V
7^55.
D&ie^
'no.
1^^^
the Introduction of New
Process Technology: International
Differences in a Multi-Plant Network
Managing
Marcie
August 1990
J.
Tyre
WP
# 12-90
INTERNATIONAL CENTER
FOR RESEARCH ON
THE MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Center for Research
on the Management of Technology
Tlie International
the Introduction of New
Process Technology: International
Differences in a Multi-Plant Network
Managing
Marcie
J.
Tyre
WP
August 1990
Sloan
WP#
Forthcoming
©
in
# 12-90
3004-89-BPS
Research Policy
.
1990 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
38 Memorial Drive, E56-303
Cambridge,
02139
MA
/
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the introduction of new technologies in the
First, how
manufacturing environment and addresses two central questions.
can factories introducing new process technology deal with change rapidly and
Further, what fundamental organizational changes are necessary
effectively?
to enable plants to respond successfully to the challenge of technological
change?
The research examined 48 projects where new manufacturing technologies
were introduced. Projects were undertaken in plants in Italy, West Germany,
In comparing success
and the United States which belong to a single company.
across regions, performance measured by startup time and operating
improvement was significantly lower in the U.S. plants than in European
A significant portion of this performance gap can be explained by
operations.
differences in the way project teams in each region used available mechanisms
U.S.
for identifying and solving the problems associated with new technologies.
project teams were, on average, less likely than those in Europe to engage in
preparatory problem-solving activities, or to solve problems by working with
external technical experts, or by merging different functional perspectives
within the project group.
To understand the source of these differences, the paper examines
and organizational differences among the operations in different
geographic regions. Over time, local managerial choices had resulted in
distinct sets of organizational capabilities, resources, and assumptions that
affected the way plants in different regions approached technological problem
historical
This paper argues that such managerial choices constitute Important
solving.
strategic decisions which have long-lived implications for technological
innovation in the manufacturing environment.
INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
There
of
is
mounting evidence that, despite rapid advances
in
the technology
manufacturing equipment and systems, U.S. firms are failing to implement
and exploit these technologies effectively.
that U.
managers "are buying the hardware
S.
are using
it
of flexible automation --but they
Rather than narrowing the competitive trade gap with
very poorly.
Japan, the technology of automation
[39]
Jaikumar [21], for instance, argues
widening
is
it
Thurow
further" (p. 69).
blames "America's poor productivity, quality, and trade performance"
squarely on inferior capabilities
in
introducing and using process technology (p.
According to the Manufacturing Studies Board, U.S. companies need to
1660).
"reemphasize process improvements
--
selecting,
available manufacturing technologies"
using, and implementing
[18,29].
Too often, when companies introduce new manufacturing processes they
not only
fail
to
capture competitive benefits but also experience
persistent
One major U.S. study found
drain on human and capital resources.
difficulties of introducing
a
new manufacturing equipment frequently
that the
result in
productivity losses equal to or exceeding the original cost of the equipment,
and that the disruptive effects can persist for two years or more [9,18].
Persistent problems can have serious competitive implications as deliveries,
reputation, and market share slip.
Further process change becomes impossible,
while competitors' process technologies steadily move ahead.
Despite evidence of serious problems,
problem of utilizing new technology.
Much
little
work has addressed the
process
of the existing reearch on
innovation and diffusion has focused on the decision to adopt new technology,
rather than on the process of learning to use
been brought into the organization [23,35].
a
new technology once
it
has
Further, existing research on
"implementation" issues focuses primarily on developing organizational attitudes
and receptivity to change'*
This
is
useful first step,
a
but
it
fails
to illuminate
This research tradition is represented by two streams of research.
of the early "implementation" research examined the different
requirements of various stages in the innovation process.
Many authors
concluded that implementation, as distinct from development, calls for
relatively tight forms of managerial control [37,44].
Another research
stream focuses on creating user receptivity to the new technology [e.g. 28,30]
'
First,
much
1
the behaviors needed to identify and address the problems involved
in
technological process change.
Process Change as
The premise
project
a
Form
of the
of Technological
paper
is
Innovation at the Plant Level
that the success of a
not just a function of user receptivity.
is
change also requires active organizational efforts
new process introduction
Successful technological
to
adapt the new technology,
the existing manufacturing system, and the organization
demands [1,25,42].
itself to a
new
set of
Consequently, new process introductions often involve
considerable problem solving and even innovation at the plant level [22,34].
However the
likely to
plant's ability to identify problems and to develop
new solutions
is
be influenced by "embedded" characteristics of the organization, such
as the sophistication of its
technical competencies, and
methodologies [15,36].
manufacturing infrastructure,
its
existing base of
repertoire of familiar problem solving
Indeed, as Adier
organizations' success with
its
[2]
points out, to understand
new manufacturing technologies one must not only
understand the behavior patterns
in
specific project,
a
but also analyze the
underlying "web of more enduring organizational features that shape both the
technology development effort and the project manager's margin of manoeuvre"
(p.
194).
This research was undertaken to explore the determinants of successful
plant-level problem solving and adaptation around
The study
identifies organizational
new process technology.
mechanisms for adapting both the new
technology and the existing organization, and tests their impact on project
success.
Further, the paper attempts to place project-level performance
context of the larger organizational setting.
strategies and project performance
identified,
in
a
Regional variations
in
in
project
multi-plant, multi-national network are
and factors that could account for such variation are proposed.
particular, the analysis focuses on differences
capabilities,
the
in
In
the nature of the technical
operating practices, and working relationships developed at the
regional level.
Results suggest that these organizational factors have an
enduring and important influence on factories'
technological process change.
ability to
adapt
in
the face of
Indeed, findings indicate that the managerial
choices which shape such organizational characteristics should be seen as long-
term strategic decisions, capable of influencing operating performance and
technological options well into the future.
This paper
is
organized
Part
five parts.
in
I
draws on existing
literature to identify three principal organizational response
dealing with technological change.
and the variables used
in
Part
the analysis.
mechanisms for
describes the research methodology
II
Part
III
examines the data on project
attributes and project success, and compares results across regions.
Part IV
discusses some of the forces which may explain the differential success of
introduction projects
in
various regions.
V
Part
presents conclusions and
suggestions for further research.
I.
ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Innovation theory suggests that organizations adapt to the uncertainties
and problems associated with new technologies
in
a
distinctions are used to categorize adaptive response mechanisms.
temporal distinction between problem solving
in
Two
variety of ways.
First
is
the
preparation for the
introduction, and real-time adaptation during actual implementation of the
technology [13,15,35].
installation of the
The timing
of
problem solving relative to physical
equipment affects the nature of the information available, the
ease of making changes, and the impact of these changes on other parts of the
The second basic
factory [7,9].
distinction concerns the mechanisms for real-
time problem solving or adaptation during implementation.
Theory suggests that
both interorganizational and intraorganizational collaboration are important for
coping with new technology, but that they involve different integration
processes and pose different kinds of problems [5,25,32].
Based on these distinctions, this study examines three mechanisms for
adaptation and problem solving
in
response to process change.
The
first
mechanism, preparatory search, refers to adaptation undertaken before
introduction of the
new technology
into the plant setting.
The second and
third mechanisms refer to adaptation activities undertaken once the
technology
is
in
place,
new
but distinguish cross-functional, intraorganizational
efforts from interorganizational activities.
These mechanisms are not mutually
exclusive, but are sufficiently different to warrant separation conceptually and
.
empirically.
1.
Preparatory Search involves the investigation, modification, or
"reinvention" of the new technology and relevant aspects of the receiving
organization before the technology
installed in the factory
is
This
[34,35,42].
may involve adapting existing manufacturing systems, routines and procedures
Coordination with internal or external developers of process equipment
[8,9].
is
an important aspect of preparatory search, allowing the mutual adaptation of
the technology and the receiving environment during the early phase of the
project [25]
The second and third response categories both involve
real-time
mechanisms for adapting to problems and opportunities which develop as the
organization gains experience with the
2. Joint
Search involves coordination with knowledgeable individuals from
or organizations external to the manufacturing plant.
facilities
joint organizational
can be defined as
"a
a
notion of
unit's "technological organization set"
of suppliers of technology,
a coalition
components, or information.
among members
The
search stems from the concept of an "organization set"
[12,38] or, more specifically,
latter
new technology.
[27].
The
equipment,
Research suggests that joint problem solving
of the relevant technological organization set can account for
major part of the company's problem solving capability with respect to the
new technology"
3.
[27,
p.
8;
see also 11,19].
Functional Overlap involves linking relevant functions within the
organization to create "overlapping" subsystems or multifunctional teams for
dealing with change [13,14,24].
In
the manufacturing environment,
key
functions include the plant technical or engineering activities and direct
management
of production output.
Tighter linkage between these areas moves
the locus of decision-making closer to the source of relevant information, and
therefore increases the organization's ability to respond to uncertainty [6,31].
One
of the principal objectives of the research
the above response mechanisms
in
was
to
examine the
technological process change.
propositions guided the investigation.
First,
it
role of
Several
was anticipated that greater use
of these response
mechanisms
at the plant level
would be associated with more
successful introductions of new process technology.
that operations
in
in
it
it
was expected
different geographical regions would display distinct patterns
their use of the response mechanisms identified.
level,
Second,
Finally,
at the qualitative
was expected that significant differences among regional operations
in
the use of preparatory search, joint search, and functional overlap would be
linked to different managerial policies across regions.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
II.
Methodology and Data Gathering
The introduction
process.
new technology
into existing plants
is
a
complex
Progress may be affected by multiple, often subtle factors related to
the project and
depth
of
its
context.
Understanding these factors typically requires
clinical analysis of individual cases.
However,
in
in-
order to identify
systematic patterns among projects, this complexity must be compressed into
few standardized measures.
collected three kinds of data:
a
To meet these competing demands, the author
descriptive Information about projects, their
history and contexts through open-ended and semi-structured interviews; specific
data on project characteristics and outcomes through a written questionnaire;
and documentary evidence about plant operations and technical projects from
company archives.
Clinical field
work began with open-ended interviews
technical staff at the corporate and division levels.
of
managers and
Exploratory interviews at
each plant were used to examine salient dimensions of the technological change
process, and to identify new process introduction projects and principal
informants.^
Data on each project were gathered through
a
series of semi-
structured interviews with principal informants and other project participants.
Personal interviews were also used to introduce
a
was completed by each principal informant, and
to collect questionnaires
^ In each case the principal informant
written questionnaire which
and
(also referred to as the "project
manager") was identified during early field work as the person who had the
"most direct, day-to-day responsibility for bringing the new technology up to
speed in the factory". Other project participants were identified both by
plant management and by principal informants.
5
follow-up comments four to six weeks later.
This process resulted
in
a
100%
Interviews lasted from one to four hours, and each respondent
response rate.
was interviewed several times over the course
was corroborated by managers
of a
year or more.
and division
at the plant
Information
This iterative
levels.
method of data gathering allowed new insights derived during the course
of the
research to help guide analysis and interpretation of the data collected.
Site Selection
Research was undertaken
involved eight plants located
The Company operates
components).
It
in
a
at a single leading
in
the United States, West Germany, and Italy.
single,
well-defined industry (precision metal
the world market leader
is
manufacturing company, and
share and reputation for product quality.
in
its
industry
Competition
in
terms of market
the industry focuses
in
on consistent precision quality as well as cost, and senior managers view the
Company's superior manufacturing capabilities as their primary competitive
tool.
These capabilities are supported by extensive in-house process development
New machine
activities.
and manufacturing processes are developed
tools
at the
central Process Development Laboratory and in several divisional technology
centers.
Process equipment
The Company
is
is
also
purchased from outside vendors.
organized geographically, and operations
in
countries are run as separate divisions with local management.
carried out
Italy,
in
three major divisions within the
and the United States
division.
operating
facilities.
a
local
They include one
a
In
This study was
West Germany,
in
each
cross-section of the Company's
large factory
core part of the product
specialized facilities.
--
and involved two to three plants
These eight plants represent
manufacturing
judged by
--
Company
different
line,
in
each division
as well as
more remote and
each division, the plants studied include one operation
management
to
be "very capable", and one judged to be less
able technologically.
Limiting the research to one global,
several benefits,
single-product corporation had
including controlling for industry and product variations.
design also facilitated access to detailed and confidential information about
projects and their historical, technological, and competitive contexts
[see
The
35, p. 361; 16]
.
