OEWEY,
HD28
.M414
90
ALFRED
P.
WORKING PAPER
SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
Technological Discontinuities
of Fiber Optics
The Emergence
John S. McCormack
James M. Utterback
AVP # 3199-90-BPS
August 1990
MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
50 MEMORIAL DRIVE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139
Technological Discontinuities
of Fiber Optics
The Emergence
John S. McConnack
James M. Utterback
^\T # 3199-90-BrS
August 1990
Presented
at a conference on "Competitive Strategies in the
Telecommunications Industry", Center for Telecommunications
Management, School
of Business Administration, University of
Southern California, Los Angeles, California, October 5-7, 1989.
m^
ABSTRACT
Prior
descriptions of technological discontinuities
Kim and by Tushman and Moore are
sphere
situation
often
is
can be perceived
The purpose
participants.
structure.
play
in
Clearly,
the
In
reality,
the
much more complex, and the emerging technology
in many different ways by different industry
of this
as a technological discontinuity
to
restricted in their competitive
a single attacker and a single defender.
to
by Utterback and
way
in
paper
is
to
examine
optical fibers
an industry which has a complex
competitive strategy has had an important role
in
technological change.
which industry participants have mastered
Technological discontinuities are frequently discussed
business strategy with reference
of
literature
defender
-
to
the
in
an attacker and a
two companies separated by a technological "divide".
In
order to attempt a more comprehensive analysis of the strategies
of discontinuous
pursued by competitors during a period
technological change
in
an
industry,
we
decided
to
explore the
product and process development decisions and actions of a number
of
competitors, as well as their technological resources and market
positions
detail.
in
technological
As an
discontinuity
on copper cable
in
we chose
illustration
which accompanied
to
explore the
the telecommunications markets
States.
The
certainly
not restricted to just a single attacker
fiber optics discontinuity
assault
optics'
fiber
in
the United
meets our needs, as
it
is
and defender.
It
is
a timely and current case, and one of the present authors
(McCormack) has been
fiber optics
intimately involved
in
Hence
technology for the past decade.
examine perceptions
of
the development of
work
this
the optical fiber-copper cable discontinuity
from the perspectives of five different industry participants
on both sides
of the divide
market positions
will
located
and having widely varying resources and
.
The second author (Utterback) joined
in
he had recently surveyed a wide variety
this
of
collaboration,
because
case studies and industry
studies seeking to understand corporations' responses to
technological discontinuities
of
general terms and to develop a set
hypotheses or model (Utterback and Kim, 1986).
prescriptive character
for the
studies
add
is
used
to
advantage
management of technology and
show that present definitions
simplistic.
will
in
to
It
is
hoped
in
This model's
highlighting
issues
the results of the case
of
"discontinuities"
are too
that the "richer perspective" obtained here
the ongoing work on technological evolution
and industry
discontinuities.
In
a recent book espousing the "attacker's advantage" Foster clearly
explains
how dogged persistence
technology can become a
liability
in
investing
in
when a new,
an established
totally
different
technology appears
the scene.
in
a given industry the
In
technology can follow a performance curve similar
old technology, but
of the
its
starting
"performance parameter" scale and
point
its
new
shape
in
to
that
be higher up the
will
"natural
will
limit"
consequently be higher than that of the existing technology (Foster,
1986).
compare
important to
is
It
between functions
discontinuities
that Foster doesn't bring out
He
defenders.
examples and
curves.
fails to
independently
progress,
technological
of
a fact
on attackers and
his treatise
in
when discussing
with like
define the unit of analysis
his
limits
many
in
of his
discussion to unidimensional progress
many dimensions
reality the
In
like
of
technology progress
a highly complex manner.
in
Cooper and Schendel's (1976) elegant and pathbreaking comparative
case studies have shown that a new product technology is more
likely
to
be introduced by an outsider, rather than a traditional
competitor, and the aggressor
is
often a small "start up" venture.
However, a new process technology
expected
Nolet,
to
emerge from
1989).
and provide clear advantages
company
must reconsider
to
quickly
would be
traditional competitors (Utterback and
Given that the new technology has the potential
substitute for the old
the established
for the old product
embrace a
prominent position
large investments
is
placed
strategy.
its
in
radical
in
is
to
the end user,
a disadvantaged position and
difficult
for
a large organization
new technology and maintain its
many reasons, among them
the market for
place
in
It
to
in
technical knowledge, designs, people
new requirements.
vacuum tube producers when the
transistor emerged in the 1950's.
