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IS DOCUMENT 1 3 TI li
"PROPERTY OP H I S
BRITOTIC
MAJESTY'S
[J R E T
OOVBPJTii^TT).
COPY
NQ./4cT,
; 896 ( 5 6 ) .
C A B IN
TBS P O S I T I O N
E
T.
0? qSLGIUM.IN THE PROPOSED
FIVE
""POVBSR "CONFERENCE.
In accordance with the recommendation of the
Committee of Imperial Defence at their Meeting on
29th October, 1936, the accompanying Reoort by the Chiefs
of Staff Sub-Committee (C.I.D. Paper No. 1269-B), together
with an extract from the draft Minutes"'' of the 233rd
Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, are
circulated to the Cabinet.
(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY.
Secretary to the Cabinet.
Whitehall hardens, S.W.1.
30th October, 1936.
K These Minutes, being in draft form only,
are subject to correction.
Printed
for the Committee
of Imperial
Defence.
October 1936.
SECRET.
Copy No.
COMMITTEE
Extract
from
the DRAFT
W
OF I M P E R I A L
Minutes
^
(3)—POSITION
DEFENCE.
of the 2 8 3 r d Meeting,
H(*
OF BELGIUM
held on October 29, 1936.
$fe
IN
THE PROPOSED
4^
FIVE-POWER
CONFERENCE.
( C . I . D . P a p e r N o . 1269-B.)
( P r e v i o u s r e f e r e n c e : C . I . D . M i n u t e s of t h e 282nd M e e t i n g , M i n u t e 5.)
T H E C O M M I T T E E h a d u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n a r e p o r t by t h e C h i e f s of Staff
S u b - C o m m i t t e e ( C . I . D . P a p e r N o . 1 2 6 9 - B ) r e g a r d i n g t h e p o s i t i o n of B e l g i u m in
the p r o p o s e d F i v e - P o w e r C o n f e r e n c e .
S I R E R N L E C H A T F I E L D , a t t h e r e q u e s t of t h e C h a i r m a n , i n t r o d u c e d the
R e p o r t a n d s u m m a r i s e d t h e s a l i e n t p o i n t s , l e a d i n g to t h e conclusion t h a t from t h e
m i l i t a r y p o i n t of v i e w H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t should n o t a s k t h a t i n t h e new
Treaty Belgium should g u a r a n t e e t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, a n d should not support
the view of t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t t h a t B e l g i u m should g u a r a n t e e F r a n c e (and
G e r m a n y ) . T h i s conclusion w a s i n a c c o r d w i t h t h e conclusion r e a c h e d i n a r e p o r t
d a t e d S e p t e m b e r 1936, d e a l i n g w i t h t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s for t h e F i v e - P o w e r
Conference^
S I R R O B E R T V A N S I T T A R T s a i d t h a t h e h a d n o r e a s o n t o differ w i t h t h e
conclusion r e a c h e d by t h e C h i e f s of Staff S u b - C o m m i t t e e . A n y o p p o s i t i o n on o u r
p a r t t o t h e policy r e c e n t l y d e c l a r e d by t h e B e l g i a n G o v e r n m e n t m i g h t e n c o u r a g e
the B e l g i a n s t o p u r s u e a less v i g o r o u s defence policy t h a n n o w seemed possible.
CONCLUSIONS.
T H E COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
agreed—
To recommend—
(a) T h a t a p p r o v a l s h o u l d b e g i v e n t o t h e R e p o r t by t h e C h i e f s of Staff
S u b - C o m m i t t e e ( C . I . D . P a p e r N o . 1269-B), t h e conclusions of w h i c h
a r e s u m m a r i s e d i n p a r a g r a p h 15 a s follows : —
" (i) F r o m t h e m i l i t a r y p o i n t of view, H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t
s h o u l d not a s k t h a t i n t h e n e w T r e a t y B e l g i u m should
guarantee the United Kingdom; and
(ii) F r o m t h e m i l i t a r y p o i n t of view, H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t
s h o u l d not s u p p o r t t h e v i e w of the F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t t h a t
i n t h e n e w T r e a t y B e l g i u m should g u a r a n t e e F r a n c e ( a n d
Germany)."
(b) T h a t t h e R e p o r t should b e s u b m i t t e d t o t h e C a b i n e t t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e
M i n u t e s of t h e C o m m i t t e e on t h e subject.
*
*
*
*
*
*
2 Whitehall
Gardens, S.W. 1,
October 29, 1936.
* C.I.D. P a p e r No. 1260-B.
[14023-1]
Printed
for the Committee
of Imperial
Defence.
October 1936.
SECEET.
' Copy No.
1269-B.
(Also Paper
No. CCS.
518.)
COMMITTEE OF I M P E R I A L DEFENCE.
Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee.
THE
POSITION
OF
BELGIUM
IN
THE
PROPOSED
FIVE-POWER
CONFERENCE.
( P r e v i o u s C . I . D . P a p e r No. 1 2 6 0 - B . )
REPORT.
Introductory.
I N o u r R e p o r t on t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s for t h e F i v e - P o w e r
conclusions t h a t we r e c o r d e d on t h e q u e s t i o n a s t o w h e t h e r —
Conference, t h e
' ' B e l g i u m should be relieved of g i v i n g a n y g u a r a n t e e , a n d h e r commit­
ments limited to a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g to defend her own territory,"
were a s follows* :—
" (i) A n effective B e l g i a n n e u t r a l i t y w o u l d be g r e a t l y t o o u r a d v a n t a g e a n d
s h o u l d n o t d e l i b e r a t e l y be r e n d e r e d impossible, even t h o u g h t h e
c h a n c e s of i t s b e i n g m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h o u t a W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n w a r
a r e remote.
(ii) W e should, t h e r e f o r e , welcome a r e q u e s t by B e l g i u m t h a t she should n o t
be a g u a r a n t o r P o w e r , b u t should merely give a n u n d e r t a k i n g t o
defend her own territorv."
2. Since t h e n , B e l g i u m h a s m a d e a p u b l i c d e c l a r a t i o n of h e r policy. F o r
the f u t u r e s h e i s d e t e r m i n e d t o e n s u r e t h e p r o t e c t i o n of h e r o w n f r o n t i e r s , b u t
she i n t e n d s t o h a v e n o o b l i g a t i o n s a s a g u a r a n t o r P o w e r .
I n other words,
Belgium h a s a d o p t e d t h e p r e c i s e a t t i t u d e w h i c h -we hoped, f r o m t h e m i l i t a r y
point of view, t h a t she w o u l d a d o p t .
3. W e h a v e been i n f o r m e d by t h e F o r e i g n Office t h a t t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t
feel s t r o n g l y on t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n of B e l g i a n policy, a n d t h a t t h e i r
Ambassador h a s i n d e e d e x p r e s s e d t h e h o p e t h a t H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t - w o u l d
support t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t i n u r g i n g t h e B e l g i a n G o v e r n m e n t t o r e m a i n a
guarantor State.
