D O C U M E N T IS T H E P R O P E R T Y OF H E R BRITANNIC M A J E S T V S G O V E R N M E N T
T h e c i r c u l a t i o n of t h i s p a p e r h a s been s t r i c t l y . l i m i t e d ^ — n
I t is issued for t h e p e r s o n a l u s e of..^^..^/ti7^..
T O P SECRET
frv^rtfr^
Copy N o . . . f f . . .
a'j[62)J70
25th October,
1962
CABINET
CUBA,
M e j n ^ r a n d ^ m by^ttie . , i ^ r d ^ C h a n c e l l o r
I w a s i n v i t e d b y t h e C a b i n e t ( C . C. (62) 6 l s t C o n c l u s i o n s ,
M i n u t e 3) t o c o n s i d e r t h e l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h e
A m e r i c a n " q u a r a n t i n e " of C u b a w i t h a v i e w t o b r i e f i n g t h e U n i t e d
Kingdom P e r m a n e n t R e p r e s e n t a t i v e at the United Nations.
2.
I h a v e , in c o n s u l t a t i o n with t h e A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l , the
S o l i c i t o r - G e n e r a l a n d t h e -Legal A d v i s e r to t h e F o r e i g n Office,
c o n s i d e r e d the i n s t r u c t i o n s a l r e a d y sent by the F o r e i g n Office to
the P e r m a n e n t R e p r e s e n t a t i v e ( F o r e i g n Office t e l e g r a m No. 3881
to N e w Y o r k ( A n n e x 'A')) in r e s p o n s e to h i s r e q u e s t (New Y o r k
t e l e g r a m No. 1703 ( A n n e x ' B ' ) ) .
We a g r e e with the views e x p r e s s e d
by the F o r e i g n Office.
3.
In o u r v i e w t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h e " q u a r a n t i n e " c a n n o t b e
justified as "pacific blockade" under international law.
In f a c t ,
the United S t a t e s ' conduct is not in c o n f o r m i t y with i n t e r n a t i o n a l
law.
We t h i n k t h a t t h e m o s t f a v o u r a b l e l i n e o f a r g u m e n t t h a t
c a n b e a d v a n c e d i n s u p p o r t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s t h a t t h e c o n d u c t
of C u b a a n d t h e S o v i e t U n i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a t h r e a t t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
of s u c h i m m i n e n c e a s t o n e c e s s i t a t e t h e t a k i n g o f i m m e d i a t e s t e p s
to r e n d e r that t h r e a t n u g a t o r y .
But we doubt that this can be
established as the United S t a t e s ' action a p p e a r s to be designed to
prevent the threat becoming imminent.
If t h e t h r e a t c o u l d b e r e g a r d e d a s i m m e d i a t e , t h e r i g h t
of s e l f - d e f e n c e w o u l d e n t i t l e t h e m u n d e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w t o d e s t r o y
the m i s s i l e sites and they would be equally entitled to stop w a r - h e a d s
reaching those sites.
T h e i s s u e d e p e n d s o n t h e i m m e d i a c y of t h e
t h r e a t being sufficient to justify the United S t a t e s in acting b e f o r e
having r e c o u r s e to the S e c u r i t y Council.
4.
We a r e a g r e e d that the situation in Cuba c o n s t i t u t e s a
t h r e a t t o p e a c e u n d e r A r t i c l e 3 9 of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s C h a r t e r .
r'
5.
"We h a v e a l s o c o n s i d e r e d w h a t w o u l d b e t h e b e s t l i n e f o r
M i n i s t e r s t o t a k e i n P a r l i a m e n t if t h e y a r e p r e s s e d t o c o m m e n t o n t h e
l e g a l i t y of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' a c t i o n .
In o u r v i e w t h e b e s t l i n e w o u l d
b e t o s t a t e t h e a c c e p t e d p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w a s t o t h e r i g h t
of s e l f - d e f e n c e , b u t t o r e f u s e t o e x p r e s s a n y o p i n i o n a s t o t h e i r
a p p l i c a b i l i t y in c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h i c h a r e n o t y e t fully k n o w n .
-1­
5.
