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T H I S D O C U M E N T IS T H E P R O P E R T Y OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
Printed
for the War Cabinet.
June
GOVERNMENT
1942.
SECRET.
Copy-No..
W . P . (42) 2 7 1 .
N
June 27, 1942.
I
1
TO B E
KEPT
UNDER
LOCK
AND
KEY
I t is requested t h a t special care m a y be. t a k e n to
ensure the secrecy of this document
WAR
POLICY
TO
BE
Memorandum
CABINET.
ADOPTED
TOWARDS
by the Secretary
of State
MR. GANDHI.
for
India.
W I T H reference to W a r C a b i n e t Conclusions of the 15th J u n e , 74 (42),
M i n u t e 3, a n d to my M e m o r a n d u m W . P . (42) 255 of t h e 16th "June, I circulate
( A p p e n d i x I) for t h e consideration of t h e W a r Cabinet a telegram from the
Viceroy, g i v i n g his a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e situation.
I also circulate ( A p p e n d i x I I ) a s u m m a r y of a r e p o r t of the discussion in
t h e Congress W o r k i n g Committee on G a n d h i ' s o r i g i n a l d r a f t of t h e Congress
W a r Resolution, the text of w h i c h will be found i n W . P . (42) 255. T h i s t h r o w s
much l i g h t on the differences of opinion in the Committee.
L. S. A .
India Office, June 27, 1942. ,
APPENDIX
Telegram
from
I.
Governor-General
to Secretary
dated June 26, 1942.
of State
for
India,
(Immediate.)
1928-S.
F O L L O W I N G is a p p r e c i a t i o n of present position vis-a-vis G a n d h i a n d
Congress :—
2. Cabinet will be f a m i l i a r w i t h recent h a p p e n i n g s . P o s i t i o n a s I see it
is, briefly, t h a t C r i p p s ' s negotiations disclosed (a) a c e r t a i n readiness on t h e
p a r t of Congress to retreat, which w a s d a n g e r envisaged by G a n d h i a n d which
he did his best to offset; (b) they also involved a much more formal acceptance
of the p r i n c i p l e of P a k i s t a n , &c.; (c) when negotiations broke down Congress
h a d become involved in them to an extent which considerably weakened their
position of e n t i r e refusal to accept bona fides of H i s Majesty's Government a n d
of a n t a g o n i s m to retention of B r i t i s h connection w i t h this country.
Nehru
himself w a s as deeply implicated as a n y o n e ; (d) following on collapse of C r i p p s ' s
negotiations G a n d h i suffered defeat and consequent loss of face in A l l a h a b a d
discussions over h i s w a r resolution.
T h i s w a s followed by defection of R a j a g o p a l a c h a r i , who is still r u n n i n g h i s
own opposition c a m p a i g n , for w h i c h he h a s received a measure of s u p p o r t .
[24012]
-'
B
3. I have always t h o u g h t t h a t two m a t t e r s which weigh w i t h G a n d h i were,
first, his personal v a n i t y , and, second, his. desire to keep Congress together.
S i t u a t i o n described in the preceding p a r a g r a p h t h r e a t e n e d both.
Congress
showed signs of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , h a d lost p r e s t i g e a n d position in the country, a n d
it h a d been made clear t h a t G a n d h i ' s w o r d s were no longer entirely a u t h o r i t a t i v e
w i t h it. H e w a s bound in these circumstances either to let process of disintegra­
tion (and parallel process of increasing loss of face on his own p a r t ) continue,
or to endeavour by d r a m a t i c gesture to reconcentrate a t t e n t i o n on himself a n d
to reconsolidate divided r a n k s of Congress.
4. T h e first method of achieving these objects was " B r i t a i n g e t t i n g out "
slogan. T o t h a t very general (? refrain) he h a s endeavoured to (? hitch), firstly,
general fears of J a p a n e s e w i t h suggestion t h a t were we not here I n d i a would
have nothing to fear about J a p a n e s e aggression; secondly, grievance, minor b u t
obviously far more acutely felt by r a n k a n d file, which m a y arise i n operational
a r e a s in connection w i t h orders to evacuate houses a n d holdings as result of our
denial policy, &c. H e has secured utmost publicity both here a n d in U n i t e d
S t a t e s for " B r i t a i n g e t t i n g out " slogan, a n d a f o r t n i g h t a g o it looked as though,
assuming t h a t t h a t slogan were a success, a n d t h a t if it was followed by a n
a p p e a l for mass civil disobedience movement, non-payment of l a n d revenue or
other move designed to interfere in our w a r effort, we m i g h t h a v e to t a k e on a
serious battle w i t h Congress in immediate future.
