“ANY ONE OF THE PRISONERS WOULD HAVE BEEN WILLING
TO DIE FOR HIS COUNTRY”:
AN ANALYSIS OF PRISONERS OF WAR
SURVIVAL NARRATIVES
By
Emily Jean Koruda
A Senior Honors Thesis Submitted to the
Department of Communication
of Boston College
May 2010
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................... 2
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................ 4
CHAPTER ONE .................................................................................................... 5
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 5
CHAPTER TWO................................................................................................... 7
HISTORICAL CONTEXT: IN THE TRENCHES................................................... 7
World War II ............................................................................................ 7
The Vietnam War ................................................................................... 12
CHAPTER THREE ............................................................................................ 18
REVIEW OF LITERATURE .......................................................................... 18
CHAPTER FOUR ............................................................................................... 26
METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................... 26
ARTIFACT CHOICE ................................................................................... 29
Harold Brick .......................................................................................... 29
Russell Gunvalson .................................................................................. 30
Harold G. Kurvers ................................................................................. 30
Gene Boyt .............................................................................................. 31
Donald Richard Peppard ....................................................................... 32
Larry Chesley ........................................................................................ 33
Porter Halyburton .................................................................................. 33
John S. McCain III ................................................................................. 34
CHAPTER FIVE ................................................................................................. 36
ANALYSIS OF THE DESCRIPTION OF CAPTIVITY ......................................... 36
CHAPTER SIX .................................................................................................... 40
ANALYSIS OF THE DESCRIPTION OF CAPTORS ............................................ 40
Stupidity ................................................................................................. 40
Erratic Behavior .................................................................................... 42
Brutality ................................................................................................. 44
German Captors .................................................................................... 46
Communism Discussed by POWs of the Vietnam War ............................ 48
CHAPTER SEVEN ............................................................................................ 50
ANALYSIS OF COPING MECHANISMS ......................................................... 50
Optimism ............................................................................................... 50
Faith ...................................................................................................... 52
Communication ...................................................................................... 54
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CHAPTER EIGHT ............................................................................................. 57
ANALYSIS OF PATRIOTISM ....................................................................... 57
Support for U.S. Policy .......................................................................... 57
Pride in Country .................................................................................... 59
CHAPTER NINE ................................................................................................ 61
RHETORIC OF REBIRTH ............................................................................. 61
CHAPTER TEN .................................................................................................. 64
IMPLICATIONS......................................................................................... 64
CHAPTER ELEVEN ......................................................................................... 68
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 68
APPENDICES ........................................................................................... 70
Appendix 1 ............................................................................................. 70
Appendix 2 ............................................................................................. 71
Appendix 3 ............................................................................................. 71
Appendix 4 ............................................................................................. 72
Appendix 5 ............................................................................................. 72
Appendix 6 ............................................................................................. 73
Appendix 7 ............................................................................................. 74
Appendix 8 ............................................................................................. 74
WORKS CITED ........................................................................................ 75
4
Abstract
“Any one of the prisoners would have been willing to die for his country”
(Chesley 68). This quote summarizes the unbreakable will of heroic American Prisoners
of War (POWs). This paper explores the personal narratives of four POWs who were
held captive during World War II and four who were held during the Vietnam War and
seeks to determine how their discourse affects American ideologies of war. By examining
these narratives through narrative criticism and Kenneth Burke‟s Rhetoric of Rebirth, this
analysis shows how POWs reveal the sociopolitical environments of the countries in
which they are held by structuring their experiences under a common framework. While
the four narratives concerning World War II shed light on the differences in captivity
between different countries in the Axis Powers, the narratives from the Vietnam War
rationalize American involvement in the conflict. Even though the Vietnam War was one
of the most misunderstood and unpopular events in American history, this paper shows
how personal POW accounts can justify and garner support for American intervention
into foreign affairs. These survival narratives reveal a depth of human strength in the face
of horrible circumstances that becomes an inspiration for audiences of this discourse.
5
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
“Because in a way becoming a prisoner in North Vietnam was like being killed”
(McCain 12). These words of Senator John S. McCain III succinctly summarize his
experiences with captivity as an American Prisoner of War (POW). McCain is one of
hundreds of thousands of American soldiers who were caught and imprisoned on foreign
soil. The tormenting suffering that these POWs experienced violates basic human rights.
The personal accounts of repatriated POWs expose much about the anguish of
their captivity. They are narratives of survival, revealing how prisoners were able endure
their experiences and their strength of will that led them to make it through alive. They
also provide an important sociopolitical perspective regarding American-fought conflicts.
How do foreign enemies treat their prisoners, and what effect does that have on
international policy? How does the nation garner support for military intervention?
This analysis investigates how POW narratives can provide answers to these
questions. By examining the personal narratives of four prisoners held during World War
II—Harold Brick, Russell Gunvalson, Harold G. Kurvers, and Gene Boyt—and four
prisoners held during the Vietnam War—Donald Richard Peppard, Larry Chesley, Porter
Halyburton, and John S. McCain III—through narrative criticism, this research highlights
the appearance of four common trends. They all provide a description of captivity, a
description of their captors, the coping mechanisms that they used to survive, and their
patriotic sentiments to reveal indispensible perspectives regarding foreign enemies. It will
also show how Kenneth Burke‟s concept of Rhetoric of Rebirth plays a crucial role in the
6
narratives specific to the Vietnam War, as it helps structure an argument in favor of
American involvement. The main focus of this research is directed toward POWs from
World War II and the Vietnam War.
The second chapter of this thesis provides a review of the historical context of
both World War II and the Vietnam War and specifically examines the roles that
American POWs had in these conflicts. Chapter three analyzes previous scholarly
research pertaining to the portrayal of these wars in the media and the psychological toll
captivity has had on POWs. Chapter four outlines the methodology and describes each of
the narratives used in the analysis. Chapter five is the first section of the analysis and
examines how POW narratives describe captivity. Chapter six analyzes how they
describe foreign captors, chapter seven analyzes the coping strategies used, and chapter
eight analyzes how the narratives establish patriotic sentiments. Chapter nine is the final
section of the analysis which examines the role that Kenneth Burke‟s Rhetoric of Rebirth
plays in those narratives concerning the Vietnam War. Chapter ten describes the
implications of this research, and chapter eleven provides a conclusion. Eight appendices
that show the trends found in each narrative along with the specific page numbers from
each artifact are also included at the end.
7
CHAPTER TWO
In the Trenches
“Does it take a special brand of courage just to endure, to survive?” (LaCroix 5)
Attitudes in the United States regarding returning war veterans have significantly
shifted over the course of the century. World War I soldiers were hailed for ending
European supremacy and affirming America‟s position as a global authority, even though
they returned to a country plagued by a new strain of influenza. Veterans of the Vietnam
War were disparaged for entering into a controversial and unfavorable conflict. And
current soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan are faced with a country that is
disconnected and dissociated from the war abroad. But World War II soldiers were sent
to fight a highly favorable war against belligerent and malevolent forces. A victory for
the Allies, and consequently the United States, marked a victory for morality and
righteousness over corrupt aggressions. Return from World War II was cause for great
celebration.
World War II
World War II was the largest armed conflict in history, involving many of the
world‟s nations. Initial combat erupted largely as a result of the long string of events that
occurred following the repercussions of the First World War. The Treaty of Versailles,
signed June 1919, was one of the peace treaties ending World War I. It stipulated that a
defeated Germany accept sole responsibility of the war, concede nearly 13% of its
territory to surrounding nations, and make substantial reparation payments. As Germany
struggled to adopt these provisions, other countries adapted to the terms of war by
8
launching massive unification campaigns. The Japanese Empire became increasingly
militaristic and seized the puppet state of Manchukuo in eastern Inner Mongolia and
Manchuria in 1931. After being condemned for this incursion, Japan pulled out of the
League of Nations.
The end of the Russian Civil War in the early 1920s led to the formation of the
Soviet Union under the pragmatic Vladimir Lenin. Following Lenin‟s death in 1924, his
successor Joseph Stalin enacted a series of national reforms known as the Five-Year
Plans that helped foster economic development under the guidelines of the Communist
Party. In Italy, fascist dictator Benito Mussolini seized power with the promise to
increase the Italian colonial empire in Africa. In October 1935, he led the country on a
vicious and violent invasion of Ethiopia that ended with an annexation of the African
nation in 1936.
After attempting to overthrow the German government in 1923, Adolf Hitler
became Chancellor of Germany in 1933. Struggling to regain Germany‟s lost reputation
and national esteem, Hitler immediately abolished a democratic government and violated
the Treaty of Versailles to initiate a massive rearmament campaign.
As a response to the foreboding conflict occurring in Europe and Asia, the United
States signed a series of Neutrality Acts in the 1930s. Supported by isolationists and noninterventionists, these acts severely limited America‟s participation in foreign conflicts.
Yet as the United States maintained its neutral stance, post-war Europe and Asia began to
disintegrate further into several armed conflicts and power struggles.
In 1937, Japan launched a German-supported campaign to invade all of China
after the capture of Beijing in July and subsequently Nanjing in December. In early 1938,
9
Germany annexed Austria. Encouraged by the lack of global response to this act, Hitler
led his country into Czechoslovakia; France and Britain conceded this territory. After
Germany seized the entire country and split it into two separate states, France and Britain
aligned together, promising support for Poland.
On September 1, 1939 Germany attacked Poland. Adhering to its former promise,
France and Britain declared war on Germany. On September 17, the Soviet Union signed
a truce with Japan and began its own invasion of Poland and continued with an invasion
of Finland in November of the same year.
By 1940 the USSR and Germany entered into a non-aggression pact. Shortly
after, Denmark and Norway were conquered by Germany, which continued its advances
into France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium. In June, Italy also invaded
France and declared war on the United Kingdom as well. France surrendered after twelve
days and was divided into Italian and German occupation zones.
As tensions mounted in Europe, the United States still abided by its acts of
neutrality. It continued to trade with the United Kingdom and increased the size of its
navy, but the general public opposed any direct military intervention. By September
1940, the formation of the Axis Powers legitimized the union between Japan, Italy, and
Germany and expanded in November with the inclusion of Romania, Slovakia, and
Hungary.
In early 1941 the Germans launched an offensive attack on the Soviet Union to
obtain strategic territory and eliminate the state as a military power. As Germany
penetrated further into the USSR, Japan attempted to seize oil reserves from Indochina.
The United States and United Kingdom responded to this attack with an oil embargo.
10
Japan planned to retaliate to these actions by taking over Southeast Asia‟s resources. To
prevent intervention by either Britain or the United States, the Japanese launched an
airstrike on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Within days,
America dropped its neutral stance and declared war.
Japan continued its aggressions with attacks on Malaya, Thailand, the Philippines,
and Burma at the end of 1941. By 1942, the Japanese had captured an estimated 50,0001
American prisoners through its encroachments of Southeast Asia. Those captured during
this time in the Philippines experienced abhorrent treatment during the Bataan Death
March.
In Europe, the Allies began to gain momentum by 1943 and by early 1944 the
Soviet Union was able to expel the Germans from Leningrad. The Soviets were also able
to force the Germans to relinquish the Ukraine. June 6, 1944 marked one of the major
turning points of the war with the Allied D-Day invasion of northern France. Paris was
soon liberated and German troops were forced to retreat into Western Europe. Allied
advances throughout the year continue to result in the capitulations of territories by the
Axis Powers. The Germans launched their final offensive on the Western Front in
December 1944. Yet in April 1945, the Reichstag—the parliament of the German
empire—was captured, indicating defeat of the Third Reich.