4. W e h a v e , t h e r e f o r e , been r e q u e s t e d (see A p p e n d i x ) t o r e - e x a m i n e t h e
conclusions s u m m a r i s e d i n p a r a g r a p h 1 above, i n t h e l i g h t of t h e a r g u m e n t s a d d u c e d
by t h e B e l g i a n s a n d F r a n c e , i n t h e n o t e s w h i c h a r e a n n e x e d t o t h e A p p e n d i x t o
this E e p o r t . ( E n c l o s u r e s Nos. 1 a n d 2 respectively.)
* Enclosure to C.I.D. P a p e r No. 1260-B, paragraph 45.
[13990]
B
102
Belgian
A
rguments.
5. I t w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t B e l g i u m h a s t w o p r i n c i p a l r e a s o n s for her
u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o be a g u a r a n t o r P o w e r . I n t h e first place, she d e s i r e s t o avoid
t h e r i s k of b e i n g d r a w n i n t o w a r a s a r e s u l t of F r e n c h c o m m i t m e n t s in C e n t r a l
a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e , a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y as a r e s u l t of t h e F r a n c o - S o v i e t P a c t . W i t h
t h i s desire w e h a v e every s y m p a t h y , the more so since w e recently e m p h a s i s e d
i n o u r R e p o r t on t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s for the F i v e - P o w e r Conference, t h e i m p o r t a n c e ,
from o u r o w n p o i n t of view, of t a k i n g " s t e p s to e n s u r e t h a t a n y g u a r a n t e e we
give w i l l n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y d r a w u s into a w a r w h i c h h a s a s i t s o r i g i n t h e rectifi­
c a t i o n of G e r m a n y ' s E a s t e r n f r o n t i e r . " ( E n c l o s u r e to C . I . D . P a p e r No. 1 2 6 0 - B ,
p a r a g r a p h 48.) I n t h e s a m e R e p o r t * we stressed t h e necessity, from t h e m i l i t a r y
p o i n t of view, for l i m i t i n g our c o m m i t m e n t s i n E u r o p e , a n d for u n d e r t a k i n g no
l i a b i l i t y to e n g a g e i n a n y w a r in w h i c h o u r v i t a l i n t e r e s t s a r e n o t affected. I t may
be t h a t in a n y case B e l g i u m ' s chance of m a i n t a i n i n g a n effective n e u t r a l i t y
t h r o u g h o u t a W e s t e r n w a r is s m a l l ; b u t in o u r o p i n i o n t h e c h a n c e will be very
m u c h g r e a t e r if she is relieved of a n y g u a r a n t e e s a n d if h e r only c o m m i t m e n t is
a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g to d e f e n d h e r o w n t e r r i t o r y .
Moreover, t h e g r e a t e r h e r c h a n c e of m a i n t a i n i n g h e r n e u t r a l i t y effectively the
less is t h e likelihood of o u r b e i n g d r a g g e d i n ; c o n s e q u e n t l y w e o u g h t to s u p p o r t
h e r in g a i n i n g t h i s e n d by r e l i e v i n g h e r of a n y g u a r a n t e e s .
6. Secondly, i t seems t h a t t h e B e l g i a n G o v e r n m e n t d e s i r e t o p r o m o t e n a t i o n a l
u n i t y in s u p p o r t of a n a t i o n a l f o r e i g n policy, a n d t h e r e b y , t o o b t a i n t h e s u p p o r t of
t h e B e l g i a n people for t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of t h e i r m i l i t a r y forces a n d defences.
A s t o t h i s , i t is clear t h a t a n y a c t i o n w h i c h r e n d e r s B e l g i u m t h e m o r e able to
d e f e n d h e r own t e r r i t o r y , is to o u r a d v a n t a g e f r o m t h e m i l i t a r y p o i n t of view.
If, t h e r e f o r e , t h e g i v i n g of a g u a r a n t e e t o F r a n c e w o u l d , as w e believe t o be the
case, w r e c k t h e h o p e of B e l g i a n n a t i o n a l u n i t y in t h e field of f o r e i g n policy, a n d
thereby prejudice the military p r e p a r a t i o n s which, we learn, are being undertaken
b y t h e B e l g i a n G o v e r n m e n t w i t h commendable v i g o u r i n t h e face of s t r o n g
P a r l i a m e n t a r y o p p o s i t i o n , i t w o u l d be u n w i s e on o u r p a r t to use o u r influence in
s u p p o r t of t h e F r e n c h d e m a n d for a n y such g u a r a n t e e .
French
Arguments.
7. T u r n i n g n o w to t h e F r e n c h objections t o t h e d e c l a r e d policy of the
B e l g i a n G o v e r n m e n t (see E n c l o s u r e No. 2 t o A p p e n d i x ) , t h e y d r a w a t t e n t i o n in
t h e first p l a c e t o i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s from the B e l g i a n p o i n t of view. T h e y a r g u e t h a t
t h e close c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of c o n c e r t e d defence p l a n s t h a t h a s
h i t h e r t o e x i s t e d between t h e F r e n c h a n d B e l g i a n G e n e r a l Staffs w i l l n o l o n g e r be
possible. A s a r e s u l t , t h e r e will be inevitable delay i n t h e a s s i s t a n c e -that can
be given by t h e F r e n c h A r m y , a n d a r i s k t h a t B e l g i u m m a y be o v e r r u n before such
a s s i s t a n c e c a n become effective.
8. T h e r e is, of course, some force in t h i s a r g u m e n t . W e w o u l d observe, how­
ever, t h a t w e h a v e been i n f o r m e d by t h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff t h a t
G e n e r a l G a m e l i n , t h e C h i e f of t h e F r e n c h G e n e r a l Staff, i n f o r m e d o u r M i l i t a r y
A t t a c h e i n P a r i s , as r e c e n t l y as l a s t M a r c h , t h a t t h e F r e n c h w e r e p r e p a r e d to
s u p p o r t B e l g i u m , only if i t w a s k n o w n for c e r t a i n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h F i e l d Force
w a s on i t s w a y t o B e l g i u m . I t seems probable t h a t t h i s t h r e a t to leave B e l g i u m
t o h e r f a t e w a s i n t e n d e d to force u s i n t o a definite c o m m i t m e n t to s e n d t h e Field
F o r c e to B e l g i u m a t t h e o u t s e t of t h e w a r , a n d t o u n d e r t a k e , i n t i m e of peace, the
d e t a i l e d m i l i t a r y c o n v e r s a t i o n s t h a t t h i s c o m m i t m e n t w o u l d involve. I n these
c i r c u m s t a n c e s w e a r e left w i t h t h e s t r o n g i m p r e s s i o n t h a t w h a t t h e F r e n c h most
f e a r f r o m t h e B e l g i a n d e c l a r a t i o n — a l t h o u g h t h e y d o n o t a d m i t i t — i s t h a t the
t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e e x i s t i n g close l i a i s o n between t h e F r e n c h a n d B e l g i a n G e n e r a l
Staffs will a u t o m a t i c a l l y p u t a n e n d to a n y h o p e of t h e F r a n c o - B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y
conversations.
