l?T7 DOCUMENT IS T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H E R B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S
CJ611J47
GOVERNMENT)
COPY NO.
mi
27th J u l y , 1961
CABINET
BERLIN
the^SeOretary
lemoranc
of State f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s
M y c o l l e a g u e s w i l l s h o r t l y be c o n s i d e r i n g v a r i o u s a s p e c t s
of the B e r l i n p r o b l e m .
T h i s h a s b e c o m e d e s i r a b l e and p o s s i b l e
n o w that P r e s i d e n t K e n n e d y has c o m p l e t e d his r e v i e w of his own
p o l i c y on the s u b j e c t . A s a r e s u l t a m e m o r a n d u m s e t t i n g out the
v i e w s of the U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t was h a n d e d t o H . M . A m b a s s a d o r
in W a s h i n g t o n on 22nd J u l y .
2.
I c i r c u l a t e the t e x t of this m e m o r a n d u m and i t s f i r s t
a t t a c h m e n t ( d e a l i n g w i t h the m i l i t a r y p r o g r a m m e p r o p o s e d b y the
U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t ) , the o t h e r t w o a t t a c h m e n t s not b e i n g
i m m e d i a t e l y r e l e v a n t to our d i s c u s s i o n .
H.
F o r e i g n O f f i c e , S. W . 1.
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26th J u l y , 1961
13)1 A MEMORANDUM ON MEASURES FOR DEALING WITH THE BERLIN SITUATION 1. The United States Government has given urgent and intensive consideration to the manner in which the Soviet threat to the Western position in Berlin should be met. In this process, searching analysis has been undertaken of Soviet objectives and "tactics, and of the resources, and the alternative means of employing them, available to the Western Alliance for dealing with the situation they present. The United States has now reached certain conclusions as to the. courses of action which it believes should be followed. This memorandum is intended to describe briefly these conclusions and in so doing to serve as a basis for initial consultations among the four Western Powers on the subject, 2. The Soviet threat to the Western position in Berlin has existed in the same general form since 1958. The United States believes, however, that the West must assume for purposes of arriving at its own policy that the USSR is in earnest in its stated intention to sign a separate' peace treaty this year with East Germany which will, in the Soviet view, bring to an end Allied rights in Berlin. - 3. The United States believes that in addition to the objectives in Central Europe which have led the USSR to pursue this course of action, a key factor in Soviet policy formulation is the belief that, in the end, the West will not fight to defend jits positiofit in Berlin. : k. In the view of the United States, therefore. Western policy should consist of two principal elements; 1) a clear demonstration of Western determination to defend the Allied position in Berlin, at the risk of war. if necessary; and 2) an Hi active diplomatic program, including negotiations with the Soviet
Union, designed to provide the Soviet leadership an alternative
course of action which does not endanger vital Western interests
in Berlin.
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5. With respect of the first element, which might be ^characterized as the establishment of a more effective deterrent jjand capability for military action, the United States proposes lb begin immediately a series of measures to increase its armed £Strength. These steps will be taken with due regard to the fiangers of a spreading arms race. We continue to stand ready jjto'negotiate on the reduction and control of armaments. However, ^pt this time, the greatest danger to peace is the failure to like the measures outlined in this memorandum. 6.
The United States, for these reasons, proposes to take as. ';its first steps measures which will initiate a long-run build-up 0? military strength and which will not be of such a dramatic and Emergency nature as to exacerbate the crisis. It intends, more !^specifically, to undertake: I'",
a. A request to the Congress, to ^e na de cn Wednesday,
$lily 26, for a supplementary defense budget of three and two mths billion dollars to add to the approximately three billion pllar supplementary request already made. This w*uld provide phe United States with progressively stronger forces in the piths ahead, giving it a capability of moving and additional six V
/ divisions to
divisions to Europe at the end of the year or at any time thereafter if our allied decision is that the situation warrants this. The United States would also have available supplementary­
units of tactical and transport aircraft and increased naval strength especially in the field of anti-submarine warfare. Further, the United States is acting to increase immediately by . fifty per cent the number of its bomber aircraft on ground alert status.' Attached to this memorandum is a paper setting forth this program in more detail, together with our thoughts on NATO­
wide measures in this field. b. Substantial measures in the field of civil defense (shelter construction, recruitment and training of personnel, etc.). 7.