Throughout the war, Winston Churchill of Britain, Joseph Stalin of the Soviet
Union, and President Roosevelt met several times to discuss the future of post-war
Europe. However, Harry Truman succeeded Roosevelt after his untimely death in April
1945. Germany surrendered in May following Hitler‟s suicide. Yet Japan continued
1
Sources estimate between 30,000 and 75,000 POWs participated in the Bataan Death March
11
fighting in northern Burma and Rangoon. In July the Allied forces demanded an
unconditional surrender from the Japanese, but when the country renounced these terms,
the United States decided to drop atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The Japanese surrendered several days later on August 15, 1945.
The conditions experienced by American POWs during World War II were
completely dependent on the location of their captivity. Roughly 100,000 to 120,000
were imprisoned in German occupied lands and less than 3 percent of these POWs
perished during their captivity. As a signatory of the Third Geneva Convention, Germany
more or less abided by the provisions regulating the treatment of POWs. According to the
PBS special, “American Experience”, the rate of death for POWs in the Pacific theater
during the war was 37% and 40 % for those held in the Philippines (“Bataan Rescue”).
Yet for POWs in Germany, this statistic was only 1.2% (“Bataan Rescue”). While these
experiences may not compare to the horrors of those held by the Japanese, historian Hal
LaCroix remarks in his collection of POW stories from Nazi prison camps, “The heroic
endurance of American POWs in Europe should be truthfully honored, and the truth is
that in the bowels of the Nazi war machine they fought an unrelenting battle against
brutality, dysentery, loneliness, and overwork….They fought it not knowing if they
would be lined up the next day and shot as Hitler‟s revenge” (4).
On the other side of the globe, thousands of POWs held in the Philippines faced
savage treatment from the Japanese during the 1942 Bataan Death March. In April, when
General Edward King surrendered to Japan in the Philippines, an estimated 50,000
American and Filipino troops entered into hellish captivity. The march earned its name
from the excruciating conditions the captors had to endure trekking over 86 miles of
12
thick-dusted roads from the Bataan Peninsula to Camp O‟Donnell. En route, thousands
died from dehydration, fatal wounds, starvation, and needless executions. Later reported
as a war-crime, one New York Times article from January 28, 1944 said of the march,
“The ghastly recital revealed beatings, allowing parched men to drink only from carabao
wallow, crowding them into barbed-wire bullpens and horsewhipping some who picked
up comrades who had collapsed from the terrible heat” (qtd. in Boyt xi). It has been
estimated that between six and eleven thousand men did not survive the brutality of the
march, which included torture, abuse, and murder.
While the location of captivity shaped each individual‟s experiences, the ability to
survive to retell their story is what defines a POW. World War II involved many nations
and combat occurred all over the globe. And, unlike the Vietnam War, American
intervention was eventually received with strong public support. It is important to
understand how different POW narratives structure distinct experiences and perceptions
of the war.
The Vietnam War
In March 1945, after the conclusion of World War II, Japan seized power in
Indochina and ousted the previous French Vichy government and its authority over the
area. The Viet Minh army of North Vietnam and leader Ho Chi Minh quickly took
control after Japan surrendered and helped proclaim the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(DRVN) in the north. France tried to reestablish its position in the south but failed to
create a reasonable agreement. By 1946, they were at war. Through the years, France‟s
13
position weakened while the DRVN‟s status as a powerful nationalist nation grew
stronger.
The Geneva Conference of 1954 aimed at restoring peace in Indochina. Countries
including the U.S., France, The People‟s Republic of China, the DRVN, and South
Vietnam agreed to end the Franco-Viet Minh war with a cease fire, a complete partition
of Vietnam along the 17th parallel, the separation of the Viet Minh to the North and
France to the South, and free elections to be held in the North in 1956. As these
discussions of peace were occurring abroad, the U.S. was toughening its anti-communist
stance at home.
The U.S. hoped that Ngo Dinh Diem‟s 1955 election as President of the Republic
of Vietnam in the South would strengthen its influence in Vietnam. Initially friendly with
the U.S., Diem soon launched oppressive and corrupt practices within the government.
As a result, southern nationalists created the National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong, to
retaliate against Diem and his regime. The Viet Cong utilized guerrilla warfare tactics in
attempts to escalate conflict and overthrow the government. Conditions in the country
rapidly deteriorated and Diem was eliminated in a coup in 1963.
President Kennedy was the first to introduce military advisors into Vietnam; by
1963 nearly 16,000 men were sent to support the South Vietnamese army against the
increasing guerilla threat. His successor, President Johnson, introduced ground troops in
1965, changing the U.S.‟s strategy from defensive to offensive. After the frustrating 1968
Tet Offensive, a campaign that attacked over 100 communist cities yet caused Johnson‟s
to renounce his incumbency, military presence had heightened to 535,000. According to
historians Stuart Rochester and Frederick Kiley in Honor Bound: The History of
14
American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973, “Johnson‟s abdication
reflected the growing conviction in Washington that a military victory in Vietnam was
impossible.…Under Nixon, U.S. troops were gradually withdrawn, but intensive
bombing of North Vietnam was resumed at intervals to maintain pressure of Hanoi for a
settlement” (9). Nixon‟s complex plans of de-escalation involved an expansive 1970
bombing campaign into neighboring Cambodia and Laos.
The experiences of American POWs during the Vietnam War are inextricably
linked to the muddled sociopolitical history that enveloped the nation during that time.
Unlike other wars with U.S. participation, the Vietnam War lasted more than the term of
one president and without a rallying, deciding victory. Instead, the country had to bear a
decade of national turmoil and anxiety. With looming feelings of defeat, the nation
regressed into fear, polarization, and ultimate failure. Foreboding feelings were felt
abroad too as captured soldiers also had to endure the torment of uncertainty. Pushed to
their physical and emotional thresholds of pain, American POWs in Vietnam were
unwillingly sucked into the legal and political complexities of war. Disturbing peace
discussions, the sociopolitical controversy surrounding Vietnam kept POWs hostage in
an unfamiliar, war-torn nation that persecuted its captives and used torture to conduct
interrogations.
In January, 1973 both the U.S. and North Vietnam, along with South Vietnam and
the Viet Cong agreed to sign peace accords. But by early spring, the terms for the
repatriation of POWs had yet to be resolved. In a press conference held March 2, 1973,
Nixon delineated his plans for POW release and troop withdrawal stating, “It is in our
interests and we are doing everything that we can to get both parties, North and South, to
15
comply with the cease-fire, but as far as the POW's are concerned, the agreement clearly
provides that in return for withdrawal, the POW's will be returned. We expect that
agreement to be complied with” (Nixon “The President‟s News Conference”). Even
though the bombings in Cambodia would continue until August and relations were still
hostile with the communists, the U.S. did not intervene further. The war ended in an
overall failed effort; the last acknowledged POW was released in 1975.
American POWs faced cruel conditions that were intensified by shifting
international politics. President Johnson‟s evasion of an official declaration of war left
POWs in legal limbo. The Vietnamese dismissed the 1949 Geneva Convention
requirements that enforced the proper treatment of captured soldiers and instead opted to
characterize them however they pleased. Thus, POWs were usually denied their
established, humane privileges. “Cold War constraints, the apprehension over Soviet and
Chinese interventions…also limited U.S. strategic options and encouraged a policy of
„graduated response‟ that held American prisoners hostage to the spasmodic and
sometimes fickle shifts in Washington‟s prosecution of the war” (Rochester and Kiley
12).
In efforts to break POW resistance for pertinent information, the Vietnamese
quickly established torture routines as standard procedures. American policies postKorean War introduced a code of conduct for captured prisoners. They were to only
release their name, rank, service number, and date of birth to enemy forces. Succumbing
to torture and announcing any other information was equated with treason and was also
perceived as dishonorable. Yet with torture techniques ranging from brutal beatings to
onerous rope ties binding prisoners to stocks for days to monotonous repetitions of
16
Vietnamese maxims, it was impossible for soldiers to remain silent. In his book M.I.A or
Mythmaking in America author H. Bruce Franklin wrote regarding the past conditions of
believed POWs, “But while the belief in live POWs may allow some flicker of hope, it
hardly offers comfort, for the missing men are imagined to be in a place much more like
hell” (9).
The physical fragility of POWs was aggravated by the constant uncertainty over
the status of their fate. The terms of their captivity were indefinite, which led to broken
spirits and weakened morals. According to Franklin, a total of 771 soldiers were captured
and interned during the Vietnam War. 658 were released back to U.S. military control
and the remaining 113 died in captivity. “That they could triumph over such adversity
was testimony not only to the Americans‟ physical courage but also to their own strong
traditions and the sense of purpose and their conviction that history was one their side,
even as it seemed, for the moment, to be conspiring against them” (Franklin 13).
The POW narrative is an indispensable account of the experiences and conditions
of surviving in an enemy camp. In his book, Franklin advocates for the study and analysis
of these personal accounts. “But the disease can never be cured so long as we fail to
confront the true tragedy of the missing in Vietnam. We certainly need a „full
accounting‟” (170). This argument is an important one: personal POW narratives provide
an authenticity that cannot be achieved through government-released statistics and
debriefing files.
Each international conflict involving the U.S. since World War II has created
animosity on the home-front. The divisions between those in favor of particular wars and
those opposed have severely separated American unity. POWs provide a new perspective
17
to the debate other than pro and anti-war, one in which soldiers who are held in captivity
while fighting for the nation, are forced to endure unwarranted torture before being
repatriated back to the U.S. An analysis of their discourse provides insights into the
history and psychology of their experiences; it reveals common patterns concerning the
descriptions of captivity and captors, similar coping mechanisms, and feelings of
patriotism shared between the men.
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CHAPTER THREE
Review of Literature
“Americans have a history of fascinated horror at captivity” (Costigliola 759).
Within the field of Communication, the scholarly research pertinent to this paper
has been dedicated to examining the Vietnam War through film and press coverage. The
majority of research pertaining specifically to POWs is found within sociological fields
of study. Therefore, this review of literature is first directed at research from the
Communication field, and then examines research of POWs under a sociological lens.
Even though research analyzing the personal narratives of POWs is spare, a
significant amount of scholars have examined the cinematic representations of soldiers
fighting in international conflicts. Woodman‟s analysis of the Vietnam War films Go Tell
the Spartans (1978), Apocalypse Now (1979), and Hamburger Hill (1987) interprets
American defeat in war. He suggests that these films justify America‟s loss of victory by
stereotyping the Vietnamese enemy as yellow-peril “super-soldiers” (Woodman 45).
They cast the Asian enemy as a barbaric and uncivilized force that uses super strength,
determination, and clandestine tactics to outlast American forces. This rationalizes
American defeat: the U.S. was bound to lose to such a formidable and unrelenting enemy.
In his article regarding the Stanley Kubrick film Full Metal Jacket (1987),
Schweitzer focuses on the psychological evolution of American troops fighting in
Vietnam and how the war atrocities transformed ordinary civilians into guiltless killers.
Concentrating on the soldiers‟ hardened moral judgment as a consequence of endless
fighting allowed filmmakers to discuss controversial issues such as the origins of war,
changing American ideologies, race relations with troops, and an evaluation of the war
19
effort. Arguing the film is “superior to much of the written work on the Vietnam War” he
believes it is a historic and realistic portrayal of American troops‟ experiences
(Schweitzer 68).