9. A s t o t h i s , i t is o u r o p i n i o n t h a t m u t u a l a s s i s t a n c e p a c t s o n a m u l t i ­
l a t e r a l b a s i s h a v e no m o r e m i l i t a r y v a l u e t h a n t h e C o v e n a n t of t h e L e a g u e . A n y
m u l t i l a t e r a l a g r e e m e n t , a s w e h a v e previously p o i n t e d o u t , t p r e c l u d e s the
p o s s i b i l i t y of effective staff conversations between t h e p a r t i e s t h e r e t o , since i t is
* Enclosure to C.I.D. P a p e r No. 1260-B, paragraphs 4 and 5.
f Enclosure to O.I.D. P a p e r No. 1260-B, paragraphs 59 to 62.
ciearly i m p r a c t i c a b l e to concert p l a n s w i t h A for w a r a g a i n s t B a n d , a t t h e same
time, w i t h B for w a r a g a i n s t A . W e h a v e also e x p r e s s e d t h e view* t h a t b i l a t e r a l
staff conversations or c o n v e r s a t i o n s between a l i m i t e d n u m b e r of t h e p a r t i e s t o a
m u l t i l a t e r a l a g r e e m e n t w o u l d be i n v i d i o u s , a n d would, moreover, t e n d to involve
us in m i l i t a r y c o m m i t m e n t s w h i c h w o u l d f e t t e r o u r freedom of a c t i o n as to t h e
form t h a t o u r i n t e r v e n t i o n m i g h t t a k e w h e n the occasion arose. T h e r e f o r e , we
a g a i n wish to e m p h a s i s e t h a t , w h a t e v e r t h e position of B e l g i u m in a n y new t r e a t y
t h a t m a y be n e g o t i a t e d , o t h e r of course t h a n a definite alliance, we should n o t be
committed to m i l i t a r y c o n v e r s a t i o n s , e i t h e r w i t h F r a n c e or w i t h B e l g i u m .
It
m i g h t be t h o u g h t r i g h t to m a k e a definite s t a t e m e n t to t h i s effect t o the F r e n c h
Government.
10. T u r n i n g a g a i n t o t h e F r e n c h objections, t h e y a r g u e t h a t t h e r e c e n t
Belgium d e c l a r a t i o n involves g r a v e consequences to F r e n c h a n d B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s .
I n the first place, t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of t h e F r e n c h a n d B r i t i s h forces would, they
consider, be p r e j u d i c e d by t h e f a c t t h a t , i n t h e absence of a p r e - c o n c e r t e d p l a n ,
the d i s t a n t F r a n c o - B e l g i a n cover, w h i c h is a t p r e s e n t c o n t e m p l a t e d , w o u l d n o t be
available i n t i m e . T h i s a r g u m e n t assumes, w i t h o u t justification, t h a t w e a r e
committed to d e s p a t c h i n g t h e F i e l d F o r c e to F r a n c e a t the o u t s e t of h o s t i l i t i e s .
11. A p a r t f r o m t h i s , t h e F r e n c h c o n t e n d t h a t t h e m o s t serious consequences
of B e l g i a n n e u t r a l i t y w o u l d a r i s e i n connection w i t h a e r i a l w a r f a r e (see A n n e x to
Enclosure No. 2, S e c t i o n I I ) . T h e y p o i n t out, i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t b o t h F r a n c e a n d
G r e a t B r i t a i n would, u n d e r t h e n e w B e l g i a n policy, be d e p r i v e d of t h e B e l g i a n
a n t i - a i r c r a f t o b s e r v a t i o n service a n d a n t i - a i r c r a f t defences, a n d of t h e use of
Belgian a e r o d r o m e s . G r e a t B r i t a i n w o u l d t h u s " f i n d i t impossible to o p e r a t e
on the v i t a l zone of t h e R u h r , a n d t h e G e r m a n bases i n W e s t p h a l i a , " w h i l s t t h e
F r e n c h a i r forces w o u l d be u n a b l e , w i t h o u t i n e v i t a b l e difficulties, to r e a c h t h e s e
objectives, for t o d o so t h e y w o u l d h a v e t o m a k e long flights over G e r m a n
t e r r i t o r y . G e r m a n y , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , w o u l d be able to a t t a c k L o n d o n from bases
on the N o r t h Sea, w h e r e a s " G r e a t B r i t a i n would h a v e no chance of a t t a c k i n g ,
by w a y of r e p r i s a l , G e r m a n objectives of c o m p a r a b l e i m p o r t a n c e .
12. I t is our view t h a t r e c e n t t e c h n i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s h a v e r e d u c e d t h e
p o t e n t i a l value to us of t h e B e l g i a n o b s e r v a t i o n service a n d a n t i - a i r c r a f t defences,
and it is a n o v e r - s t a t e m e n t t o s u g g e s t t h a t i t w o u l d be impossible for u s t o o p e r a t e
a g a i n s t t h e R u h r w i t h o u t t h e use of B e l g i a n a e r o d r o m e s . W e could clearly d o so
by o p e r a t i n g from bases i n N . E . F r a n c e , a n d t h e t a c t i c a l difficulties i n d o i n g so
would be l a r g e l y offset by t h e g r e a t e r c e r t a i n t y of o c c u p y i n g t h e m a n d the a d d e d
security a n d convenience of such bases a n d t h e i r lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n as
compared t o those i n B e l g i u m . T h o u g h w e a g r e e g e n e r a l l y w i t h t h e F r e n c h
thesis t h a t a n e u t r a l B e l g i u m w o u l d e n a b l e G e r m a n A i r F o r c e s to a t t a c k o u r
vital a r e a s in g r e a t e r s t r e n g t h t h a n w e could a t t a c k t h e i r s , i t m u s t be observed
t h a t even if B e l g i u m w e r e n o t n e u t r a l , t h e G e r m a n s w o u l d still h a v e t h e a d v a n t a g e
due to t h e f a r g r e a t e r i m p o r t a n c e a n d v u l n e r a b i l i t y of L o n d o n t h a n a n y
comparable objective i n G e r m a n y .