Yet even within the same company, individual divisions had
developed along very different lines.
managers
in
new process technology [10,21,27].
company enabled
approaches
it
was anticipated that
different locations might take different approaches to the
introduction of
single
Therefore
Research
in
the context of
identification of the effects of different managerial
or regional level as distinguished from variations due to
at the local
different corporate policies.
In
summary, the Company offered an excellent opportunity
to explore
regional performance variations in a multi-plant network and to examine the
At the same time
it
noted that the small size and restricted nature of the sample make
it
managerial policies underlying such differences.
must be
inappropriate to generalize from this study to more general national or
management
regional differences in the
of technology.
Sample Selection
The sample
of projects studied included
all
new process
of the
introductions identified where the technology was "new"
in
some way to
a
particular factory and which:
1)
were undertaken during the preceding four years and completed or
nearing completion at the time of the study;
2)
represented
a total
capital investment of greater than $50,000 (in
constant 1986 U.S. dollars); and
3)
involved participants
Most of the projects identified
who were
in
available for interview.
each division met these criteria; there was no
indication of selection bias across regions.
The sample included
a
spectrum of technological process change, from
improved versions of existing equipment to introductions of novel technologies
Production technologies included metal turning and
and production systems.
precision machining equipment, assembly and inspection systems, thermal
treatment and metal forming equipment, and handling systems; the range of
technologies introduced
in
each of the three divisions
eight projects were studied
in
each plant.
A
total of
is
comparable.
Four to
48 introduction projects
a
comprise the sample.
Variable Definition
Quantitative measures were developed for each of the following:
Project Attributes
(1)
The
:
relative to existing technology
Response
(2)
:
and nature
size
and
change,
of the technological
to local operating practices;
The organization's response
to the
change,
in
terms of the
three mechanisms identified above (preparatory search, joint search, and
functional overlap);
(3)
Outcome
:
The success
of the introduction project,
terms of the
in
startup time required and the operating benefits achieved.
Each of these variables
definition
is
described below.
and measurement are presented
in
Further details on variable
Tyre and Hauptman
[41].
Project Attributes
Because the projects varied widely
involved,
was necessary
it
Measurement
investment
in
was straightforward and was based on
new equipment,
constant 1986 U.S. dollars).
tooling,
total
and other capitalized items (stated
in
By contrast, controlling for the technological
Six measures of technological
challenge involved was more complex.
were identified, based on the literature
with early field work.
the amount and nature of the change
measure and control for these project attributes.
to
of project scale
in
of innovation
change
and diffusion, combined
These encompass the absolute newness
of the
technology, the novelty of technical features relative to existing equipment
use
in
a
given plant, the novelty of the operating principles involved for
in
a
given plant, the stage of development of the underlying technology, and the
degree to which the new technology
accompanied by new product designs or
is
Data on each aspect of technological change
new performance requirements.
were gathered through multiple questionnaire and interview items and
combined into aggregate scales of technological change.
ranged from .64 to .86 (see Appendix
reliability
and interpretability
in
1).
Reliability of scales
Data reduction increased statistical
further analyses.
8
later
Aggregate scales then served as input for exploratory factor analysis
identify underlying dimensions of process change.
The
factor procedure
employed principal analysis with orthogonal factors
[20,
p.
147].
to
Analysis
revealed convergence around two factors, accounting for 53% of the variance
in
the aggregate scales of technological change"'.
The
first factor,
termed technical complexitv
novelty, and technological sophistication of
.
measures the number,
new features and improved
concepts introduced (such as tooling, measurement and control systems).
second factor, called svstemic shift
,
The
the degree to which the new equipment
is
or system introduces fundamentally changed manufacturing tasks or operating
principles within the plant.
Projects with high scores on systemic shift
represent departures from accepted manufacturing approaches, such as moving
from traditional metal removal processes to net-shape forming technology, or
moving from reliance on buffer stocks between operations
in-time flow of materials
.
When both
are high, the introduction represents
to an integrated just-
technical complexity and systemic shift
a
"radical" shift in the technology of the
factory [1,15,31].
Organizational Response Mechanisms
1.
Preparatory search:
installation of the
The
intensity of search and adjustment prior to
new technology was measured by four interview and
•^
Factor results are shown in Appendix 2.
While the percent of variance
explained is not large, it is considered satisfactory for exploratory work
and appears consistent with findings based on clinical data [41]. Given the
relatively small sample size it is important to note that results reported
later in this paper proved robust to changes in factor technique or to the
substitution of aggregate scales for factor results.
^ This dichotomy can be traced back to Perrow [31]; similar distinctions
have been suggested by Abernathy and Clark [1], Rogers [35], and Tushman and
Anderson [40]. The measurement and implications of the distinction described
here are discussed in Tyre and Hauptman [41].
questionnaire items detailing the involvement of factory personnel
in
proposing
and developing the technical features of the new equipment or system, including
early development and testing activities carried out by factory personnel.
and scale
are shown
reliabilities
2. Joint
in
Appendix
3.
Measures of the intensity
Search:
Items
of joint search across
organizations subsequent to installation are based on four interview and
questionnaire items describing the role of personnel from outside of the
factory and the importance of their contributions during the start-up process.
(See Appendix 3.
3.
)
Functional overlap was measured by the number of lateral linkages
between plant engineering and production personnel involved
Eight possible linking mechanisms were identified.
cumulatively [13],
between functions.
a
higher score represents
a
in
the project.
Since linkages are adopted
greater intensity of integration
Primary information came from:
(1)
participants' sketches of
the "people and project structure" on the written questionnaire and (2)
participants' descriptions of the involvement and contribution of various players
in
r
the problem solving process.
Project Outcome
Multiple measures of project outcome were investigated; two principal
measures, startup time and operating improvement, are discussed
1.
Startup Time:
The elapsed
in
this paper.
time between the point of installation and
the achievement of productive use of
new process technology
a
is
a
measure of
the efficiency of the introduction project, and has important economic and
competitive implications for the firm [17,21,39].
Startup time influences
factory efficiency and delivery performance, the ability to carry out other
projects, and career growth of project participants.
startup time reflects the idea that the
disruption to ongoing operations
is
initial
The following
definition of
startup period, during which
often significant,
is
more costly,
terms of
in
resources used and opportunities foregone, than the later period, when the
technology
time
is
is
operating productively but
the sum of:
10
is
not yet fully
debugged
[9]
.