Companies wishing to
successfully make the transition from the old to the new
and equipment
that
may
Witness the demise
not be adaptable to the
of the leading
technologies must carefully organize themselves
balanced
order to
change
manage
technologies.
in
strategy, culture
the discontinuity
and structure
between the
old
to
facilitate
of the
a
company
and new
in
It
can take a decade or more
technologies and hence
it
is
to
complete the switch from old
engage
often too late to
to
new
a new
in
technology when the signs become clear that the existing technology
is
A
decline.
in
successful
long before the decline
in
new technology must
the
shift to
the old technology has set
begin
Forecasting
in.
the beginning of a decline by carefully reading the signs available
the earlier stages of the technology lifecycle
is
essential
new
correctly time the transition from the old to the
in
in
order
to
technologies.
Utterback and Brown discuss such environmental monitoring using
the
example
based photographic business and
of the silver chemistry
on the traditional competition
point out that focusing
is
Relevant information must be gathered from potential
insufficient.
entrants outside the established industry such as electronics and
and Brown, 1972,
television (Utterback
or
p. 5).
A
change
in
technology
market conditions often allows companies from outside a
group
particular strategic
lower the mobility barriers and seek
to
entrance.
Conversely, the old technology usually
to
the
improve
at
aggressor.
in
to
research and development
This
write
old technology
reluctant to
to
improve, and
the traditional competitors
is
in
plant
Retrenchment
off.
may make
embrace
in
order to
increased
fight off
the
be expected because the established companies
to
have had significant investment
difficult
continue
a dramatically faster rate, after the introduction of
new technology, because
investment
will
the
and equipment which
of the
established competitors
new
-
to
is
rate of progress of the
all
the
An
cross the divide.
more
interesting
point
emerging from Cooper and Schendel's (1976) study was
most
of
that
the traditional companies divided their resources and
invested Jn both the old and the
strategy which
was
competitive position
largely
in
the
new
technologies.
unsuccessful
in
It
is
this divided
producing a strong
new technology.
Utterback and Kim (1986) contend that discontinuities
technologies frequently occur.
In
in
order to be a significant threat an
invading technology must obviously be potentially superior along at
least
one performance dimension even though
inferior to
in
its
measurement without reference
of
new, or
of the
its
will
often
to
traditional
improving the cost/performance criterion.
innovations invading stable businesses,
in
-
terms of an earlier model
evolutionary technological change (Utterback and Abernathy,
1975)
by postulating four different patterns of discontinuous
The hypothesised patterns are based on the varying degree
change.
to
is
It
unique dimensions
Utterback and Kim discuss the process of radical innovation
of
start
emphasize the differences
will
performance between the old and the new along
dimensions
start off being
unique characteristics are crucial.
established companies
here that the
in
The invader
the established technology.
a small market where
may
it
which production process and/or market linkages are disrupted by
These same patterns of change have been
Tushman and Anderson who describe them in terms of
a particular innovation.
reinforced by
whether they are competence-destroying or competence-enhancing
for the
industry participants
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986,
Following a discontinuity these authors
uncertainty and
munificence
increase.
Each
below, and
we
be placed
Product
in
(ability
of Utterback's
will
and Kim's patterns
Process
in
will
both
be described
Discontinuitie.c^
when new
firms entering the
business introduce a product with very different properties
one that
replicate the
initially
will
this typology.
from the existing ones.
existing
predict that industry
support growth)
discuss where the emergence of fiber optics can
This pattern of discontinuity occurs
existing
to
p.439).
The new product
traditional
new product
is
so unrelated to the
firms cannot use existing
new process
since a
is
processes
required.
to
Although
crude and expensive, the new product's higher performance
at least
one dimension enable
it
to
enter niche markets.
As the
dominant design (Abernathy, 1978) for the new product emerges, it
introduces both major product and process changes compared to the
product which
existing
being changed incrementally
is
improve
to
productivity.
