GAO
April 2013
United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Committees
EXPLOSIVE
ORDNANCE
DISPOSAL
DOD Needs Better
Resource Planning
and Joint Guidance to
Manage the Capability
GAO-13-385
April 2013
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
DOD Needs Better Resource Planning and Joint
Guidance to Manage the Capability
Highlights of GAO-13-385, a report to
congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study
What GAO Found
DOD has relied heavily on the critical
skills and capabilities of EOD forces to
counter the threat from improvised
explosive devices on battlefields in Iraq
and Afghanistan. The House Armed
Services Committee directed DOD to
submit a report on EOD force structure
planning and directed GAO to review
DOD’s force structure plan. DOD’s
report provided little detail. GAO
examined to what extent (1) DOD and
the services have addressed increased
demands for the EOD capability and
identified funding to meet future
requirements; and (2) DOD has
developed guidance for employing the
EOD capability effectively in joint
operations. GAO evaluated DOD’s
report and EOD guidance; analyzed
data on EOD missions, personnel, and
funding; and interviewed DOD and
service officials to gain perspectives
from EOD personnel and managers.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) forces grew over the past 10 years to meet
wartime and other needs, but the Department of Defense (DOD) does not have
the data needed to develop a funding strategy to support future EOD force plans.
To meet increased demands for EOD personnel, the services increased their
EOD forces from about 3,600 personnel in 2002 to about 6,200 in 2012.
Anticipating that the need for EOD will continue as forces withdraw from ongoing
operations, the services intend to maintain their larger size. The Navy and Air
Force have data on the baseline costs for some or all of their EOD activities, but
the Army and Marine Corps do not have complete data on spending for EOD
activities. Therefore, DOD does not have complete data on service spending on
EOD activities needed to determine the costs of its current EOD capability and to
provide a basis for future joint planning. Until all the services have complete
information on spending, service and DOD leadership will be unable to effectively
identify resource needs, weigh priorities, and assess budget trade-offs.
EOD Active Duty Personnel Growth by Military Services, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2017
What GAO Recommends
To better enable DOD to plan for
funding EOD mission requirements
and enhance future use of EOD forces
in joint combat operations, GAO
recommends that DOD direct (1) the
Secretaries of the Army and the Navy
to collect data on current Army and
Marine Corps EOD funding, and (2) the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
develop joint EOD doctrine that would
guide combatant commanders’
planning and clarify joint operational
roles and responsibilities. In oral
comments on a draft of this report,
DOD concurred with the
recommendations.
View GAO-13-385. For more information,
contact John Pendleton, 404-679-1816, or
PendletonJ@gao.gov
Figure Notes: Authorized personnel refers to the manning level the military services authorized for their EOD forces, as presented in
service manning data. The Army and Air Force data above do not include EOD officers authorized prior to 2005 and 2008, respectively.
EOD forces from all four services have worked together in Iraq and Afghanistan
and the services have developed guidance on tactics and procedures for EOD
forces, but challenges persist because DOD has not institutionalized joint EOD
doctrine through a joint publication. Joint doctrine facilitates planning for
operations and establishes a link between what must be accomplished and the
capabilities for doing so. DOD studies have noted commanders’ limited
awareness of EOD capabilities during combat operations, and EOD personnel
reported challenges they attributed to non-EOD forces’ lack of understanding of
EOD operations. Several DOD organizations have responsibilities for some EOD
functions, but no entity has been designated as the focal point for joint EOD
doctrine. Joint doctrine could help leaders identify EOD capability requirements
and better position combatant commanders in their use of EOD forces in future
operations. Joint doctrine that is developed and approved as authoritative
guidance would enhance the EOD forces’ ability to operate in an effective
manner, and would better position the services to identify capability gaps in
meeting service, joint, and interagency requirements; to invest in priority needs;
and to mitigate risks.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
1
Background
EOD Forces Grew to Meet Wartime and Other Demands, but DOD
Does Not Have Data Needed to Develop Funding Strategy to
Support Future EOD Force Plans
EOD Forces Have Worked Together in Joint Operations, but DOD
Has Not Developed Joint EOD Doctrine to Guide Effective
Employment of the Capability
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
3
14
18
19
20
Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
22
Appendix II
Themes from the Group Discussions
30
Appendix III
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
33
Table 1: Composition of EOD Discussion Groups
27
6
Table
Figures
Figure 1: EOD Personnel Supporting a Range of Events
Figure 2: Process for Becoming Certified as a Basic EOD
Technician
Figure 3: EOD Personnel Growth by Military Service, Fiscal Years
2002 through 2017
Figure 4: Example of Homemade Explosive Training Course and
Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected Vehicle
Page i
4
5
7
13
GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Abbreviations
DOD
EOD
IED
Department of Defense
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Improvised Explosive Devices
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
April 25, 2013
Congressional Committees
The Department of Defense (DOD) has relied heavily on the critical skills
and capabilities of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel from
each of the four military services to counter threats from improvised
explosive devices (IED), a significant cause of fatalities among U.S.
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. 1 EOD personnel have extensive training in
the detection, identification, on-site evaluation, making safe, recovery,
and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. EOD forces’
capabilities in countering the IED threat—including collecting and
evaluating captured explosive-related enemy materiel from the devices—
have made these forces integral to successful joint military operations.
However, the high demand for the EOD capability has resulted in
personnel experiencing numerous deployments. In addition to their
function in countering IEDs, EOD personnel are responsible for a wide
range of other missions, such as clearing unexploded ordnance from
training ranges; providing defense support to civil authorities; and
assisting the U.S. Secret Service and Department of State with the
protection of the President and other high-ranking government officials.
In House Report 112-78, which accompanied a House bill for the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, the House Armed
Services Committee directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report
on Explosive Ordnance Disposal force structure planning to the
congressional defense committees by March 1, 2012. 2 Further, the
committee directed GAO to review DOD’s force structure plan and to
report our findings to the congressional defense committees. 3 We
1
We have previously testified that IEDs accounted for almost 40 percent of the attacks on
coalition forces in Iraq during 2008. See Warfighter Support: Challenges Confronting
DOD's Ability to Coordinate and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices
Efforts, GAO-10-186T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2009). Also, we have previously
reported that approximately 16,500 IEDs were detonated or discovered being used
against U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2011. See Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices:
Multiple DOD Organizations Are Developing Numerous Initiatives, GAO-12-861R
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 1, 2012).
2
See H.R. Rep. No. 112-78, at 116 (2011).