13. W e have, however, seen a R e c o r d t of a c o n v e r s a t i o n between M r . S t r a n g
and M. M a s s i g l i in w h i c h t h e l a t t e r " a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e r e m i g h t be w a y s of
g e t t i n g r o u n d t h e s e difficulties, even i f B e l g i u m gave n o e x p r e s s g u a r a n t e e . S h e
might, for e x a m p l e , c o n s e n t t o t h e p a s s a g e of F r e n c h or B r i t i s h forces, t h r o u g h
or over h e r t e r r i t o r y , in c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o be defined in t h e n e w t r e a t y , a n d i n d e e d ,
she w a s b o u n d to do so u n d e r A r t i c l e X V I (3), of t h e C o v e n a n t , if F r a n c e a n d
G r e a t B r i t a i n w e r e a c t i n g u n d e r t h a t a r t i c l e . " T h e possibilities of t h e c a s e
clearly call for t h e m o s t c a r e f u l e x a m i n a t i o n .
CONCLUSION.
14. T h e f o r e g o i n g e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e a r g u m e n t s a d d u c e d by t h e B e l g i a n s
and F r e n c h h a s led u s to t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , from t h e m i l i t a r y p o i n t of view, t h e
balance of a d v a n t a g e is t o be d e r i v e d f r o m a d h e r i n g t o t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
quoted in p a r a g r a p h 1 above.
* Enclosure to C.I.D. P a p e r No. 1260-B, paragraphs 59 to 62.
t Enclosure to P a p e r No. C.O.S. 516.
[13990]
B 2
15. A c c o r d i n g l y , o u r a n s w e r s to t h e specific q u e s t i o n s p u t t o u s by the
F o r e i g n Office, a r e a s follows : —
(i) F r o m t h e m i l i t a r y p o i n t of view, H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d not
ask t h a t in the new Treaty Belgium should guarantee the United
Kingdom; and
(ii) F r o m t h e m i l i t a r y p o i n t of view, H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d not
s u p p o r t t h e view of t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t t h a t in t h e n e w T r e a t y
Belgium should g u a r a n t e e F r a n c e (and Germany).
(Signed)
2 Whitehall
Gardens, S.W.
October 26, 1936.
1,
ERNLE
CHATFIELD.
E. L.
ELLINGTON.
C. J .
DEVERELL.
APPENDIX.
[C.O.S. 515.]
Copy of a letter
from
the Foreign
Office to the Secretary,
Defence.
Committee
of
Imperial
[C 6 9 0 3 / 4 / 1 8 ]
Sir,
Foreign Office, October 16, 1936.
I T w i l l be recalled t h a t in F o r e i g n Office m e m o r a n d u m * of t h e 1 9 t h A u g u s t
on t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s for t h e p r o p o s e d F i v e P o w e r C o n f e r e n c e t h e a d v i c e of t h e
C o m m i t t e e of I m p e r i a l D e f e n c e w a s s o u g h t on the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r B e l g i u m
should be relieved of g i v i n g a n y g u a r a n t e e a n d h e r c o m m i t m e n t s l i m i t e d t o a n
u n d e r t a k i n g to d e f e n d h e r o w n t e r r i t o r y .
T h e views of t h e C o m m i t t e e of
I m p e r i a l D e f e n c e o n t h i s q u e s t i o n will be f o u n d in p a r a g r a p h s 3 6 - 4 5 of t h e
C h i e f s of Staff S u b - C o m m i t t e e ' s R e p o r t t of t h e 1st S e p t e m b e r ( O P . 218 ( 3 6 ) ) .
T h e conclusions of t h e S u b - C o m m i t t e e w e r e t h a t : —
(1) a n effective B e l g i a n n e u t r a l i t y w o u l d be g r e a t l y t o o u r a d v a n t a g e a n d
s h o u l d n o t d e l i b e r a t e l y be r e n d e r e d impossible even t h o u g h the c h a n c e s
of i t s b e i n g m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h o u t a W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n w a r a r e
remote, a n d
(2) w e should, t h e r e f o r e , welcome a r e q u e s t by B e l g i u m t h a t she s h o u l d
n o t be a g u a r a n t o r P o w e r b u t should m e r e l y g i v e a n u n d e r t a k i n g to
d e f e n d h e r own t e r r i t o r y .
2. S u b s e q u e n t l y , on t h e 17th S e p t e m b e r , a m e m o r a n d u m w a s c o m m u n i c a t e d
to t h e four o t h e r G o v e r n m e n t s , i n p a r a g r a p h 5 (1) of w h i c h is e x p r e s s e d , i n t h e
following w o r d s , t h e view of H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t as to w h i c h P o w e r s
should give a n d receive g u a r a n t e e s so f a r as t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m is concerned :—
" H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d be r e a d y to g u a r a n t e e t h e observance
of such ( n o n - a g g r e s s i o n ) a r r a n g e m e n t s as between G e r m a n y on t h e one h a n d
a n d F r a n c e a n d B e l g i u m on t h e o t h e r , i n r e t u r n for s i m i l a r g u a r a n t e e s f o r
t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m from France against G e r m a n y and from G e r m a n y
against France."
I t should be n o t e d t h a t in t h i s m e m o r a n d u m no view is e x p r e s s e d by H i s M a j e s t y ' s
G o v e r n m e n t u p o n t h e q u e s t i o n of a B e l g i a n g u a r a n t e e t o F r a n c e , or, i n d e e d ,
r e s p e c t i n g g u a r a n t e e s by or to a n y P o w e r except i n cases w h e r e H i s M a j e s t y ' s
G o v e r n m e n t a r e themselves d i r e c t l y i n t e r e s t e d .
3. D u r i n g t h e r e c e n t discussions a t G e n e v a i t w a s l e a r n e d t h a t t h e F r e n c h
G o v e r n m e n t i n t e n d e d to e m p h a s i s e t h e i m p o r t a n c e w h i c h , for a n u m b e r of
reasons, they a t t a c h e d to a B e l g i a n g u a r a n t e e to F r a n c e . I t w a s also l e a r n e d (see
G e n e v a despatch:): No. 96 of t h e 3 0 t h S e p t e m b e r ; copy enclosed) t h a t t h e B e l g i a n
G o v e r n m e n t w e r e v e r y satisfied w i t h o u r N o t e of t h e 17th S e p t e m b e r d i d n o t
propose a B e l g i a n g u a r a n t e e t o t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m a n d t h a t t h e y h o p e d t h a t
F r a n c e also w o u l d n o t ask B e l g i u m for a g u a r a n t e e . S u b s e q u e n t l y , t h e F r e n c h
G o v e r n m e n t s v i e w s w e r e developed i n d e t a i l i n a m e m o r a n d u m ^ c o m m u n i c a t e d
by t h e F r e n c h D e l e g a t i o n a t G e n e v a on t h e 2 n d October ( G e n e v a d e s p a t c h No. 106
of the 2 n d O c t o b e r ; copy enclosed). C o p y of recordsll of c o n v e r s a t i o n s a t G e n e v a
between F r e n c h a n d B e l g i a n M i n i s t e r s a n d officials, w h i c h h a v e been c o m m u n i ­
cated confidentially by t h e F r e n c h E m b a s s y i n L o n d o n , a r e also enclosed.
