New Trends in Mexican
Immigration:
Brett Boor, Olivia Burzynska-Hernandez, and
Jennifer Windell
IGIS WP 03
December 2012
Institute for Global and International Studies
1957 E Street NW, Suite 501
The Elliott School of International Affairs
The George Washington University
Washington, DC 20052
www.gwu.edu/~igis
ABSTRACT
Migration from Mexico is central to U.S. immigration policy and illegal migration from
Mexico has received an increasing amount of attention in domestic policy rhetoric over the
last several years. However, over the past decade, the once massive flow of immigrants from
the south has come to a standstill and may even be reversing, with increasing numbers of
Mexicans leaving the United States to return home. This policy brief analyzes this new trend
in Mexican immigration, its causes, how it impacts the United States, and what policies the
U.S. government should enact in response.
__________________________
Brett Boor is a recent graduate of the Elliott School of International Affairs with a Master’s
of Arts in International Affairs with a focus on International Economics. He is from Detroit,
Michigan, and has moved to Chicago to further pursue economic research. Olivia BurzynskaHernandez is a recent graduate from the Elliott School of International Affairs. She focused
her academic studies on conflict & conflict resolution and hopes to pursue a career in
international human rights issues in the Washington D.C. area and internationally. Jennifer
Windell, a native of El Paso, Texas, is current graduate student at the Elliott School working
on a thesis project comparing xenophobia in eastern and western Germany. She will
graduate in May 2013 with a Master’s of Arts degree in International Affairs, focusing on
Europe and Eurasia.
The authors would like to thank Dr. Inder Sud, the Elliott School of International Affairs, and
the Institute for International and Global Studies for their continuous support and
mentorship throughout both their graduate studies and the writing process. This piece
would not have been possible without their guidance and dedication.
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Migration from Mexico is central to U.S. immigration policy, as these immigrants work in critical
sectors of the economy, make up almost one third of the foreign-born population, and are the
primary source of illegal immigration. Furthermore, as the United States continues to suffer
from economic recession, Mexican immigration has received an increasing amount of attention
in domestic policy rhetoric. However, over the past decade, the massive flow of immigrants
from the south has begun to slow. This year, experts report that net migration between Mexico
and the United States has come to a standstill and may even be negative. This slowdown is a
result of both decreasing inflows of immigrants and the return home of immigrants previously in
the country, many of whom were in the country illegally.
This policy brief analyzes this new trend in Mexican immigration, its causes, how it impacts the
United States, and how the United States should respond. The analysis begins by examining the
causes of the immigration reversal through social, policy, and economic lenses. The paper finds
that all three factors have played an important role in reducing immigration to the U.S. On the
social side, decreased birth rates and improved education in Mexico have caused remaining in
Mexico to be more attractive, as young Mexicans can now find better jobs at home and with less
competition. In addition to these improvements at home, fighting between drug cartels on the
border has made passage to the United States far more dangerous.
From a policy perspective, increased border patrols and tougher U.S. laws are a clear driver of
the downward trend. Many of the illegal immigrants who have left the United States have “selfdeported”, meaning that they have chosen to leave because they fear prosecution. Finally,
economics also has a role to play as an improved economy in Mexico and a suffering economy in
the United States have drastically altered the incentives behind immigration. It is clear that all of
these factors have entered the cost-benefit analysis of potential immigrants, and may continue
to alter the immigration picture in coming years.
Having determined the causes of the reduction, this paper next attempts to analyze the impact
of Mexican immigration to see what this new trend means for the United States. The general
finding is that Mexican immigration is at worst neutral and at best highly beneficial. Especially in
economic terms, where the policy debate centers, there is no concrete evidence that
immigration hurts U.S. workers. In fact, given assimilation effects, immigration arbitrage and
increased total factor productivity a net benefit is highly likely.
Finally, the paper provides policy prescriptions for how the United States should react to this
new trend Mexican immigration. Given the finding that Mexican immigration is either neutral or
positive, the foremost policy prescription is to reduce spending on border protections and the
criminalization of illegal immigration. Second, the U.S. should improve its visa system to allow
necessary workers, especially seasonal immigrants, to enter the United States legally. Finally,
the U.S. should try to reap the benefits of assimilation and the DREAMers and allow social and
political aspects of immigration to enter more fully into the policy debate.
2
INTRODUCTION
The flow of migration between the United States and Mexico is the largest in the world. In the
United States today, Mexican immigrants make up 30% of the total foreign-born population and
58% of the total illegal immigrant population. 1 As a result, migration from Mexico is the main
focus of the immigration debate in the United States and the primary target of U.S. immigration
policy. The flow of migration between the two countries is also of huge importance to Mexico.