Startup
Initial
1)
equipment
startup period: the elapsed time
until parts are
being made
in
Introduction period: the elapsed time
2)
project
is
in
months from delivery
of the
production mode; plus
in
months from delivery
until the
considered complete.
Information came from project schedules and key dates reported on the written
questionnaire, with corroboration from project documentation and plant
management.
2.
Operating Improvement:
Project success must be measured not just
in
terms of the speed of the introduction but also the effectiveness of the
introduction
in
in
achieving organizational goals [25,35]
.
Data on improvements
operating performance came from three interview items concerning the
usefulness of the technical solutions implemented, the degree to which
technical objectives of the project were met, and the level of operating
reliability
achieved.
(Cronbach's alpha test of scale
approach to measuring project performance
projects,
reliable
where judgmental assessments
is
reliability =
.86).
consistent with studies of
of operating
This
R&D
improvement have proven
[e.g. 3,4].
Variables can be organized into
a
model depicting managerial inputs into
technological process change (Figure 1).
This does not indicate when (or whether) the technology reaches fully
satisfactory levels of performance.
Performance at project completion may
differ significantly from original expectations or from current requirements.
11
Figure
Key Factors
in
1
the Management of Technological Process
Chang e
PROJECT ATTRIBUTES
-
Technical Complexity
-
Systemic Shift
-
Project Scale
ORGANIZATIONAL
RESPONSE MECHANISMS
-
Preparatory Search
-
Joint Search
-
Functional Overlap
PROJECT OUTCOME
Startup Time
Operating Improvement
12
.
RESULTS
III.
Project Attributes,
Proiect-Level Differences:
Organizational Response, and
Outcome
Proiect
The
first question
explored
is
the relationship among project attributes,
organizational responses, and project outcomes for the sample as a whole.
Table
1
shows the correlation matrix for the variables introduced above, and
Table
2
shows regression results.
Equations
and
[I]
[II]
in
Table 2 examine
the effect of project attributes on outcomes; they provide some
explain a significant amount (33%) of the variation
in
support
Project attributes by themselves
for the validity of the measures used here.
they do not explain observed variations
initial
startup times; however
in
the level of operating improvement
achieved.
Considerable insight
is
gained by taking into account the use of
organizational response mechanisms.
2,
In
the regression for startup time (Table
equation [III]), the coefficients of preparatory search, joint search, and
functional overlap are
all
use of these mechanisms
negative and significant (at p=.05).
is
That
associated with shorter startup times.
once the use of response mechanisms
is
is,
greater
Moreover,
taken into account, coefficients of both
systemic shift and project scale become relatively large and significant.
Results of the
full
regression for operating improvement (equation [IV]
Table 2) suggest that organizational responses also play an important role
achieving superior operating performance with new technologies.
in
in
Higher levels
of preparatory search and joint search are both associated with higher levels of
operating performance.
functional overlap, while
The major difference
in
is
that the coefficient of
the expected direction,
is
not statistically
significant".
This result was not expected and
and Hauptman
[41]
13
is
explored
in
more
detail in
Tyre
Table
Correlation Matrix of Project Attributes.
1
Response Mechanisms, and
Outcomes
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These results suggest that preparatory search,
joint search,
and functional
overlap are important mechanisms for coping with technological process change.
They appear
to contribute both to the
speed with which manufacturing
facilities
introduce new process technology, and (with the possible exception of functional
overlap) to the degree of operating improvement achieved.
noted that fast startups are,
should also be
general, associated with high levels of operating
in
improvement (r=-.63; p<.05).
It
Therefore,
it
is
not surprising that the response
mechanisms identified appear to enhance performance on both measures.
r
Regional Differences:
The analysis
Germany, and
also
Italy.
U.S. versus Europe
compared project performance
As shown below, analysis revealed systematic differences
between projects undertaken
U.S. plants and those
in
On the other hand, the German and
Italian
projects undertaken
European sample.
in
in
Germany and
Italy.
subsamples were statistically
indistinguishable on the dimensions examined.
analysis,
of plants in the U.S.,
Germany and
Therefore,
in
the following
Italy are treated as a single
Underlying qualitative similarities and differences within the
European sample are discussed
in
Section IV.
The U.S. plants took longer, on average,
to introduce
new process
technology than did European factories, and they reported lower levels of
operating improvement.
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the two regions.
As noted, no consistent differences were discovered between divisions
\ Europe.
16
in
Table 3
Regional Differences
in
Means: Europe and the U.S.
MEAN
MEDIAN
Pearson
Europe
U.S.
t
Europe
U.S.
(n=31)
(n=17)
(2-tailed)
(n=31)
Startup Time
Operating Improvement
Preparatory Search
Joint Search
Functional Overlap
19.9
(n=17)
chi^
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Cfl
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1-
Europe and the U.S.: Differing Organizational Responses
Data on the response mechanisms used
in
to
Change
each introduction project make
it
possible to examine the source of the performance gap between European and U.S.
plants
in
introducing new process equipment.
Analysis was performed to test
whether regional differences can be explained by differential use
of the three
response mechanisms identified, or must be attributed to other, unmeasured
Equations
variables.
gap
is
III
and IV
in
Table 4 suggest that
explained by the way that project teams
technological change,
significant part of the
the two regions respond to
in
both before and after the actual installation of the new
As shown, the addition
equipment.
a
of
preparatory search, joint search, and
functional overlap explain almost two-thirds of the regional gap
(Equation
III),
and approximately one half of the difference
in
in
startup times
operating
improvement achieved (Equation IV).
This analysis suggests that while the U.S. plants studied did tend to
perform poorly on process introductions relative to their European counterparts,
large part of the gap
is
accounted for by the tendency of project teams
in
a
the
U.S. to make less aggressive use of the three response mechanisms identified here.
This argument
is
further supported by comparing the relationship between project
attributes and organizational response variables across the two regions (Table 5).
U.S. -based project teams were less likely than their European counterparts to
respond to particularly challenging projects with intensified preparatory search or
joint search.
search
in
In
fact,
there
is
a
marked tendency
the face of large-scale projects than
while the use of functional overlap
in
in
to
undertake
less
preparatory
smaller introductions.