An example
of
product-process discontinuity
vacuum tubes by
is
the displacement of
Although crude when
transistors.
first
introduced
by Bell Labs (who did not manufacture vacuum tubes) they had
potential
advantages
after their discovery
with
transistors
of size
and energy
led
the
to
significantly
efficiency.
emergence
of thin
Major changes
film
improved temperature
A
and bandwidth characteristics.
effect
field
noise
stability,
similar story could be told of the
emergence of electronic calculators, introduced in 1962 by
companies such as Sumlock and Sharp, who were not manufacturers
of
Rapid progress produced
electromechanical calculators.
cheap machines which completely displaced
their
reliable,
electromechanical
competitors.
In
both of these areas the pattern of technological change
by an industry outsider and product and process change
initiated
from the "specific" state of the traditional product
shifted
"fluid"
was
state of the
new product (Abernathy and
to
the
Utterback, 1980).
In
these examples Tushman and Anderson would term the creation of a
new product
class or a substitute for an existing product as being a
competence destroying product discontinuity. Such a discontinuity
will favor new entrants who possess the knowledge and skills that
established producers do not have.
Product
A product
Di?;continiiitiP5^
when a new
discontinuity occurs
participant introduces a
industry
higher performance product which
basically similar to the existing
is
one, but which exploits changing
Because the new and
market opportunities.
or existing
old products are not
widely dissimilar established firms can
use their existing process
know how
The
to
replicate the
process innovations
occurring
in
is
new
product.
rate of
change
in
therefore expected to be less than those
the product.
Rapid price reduction
of the
new product
increases
and the
A
price/performance
its
latter
is
ratio
above the
far
eventually displaced.
classic example of product discontinuity
model T by the model A automobile
invested heavily
in
plant
is
the substitution of the
and equipment
automobile
Ford met
GM
technology enabled
in
1923
in
this
new
offering
to
mass produce
to introduce
of
its
Ford used
A.
its
is
its
operations,
retooling to introduce the
experience as a car manufacturer
emergence
the
T
an enclosed
1927 by closing
in
Another example
existing production knowledge.
discontinuity
the model
million units.
higher performance at a higher price.
competition
making 60,000 workers redundant and
model
Ford
at Ford in the late 1920's.
and between 1908 and 1927 produced over ten
Changes
product
existing
of
use much
to
a product
of
integrated circuits which
replaced
a product containing a large number of discrete transistors.
Experience gained
in
the production of transistors could be
transferred to the production
Tushman and Anderson
integrated
of
circuits.
(1986) would term these events competence
enhancing product discontinuities, and because existing production
"know-how"
may be
Process
is
transferable to the
essentially the
process
stiff
in
same product
when an
established firms
response
to
cost competition.
material shortages,
basic oxygen process
in
continuous casting
steel
mill
in
government regulations
Non-assembled products such as
Examples are the displacement
of
company produces
new or improved
established
but by a radically
chemicals or steel often exhibit
primary
product,
Discontinuities
This pattern of change occurs
or
new
an advantageous position.
in
steel
of the
open hearth furnace by the
making and the introduction
which
is
of
presently displacing the
Such examples of process
competence destroying by Tushman and
the steel industry.
substitution would be termed
this
glass,
pattern.
Anderson and they would expect outsiders
albiet
industry,
market share,
not necessarily the dominant firms
be most
will
likely
(Utterback and Nolet, 1989).
essentially remains
(1980)
terms
in
new
While the product
state,
"fluid"
in
the
in
of
process discontinuities
in
these examples
the "specific" state the process
in
from "specific" to a
initiate
to
We
to enter the industry.
hypothesize, quite to the the contrary, that existing firms
moved
is
Abernathy and Utterback's
terms.
Process
Product
discontinuities
This change results from a radical process innovation which,
although
it
produces the same physical product, completely changes
the products' strategic market position
example
of
such events
the on-site
is
and new uses emerge. An
production of liquid oxygen
which replaced bulk delivery and opened up new markets by removing
existing
entry barriers to other business segments.
say whether Tushman and Anderson would term
change competence destroying
or
It
this
difficult
is
to
pattern of
competence enhancing.
It
could be
either.
The Sample
We
will
of
Firms
be Studied
to
be concerned here only with the manufacturers
communications grade
optical
whose major market
fibers
has been telecommunication systems.
industry prior to analysis
is
to
follow
take_each_ participant and look at
development
ratio,
level
of
its
of
One method
Porter's
of
to
(1985) approach and
market share, research and
integration,
customers and other
important factors and produce a series of "strategic groups".
emergence
of fiber optics could then
changing mobility within the groups.
date
segmenting the
be discussed as a factor
Because we wish
The
in
to
concentrate on managing the emergence of optical fibers as a
technological discontinuity which "forms" groups,
segment the participants
into
five
groups
of
we have chosen
different
historical
to
perspectives according to the background of the
respect to telecommunications.