"We t h i n k i t i m p o r t a n t t h a t w e s h o u l d m a k e i t c l e a r t o t h e
United States Government exactly what our views a r e on the legality
of t h e p r o p o s e d b l o c k a d e a n d e m p h a s i s e t h a t , w h i l e i n t h e p r e s e n t
c i r c u m s t a n c e s we will c o - o p e r a t e w i t h t h e m a n d not s t a n d on o u r
r i g h t s , we do not concede that they have any legal right to s e a r c h or
detain B r i t i s h ships on the high s e a s .
I suggest, therefore, that we
send to the United States G o v e r n m e n t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n on the
following lines:­
"Her Majesty's Government regret that after
careful
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e y a r e n o t s a t i s f i e d a s t o t h e l e g a l i t y of t h e b l o c k a d e .
m e a s u r e s to be taken by the United States against Cuba in the a b s e n c e
of a d e q u a t e c o v e r f r o m a c o m p e t e n t o r g a n of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e y fully s y m p a t h i s e with the m e a s u r e s a n d u n d e r ­
stand the r e a s o n s that have m a d e t h e m n e c e s s a r y .
T h e y will give
t h e f u l l e s t p o s s i b l e s u p p o r t i n t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l a n d , if n e e d b e ,
in the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y , and t h e y hope that all B r i t i s h ships will in
fact co-operate with the United States' a r m e d forces so far as those
ships m a y be affected by the blockade m e a s u r e s .
But Her Majesty's
G o v e r n m e n t a l s o f u l l y e n d o r s e t h e d e c i s i o n of "^he J B i u t i a h C h a m b e r Z^r" ^
&£ Ghipprt-n-g t h a t t h e l e g a l r i g h t s of B r i t i s h s h i p s s h o u l d b e r e s e r v e d .
A l t h o u g h H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t do n o t , in p r e s e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,
intend to stand on t h e i r legal r i g h t s in this m a t t e r , t h e y a l s o m u s t
r e s e r v e the right to extend such diplomatic and legal protection to
B r i t i s h shipping as m a y be p e r m i s s i b l e in a c c o r d a n c e with i n t e r ­
nationa.1 l a w . "
If w e s e n d s u c h a c o m m u n i c a t i o n t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
G o v e r n m e n t i t m i g h t p r o v e v e r y u s e f u l i n P a r l i a m e n t if w e a r e
c r i t i c i s e d f o r p e r m i t t i n g t h e s e a r c h of B i i t i s h v e s s e l s .
j
D.
H o u s e of L o r d s ,
24th October,
S . W . 1.
1962.
C O P Y O F F O R E I G N O F F I C E T E L E G R A M N o . 3881
TO THE UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
23rd October,
Your telegram
No.
1703:
1962.
Cuba.
If t h e s e q u e n c e of e v e n t s w o r k s o u t a s e x p e c t e d , I t h i n k y o u
s h o u l d m a k e a s h o r t a n d s h a r p i n t e r v e n t i o n i n s u p p o r t of t h e
A m e r i c a n s at whatever m o m e n t you think appropriate during the
debate.
2.
I n v i e w of t h e d i f f i c u l t y of t h e l e g a l c a s e , y o u s h o u l d l e a v e
i t t o t h e A m e r i c a n s t o d e f e n d t h e l e g a l i t y of t h e i r b l o c k a d e .
For
your own information, while it m a y be possible to justify action
against Cuban ships and possibly against Soviet ships, I a m advised
t h a t i n t h e a b s e n c e of U n i t e d N a t i o n s a u t h o r i t y i t i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t
t o j u s t i f y a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e s h i p s of t h i r d c o u n t r i e s .
If y o u f e e l
o b l i g e d to s a y a n y t h i n g on t h i s p o i n t , it s h o u l d b e t o t h e effect t h a t
t h e r e is a n i n f l a m m a b l e s i t u a t i o n , t h a t t h e r e is no v i r t u e in a
d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e l e g a l p o i n t b y t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , t h a t
the A m e r i c a n s have acted p r o p e r l y by corning to the Security
Council at the first possible m o m e n t , and that the Council should
take i m m e d i a t e steps to deal with the situation.