In addition, the United States believes that the following
precautionary and planning efforts should be undertaken within
the next, few weeks:
a. Strengthen the position of West Berlin to sustain an interruption of access by reviewing and improving airlift procedures and the stockpile as necessary; b. Review
our Berlin contingency planning in the light
of the present situation;
c. Complete Allied plans for use of a wide range of non­
military countermeasures, including economic sanctions, upon interruption of access to Berlin or earlier as a warning and deterrent. A paper on the subject of economic sanctions is attached. 0. It will be of great importance to obtain the maximum support of world public opinion for the Western position and Policies. The United States has begun, therefore, and proposes ;o expand in cooperation with its Allies, an active public Jiformation program on a world-wide scale to this end. A - r - . ^ preliminary quadripartite paper based on propaganda themes
"*--.
suggested by the British Government has already been agreed, and the attached paper is intended as a further step in the development of such a program. v
9* The United States regards it as of the utmost importance
"that the response to the Soviet threat be a joint undertaking
Son the part of the NATO Alliance. The unity of the West, in the
vface of Soviet aggrandizement in Central Europe will in and of
itself be a most powerful factor in deterring the USSR from its.
present course of action. The United States hopes, therefore,
that in all aspects of this endeavor it will be joined by its
Allies. In the military field particularly the United States
believes that all NATO members should make an effort comparable
to that which it is making. The United States realizes that
;cost and sacrifice will be involved, but believes that the
/Alliance must act vigorously to meet the present challenge. A
jfclear willingness to bear increased burdens on the part of all
lour countries will be essential to convey to the Kremlin the
fnee&ed impression of allied determination. We are prepared to
jfjoin our allies urgently in working out a joint military program
f% this end. A joint endeavor of this nature will require the
loosest consulation at every step of the way, and suggestions
-will be made later in this memorandum for pursuing the initial
stages of this consulation. I
/ 10. With
Yhlc
^To.
W i t h r e s p e c t t o the second elemei,; o f W e s t e r n p o l i c y , an a c t i v e d i p l o m a t i c p r o g r a m , the U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r e s e e s s e v e r a l p o s s i b l e courses of a c t i o n .
They s h a l l be t h e s u b j e c t o f f u r t h e r f i n t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n among u s , but i t might be w e l l a t t h i s s t a g e
II to i n d i c a t e i n g e n e r a l terms what t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s may w i s h t o
propose i n more d e t a i l l a t e r :
a.
I t might b e w e l l at an e a r l y d a t e f o r us t o have i n f o r m a l and q u i e t t a l k s w i t h the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p , f o r example through our Ambassadors i n Moscow, to p r o b e t h e S o v i e t p o s i t i o n , to warn o f p o s s i b l e consequences o f t h a t p o s i t i o n i n terms o f A l l i e d m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p , and to t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f any
o p p o r t u n i t i e s which might appear t o move tov/ards subsequent
u n d e r s t a n d i n g on an arrangement w h i c h might b e a c c e p t a b l e .
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b.
T h e r e a f t e r we might w i s h t o e x p l o r e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r
, Western p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e s a t an a p p r o p r i a t e t i m e . - The t i m i n g
I of such i n i t i a t i v e s would depend on a number o f fa t o r s , among them
: the l i k e l i h o o d a t any p a r t i c u l a r t i m e t h a t t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p
I may have b e e n s u f f i c i e n t l y i m p r e s s e d by the W e s t e r n d e t e r r e n t
t e f f o r t s t o be w i l l i n g t o s e t t l e f o r s o l u t i o n s a c c e p t a b l e to ua,
11.
The U n i t e d S t a t e s s u g g e s t s t h a t c o n s u l a t i o n b e g i n a t o n c e ,
commencing w i t h t h e A m b a s s a d o r i a l S t e e r i n g Group.
T h i s Group
would p r e s u m a b l y w i s h t o c o n s i d e r d i r e c t i v e s t o g u i d e the a c t i v i t y
of A l l i e d w o r k i n g g r o u p s i n W a s h i n g t o n on g e n e r a l a s p e c t s of the
q u e s t i o n , n o n - m i l i t a r y c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s and p s y c h o l o g i c a l and
propaganda p r o b l e m s ; the q u a d r i p a r t i t e group on economic c o u n t e r ­
measures; and t h e L i v e Oak g r o u p ,
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12.