3
See id. at 117.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
reviewed and evaluated the DOD report on EOD force structure directed
by the committee, and in July 2012 we briefed the House Armed Services
Committee staff on our observations of DOD’s force structure plan. We
found that DOD’s classified one-page EOD report provided limited detail
or context about the status of the department’s EOD force or plans for
future EOD capability requirements. Also, we found that DOD had not
established a new consolidated budget justification display that fully
identified the services’ baseline EOD budgets, as directed by the House
Armed Services Committee. 4
In order to provide additional information on the status of DOD’s EOD
forces and identify baseline EOD budgets, we gathered and analyzed
data on EOD forces’ support for joint operations and the services’ plans to
support future EOD requirements. We reviewed and analyzed prior DOD
reports on the EOD force, collected available data on personnel 5 and on
budgets, and interviewed cognizant officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the services. In addition, we conducted 28
group discussion sessions with EOD personnel to obtain their
perspectives on the EOD capability. Specifically, we examined the extent
to which (1) DOD and the services have addressed increased demands
for the EOD capability and identified funding to meet anticipated future
requirements; and (2) DOD has developed guidance for employing the
EOD capability effectively in joint operations.
To determine the extent to which DOD and the services have addressed
increased demands for the EOD capability, we collected and analyzed
data from each of the four services’ EOD forces, including data on the
organizational structure of EOD forces; on the size of EOD forces since
2002; and on projected manpower needs. Further, we interviewed key
DOD EOD officials across the department—including from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, each of the services, and various support
commands—to gain their perspectives on the operational tempo of EOD
forces; the use of joint EOD forces for recent EOD combat missions, and
the challenges EOD forces experienced; and expected future EOD
4
The committee directed DOD to establish a new consolidated budget justification display
that fully identifies the services’ baseline EOD budgets and encompasses all programs
and activities of the EOD force for the functions of procurement; operation and
maintenance; and research, development, testing, and evaluation. See id. at 116.
5
For the purposes of this report, we obtained data only for active duty EOD forces. These
forces comprise the majority of EOD personnel.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
mission requirements. To determine the extent to which DOD and the
services have identified funding to resource EOD forces to meet
anticipated future requirements, we collected and analyzed available
EOD funding data from each of the services for the past 3 fiscal years.
To determine the extent to which DOD has developed guidance for
employing the EOD capability effectively in joint operations, we reviewed
existing service, multi-service, and joint DOD regulations and doctrine;
reviewed and analyzed prior DOD reports’ findings about doctrine; and
determined whether associated recommendations had been
implemented. We interviewed key DOD EOD officials to ascertain the
extent to which DOD has comprehensive joint EOD guidance.
Additionally, we met with officials from selected EOD units in all four
military services and conducted group discussions with EOD-qualified
team members, team leaders, senior enlisted personnel, and officers to
obtain their perspectives on issues related to military service-specific
missions, joint combat operations, training, equipment, and operational
tempo. A more detailed description of our scope and methodology can be
found in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 through April 2013
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background
As depicted in figure 1 below, the services maintain highly trained EOD
personnel responsible for eliminating explosive hazards in support of a
range of events, from major combat operations and contingency
operations overseas to range clearance to protecting designated persons,
such as the President of the United States. The services’ EOD forces are
dispersed worldwide to meet combatant commanders’ requirements.
Units may be deployed together or organized into smaller teams, as
missions require. EOD technicians generally work in two- or three-person
teams to identify and disarm ordnance.
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Figure 1: EOD Personnel Supporting a Range of Events
Servicemembers volunteer 6 for the EOD force and attend joint basic EOD
training at the Naval School Explosive Ordnance Disposal at Eglin Air
Force Base in Florida. This 143-day course—staffed by Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps instructors—provides instruction in munitions
identification, render-safe procedures, explosives safety, and EOD-unique
equipment. Servicemembers who successfully complete training are
certified as Basic EOD Technicians and, afterward, join their EOD units.
This process is shown in figure 2 below. With additional training and
experience, a Basic EOD Technician can earn advanced certifications as
a Senior EOD Technician and a Master EOD Technician.
6
Enlisted personnel in the Army, Navy, and Air Force may volunteer for the EOD force
during basic training. In the Marine Corps, enlisted personnel must have achieved an
enlisted rank 4. Officer personnel in the Air Force and Army can volunteer to become
EOD-qualified but are part of the Civil Engineer and Logistics career fields, respectively. In
the Navy, officer personnel can join the EOD career field upon becoming a commissioned
officer. In the Marine Corps, enlisted personnel who are EOD-qualified can become
warrant or limited duty officers.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Figure 2: Process for Becoming Certified as a Basic EOD Technician
The EOD capability is generally viewed as an activity that–comparable
with logistics—supports combat forces, rather than as a combat activity.
EOD forces in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps are considered
support activities and are organizationally placed with other support
forces. Examples of where EOD forces are organizationally aligned
include the ordnance corps (Army), the engineer forces (Air Force and
Marine Corps), and aviation forces (Marine Corps). Previous DOD studies
have noted that this organizational alignment of EOD forces created
operational challenges in recent operations. For example, one study
noted that EOD forces, as support forces, were not perceived as available
in some phases of a battle. In contrast with the other services, the Navy
identifies its EOD force as a combat activity and it is organizationally
placed within the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. 7 According to
Navy officials, this better reflects the battlefield role of its EOD force and
provides advocacy at senior levels in the Navy.
Other organizations have responsibilities for EOD activities and policy.
Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict serves as the
Office of the Secretary of Defense proponent for EOD and is responsible
7
The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command mans, trains, and equips rapidly deployable
and agile expeditionary forces to support warfare commanders’ requirements for maritime
security operations around the globe.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of DOD
policy for EOD technology and training. The Joint Staff’s Force Protection
Division (J8 Directorate) oversees requirements from combatant
commands related to the department’s EOD capability. The Secretary of
the Navy is the DOD single manager for joint service EOD technology
and training. 8 The Navy is supported in this role by a joint EOD Program
Board made up of general or flag officers from each of the services who
function as their respective services’ focal points for EOD program
requirements. The Program Board establishes the joint EOD program and
approves the plan and budget. The Technical Training Acceptance Board,
under the Program Board, coordinates, approves, and standardizes all
EOD common-type individual training. 9 The Program Board also has a
role in prioritizing and recommending funding for research and
development of equipment based on joint EOD requirements.
EOD Forces Grew to
Meet Wartime and
Other Demands, but
DOD Does Not Have
Data Needed to
Develop Funding
Strategy to Support
Future EOD Force
Plans
To meet increased demands for EOD personnel, the services increased
the size of their EOD forces. Based on available data, we determined that
the services grew from about 3,600 personnel in 2002 to about 6,200 in
2012—an almost 72 percent increase. The services anticipate that even
as forces withdraw from recent operations the need for EOD forces will
continue, so they intend to maintain their larger size. However, the
respective services’ abilities to identify and track spending on EOD
activities vary, so DOD does not have complete information on EOD
spending. The House Armed Services Committee directed DOD to
establish a consolidated budget justification display fully identifying the
services’ baseline EOD budgets, but DOD has not done so. Without
complete EOD spending information, the services and DOD may have
difficulty in justifying the future EOD force structure, and in informing
future funding plans and trade-offs among competing priorities.