Directing focus toward the psychology of soldiers in Vietnam, Morag suggests
that defeated masculinity is evident in films emphasizing events after 1968. These films
are hyper-masculinized, portraying American soldiers as hunters to compensate for
feelings of defeat felt during the war. “This dominant model expresses the most extreme
sense of denial—historic, moral, and sexual” (Morag 205). Once this denial becomes
acknowledged, the previous identification between masculinity, patriotism, and
nationalism are subverted. K. Rasmussen and S. D. Downey also discuss the perverted
mythologies of war. Through their study of The Deer Hunter (1978), Apocalypse Now
(1979), Platoon (1986), and Full Metal Jacket (1987), they conclude that these films
undermine the notion that war is necessary to overcome formidable forces of evil and that
the contradictions of militarism create a quagmire for troops. “Soldiers are victims who
victimize others; they are powerless to alter events but have the power to devastate; they
have moral instincts but engage in immoral acts” (Rasmussen and Downey 189).
Unlike other Vietnam War films that emphasize the effects of war atrocities on
specific characters, the anonymous author of “Dear America: Letters Home from
Vietnam” argues that the 1987 film Dear America attempts to reestablish the forgotten
identities of all American soldiers. Stating that “the film‟s aim is to let us hear the voices
that otherwise go largely unheard” the article discuses how soldiers immediately
surrendered their individuality upon arriving in Vietnam and as a consequence, struggled
to participate in the overall war effort (“Dear America” 117).
20
The scholarship on press coverage during the Vietnam War seeks to determine if
soldiers and veterans were accurately and substantially portrayed in American media.
Prior to Vietnam, American veterans had been welcomed back home and venerated by
the public. Patterson III examines if the disaffection towards Vietnam veterans was due to
media bias. In his investigation of The New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, and The
Atlanta-Journal Constitution before and after 1968, he concludes “1) the press gave
favorable coverage to the Vietnam war and the Vietnam veteran; and 2) the amount of
antiwar coverage increased in the post-1968 period and that coverage was perceived as
unfavorable toward the war and the veteran” (Patterson 310).
Huebner supports this argument that journalists “produced a body of work that
faithfully reflected the complexities and perplexities of the American fighting man and
the war in Vietnam” (159) in his analysis of American press coverage of the war. He
argues that the media‟s shift in perspective ideology of the war paralleled the complicated
feelings of both soldiers and American public opinion. Coverage of the war began by
casting American soldiers as “heroic, selfless soldiers” yet by the mid-1960s, news
reports were beginning to hint at the defectiveness of the army as troops were becoming
more victimized and defeated (159).
While it is important to understand how American-fought conflicts have been
portrayed in the media, an examination of literature regarding POWs is imperative for
this analysis. Young examines the difficulty in translating actual POW experiences into
cinematic success. He argues that many Americans targeted POWs as a source of
frustration over the lack of victory in the Korean War. Filmmakers found it difficult to
21
capitalize on these POW narratives; the films‟ lack of success was based on the nation‟s
negative perception of captured soldiers, viewing them as “symbols of the nation‟s
vulnerability to foreign evil” (Young 54).
Prividera and Howard III‟s examination of Private Jessica Lynch‟s narrative
following her POW experience in Iraq in 2003 discusses the persistent marginalization of
women in the U.S. military. Like released POWs, women share similar experiences of
entrapment, except they remain trapped in the gendered perception of their worth. After
Private Lynch‟s release, the media stripped her of her title as “soldier” and labeled her as
an all-American “girl next door” who needed to be rescued by masculine heroes.
“Ultimately, Lynch was recognized for what was done to her (capture and rescue) rather
than what she did (soldiering)” (Prividera and Howard 34). This damsel-in-distress
paradigm permanently erased Lynch‟s status as an American POW and she became
subordinate under her male counterparts.
Interest in forced captivity has prompted a significant amount of research
concerning both the psychological and psychiatric conditions of American POWs after
their release. In his 1946 article examining the psychiatric conditions of 4,617 men
released from Japanese prison camps during World War II before their return to the
United States, Brill discovered that many of the men developed anxiety upon their release
and nearly all felt extreme resentment toward their Japanese captors. Yet one interesting
finding revealed that some men felt a sense of accomplishment. “They feel they have a
much better insight into human nature, because they have had a glimpse of man without
the veneer of civilization” (434). The surviving men were able to overcome the harsh
22
experiences by adapting to the severe conditions. “Most of them felt that many of the
men who died did so because they lacked courage” (438).
Concerning the mental stability of surviving POWs of the Pacific Theater during
World War II, in 1987 Goldstein and fellow researchers found that personal coping
mechanisms abated the psychiatric symptoms of depression, anxiety, and Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD). Of the 41 veterans examined, the majority was able to return and
live “relatively normal lives from the point of view of work and family considerations”
(Goldstein et al. 1211).
The 1986 research of Ursano, Wheatly, Sledge, Rahe, and Carlson supports these
findings. After evaluating 325 repatriated American POWs held during the Vietnam War,
they discovered that the majority were successfully able to adapt to the extreme stresses
of their captivity. “The [repatriated prisoners of war] who suffered the greatest stress and
deprivation were most likely to feel that they had benefited from the POW experience”
(708). Social and familial support systems and cognitive experiences, such as mental
games that emphasize problem solving, were the most beneficial strategies for coping
with their traumas.
Further research conducted by Ursano and Rundell in 1990 reveals that survival
during captivity is most related to the extent of injury and maltreatment, yet successful
coping mechanisms included the ability to adapt to both psychological and physiological
adversities and the availability of communicative means. While PTSD, adjustment
disorder, depression, psychoactive substance use disorders, anxiety disorders, and
phantom-pain disorders were common among Vietnam POWs, “post-1969 POW
23
returnees experienced more complete and rapid return toward normal and expected
baselines than did POWs who were captured before 1969” (445).
Henman also further investigates coping mechanisms among American POWs in
her analysis of captive soldiers in during the Vietnam War. She determines that the
reason Vietnam POWs suffered relatively less from post-war mental disorders and stress
is because their narratives portray resilience as a communication phenomenon. Defining
resilience as a “capacity to cope with and to survive traumatic conditions and to recover
from adversity” (14), she argues that Vietnam POWs utilize this concept in their
narratives to diminish the harsh realities of their experiences, thus unifying the troops in a
strong sense of community. “Through the creation of social support and interdependency
these fiercely independent men learned to rely on their own power and to draw a sense of
mastery from one another. Ordinary men were able to do extraordinary things” (169).
Research has not been limited to solely the analysis of POWs. One study
conducted by Hunter between 1971 and 1978 examined the families of repatriated POWs
during the Vietnam War. One of the first major adjustments undergone by families of
POWs was the switch from complete dependence to unaccustomed independence. POW
families had to quickly adjust to the changes in role relationships. The families that
adjusted better quickly adapted to the role reversal that had occurred while the males
were abroad. By 1978, 5 years after the return of the prisoners, 50% of families at the
time of captivity had stayed together. These families had “well renegotiated and
stabilized the family roles and were well integrated” (Hunter 246).
Dekel and Solomon continued this line of research through their 2006
investigation of marital relations among former POWs. War captivity has been labeled a
24
detriment to spousal relations, yet “it remains to be determined whether these effects are
due to the captivity experience or whether they are due to PTSD, which only some of the
prisoners develop after captivity” (709). The study discovered that marital problems
found among POWs were in fact due to PTSD. POWs suffering from PTSD were more
likely to succumb to verbal aggression and heightened sexual dissatisfaction that POWs
not afflicted with the disorder.
Only a meager amount of research has been dedicated specifically to the analysis
of POW narratives. In his 2004 research, Costigliola focuses on the narratives of
American POWs held behind Soviet lines during World War II. He believes that it is
important to revisit these personal histories now that the adverse stigma regarding
Germany and the former Soviet Union has been lifted. These narratives integrated both
emotional and rational thought that “contributed to the formation of verbal images of the
Soviets as „animals,‟ „barbarians,‟ and a „Frankenstein” (780).
Using narratives from British POWs held by the Japanese in both Thailand and
Japan during World War II, Murakami‟s research centers on the concept of reconciliation
and redemption. He establishes that post-war narratives serve to reformulate significant
past experiences to discover new positions of reconciliation. Since reconciliation is a
continuous process, narratives function as tools to “settle with a meaning of a particular
experience or event and the constitution of situated identities in a social relation” (435).
POWs achieve reconciliation through claiming a change of identity and reformulating the
past.
With the U.S. currently involved in another international conflict, this time
occurring in the Middle East, Americans are constantly demanding information. In the
25
face of globalization and advancing technologies, Americans feel they are obligated to
know precisely what occurs on the fronts. The government and media are expected to
deliver accurate reports to satisfy the demands of the nation. Yet one of the simplest ways
to understand the condition of war is to reflect back on the personal experiences of those
who have already fought. This investigation of World War II and Vietnam POW
narratives shows how these texts either reaffirm or subvert existing ideas of war and what
they reveal about the psychology of an American soldier.
26
CHAPTER FOUR
Methodology
“How can we know them? The answer, surely, is one by one” (LaCroix 2)
Human beings communicate through fundamental storytelling techniques. Walter
R. Fisher argues that storytelling can be found in all forms of human communication and
is an indispensable vehicle for people to relate to each other and to discover certain
truths. Defining narration as, “a theory of symbolic actions—words and/or deeds—that
have sequence and meaning to those who live, create, or interpret them” (Fisher
“Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm” 375), he proposes the existence of a
paradigm that frames narration as an essential component of human communication. This
narrative paradigm is a synthesis of both the argumentative and literary strands of
rhetoric. While the paradigm is not necessarily rhetoric on its own, it helps illuminate
what could be interpreted as rhetorically significant. Critics use the paradigm to discover
symbolic messages and analyze their rhetorical power. “[It] is meant to offer an approach
to interpretation and assessment of human communication—assuming that all forms of
communication can be seen fundamentally as stories…occurring in time and shaped by
history, culture, and character” (Fisher “Clarifying the Narrative Paradigm” 57).
Karyn Rybacki and Donald Rybacki developed Fisher‟s concepts into a form of
narrative criticism. They explained it as a way to interpret communication through
storytelling symbols that establish certain common trends and patterns. The fusion of
these elements allows audiences to test the validity of the story. Do these pieces form a
cohesive and rational narrative? If they do, then the main focus of the criticism becomes:
“What does an audience see as the truth of it?” (Rybacki and Rybacki 110).
27
Storytelling techniques are fundamental to the POW narrative, which structures
all techniques in a cohesive manner, and, as a rhetorical device, reveals ideologies
regarding American-fought conflicts that garner support for war. Under the lens of
narrative criticism, all of the narratives analyzed share four main narrative themes: the
description of their captivity, the description of their captors, the different coping
mechanisms they used, and the patriotic sentiments they felt throughout their
experiences.
Another feature shared by some of these narratives is a Rhetoric of Rebirth story.
Kenneth Burke‟s concept of Rhetoric of Rebirth plays an integral role in the four
narratives from the Vietnam War. Burke believes that human motivation follows a
pattern based on three rhetorical steps: pollution, purification, and redemption. When
human beings commit a guilty act, they feel the need to restore themselves to an ordered
state, because according to Burke, they are “rotted with perfection” (Burke “Definition of
Man” 507). By following this process, he argues that an individual is able to achieve a
new identity and state of mind.
First, pollution occurs when one commits an offense that violates the hierarchical
orders of society. Human beings wish to get out of a state of pollution or guilt. So after
committing this act of sin, one intrinsically looks for a way to cleanse themselves.
Purification is the process in which one relieves guilt through symbolic action. It is “the
step of cleansing or catharsis, where the guilt is sloughed off” (Foss, Foss, and Trapp
196). An individual can follow two routes. Through victimage, guilt can be transferred to
something outside of themselves. Or, through mortification, a person can inflict suffering
on themselves for the sin they have committed.
28
Both lead to redemption, the final stage of the process. This symbolizes the
rebirth of the individual. The individual has been purified and through the process has
arrived at a new state in the search for their true self. “It represents our attempts to
discover and maintain our identities so that we can act purposefully, feel at home in the
world, and move toward the perfection we seek” (Foss, Foss, and Trapp 197).