5. T h e last fortnight, however, has, in my j u d g m e n t , eased the situation.
G a n d h i , somewhat unwisely p e r h a p s , m a d e it clear t h a t it was not only the B r i t i s h
but the A m e r i c a n s also who must leave t h e country.
T h e H a r i j a n contained a
series of somewhat i n s u l t i n g comments on A m e r i c a n colour policy, t r e a t m e n t of
negroes, & c , while A m e r i c a n soldiers have been bracketed w i t h B r i t i s h a s
unwelcome. A n d w h i l e G a n d h i has seen a large number of A m e r i c a n press
correspondents, the accounts in H a r i j a n show t h a t h i s talks w i t h them have a t
least on one occasion led to " some e x a s p e r a t i o n " on p a r t of h i s visitor. H e
h a s not, so far as I a m a w a r e , h a d a good A m e r i c a n press, a n d he is, of course,
very sensitive to t h a t . So f a r as I n d i a is concerned, u n r e a l c h a r a c t e r of his
proposals, failure to accept reality of J a p a n e s e menace, & c . , h a s probably been
contributory cause of w h a t is undoubtedly a fact, t h a t he did not get too good a
press even in I n d i a n p a p e r s which s u p p o r t Congress. There are indications also
t h a t soundings taken of provinces h a d not been wholly e n c o u r a g i n g from his point
of view : and while he has got N e h r u a n d K a l a m A z a d on his side, bur informa­
tion suggests t h a t neither of them is p r e p a r e d to go in for mass civil disobedience.
Finally, J i n n a h has now published statement, gist of which you have seen, which
shows t h a t he is not p r e p a r e d to acquiesce in G a n d h i ' s policy, or in a n y action
by H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government or G a n d h i w h i c h may p r e j u d i c e Moslem claims.
6. The M a h a t m a ' s reactions to this position are shown by fact t h a t in
last ten days he has s p a r e d no o p p o r t u n i t y ' ' to i n t e r p r e t ' ' (and in the process to
cloud and befog) his o r i g i n a l slogan. N o m e t a p h y s i c i a n could now d r a w any
really firm conclusion from o r i g i n a l slogan r e a d w i t h variety of r i d e r s which
G a n d h i h a s passed u p o n it. H e is thus, so far as broad policy s t a n d s , in position,
which he always tries to create, in which he h a s the o p e r a t i o n of a policy not
clearly understood by e i t h e r his followers or world a t large a n d the definition of
which remains entirely in h i s own h a n d s .
7. A t the same time, while he may not have h a d response for which he h a d
hoped, he has w i t h s i n g u l a r success a g a i n focussed a t t e n t i o n in this country
(and I should have t h o u g h t also abroad) on himself. By securing s u p p o r t (under
whatever limitations) of N e h r u a n d A z a d , he has got the backing of m a i n figures
i n W o r k i n g Committee, a n d the a t t e n t i o n concentrated on G a n d h i has still
f u r t h e r detracted from significance a n d activities of R a j a g o p a l a c h a r i . H e has
t h u s secured w i t h o u t any open clash w i t h us certain of objects w h i c h he may be
presumed to have h a d in view in l a u n c h i n g h i s present a g i t a t i o n , and to t h a t
e x t e n t t h e need for extreme measures may p e r h a p s be r a t h e r less from his point
of view t h a n it was a t an earlier stage. I t is very relevant, too, t h a t G a n d h i , so
f a r as I can judge, h a s lost none of his political astuteness, a n d I r e m a i n of the
opinion t h a t he is as unlikely as in past, p a r t i c u l a r l y at his age a n d the somewhat
shaky condition of Congress, to engage in a battle in which he does not feel fairly
confident of victory.