U.S. -based projects
is
Further,
strongly associated
with the degree of systemic shift being undertaken, absolute levels of functional
overlap
in
the U.S. are
still
relatively low.
in
Europe, six projects rated either
five or six on functional overlap (out of a possible high score of 8),
U.S. project rated higher than four.
overlap rating of
Conversely, five projects
in
while no
the U.S.
had an
(the lowest possible score), as opposed to one such project
Europe.
19
in
IV.
ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL DIFFERENCES
Regional differences
in
startup time and operating improvement cannot
easily be attributed to differences in the products
comparable across regions) or
in
in
produced (which are closely
the difficulty of projects undertaken; as shown
Table 4, significant unexplained differences persist even after controlling for
Rather, results suggest that there exist
the size and nature of the change.
systematic differences across regions
examined here.
in
teams' use of the response mechanisms
This finding raises important questions about the source of
regional differences in search activities and,
in
turn,
in
the ability of the plants
studied to introduce new manufacturing technologies.
To answer these questions the following analyzes the
the manufacturing organization and
discussed below,
local
its
process technology
historical evolution of
in
each division.
As
managerial choices dictated that regional operations
evolved along different lines, acquiring different capabilities and operating
(see Figure 2).
assumptions'
Further, these attitudes and capabilities, once
created, proved to be long-lived and resistant to change.
year before
levels
initiation of this
Starting
in
1985 (the
study), management at the corporate and division
began taking vigorous action to address what they viewed as historical
weaknesses
in
the U.S. operations.
However the evidence suggests that embedded
organizational practices and constraints continued to affect efforts to introduce
new process technology
well after this date.
As background, it is important to note that these differences
developed within particular social, political, and economic contexts at
national and regional levels.
However the discussion in this paper is
limited to specific intrafirm comparisons; it does not explicitly examine the
'
impact of larger national or cultural variables.
20
;
Figure 2
Summary
of Organizational Differences Across Regions
Europe
U.S.
1.
TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY
* Coherent strategy for investment
in new process technology;
* No long-term planning for
equipment and process investments.
* Considerable experience in
introducing advanced process
* Relatively low levels of investment
in
new process technology;
technology;
* No local equipment development
* Strong installed base of advanced
activities.
technology;
* In-house equipment development at
local
levels.
2.
ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES
* Systematic tracking of ongoing
operating improvements;
* Little attention to ongoing
* Ongoing development in conjunction
with external and internal suppliers.
* Purchase solutions from equipment
and tooling suppliers.
3.
efficiency improvements:
ENGINEERING INFRASTRUCTURE
* Integration of plant-level
* Formal distinctions between
engineering and production roles
engineering and production personnel
echoed in informal working patterns.
(Italy);
* Extensive in-house training and
rotation among functions and
facilities
* Significant turnover
level
among plant-
engineers;
(Italy);
* Formal distinctions between
engineering and production combined
with close informal working
*
Uneven
levels of technical
competence among engineering and
production groups.
relationships (Germany);
* Considerable formal training for
engineering and production personnel
(Germany)
* Strong internal capabilities for
real-time process and equipment
modification.
21
Table 5
Organizational Responses to Technological Change
[1]
Projects Undertaken
in
EUROPEAN PLANTS
(n=31)
Organizational Response
PREPARATORY
SEARCH
JOINT
SEARCH
Project Attributes
TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY
-.08
SYSTEMIC SHIFT
.27*
PROJECT SCALE
.05
.51**
FUNCTIONAL
OVERLAP
Technological Strategy and Decision Making
1.
European Operations
have
Local
:
managers
in
the Company's European divisions
high degree of autonomy over operating decisions.
a
However, strategic
decisions relating to manufacturing operations and technology are
centralized
management committees composed
central staffs.
Product
line rationalization,
of senior
made by
managers from division and
as well as process
and product
development, have been aggressively pursued and centrally coordinated through
this vehicle in
As
all
a result,
European operations since the mid 1960's.
a
coherent strategy has guided process development
European divisions for almost 20 years.
In
in
the
the early 1970's, the Company's
central Process Development Laboratory" introduced the first generation of
proprietary "ABC" machine tools, which incorporated new concepts for precision
German and
metal finishing.
plants soon adopted the technology,
Italian
completing hundreds of introduction projects.
manufacturing manager observed,
"It
Describing the process, one senior
took a long time to debug those early
machines and we had many problems.
But we learned
a
huge amount about the
equipment, and about how to bring new technology into the plants."
the late 1970's, the Development Lab introduced the second generation of
In
"ABC" machine
tools.
The new equipment was based on existing machining
concepts but incorporated
a
proprietary microprocessor control system.
This
development enabled European plants to introduce one standardized control
technology from the start.
As
a
plant manager explained,
"We made sure that
not one machine was introduced that did not have the possibility to communicate
with other machines on the floor."
the early 1980's, the Company's development thrust turned to linking
In
separate machines on the shop floor.
and
The
Italian plants of a centrally-controlled,
result was the introduction
fully integrated
Q
The Process Development Lab
country.
studied.
It
is
remote
in
location
German
machining and
assembly system capable of 24-hour operation with minimum staffing.
°
in
Finally,
is located in a different European
and language from any of the divisions
23
in
the late 1980's the objective was to develop more flexible integrated systems,
where appropriate, for greater market responsiveness
2.
United States Operations
Recent history
:
differs sharply from that in Europe.
enjoyed
full
autonomy over
length relationship with the parent
Over
committees.
time,
these
local
low-volume product types.
the Company's U.S. division
Until the mid-1980's the U.S.
policies
local
in
in
division
and operations, maintaining an arm's
Company and
its
policies created a
centralized management
very different environment
Operations during the 1970's and early 1980's were
for technological change.
characterized by fragmented product offerings and low quality levels relative to
the Company's standards
division
in
manager described
its
it,
other divisions.
"The U.S. division had been making money, but
They were not investing
short-term mode.
the U.S. division treated
Until 1985,
There was very
profit centers.
of process development.
During this period, as one
little
in
technology or productivity."
independent
plants as decentralized,
its
product
in
line
rationalization or coordination
According to the engineering manager
at
one U.S. plant,
there was no real long-term planning on the subject of
"Until recently,
manufacturing processes and equipment.
Every capital request was reviewed
in
isolation."
number
While a
tools
of early examples of internally-developed
were introduced
years.