One particular study conducted by Robert E. Rosenthal examining the 1989 film
Born on the Fourth of July, is pertinent to the Vietnam POW analysis. He applies the
Burkean concept of rebirth to explain the psychological transformation of a Vietnam
veteran, Ron Kovic, upon his return to the United States. However, instead of arguing
that Kovic committed a wrongful act himself before entering into the rebirth process,
Rosenthal shows that the American society placed its collective guilt on Vietnam
veterans, “hoping to purge itself in order to restore our social consciousness to its pre-war
innocence” (28). His analysis reveals that Kovic feels the burden of America‟s guilt upon
his return from Vietnam and questions the legitimacy of the war. He is scapegoated by
society and to dismiss these feelings of failure, he participates in the antiwar movement.
Yet after much soul-searching, he enters into the stage of mortification by realizing that
the failures of the United States were by no means his own fault. His is finally redeemed
at the Democratic National Convention of 1976 where he is welcomed as a hero and
makes a speech announcing “Just lately, I felt like I‟m home…like maybe, we‟re home”
(qtd. in Rosenthal 40). Through this rhetorical transformation, Kovic no longer feels
ashamed about his veteran statues. He is finally able to accept and feel proud about his
actions fighting in Vietnam.
29
I have chosen to examine eight very distinct American POW narratives to achieve
the most comprehensive analysis possible. Four narratives are from POWs who were
imprisoned during World War II. Harold Brick and Russell Gunvalson were both held in
Germany. Harold G. Kurvers and Gene Boyt were both imprisoned by the Japanese in the
Philippines and forced to participate in the infamous Bataan Death March. The four
remaining narratives originate from POWs held during the Vietnam War. Donald Richard
Peppard was held captive in North Korea. Larry Chesley, Porter Halyburton, and John S.
McCain III were held in Hanoi by the North Vietnamese. Five of these eight narratives
came from interviews for the Veterans History Project, a branch of the American Folklife
Center in the Library of Congress established to preserve stories of wartime service for
future generations. The three remaining narratives are autobiographical books that pertain
specifically to imprisonment. The following section provides a brief description of their
lives and experiences in captivity.
Harold Brick
Brick was drafted into the Army in June, 1943 and assigned to the 275 th
Regiment, 70th Infantry Division. He arrived in Marseilles, France in December, 1944 but
was soon captured in eastern France, close to the German border in early January, 1945.
He endured nearly six weeks at Stalag IX-B in Bad Orb, Germany before being
transported to another camp by Trebnitz on the eastern border. He remained at the work
camp until mid-April, 1945 when the Germans evacuated due to potential advances of the
Red Army. Abandoned by their captors, Brick and his fellow POWs wandered for several
days until being discovered by American forces. He was discharged in December, 1945
and returned to his family in Lake Henry, Minnesota. He married in 1953 and retired
30
from his career with the U.S. Postal Service after 31 years in 1984 and spoke to Thomas
Saylor for the Veterans History Project in April, 2004.
Russell Gunvalson
After entering into the Army in 1943, Gunvalson began training with the 590 th
Field Artillery, 423rd Regiment, 106th Infantry Division, which was later shipped to
Europe in November, 1944. They quickly set-up along the Belgian-German border, but
were overcome by German forces soon after. Gunvalson became a POW on December
19, 1944. He and his division were first marched to the German town of Gerolstein and
then transported to Stalag IX-B at Bad Orb. He remained there until January, 1945 when
he was transferred to Stalag IX-A at Ziegenhain until he was liberated by U.S. troops on
March 30, 1945. Before being sent back to the U.S., he was moved to a medical facility
in Rouen, France for two months. Once he returned to his home in Wisconsin, he still
spent several weeks recovering at various medical facilities. He then returned to civilian
status and began working for the U.S. Postal Service before retiring in 1979. His
interview with Thomas Saylor for the Veterans History Project took place in February,
2004.
Harold G. Kurvers
Born in 1918 in St. Paul, Minnesota, Kurvers was drafted into the Army in 1941.
He joined the 194th Tank Battalion as a medic and his unit was soon posted to the
Philippines near the Army Corp‟s Clark Field. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
in December, 1941, Kurver‟s battalion was forced to retreat until it was eventually
captured at Bataan. He survived the Bataan Death March and stayed at the prison camp,
31
Camp O‟Donnell, for nearly three months in 1942 before being sent to Cabanatuan,
Philippines in October, 1944. After two months, he was herded with sixteen-hundred
other prisoners onto a ship bound for Japan. When the ship finally docked in January,
1945, only 400 of the original passengers were still alive. Kurvers was sent to the prison
camp Fukuoka #17 and worked in a coal mine until the end of the war in August, 1945.
Upon liberation, he was hospitalized for a year to recover from tuberculosis. Soon after
his release, he married his wife Dorothy in 1946 and spent the rest of his life with her in
St. Paul raising their three children. He spoke to Thomas Saylor for the Veterans History
Project in 2002.
Gene Boyt
In 1997, David L. Burch, a friend of the Boyt family, approached the POW
regarding his experience on the Bataan Death March. After three years of communication
and collaboration between the two men, they compiled Boyt‟s narratives into a book
published in 2004 and titled Bataan: A Survivor’s Story. Raised in the Great Plains region
of the United States, Boyt‟s family moved around throughout his childhood due to
poverty. He joined the Civilian Conservation Corps in 1935 and later graduated from the
ROTC in 1941. In May of the same year, his unit was transported to the Army Corp‟s
Clark Field where he worked as a project engineer. Boyt was captured by the Japanese a
few days after the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December, 1941 and was forced to
participate in the Bataan Death March to Camp O‟Donnell. Similar to Kurvers, Boyt
spent a few months at the camp before being transferred by rail to Japan in October,
1942. He was among approximately 875 men brought to the Japanese prison camp
32
Tanaguaw. By the time he left in August, 1943, only 341 POWs were still alive. He and
the remaining survivors journeyed to another camp, Zentsuji, on the island of the
Japanese homeland. After spending two years there, he endured another arduous transfer
to a remote mountaintop prison called Roko Roshi. He was liberated after a month by
American forces in August, 1945. After his return to the U.S., he married, raised two
children, and continued his career as an engineer. In 1987, he was among a group of
POW survivors of the Bataan Death March who returned to the Philippines to
commemorate the forty-fifth anniversary of the Japanese takeover. According to his
narrative, “It was definitely a bittersweet trip, but one I am very glad to have made”
(Boyt 217).
Donald Richard Peppard
In 1967 Peppard was commissioned as a Chief Petty Officer aboard the U.S.S.
Pueblo 2 to help monitor waters off the shore of North Korea. On January 23, 1968,
several North Korean vessels, including sub chasers and torpedo boats, chased down the
American naval ship. The enemy troops boarded and captured all 83 crewmembers. After
enduring eleven months of cruel imprisonment, Peppard and the remainder of the crew
were released December, 1968. He spoke with Alan P. Pendergrast for the Veterans
History Project in October, 2002.
2
When the U.S.S. Pueblo was captured, President Lyndon B. Johnson defended allegations that the vessel
was used for spying on the communist country. He maintained the stance that the Americans were innocent
and the actions of the North Koreans were unjustifiable. He prohibited attempts to retaliate or to rescue the
crew. However, after 11 months of tortuous captivity, President Johnson issued an apology which admitted
to spying, and the crewmen were released. As soon as the men reached safety, the U.S. government
immediately rescinded the apology and continued to deny the espionage (Wood 2010).
33
Larry Chesley
Born in 1938, Chesley had a meager upbringing in Burley, Idaho before he
enlisted in the U.S. Air Force at the age of 18. In 1964 he entered Undergraduate Pilot
Training and was awarded his wings in March, 1965. He immediately began flying
combat missions in Southeast Asia with the 433rd Tactical Fighter Squadron. However he
was forced to eject over North Vietnam in April, 1966 and was taken as a POW. He spent
2,464 days as a captive at the Hanoi Hilton, which amounted to a little over 6 ½ years. He
was released during Operation Homecoming on February 12, 1973 and was hospitalized
for a brief period following his liberation. He was still able to earn his MBA at Arizona
State University. At the end of 1973, his narratives were published into a book titled
Seven Years in Hanoi, which serves as the basis for this analysis. Chesley later became a
flight instructor at Williams Air Force Base, Arizona before retiring from the Air Force in
1982. He continued serving his country as a State Senator in Arizona from 1993 to 1997.
Porter Halyburton
Porter Halyburton was born in 1941 and raised in Davidson, North Carolina. In
October, 1963 he entered into the U.S. Navy Pre-Flight Program where he was trained as
an Intercept Officer. In April, 1965 he began flying combat missions in Southeast Asia,
but was shot down over North Vietnam in October of the same year. He was immediately
forced into captivity by the North Vietnamese and spent 2,675 days at the infamous
Hanoi Hilton. Similar to Chesley, he was released during Operation Homecoming in
February, 1973 and continued to serve at the Naval War College in Rhode Island until his
34
retirement from the Navy in 1984. He was interviewed by Aaron Keegan in 1998 and in
2008 he served as a guest speaker at the 40th Reunion of the Third Medical Battalion.
John S. McCain III
Former Lieutenant Commander John S. McCain III was shot down during the
Vietnam War in 1967 while flying over Hanoi. He was imprisoned there for over 5 ½
years. His original statements were published in a 1973 issue of U.S. News & World
Report upon his release in and were used for this analysis. Son of John S. McCain Jr.,
distinguished Navy admiral, McCain‟s captivity fascinated the media and caught the
nation‟s attention. According to the 1973 issue of U.S. News & World Report “Of the
many personal accounts coming to light about the almost unbelievably cruel treatment
according to American prisoners of war in Vietnam, none is more dramatic than that of
Lieut. Commander John S. McCain III” (“John McCain, Prisoner of War”). In 2000, he
published his memoir Faith of My Fathers which provides a detailed account of his time
in captivity. Soon after publication it became a New York Times bestseller.
In 2008, McCain ran against former Senator Barack Obama in an intensely
publicized presidential campaign. During his race to the White House, McCain‟s status as
a POW frequented his discourse and influenced his policies, especially when he spoke
out in favor of humane interrogation methods and against U.S.-inflicted torture of foreign
prisoners (“The Third McCain-Obama Presidential Debate”). The biography on his
website even attested to his experiences, stating, “John was then taken as a prisoner of
war into the now infamous „Hanoi Hilton,‟ where he was denied necessary medical
treatment and often beaten by the North Vietnamese. John spent much of his time as a
35
prisoner of war in solitary confinement, aided by his faith and the friendships of his
fellow POWs” (“Ready from Day One”). McCain‟s endeavors as an influential political
figure publicized his experiences as a POW. His fame and relevancy with the American
public make his narrative worthy of study.
36
CHAPTER FIVE
Description of Captivity
“Flies, maggots, and dead bodies were everywhere, and the odor was
overpowering” (Boyt 139)
The first trend in the POW narrative is a description of captivity, which includes
both the setting of imprisonment and the physical well-being of the captives. While the
eight POWs analyzed endured a variety of different conditions, all the narratives describe
their intolerable captivity. Defining his prison camp as “deplorable” (Boyt 153), Boyt
describes the infamous Camp O‟Donnell as “the worst hellhole in the Philippines, with
conditions even poorer than on the Death March” (142). Also held in the Philippines
during the World War II, Kurvers recounts the conditions he faced aboard a prison ship
that herded POWs from Bataan to Japan. He depicts them as “Terrible. Packed. Just
packed. Shoulder to shoulder, belly to back. [The prisoners] went mad the very first
night. Guys were cutting throats, sucking blood” (18). While Boyt equates his captivity to
hell, Kurvers sheds light on the psychological toll imprisonment had taken on the POWs.