Outsiders
1.
for
-
These groups
Companies
not involved
company
with
are:
in
telecommunications
example Corning, Dupont.
2.
Telecommunication Companies
3.
Copper cable manufacturers
example AT&T, GTE.
for
for
example Mohawk Wire
and Cable, Times Wire and Cable, Simplex Wire and Cable,
General Cable Corp, Belden.
Traditional
4.
illumination
fiber
American Optical Corp,
New
5.
Two companies
one from each
extremely important roles
for
example
Galileo.
example SpecTran, Fibronics, Valtec.
start-ups for
-
manufacturers
in
the
of the first
two groups
-
have played
emergence and subsequent
commercialization of optical fibers world wide.
Corning Glass
Works and AT&T are the subjects of the first two case studies of
technological change (in McCormack, 1987). One company from each
of the other three groups were chosen for further discussion and the
emergence of optical fibers at Times Wire and Cable, Galileo and
SpecTran form three
In
terms
fibers
of
case studies
(in
McCormack, 1987).
a typology of technological discontinuities, optical
would be described by both Utterback and Kim and by Tushman
and Anderson as a
radical
The closest category
that
further
of
in
change which
the Utterback
is
competence destroying.
and Kim framework would be
product-process discontinuity, because the product was
introduced by an industry outsider. Corning, and existing processes
for the
manufacture
of
copper conductors could not be used
production of silica based fibers.
for the
The Discontinuity
Optical Fibers:
Figure
1
Performance
The
of Coaxial
fiber
first
and Fiber Optic Systems
systems were expensive and
performance was
their
system as shown
less than the best available coaxial
in
Figure
1.
This figure represents information on a series of optical fiber
communications systems taken from the
literature
and trade press
Major product and process changes have stimulated the
emergence of a dominant product in the form of doped silica fibers.
The competence destroying nature of the discontinuity lowered entry
barriers and allowed new firms such as Corning, Galileo and
SpecTran to enter previously impenetrable telecommunications
of the time.
markets.
There
is
little
doubt that copper cable manufacturers perceived a
strong
product-process discontinuity with the emergence of optical
fibers.
Some, such as Simplex Wire and Cable and General Cable,
used
their
others, like
cabling expertise to cable bought-in optical fiber while
Times Fiber Communications and Mohawk Wire and
Cable, attempted to manufacture optical fibers but failed.
case
of
1987)
was
Times Fiber Communications, (described
was
it
In
the
McCormack,
competence destroying
discontinuity
company's senior management, and their
acquire the technology by merging with an existing
highly visible to the
strategy
was
fiber optics
large
clear that this
in
to
company.
Although Times Fiber Communications spent
amounts on research and development, they were unable
emerge as
reasons
strong contenders
in
the fiber optic market for the
and development, an
and "specific" copper industry
of lack of focus in research
incompatibility
in
the
"fluid"
fiber
cultures and late development of the market for optical cable
television
systems.
to
10
Although the telecommunications market was new
optical
be considered a direct outgrowth
fibers could
begun by
Hide
the 1940's (as noted
in
Corning,
to
vapor phase deposition
series of incremental
of silica optical
changes
of the
McCormack, 1987).
in
was a major step
fibers
in
a
To a large
Corning Glass Works.
at
work
The
competence destroying
discontinuity, and in terms of the Utterback and Kim framework,
The fact
Corning best fits the product-discontinuity description.
that vapor-phase technology could be transferred from earlier work
extent, Corning did not perceive a major
at
Corning Glass Works means that the discontinuity could be
described as competence-enhancing.
observation that Corning holds
silica
glass optical fibers.
This fact
of the
all
To lessen the impact
embraced
its
tried
of this
and tested strategy
partners and starting joint ventures.
has an important
At
AT&T,
play
role to
in
major patents
to
for
research and development
low loss fiber
despondency.
in
at Bell
the telecommunications
of obtaining
development
Clearly competitive
strategy
sown
in
long
1960, and competence
of the truly
massive scale
of
Labs, Coming's announcement of
1970 caused excitement
No-one thought
the
the progression from copper wires
in
Because
optical fiber systems.
in
market discontinuity. Corning
the seeds of optical communications had been
enhancing changes can be seen
doped
be
to
mastering technological changes.
before the introduction of the laser
to
borne out by the
The discontinuity was seen
market since Corning was an outsider
market.
is
at
AT&T
but certainly not
an outsider could usurp the
that
technological lead of the monopolistic Bell Empire.