One in ten Mexicans currently resides in the United States 2 and remittances from the United
States make up as much as 15% of the GDP in some Mexican states. 3
Though migration between Mexico and the United States dates back to the late 1800s, the size
of this flow was relatively limited until the 1970s. 4 Prior to World War II, Mexican migration to
the United States consisted primarily of limited seasonal agricultural migration. However, as the
United States entered World War II, agricultural laborers became scarce and the United States
and Mexico created a bilateral guest worker program, known as the Bracero program, which
brought Mexican workers to the United States to fill U.S. labor shortages. Though the Bracero
program itself was only temporary, ending in 1964, it transformed the U.S. agricultural market
and Mexican labor market, making them much more migration oriented. The end of the Bracero
program coincided with high fertility levels, a period of agricultural privatization, and weak
economic performance in Mexico, which led to huge agricultural dislocation and
unemployment, pushing Mexicans to migrate in search of jobs. At the same time, the Unites
States ended the Bracero program, limiting the number of legal migration pathways for Mexican
laborers, even though low-skilled employment opportunities in the United States were
expanding. As a result of these push-pull factors and limited options for legal immigration, the
migration flow between the United States and Mexico over the last half-century has been
characterized by large-scale illegal immigration. 5
Data from the Migration Policy Institute shows that starting in the 1970s, the number of
Mexican born immigrants
residing in the Unites States
increased rapidly, doubling
each decade until the 2000s
(See Figure 1). 6 In the last
decade, however, this trend
has slowed considerably and,
according to a recent report
by the Pew Hispanic Center,
net migration between Mexico
and the United States has
come to a standstill and may
even be negative. The total
Mexican born population in
the United States peaked in 2007 at 12.6 million, stabilized through 2008 and 2009, and then
began to drop in 2010. The most recent data (2011) shows that there are now around 12 million
Mexican immigrants living in the United States. 7
To understand this drop in net migration, both inflows and outflows to the United States must
be examined. While in 2000, around 770,000 Mexican immigrants came to the United States, in
3
2009 only around 150,000 immigrated and fewer still in 2010. 8 At the same time that migration
to the United States has been dropping, return migration to Mexico has been picking up.
Between 1995 and 2000, around 670,000 Mexican immigrants returned home from the United
States, while between 2005 and 2010, 1.4 million did so. As a result, the return flow of
immigrants to Mexico has exceeded the inflow to the United States over the last few years,
making net migration negative. The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that most migrants returning
to Mexico (between 65% and 95%) did so voluntarily, as opposed to being deported. 9
The drop of Mexican born individuals living in the United States has also represented the overall
reduction in unauthorized immigrants. At the peak of the migration flow, of the 12.6 million
Mexican born immigrants in the United States, 51% - around 7 million - were unauthorized.
Since this peak of 7 million unauthorized Mexican immigrants in 2007, the number has shrunk to
6.1 million today, whereas legal migration has increased slightly, from 5.6 to 5.8 million between
2007 and 2011. 10 In the United States, 58% of all unauthorized immigrants are from Mexico,
making the change to this particular migration flow of the utmost importance for U.S.
immigration policy.
The following policy brief attempts to analyze this new trend in Mexican immigration. First, the
brief will explain the reduction through social, policy, and economic lenses. Next, the brief will
analyze the impacts of immigration on the United States to determine if Mexican immigration is
positive, negative, or neutral. Once this net impact is determined, the paper provides policy
prescriptions to advise the United States on how it should respond to these new trends in
immigration.
CAUSES OF REDUCED IMMIGRATION: SOCIAL
While many scholars and policy makers point to the economic recession and increased U.S.
security measures at the border to explain the changing trends in Mexico-U.S. immigration,
there are also important changes taking place in Mexico which have played a role in reducing
the flow if immigration to the United States.
The high fertility rate and resulting
rapid population growth in Mexico in
the 1960s was an important push
factor which helped to initiate largescale migration to the United States. At
the time, each woman on average was
giving birth to 7 children (See Figure 2).
Figure 2 shows that since that time,
however, the birthrate in Mexico has
been in constant decline and today
women only have just over 2 children
each on average. 11 As a result, the
Mexican population has slowed its growth and has aged - whereas in the 1960s the median age
was 18, today it is 26. 12 This means that there are far fewer people entering the workforce and
far more leaving it each year than in previous decades and, as a result, the labor market in
Mexico is, and will continue to be, less crowded. 13 Thus a major push factor which once drove
young Mexican workers to seek employment abroad no longer has the same force, and more
4
Mexicans are able to find opportunities at home, reducing the flow of immigration to the United
States.
Not only are there more available positions and fewer people to compete for them, but young
Mexicans are better qualified to fill those positions as education in Mexico has improved in the
last few decades. Figure 3 shows that since the 1970s, school enrollment has steadily improved
on the primary, secondary, and
tertiary education levels,
increasing especially since the
1990s. 14 Today, essentially all
children participate in primary
education and almost 90% enroll
in secondary schools. On
average, Mexicans are staying in
school longer, averaging 8.6
years of education in 2010, up
from 7.3 years in 2000. Literacy
rates have also improved from
83% of the population over the
age of 15 in 1980 to 92.4% in 2010. 15 Several Mexican states, such as Jalisco and Chiapas, have
also seen the number of bachelor’s and professional degree holders double over the last
decade. 16 These improved levels of education make well-paying jobs in Mexico more attainable
and the low-skilled jobs available in the United States less attractive to young Mexicans entering
the work force.
In contrast to improved educational and employment opportunities in Mexico leading many to
choose to stay, the increased danger and cost of crossing the border dissuade others from
leaving. In recent years, violent drug cartels in Mexico have strengthened and posed a
formidable threat to the domestic security of the country. Along with their efforts at securing
drug trafficking routes to the United States, these cartels have also begun to take over the
business of smuggling immigrants across the border. 17 The Miami Herald reports that the
powerful Los Zetas cartel controls most of the human trafficking trade along the border,
charging immigrants anywhere from $7,000 to $10,000 to take them into the United States.
Whereas coyotes used to take small groups of around 20 immigrants across the border, these
cartels have much more sophisticated means, carrying hundreds of immigrants at once in the
sweltering heat in the backs of semi-trucks, bribing checkpoint officials along the way. In several
cases, authorities have found mass graves of immigrants who were killed by the cartels before
making it to the border. Immigrants or coyotes that try to operate outside of the system are
intimidated, kidnapped for ransom, or killed. 18
The major impact of the social changes described above has been to alter the push-pull factors
and cost-benefit calculations which previously drove many of Mexico’s citizens to leave their
homes in search of a better life in the United States. Mexicans think more positively now about
the situation in Mexico and are concerned about the difficulty of immigrating, leading many to
choose to stay put. The next sections detail how immigration policies in the United States,
especially those regarding border control, and economic changes in the United States and
Mexico have also impacted the flow of migration between the two countries.