When
in
"ABC" machine
the early 1970's, process investment slowed
factories did
buy new
capital
effort to build on existing capabilities
in
later
equipment there was no explicit
and concepts.
the second-generation, microprocessor-based
Decision makers eschewed
"ABC" machines,
external equipment vendors and traditional manual technology.
relying instead on
A few
projects
were undertaken to integrate separate machining operations, but plants ended up
with multiple, incompatible machine control systems.
Italian divisions
work
maintained active equipment development efforts to complement
at the central
been closed
in
Whereas the German and
1972.
Development Lab, the U.S. equipment development center had
With that action
many
of the functions of the division-level
technology group had been discontinued, and manufacturing engineering depth was
seriously eroded.
24
a
Oraanizational Practices and Assumptions
German and
Partly as a result of this pattern of decisions, both the
divisions featured strong installed bases of process technology,
Italian
strong
manufacturing capabilities, and technically capable personnel, each of which
largely was absent
in
the Company's United States division.
in
Productivity growth
Europe had averaged 7% per year between 1970 and 1985, whereas the
comparable figure
in
the U.S. was 1.5%.
Similarly, while local variations prevent
exact comparisons, U.S. plants were judged by
considerably behind their European counterparts
levels,
and
in
Company management
to
be
terms of defect and quality
in
measures of operating efficiency such as cycle time and machine
set-up time.
Following a renewed focus by
operations starting
in
Company management on improving U.S.
1985, differences between regions in specific manufacturing
However, patterns and assumptions
performance indicators began to narrow.
developed during the earlier period continued to influence strongly the way new
process technology was introduced into plants.
factors was a relatively
Most important among these
weak organizational infrastructure for ongoing process
development and refinement.
In
the U.S., process improvement activities were not
monitored consistently before 1986.
As one senior manager
in
the region
explained, "There were other ways to show a profit besides worrying about
operating efficiencies."
in
According to
a
manufacturing engineer who had worked
both the European and U.S. plants:
In America, it's easy to get plant engineers to start working on large
projects, with formal project management structures, but it's extremely
difficult to keep attention focused on the details over time.
People tend to
drift away to other problems when the work is only half done, leaving all
the little tasks that actually mean the difference between success and
failure in a new system.
In
both Italy and Germany, plant-level engineers spent
developing and achieving annual improvement plans.
a
great deal of time
These plans were formally
specified in terms of targets for productivity, quality, and other measures of
operating effectiveness, and monitored at the division and corporate levels.
improvement
activities
were managed differently
in
While
the two European divisions,
plant-level personnel in both countries generally had several process improvement
projects
underway
at
any time.
These "miniprojects" frequently involved
25
iterative
development and testing of new tooling or devices
in
conjunction with the
division's local technical center or with outside suppliers.
According
to
one
senior technical manager:
When we say
that European plants are specialized by product line, we mean
that they concentrate not just on making those parts but are also
responsible for both product and process development.
Each division is a
development center for a specific technology. Underlying this is a strong
requirement -- and will -- to improve on what now exists.
This suggests an important difference between the two regions
In
in
the way
which project teams used external sources of expertise, both inside the
company and outside
it,
problems and potential solutions.
to explore technical
With a few exceptions, U.S. project teams generally expected to purchase
solutions from equipment vendors or component suppliers,
in
Europe were more apt
of a given item.
is
apparent
different regions viewed the development of
technology.
In
resource for ongoing development
to use outsiders as a
This contrast
in
whereas project teams
the way project teams
new
tooling to support
in
the
new process
Europe, tooling development typically was viewed as
a critical
task requiring the combined knowledge of both plant-level engineers and tooling
experts from internal and external suppliers.
For instance, one project leader
in
an Italian plant explained:
We
identified very early what would be the most critical problem to solve:
developing tooling of sufficient precision to allow us to take advantage of
the new computer-controlled technology.
And we devoted a great deal of
effort to a thorough tooling study.
An important part of this process was
working with the tooling experts at the equipment developer to understand
how to utilize this new technology.
Developing the tooling systems which were not just usable but optimal was
considered one of the factory's regular responsibilities and was
attention before, during, and after the introduction itself.
this
focus of
several instances,
emphasis blurred the exact boundaries of the introduction "project"
one German project leader stated, "You really can't
at tool optimization part of the project -- that's
on
In
a
all
our equipment."
26
call
all
itself.
the continued effort
something we are always doing,
As
"
In
many U.S.
contrast,
efficient
project managers expressed the view that the most
approach was simply to purchase
a
satisfactory tooling package from
the equipment vendor, thereby avoiding the need to invest time
development.
tooling
in
One manager attributed the problems that plagued
particular
a
introduction to the fact that the machine had not been purchased along with a
full
complement of tooling from the vendor, rather than to examine internal
tooling development practices.
effort devoted to optimization.
little
as long as tooling
Similarly,
worked, there was
Another project manager explained that the
external supplier had delivered a tool set "which worked right off the bat.
never presented
a
It
problem, so we never had to run any more trials or ask for
changes.
The
notion that technology can be purchased "off the shelf" extended to
new manufacturing equipment from the Company's Process Development Lab.
As
senior U.S. manufacturing engineer explained;
The new machines from Central Lab require a shift in skills and operating
procedures -- but that is all provided. You don't need to have all the
knowledge in place because the machines come complete with hardware and
software, reference manuals, and service engineers from Central to do the
training and initial set-up.
Once you learn how to push the buttons, these
machines are quite simple to use.
This expectation, however, was not borne out
in
practice.
In
almost every
instance where equipment from the central Lab was introduced into a U.S. plant,
project participants complained that the machine did not
in
fact operate
according to specifications, and that the service engineers who performed the
initial
local
set
up did not complete the task
operators.
of
debugging the equipment or training
Engineers from the Process Development Lab,
in
turn, argued
that U.S. managers and technical personnel expected Lab engineers to run their
equipment for them.
While there were notable instances
in
which U.S. project
participants invested heavily in joint search with equipment vendors,
all
but one
such case involved vendors external to the company and technical features which
were relatively well-developed, with low
to
medium
levels of technical
complexity.
While European project participants also complained about the lack of
technical support from the central lab, they simultaneously stressed that part of
27
a
the development responsibility rested with the factory.
As
a divisional
manager
explained:
Engineers in the labs are experts in the machine technology, but we are
the ones who really understand the manufacturing process.