F o l l o w i n g the i n i t i a l c o n s u l a t i o n s of the S t e e r i n g Group,
' the U n i t e d S t a t e s p r o p o s e s c o n s u l t a t i o n s a t a s e n i o r o f f i c i a l
l e v e l t o t a k e p l a c e i n P a r i s f o r a week b e g i n n i n g J u l y 2 8 .
This
- s e s s i o n would h a v e t h e p u r p o s e of s u r v e y i n g and c o o r d i n a t i n g so
s far as p o s s i b l e the e n t i r e r a n g e o f m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , economic
and p s y c h o l o g i c a l measures.
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13.
S h o r e w o u l d 1 t h e n f o l l o w m e e t i n g s o f the W o s t e r n ^ForeignV-...
:' 1 ' i n i o t e r S i n P a r i s t o r e v i e w tho s t a t e o f p r e p a r a t i o n s , " s e t t l e
s u t s t a n d i n g p r o b l e m s and i o o u o d i r e c t i v e s , f o r ' " f u r t h e r work.'
1
1h.
A f t e r t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s meeting, i t i s proposed that
one " o r a l l o f t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s make an i n t e r i m r e p o r t tw
NATO and seek o t h e r member c o u n t r i e s ' v i e w s on t h e s t a t e o f
preparations.
15o
I f n e c e s s a r y , the s e n i o r l e v e l group c o u l d presumably
remain f o r a f e w days !n P a r i s t o c a r r y out t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s o f ^
I the F o r e i g n tf.1ii.1stors-.
Attachments:
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1.
2.
3.
The M i l i t a r y P r o g r a m .
The Use o f Economic Countermeasures i n t h e B e r l i n
I n f o r m a t i o n Program i n S u p p o r t L o f i B e r l i n P o l i c y
1
Crisis.
i t
THE MILITARY PROGRAM 1
The U.S. intends to increase promtly the military strength which could be applied in event of blocked access to Berlin. The purpose is twofold: to deter Khrushchev from pressing a Berlin crisis to the point of conflict, and to become better -
able to deal with a conflict i' it nevertheless occurs.
We
expect that the Allies will wish to make corresponding increases in their own strength, so that our united efforts can have fullest effect.
The benefits we expect from developing this added power are described below, followed by statements of the U.S. program and suggested comparable Allied programs. A o
Improved Position Anticipated from II.3. and Allied Military
Build-Up
What deterrent and related political effects and what opportunities for action not available from present strengths can be anticipated as a consequence of a prompt though orderly build­
up of the Alliance's military power? The only military action which present deployed strengths make possible is a gradual series of probes culminating in a reinforced battalion-sized effort A In the meantime the NATO front remains vulnerable to sudden pano­
tration by Soviet forces such as might present us with a fait accompli. The proposed U.S. and Allied build-up would have important deterrent effects upon the Soviet Union and would contribute substantially to the security of the North Atlantic area. Although our common efforts have actually produced a substantial degree of all forms of military strength, there are many among us who do not recognize the degree of strength these efforts have already brought. Through an uncritical acceptance of reported Soviet division and aircraft numbers and a keen awareness of N A T O s own military deficiences, it is easy to mislead oneself into attributing to the Soviet Union a capability rapidly to overwhelm NATO in non-nuclear action regardless of what we may do. This leads to the false conclusion that the only effective military action available to NATO is immediate nuclear action and that there is little or nothing that can be done to improve our position. !
The proposed program .o.f U.S and allied build-up would open wider options for NATO military action, and would thereby create a basis for a reversal of the misconceptions about NATO weakness.and for a substantial increase in the credibility of Western capacity to take actions which would render the situation uncontrollable by the Soviet Union and, therefore, deaigerous to its basic interests. 0
Carried to completion, the U.S. ' and allied program would make
possible the deployment along the crucial central front of hO allied
divisions -- about one and a half million men -- including a
substantial force in strategic reserve, prior to the sending of a
probe along the autobahn. These divisions would be supported
by substantial allied air power and by nuclear power generally
superior to that of the Soviet Union. Even if the Soviet Union
were to mobilize and deploy the maximum number of divisions which
it is believed the terrain and Soviet logistics could support on
the central front, 50 to 55 Soviet divisions ( 1 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 m e n ) , the
Soviet Union would not have the margins necessary for assurance of
rapid offensive success with non-nuclear weapons.