5
CAUSES OF REDUCED IMMIGRATION: POLICY
The 21st century has seen a large increase of immigration border security in the United States. In
many instances Mexican immigration has become linked not only with illegal border crossing,
but also with illegal drugs and weapons entering into the United States. Since 2000, the federal
government’s immigration policy has largely revolved around securing the United
States/Mexican border through increased border patrol personnel, increased drug and weapons
seizures, implementing worksite enforcement initiatives, and criminalizing immigrants without a
visa. Subsequently, the migration flow between the United States and Mexico has been largely
affected, discouraging Mexicans from crossing the border and encouraging Mexican-born
individuals living within the United States to return to Mexico. Although the last four years has
seen a policy shift from exclusion to inclusion, many of the aforementioned policies remain
established within the United States’ system. The following sections provide a synopsis of the
United States’ immigration policies and initiatives in the last decade.
The Southwest Border Initiative
The Southwest Border Initiative became one of President Obama’s largest programs under his
comprehensive immigration policy in 2009. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is
responsible for implementing the Initiative, the main priority of which is to eliminate the flow of
Mexican drug and weapon violence into the United States. Due to the Southwest Border
Initiative, Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s (ICE) Border Enforcement Security Task Force
(BEST) has increased personnel from 90 to 190, tripled the number of intelligence analysts
working on the border, and increased ICE Attaché personnel in Mexican border communities
that have high levels of violence due to the drug trade, among other initiatives. 19
Increased personnel for the Southwest Border Initiative are part of a larger effort by Obama’s
administration to increase border security. Under the Obama Administration, border patrol has
increased from roughly 10,000 agents in 2004 to 20,000 in 2010. Additionally, at least a quarter
of ICE personnel reside on the United States/Mexican border in various capacities. Technological
advancements have also allowed DHS to provide unmanned aerial surveillance cover between
California and Texas, which provides assistance to border patrol units on the ground. 20
Working in conjunction with the Mexican government, DHS has seized 75% more currency from
illegal trade, 31% more illegal drugs, and 64% more illegal weapons since 2009. The
apprehension of these illicit goods is largely attributed to the Southwest Border Initiative and
the increased personnel and vigilance on the border. Subsequently, evading border patrol has
become more difficult and more expensive. While this has not completely deterred individuals
from crossing the border, there has been a large reduction of Mexicans crossing the border
illegally in the last decade.
Regardless of the reduction, there continues to be more immigrants in the United States than
legal immigrant quotas and work visas available. 21 This had led to the federal government
enforcing work force criteria more vigilantly than in previous years. Now, business owners who
hire undocumented workers face severe penalties from the government. The responsibility of
work site enforcement has largely fallen under the responsibility of ICE, in conjunction with local
and state authorities.
6
Worksite-Enforcement Initiatives
In 2007, ICE began raiding large companies who hired undocumented workers. The high-profile
raids infiltrated manufacturing and meatpacking plants, arresting thousands of workers and
charging hundreds with identity theft. Since these large-scale raids, ICE has shifted attention not
to the undocumented workers, but to the businesses and company owners that hire foreignborn workers. 22 Currently, more focus is placed on penalizing companies and their owners by
imposing heavy fines, and in some cases seizing property and bank accounts. Often times ICE
uses undercover agents to target companies that exploit undocumented workers, ignore labor
standards, aide undocumented immigrants across the border, or help criminals and/or
fugitives. 23
The vigilance of ICE raids has prompted companies, both large and small, to look more carefully
at new employees’ documents and use criminal background checks to vet new hires. The overall
goal is to deter companies from hiring undocumented workers and to deter these individuals
from obtaining day jobs within the United States. In 2010 ICE initiated 2,746 work enforcement
investigations, arrested 196 individuals due to worksite-relations, and issued 237 final orders
(forcing companies to pay fines for violations). Overall, ICE removed 195,000 undocumented
criminals in 2010. 24 This is part of the larger effort by the government to remove undocumented
individuals from the United States. The Obama administration reports the apprehension of
illegal immigrants has reduced from 724,000 in 2008 to 463,000 in 2010, suggesting that there
are fewer individuals who are attempting to cross the border illegally. 25
State and Local Immigration Policy Efforts
ICE is not the only organization that has focused its efforts on reducing illegal immigration
through criminal apprehensions and worksite initiatives. Individual states and counties,
especially in the Southwest, have passed strict immigration initiatives in order to limit immigrant
movements and opportunities. Operation Streamline is a prime example of federal and state
financial funds criminalizing individuals without a visa. Currently, districts in Arizona, New
Mexico, and Texas have implemented Operation Streamline into their court systems in order to
reduce the number of undocumented workers in their counties. Between April 1, 2010-March
31, 2011 Operation Streamline criminally prosecuted 30,000 undocumented immigrants, a large
majority within the Tucson Sector. 26
Under H.R. 2017-Continuing Appropriations Act, Operation Streamline has continued to be
funded for FY 2012, citing success in decreased numbers of illegal immigrants crossing into the
United States during its operational use. Under Operation Streamline, people criminally
prosecuted may spend up to 6 months in prison, and those reentering the country may spend
up to 2 years in prison and be charged with a felony. Those with criminal records may spend up
to 20 years in prison. Furthermore, immigrants who are prosecuted are lawfully barred from
reentering the country for 10 years if not longer. 27
DHS has reported that Operation Streamline decreased apprehension rates in Yuma, Arizona by
70%, decreased apprehension rates in Del Rio, Texas by 70%, and decreased apprehension rates
in Laredo, Texas by 28%. While they cannot confidently contribute the implementation of
7
Operation Streamline as the sole cause of decreased apprehensions, DHS has stated that
Streamline has largely contributed to decreased apprehension, and immigrants have heard of
Operation Streamline by word of mouth, deterring them from crossing the border. However, a
study done by the Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity, and Diversity found that
most immigrants who are placed in the Streamline System are caught off guard when they are
criminally prosecuted and do not understand what is happening to them. In addition, as the
figure from the Warren Institute demonstrates, while petty immigration prosecutions have gone
up in the last decade, drug prosecutions have declined and alien smuggling prosecutions have
hit a plateau. 28 This calls into question how the federal government is allocating its resources for
border patrol purposes and how it spends its money within the judicial system.