8
See Department of Defense Directive 5160.62, Single Manager Responsibility for
Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training (EODT&T), encl. 2, para.
3.a (June 3, 2011)(hereinafter cited as DODD 5160.62 (June 3, 2011)); see also Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 8027.6F, Naval Responsibilities for Explosive
Ordnance Disposal, encl. 12 (Dec. 7, 2012).
9
Common-type training is defined as training in EOD procedures required by two or more
military services in the normal execution of their assigned missions. See DODD 5160.62,
Glossary (June 3, 2011).
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Services Increased
Numbers of EOD
Personnel to Meet Demand
for the Capability
Over the past decade of military operations, the services all took actions
to increase their EOD capabilities. As figure 3 shows, the Army more than
doubled its EOD forces, with the largest increases occurring after fiscal
year 2006. The Marine Corps and the Navy increased their EOD forces
by approximately 77 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The Air Force
increased its EOD forces by approximately 36 percent. 10 The services
anticipate maintaining EOD personnel numbers at the 2012 level at least
through the next 5 years, as is also shown in figure 3, although final
decisions on EOD force size and structure will depend on future DOD
budgets. According to DOD EOD officials, the time required to train
qualified EOD personnel is lengthy; therefore, EOD is not a capability that
can be built up quickly.
Figure 3: EOD Personnel Growth by Military Service, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2017
Figure Notes: Authorized personnel refers to the manning level the military services authorized for
their EOD forces, as presented in service manning data. The Army and Air Force data above do not
10
The Army and Air Force calculations presented above do not reflect data on authorized
EOD officers prior to 2005 and 2008, respectively, because service officials could not
provide these data.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
include EOD officers authorized prior to 2005 and 2008, respectively, because service officials could
not provide those numbers.
Meeting the demands for EOD forces in combat operations has
negatively affected EOD units’ personnel and ability to train for other
missions. Each of the services met the combatant commanders’ high
demand for EOD personnel by deploying EOD units and assuming risks
as other EOD missions and training activities were left unfulfilled. For
example, according to service officials, the services assumed some risks
in some mission areas such as countering sea mines, clearing
unexploded ordnance on training ranges, and providing defense support
to civil authorities. EOD personnel who participated in our group
discussions said they experienced multiple deployments and limited time
at home, maintaining a pace that was exacerbated by time spent away
from home in training and in support of the U.S. Secret Service and
Department of State in the protection of important officials. 11 (Appendix II
summarizes, in greater detail, the operational and personnel issues
raised by EOD personnel who participated in group discussions we held.)
As the services begin turning their focus away from training for
deployments to Afghanistan to counter IEDs, officials from across the
services and DOD officials noted that the services will need to retain the
current EOD size so that they can expand training for their core missions
and prepare for future requirements. For example, according to Navy
officials, Navy EOD personnel will re-emphasize skills—such as diving—
that are needed for their core missions. EOD forces will also be assigned
to traditional missions to fill gaps in capabilities that came about when
EOD forces were deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. For example,
according to DOD officials, EOD personnel will be available to combatant
commanders for humanitarian demining, irregular warfare, and building
international partner capacity activities. Also, according to Army officials,
Army EOD forces will be available to respond more quickly to incidents
involving unexploded military ordnance found in local communities. In
addition, EOD forces will continue to provide support to the Very
Important Persons Protection Support Activity’s mission of ensuring the
safety of federal officials, such as the President, as they travel. In fiscal
11
The Very Important Persons Protection Support Activity provides EOD support to the
U.S. Secret Service and the Department of State for the protection of high ranking
government officials such as the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and foreign
heads of state visiting the United States. The services generally provide two-person EOD
teams to search venues for explosive ordnance, among other duties.
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year 2012, the services provided more than 473,000 hours of support to
this activity; as a presidential election year, 2012 required greater than
the annual average of about 300,000 hours provided from fiscal years
2007 through 2011.
DOD officials expect EOD capabilities to continue to be in demand by
combatant commanders for the foreseeable future. For example, officials
believe that the IED threat is likely to persist given its low cost and high
accessibility to non-state adversaries. In addition, based on the primary
missions highlighted in DOD’s current strategic guidance, 12 the services
anticipate continued requirements for EOD capabilities. For example,
EOD capabilities are expected to be needed for several missions
including, among others: (1) countering terrorism and irregular warfare;
(2) countering anti-access/area denial measures, including mining; (3)
countering weapons of mass destruction; and (4) providing support to civil
authorities. The mission of countering anti-access/area denial measures,
in particular, will require Navy EOD forces to train to counter anti-access
measures that use sea mines and to clear explosive obstacles in sea
lines of communication. Also, Air Force EOD forces will be expected to
train to support recovery operations to keep air bases and runways clear
of unexploded ordnance. All the services’ EOD forces will need to
continue to train for homeland missions of providing support to civil
authorities. In addition, EOD forces’ ability to conduct humanitarian
demining activities can support combatant commanders’ efforts to help
build relationships with other countries, according to DOD officials.
Lack of Full Visibility into
EOD Funding Complicates
Planning for Resources to
Meet Future Requirements
DOD does not have the consolidated information on service spending on
EOD activities needed to enable it to determine the amount of resources
currently being devoted to EOD capabilities and how the services are
planning to support joint EOD capability needs. The House Armed
Services Committee directed DOD to establish a consolidated budget
justification display that fully identifies the military services’ baseline EOD
budgets and encompasses all programs and activities of the EOD force
for specific functions. 13 Further, GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in
12
Department of Defense: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 Century
Defense. January 2012.
St
13
See H.R. Rep. No. 112-78, at 116 (2011).
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the Federal Government 14 state that managers need financial data to
determine whether they are meeting their accountability goals for effective
and efficient use of resources. However, DOD has not taken steps to
identify comprehensive financial data on EOD activities across the
services, nor has it responded to direction by the House Armed Services
Committee to establish a new consolidated budget justification display
that fully identifies the services’ baseline EOD budgets and encompasses
all programs and activities of the EOD force for the functions of
procurement; operation and maintenance; and research, development,
testing, and evaluation. According to an Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) official, the DOD budget is not constructed or
structured to report at the level of detail called for by the committee.