The conditions were so unbearable, some men resorted to killing each other.
Even though conditions in Germany during World War II were significantly
better, these narratives show that these POWs endured abhorrent captivity as well. Brick
describes the camp Bad Orb as “a godforsaken place” (19) where “everything was
difficult” (19). His cell was approximately the size of a basketball court and fit over two
hundred and fifty men. “They were laying side by side. I mean we just…that was without
blankets. I mean the only thing we had to cover us was our overcoat. That was our
shelter” (8).
37
Held in Hanoi during the Vietnam War, Chesley says his conditions were
“gruesome” (29). He comments, “The name Hanoi Hilton is of course the Americans‟
nickname for the major prison compound in Hanoi. The Vietnamese are more realistic.
Their name for it is Hoa Lo, which means „hell hole‟” (18). While the type of cell and
duration of solitary confinement varied for those captive in Hanoi, punishment remained
a consistent practice. Chesley describes one such tactic as “being confined to a hole in the
room….The holes contained sharp rocks, they often contained a pool of stagnant water,
and they were always full of mosquitoes. The punishment at this time for communication
between rooms was to live in that hole for three months with the hands tied or cuffed
behind the back, without a mosquito net, and without any blankets to keep you warm”
(27). During his time in Hanoi, McCain was held in solitary confinement for over two
years. He says:
I was not allowed to see or talk to or communicate with any of my fellow
prisoners. My room was fairly decent-sized—I'd say it was about 10 by
10. The door was solid. There were no windows. The only ventilation
came from two small holes at the top in the ceiling, about 6 inches by 4
inches. The roof was tin and it got hot as hell in there. The room was kind
of dim—night and day—but they always kept on a small light bulb, so
they could observe me. I was in that place for two years (8).
Harsh treatment and horrible living conditions during the war were not isolated to
Vietnam. Peppard describes his captivity in North Korea as “very dreary, very dismal”
(9) and remarks, “We were awakened at six every morning, and we sat all day long in
straight-back chairs, and that is all we could do until we were allowed to turn in at night”
(9).
38
The second way these narratives outline the hellish conditions encountered by the
POWs is describing the physical appearance of the prisoners. Boyt says, “All the
prisoners at Camp O‟Donnell were reduced to skin and bones. We looked like Holocaust
survivors, with ribs and collarbones protruding visibly. When men finally died of
starvation, their bodies were just withered skeletons” (144). Kurvers laments “We had
thirty, forty [dying] a day” (9) in his discussion concerning his sojourn in Camp
O‟Donnell. Citing hunger as the main cause of death, he continues, “You were hungry all
the time. Even when you were full, you were hungry. There was something your system
was crying for” (15).
Similar to Kurvers, Gunvalson struggled to satisfy his ache for sustenance during
his captivity in Germany. “[Hunger] was twenty-four hours a day. It was just…our
stomachs just rolled. Just crawled all the time” (13). He later adds, “I was nothing but
skin and bones. My clothes just hung on me and I hadn‟t had a bath, a shower since the
first of November….You‟re almost ready to give up because of your weakened condition.
That‟s what…(sighs) Germany wanted” (22). This discourse enhances the understanding
of captivity conditions. Descriptions of hunger and the appearance of the POWs are
shocking. Yet they further shed light on the physical effects imprisonment had on the
soldiers. Not only were men psychologically breaking down, they were physically
deteriorating as well.
These descriptions of captivity and the physicality of the POWs are imperative to
the overall narrative. Not only do they provide a setting—an essential component to the
narrative paradigm—they reveal the deprivations that these men endured. And, one
39
cannot understand the significance of these men overcoming such hardships and the
sacrifices they made if their captivity experiences are not first described.
40
CHAPTER SIX
Description of Captors
“They tortured him to say that he wasn’t tortured” (McCain 16)
The second trend common to all of the narratives is a description of the captors.
Understanding how POWs perceived their enemies, characterizing them as malicious and
hostile reveals a sense of justification of the American war effort. These narratives
structure the captors as unfavorable first by highlighting their stupidity and erratic
behavior. Then, by discussing the extreme brutality that the POWs experienced, the
narratives broaden the scope of captivity to show the universality of evil among all
foreign enemies. However, an additional section will show how the Germans were
exempt from participating in these cruel acts of torture. Finally, an analysis of the
narratives originating from the Vietnam War will address communism and show how the
POWs both admonish the ideology and establish the authority of American democratic
ideals.
Stupidity
Highlighting their captors‟ stupidity serves two functions in these POW
narratives. On the surface it first shows that captured soldiers are more intelligent than
the foreign forces that have imprisoned them. Defining Vietnam as “a backward country”
(Chesley 55), Chesley establishes his intellectual superiority over his captors by stating,
“Apparently he wasn‟t smart enough to slip my underwear down, so he cut the back of it
out to give me a shot” (24). McCain shared similar sentiments regarding the
Vietnameses‟ intellect and even describes one in particular, “The North Vietnamese
interrogator, who was pretty stupid, wrote the final confession, and I signed it” (13).
41
Realizing their mental advantage, these narratives show that several POWs
leveraged their intelligence to manipulate and deceive their captors. Peppard recounts an
event when his crew was caught extending their middle fingers in the air and their captors
asked them about the gesture‟s meaning. “We for a long time got away with the
explanation that it was a Hawaiian good luck sign. So that went on for a while, and—but
then later on they learned what it was and they beat the hell out of us” (17). Halyburton
had similar experiences with his captors and states:
But we tried very hard to make sure that what they did get, you know, was
not useful to them, which in a way, was not all that difficult, because they
didn‟t have anybody there who had been educated in the United States.
They had no one who had learned English in the United States. So their
knowledge of the language, idioms and humor and even accents, you
know, were fairly foreign to them. And so you could use of their
ignorance against them. So you could play games with them, you know,
deceive them. You could make them believe some real ridiculous stuff
(11).
This discourse shows that American POWs are smarter than their foreign captors,
yet it only superficially critiques their stupidity. Therefore, these narratives reveal a
second trend concerning the captors‟ intellect: remarks undermining their captor‟s
intelligence to reinforce American superiority.
Chesley first attacks the Vietnameses‟ lack of understanding of American culture.
He says, “Because our captors had only a poor understanding of English, absolutely no
feel for its idiom, and no background of American ways and customs, they rarely saw
through the prisoner‟s attempt to fool them” (64). Then he takes a strike at communism,
the defining factor of the war, and states, “With their Vietnamese and communist
background, their poor education, and their lack of appreciation for what we knew as
42
freedom, they apparently could not understand that we had minds of our own and that we
really approved of and glorified in the right to dissent which was our birthright as
Americans” (63). Here, Chesley shows that stupidity is the foundation of their communist
background. His captors, and the country they belong to, are communists because they
lack the mental capacity to understand a democratic state. McCain also furthers this point
and states, “Others came in to find out about life in the United States. They figured
because my father had such high military rank that I was of the royalty or the governing
circle. They have no idea of the way our democracy functions3” (7).
For these two POWs who served during the Vietnam War, this discourse links the
enemy‟s stupidity with a justification of the war. These critiques disparage the captors
and simultaneously admonish communism. This establishes the understanding that
foreign enemies are too stupid to run a functioning, democratic government. American
intervention is therefore worthwhile if it helps spread our moral and intellectual ideals
and eliminates stupidity in government.
Erratic behavior
By characterizing their captors‟ behavior as erratic, these narratives reveal that
POWs did not deserve the type of treatment they received in captivity. Boyt describes his
Japanese captors as “senseless” (134) “who killed with cold impunity” (127) and
Kurvers‟ perception of the Japanese consistently follows this trend. He states, “The only
problem was that we didn‟t know who we could trust. Sometimes they could give you a
cigarette, then the next thing kick it out of your mouth, so we didn‟t know if you could
3
Emphasis added
43
trust them all the while….I don‟t understand their culture. Just because you couldn‟t
understand their language, you were belted for that” (14). Kurvers emphasizes that he and
his fellow POWs did not understand why they were being punished. Under the Geneva
Conventions, a captured POW is entitled to certain privileges such as immunity from
punishment and torture. Japan became a signatory in 1886 and Germany followed in
1906. The Philippines is also among the list of countries that have ratified the convention.
Yet, these narratives show that the tortuous actions of the captors were completely
unjustified and in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Boyt describes his regulation as
“pointless” (187) and even states regarding two different torture sessions he encountered,
“Both punishments were unnecessary and evidently served only to satisfy the guards‟
twisted sense of correction” (188).
The captors are depicted as cruel and unreasonable. Thus the American POWs
provide a stark contrast to this characterization. Chesley describes the treatment he
received from the Vietnamese as “barbaric” (69) and states, “This guard would beat me
with a stick about eighteen inches long and maybe a quarter of an inch in diameter. Every
time our aircraft flew over, or just whenever he felt like it, he would beat on me” (13). In
these circumstances, the American POWs are depicted as innocent and completely at the
mercy of their captors. This can garner significant sympathy from the audiences of these
narratives. American troops chose to fight for the country and therefore should not be
subjected to such atrocious and senseless conditions.
Also, administering undeserved punishment to POWs violates the Geneva
Conventions. And these narratives show that these violations were both consistent and
frequent. Since their actions are representative of their country, audiences can generalize
44
that these foreign governments are also participating in this type of deviant behavior.
American intervention is therefore substantiated if its goal is to correct the perverse
actions of these foreign states and rectify the damages they have caused.
Brutality
Torture was frequent in prison camps and all the narratives analyzed, except for
those of Brick and Gunvalson who were both held in Germany, discuss the malevolent
brutality of the captors. When describing the Vietnamese, Chesley states they had a
“genius for cruelty” (66) and uses language like “barbaric” (65) and “sadistic” (64) to
recount his beatings. McCain‟s accounts of his experiences in Hanoi reflect this trend as
well. When he was first captured, a mob of Vietnamese guards immediately set the tone
for the rest of his time in captivity. “I said, „My God—my leg!‟ That seemed to enrage
them—I don‟t know why. One of them slammed a rifle butt on my shoulder, and
smashed it pretty badly. Another stuck a bayonet in my foot” (2). The brutality he
encountered continued for seven years marked by periods in solitary confinement,
interrogations, and torture sessions. He later describes one guard as “a psychotic torturer,
one of the worst fiends we had to deal with” (4) and regarding one particular torture
session, he states, “I had been reduced to an animal during this period of beating and
torture” (13).
The Japanese and North Koreans were not exempt from participating in a variety
of methods of cruelty. Kurvers states that “[The Japanese] were cruel to their own
people” (14) and they treated their American POWs similarly. He recounts reading a
propaganda pamphlet and states, “It said, they didn‟t care if we died.…They didn‟t” (19)
45
and continues to describe an instance when fifteen captives were taken outside to a
cemetery and immediately beheaded (20). Boyt further emphasizes the grotesque
savagery of his Japanese captors by stating, “As I left through the main gate, I saw an
example of the guard‟s gruesome flair for decorating, which became my most memorable
image of Cabanatuan: two severed heads, one stuck atop the other” (157). And of his
North Korean captors, Peppard says, “Oh we could hear the screams down from the
passageways when they had taken people out and were beating them. We know people
were getting beaten real bad” (11).
By casting the captors as cruel barbarians, these narratives emphasize their
involvement in sadistic practices and establish a sense of bestiality. Boyt recounts the
severed heads, adorning the prison walls as sick decoration (157) and Kurvers mentions a
propaganda film featuring Japanese soldiers throwing babies in the air and catching them
on bayonets (22). The graphic descriptions of torture succeed in nauseating and
producing disgust among audiences. It is unequivocal that the enemy is inhumane and
lacks even the smallest sense of morality. Not only have these evil entities violated the
established regulations of the Geneva Conventions, some narratives, like McCain‟s,
reveal that they “seemed to get a big thrill out of the beatings” (14). Their corruption is
no longer just political, it is perverse as well.