8. I see no sign of any p a r t i c u l a r excitement in the country. A s suggested
above, I doubt if response to an a p p e a l for mass civil disobedience by G a n d h i
would be in a n y sense whole-hearted. Nor do I t h i n k such a n a p p e a l likely.
9. T h e next stage is meeting of the W o r k i n g Committee of Congress on
6th J u l y . T h e r e is a t t h i s moment n o clear indication of w h a t proposition G a n d h i
is likely to p u t before them. I doubt myself if he is really yet clear in h i s m i n d .
Moreover, h e is essentially o p p o r t u n i s t . I t may be t h a t t h e course of L i b y a n
compaign over the n e x t f o r t n i g h t will materially affect the line w h i c h the
W o r k i n g Committee a n d G a n d h i will take. T h a t we cannot j u d g e .
10. I am, however, advised t h a t , whatever the W o r k i n g Committee decide,
it would be impossible for them to implement it, p a r t i c u l a r l y if they have to go
for confirmation to A l l - I n d i a Congl'es"s""Committee, w i t h i n a t least a f o r t n i g h t
from the d a t e of t h e i r meeting. On t h a t assumption, there-is-notra"''greaT3eal to
be g a i n e d a t this stage by my e x a m i n i n g for benefit of the Cabinet a l t e r n a t i v e
possibilities. I would prefer, on the whole, therefore, to w a i t u n t i l t h e W o r k i n g
Committee h a s met, a n d t h e r e a f t e r to advise you a n d the Cabinet in the l i g h t of
t h e i r conclusion. T h e r e need be no delay about t h a t , a n d I should be (? able to)
avoid w a s t i n g your time by e x a m i n i n g a series of hypotheses. Meanwhile, I will,
of course, k e e p you in closest touch w i t h any developments t h a t may affect the
general s i t u a t i o n .
11. B u t I t h i n k I can p r o p e r l y a t t h i s stage record the following general
propositions : (a) N e i t h e r H i s Majesty's Government nor I h a v e a n y desire to t a k e
on Congress if we can avoid t h a t consistently w i t h m a i n t a i n i n g w a r effort and
provisions of the law, &c. W e have q u i t e enough on our h a n d s already, (b) On
t h e o t h e r h a n d , if Congress a t t i t u d e forces us to take them on, we m u s t be
p r e p a r e d to do so a n d w i t h the u t m o s t vigour. T h a t would be the case w h e t h e r
Congress a t t e m p t e d a policy of mass or i n d i v i d u a l civil disobedience t h r o u g h o u t
t h e whole country, or, alternatively, to slow down w o r k in connection w i t h w a r
effort, or, alternatively ( p e r h a p s in some ways as likely as any), issue i n s t r u c ­
tions to refuse to p a y l a n d revenue or to i n d i v i d u a l s in operational a r e a s to get
i n t h e w a y of m i l i t a r y a r r a n g e m e n t s for evacuation of areas, occupation of
b u i l d i n g s , & c , a n d denial policy, (c) W e m i g h t be p r e p a r e d to contemplate t h e
a r r e s t of G a n d h i , and, if necessary, of other leaders, if circumstances so dictate. I
a t t a c h , I fear, little i m p o r t a n c e t o o t h e r leaders, b u t G a n d h i is a special case. I f
we a r e forced to a r r e s t bim, a l t e r n a t i v e s a r e to i n t e r n him outside I n d i a or in
I n d i a . I have carefully considered these alternatives. I n result, I conclude in
favour of i n t e r n i n g h i m in this country on same line as w e h a d in view previously,
viz., in a comfortable house, probably in Bombay Presidency, a n d g i v i n g all due
consideration t o him. H e will, in my j u d g m e n t , have f a r less p o p u l a r a p p e a l if
he is i n t e r n e d here a n d be far less of a focus. I t h i n k effect, too, in U n i t e d S t a t e s
will probably be less u n f o r t u n a t e if he is k e p t in h i s own c o u n t r y in comfortable
s u r r o u n d i n g s t h a n if he is deported to U g a n d a or t h e like. Finally, we avoid a n y
risk, of difficulties over food, medical attention, physical s t r a i n on h i m of a long
a i r or sea passage, &c.