In the absence of a departmental budget justification for EOD activities,
we sought to compile DOD’s EOD spending but we were unable to collect
comprehensive and reliable data because the completeness of the
services’ EOD budget data varied. We requested funding data from all the
services for EOD activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2012. According
to the data the services provided, they received funding for EOD activities
from their regular funding accounts for military personnel, for
procurement, and for operation and maintenance. In addition, Congress
has provided overseas contingency operations appropriations to the
services for EOD activities. Further, the Joint IED Defeat Organization—
which is largely funded by overseas contingency operations
appropriations—paid for or provided some equipment, such as robots,
and training, such as courses on the design and construction of IEDs. 15
However, we found that the Army and Marine Corps had incomplete or
little available information but information from the Navy and Air Force
was more complete. Specifically, we found the following:
•
The Army, which has the largest EOD force, does not have full
visibility over EOD funding. Army officials collected some information
on funding at our request, but they could not be sure that the data
14
GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD 00-21.3.1
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
15
The mission of the Joint IED Defeat Organization is to lead, advocate, and coordinate
all DOD actions in support of the combatant commanders’ and their respective joint task
forces’ efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. A primary role for the
organization is to provide funding and assistance to rapidly develop, acquire, and field
counter-IED solutions.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
were complete and accurate. The Army regulation on EOD assigns
responsibility for monitoring funding for the Army EOD program to the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training (G-3/5/7). 16
Officials in that office, however, told us they do not have access to
complete funding information because funding for EOD activities is
spread across multiple programs, functions, or organizations. Officials
who oversee the EOD program told us they would like to have funding
data to assist in managing and prioritizing the Army’s EOD operations,
but they have no plans currently to collect it.
•
The Marine Corps EOD program officials could readily provide us with
procurement funding information, but not with comprehensive
information on funding that could have come from other funding
accounts, such as military personnel and operation and maintenance.
•
Officials in the office of the Navy EOD program resource sponsor
could provide funding information because the Navy has a dedicated
EOD program element code 17 and it tracks funding for the EOD
capability separately on a continuous basis to enable it to manage its
own capability.
•
Officials in the Air Force EOD program oversight organization could
provide funding information on operating, maintaining, and procuring
equipment and other items for the Air Force EOD force that it
compiles and uses to manage the Air Force EOD program. However,
it could not readily provide information on military personnel because,
according to officials, personnel are accounted for across more than
30 program elements. Starting in fiscal year 2013, the Air Force
began to use a dedicated EOD program element code to enable
better identification of current EOD spending and to provide
justification for the EOD capability in future budget requests.
The services anticipate maintaining their currently authorized EOD
personnel levels. 18 However, planning for the future EOD capability may
16
See Army Regulation 75-15, Policy for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (Feb. 22, 2005).
17
Program element codes are the building blocks of the defense programming and
budgeting system, and can be aggregated to display total resources assigned to specific
programs, or specific military services, or in other ways, for analytical purposes.
18
In this report, we use the term “authorized” to refer to manning levels for the EOD
mission, as identified by the services.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
be hampered by DOD’s lack of visibility into the current costs of EOD
capabilities across the services. According to officials from each service,
overseas contingency operations funding has been used to provide
equipment and training to EOD forces for the past several years, such as
that shown in figure 4 below. In the future these costs will have to be
funded from regular appropriations, and to compete with other service
priorities. 19 For example, the services received EOD robots and mine
resistant ambush-protected vehicles from overseas contingency
operations funding. Should EOD units need to continue to use the
equipment in the future or to acquire similar such equipment, maintaining
and procuring it may have to be funded through regular appropriations.
Overseas contingency operations funding also provided advanced
homemade explosive, forensic, and medical training opportunities that
EOD technicians in our discussion groups thought were valuable to their
missions and their safety.
19
We have previously reported that the Army and the Marine Corps quickly acquired and
fielded equipment to meet evolving threats. The equipment was initially supported with
overseas contingency operations funding rather than through the Army’s and Marine
Corps’ regular budgets and was not listed on unit authorization documents (modified
tables of organization and equipment for the Army and tables of equipment for the Marine
Corps). See Force Structure: Army and Marine Corps Efforts to Review Nonstandard
Equipment for Future Usefulness, GAO-12-532R (Washington, D.C.: May, 2012).
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Figure 4: Example of Homemade Explosive Training Course and Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected Vehicle
Service officials expressed concerns to us about the adequacy of future
funding for their EOD forces after overseas contingency operations
funding is phased out, but the extent to which the services have
identifiable funding plans for future EOD activities varied. The Navy and
Air Force now have program element codes that enable service officials
to identify and evaluate the appropriate level of spending on their EOD
capabilities. However, the Army’s and Marine Corps’ lack of complete
data on the costs of their current EOD forces negatively affects their
efforts to develop viable funding plans for supporting their EOD capability
into the future. Until the services have information on current spending as
well as justification for their future funding needs, service and DOD
leadership will be unable to effectively identify resource needs, weigh
priorities, and assess budget trade-offs within anticipated declining
resources. Moreover, the lack of visibility into current spending and future
funding plans may impede DOD’s ability to provide Congress with
information needed to facilitate its oversight.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOD Forces Have
Worked Together in
Joint Operations, but
DOD Has Not
Developed Joint EOD
Doctrine to Guide
Effective Employment
of the Capability
EOD forces have operated jointly in Iraq and Afghanistan to fulfill
battlefield requirements, and the services have jointly developed
guidance on tactics, techniques, and procedures for EOD forces, 20 but
DOD has not fully institutionalized the guidance through joint EOD
doctrine in the form of a Joint Publication. According to DOD, the purpose
of joint doctrine is to enhance the operational effectiveness of U.S. joint
forces. 21 It is written for those such as the services, among other
recipients, who prepare and train forces for carrying out joint operations.
Joint doctrine facilitates planning for and execution of operations, and it
establishes a link between what must be accomplished and the
capabilities for doing so by providing information on how joint forces can
achieve military strategic and operational objectives in support of national
strategic objectives. According to service EOD officials, joint doctrine also
provides standardized terminology. EOD personnel and officials told us,
however, that they had encountered repeated challenges—such as a lack
of planning for EOD capabilities as well as variations among the services’
procedures—during joint combat operations. A key reason for the
services’ challenges is the absence of a consistent understanding of EOD
operations, including expectations for how forces should plan operations
and work together. The services are disadvantaged with respect to EOD
capabilities, knowledge, and use because DOD has not developed joint
doctrine in the form of a Joint Publication.
20
See Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance
Disposal, ATTP 4-32.16(FM 4-30.16) /MCRP 3-17.2C/ NTTP 3-02.5/ AFTTP 3-2.32 (Sept.
2011).
21
See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02C, Joint Doctrine
Development System, encl. A, para. 1.c (Jan. 13, 2012).
