;-
s:tnt-CG,
and--niStricts, Gambi:r;-1972, p. 142.
5 2The Mj Ii tr'l:'Y IJobby, Q!2. cit 0, p. 1583.
5 3Gos s , Co F., "MiJJ.t~ry CO'!n~ittep. ~,~embership ::lnn T1cf('n~~
Related PI"!!1cfi t~ in +:l:c H()1):::',e of Peprescnt2:t.i v es ," 't'p~-t~!'n
P,')1:'+;;:;..:'22: Q"~rt(':::'J.;/, ?C': ~15-;:'t .Tt1Tl;, 197? !'O "'18.
~I'
"N:-:.tional Secu!'i ty State, "fEe Pror>;ressi va,
331 1-58, June 1969, p_ 19.
-T)_~~: ~ r1 t
··~:''''Ci.AS,
Sect1.('1!1 Seven
1 Vnctc , P_lfred, b. Hj~T(\"(':r nf 1'.";.J~t2.r~st1l: 9.iyJ}irm anD
q1.1oted by Kaufman, l,'ln.r D;:,cfiter:-rs, O;h C l t . , n:-201.
~ilitr'.r:l.
2Econcmj,c Report of the President, 1·,'a~hinGton, Do Co,
U.S. GoverrnVlpnt-Printing O:ffic.::, January 1973, p. 193- (Tabulation of national defense columns).
3Kaufman, War Proftteers, .2l2.- cit., p. 38.
4Ibtdo, p. 38, 204; McConnell, '££0 cit., p- 697,1395Fulbright, W., quoted Kaufman, War Profiteers, p. 245.
6r.:cGovern, Geor.r:re, S., "The People Versus the Pp.ntagon,"
ProfTf'ss}vc, .212.- cit., p. 60
7McConnell, ~. ci~., p. 697.
8"Tov,rards A Comprehensive Health Policy for the 1970's,
A White Paper," U.S. Department of HEW, ~,~ay 1971, ppe 4-5.
9ftA Crisis of Conscience," progressivp, £J2e -::::i.t., pp. 3-4.
10SChultZ0 J Cho.rles, tiThe Pentagon' s Shopping List," Progressive, .922. cit., p. 43.
11MCGovern, ~. cit., po 6.
12~lfelmsn • .9,E- cit •• p. 3.
131 bid., p. 87.
14
l\~cConnell, £'£0 cit., p. 699.
15Kaufman. War Profiteers, po 20).
16Eis £>nhower, Dwirrht D., "The Chancf' for Peace, II Address
by the Prcsidpnt before the Amerjcan Society of Newsraper
Editors, April 16, 19530
Section Fisht
lSc hul tz o
2
,
Procrrt:>ss i 'Ie, .£2.. c it., p. 28.
Kaufman, WRr
Profit~nrs,
p. 294.
3Ibid , p. 162.
4
Kaufman, "MIRVing the Boondoggle ," p. 289.
5Kauf~an, Wqr ?rn~it~ers, pp. 271-2730
6Sp.lf'!r7pd
~~:'-l~,.,r Wt:\~non Sy8~~,
1'"
9.
7Cos t Grovrth of ME'jor We3pon Systems, p.
48.
8nefense Industry Profit Study. ppo 54-55.
9Kaufman, Vl,ar Prof; tei:rs, p. 276.
10Carey ,
2£. cit.,
p.
65.