Therefore, to
take a machine which meets the basic specs and make it respond to all our
requirements --that's the job of the factory.
Engineering Infrastructure
The different
attitudes and capabilities displayed
States appeared to be rooted
in
in
Europe and the United
different engineering "infrastructures":
that
contrasting approaches to the organization and development of technical talent
the manufacturing environment.
Although Germany and
Italy differed in
is,
in
many
aspects of their engineering infrastructures, both divisions shared common themes
which were absent
1.
Italy
:
In
Italy,
in
the U.S.
respondents sometimes had trouble distinguishing engineering
and production as separate functions.
In
several cases, an individual was
described as having direct responsibility for manufacturing, but also maintaining
seat in the plant technical office.
a
According to the division's director of
manufacturing technology:
The word "engineer"
There are at least two
is hard for us to define.
possibilities this can refer to within the plant.
First and foremost, the
backbone of this organization is the "shop floor engineer". He is on the
line: generally a foreman or assistant foreman.
He is responsible for
production and quality, as well as for cost and quality improvements.
He
also has hands-on responsibility for new projects.
Second, there are
factory technical offices.
These are the future-oriented engineers; they
support production people in ongoing operations but they also develop new
kinds of solutions.
But they never have direct project responsibility for
new process introductions. It's important that production people have
responsibility for new technology from the start.
Personnel development
in
the Italian division included considerable job
rotation between direct manufacturing supervision
All
levels of
of rotation"
and the plant technical
manufacturing management and technical experts go through
which begins with machine attendance and generally includes
28
office.
a
"spiral
experience
variety of manufacturing and project situations.
a
in
individuals also
Promising
move between the division technical center and the
While the Italian technical center itself
is
very small,
its
staff
factories.
works closely with
plants to understand their needs, and with outside machine shops or component
suppliers to design and implement
the plants.
In
addition, people
new
ideas for machines or devices for use in
move between plants over the course
career, creating a basis for sharing knowledge and experience
division.
The
Italian division
was noted for
its
of their
among plants
ability to utilize
in
the
and build on
existing knowledge through extensive in-house training, team assignments, and
cross-fertilization
among areas and plants.
Many observers within the Company pointed
to the
deep capabilities
developed by this system at the level of production setters, supervisors,
mechanics and maintenance people.
described
As the Company's director
of manufacturing
it:
Our Italian plants put less emphasis on the pure engineering excellence of
their people than do, say, the Germans; but their strength is in the very
careful, conscious management of their technology.
They have created a
very high level of interest and ability among aU their people.
The outcome,
as one U.S.
engineering manager remarked, was that:
wonderful at making all kinds of process refinements -because of the management there, not the product line or anything
They love to "fiddle" with their equipment. But it's not a game -else.
they are very conscientious about applying their knowledge to their
operations.
You take a machine which we consider great, but they make
lots of little innovations and end up running twice as much product on it.
2.
The
Italians are
and
it's
Germany
differently.
:
In
the German division, the plant-level engineer
Engineering
is
is
conceived quite
organizationally distinct from production management
and generally reports directly to the plant management.
Many
plant-level
engineers have formal engineering degrees, as distinct from the apprenticeship
29
Indeed, there are important distinctions
undertaken by operating personnel.
within the engineering office based on individuals' formal technical training.
Formal responsibilities
in
The
directly responsible for cost and quality improvements.
formal project leader for planning and administration of
introductions, and implementation
process engineer
in
his or
Engineers are
the plant are clearly bifurcated.
is
chief engineer
new process
generally the direct responsibility of
her group.
responsible for meeting output targets
the
is
a
Production managers, meanwhile, are
in
terms of quality and quantity.
They
are also expected to support the engineers' improvement efforts, principally by
allocating people
and development time
to
improvement and introduction projects.
However, these clear distinctions often break down
broken down
in
--
in
actual operating procedures.
Germany presented exceptions
Two
-- or are actively
of the three plants studied
One
to the standard organization structure.
plant was composed of several small shops or subfactories; within them,
engineers reported to manufacturing shop managers.
fact,
In
in
at least
these shops, the production manager was also the chief engineer.
addition to the "real" engineers with degrees working
plant,
in
office,
there were also engineers who "sat on the production floor"
in
In
one of
another
the technical
in
each
department and reported to manufacturing managers.
Further, there was considerable technical expertise among production
personnel at
all
levels.
Production managers typically were shown considerable
respect by the degreed engineers on the basis of their technical know-how.
As
one degreed engineer explained, "The manufacturing supervisor and the
department manager are really engineers too
--
they are the floor engineers."
While their technical capabilities varied, manufacturing managers at this level
all
received some formal technical training, and they were the first ones to respond
to technical
problems on the
line.
Indeed production department managers
frequently came from the plant's engineering office.
engineers
in
arrangement
many
In
charge of the introduction projects reported
to the
in
cases, junior
an informal matrix
production department manager.
Relative to Italy, technical personnel
in
Germany were
among plants or between plants and the division technical
less likely to rotate
office.
On the other
hand, considerable efforts were made to link technical development activities at
30
various facilities.
First,
five of the seven plants in the division
the three plants studied here) were located
a
in
(including two of
geographically centralized
"complex" along with the division headquarters and technical center.
technical staff, which was several times the size of the group
in
The
division
was
Italy,
responsible for designing, building, and helping plants to implement new equipment
and systems.
Especially
in
plants located
in
the central complex, there was
considerable interplay between plant engineers and engineers at the technical
Further, factory personnel with particular areas of expertise or
center.
experience were often consulted or even borrowed for projects undertaken
other plants
In
the complex.
While Italy was known within the
with production equipment once
doing
a
in
it
Company
was on the
for
floor,
its
penchant for "fiddling"
Germany was known
for
great deal of technical preparation of both the new equipment and the
existing factory before attempting a
new introduction.
This was consistently
recognized by those interwiewed as being of utmost importance.
One
project
leader explained:
This was one of our most successful introductions because we worked
explicitly to identify all the most important unknowns, and to develop
solutions, before the equipment was shipped or, in many items, even before
it was ordered.
If you really think about it, you can identify and address 95
percent of the hard issues beforehand.
3.
United States
:
The formal organization structures
of U.S.
factories resembled
the German pattern, with separate engineering departments reporting to the plant
manager.