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
The Services Use Common
EOD Operational
Guidance, but Challenges
Persist in Operating Jointly
In 2001, DOD’s Air Land Sea Application Center 22 published multiservice guidance outlining a set of EOD tactics, techniques, and
procedures for employing EOD forces jointly in a range of military
operations. 23 The guidance, which was updated in 2005 and 2011,
applies to leaders, planners, and EOD personnel and provides
information that can help them understand each military service’s
capabilities. The multi-service guidance, as updated, has been in place
for more than a decade, but challenges in joint EOD combat operations
have continued, as prior DOD studies on EOD capabilities have reported.
One study described EOD forces’ efforts to work jointly as being
“somewhat ad hoc” and noted that culture, technique, and language
differences among the military services caused challenges in working
together. 24 Another study reported on some combat unit commanders’
limited awareness of EOD capabilities during overseas combat
operations. 25 For example, in some instances Army combat unit
commanders did not understand the differences between the capabilities
of EOD personnel who are trained to safely disarm ordnance and the
capabilities of Army combat engineers, some of whom have limited
training on disposing of select unexploded ordnance. As a result, some
combat engineers, who are not trained to safely disarm ordnance,
destroyed ordnance caches, resulting in improper handling of some of the
ordnance caches and creating a more dangerous site containing debris
as well as potentially unexploded ordnance.
EOD personnel we spoke with reported experiencing similar challenges
during recent deployments in support of joint combat operations, and as
the observations recorded below indicate, they attributed these
22
The Air Land Sea Application Center is a multi-service organization established by the
services’ doctrine centers to develop tactical-level solutions to multi-service interoperability
issues consistent with joint and service doctrine.
23
This guidance describes each military service’s EOD organizations, capabilities,
equipment, doctrine, and training and provides joint EOD command and control options,
as well as information for planning and conducting EOD operations in a joint environment.
This guidance was updated in 2005 and 2011 to reflect EOD’s evolving role in military
operations.
24
Department of Defense, Final Report of Assessment for Joint Explosive Ordnance
Disposal. (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006).
25
Squires & Fulcher, LLC. Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Force Transformation
Analysis. A report prepared for the Department of Defense. May 30, 2007.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
challenges to a lack of understanding of EOD operations on the part of
non-EOD forces. EOD personnel indicated the following:
•
•
•
Commanders of combat units did not always take into account
differences among the military services’ EOD forces. For
example, Marine Corps EOD personnel commented that their EOD
standard operating procedures include conducting dismounted
patrols, while at one time the Army’s EOD personnel were not allowed
to dismount from vehicles to conduct EOD operations. These Marine
Corps personnel stated that Marine Corps commanders were unsure
how to work with Army EOD forces supporting Marine units. Similarly,
Air Force personnel said they were not trained to dismount to search
for explosives, as Marine Corps commanders expected them to be.
Non-EOD personnel in combat units did not always understand
EOD protocols or capabilities. For example, Army EOD personnel
cited an instance in which a non-EOD officer at a forward operating
base picked up post-blast fragments of an improvised explosive
device at a blast site, thus disturbing the site and contaminating
potential forensic evidence. Other examples include commanders not
securing sites where unexploded improvised explosive devices were
found, and non-EOD personnel tampering with unexploded devices in
an attempt to deactivate them before EOD personnel arrived.
Requests for EOD support did not always take into account
differences in how the various services’ EOD forces are
organized. For example, an Army EOD Company contains
approximately 40 people, while a Navy EOD Mobile Platoon has 8
people. According to Navy EOD personnel, battlefield commanders
they supported sometimes received a smaller EOD force than was
needed and expected, or conversely, sometimes received a larger
force, which would require more logistical support than planned.
We found that pertinent Navy and Air Force regulations only briefly
mention joint EOD operations, and they refer to the multi-service
guidance as a source for more detailed information. However, the Army’s
and Marine Corps’ regulations do not discuss joint EOD operations in
detail or refer to the multi-service guidance. A DOD study assessing the
joint EOD capability reported that this multi-service guidance was not
widely used by combatant commands. 26 In addition, according to DOD
officials, this multi-service guidance is not as authoritative to the services
26
Department of Defense, Final Report of Assessment for Joint Explosive Ordnance
Disposal. (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006).
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
and combatant commands as a Joint Publication, and is generally not
used by the services to develop force requirements.
DOD Does Not Have Joint
Doctrine in the Form of a
Joint Publication to
Provide Authoritative
Doctrinal Guidance for
Joint EOD Operations
Prior DOD studies have highlighted the need for joint doctrine on EOD
operations and noted that current guidance is insufficient, but the Joint
Staff has not published joint doctrine for EOD operations. We found that
several DOD doctrinal joint publications refer to EOD activities, but most
references are limited, recognizing the need for EOD but not providing
additional guidance as to how such capabilities should apply to
operations. EOD is briefly mentioned or discussed in greater detail in 30
unclassified or for official use only doctrinal joint publications. For
example, the role of EOD is briefly mentioned in joint doctrine about
operations such as antiterrorism, foreign humanitarian assistance, and
evacuating noncombatants. The EOD role is more fully discussed in joint
doctrine about countering the improvised explosive device threat, joint
engineer operations, and addressing obstacles—such as unexploded
ordnance and sea mines—that could be encountered by joint forces in a
range of military operations. According to a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff manual on joint doctrine development, part of the development
philosophy for joint doctrine is that it continues to evolve as the United
States Armed Forces adapt to meet national security challenges. 27
However, none of these joint publications addresses the full range of
EOD capabilities and potential activities. As previous assessments of
DOD’s joint EOD capabilities have reported, the lack of joint EOD-specific
doctrine limits EOD forces’ and planners’ ability to identify and mitigate
capability gaps.
According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual, joint
doctrine projects must be formally sponsored by a service chief, a
combatant commander, or a director of a Joint Staff directorate. 28 A key
reason why joint EOD doctrine has not been developed is that no entity
has been made accountable for following through on recommendations
and sponsoring EOD doctrine, to include stakeholder coordination, for
development of joint guidance. Although several organizations have
responsibilities for some EOD functions, no one entity has been
27
See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 5120.01, Joint Doctrine Development
Process, encl. B, para. 2 (Jan. 13, 2012).
28
Id. para. 5.a.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
designated as the focal point on joint doctrine or operational issues. For
example, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict, as the Office of the Secretary of Defense
proponent for EOD, is charged with developing, coordinating, and
overseeing the implementation of DOD policy for EOD technology and
training, but that official is not involved with oversight of joint doctrine or
operational issues. Similarly, the joint EOD Program Board, chaired by a
flag officer designated by the Secretary of the Navy and comprising
general officer representation from the other services, is generally
focused on joint common EOD technology and training issues. One DOD
EOD study, which according to a Joint Staff official was initiated by a
former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended among
other things that the Joint Staff sponsor the development of joint EOD
doctrine. However, during DOD’s review process that recommendation
was sent back to the Joint Staff for reconsideration, where, according to a
Joint Staff official, the matter was dropped and never presented to senior
leaders.