4. T h e a r g u m e n t s used by t h e F r e n c h a n d B e l g i a n G o v e r n m e n t s for a n d
a g a i n s t B e l g i u m c o n t i n u i n g a s a g u a r a n t o r P o w e r a r e n o t discussed i n t h e
F o r e i g n Office m e m o r a n d u m of t h e 1 9 t h A u g u s t , n o r i n t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f s
m e m o r a n d u m of t h e 1st S e p t e m b e r . I a m t h e r e f o r e d i r e c t e d by M r . S e c r e t a r y E d e n
to ask t h a t t h e v i e w s of t h e C o m m i t t e e of I m p e r i a l D e f e n c e m a y be o b t a i n e d w i t h
the least possible d e l a y on such of t h e s e a r g u m e n t s a s h a v e a m i l i t a r y c h a r a c t e r .
* Appendix to Enclosure to C.I.D. P a p e r No. 1260-B.
f Enclosure to C.I.D. P a p e r No. 1260-B.
% Enclosure No. 1 to Appendix.
[13990]
g Enclosure No. 2 to Appendix,
II Not reproduced.
B 3
5.
T h e r e are, i n effect, t w o s e p a r a t e q u e s t i o n s now u n d e r discussion :—
(a) S h o u l d H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t ask t h a t in t h e n e w T r e a t y B e l g i u m
should g u a r a n t e e t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , a l t h o u g h t h i s w a s n o t t h e case
u n d e r the L o c a r n o T r e a t y ?
(b) S h o u l d H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t s u p p o r t t h e view of t h e F r e n c h
G o v e r n m e n t t h a t i n t h e n e w T r e a t y , a s i n t h e T r e a t y of L o c a r n o ,
Belgium s h o u l d g u a r a n t e e F r a n c e (and G e r m a n y ) ?
6. M r . E d e n w i l l be g l a d if t h e C o m m i t t e e of I m p e r i a l Defence will
r e c o n s i d e r both these questions in r e l a t i o n t o one a n o t h e r a s well a s i n t h e l i g h t
of t h e technical a r g u m e n t s now a d d u c e d by both t h e F r e n c h a n d B e l g i a n
G o v e r n m e n t s . I am to p o i n t o u t t h a t a n e a r l y decision m a y be r e q u i r e d of H i s
M a j e s t y ' s Government, as t h e F r e n c h A m b a s s a d o r a s k e d on t h e 1 3 t h October t o
be f u r n i s h e d w i t h t h e i r views a s soon as possible. T h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t
e v i d e n t l y feel strongly on t h i s subject, a n d t h e A m b a s s a d o r , indeed, expressed
the hope t h a t H i s Majesty's Government would support the French Government
in u r g i n g t h e B e l g i a n G o v e r n m e n t to r e m a i n a g u a r a n t o r S t a t e .
7. Since t h e f o r e g o i n g w a s w r i t t e n t h e need for very e a r l y c o n s i d e r a t i o n
h a s been e m p h a s i s e d by t h e speech of t h e K i n g of t h e B e l g i a n s on t h e 14th October.
I a m , &c.
(Signed)
R. F. W I G R A M .
ENCLOSURE N o .
United
Kingdom
Delegate
1 TO APPENDIX.
to Foreign
Office.—(Received
October
(No. 96.)
T H E U n i t e d K i n g d o m d e l e g a t e t o t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s
c o m p l i m e n t s , a n d h a s t h e h o n o u r t o t r a n s m i t copies of a r e c o r d of a
b e t w e e n M r . E d e n a n d M . S p a a k on t h e 2 8 t h S e p t e m b e r , r e s p e c t i n g
c o n v e r s a t i o n s , of w h i c h a copy h a s been s e n t to H i s M a j e s t y ' s
Brussels.
United
3.)
presents his
conversation
the Locarno
Ambassador,
Kingdom
Delegation,
Geneva, September
30, 1936.
A n n e x t o E n c l o s u r e No. 1.
Record
of a Conversation
between
Mr. Eden
and M.
Spaak.
I H A D a conversation t h i s e v e n i n g w i t h M. S p a a k , t h e B e l g i a n F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r , w h o asked me w h e t h e r I could give h i m a n y i n f o r m a t i o n as t o t h e
p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n a n d p r o s p e c t s of t h e F i v e - P o w e r m e e t i n g . H e h a d h e a r d some
p e s s i m i s t i c r e p o r t s w h i c h h i s o w n i n f o r m a t i o n d i d n o t seem t o j u s t i f y , a n d t h i s
h a d m a d e h i m p a r t i c u l a r l y a n x i o u s t o o b t a i n a u t h e n t i c i n f o r m a t i o n . I gave
M . S p a a k some account of r e c e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s , w h i c h , I s a i d , led m e t o a g r e e
w i t h h i m t h a t , while t h e r e w e r e s t i l l p l e n t y of obstacles t o b e overcome, t h e r e
seemed to me t o be no g r o u n d s for excessive p e s s i m i s m a t p r e s e n t .
M. S p a a k said t h a t he h a d carefully studied the memorandum which we had
s e n t t o h i m s t a t i n g o u r views a s t o t h e m e t h o d we p r o p o s e d for f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e
p r o g r e s s of n e g o t i a t i o n s t h r o u g h t h e d i p l o m a t i c c h a n n e l . T h e B e l g i a n Govern­
m e n t w e r e i n e n t i r e a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h o s e s u g g e s t i o n s . T h e y w e r e , however, by
n o m e a n s so completely i n a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e d o c u m e n t s u b m i t t e d by t h e F r e n c h
G o v e r n m e n t , a n d M. S p a a k a s k e d m e w h e t h e r I i n t e n d e d t o r e t u r n a n y r e p l y to
this. I said t h a t I h a d not yet h a d t i m e to give any detailed study to the French
d o c u m e n t , a n d t h a t I d i d n o t e x p e c t t o be able t o do t h i s u n t i l I a r r i v e d b a c k i n
L o n d o n . I w o u l d t h e n consider w h e t h e r t h e d o c u m e n t w a s of a c h a r a c t e r t h a t
called for a reply. M y own i m p r e s s i o n w a s t h a t t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t h a d
s t a t e d t h a t i t w a s for o u r i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d I s u p p o s e d for t h a t of t h e B e l g i a n
G o v e r n m e n t also, b u t t h a t i t h a d n o t been c o m m u n i c a t e d to t h e o t h e r s i g n a t o r i e s
of t h e L o c a r n o T r e a t y . M . S p a a k s a i d t h a t t h i s w a s so. I n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , I
a d d e d , t h e d o c u m e n t w a s h a r d l y i n t h e s a m e c a t e g o r y as o u r m e m o r a n d u m , w h i c h
h a d been s u b m i t t e d t o all t h e s i g n a t o r i e s w i t h a v i e w to f u r t h e r i n g p r o g r e s s , a n d
i t w o u l d p e r h a p s be a p i t y if i n t h i s e a r l y s t a g e of o u r d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s
t h e r e w e r e a l r e a d y t w o sets of p r o p o s a l s i n existence. W i t h t h i s o p i n i o n