These descriptions of brutality justify American intervention. Similar to the
discussions of erratic behavior and cruelty, brutality in foreign governments and states
outside of prison camps can be extrapolated from these POW accounts. Prison camps are
just one level in a governmental hierarchical structure. Captors receive orders from
superior sources—powerful governmental figures. Therefore audiences of this discourse
46
can infer that foreign regimes are as cruel, if not more cruel, than the captors and guards
they employ. According to the POW narratives, our own soldiers were disgustingly
mistreated. Therefore, it should be our duty as a nation to punish those involved and
enforce regulations that support our more compassionate and humanitarian ideals.
German Captors
Throughout this analysis, one anomaly became unmistakably apparent. The
prisoners held in Germany, both Brick and Gunvalson, did not experience the same
instances of cruelty and torture as those held in other countries. The narratives of these
two men follow all other trends discussed in this analysis except the descriptions of
stupidity, erratic behavior, and brutality of their captors. In fact, both Brick and
Gunvalson were initially incredibly intimidated by the Germans, stating “Because we got
word that [the Germans] were shooting prisoners. And that you know, ran through our
mind more than anything” (Gunvalson 4).Yet, as their captivity continued, their
narratives reveal that the Germans‟ behavior falls on the opposite side of the spectrum of
the Vietnamese, Japanese, and North Koreans.
Brick begins his narrative by declaring that his German guard was “cordial” (3).
Later, he even states, “he was a good guard. I mean he was [a good human being]” (6).
There is little debate regarding Japanese violations of the Geneva Conventions during
World War II. POWs held in Germany acknowledged their fortuitous conditions. Brick
states, “Well, I surely didn‟t want to be a prisoner of the Japanese, because I knew that
they had it lots worse than we did” (28). Gunvalson‟s narrative also reflects this fortunate
47
leniency. “I can‟t say the Germans treated me poorly at all. I mean, if they would have
had the provisions to feed us I think they would have” (15).
Unlike the Vietnam War, American intervention in World War II was greatly
supported across the homefront. Hitler personified evil and the Axis Powers were a
clearly defined enemy. Germany did not violate the Geneva Conventions to the extent
that other regimes did. As the war progressed, Hitler‟s war crimes continued to become
public. By July 1944, Soviet troops liberated abandoned Nazi concentration camps in
Poland and had discovered the remains of gas chambers (“Lublin/Majdanek:
Chronology”). By September of that same year, American reporters visited the Lublin
and the Majdanek camps in Poland and published pictures of the horrific atrocities
(“Lublin/Majdanek: Chronology”). Soon the whole world would be aware of Nazi
atrocities.
By Nazi Germany‟s final offensive effort on the Western Front at the end of 1944,
the empire was severely faltering. These narratives show that German guards stationed at
prison camps seemed to be losing hope. Their living conditions matched their prisoners‟
conditions and their own government was neglecting their needs.
As the Third Reich continued to fall, instances of brutality and cruelty against
POWs decreased. The captors‟ government had abandoned them and their indifference
was reflected in the treatment of their prisoners. By the moment of their liberation, many
POWs felt little disdain for their captors. Gunvalson poignantly states at the end of his
narrative that it was not the Germans he was fighting, it was their evil regime. “I have no
ill will for them. I know they were the enemy. The German people were not my enemy or
the German soldier. It was Hitler and his regime that was our enemy” (15).
48
Communism discussed by POWs of the Vietnam War
“Hanoi, in effect, has tried to apply the principles of the Nuremberg trials to U.S.
captives; to the Communists, the Americans are not prisoners of war in the Geneva sense,
but war criminals” (“Nation: Acting to Aid the Forgotton Men” 7), states a 1970 article
regarding the treatment of POWs that were held in North Vietnam during the war. While
discussions of communism are not necessarily categorized as descriptions of captors, it is
a consistent theme that reveals how POWs have the rhetorical power to establish the
credibility of American ideals. Three of the four POWs analyzed who were captured
during the Vietnam War explicitly admonish communist ideologies. Chesley‟s remarks
against communism emphasize the barbarity of its ideals. He first states, “A Communist
is a person who will torture you to write a statement that you have not been tortured.
Among other things, our captors did just that” (72) and later accentuates his point by
saying, “Communists, it seems, can torture and kill—and then go home smiling to dinner
and a good night‟s sleep” (150). To Chesley, communism represents “forces of darkness
and horror” (113). It is a savage force that must be annihilated before it spreads its
wickedness further and affects America‟s own freedom. McCain‟s views parallel those of
Chesley as he states, “This is what Communism is all about—armed struggle to
overthrow capitalist countries” (6). Both of these men‟s views reflect the popular
assumption of the domino theory. Communism is a rampant epidemic that will spread if
the forces behind it are not immediately stopped. This includes the countries in which
they were imprisoned.
Instead of speaking to the depravity of communism, Halyburton‟s narrative
reveals his support for U.S. interventions. He states:
49
Well, what I understood and believed I think at the time was that the
communists in North Vietnam with the support of China and the Soviet
Union, were attempting to overthrow the government in South Vietnam,
and what would be a preview to overtaking the other countries in the area,
Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, perhaps further than that. And we were
sort of drawing the line in the sand, saying, this is where you stop, you
know, and that was worthwhile doing4. And that the South Vietnamese
people desired democracy and did not want to be communists and that was
worth, you know, trying to make sure that they weren‟t enslaved by
communism (6).
Here, Halyburton shows that American efforts to stop communism and protect
freedom are in fact good. Although efforts to enter into and escalate the war divided the
nation, this narrative shows that intervention was necessary and worthwhile. Chelsey
briefly addresses this as well and states, “To my mind [Americans] were fighting in a
worthwhile cause….In that sense they were defending the best that is in our way of life,
the cause of freedom” (113).
This discourse is incredibly persuasive. These POWs endured horrific conditions
while fighting for their country, and still believed that their efforts were worthwhile.
These narratives have the power to unite audiences around the purpose of the Vietnam
War and to diminish the negative repercussions that resulted from national animosity and
anti-war movements.
4
Emphasis added
50
CHAPTER SEVEN
Coping Mechanisms
“We believed we would win in the end” (Boyt 71)
In the overall POW narrative, coping mechanisms were indispensable. For those
who survived, these methods gifted them with the will to fight and live until liberation.
These stories would not be told if the men who lived through them had felt apathetic and
defeated. Therefore it is crucial to understand how these men coped and how they found
the will to survive. The following analysis will examine the three common trends that
were evident throughout the eight narratives: optimism, faith, and communication.
Optimism
One of the most powerful coping mechanisms adopted by POWs was optimism.
Regardless of where the POWs were imprisoned, optimism proved to reduce the
hardships of captivity and provide a sense of purpose under horrible circumstances.
While conditions of the Bataan Death March were excruciatingly insufferable, Boyt
remarks that he remained “haggard yet confident” (78). “Yet with each mile that I
survived,” he further states, “I grew tougher and vowed to carry on, dreaming of the time
when the march would end. Above all, I fought to live; as bad as things were, I did not
want to die” (128).
Also a survivor of the Death March, Kurvers‟ narrative reflects similar feelings of
optimism. When asked by his interviewer whether he believed he would make it to Japan,
Kurvers responded, “Optimism rules, you know” (23). Kurvers also introduces the
interesting notion that those prisoners who did not maintain optimistic attitudes were the
51
ones who perished during captivity. When asked if there were prisoners who had a hard
time being optimistic and struggled to laugh once in a while, Kurvers said, “Yes. And
none of those came back” (13).
Gunvalson‟s optimistic views are very similar to those of Kurvers. He initially
declares, “I‟ve never tried to be negative about anything” (13). Then, when discussing
how he coped in relation to those who did not survive, he says, “When I went into the
Army I said I know there‟s going to be things in there that I‟m not going to like, but I
said I‟m going to be positive about it and do what I‟m told to do, when to do it, and not
make any ripples or cause any trouble…trouble will follow you” (13).
Chesley also cites “the will to live” (70) as a strong coping strategy throughout his
captivity. Regardless of the conditions that he suffered through during his six and a half
years in Hanoi, he believes that “there is no profit in being sad, especially about what you
can‟t change” (137).
It is incredible to believe that these men were able to remain optimistic
throughout their captivity experiences. Yet, as Chesley comments, “For all their neglect
and cruelty the North Vietnamese did not break our spirit” (71), surviving POWs were
able to channel optimism to strengthen their will to live. In the POW narrative paradigm,
an optimistic attitude reveals that these men did not feel defeated by their capture nor did
they feel neglected by their country. Even though he was forced to endure one of the
most hellish death marches in history, Boyt still held on to the belief that Americans can
persevere and states, “We believed we would win in the end” (71). While McCain admits
that there were low points during captivity and that after five and a half years he was
almost “at the point of suicide, because I saw that I was reaching the end of my rope”
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(13), he continued to believe that American forces were close to ending the war. Even in
their darkest hours, these POWs never lost hope that their country was coming to liberate
them. Brick recounts in his narrative how his German captors abandoned their camps due
to the advancing Red Army. Unlike the Germans who felt defeated by their government
and therefore fled to seek refuge outside of their country, American POWs continued to
endure harsh conditions with the solid conviction that the U.S. would never let them
down.
Faith
Many of the POW narratives reveal that faith in God acted as a very successful
coping mechanism. A devout member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,
Chesley addresses an entire chapter of his narrative to his faith. Titling the section, “No
Atheists in Hell Holes”, his overall belief is that “hardship and danger sharpen the
religious instincts—or rather, make people feel toward God” (87). Yet he was not the
only prisoner who believed faith to be a strong coping strategy. “I think that most men I
knew in prison were sincerely religious. Most of them prayed to God asking for strength
and guidance” (Chesley 88). While Chesley‟s narrative was the most religious of the
eight texts, with him mentioning “Lord” thirty-times and “God” fifty-one times compared
to four mentions of the word “barbaric” and six of the word “cruel”, faith in God was a
major factor contributing to the survival of many other POWs.
These narratives show that POWs utilized their faith in the Lord in two distinct
ways. First, several appealed to God to help them endure hardship. During the German
bombing of his troops, Brick states, “We were there for over forty-eight hours and prayed
53
all the while being bombed” (7). Gunvalson not only relies on his faith to survive, he
states his belief that he was strengthened by it:
[Faith] was something that you could rely on because…like I say further
on, that the Germans, they did everything they could to break me down
physically. They did everything they could to break me down mentally.
And financially I had nothing. But the only thing I had left was my faith in
God. That‟s one thing they couldn‟t take away. As a matter of fact I think
it probably made me stronger (10).
McCain‟s narrative shows that he also used his faith to reinforce his values and
seek guidance. “I was finding that prayer helped,” he says. “It wasn‟t a question of asking
for superhuman strength or for God to strike the North Vietnamese dead. It was asking
for moral and physical courage, for guidance and wisdom to do the right thing….I was
sustained in many times of trial” (14).
The second way these narratives demonstrated the faith of the POWs was by
attributing survival to God. McCain briefly mentions that prayer alleviated much of the
physical pain he felt in prison (14), and both Gunvalson and Kurvers declare that God
was the contributing factor in their survival. Gunvalson states, “I think it‟s just the grace
of God we made it because we were together” (17). Here, God is portrayed as the reason
he was able to make it out alive. Upon his liberation, Kurvers had similar sentiments and
stated, “God was with me. I was fortunate” (18).