12. I would, however, also a d d following comments :—
(a) I f w e a r e faced w i t h serious trouble here a n d a r e (? to come) t h r o u g h it
successfully, I m u s t be assured of complete b a c k i n g of H i s Majesty's
Government. My Council have made a very s t r o n g p o i n t of this. They
complain t h a t when they a r e invited to go all out a g a i n s t Congress
tihey cannot r i s k position being radically changed a t a moment's notice
w i t h o u t consulting w i t h them by a mission sent such a s C r i p p s ' s from
home which concentrates on Congress, a n d they u r g e very strongly t h a t
if they a r e t o get on the p l a t f o r m s a n d expose t h e fallacies of Congress
policy they should do so w i t h a n assurance t h a t they will not be t h r o w n
overboard. I recognise t h a t politics being w h a t they a r e there cannot
be any last w o r d in m a t t e r s such as these. B u t I should like to be able
t o a s s u r e my Council t h a t in t h e event of their t a k i n g t h e line (and
political risks to themselves) involved they would do so w i t h complete
b a c k i n g of H i s Majesty's Government.
(&) H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government m u s t be p r e p a r e d to p r e p a r e the way in U n i t e d
S t a t e s a n d a t home, and to do really active p r o p a g a n d a for our course
[24012]
B 2
of action. I t h o u g h t your telegrams to H o m e D e p a r t m e n t 10853 a n d
10854 a d m i r a b l e on those lines, but g r o u n d requires very careful
preparation.
(c) (5 W e ) m u s t be p r e p a r e d to t a k e a much more r i g i d line as r e g a r d s news,
broadcasts, &c. I am t e l e g r a p h i n g s e p a r a t e l y to you about B.B.C.,
a n d s u g g e s t i n g t h a t a f a r g r e a t e r degree of control over I n d i a n
m a t e r i a l p u t out by i t is called for. I can do a good deal myself w i t h
R e u t e r s ; but I should have to look to you a n d to H i s M a j e s t y ' s
Government to help so f a r as they could w i t h R e u t e r a n d w i t h press
generally. I recognise t h a t we cannot p r e v e n t people like Sorensen, & c ,
from a s k i n g questions in P a r l i a m e n t .
APPENDIX
Summary
II.
of Discussion in Congress Working Committee on the
War Resolution, finally adopted en May 1.
Congress
Nehru u r g e d t h a t G a n d h i ' s d r a f t m a d e the w r o n g a p p r o a c h .
The British
could not reasonably w i t h d r a w their troops even if they recognised independence;
w i t h d r a w a l of troops a n d t h e whole a p p a r a t u s of civil a d m i n i s t r a t i o n would
create a vacuum which could not be filled immediately. Moreover, the conquest
of I n d i a is in the J a p a n e s e p l a n . I f the B r i t i s h w i t h d r e w , the J a p a n e s e would
insist on c e r t a i n facilities—aerodromes, occupation of s t r a t e g i c points, passage
for troops to the M i d d l e E a s t . Acceptance of the policy in G a n d h i ' s d r a f t would
m a k e I n d i a a passive p a r t n e r of the A x i s P o w e r s . H e r e p e a t e d l y emphasised t h i s
last p o i n t a n d said t h a t the J a p a n e s e could not be stopped by non-violent non­
co-operation, while Congress would get hostility from every other element outside
t h e A x i s P o w e r s . T h e whole t h o u g h t a n d b a c k g r o u n d of G a n d h i ' s d r a f t w a s one
of f a v o u r i n g J a p a n . I t was G a n d h i ' s feeling t h a t J a p a n a n d G e r m a n y would
win. H e t h o u g h t Congress were agreed (1) on their reactions to Government;
(2) on their total i n a b i l i t y to co-operate w i t h G o v e r n m e n t ; (3) on their policy not
to e m b a r r a s s Government because t h a t would help the invader.
P o i n t s m a d e by speakers who s u p p o r t e d N e h r u were :—
Pandit Pant: T h e l a n g u a g e about condemnation of t h e C r i p p s proposals is
highly e x a g g e r a t e d - i f the proposals were so bad, w h y did w e spend so much time
over t h e m ? W e m u s t do our u t m o s t to defend the c o u n t r y a n d swallow m a n y
t h i n g s . If I c a n ' t co-operate w i t h the B r i t i s h it is because it is not consistent
w i t h our d i g n i t y . B u t the a p p r o a c h in G a n d h i ' s d r a f t makes every soldier I see
my enemy.