In
order to climb
the "vapor phase technology curve", Bell Labs transferred knowledge
from
its
work
in
semiconductor fabrication
fiber optic fabrication
processes.
Chemical Vapor Deposition was the
enhancing discoveries.
itself
to
its
The emergence
result of
research into
of Modified
a series
of
competence
Although the production of the glass fiber
could be considered more of a discontinuity than events which
occurred at Corning, the product, communications fiber was not,
because the waveguide transmission properties of the resultant
fibers were largely understood by Bell Labs as a result of previous
11
theoretical work.
Therefore, although a discontinuity did occur, the
technical strength of
AT&T smoothed
over any shock
system
to the
and AT&T, with some help from the Federal Communications
Commission, emerged a strong contender
in
communication
optical
systems.
At Galileo, which
was an
established producer of medium-high loss
Ray Tube face
plates, the discontinuity appears to have occurred more in its
market instead of in its technology. It licensed compound glass
technologies for fiber fabrication, and was also producing fibers by
vapor phase deposition techniques (Porter, 1983). The move to
telecommunications applications should have been complete when
glass optical fibers for illumination and Cathode
and Cable business
Galileo acquired the Wire
Corporation of America
September
in
of the
of 1977.
Revere
At this point, Galileo
could produce fiber (by several different techniques), fiber cable,
sources, detectors and auxiliary equipment.
suggest that Galileo,
regard
too-thin" with
to
even though they had
avenues
in
all
all
fronts,
Little
At a time of rapid
who
players
information
phase technology used by Galite
to
is
intended
new
fabrication
In
technologies and
fibers or
any event,
Wire.
When
Galite,
Pirelli,
Their
the fiber manufacturing part of Galileo,
three employees from Galileo
new focus was
manufacture
clear.
of fibers.
competence-destroying
because
it
left
its
this
new markets was
never pursued by Galileo and they sold the fiber optics
Pirelli
to
available on the vapor
produce optical
position with respect to the Corning patents.
of
many
staff
aspects of optical communications needed
considerable resources.
combination
to
because
effort,
research and development
technological developments on
keep ahead
tempting
is
research and development
fifty
work were being investigated.
of
It
Times Fiber Communications, was "spread-
like
activity to
was
sold to
and started SpecTran.
They would concentrate on the
SpecTran's existence was based on the
nature
of
the
fiber
optics
transition,
allowed SpecTran to enter a telecommunications market
12
which had been the sole preserve
The entry
equipment producers.
of "metal"
and
barriers being erected by Corning
Bell
Labs were
maintained when SpecTran licensed both Corning and Bell labs
technology
manufacturing processes (SpecTran, 1986).
for their
SpecTran's unique strategic move was
to
become a
specialty
supplier of fiber producing a range of fibers which transmit from
the ultra violet to the infra red.
with this strategy (sales
SpecTran appeared
to
be doing
(SpecTran, 1984)) although to concentrate on a niche market
considered
A
to
well
1983 were $1.7m; 1984 were $6.4m
is
be a weak strategy (Abernathy and Clark, 1985,
p. 3).
"Richer" Model nf Discontinuitip.g
By looking
fiber
in
at the five
detail
manufacturers
case studies
of potential
optical
was demonstrated above that each
did not perceive the same type of
of
it
industry participants
these
Using the Utterback and Kim typologies. Corning, the
discontinuity.
industry outsider
went through what was primarily a "product
Although novel, the process technology could be
discontinuity."
considered as an outgrowth of previous work.
Its
uniquely strong
A combination
patent position supports this proposition.
of strong
research and development, patents, careful marketing and planning
enabled Corning
to
produce a highly successful innovation
in
fiber
optics.
AT&T
perceived more of a "process discontinuity" with the
emergence
of fiber optics
conversant with
because, although
vapor phase technology
hand the product, doped
discontinuity
optical
because
fibers
transmission.