This reliance on faith throughout captivity shows that their belief in a
transcendent Deity prevented them from succumbing to the hellish conditions they were
experiencing. From a rhetorical perspective, these men evaded defeat by petitioning to a
superior being far more powerful and great than the captors that imprisoned them. These
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men knew that their faith would prevail over their captors‟ brute force and malevolence.
They trusted a benevolent, humane source to provide them with the assistance to tolerate
some of history‟s most evil circumstances. As McCain had said, the POWs did not want
God to strike their captors dead (McCain 14). They merely sought guidance and strength
to continue surviving until liberation.
Communication
The third coping mechanism utilized by POWs is communication. Especially for
those prisoners held in solitary confinement, communication, regardless of the method,
proved to be vital. Even if it consisted of a cryptic tapping-code system or the simple
whistling of a song, these tactics allowed prisoners to share their experiences with one
another and remind each other that they were still alive.
Both Chesley and McCain spent time during their imprisonment in solitary
confinement and both men discuss how communication was essential for survival.
Chesley describes how many men relied on complex systems of codes including
methodical sweeps of a broom and foot-taps on the floor. “In the early days in
particular,” he says, “the system of communication between single or small cells was
virtually indispensable” (104). And, declaring that communication “was of the utmost
value” (14), McCain believes that it served to “keep up morale” (14) and acted as the
difference between “being able to resist and not being able to resist” (14). Even if it was
only a wave, wink, or tap on the wall, McCain states, “As far as this business of solitary
confinement goes—the most important thing for survival is communication” (8).
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However, most captors regarded all forms of communication between prisoners as
conspiracy. They went to great lengths to ensure that POWs were not able to speak to or
see each other. Admitting the he and his fellow prisoners frequently attempted to violate
their orders against communicating, Halyburton says, “And the punishment for getting
caught communicating was, could be quite severe. And about the least you could expect
would be to be beaten some and then to spend two weeks in leg irons and handcuffs”
(11). McCain found similar conditions at his camp and states, “When they caught us
communicating, they‟d take severe reprisals” (14).
Communication provided POWs with company. It assured them that even though
they had been separated, they were not alone in their struggle to survive. Like many
POWs, Halyburton states that regardless of the punishment, he dedicated “a lot of time
communicating with others” (10). Since they could not be together physically, this
system gave POWs the opportunity to join together mentally. While they did not conspire
to seek retribution against their captors, they bonded over the conditions they were
enduring. It was a crucial resource that reminded them that their cause had not been lost.
Communication also functioned as an essential coping mechanism for POWs once
they had been released and were repatriated on American soil. Both Brick and Gunvalson
discuss how becoming members of POW organizations alleviated some of the pain they
still felt years after their release. Prior to joining the organization, Brick‟s narrative shows
that he avoided most conversations regarding World War II and his time spent in
captivity. After joining one particular organization, he says, “For my part it was good for
me to talk about it. Not only that, I mean the ex-POWs they‟ve helped me” (30).
Regarding having other POWs to talk to, he adds, “I think it was quite important. Yes. I
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mean, it gave you a feeling of belonging” (9). For Gunvalson, joining a similar
organization was “[the] greatest thing that ever happened to me. It helped me to where I
am today and just talking about it” (30). And for those POWs who do not embrace these
organizations? “They‟re miserable people” (Gunvalson 30).
As these narratives have shown, communication between POWs after repatriation
is just as powerful a coping mechanism as it was for POWs when they were in captivity.
Both Brick and Gunvalson describe how it provided them with a sense of belonging.
Similar to prison camps, where POWs were separated by cells, ex-POWs in the United
States are separated by distance and the responsibilities associated with reentering their
previous lives. Yet communication serves the same purpose of providing the men with a
community of peers to share their experiences. For many POWs, it is difficult to discuss
their painful experiences with their families and friends. Communication with other
POWs enables them to truly relate to each other‟s experiences. It gives them the
resources to accept what happened to them during captivity and to embrace the new
chapters in their lives. For a POW to have the strength to recover after their experience,
the narratives reveal that communication techniques are indispensable.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Patriotism
“We former POWs love our country” (Chesley 112)
Patriotism is an essential component of the POW narrative. After all the terrible
hardships these men faced, it is important to recognize their faith in their country. These
eight narratives reveal that patriotic discourse is a common trend that can be categorized
into two groups: support for U.S. policy and pride in the country.
Support for U.S. policy
While patriotism appears in all of the eight narratives analyzed, explicit support
for U.S. policy only occurs in those narratives of the Vietnam War. This is particularly
important due to the controversy concerning American involvement. Yet these narratives
reveal that while the war may not have been highly favorable on the homefront, those
fighting in it believed it to be an important cause. After stating, “I believe that in the long
run we all felt the U.S. policy to be right” (Chesley 113), Chesley continues to explain:
We knew that there were political facts to be faced, and that our
government was doing all it could properly do to secure our release from
an enemy who had no regard for human life or dignity and who treated us
(and their own nationals who were POWs in South Vietnam) as pawns in
the game (113).
By emphasizing the Vietnamese‟s disregard of compassion and morality, Chesley
further legitimizes U.S. intervention. He also adds his belief that POW efforts were
worthwhile and states, “Because the POWs generally felt that we did what we were
supposed to do for our country, only what others would have done if they had found
58
themselves in our circumstances” (146). Therefore, the war overall was not extraordinary,
it was supposed to happen for the good of the country.
Another way these narratives show support for U.S. policy is by criticizing
dissenters. When discussing student protests and the antiwar movement, Halyburton
mentions his animosity towards them and states: “Because from our point of view, that
simply prolonged the war. It made the government less able to prosecute the war the way
that we felt, you know, was needed in order to win….The antiwar movement was our
enemy. And so we sort of had that attitude through most of the time” (13). Chesley shares
similar sentiments and says:
We managed to reconcile ourselves to all this with the thought that as
servicemen it was our duty to fight for America‟s freedoms, among which
is the right to dissent. We might disagree with the dissenters. We might
consider them ill-advised, immature, blind to reality. We might wish for
them the experience of living for a few years in North Vietnam and trying
to show their dissent there by protest marches and by flying the American
flag. But still it was our responsibility as necessary to protect their right to
act wrong (163).
Halyburton uses the word “enemy” to describe the antiwar movement and
Chesley explicitly says that dissenting is “ill-advised”, “immature” and “wrong”.
Previous sections of this analysis have shown that these narratives use similar language
when describing their foreign captors. Therefore the POWs have equated the antiwar
movement with the very enemy that imprisoned them. Categorizing dissenters in this
light shows the POWs‟ firm conviction that U.S. foreign policy was correct and therefore
their captivity was worthwhile.
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Pride in Country
Pride in the United States is a theme found in all of the narratives, regardless of
the war and location of captivity. In many instances, this pride was extremely explicit.
Chesley discusses his love for the United States several times and even states, “It is that
under God‟s blessing the United States of America is the greatest country on the earth”
(165). When justifying his involvement in the Vietnam War, McCain states, “I think
America today is a better country than the one I left nearly six years ago” (28) and further
adds, “I had a lot of time to think over there, and came to the conclusion that one of the
most important things in life—along with a man‟s family—is to make some contribution
to his country” (29).
One of the more common ways this trend appears is by equating America to
freedom and integrity. When discussing his liberation, Peppard claims, “As soon as we
were in U.S. hands, I felt we were free….I saw those soldiers there with their uniforms
and with their buses painted up with the U.S. Army insignia on it and all that I felt that I
was finally out of that place” (14). Similarly, Kurvers states regarding his return to the
United States, “That was freedom. I didn‟t feel really free until I got back there” (28).
When Gunvalson was released from German captivity, he says, “And another beautiful
spot was when we got liberated and they took that swastika down and put up the
American flag in its place” (13).
In all of these instances, America, and everything that symbolizes it, provided the
men with a source of motivation and relief; they knew their freedom had been fully
restored when they finally landed on American soil. Equating America with freedom
60
shows the powerful significance the POWs placed on their country. Instead of becoming
angered by their imprisonment, the men continued to hold the nation in high regard.
The trend of patriotism is important to the overall POW narrative. These men
cannot feel like their efforts are significant without pride in their own country.
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CHAPTER NINE
Rhetoric of Rebirth
“Because we kept faith in each other, we could recover our spirit” (Chesley 71 )
A Rhetoric of Rebirth story was found in the four narratives of POWs from the
Vietnam War. As previous sections have shown, these men faced cruel conditions while
in captivity. Yet their ability to endure these experiences, remain patriotic, and feel as
though their efforts were worthwhile shows how they eventually accomplished
redemption after completing the process of rebirth.
Chesley admits that he frequently felt as though his time in captivity was futile.
However, he continues to state, “I no doubt lost a lot by my seven years‟ captivity, but I
like to think it wasn‟t all loss. I believe I learned a thing or two there and reaffirmed
others. One thing I learned was the futility of worrying over something one can‟t control”
(71). Regardless of the amount of time he spent imprisoned and the extreme brutality he
encountered, he later reinforces the idea that serving one‟s country should be an
important consideration for every American. He states, “As to my military service, I have
no regrets about spending those years serving my country. I believe that any young man
living in America should be willing to serve this country if the military called upon to do
so” (162).
Peppard continued to serve out his military career after his releases and briefly
states, “Outside of that I enjoyed my time in the Navy, else I wouldn‟t have stayed after I
got back. But I did enjoy that” (24). He did not feel discouraged by America‟s defeat in
the war, and neither did Halyburton, whose remarks reveal that he felt as though he had
become a better person after his time in captivity. He states:
62
Well, I think I obviously matured a lot. As you would normally during that
period of time, but I think I got, I rearranged my priorities about things
that were important. I had a much greater sense of what was really
important, as opposed to what seemed to be important. I think I learned
that the human body, mind and spirit is a lot tougher and more adaptable
and creative, you know, than you ever think it is. That you can get a lot
more out of your mind and your body then [sic] you think you can if you
are called on to do that. So, it just gave me a very, very different outlook
on life, on what was important (17).
Similar to Chesley, McCain explicitly states in his narrative that second to family,
the most important thing in life should be the desire to serve the country (27). His
statements even go further than the other POWs because he believes that America as a
country has been redeemed after the conclusion of the Vietnam War. He says:
I think America is a better country now because we have been through a
sort of purging process, a re-evaluation of ourselves. Now I can see more
of an appreciation of our way of life. There is more patriotism. The flag is
all over the place. I can hear new values being stressed—the concern for
environment is a case in point (28).
McCain‟s discourse unequivocally addresses the rebirth process. For him, the
Vietnam War was ultimately a healthy experience for the entire nation. While
controversy surrounding the war lasted for decades, McCain‟s perspective is
incontrovertible. Regardless of the intense antiwar movement at home and military
failure abroad, America, as a whole, is a “better country” (28). McCain‟s point of view
shows that not only was America misguided in its attempts to blame Vietnam veterans for
the nation‟s involvement in the war, but both the veterans and the country were able to
improve because of it.
63
Burke‟s Rhetoric of Rebirth serves a similar purpose as the descriptions of
captivity and captors do for those narratives of the Vietnam War. POWs persevered
through harsh imprisonment and still faced animosity upon their arrival back to the
United States. Yet, they believe their efforts to be important, and they feel they are better
people due to their experiences.
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CHAPTER TEN
Implications
“Any one of the prisoners would have been willing to die for his country had that
been required of him” (Chesley 68)
While POW narratives garner attention regarding the mistreatment of prisoners,
their assessments of international conflicts have gone largely ignored. Not only are POW
experiences with foreign enemies invaluable to the politics of war, they reveal a new
perspective that can potentially sway public opinion. This narrative criticism reveals four
trends shared by all eight narratives: description of captivity, description of captors,
coping mechanisms, and patriotism. An analysis of these trends shows that these
narratives disclose the effectiveness and morality of an American soldier and accentuate
the enemy‟s unjustifiable stupidity and cruelty [with the exception of those held in
Germany during World War II]. They also show how POWs managed to cope with their
experiences and still maintain strong patriotic sentiments.