Asaf
Ali:
T e l l i n g the B r i t i s h to w i t h d r a w will do nobody a n y good.
Bhulabhai Desai: The resolution is inconsistent w i t h our previous stand.
have said t h a t if offered an o p p o r t u n i t y w e shall side w i t h t h e Allies.
We
Satyamurti:
I do not a g r e e w i t h the objection to the e n t r y of foreign soldiers.
I n d i a m a y defend herself even w i t h the aid of foreign soldiers.
Rajagopalachariar
also criticised t h e o r i g i n a l d r a f t a n d its a m e n d m e n t by
R a j e n d r a P r a s a d . T h e new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Congress policy would go terribly
a g a i n s t them, a n d J a p a n would say : " E x c e l l e n t ! " J a p a n would fill, the vacuum
c r e a t e d by t h e B r i t i s h w i t h d r a w a l . " O u r reaction to the evils of B r i t a i n should
n o t make us lose our sense of perspective. Do not r u n into the arms of J a p a n ,
w h i c h is w h a t t h e resolution comes t o . "
B u t in spite of N e h r u ' s criticisms t h e m a j o r i t y of the W o r k i n g Committee
s u p p o r t e d G a n d h i ' s d r a f t , as amended by R a j e n d r a P r a s a d .
Kripalani:
T h e resolution will not necessarily lead to the passage of J a p a n e s e
a r m i e s t h r o u g h I n d i a . Congress have asked B r i t i s h a n d A m e r i c a n s to w i t h d r a w
thejr armies, a n d so also they ask others to keep out of t h e i r frontiers. " I f they
do not, we fight."
Patwardhan:
If we do n o t take decisions N e h r u ' s a t t i t u d e will lead to abject
and u n c o n d i t i o n a l co-operation w i t h B r i t i s h m a c h i n e r y which m u s t collapse.
Co-operation w i t h B r i t a i n is a n i n v i t a t i o n to J a p a n . T h e w a r is an imperialist
war. O u r policy can be t h a t we t a k e no sides. I would reconsider the position
if the Allies could defeat the A x i s . B u t I see clearly t h a t B r i t a i n is going t o w a r d s
the deep. W e w a n t t o create n e u t r a l i t y .
Vallabhai Patel: T h e B r i t i s h cannot defend I n d i a . W e cannot d e f e n d - i t
either because they w o n ' t let us. B u t if they w i t h d r a w there is a chance for us.
Congress to-day is reeling u n d e r two blows, one C r i p p s a n d the other
E a j a g o p a l a c h a r i a r ' s resolutions. I feel G a n d h i is instinctively r i g h t in the lead
he gives in all c r i t i c a l situations. I t is time the door (to negotiations with the
British Government) w a s finally closed after the repeated insults heaped on us.
Sarojini Naidu: T h e d r a f t is good as an expression of our extreme disgust
and dislike a n d h a t r e d of the B r i t i s h Government.
Bishwanath
Das: T h e C r i p p s proposals if accepted would have kept us in
p e r m a n e n t bondage. T h e a p p e a l to B r i t a i n to w i t h d r a w is very proper.
A. N. Deo: W h a t e v e r u n r e a l i t y there is in I n d i a n politics is due to B r i t i s h
rale. L e t i t go a n d the u n r e a l i t y will disappear. I am not interested in defeating
Hitlerite Germany.
Maulana
Kalam Azad:(jve&t
B r i t a i n h a s m a d e 'it impossible for us to
defend our country.
I f I felt t h a t J a p a n was better t h a n B r i t a i n and h e r
invasion w a s for the good of I n d i a I would have said so in public.
Gandhi's
prescription is the only a l t e r n a t i v e , t h o u g h I doubt i t s effectiveness.
G a n d h i ' s resolution,- as amended by R a j en dr a P r a s a d , and an alternative
resolution s u b m i t t e d by N e h r u were p u t to the vote. T h e former was a d o p t e d a t
the m o r n i n g session on the 1st May, but t h e m a t t e r was reopened a t the afternoon
session a n d N e h r u ' s d r a f t was finally adopted.