Prom such a posture a large number of options are opened to the West. A probe launched from such a position carries conviction of serious intent. If the Soviets were to throw it back, they could-not be certain of our response. We might initiate expanded ground action with the assurance that allied forces could not quickly be driven back. OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT The significant point, however, is that the West would have the option of initiating large scale ground action which the Soviets could not throw back rapidly with conventional means. They could hardly believe that they, could overwhelm NATO forces in large scale and continued ground action without certain escalation to nuclear war. The most important results of a U,S. and allied build-up are,
however, to.be sought in the phase prior to
ground probe. In
view of the fact that military actions aften an initial ground
probe could tend, as the forces engaged beca me more numerous and
varied, to pass beyond the positive control of either side short
of ultimate escalation into general nuclear war, 0 ground probe
should be delayed until all other reasonable : 1ternativo courses
have failed. These other courses will not i n themselves
necessarily be conelusive and a number of th em cannot be
indefinitely sustained. It therefore makes a great deal of
difference to their probable effectiveness v,hether they are under­
taken against a background of continued non-nuclear military
weakness or against a background of growing military strength.
Economic counter-measures gain added weight when they presage military action should they, in themselves, not accomplish the desired results. An airlift becomes more meaningful and enemy counter-measures less likely against a background of increasing military strength. Furthermore, the contemplated build-up would give us substantially increased fighter cover for such an airlift and an increased bomber atack threat against counter-measures. Naval harassment and. even naval blockading actions are more likely to be suffered without major retaliation in a situation of growing power than against a background of unchanged strength. In view of the stockpiled supplies in Berlin, there may be time to consider what military response should be made to harassment, or blockade of the access routes, and to complete any needed build-up. This element of time will allow us to relate any decision about the actual deployment of U.S. divisions to Europe to the develop­
ment of the crisis. In the meantime there would be a continuous improgement in the. training, filling up, and equipping of the" NATO forces in being, an improvement in their deployment and in their air; support. -. All such u\-S. and allied \ac'tionc; w o u l d " contribute to :a long-run improvement of allied forces as well as to increased readiness for the current crisis. B-
,'L'HO U PI
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0
M I L 1 TARY
PROGRO IN
THE U N I T E D S T A T E S GOVERNMENT P L A N S , SUBJECT TO APPROVAL B Y
THE CONGRESS OF NECESSARY I N C R E A S E S I N THE DEFENSE BUDGET, TO
UNDERTAKE I M M E D I A T E L Y A PROGRAM DESIGNED TO IMPROVE AND AUGMENT
THE FORCES WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO COMMON DEFENSE OF THE NATO A R E A ,
AND S P E C I F I C A L L Y TO ANY M I L I T A R Y A C T I O N S WHICH THE A L L I A N C E MAY
F I N D NECESSARY I N CONNECTION W I T H A P O S S I B L E B E R L I N C R I S I S .
THE PURPOSE OF T H I S M I L I T A R Y PROGRAM W I L L BE TWOFOLD: F I R S T ,
TO G I V E CLEAR EVIDENCE OF OUR D E T E R M I N A T I O N , AND OF THE F A C T THAT
WE W I L L CONDUCT ANY N E G O T I A T I O N S , P O L I T I C A L , OR ECONOMIC A C T I O N S
A G A I N S T A BACKGROUND OF S T R E N G T H , I N ORDER TO PERSUADE THE S O V I E T
U N I O N THAT I T S PRESENT COURSE I S NOT ONLY DANGEROUS BUT ALSO
FRUITLESS.
SECOND, TO I N C R E A S E THE RANGE OF M I L I T A R Y
A L T E R N A T I V E S A V A I L A B L E TO THE A L L I A N C E SHOULD THE S O V I E T LEADERS
NEVERTHELESS P R E C I P I T A T E A . C R I S I S , I N ORDER TO ALLOW T I M E FOR
THEM TO CORRECT THE M I S C A L C U L A T I O N WHICH LED TO THE C R I S I S AND
D I V E R T THE COURSE OF EVENTS AWAY FROM NUCLEAR WAR I N A MANNER
WHICH PRESERVES OUR I N T E R E S T S .