While these trends are common in all eight narratives, there are important
differences between those of the POWs held during World War II and those of the POWs
held during the Vietnam War. By the time America became involved in World War II,
intervention was not just favored, it was expected. Those who fought were sent off with
hope and celebrated upon return. “It is for the veterans of World War II…,” says
LaCroix, “that we have reserved our fondest, least complicated tributes. They fought the
Good War, after all, emerging triumphant against evil” (1). How do we distinguish their
narratives from those of Vietnam veterans?
Since approval of American intervention in World War II was guaranteed across
the homefront, these narratives do not function to garner support for the war. However,
65
they do shed light on the sociopolitical environment of the countries in which the POWs
were held. For Brick and Gunvalson, their narratives reveal that their German captors
were not nearly as passionate about the war as other foreign captors, and eventually felt
neglected by their government. This provides a stark contrast to the perceptions of
German soldiers involved in the Holocaust who persecuted and murdered millions of
prisoners. Yet the Germans in charge of POW camps did not practice this same type of
barbarity. Even though they were fighting for the Nazi state, their indifference made them
more empathetic and appear as victims of their country‟s injustice as well.
For those POWs held by the Japanese, their narratives confirm Japan‟s blatant
violation of the Geneva Conventions. They showed no mercy for their captives. If they
were not working them to death, they were beating them endlessly or depriving them of
food. Although over 60 years have passed since the end of the war, it is important that the
mistreatment encountered by these POWs is not forgotten. The number of living
survivors is diminishing quickly, and their discourse provides historical context regarding
conditions on enemy territory and acts as a reminder of the unshakable perseverance of
the American soldier and POW.
By emphasizing the cruelty of the captors and addressing the issue of
communism, the four narratives concerning the Vietnam War challenge common beliefs
that American involvement was unwarranted and haphazard. Although Rasmussen and
Downey state, “As pragmatists, many Americans apparently are willing to put the tragedy
to rest through a reconceptualization of Vietnam as an anomaly in the larger framework
of the American war experience” (191), these narratives legitimize military intervention
in Vietnam. They show American POWs as honest, moral soldiers of peace and portray
66
the foreign enemy as destructive and immoral. According to these narratives, the U.S.
would have been neglecting its international responsibilities of maintaining peace and
preventing the communist threat had it not interfered. Audiences of this discourse are
therefore led to trust the government‟s decision to intervene.
The controversy regarding the U.S.‟s current involvement in the Middle East has
been equated with battles against communism from decades past. Similar to the 1960s
and 70s, the invasion into Iraq and America‟s ability to withdraw has resulted in heated
opposition to foreign policy decisions. Vietnam POW narratives have the potential to
render advocacy for this American conflict if their rhetoric is understood in light of the
United States‟ current political situation.
POW experiences have had a profound effect on repatriated prisoners and their
families, yet the short term effects of their narratives are difficult to measure. Men
returning from captivity during World War II were welcomed and celebrated by the
American people, yet the efforts of those returning from the Vietnam War did not
resonate as strongly with the country. In 1974, Nixon briefly addressed the POW issue in
his State of the Union speech saying, “They have returned with honor. And we can be
proud of the fact that our courageous prisoners of war, for whom a dinner was held in
Washington tonight, that they came home with their heads high, on their feet and not on
their knees” (Nixon “State of the Union”). Vietnam POWs were honored by the
government, but American audiences struggled to interpret the war as valuable.
Decades after these wars, it is still challenging to decipher the long term effects of
POW narratives. As previously stated, the American Folklife Center at the Library of
Congress established the Veterans History Project in 2000 to commemorate the service of
67
America‟s armed forces. A branch of the archives has been allotted for the experiences of
American POWs. This has made transcripts, photographs, and video footage available for
the public, allowing more audiences to have access to these powerful narratives.
Issues concerning POW treatment also began to appear during John McCain‟s
2008 presidential campaign. As his episodes in Vietnam were introduced into his
discourse, they were brought to the forefront of media attention. Orson Swindle, a former
lieutenant colonel who briefly shared a cell with McCain in Hanoi, shared his views
about the candidate to U.S. News & World Report. “He chose probably to die. That, my
friend, is character beyond what most of us can understand” (“McCain‟s „POW Buddies‟
Speak Up on his Behalf”). Fellow POW Gunvalson has also spoken out regarding
McCain‟s character by stating, “I think John McCain is a survivor. He‟s a hero to me”
(23). His survival narrative during the Republican Convention and presidential campaign
was used as a point of inspiration. By promoting the time he spent in captivity, different
media outlets increased national awareness of POW discourse.
68
CHAPTER ELEVEN
Conclusion
It is important to realize that this research examines eight narratives from only
two American-fought conflicts. There is still so much information to be attained from
narratives that have not yet been analyzed. Global politics have shifted significantly over
the past decades, yet the history of POWs and their narratives provide a fundamental
account to the change in these policies.
The four main trends found in this research reveal that regardless of location, the
POW experience is a shared one. While these narratives are essential in understanding
foreign and domestic perspectives of war, it is important that the personal histories of
these men are not forgotten. Their accounts provide indispensable insights into the
psychology of foreign enemies, yet serve as a reminder to the extent of sacrifice that they
made for the country. These men were beaten, tortured, starved, and murdered for a cause
they believed to be worthwhile, regardless of whether they received support from the
American people. While imprisonment interrupted their fight for the United States,
POWs felt as though they were bettered by their experiences, and as Gunvalson states in
his narrative, “As a matter of fact I think it probably made me stronger” (10).
If anything is taken away from these stories, it should be the inspiration that these
POWs instill in their audiences. These survival narratives emphasize the incredible
strength that can be found when people are pushed past their breaking points. They teach
that regardless of the circumstances, people can be resourceful, they can cope, and they
will survive. The discourse created in POW narratives tells inspiring human stories that
69
show that nothing is impossible if you have the will to survive. It is discourse that is
nothing less than powerful.
70
Appendices
Appendix 1
Narrative of Harold Brick
Disbelief in being
captured
Patriotism
Adherence to
military standards
2 3, 26, 28, 29
Pages
Pages
Intimidation
Factor
3, 4
Pages
Coping
Mechanisms
9, 17, 19, 29, 30,
32
Erratic
behavior of
captors
Rhetoric of
Rebirth
34, 35
Speaking Description
English
of Germans
3
German civilians
4 6, 4, 17
3, 20
3, 6, 20,
21, 22, 23
Faith
7, 9
Horrible
conditions
7, 8, 19
71
Appendix 2
Narrative of Russell Gunvalson
Faith in God
Pages
3, 6, 8, 9, 10,
17
Pages
Conditions of
captivity
6, 7, 8, 10,
13, 14, 16,
17, 22
Coping
Mechanisms
Pages
Disbelief in
being captured
Intimidation factor
of the Germans
3 4, 7, 25
German
civilians
4, 8, 15, 21, 22, 25
Speaking English
Rhetoric of Rebirth
6 6, 7
Abuse of
prisoners-punishment
10, 30, 33
Jessica Lynch and
other POWs
22, 23, 26, 29, 30.,
12 31, 32
5, 9
Description of
Germans
Patriotism/Optimism
12, 13, 24
Appendix 3
Narrative of Harold. G. Kurvers
Pages
Pages
Physical
conditions of
soldiers
Meager
Upbringing
2, 7, 25
Japanese
bombing
Cruel Conditions
of captivity
Treatment of
Japanese
7, 8, 13, 14,
19, 20, 21,
22, 23, 24,
25, 26
7, 9, 10, 14, 15,
16, 18, 19
5
Dislike for
MacArthur
5
Coping
mechanisms
Physical
Description
of Japanese
7, 8, 10, 12, 13,
18, 19, 23, 29,
30, 31, 32
13, 14, 15
Conditions
of surrender
6
6
Patriotism
28
72
Appendix 4
Narrative of Gene Boyt
Immediate Impressions of Japanese
Pos. Will to Fight
Pages
54, 56 , 59, 60 73, 84
59, 60, 63, 68, 71, 78, 125,
128, 145, 149, 154, 157
Pages
Feelings of defeat
110, 111, 114, 116, 119
Japanese--English
language
119, 132, 179
Pages
Characteristics of Prisoners
123, 137 , 144
Rhetoric of Rebirth
134, 210, 219, 221
75, 76, 162, 183
Brutality of Japanese
Soldier-->Enjoyment
119, 120, 121, 122, 124,
125, 127, 127, 128, 130,
132, 133, 136, 142, 150,
157, 188 , 220
Positive Placement Feelings
Weak Filipino Soldiers
Pages
35,30, 33, 41, 43, 46, 51
112, 124, 125, 134-135, 151 ,
217
Pages
Horrible Conditions
127, 128, 131, 134, 139, 142, 145-146,
153
Deceiving the Japanese
Pages
Subversive Behavior
129
Appendix 5
Narrative of Donald Richard Peppard
Pages
Decision to Join
1, 3
Pages
Coping
mechanisms
11, 17
Erratic
behavior of
captors
Adherence to
military standards
5, 9, 12
Brutality of
captors
7, 9, 10, 11
Stupidity of
captors
9, 13, 14
Patriotism
14, 16
Rhetoric of Rebirth
7, 11
Description
of captivity
9
18
73
Appendix 6
Narrative of Larry Chesley
Pages
Pages
Pages
Pride
Faith
Adherence to
military standards
3, 110, 146
8, 9, 10, 13, 22,
23, 26, 32, 36, 50,
52, 69, 70, 71, 77,
80, 85, 88-103,
116, 133, 137, 148
12, 21, 62, 106
Coping
Mechanisms
Stupidity of
Vietnamese
Description of
Vietnamese
23, 29, 37, 55,
70, 71, 73, 7982, 84, 104, 111
9, 11, 24, 25, 38,
40, 58, 55, 63,
64, 106, 112
11, 40, 54, 55, 69,
72, 102
Brutality of
captors
Description of
captivity
Patriotism
19, 18, 35, 52,
116, 121, 122
23, 45, 60, 68, 80, 83,
104, 112, 113, 120,
126, 127, 139, 143,
144, 146, 162, 163,
165
12, 13, 14, 26,
27, 30, 31, 55,
60, 61, 64-69,
116
Returning
home
Pages
138, 160
Against
Communism
55, 72, 113,
158
Rhetoric of Rebirth
160, 161, 162
74
Appendix 7
Narrative of Porter Halyburton
Pages
Pages
Decision to
join
1, 3, 5, 6
Against
Stupidity of
communism Vietnamese
6 8, 11, 15
Adherence to
military
standards
8, 11
Conditions
of
captivity
9
Coping
Mechanisms
Brutality of
captors
Patriotism
Rhetoric
of Rebirth
10, 13
11, 12, 16
Description
of captors
13, 14, 15,
11 16, 19
Appendix 8
Narrative of John S. McCain III
Pages
Cruelty of N. Viet
captors
2, 5, 9, 13, 14, 16
Refusal to comply with
captors
3, 6, 11, 12, 15
Pages
Stupidity of Vietnamese
7, 13, 23, 26, 27
Coping Mechanisms
8, 9, 14, 24
Pages
Physical/animalistic
description of captors
4, 5, 6, 10, 12
Horrible captivity conditions
4, 8, 13, 17, 21
Pride/Patriotism
Rhetoric of Rebirth
19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28
28, 29
Pages
17
75
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