Arizona has one of the strictest immigration policies in the United States. Due to drug-related
violence and anti-immigrant sentiment, Arizona passed SB 1070 in 2010, which requires police
to check the immigration status of individuals suspected of being in the United States illegally.
The federal government sued Arizona for this particular law, and the case went to the Supreme
Court. In July, 2012 the Supreme Court upheld the ability for Arizona police to check the status
of individuals who are suspected of being in the country illegally. However, the Justices did
strike down three major provisions, including forcing immigrants to carry their papers, making it
a criminal offense for immigrants to find work, and allowing police to arrest suspected
undocumented workers without a warrant. 29
CAUSES OF REDUCED IMMIGRATION: ECONOMIC
In addition to social and policy effects, there are important economic reasons behind the
reduction in Mexican immigration. In general terms, an April article from The Economist quotes
the macro-variables of the American recession, a Mexican economy that is picking up, and the
aforementioned slow in population growth in Mexico (i.e. a reduction at the margin of their
surplus labor). 30 The Wall Street Journal found that the most prominent factors in the recession
affecting immigrants were the loss in construction employment (with some firms decreasing by
70%) and the consolidation of American homes (extended families moving in together, having
less money for extras, etc.). 31 A related article from Michael Barone at Real Clear Politics
references data from the Pew Hispanic Center in attempting to understand the issue. Barone
quantifies the improvement in the Mexican economy quoting an increase in Mexican GDP
between 1980 and 2010 of 22 percent. 32 A May 2011 report from the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) argues that this growth rate, which averaged 2.5 percent for the
past three decades, would need to be at least 5 or 6 percent to cover new entrants into the
workforce. 33 However, even a small improvement at the margin in the Mexican economy in
conjunction with a falling birth rate and an ailing American economy is likely sufficient to cause
the observed reduction.
As discussed in this section, it is clear that the recent reduction in Mexican immigration to the
United States and the number of illegal Mexican immigrants already living in the United States is
brought about by a combination of social, policy, and economic factors. The next section will
analyze how Mexican immigration to the United States has impacted the United States and
what this new trend in the flow of migration means for the United States moving forward.
8
IMPACT OF REDUCED IMMIGRATION:
Thus far this paper has established that a variety of factors in both the United States and Mexico
are leading to a reduction in the flow of migration to the United States as well as an increase in
return migration to Mexico. This leads naturally to the question of what this new trend and its
causes mean for the United States. The following section will look at the impact that Mexican
immigration has had on the United States in the past and whether the recent reduction in the
migration flow should be seen as a positive, neutral, or negative development. Through this
investigation, this section aims to guide policy on the most optimal response to the present
reduction in immigration.
From even a first glance at the literature on immigration economics, the calculations of
immigration’s effects on the U.S. economy are extremely complex. This complexity arises
because of the impact immigration has on a multitude of economic variables, many of which can
affect Americans on different time horizons. The more popular variables in the policy rhetoric
will appear first in the analysis, namely: marginal and distributional wage effects, the fiscal
burden of immigrants, CPI effects, and the immigration surplus. Some of the more subtle and
complex variables that follow are total factor productivity, immigration arbitrage, and
assimilation gains.
The first set of variables, despite being comparatively simple, is still quite difficult to calculate.
These variables appear in the most common policy arguments, as many argue that immigration
lowers domestic wages and drains public services. In fiscal terms, according to a study published
by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the net impact of Mexican immigrants can be
calculated by summing the immigration surplus (the gain in productivity yields for U.S.
businesses) with the net fiscal transfer from immigrants (which, when negative, is referred to as
the “fiscal burden”). The fiscal impact of immigrants changes dramatically with skill level and
family size, as low-skill workers with large families use more government services and pay fewer
taxes. According to CFR after performing a national accounting equation, “The net economic
impact of immigration on the US economy appears to be modest”. 34 Despite this ambiguous
result for the net macroeconomic impact, policy makers should bear in mind that there are
distributional implications of immigration, namely the change in prices (CPI impact) and effects
on wages.
In distributional (wage effects) terms, the generic analysis states that low-skill American workers
will be forced to compete with immigrants. According to George Borjas, between 1980 and
2000, wages were down 3% nationwide due to immigration with a 9% loss for high school
dropouts (a simple proxy for low-skill labor). Although in many ways Borjas’ work is innovative
for his use of cross sections along skill sets rather than by geographic location, there may be
other forces causing even the distributional effect to be ambiguous. First, from the Institute for
the Study of Labor, even with low-skill immigration, the skill of the domestic labor force may be
increased through a relative increase in native skill. 35 The authors continue by stating that
empirically in all OECD countries, foreign participation in the workforce and workforce quality
are positively related, while immigration and inequality are negatively related. Second, Giovanni
Peri from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (FRBSF) shows evidence that immigrants
improve the overall productive capacity of the economy, thereby causing efficiency gains that
boost income per worker. 36 Finally, according to economists from UC Davis, there is no evidence
that immigration crowds out employment, especially as domestic workers and immigrants are
9
not perfect substitutes (and according to Patricia Cortes of MIT this will cause immigrants to
more heavily bear the burden of wage decreases). 37 In fact, the authors find that immigration
has a positive association with total factor productivity and may also promote the use of
“unskilled-efficient” technologies, which in the long run will improve the wages of low-skill
workers preventing more significant job and wage losses from technology change.