The inference may
be left that the A m e r i c a n s w e r e justified in t a k i n g i m m e d i a t e
e m e r g e n c y action having r e g a r d to all the c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
The
important thing now is to obtain adequate United Nations cover, for
w h a t t h e A m e r i c a n s a r e d o i n g , a n d f o r t h a t p u r p o s e t h e f i n d i n g of
a threat to peace is vital.
3.
We do not dispute that a s o v e r e i g n State is entitled to call
f o r m i l i t a r y a i d f r o m a n o t h e r G o v e r n m e n t if n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e
p u r p o s e of i t s d e f e n c e .
In n o c a s e i n w h i c h t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m
has been involved have we gone beyond this.
T h e situation in
Cuba is entirely different.
The threat c o m e s not f r o m without
a g a i n s t Cuba but f r o m within Cuba a g a i n s t its n e i g h b o u r s , ' and the
t h r e a t i s c r e a t e d b y t h e i m p o r t of t h e o f f e n s i v e w e a p o n s w h i c h t h e
S o v i e t U n i o n s e e k s t o d e f e n d o n t h e b a s i s of t h e r i g h t of G o v e r n ­
m e n t s to a s k for m i l i t a r y aid in t h e i r own s e l f - d e f e n c e .
4.
We s e e c o n s i d e r a b l e difficulty in the a r g u m e n t a b o u t
" s e c r e t d i s t u r b a n c e of t h e b a l a n c e of p o w e r " .
While the p r e s e n c e
of S o v i e t m i s s i l e s i n C u b a n o d o u b t g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e s S o v i e t
s t r i k i n g p o w e r , it could still be a r g u e d that t o t a l A m e r i c a n n u c l e a r
s t r e n g t h w a s s t i l l a h e a d of S o v i e t n u c l e a r s t r e n g t h .
We think
that it would be b e t t e r to e m p h a s i s e a n d e l a b o r a t e on o t h e r p o i n t s
in the P r e s i d e n t s s p e e c h a s follows :­
( i )
This is a deliberately p r o v o c a t i v e action, p a r t i c u l a r l y
at a t i m e when d i s a r m a m e n t negotiations a r e in
progress.
( i i )
T h e s e c r e c y w i t h w h i c h t h e t r a n s f e r of S o v i e t
missiJas has been conducted, and the deliberately
m i s l e a d i n g s t a t e m e n t s m a d e on the subject,
c o n t r a s t s with the A m e r i c a n attitude towards the
s t a t i o n i n g of t h e i r o w n m i s s i l e s i n o t h e r t e r r i t o r i e s
and can only give r i s e to the inevitable inference
that they a r e not for p u r e l y defensive p u r p o s e s and
therefore constitute a threat to the p e a c e ,
5.
T h e s e s e e m to us to be far the m o s t powerful g e n e r a l argu­
m e n t s a n d we think that it would be b e s t to c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e m .
T h e r e i s t h e c o m p a r a t i v e l y s u b s i d i a r y p o i n t t h a t t h e t r a n s f e r of
S o v i e t m i s s i l e s h a s b e e n t a k i n g p l a c e at a t i m e when, t h e r e h a v e
b e e n A m e r i c a n / S o v i e t c o n v e r s a t i o n s a b o u t l i m i t i n g t h e s p r e a d of
n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , a n d t h e p r o s p e c t of f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n on t h i s
subject in the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y .
T h e r e is also the propaganda
point that the t r a n s f e r h a s taken p l a c e at a t i m e w h e n the Soviet
U n i o n a r e u r g i n g t h e c o m p l e t e a b o l i t i o n of f o r e i g n b a s e s d u r i n g t h e
f i r s t s t a g e of d i s a r m a m e n t , i . e . , w i t h i n 1 8 m o n t h s a c c o r d i n g t o
their own plan.
6.
W i t h r e f e r e n c e t o p a r a g r a p h 3 of y o u r t e l e g r a m , i n t h e
e v e n t of a S o v i e t v e t o y o u m a y s u p p o r t t h e A m e r i c a n s if t h e y w i s h
to rGfer t h e m a t t e r t o the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y .