Having joint guidance, such as joint doctrine, could put combatant
commanders in a better position to make decisions about using EOD
forces in future operations. In addition, joint EOD doctrine could provide a
basis for planning and identifying capability requirements for future
operations. Having joint doctrine that is developed and approved by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as authoritative guidance would
enhance DOD’s EOD forces’ ability to operate in an effective manner and
better position the military services to identify capability gaps in meeting
service, joint, and interagency requirements; to invest in priority needs;
and to mitigate risks.
Conclusions
As IEDs became a significant threat to U.S. forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan, EOD emerged as a critical capability, and over the past
decade, the services increased the size of their EOD forces. Growing the
EOD capability takes time because of the highly technical training
required and the additional experience needed to become proficient in
handling dangerous unexploded ordnance. Looking toward the future,
DOD and the services believe that broad demand for this capability will
continue. Growth of the EOD forces until now has been funded in part by
overseas contingency operations dollars, but these funds are likely to
decrease as operations in Afghanistan diminish. A major challenge facing
the EOD community, especially the Army and Marine Corps, is the lack of
complete information to clearly show the resources it will take to sustain
their larger force levels. Further, DOD does not have good visibility into
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
service spending on EOD forces. Without comprehensive information on
the costs of the services’ EOD forces, senior service and DOD leaders
are not well positioned to justify the current EOD force structure or to
ensure that funding goes to priorities in accordance with strategic
guidance. In addition, the absence of comprehensive information limits
DOD’s ability to respond to congressional requests for budget information
and may continue to hamper Congress’ oversight of the health and
viability of the EOD force.
Although EOD forces from each of the services have deployed together to
support recent ground operations, attention to EOD as a joint capability
has been limited. Differences among the services’ procedures complicate
joint force planning and operations, and there is little common
understanding of the EOD capability outside of the EOD force. The lack of
understanding of EOD capabilities among those battlefield commanders
has caused them challenges in providing the right capabilities to
maximize the effectiveness of operations to protect U.S. forces and to
collect information to defeat the networks of insurgents using IEDs
against U.S. forces. A number of publications refer to EOD and its
capabilities for specific functions, but none provides clear and complete
guidance for integrating the activities of EOD forces with other combat
activities and maximizing the capabilities that EOD forces provide. In
addition, no entity has followed through on previous recommendations to
sponsor and advocate for developing joint EOD doctrine. With joint
doctrine that specifies the role of EOD in joint operations and provides a
consistent lexicon for joint planning, EOD participation in joint operations
could be more efficient and effective. In addition, with joint doctrine
regarding future requirements for the joint EOD capability, the services
will have more complete information to inform their force structure
planning and provide adequately trained and experienced forces to meet
future requirements.
Recommendations for
Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two
actions:
•
•
To improve the Army’s and Marine Corps’ ability to ensure adequate
support of their EOD forces within expected budgets, direct the
Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to collect data on costs
associated with supporting their current EOD forces.
To enhance the future employment of EOD forces in joint combat
operations, direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
joint EOD doctrine that would guide combatant commanders’ planning
and clarify joint operational roles and responsibilities.
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Defense for
comment. An official from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict provided oral comments
on the draft indicating that DOD concurred with our report and both of our
recommendations.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the
Director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization.
This report will also be available at no charge on our website at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me on (404) 679-1816 or PendletonJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix III.
John H. Pendleton
Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
List of Committees
The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable James Inhofe
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Dick Durbin
Chairman
The Honorable Thad Cochran
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
Chairman
The Honorable Adam Smith
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable C.W. “Bill” Young
Chairman
The Honorable Pete Visclosky
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The scope of our review on Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) forces
included the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the
military services, including select EOD units from each service, and other
DOD organizations that utilized or impacted EOD forces.
We obtained relevant documentation and interviewed key officials from
the following offices:
•
•
•
•
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict;
The Joint Staff
•
J34 – Deputy Directorate for Antiterrorism/Homeland Defense;
•
J5 – Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate; and
•
J8 – Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate;
Department of the Army
•
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations, Plans, and
Training) EOD & Render Safe Procedures Branch;
•
U.S. Army Ordnance Corps Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Directorate, Fort Lee, Virginia;
•
20th Support Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland;
•
52nd Ordnance Group (EOD), Fort Campbell, Kentucky;
•
49th EOD Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky;
•
723rd EOD Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and
•
788th EOD Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky;
Department of the Navy
Navy
•
•
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Expeditionary Combat
Requirements Branch;
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, Joint Expeditionary Base
Little Creek-Fort Story, Virginia;
•
EOD Group One, Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California;
•
EOD Mobile Unit One, Naval Base Point Loma, California,
•
EOD Mobile Unit Three, Naval Amphibious Base
Coronado, California,
•
EOD Mobile Unit Eleven, Imperial Beach, California,
•
EOD Training and Evaluation Unit One, Naval Base Point
Loma, California,
•
EOD Expeditionary Support Unit One, Naval Amphibious
Base Coronado, California, and
•
Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit One, Naval Amphibious
Base Coronado, California;
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
•
•
Executive Manager of EOD Technology and Training, Washington,
D.C.
•
Naval EOD Technology Division, Naval Support Facility Indian
Head, Maryland;
•
Naval School EOD, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida;
Center for EOD and Diving, Naval Support Activity Panama City,
Florida;
Marine Corps
EOD Occupational Field Sponsor, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps;
•
1st EOD Company, Camp Pendleton, California;
•
3rd EOD Company, Okinawa, Japan; and
•
EOD Personnel Supporting the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine
Corps Air Station Miramar, California;
Department of the Air Force
•
EOD Program Directorate;
•
Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency, Tyndall Air Force Base,
Florida;
•
96th Civil Engineering Squadron EOD Flight, Eglin Air Force
Base, Florida;
Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization,
Arlington, Virginia; and
U.S. Northern Command Joint Force Headquarters, National Capitol
Region, Joint EOD – Very Important Persons Protection Support
Activity, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
•
•
•
•
To determine the extent to which DOD and the services addressed
increased demands for the EOD capability, we collected and analyzed
data and descriptions from each of the four services’ EOD forces on their
traditional military service EOD missions, including the total number of
hours dedicated to support the Very Important Persons Protection
Support Activity. After receiving the data showing the total number of
hours dedicated to support this activity, we reviewed the data and
interviewed the U.S. Northern Command official who provided them to
assess the data’s reliability. Based on these actions, we determined that
these data were sufficiently reliable to include the amount of hours of
support EOD personnel provided to this activity. We also requested data
on the organizational structure of EOD forces from each of the services;
operational tempo of EOD units and the authorized numbers of EOD
officers and enlisted personnel within each service from fiscal year 2002
through fiscal year 2012; as well as projected manpower needs through
fiscal year 2017. After receiving the authorized EOD personnel data, as
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
identified by the services, we interviewed service officials who had
provided it and other subject matter experts to assess the reliability of the
data. Based on our review of the personnel data provided and our
interviews, we determined that the personnel data were sufficiently
reliable to describe growth in numbers of EOD personnel. Additionally, we
interviewed key cognizant DOD officials with responsibility for EOD
activities across the department—including from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, each of the military services, selected support
commands, and units—to gain their perspectives on the operational
tempo of EOD forces, use of joint EOD forces for recent EOD combat
missions and challenges, and expected future EOD mission
requirements.