Bell
and had
Labs was
semiconductor
for
made before
was conceived. On the other
manufacture, significant advances needed
modified chemical vapor deposition
Bell
to
silica fiber optics,
be
was
less of a
Labs already produced compound glass
significant expertise
in
waveguide
13
Because Galileo was not
when
it
entered
it
In
the telecommunications business and
compound glass manufacturing
doped silica optical fibers was seen as
concentrated
techniques, the emergence of
in
a product-process discontinuity with the market, rather than the
product, being more unfamiliar than the process technology.
The only company to suffer a major product-process discontinuity
was Times Wire and Cable who were unfamiliar with optical
waveguides and had no expertise at all in their method of
manufacture.
acquire the
Although the company made a determined effort
new technology, they were confronted by a slowly
developing market
fiber
for
research and development
"cultures"
and a
lack of
optics
effort,
cable television, diluted
in
incompatibility of fiber
perseverance
SpecTran entered the business as a
top
in
recent slowing
long
haul
by limiting
down
itself
result of the discontinuity
to
it
call
and
a "weak
a niche market. With the
of optical fiber sales
telecommunications
and copper
management.
developed what Abernathy and Utterback (1980) would
strategic position"
to
in
risks
clearly
the primary market of
direct
competition
from the two larger volume, lower cost producers.
Figure 2
Positions of Significant Events
in
the Development of Optical Fibers
Conclusions
The conclusion
of the
company defending
above discussion
itself
is
that the
against an attacker's
model
of a
new technology
is
too
the levels of product and
There are clearly gradations
process discontinuities perceived by different industry participants.
Figure 2 shows an attempt to place the four companies into a
simplistic.
in
product/process discontinuity matrix.
Figure 2
is
that with
hindsight
it
is
The obvious
result
shown
clear that the firms on the
in
14
lower
product/process "efficiency frontier"
have stronger
will
technological positions than those farther out.
As a
comment on
final
dates of entry
into
the models
fiber optics the significant
the "fiber optics discontinuity" are also given on
Although the sample
Figure 2.
and
small
is
it
does seem
logical that,
given the emergence of a discontinuity, events which surround the
companies who perceive the smaller
first.
They
be
will
"first
companies seeing a
Given
movers").
into
together with the
predicted
extremely
this
fiber optics,
to
("second
shift
it
in
could be
emerging industry would occur
A
process which
radical
enter totally
new markets
will
is
a process-product discontinuity.
-
Fiber optics
in
the efficient frontier.
enable the product,
later
documented
novel fabrication techniques,
expected that the next event
further out on
occur
larger discontinuity will
this,
research emphasis
discontinuities should occur
Events associated with
movers".
is
a non-assembled product which has emerged
rapidly with the
processing technology.
Utterback can be used
introduction
of
vapor phase
The lifecycle-based model
to explain
of
Abernathy and
the evolution of the fiber optics
industry and the implications of the
management
of the
model are applicable
the
to
fiber optic technology.
The model's prescriptive character is consistent with the strategic
moves a company makes in order to improve its competitive
Technology and company strategy are
advantage.
interlinked not just
during industry evolution, they are tightly bound during
technological
discontinuities
as
well.
Technological discontinuities are discussed
in
the
terms of two participants, an attacker and defender.
here that
in
participants
the case of fiber optics,
perceive the discontinuity
literature
We
in
have seen
several different industry
in
different
ways.
Within
the discontinuity, the timing of the entrance of different players can
be predicted based on the size of the discontinuity they perceive.
15
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16
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17
REFEFENCES
Abernathy, William
(1978),
J.
The
Productivity
Dilemma
Baltimore:
.
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Abernathy, William
and Kim.
J.
B. Clark (1985), "Innovation:
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the Winds of Creative Destruction"
Abernathy, William
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in
.
Mapping
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and James M. Utterback (1980), "Patterns
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Horizons
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Foster, Richard N. (1986),
New
Jersey:
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to
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Summit Books.
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The Free
Cases
in
Competitive Strategy
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New
York:
Press.
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New
York: Free Press.
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P.
Anderson (1986), "Technological
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18
Utterback,
James M. and
Model
Utterback,
of
William
J.
James M. and James W. Brown
Future:
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Omeoa
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(1972), "Profiles of the
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James M. and
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Nolet (1989), "Product and Process
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Date Due
JUL 20
1991
SEP XO
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