M. S p a a k d e c l a r e d himself to be i n c o m p l e t e a g r e e m e n t .
T h e Belgian Foreign Minister then asked me whether I h a d h a d any
c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h t h e D u t c h G o v e r n m e n t a s to t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a n e w
W e s t e r n P a c t . I r e p l i e d t h a t I h a d not, w h e r e u p o n M . S p a a k s a i d t h a t h e h a d
h a d some e x c h a n g e of views w i t h t h e D u t c h M i n i s t e r a t B r u s s e l s , w h i c h h a d been
followed u p by some c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h M . de Graeff h i m s e l f a t G e n e v a w i t h i n t h e
last f e w d a y s . F r o m t h i s i t a p p e a r e d t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n of H o l l a n d w a s t h a t she
was w i l l i n g t o be g u a r a n t e e d , b u t t h a t she d i d n o t w i s h t o be a s i g n a t o r y of t h e
p r o j e c t e d t r e a t y . M . S p a a k c o m m e n t e d t h a t t h i s seemed t o h i m t o be h a r d l y a
tenable p o s i t i o n , a n d he t h o u g h t i t likely t h a t in d u e course t h e D u t c h w o u l d move
from i t a n d be w i l l i n g to sign a t r e a t y by w h i c h t h e i r t e r r i t o r y w a s g u a r a n t e e d as
long a s they w e r e n o t asked t o g u a r a n t e e o t h e r s .
I n this connexion the Belgian Foreign Minister expressed his g r a t i t u d e t h a t
in o u r p r o p o s a l s w e h a d n o t s u g g e s t e d t h a t B e l g i u m s h o u l d g u a r a n t e e G r e a t
Britain.
A s he u n d e r s t o o d o u r p o s i t i o n , w e d i d n o t a s k B e l g i u m for s u c h a
g u a r a n t e e , b u t w e d i d expect h e r to i n s i s t u p o n r e s p e c t of h e r n e u t r a l i t y , b o t h by
l a n d a n d by a i r . I r e p l i e d t h a t t h i s w a s t h e p o s i t i o n . M . S p a a k e x p r e s s e d t h e
e a r n e s t h o p e t h a t i t m i g h t be t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t also, for if
B e l g i u m h a d f u r t h e r to i n c r e a s e h e r a r m a m e n t s a n d h e r l e n g t h of m i l i t a r y service,
both of w h i c h he f e a r e d w o u l d be necessary i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e , i t w o u l d be g r e a t l y
f a c i l i t a t e d if she w e r e n o t a s k e d t o g u a r a n t e e F r a n c e . I t w a s impossible to d e n y
t h a t , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e r e w a s a c e r t a i n a n t i - F r e n c h feeling in B e l g i u m .
A
g r a c e f u l g e s t u r e by F r a n c e , such as w e h a d m a d e i n o u r p r o p o s a l s , w h i l e i t could
have n o d e e p p o l i t i c a l significance, w o u l d be of t h e g r e a t e s t a s s i s t a n c e i n
p r o m o t i n g B e l g i a n n a t i o n a l u n i t y i n s u p p o r t of a n a t i o n a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y ; i t w o u l d
be all t h e b e t t e r if B e l g i u m a n d H o l l a n d could e v e n t u a l l y be i n t h e p a c t o n t h e
same t e r m s .
I u n d e r s t o o d f r o m M . S p a a k t h a t he h a d m a d e some p r o g r e s s w i t h t h e F r e n c h
G o v e r n m e n t i n c o n v e r s a t i o n on t h i s subject, t h o u g h t h e l a t t e r a p p e a r e d t o h a v e
c e r t a i n a p p r e h e n s i o n s as t o t h e consequences of B e l g i u m n o t g u a r a n t e e i n g F r a n c e .
H e h i m s e l f t h o u g h t t h e s e a p p r e h e n s i o n s m i s p l a c e d , since F r a n c e stood t o g a i n
if she only w e r e a t t a c k e d by G e r m a n y , for h e r o w n n a r r o w f r o n t i e r w a s h e a v i l y
defended.
I a s k e d M . S p a a k w h a t w a s h i s v i e w as t o t h e p r o b l e m of L u x e m b u r g w h i c h
h a d been r a i s e d i n t h e F r e n c h m e m o r a n d u m . H e r e p l i e d t h a t h e d i d n o t c o n s i d e r
t h a t t h e m a t t e r h a d a n y p o l i t i c a l significance.
Luxemburg's position was
u n c h a n g e d i n t h i s respect by t h e v i o l a t i o n of t h e d e m i l i t a r i s e d zone. T h e q u e s t i o n
w a s p u r e l y a m i l i t a r y one a n d s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d o n t h a t basis.
F i n a l l y , t h e B e l g i a n F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s t a t e d t h a t he h a d t h e i m p r e s s i o n , f r o m
c o n v e r s a t i o n s w h i c h h e h a d h a d w i t h c e r t a i n m e m b e r s of t h e F r e n c h d e l e g a t i o n
in t h e l a s t f e w days, t h a t r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n F r a n c e a n d Soviet R u s s i a w e r e n o w a
little less close t h a n they h a d been a m o n t h or t w o a g o . T h i s f a c t seemed t o g i v e
M. S p a a k some s a t i s f a c t i o n , even t h o u g h h e is a Socialist.
ANTHONY EDEN.
Geneva, September
28, 1936.
ENCLOSURE N o .
United
Kingdom
Delegate
2 TO APPENDIX-.
to Foreign
Office.—(Received
October
5.)
(No. 106.)
T H E U n i t e d K i n g d o m d e l e g a t e t o t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s p r e s e n t s h i s c o m p l i ­
ments, a n d h a s t h e h o n o u r t o t r a n s m i t copy of a m e m o r a n d u m c o m m u n i c a t e d b y
M. Delbos on t h e 2 n d October r e s p e c t i n g t h e T r e a t y of L o c a r n o a n d t h e p o s i t i o n of
Belgium.
United
Kingdom
Delegation,
Geneva, October 2, 1936'.
(Translation.)
A n n e x to E n c l o s u r e No. 2.