To determine the extent to which DOD and the services have identified
funding to resource EOD forces to meet anticipated future requirements,
we collected and analyzed available EOD funding data from each of the
services for fiscal years 2010 through 2012. We requested that the
services provide EOD funding data from the base and overseas
contingency operations budgets for specific funding accounts, including
military personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; and
research, development, test, and evaluation. Also, we requested that the
services identify funding, if any, received from the Joint IED Defeat
Organization, or other sources. The comprehensiveness of the data
provided by each of the military services varied. After receiving the
funding data, we interviewed service officials who had provided them to
assess the reliability of the data. Based on our review of the funding data
provided and our interviews, we determined that the funding data were
incomplete, potentially inaccurate, and not sufficiently reliable to establish
a baseline level of DOD’s EOD spending.
To determine the extent to which DOD has developed guidance for
employing the EOD capability effectively in joint operations, we
systematically analyzed 75 unclassified and for official use only
documents of existing joint DOD doctrine (Joint Publications) to identify
the inclusion of EOD functions. One GAO analyst conducted this analysis,
coding the information and entering it into a separate record, and another
GAO analyst verified the information for accuracy. All disagreements
were resolved by a third GAO analyst. The analysts then tallied the total
number of joint DOD doctrinal documents in which EOD functions were
included. In addition, we reviewed and analyzed prior DOD reports’
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
findings about doctrine and examined whether associated
recommendations had been implemented. Specifically, we reviewed an
EOD report from the Joint Staff 1 and an EOD report analyzing
transforming the joint EOD force. 2 We also reviewed guidance on EOD
activities from the services, including multi-service tactics, techniques,
and procedures guidance. Additionally, we interviewed key EOD officials
across DOD to ascertain the extent to which DOD has comprehensive
joint EOD guidance and, if so, any potential benefits joint guidance has
provided. Moreover, we discussed with DOD and service officials how
EOD has been integrated jointly across DOD in areas such as joint
operations and the joint training and equipping of EOD forces.
Finally, we met with EOD leadership and personnel from selected EOD
units in all four military services and conducted 28 group discussions with
EOD-qualified team members, team leaders, senior enlisted personnel,
and officers to obtain their perspectives on issues related to military
service-specific EOD missions, joint combat operations, training,
equipment, and operational tempo. We used these data to provide
illustrative examples throughout this report. A detailed discussion of how
we conducted those group discussions follows, and more details of the
themes from the group discussions can be found in appendix II. The
group discussions included EOD-qualified personnel from the following
military units:
U.S. Army
52nd Ordnance Group (EOD), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
•
•
•
49th EOD Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky;
723rd EOD Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and
788th EOD Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
U.S. Navy
EOD Group One, Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California
1
Department of Defense, Final Report of Assessment for Joint Explosive Ordnance
Disposal. (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006).
2
Squires & Fulcher, LLC. Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Force Transformation
Analysis. A report prepared for the Department of Defense. May 30, 2007.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
•
•
•
EOD Mobile Unit One, Naval Base Point Loma, California;
EOD Mobile Unit Three, Naval Amphibious Base Coronado,
California; and
EOD Mobile Unit Eleven, Imperial Beach, California.
U.S. Marine Corps
•
•
•
1st EOD Company, Camp Pendleton, California;
3rd EOD Company, Okinawa, Japan; and
EOD Personnel Supporting the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine
Corps Air Station Miramar, California.
U.S. Air Force
•
96th EOD Flight Civil Engineering Squadron EOD Flight, Eglin Air
Force Base, Florida.
We selected EOD units to visit based on information from the services for
units that had recent deployment experience as well as the ability to
provide sufficient quantities of EOD-qualified personnel who would be
available to participate in our group discussions.
Our overall objective in using the group discussion approach was to
obtain insight and perspectives from EOD personnel on training,
equipment, operational tempo, joint military operations, and military
service-specific responsibilities. Group discussions, which are similar in
nature and intent to focus groups, involve structured small group
discussions designed to obtain in-depth information about specific issues.
The information obtained is such that it cannot easily be obtained from a
set of individual interviews. From each location, we requested that each
military service provide up to 10 volunteers to participate in our group
discussions. We also conducted group discussions separated by rank
and position. Specifically, we conducted separate group discussions that
were comprised of officers, senior enlisted personnel, team leaders, and
team members. At one location, two group discussions included both
officers and senior enlisted personnel, and two other group discussions
included all available EOD personnel assigned to those particular units.
The number of participants per group discussion ranged from 2 to 12.
Discussions were held in a semi-structured manner, led by a moderator
who followed a standardized list of questions. The group discussions
were documented by one or two analysts at each location. Group
discussions were conducted between August 2012 and October 2012.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Composition of the
Discussion Groups
We conducted 28 group discussions with EOD-qualified junior enlisted,
noncommissioned officer, warrant officer, and commissioned officer
personnel from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. During
each discussion, we asked participants to complete a voluntary
questionnaire that provided us with supplemental information about each
person’s EOD background, including:
•
•
•
•
•
Rank;
EOD qualification level (Basic, Senior, or Master Badge level);
Number of deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan;
Support provided to or received from another military service; and
Support to the Very Important Persons Protection Support Activity.
This information provided by participants helped us to ensure that we
obtained a wide range of perspectives from qualified EOD personnel with
a variety of EOD-related experiences. In total, we met with 188 EOD
personnel. Table 1 below shows the composition of our various
discussion groups.