\re
D E T A I L S CONCERNING MAJOR A C T I O N :
INDICATED I N SECTION C. CONTEMPLATED
IN
THE
PROGRAM T O . F I N A N C E THE PROGRAM, THE CONGRESS W I L L BE ASKED TO
A U T H O R I Z E ABOUT 1=3.2
B I L L I O N NOW, W I T H A D D I T I O N A L E X P E N D I T U R E S
TO BE AUTHORIZED I F AND WHEN A D D I T I O N A L M O B I L I Z A T I O N I S I N D I C A T E D .
OF THE FUNDS I N V O L V E D , I N EXCESS OF $ 1 * 7 5 B I L L I O N W I L L BE
DEVOTED TO PROCUREMENT, AND THE REMAINDER TO A D D I T I O N A L PERSONNEL
AND O P E R A T I N G C O S T S .
T H I S PROGRAM W I L L G I V E US THE C A P A B I L I T Y , B Y THE END OF T H I S
CALENDAR Y E A R , TO DEPLOY S I X A D D I T I O N A L D I V I S I O N FORCES AND UP TO
T H I R T Y A D D I T I O N A L T A C T I C A L A I R SQUADRONS TO E U R O P E .
T H I S REPRESENT
A DEPLOYMENT I N EXCESS OF OUR P L A N N E D C O N T R I B U T I O N S TO NATO
THROUGH M / 30 OF A GENERAL WAR.
THESE FORCES WOULD NOT A C T U A L L Y
BE DEPLOYED UNLESS AND U N T I L THE S I T U A T I O N , AGREED P L A N S , AND
CORRESPONDING PROGRAMS ON THE P A R T OF OUR EUROPEAN A L L I E S
WARRANTED SUCH A C T I O N .
N E V E R T H E L E S S , T H E I R VERY R E A D I N E S S AND
A V A I L A B I L I T Y SHOULD EXERT CONSIDERABLE I N F L U E N C E ON THE S I T U A T I O N
LONG BEFORE ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT BECAME A C O N S I D E R A T I O N .
/
THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT IN
ADDITION,
m In addition, our program will provide for such vital collateral military capabilities as: — Increased readiness of our long-range nuclear strike capability, including an accelerated alert status in our Strategic Air Command. — Greatly improved capabilities to conduct anti-submarine warfare and other necessary naval operations,, — Retention of the capability to cope with possible acts of limited aggression outside the European area, and a strengthened general war posture. The United States Government considers that this program, particularly if associated with corresponding programs on the part of our allies, will substantially enhance the cieiibility of our policy, which is to deter the Soviet Union from carrying out its threats with respect to Berlin, and to provide us with the necessary military posture to achieve our common political objectives in a Berlin crisis should one develop. IC^^Majop Actions in the TI.S. Program
I' - ' ^ *
Personnel, Unites, and Operations
a. Increases in selective service call-ups, and extensions
in terms of service of personnel now on active duty.
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b. Bringing combat units in Europe to full wartime manning j-;; levels and adding support units. c. Bringing four active division forces in the U.S, to combat readiness, so that they can be deployed within 30 days.
( 2 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, and 1 Marine
division are involved, in addition to the 2 airborne divisions,
% ' 1 infantry division and 2 Marine divisions now ready for early
l
deployment,)
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f£ '
m
d. Expanding training, and logistical base capacities. $jk
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e. Preparing transport and facilities for deployments to
Europe.
f:.\
f. Stand-by preparations to mobilize five additional divisions ( 2 infantry, 2 armored and 1 Marine). g. Increasing amphibious and administrative sea lift by tention and reactivation of ships not previously planned for the active fleet. -I
h. Activation of additional naval units for anti­
submarine and other missions. i. Stand-by preparations to increase active fleet personnel strength levels. 3. Retention of twelve tactical air squadrons and six
strategic tanker wings not previously planned for the active
force. (Tactical squadrons include 8 fighter-bomber­
reconnaissance, and U transport.)
k. Preparing to call up twenty-nine reserve fighter­
reconnaissance squadrons and eleven reserve transport squadrons. 1. Diversion of Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft to
military use.
m. Preparation to arrange for bases and facilities to support deployment of air units to Europe. n. Acceleration of ground alert in strategic bomber units, :
;2. Material and Supplies
..
a. Accelerated procurement of material and supplies which will
JH.be impaired to support the foregoing units in possible operations,
"land which can be delivered in time to have most direct bearing on the prospective ,Berlin crisis. b. Tank rebuild, aircraft reworks, and the like will also be ££involved. MM
H
c. Accelerated production of ammunition.' and appropriate expansion of the munitions productions b a s e / SAFE
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P* Other NATO Strengthening.