Consequences
from the Military Point of View of a change
Situation
of Belgium as established
by the Treaty of
cated by M. Delbos to the Secretary
of State.)
in the
International
Locarno.—(Communi­
A modification of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n of B e l g i u m t e n d i n g to divest
h e r of every o b l i g a t i o n as a g u a r a n t o r P o w e r a n d l e a v i n g h e r merely in t h e
p o s i t i o n of one g u a r a n t e e d m i g h t h a v e serious consequences, b o t h from t h e p o i n t
of v i e w of B e l g i a n security a n d f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of F r e n c h a n d B r i t i s h
interests.
I.
So long as B e l g i u m i n t e n d s herself to e n s u r e t h e p r o t e c t i o n of her f r o n t i e r s ,
such a modification would n o t r e s u l t for h e r in a n y r e d u c t i o n of h e r m i l i t a r y
burdens.
F r a n c o - B e l g i a n m i l i t a r y collaboration, in the event of a conflict, i n effect only
i m p l i e s a s s i s t a n c e to be r e n d e r e d by t h e F r e n c h a r m i e s to a B e l g i u m whose
t e r r i t o r y h a s been violated or h a s been t h r e a t e n e d w i t h v i o l a t i o n ; by a b a n d o n i n g
h e r p o s i t i o n as g u a r a n t o r P o w e r in r e s p e c t of F r a n c e , B e l g i u m w o u l d t h u s n o t
be a v o i d i n g a n y positive o b l i g a t i o n .
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i t is permissible t o ask w h e t h e r , once the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
s i t u a t i o n of B e l g i u m h a s been modified, F r e n c h assistance w o u l d h a v e t h e s a m e
efficacity.
A t p r e s e n t t h i s assistance t a k e s t h e f o r m of i n t e r v e n t i o n , a f t e r a very s h o r t
l a p s e of t i m e , by t h e first echelon of i m p o r t a n t forces.
T h e d e s p a t c h of these forces a f t e r t h i s s h o r t l a p s e of t i m e p r e s u p p o s e s a
c a r e f u l p r e p a r a t i o n in time of peace on t h e p a r t of t h e G e n e r a l Staffs of the t w o
a r m i e s w o r k i n g in c o l l a b o r a t i o n ; a n d i t necessitates close and f r e q u e n t c o n t a c t s
between these G e n e r a l Staffs.
A s soon a s t h e co-operation of t h e t w o a r m i e s no longer t a k e s p l a c e as t h e
consequence of r e c i p r o c a l o b l i g a t i o n s b e t w e e n the t w o c o u n t r i e s , t w o forces w i l l
o p e r a t e to r e l a x t h e m i l i t a r y t i e s w h i c h e x i s t between P a r i s a n d B r u s s e l s ; on t h e
one h a n d , t h e same B e l g i a n elements w h i c h would f a v o u r t h e a b a n d o n m e n t by
B e l g i u m of t h e p o s i t i o n of g u a r a n t o r w o u l d declare for a s t r i c t a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e
p r i n c i p l e of n e u t r a l i t y ; on t h e o t h e r h a n d , G e r m a n y w o u l d n o t fail, p r o c e e d i n g
from t h e modification w h i c h h a d t a k e n place in t h e s i t u a t i o n of B e l g i u m in
r e l a t i o n to F r a n c e , t o a r g u e t h a t t h e g u a r a n t e e given w i t h o u t r e c i p r o c i t y by all
the s i g n a t o r i e s of t h e n e w t r e a t y to B e l g i u m implies a loosening of t h e m i l i t a r y
ties w i t h F r a n c e . I t is impossible n o t t o recall i n t h i s r e s p e c t t h e a d v a n t a g e
w h i c h G e r m a n apologetics h a v e d r a w n f r o m t h e s u p p o s e d A n g l o - B e l g i a n Staff
c o n v e r s a t i o n s w h i c h preceded 1914.
T h u s t h e p r e p a r a t i o n in time of p e a c e of the F r a n c o - B e l g i a n co-operation
m e n t i o n e d above w o u l d become i m p o s s i b l e ; from w h i c h t h e
following
consequences w o u l d result, w h i c h w o u l d n o t fail to h a v e a serious i m p o r t for
B e l g i u m :—
A n i n e v i t a b l e delay in t h e a s s i s t a n c e given by t h e F r e n c h a r m i e s to t h e
B e l g i a n a r m i e s fighting for t h e defence of t h e n a t i o n a l f r o n t i e r s ;
A r i s k t h a t t h e B e l g i a n forces w o u l d find themselves u n a b l e to hold u p t h e
G e r m a n forces on t h e M e u s e ;
T h e B e l g i a n forces w o u l d be obliged to a b a n d o n t o t h e e n e m y t h e g r e a t e r
p a r t of t h e t e r r i t o r y , w i t h a l l t h e consequences w h i c h m i g h t r e s u l t so f a r as
concerns t h e s u b s e q u e n t conduct of o p e r a t i o n s .
S u c h r i s k s w o u l d not, moreover, be c o m p e n s a t e d for by a n y chance t h a t the
R e i c h , on a c c o u n t of t h e a t t i t u d e of s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y a d o p t e d b y B e l g i u m , m i g h t
a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of a conflict r e n o u n c e t h e i n v a s i o n of t h a t c o u n t r y .
The
i n v a s i o n of B e l g i a n t e r r i t o r y by G e r m a n y i n t h e event of m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s in
W e s t e r n E u r o p e r e s u l t s i n effect a s m u c h f r o m s t r a t e g i c a l necessities a s from
p o l i t i c a l a i m s ; every d i m i n u t i o n of t h e possibility of d e f e n d i n g t h e c o u n t r y
w o u l d , by i n c r e a s i n g t h e a d v a n t a g e s t o be g a i n e d from such a n invasion, in t h e
e n d only e n c o u r a g e t h e G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff still m o r e to u n d e r t a k e it.
Such, g e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , from t h e B e l g i a n p o i n t of view, a r e t h e m i l i t a r y
consequences t o be foreseen, w h e t h e r i t is a case of w a r on l a n d or of w a r i n
the a i r .
I f t h e s i t u a t i o n be n o w considered f r o m t h e p o i n t of v i e w of F r e n c h a n d
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , t h e consequences a p p e a r s i n g u l a r l y g r a v e .
I t w i l l be n o t e d first t h a t , should a G e r m a n offensive i n B e l g i a n t e r r i t o r y be
f a c i l i t a t e d for t h e r e a s o n s i n d i c a t e d above, t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of t h e F r e n c h a n d
B r i t i s h forces, d e p r i v e d a s t h e y would be of t h e d i s t a n t F r a n c o - B e l g i a n cover
which i t w o u l d n o t h a v e been possible to o r g a n i s e in time, m i g h t be h i n d e r e d . B u t
it is, above all, from t h e p o i n t of view of a e r i a l w a r f a r e t h a t t h e consequences
would be s e r i o u s .