Table 1: Composition of EOD Discussion Groups
Total number of participants
completing the questionnaire
Army
Navy
Marine Corps
Air Force
Total
39
53
67
29
188
Military Grade
E-1 to E-3
5
0
0
2
7
E-4 to E-6
20
19
51
24
114
E-7 to E-9
7
16
9
3
35
a
8
a
1
15
W-1 to W-3
0
3
5
N/A
W-4 to W-5
0
1
0
N/A
O-1 to O-3
4
9
2
0
O-4 to O-6
3
5
0
0
8
No Response
0
0
0
0
0
Basic EOD Badge
25
10
37
10
82
Senior EOD Badge
8
11
17
4
40
Master EOD Badge
6
30
13
15
64
No Response/Not Applicable
0
0
0
0
2
EOD Qualification Level
b
Number of EOD Deployments in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
None
28
19
39
7
93
1 to 5 deployments
11
34
28
21
94
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Army
Navy
Marine Corps
Air Force
Total
6 to 10 deployments
0
0
0
0
0
11 or more deployments
0
0
0
1
1
No Response
0
0
0
0
0
Number of EOD Deployments in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom
None
21
14
28
5
68
1 to 5 deployments
18
39
39
24
120
6 to 10 deployments
0
0
0
0
0
11 or more deployments
0
0
0
0
0
No Response
0
0
0
0
0
Yes
26
46
50
25
147
No
13
7
17
4
41
Not Applicable
0
0
0
0
0
No Response
0
0
0
0
0
Yes
29
49
39
27
144
No
10
3
27
2
42
0
1
1
0
2
Received Support From/Gave Support to other Military Services
Participated in Very Important Persons Protection Support Activity Missions
No Response
Source: GAO.
a
N/A stands for Not Applicable. There are no warrant officers in the Air Force.
b
Two participants identified their qualification level as “EOD Officer.”
We performed content analysis of our group discussion sessions in order
to identify the themes that emerged during the sessions and to
summarize participant statements regarding EOD experiences and
perceptions. Specifically, at the conclusion of all our group discussion
sessions, we reviewed responses from the discussion groups and created
a list of themes. We then reviewed the comments from each of the 28
group discussions and assigned comments to the appropriate themes.
One GAO analyst conducted this analysis and a different GAO analyst
checked the information for accuracy. Any discrepancies in the
assignment of the comments to themes were resolved through discussion
by the analysts. The information gathered during our group discussions
with EOD personnel represents the responses of only the EOD enlisted
and officer personnel present in our 28 group discussions and it is not
projectable to other EOD personnel.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to April 2013 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix II: Themes from the Group
Discussions
Appendix II: Themes from the Group
Discussions
In group discussions, we asked EOD personnel for their perspectives on
what is working well and what needs improvement with regard to military
service-specific missions, joint combat operations, training, equipment,
and operational tempo. We analyzed participants’ responses to identify
the most common themes, which are summarized below.
EOD Organizational Alignment and Career Path: Some participants
from each military service raised concerns about where EOD is aligned
within their respective military service. Some also noted issues with
career paths for EOD-qualified officers. For example, Army, Marine
Corps, and Air Force personnel expressed concerns about EOD
alignment under the Ordnance Corps (Army) or Engineers (Marine Corps
and Air Force). They perceived these alignments as hampering EOD
forces’ influence for resourcing and operations. Additionally, Army officers
reported that officer career paths are of concern because the EOD
specialty is a technical area that is not the same as others in their
organization. For example, the Army EOD officer career path is within the
Logistics Branch of the Army, and all EOD officers are expected to have
logistic skills; however, an Army officer noted that learning about
managing fuel farms has nothing to do with EOD. Conversely, Navy
participants viewed the officer career path as generally positive and noted
that enabling an officer to stay within EOD for his or her entire career was
beneficial to the EOD force.
Training: Participants in the majority of the group discussions said they
felt positive about the training they received, and almost all of our group
discussion participants reported that they wanted more training or more
time for training. Some group discussion participants reported concerns
about not being able to train with the same types of equipment, such as
robots, as they would be using when deployed. Both Army and Marine
Corps personnel expressed the desire for more training in homemade
explosives and casualty care. Additionally, Army and Navy personnel
reported that they needed additional access to training ranges. Army
participants at Fort Campbell noted that access to training ranges is
difficult to provide because there are not enough training ranges for all
EOD companies to train at their installation. Likewise, Navy personnel in
the San Diego area noted that they have issues accessing training
ranges, particularly for exercises involving demolition.
Frequency of deployments: Participants in our discussions expressed
mixed opinions regarding operational tempo. Some EOD personnel felt
that the high pace of deployments and other missions put stress on EOD
personnel and their families. For example, some personnel felt that EOD
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix II: Themes from the Group
Discussions
team leaders are getting burned out because they are always away from
home. In addition, some personnel said that to cover missions clearing
training ranges they had to turn down annual leave or cancel doctors’
appointments because of staffing shortages. Also, some personnel noted
that during their 12 months home between overseas deployments they
are often away from their families because of the need to attend training
or sometimes to travel in support of the Very Important Persons
Protection Support Activity. Some personnel liked a high operational
tempo and voiced concerns about having too much down time as
operational tempo slows.
Support to Very Important Persons Protection Support Activity:
Participants in many of our group discussions noted that the time they
spent in support of the Very Important Persons Protection Support Activity
exacerbated their high operational tempo, and some raised the concern
that these missions are not an effective use of EOD skills. EOD personnel
reported that these missions had a negative effect on EOD personnel and
their families by taking them away from home too often. Further, they
noted that to support these missions they missed training for overseas
missions. Moreover, some participants said that the Very Important
Persons Protection Support Activity missions were not a good use of the
EOD skill set or did not use EOD to its full potential because EOD
personnel are asked only to identify potentially explosive hazards but are
not allowed to disarm anything that is found.
Funding for Training EOD Units: Some participants in our group
discussions reported concerns about the adequacy of funding for EOD
training. For example, some Army EOD personnel said that they
sometimes had to buy materials needed for training aides, such as
electrical tape and electronic parts. Moreover, Army and Marine Corps
personnel reported that specialized training, such as post-blast analysis
or homemade explosive courses, is expensive, which limits the number of
people who can take the training. In particular, Marine Corps personnel
expressed concerns that money for training might be scaled back in the
future.
Incentive and Special Duty Assignment Pays: Participants in our
discussion groups noted that incentive pay, special duty assignment pay,
and retention bonuses are important to EOD personnel, and that
availability of such pays is a factor in retaining EOD personnel, but that
availability of incentives varied across the military services. Some
participants from the Marine Corps raised issues regarding incentive pay,
special duty assignment pay, and retention bonuses. Marine Corps
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix II: Themes from the Group
Discussions
personnel stated that, unlike the other military services, the Marine Corps
does not provide any additional pays or bonuses for EOD, and they felt
that not receiving these types of pay like the other services constituted an
issue of equity.
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
John Pendleton, (404) 679-1816 or PendletonJ@gao.gov
Staff
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Margaret G. Morgan, Assistant
Director; Tarik Carter; Simon Hirschfeld; Shvetal Khanna; James
Krustapentus; James E. Lloyd III; Michael Shaughnessy; Michael Silver;
Amie Steele; Tristan T. To; Cheryl Weissman; and Sam Wilson made key
contributions to this report.
(351723)
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GAO-13-385 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
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