A N N E X .IB'
COPY OF NEW YORK (UNITED KINGDOM MISSION
T O T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S ) T E L E G R A M N.O..J703
" TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE"
Sir l-atrick Dean.
My telegrams
23rd October,
Nos.
1698 a n d 1699:
1962.
Cuba.
I w o u l d e x p e c t t h e s e q u e n c e of e v e n t s i n t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
to be as follows.
P o s s i b l y after a p r o c e d u r a l w r a n g l e , the United
States representative would speak first.
He would be followed by the
Cuban r e p r e s e n t a t i v e who will have been invited to the table and then
by the Soviet r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
Thereafter, the United States Mission
w o u l d h o p e f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n s b y t h e t w o L a t i n - A m e r i c a n m e m b e r s of
the Council (Venezuela and Chile).
The A m e r i c a n s would then, I
think, look to us to speak next.
The other m e m b e r s would have no
i n t e r e s t in p u s h i n g t h e m s e l v e s f o r w a r d .
The F r e n c h here expect
t h a t t h e y w i l l h a v e t o s p e a k i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e d a y .
2.
When the issue c o m e s to the vote the A m e r i c a n s should be
able to count on s e v e n v o t e s in f a v o u r , p r o v i d e d t h e y c a n k e e p the
Irish and Chileans up to the m a r k .
I would expect Ghana and the
United A r a b Republic to abstain and the R u m a n i a n and Soviet
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w o u l d of c o u r s e v o t e a g a i n s t , t h e l a t t e r c a s t i n g a
veto.
3.
T h e A m e r i c a n s a r e still u n d e c i d e d about w h e t h e r to go for
t h e u n i t i n g f o r p e a c e p r o c e d u r e i n t h e e v e n t of a S o v i e t v e t o .
They
have s o m e doubts about whether they will be able to m u s t e r a
sufficiently i m p r e s s i v e m a j o r i t y in the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y , but
u n l e s s the Soviet r e s p o n s e in the S e c u r i t y Council s h o w s s o m e signs
of a d e s i r e t o n e g o t i a t e t h e y m a y b e c o m p e l l e d t o m o v e f r o m t h e
Security Council to the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y .
M u c h a l s o d e p e n d s on
h o w t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n of A m e r i c a n S t a t e s ' m e e t i n g g o e s a n d h o w
s o l i d t h e s u p p o r t of t h e L a t i n A m e r i c a n c o u n t r i e s i s .
4,
A s for our s p e e c h , at first sight the m o s t difficult points
will probably be the legal ones.
We should t h e r e f o r e b e grateful for
a s full a b r i e f i n g a s p o s s i b l e on w h a t we s h o u l d s a y a b o u t the
"quarantine".
We s h o u l d a l s o l i k e m a t e r i a l to d e a l w i t h t h e
a r g u m e n t which we frequently u s e that any s o v e r e i g n State is entitled
t o c a l l f o r m i l i t a r y a i d f r o m a n o t h e r G o v e r n m e n t if t h e y f e e l t h e i r
security is threatened.
-1­
5.
In h i s b r o a d c a s t t h e P r e s i d e n t l a i d g r e a t s t r e s s on t h e
" s e c r e t d i s t u r b a n c e of t h e b a l a n c e of p o w e r " .
This seems an
e f f e c t i v e w a y of d e a l i n g w i t h t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t , a s t h e A m e r i c a n s
m a i n t a i n m i s s i l e b a s e s in c e r t a i n E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s , the R u s s i a n s
a r e equally entitled to m a i n t a i n t h e m in Cuba.
The President also
s t r e s s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e ; of t h e b a l a n c e of n u c l e a r p o w e r , w h i c h w a s
e m p h a s i s e d by you in y o u r s p e e c h to the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y , a n d
g i v e n the p r o b a b l e difficulties in the l e g a l c a s e it s e e m s to m e
that this might be a profitable line to p u r s u e .
If y o u a g r e e , p l e a s e
let us have as m u c h supporting m a t e r i a l as possible.
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