In summation, the analysis thus far reveals that both the macroeconomic equation and
distributional wage effects are necessarily ambiguous, and in some cases immigration may
improve earnings of domestic workers. In terms of CPI price effects, Patricia Cortes finds that
immigration reduces prices in immigrant intensive industries by 1.3% and in all others by .2%
with a 10% increase in labor. In the 1990s she found this led to a .65% increase in purchasing
power of high-skilled natives and a decrease of 2.66% in purchasing power of low-skilled
natives. 38 Given the tax differentials between these groups this may also balance out. The
Alliance for Excellent Education quotes the U.S. Department of Education with high school
dropout and high school diploma incomes averaging $19,540 and $27,380 respectively, with
Associate’s degree holders starting above $35,000. 39 According to 2012 generalized tax
brackets, on an individual basis, this would place low-skill workers on average in the 15%
bracket with average higher skilled
workers 25%. 40 Combining progressive
tax policy with the poor-oriented U.S.
progressive tariff-rate structure, policy
makers should have little difficulty
balancing out this CPI impact.
In addition to the CPI consideration,
there are two economic factors that,
despite being less tangible, are equally
important in policymaking: immigration
arbitrage and assimilation gains.
According to Joel Kotkin of Forbes,
immigration arbitrage (balancing out
labor demand and supply across
countries) is a vital process for rapidly aging developed nations. 41 Although a key component of
successful arbitrage is finding immigrants with adequate skills, Mexico is still expected to be a
critical source of the “right” immigrants. According to the PEW Center, immigration is a
fundamental component of the expected U.S. population jump to 438 million by 2050 (see
Figure 4), and many have estimated that this population growth is essential to ensuring future
growth. 42 Even putting aging aside, there is a form of arbitrage occurring in a number of
American sectors, especially manual labor and seasonal work, in which, there is a significant
shortage of labor without immigrants. The most alarming examples of these shortages have
occurred in the agricultural sector, with a number of stories coming out in the past year of
harvests rotting in the fields due to a lack of workers. A good representative case comes from
Yuba and Sutter county peach farms in California. According to Food World News, despite these
regions having unemployment rates between 15 and 18%, farmers lacked sufficient migrant
workers this season, and their offers to pay locals higher wages were to no avail. Some farmers
are now considering switching to higher technology harvesting methods and different crops, all
of which will likely result in higher costs for consumers. 43
10
Assimilation gains constitute the changes in second-generation immigrant families that produce
higher skilled workers. According to an economic impact paper on immigration from the Bush
administration, assimilation easily exhibits the benefits of gaining more permanent residents
and citizens, and also shows the complexity of comparing short run and long-term effects of
immigration. 44 Over several decades, these assimilation effects of current immigrants could
potentially match the needs of immigration arbitrage described by Kotkin. Also related to
assimilation effects are the potential benefits the U.S. could accrue by assimilating the
“dreamers”. The Development, Relief, and Education of Alien Minors (DREAM) Act is a
bipartisan bill first introduced in 2001 (recurring in 2011), that aims to provide “undocumented
youths who came to the United States before sixteen a path towards legalization…” According
to a UCLA study of these economic benefits, the 38% of eligible individuals (825,000) that will
likely apply for the benefits will generate $1.4 trillion over the next forty years in current
dollars. 45 Furthermore, if as the study proposes, the full 2.1 million of undocumented youths are
integrated into the process, the fiscal benefits could reach $3.6 trillion over the same period.
The benefits described are based upon the estimated educational attainment of the dreamers
as well as their estimated income (based on skill-level), which will translate into lifetime tax
contributions (which is in part the basis for the 40 year time horizon).
Having considered the multiple factors at work in the economic impacts of Mexican
immigration, it is evident that there are no totally conclusive results, and the evidence points to
effects that are at worst neutral and quite possibly extremely beneficial. Given this “positive
ambiguity”, it also becomes clear that the negative trend in Mexican immigration could actually
hurt the United States. This fact will lend itself to the policy prescriptions this paper provides.
However, the fact that demographic and social changes taking place in Mexico have had a large
impact on the flow of Mexican immigration to the United States means that in many ways,
control of this new trend in the migration flow is largely outside of U.S. purview. Long-term
falling birth rates in Mexico means that there are increasingly fewer Mexicans in the age range
of 15-39, when most people emigrate. As a result, the pool of potential immigrants is shrinking
and will continue to do so, making it unlikely that there will be a return to the large-scale
immigration seen in previous decades. 46
Additionally, while Mexico has certainly seen increased levels of educational attendance and
attainment, the system is still largely defunct and there is a great deal of room for improvement.
The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) reports that while
enrollment rates at the primary and secondary level have improved significantly and graduation
rates at the secondary level improved by 14% in the last decade, still 47% of all students at the
secondary level are not expected to graduate. 47 Additionally, though Mexico ranks second of all
OECD countries for the percent of public expenditure dedicated to education (23.3%), it ranks
last for total amount spent on education. 48 Thus we see that as small improvements in Mexican
education have led to a reduction in the flow of migration to the United States, it is likely that
continued improvements will reinforce and even strengthen the current trend of reduced or
even reversed Mexican immigration.