It lies within the capability
qf the NATO powers to bring about a large increase in our
collective non-nuclear military strength.
Some increase In
strength could be managed within several weeks; within six
months a major improvement in the basic military situation
in Europe could take place.
The key to the potential change
lies in our ground forces.
While the number of men in active NATO units in the Central Region is quite comparable to the Soviets', many NATO
­
divisions are below proper levels in trained manpower, are '
poorly equipped, and have inadequate stocks.
Most importantly,
the Soviet ability to mobilize additional forces and move
reinforcements into Central Europe well exceeds that of NATO
forces.
In thirty days, the Soviets can more than double
their well-equipoed forces, while NATO can add only a little
over half to its M-Day strength, and the added units will
mostly be poorly equipped.
In any case, the NATO stock levels
of equipment and supplies would probably not be adequate for
much more than 3 or k weeks of intensive combat.
This posture
may not deter Soviet action endangering our common interests.
Being convinced that our objectives are best attained through improving rapidly our real and visible capacity for non­
nuclear air-ground action in Central Europe,, while further strengthening our already substantial nuclear strength, the. U.S. has decided upon the program described in the preceding
section.
It involves U.S. readiness to make force contri­
butions on a scale in excess of our MC-70 commitments.
The U.S. expects its allies v/ill wish to strengthen theii' contributions to NATO concurrently. A suitable program might be in two phases.
In the first,
from now until the end of 1 9 6 1 , M-Day forces agreed in MC-70
would be brought up to the levels and standards agreed in
MC-70,
At the same time, advance preparations of reserve
forces would be intensified in anticipation of the second phase,
to be undertaken when and if it becomes clear that despite
our first phase actions the crisis continues.
The second
pha^e would entail bringing generally the remainder of the
First Echelon forces of the Central Region to an active state
and deploying them as ready forces.
To carry our this program, the NATO allies would act during the first phase so that as rapidly as possible they can have deployed in the Central Area the numbers of combat ready divisions shown in Column A below.
Suitable preparations having been made in the first phase for further strengthening, the NATO allies would be ready to deploy additional combat ready divisions into the Central Area to create the totals shown in Colum B below.
Column A
Column B
Belgium
2
2
Canada
1
1
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Prance
FRG
h
8
9
12
Netherlands
2
2
U.K.
3
k
/During
During the first phase, Italy would also prepare two divisions for deployment in the second phase.
Countries on Northern and Southern flanks would increase their ready strength also. Besides these ground force reinforcements, some additional air and naval strengthening would be needed and feasible during the time available. The following measures would apply to all members generally: a. Increase to MC-70 standards the manning and equipment
levels of existing active units.
b.
Maintain a minimum of an 18 month term of service.
c.
level.
Establish war reserve stocks at 90-day operational
d. Assume heightened state of readiness and accelerate
the combat readiness training of active units. e. Prepare during the first phase to bring second phase units rapidly to full combat readiness. f. Accelerate the preparation of additional reserve forces through speeded production, intensified training, and mobilization exercises. g. At an appropriate time transfer operational command of selected forces to NATO commanders. The U.S. has set forth in the preceding section those specific measures which it intends to take in addition to the Other NATO governments will more generally applicable ones.
no doubt likewise wish to set out the comparable specific measures which would contribute toward our common aims,
A
number' of impressions which the U.S, has concerning some of these will be communicated to each government. The program as a whole would make evident our united determination to carry out our commitments to defend the freedom of the people of f/est Berlin and to act together in the common defense.
Soviet leadership would be faced with new, compelling evidence that the allies were indeed prepared to deal with whatever situation grew out of a Soviet aggression over Berlin.
In addition, the real NATO military capability and range, of alternatives would be improved."