H e r e t h e r e a r e several h y p o t h e s e s t o e x a m i n e :—
(a) T h e case of a G e r m a n a t t a c k confined to t h e F r a n c o - G e r m a n f r o n t i e r
a n d n o t i n c l u d i n g flight over B e l g i u m .
U n d e r t h e T r e a t y of L o c a r n o , F r a n c e a n d E n g l a n d w e r e e n t i t l e d to d e m a n d
from B e l g i u m t h e b r i n g i n g i n t o action of t h e B e l g i a n o b s e r v a t i o n service a n d
a n t i - a i r c r a f t system, t h e r i g h t of flight over B e l g i u m (which w o u l d r e s u l t , i n a n y
case, f r o m t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a r t i c l e 16 of t h e C o v e n a n t of t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s )
a n d t h e r i g h t t o use B e l g i a n a e r o d r o m e s . T h a t being so, t h e F r e n c h a n d B r i t i s h
a i r forces w o u l d be able, w i t h o u t difficulty a n d effectively, to a t t a c k t h e R u h r
B a s i n . M o r e o v e r , t h e B e l g i a n o b s e r v a t i o n service w o u l d a l l o w e n e m y forces
m a k i n g for P a r i s or L o n d o n t o be observed w i t h i n a l i m i t of t i m e c o m p a t i b l e
w i t h t h e n e c e s s a r y d e l a y i n p u t t i n g i n t o o p e r a t i o n t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s for t h e
defence of t h e t w o c a p i t a l s .
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , in t h e event of B e l g i u m confining h e r s e l f to t h e a t t i t u d e
of a " g u a r a n t e e d P o w e r , " G r e a t B r i t a i n w o u l d find i t impossible to o p e r a t e
on t h e v i t a l zone of t h e R u h r , a n d on t h e G e r m a n a i r bases i n W e s t p h a l i a ; i t
would follow f r o m t h i s t h a t t h e a s s i s t a n c e of t h e B r i t i s h a i r forces w o u l d lose a
g r e a t d e a l of i t s effect so f a r as F r a n c e is concerned. A s for t h e F r e n c h a i r
forces, t h e y w o u l d be u n a b l e , w i t h o u t i n e v i t a b l e difficulties, to r e a c h t h e s e
objectives, for t o do so they w o u l d h a v e to m a k e a long flight over G e r m a n
territory.
I t w i l l be observed, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h a t G e r m a n y , o p e r a t i n g from b a s e s
on t h e N o r t h Sea, w o u l d be able, w i t h o u t v i o l a t i n g B e l g i a n a i r , t o a t t a c k L o n d o n .
I n t h i s case G r e a t B r i t a i n w o u l d h a v e n o c h a n c e of a t t a c k i n g , by w a y of r e p r i s a l s ,
G e r m a n objectives of c o m p a r a b l e i m p o r t a n c e .
(b) T h e case of a G e r m a n l a n d a t t a c k confined to t h e F r a n c o - G e r m a n f r o n t i e r
w i t h v i o l a t i o n . of B e l g i a n a i r , b u t w i t h o u t a c t s of w a r b e i n g
c o m m i t t e d on B e l g i a n t e r r i t o r y .
I f t h e B e l g i a n G o v e r n m e n t does n o t consider flight over i t s t e r r i t o r y to be a
casus belli, t h e s i t u a t i o n will be, from t h e F r e n c h a n d E n g l i s h p o i n t of view,
extremely s e r i o u s . C e r t a i n l y , F r e n c h a n d B r i t i s h a i r forces w i l l be able i n t h e i r
t u r n to fly over B e l g i a n t e r r i t o r y to a t t a c k t h e R u h r a n d t h e G e r m a n a i r bases i n
W e s t p h a l i a ; b u t F r a n c e a n d G r e a t B r i t a i n w i l l lose the a d v a n t a g e of t h e B e l g i a n
observation service, w h i c h w i l l be very s e r i o u s for t h e s e c u r i t y of P a r i s a n d s t i l l
more for t h a t of L o n d o n .
(c) T h e case of t h e G e r m a n a t t a c k v i o l a t i n g t h e t e r r i t o r y a n d t h e a i r of
Belgium.
E v i d e n t l y i n t h i s case t h e r e is no t h e o r e t i c a l difference b e t w e e n B e l g i u m a s
a g u a r a n t o r a n d as a g u a r a n t e e d P o w e r . B u t if, i n consequence of t h e n e w
s i t u a t i o n of B e l g i u m , n o p r e p a r a t i o n s for i n t e r v e n t i o n h a d been m a d e i n t i m e of
peace, t h e efficacy a n d , above all, t h e r a p i d i t y of t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of t h e F r a n c o B r i t i s h a i r forces w o u l d be seriously d i m i n i s h e d . T h e absence of p r e v i o u s a g r e e ­
m e n t for t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n of t h e o b s e r v a t i o n service in B e l g i a n t e r r i t o r y for t h e
a d v a n t a g e of F r a n c e a n d E n g l a n d would, moreover, h a v e e x t r e m e l y a w k w a r d
consequences, a t l e a s t a t t h e o u t s e t of t h e conflict.
III.
T o s u m u p , t h e modification of the s i t u a t i o n of B e l g i u m i n t h e n e w t r e a t y
w o u l d offer g r a v e d r a w b a c k s f r o m the p o i n t of view of F r e n c h a n d B r i t i s h
interests.
A s for B e l g i u m herself, since t h e F r e n c h a n d B r i t i s h o b l i g a t i o n s t o w a r d s a
g u a r a n t e e d P o w e r a r e i d e n t i c a l l y t h e s a m e as t o w a r d s a g u a r a n t o r P o w e r , t h i s
modification would be w i t h o u t p r a c t i c a l inconvenience, if p r e p a r a t i o n could be
m a d e i n t i m e of peace for the c o - o p e r a t i o n of the t h r e e c o u n t r i e s . B u t , for t h e
r e a s o n s i n d i c a t e d above, the m o s t s e r i o u s doubts m u s t be e x p r e s s e d i n t h i s
connexion. I f these d o u b t s a r e even i n p a r t well f o u n d e d , t h e consequences for
B e l g i a n s e c u r i t y would be g r a v e ; i n v i e w of t h e c o n d i t i o n s of m o d e r n w a r , h a v i n g
r e g a r d a t once t o t h e possibility of a G e r m a n a t t a c k by r a p i d m o t o r i s e d forces
a n d t o t h e technical conditions of F r e n c h i n t e r v e n t i o n , a m i n u t e a n d c o n t i n u o u s
p r e p a r a t i o n for co-operation is p a r t i c u l a r l y necessary. I n t h e absence of such
p r e p a r a t i o n , t h e F r e n c h a r m y would only be able, a t t h e best, t o f o r m a r a l l y i n g ­
p o i n t for t h e B e l g i a n a r m y .
Geneva,
October 2, 1936.