While economic stagnation in the United States and improved opportunities in Mexico have
contributed to the slowdown of Mexican migration the United States in general, the fact that we
are now seeing a reverse migration of primarily illegal immigrants suggests that factors which
most affect illegal immigration – such as anti-immigrant laws in some states, U.S. border control,
11
and the increased danger and cost of illegal immigration due to drug violence along the border –
have had a profound effect on the reduced flow of migration between the two countries.
However, as the issue of large scale immigration naturally abates, the issue of controlling the
border will become moot and the issue of how to deal with the millions of illegal immigrants
already in the United States, over half of which are from Mexico, will press more urgently. Thus,
the impact of Mexican immigration will center on whether the government decides to deport,
integrate, or ignore long-term resident illegal immigrants.
It is clear that the federal immigration policy lags behind the economic and social trends of
U.S/Mexican immigration. While both economic and social findings demonstrate large scale
immigration has abated in the last decade, current federal policies continue to maintain an
enhanced border security program, which drains federal funds and criminalizes individuals who
cross the border. Although the protection of our borders is extremely pertinent to the national
security interests of the country, immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries
peaked in 1977, while the budget for Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now known
as ICE, has steadily increased. 49 Some academics, including Douglas Massey, sociologist at
Princeton University, argue that increased restrictive or exclusionary policies has led to
continued anti-immigration sentiment, fueled by post 9/11 anti-terrorism security as well as
violence due to the illegal drug and weapons flow on the border. 50 Exclusionary or restrictive
immigration policies have led to increased border patrols and deterrence mechanisms,
subsequently maintaining anti-immigration sentiment due to the post-9/11 environment and
the highly publicized violence fueled by drug and weapon smuggling. Anti-immigration
sentiment therefore leads to more restrictive policies, creating an “enforcement loop.”
Source: Warren Institute 2012
Overall, border patrol and increased security has also not allowed traditional immigrant outflow
to occur. Immigrants who come into the United States are deterred from going back into
Mexico, creating a large population of immigrants who were raised in the United States.
Additionally, immigrants are also deterred from crossing into the United States from Mexico.
Those that do try to cross the border are forced to go through potentially extreme terrain that
has led to the deaths of hundreds of immigrants over the last decade. As border security
increases personnel and
surveillance, it has become much
harder for individuals to cross the
border alone. Instead of paying
small fees to coyotes, individuals are
now lured by criminal organizations
that charge exorbitant prices and
settle in the United States instead of
returning to Mexico. 51
Individuals who do cross the border
illegally now face criminal charges,
not only impacting how the
American public views Mexican
immigrants, but also diverting
attention and funds away from
larger security and judicial issues,
including drug and weapon smuggling. As previously discussed, Operation Streamline’s goal is to
12
prosecute as many undocumented immigrants as possible. The Department of Justice estimates
that the cost of incarcerating first time border crossers equates to $7 million-$10 million each
month. This does not include pre-trial detention costs, the cost of the program itself, or the cost
of the defense attorneys and those associated with the court system.
Opponents of Operations Streamline state that the program diverts judicial resources from
prosecuting cases that involve drugs, weapons, or explosives. As demonstrated by Figure 5,
since Operation Streamline has begun, immigration-based prosecutions have slowly become the
majority, while prosecution of weapons and narcotics has slumped in several districts in the
Border States. In 2008, Arizona’s prosecution of marijuana dropped 26%, violent offenses
dropped 17%, forging and counterfeiting dropped 63%, and theft decreased 28%. Opponents
say that while judges’ prosecutions have increased, the majority has been for petty immigration
border crossing, instead of prosecuting more dangerous offenses. 52
Federal policies do provide legal visas for Mexicans to live and work temporarily in the United
States, but as John Hancock, the former Chief of Agricultural Certification Unit at the
Department of Labor (DOL), stated before Congress in 1997, “the [visa] program is not currently
a reliable mechanism to meet labor needs in situations where domestic workers are not
available.” 53 In general, it is difficult and complicated to obtain not only temporary visas for
lower-skill jobs but also for higher-skill jobs in the United States.
Many immigrants from Mexico are eligible for obtaining H-2A or H-2B visas. H-2A applicants
include temporary agricultural jobs within the United States, while H-2B visas include temporary
non-agricultural workers. In both instances the United States employer must apply through U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services in order to sponsor an individual to work temporarily.
There is no annual cap for H-2A workers, although the application process and sponsorship is
arduous. While the visa cap for H-2B is 66,000, often times the quota is filled, leaving industries
like resorts, factories, and marine farms lacking legal means of finding foreign-born employees.
Currently within the United States, many undocumented immigrants are young adults who were
raised in the United States and have received a higher education, but are unable to find jobs
without obstacles. Although President Obama supports the DREAM Act, Congress has not
passed the law, which helps long-time residents of the United States to apply for legal
citizenship. However, in summer 2012 President Obama signed an executive order called
Deferred Action, allowing specific undocumented individuals to obtain a workers license to
legally work in the United States. In order to be eligible, a candidate must have come to the
United States before the age of 16, lived in the United States for a consecutive five years,
currently be enrolled in school or in military service / be a honorably discharged veteran, must
not have a criminal record, and must not be over the age of 30. 54
Deferred Action is a step forward in providing relief for thousands of individuals who consider
the United States their home. However, the immigration system currently criminalizes
individuals who cross the border, not only to the cost of the individual, but also to the cost of
the country. The cost of Operation Streamline is not justifiable given the decreased flow of
migrants from Mexico and the way migrants are treated during their time in the United States
judicial system. This particular federal policy diverts resources from more violent crimes that
occur on the border and adds to the anti-immigration sentiment that is particularly visible in the
Southwest United States. Focusing on revising temporary work visas and providing legal
13
opportunities for permanent citizens would allow federal policies to catch up to economic and
social immigration findings within the United States.
POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
The analysis above offers extremely valuable policy implications. There are three general
parameters that emerge from the previous analysis: the potential benefits of immigration; the
limited ability of the U.S. government to affect this migration flow; and the possible lack of an
effect despite perceived costs. Even though policy makers may have the ability to reduce selfimposed deportation and other strict border enforcement policies, the social and economic
changes in the United States and Mexico may dictate a considerable amount of immigration
dynamics. However, in as far as the government can make effective policy on the issue, the
impacts of immigration described above point out general guidelines for action.
First, there are policy implications for the potential economic benefits the country can accrue
from immigrants. These possible benefits are the described assimilation benefits, fiscal gains
from high-skill immigrants (as they pay more in taxes than the services they use), immigration
arbitrage in the future economy, and increased total factor productivity (which may even
improve low-skill wages). Given these benefits, policy ought to revolve around increasing the
number of job-based, high-skill immigrants, promoting the assimilation of “DREAMers”, and
improving seasonal workers’ access to jobs in the United States.
The convoluted process of obtaining H-2A and H-2B visas is an extremely large obstacle in
providing a legal means for Mexican immigrants to enter in the United States for seasonal work.
It is recommended that both temporary visas streamline their process in order to allow more
temporary workers to enter the United States legally. This would prevent the severity of
consequences for work-site enforcement laws and allow industries to hire foreign-born workers
legitimately and legally. Allowing a larger number of individuals access to visas would ideally
reduce immigrants crossing the harsh terrain between the United States and Mexico and
prevent needless deaths on the border.
Even turning to the neutral impact scenario, several policy prescriptions are clear. Most
prominently, if Mexican immigration is a wash, the United States should take clear steps to
reduce its expenses from border patrol and enforcement. New efforts aimed at criminalizing
and incarcerating individuals places a large burden on the judicial and prison systems around the
country. As federally funded entities, resources are currently diverted for criminalizing petty
actions instead of focusing on criminals who smuggle illegal drugs and weapons. Programs like
Operation Streamline severally drain resources into a system that does that not necessarily
deter individuals from crossing the border multiple times. If incarcerated, individuals live in
prison without any type of legal right, and cases of human rights issues arise as more and more
individuals remain in limbo in the United States prison system. The United States should take
steps to assist Mexico in their fight against drug cartels. This policy action would ensure the
safety and security of immigrants, as well as reduce any cross-border danger that often muddies
the waters of the immigration debate. In general, the government should make a greater effort
to analyze the social effects its immigration policy has.
14
Taking all of these policy recommendations into consideration would allow the United States to
respond to the new trend of decreasing Mexican immigration in a way that is both effective and
beneficial for the country. The current policy debate that has remained unchanged for so many
years needs to adapt to a new age, a new Mexico, and a new kind of immigration.
ENDNOTES
1
D’Vera Cohn, Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, and Jeffrey Passel, “Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero—and
Perhaps Less,” Pew Hispanic Center, April 23, 2012, accessed July 27, 2012,
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/23/net-migration-from-mexico-falls-to-zero-and-perhaps-less/, 67.
2
Cohn, Barrera, and Passel, “Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero,” 9.
3
Raymundo Campos-Vasquez and Horacio Sobarzo, “The Development and Fiscal Effects of Emigration on
Mexico,” Migration Policy Institute, April, 2012, accessed August 5, 2012,
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-fiscaleffects-emigration.pdf, 8.
4
William A. Kandel, et al., “Mexican Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends,” Congressional
Research Service (2012), accessed July 27, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42560.pdf, 4-5.
5
Ibid., 6-8.
6
Migration Policy Institute Data Hub, “United States: Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth,
by year,” accessed November 8, 2012,
http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/charts/MPIDataHub-Region-birth-1960.xlsx.
7
Cohn, Barrera, and Passel, “Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero,” 9, 11.
8
Ibid., 17.
9
Ibid., 22.
10
Ibid., 7.
11
“World Development Indicators Databank,” World Bank, accessed November 8, 2012,
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do.
12
Ann Garcia and Philip E. Wolgin, “What Changes in Mexico Mean for U.S. Immigration Policy,” Center for
American Progress, August 08, 2011, accessed July 27, 2012,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/mexico_immigration.html.
13
Michael Graybeal, “U.S.-Mexico Migration – Prospects for Reform,” Center for Strategic & International
Studies, January 5, 2012, accessed November 9, 2012,
http://csis.org/files/publication/120105_Graybeal_Mexico_HemFocus.pdf,1.
14
“World Development Indicators Databank.”
15
Cohn, Barrera, and Passel, “Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero,” 33.
15
16
Ben Lamport, “Mexico’s Improving Education and Declining Emigration,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs,
July 28, 2011, accessed November 6, 2012, http://www.coha.org/mexicos-improving-education-anddeclining-emigration/.
17
Graybeal, “U.S.-Mexico Migration,” 1.
18
Tim Johnson, “Violent Mexican Drug Gang, Zetas, Taking Control of Migrant Smuggling,” The Miami
Herald, August 12, 2011, accessed September 27, 2012,
http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/08/11/2355095/violent-mexican-drug-gang-taking.html.
19
Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary Napolitano Announces Major Southwest Border Security
Initiative,” March 24, 2009, accessed September 3, 2012,
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/03/24/napolitano-announces-major-southwest-border-securityinitiative.
20
The Obama Administration. “Building a 21st Century Immigration System,” May 2011, accessed
September 3, 2012,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_blueprint.pdf
21
Edward Alden, “Immigration and Border Control,” Cato Journal 32, no. 1 (2012): 107-124.
22
Scott W. Wright, “Worksite enforcement of US immigration law,” Employee Relations Law Journal 34,
no. 2 (2008): 66-102.
23
Wright, “Worksite enforcement of US immigration law.”
24
Ibid.
25
The Obama Administration, “Building a 21st Century Immigration System.”
26
American Civil Liberties Union, “Operation Streamline Fact Sheet,” National Immigration Forum, July 21,
2009, accessed September 3, 2012,
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/OperationStreamlineFactsheet.pdf.
27
Joanna Lydgate, “Assembly Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline,” The Chief Justice Earl
Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity, and Diversity, June 2010, accessed September 3, 2012,
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf.
28
Ibid.
29
Mark Sherman, “Supreme Court Issues Ruling on SB 1070,” Huffington Post, June 25, 2012, accessed
September 1, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/25/supreme-courtsb1070_n_1614121.html.
30
“Mexican Immigration: Low Tide,” The Economist, April 26, 2012, accessed September 15, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/04/mexican-immigration.
16
31
Conor Dougherty and Miriam Jordan, “Recession Hits Immigrants Hard: Survey Shows First Decline in
Foreign-Born U.S. Residents in Nearly 40 Years,” The Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2009, accessed
November 15, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125356996157829123.html.
32
Michael Barone, “Shrinking Problem: Illegal Immigration from Mexico,” Real Clear Politics, April 26,
2012, accessed September 15, 2012,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/04/26/shrinking_problem_illegal_immigration_from_mex
ico_113960.html.
33
Michael Graybeal, “Mexico’s Economic Policy and Migration: Dealing with the Causes,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, May 2011, accessed September 15, 2012,
http://csis.org/files/publication/110509_Graybeal_MexicoEconPolicy_Web.pdf.
34
Gordon H. Hanson, “The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration CSR No. 26,” Council on Foreign
Relations, April 2007, accessed September 15, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/immigration/economic-logicillegal-immigration/p12969.
35
Martin Kahanec and Klaus F. Zimmerman, “Migration, the Quality of the Labor Force, and Economic
Inequality,” Institute for the Study of Labor, June 2008, accessed September 15, 2012,
http://ftp.iza.org/dp3560.pdf.
36
Giovanni Peri, “The Effect of Immigrants on U.S. Employment and Productivity,” Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, August 30, 2010, accessed September 15, 2012,
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2010/el2010-26.html.
37
Patricia Cortes, “The Effect of Low-skilled Immigration on U.S. Prices: Evidence from CPI Data,” MIT,
January 2006, accessed September 15, 2012,
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/workshops/AppliedEcon/archive/pdf/CortesJan252006AEW.pdf.
38
Ibid.
39
“The High Cost of High School Dropouts: What the Nation Pays for Inadequate High Schools,” Alliance
for Excellent Education, November 2011, accessed September 15, 2012,
http://www.all4ed.org/files/HighCost.pdf.
40
“2012 Federal Income Tax Brackets,” Five Cent Nickel, January 26, 2012, accessed September 15, 2012,
http://www.fivecentnickel.com/2011/09/28/2012-federal-income-tax-brackets-irs-tax-rates/.
41
Joel Kotkin, “U.S. Desperately Needs Immigrants and a Strategy to Get the Right Ones,” Forbes, June 26,
2012, accessed September 15, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2012/06/26/u-sdesperately-needs-immigrants-and-a-strategy-to-get-the-right-ones/.
42
Carl Haub, “U.S. Population Could Reach 438 Million by 2050, and Immigration is Key,” Population
Reference Bureau, February 2008, accessed September 15, 2012,
http://www.prb.org/articles/2008/pewprojections.aspx.
43
“Shortage of Pickers Leave Peach Farms Rotting,” Food World News, July 31, 2012, accessed September
15, 2012, http://www.foodworldnews.com/articles/1909/20120731/shortage-fruit-pickers-peachimmigrant-workers-rot.html.
17
44
Edward P. Lazear, Donald B. Marron, “Immigration’s Economic Impact,” Council of Economic Advisors,
June 20, 2007, accessed September 15, 2012, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/cea/cea_immigration_062007.html.
45
Raul Hinojosa Ojeda, et. al., “No DREAMers Left Behind: The Economic Potential of DREAM Act
Beneficiaries,” UCLA, February 1, 2012, accessed September 15, 2012,
http://naid.ucla.edu/uploads/4/2/1/9/4219226/no_dreamers_left_behind.pdf.
46
D’Vera Cohn and Jeffrey Passel, “Why Wave of Mexican Immigration Stopped,” CNN News, April 26,
2012, accessed November 7, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/26/opinion/passel-cohn-mexicanimmigration/index.html.
47
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, “Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators,
Mexico Country Note 2012,” accessed November 7, 2012, http://www.oecd.org/edu/EAG2012%20%20Country%20note%20-%20Mexico.pdf, 1.
48
Ibid., 3.
49
Judith Warner, Battleground Immigration, Greenwood Press: 2009. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost),
accessed August 22, 2012.
50
Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren, “Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Policy: Explaining
the Post-1965 Surge From Latin America," Population and Development Review 38, no. 1 (2012).
51
Lydgate, “Assembly Line Justice.”
52
American Civil Liberties Union, “Operation Streamline Fact Sheet.”
53
Stuart Anderson, “America's Incoherent Immigration System,” Cato Journal 32, no. 1 (2012).
54
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Eligibility for Deferred Action,” accessed August 28, 2012,
http://www.dhs.gov/eligibility-deferred-action.
18
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19
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20
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21
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22