However, with the exception
of
one small subcomponent plant studied,
informal integration of technical priorities and production requirements was often
more
in
difficult to attain.
In
several instances, plant-level engineers blamed delays
introducing new equipment on the difficulty of getting the production manager
to set aside time for operator
tooling or devices.
and supervisor training or for on-line testing
of
Manufacturing managers, meanwhile, frequently attributed
disruption and startup delays to the absence of engineering support during startup
and
later
debugging
of the
new equipment.
Further, many individuals
capabilities in U.S.
in
the company argued that engineering
plants were too thin.
31
In
the U.S., formal and in-house
technical training or personnel development through job rotation received
less attention
than was true
Europe.
in
Plant-level engineering capabilities,
the relationship between engineers and production people
Unlike the situation
widely.
engineers was
a
In
skills.
in
and
the plants, varied
European divisions, high turnover among
in
As one senior manager said with
frequently-cited problem.
dismay, "Many of the engineers
They do
much
in
these plants are not even from our industry.
not really understand the products and processes involved."
key production personnel frequently lacked necessary technical
addition,
According to one European engineer who had worked
in
various U.S.
operations:
The production supervisor is the place where there is very often a big gap.
in too many cases, the supervisor does not have sufficient understanding of
modern production technologies, so he ends up relying on operating people
for process expertise.
Sometimes the operators have long experience and
special aptitudes, but sometimes that is not the case.
So it can be hard to
carry out big projects successfully.
Another engineer explained the danger
in
this situation:
Expertise at the operator level should not be what is critical.
Productivity
of both old and new machines comes from the engineering backup in the
plants -- the engineers, maintenance people, and supervisors.
That small
group has got to be the organizational intelligence between management and
operators.
They have to be able to teach operating people, to guide them to
focus on key problems, not just rely on operators' expertise.
The
competence of that group and how it is cultivated is the key to the ability
to bring in new machine technology.
V.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analyzed the success of new process introductions
undertaken by
a
single technology-based
the United States.
in
Identified -- preparatory search, joint search,
to
both Europe and
the short run, to underlying differences
project teams respond to technological change.
shown
in
Analysis suggested that observed regional differences
performance can be traced,
way
company operating
support improved project performance
32
the
The response mechanisms
and functional overlap
in
in
in
--
were
terms of startup time and
operating improvement.
Project teams in Europe and the U.S.
propensity to use these mechanisms
differed
their
in
dealing with challenging introductions,
in
which contributed to different levels of success with new process technology.
More importantly, differences
at the project level
have been examined
Based on this evidence, the paper
their organizational and historical contexts.
has argued that the response patterns observed are rooted
differences
in
in
in
historical
the management of technology and technical resources at the
local
This study identified three related areas of managerial choice
operating level.
that affected the ability of individual plants to respond aggressively to the
challenge of technological change.
The
managerial decision making for investments
local
relates to the style of
first area
in
process technology.
In
Europe
operating managers developed coherent strategies to guide process
development efforts over time and across
To implement
facilities.
their
strategies, divisions Invested aggressively in capital equipment and development
activities.
The second area
of concern
relates to practices
govern existing manufacturing processes.
In
and relationships that
European plants
a
consistent, top-to-
bottom emphasis on continuous process improvement showed up clearly
levels of productivity
improvement and quality performance, and
and assumptions that project participants brought
This determination was supported by
a tradition
to
of
in
in
high
the attitudes
new process introductions.
cross-boundary problem solving
between the manufacturing organization and outside suppliers of technology.
Finally, the third area of managerial choice
which differed across regions was the
system for building technical competence
the manufacturing organization.
the Italian plants
in
in
particular, continuous managerial emphasis on personnel
development, cross-training, and cross-fertilization appears to have created
strong technical
skill
In
a
base and dense linkages across functions.
These results have important implications for understanding and managing
technological process change.
First, the research
reported here adds substance
new process technology requires
to the notion that the introduction of
considerable ongoing adaptation and even innovation at the plant level
[1,25,34,42].
It
further suggests that specific mechanisms to support adaptation
can be identified, classified according to innovation stage and organizational
locus,
and measured.
The constructs
functional overlap introduced
in
this
of
preparatory search, joint search, and
paper are potentially powerful tools for
33
managing technological process change and for understanding
organizational
its
implications.
Further, this research explicitly links the ability to utilize new process
technologies to existing organizational practices and past investments
capabilities
While
[2,15,36].
a
in
technical
good deal of literature has focused on managing
technological projects and project teams [4,19,21,22], this research suggests that
project activities
will
themselves be constrained by embedded organizational
features.
Specifically, the research suggests that responses to
technology
will
be affected by the pattern of past investments
new process
in
new processes
and equipment, by familiar operating routines and procedures, by established
working relationships across functional and organizational boundaries, and by
Indeed these
practices for developing technological capabilities at the plant level.
features of the organization emerge as critical strategic assets or
liabilities
in
dealing with technological process change at the plant level.
At the same time the evidence presented
introduction of new process technology can,
in
in
turn, alter embedded
organizational practices and technical competencies.
many years and generations
cumulative, spanning
described
this
in
a
effect
is
likely to
new technology.
period of ten to twenty years.
frame, decisions regarding investments
of
be
As
its
Examined
in
to
this time
transform the
capacity for technological change.
short, this paper argues that there are strong relationships
in
both the
short and long term between the introduction of new process technology and
organizational context.
More research
and their managerial implications.
suggestive,
needed to describe these relationships
is
While the findings reported here are
must be remembered that
this
study was confined to
a
single
different operating units to underlying political and cultural factors
local
environment.
cultural,
its
Further, no attempt has been made explicitly to link managerial choices
company.
in
it
in
new process technology and the
in
subsequent improvements can be seen
organization and
In
of
The
the last section, critical differences among the operations studied
paper evolved over
management
paper suggests that the
this
Further empirical work
institutional,
management
and
of technological
is
needed
to better
political forces that influence
change
in
in
the
understand the
or constrain the
different regional contexts [26,33,43].
34
More research
is
merited to explore the relationship between the
introduction of new process technology and
global corporation.
its
organizational setting within the
The questions involved are imp
tant for developing
insights into the problems of technological change within organizations.
these issues are of vital practical concern
in
Further,
light of the serious questions
surrounding the global competitiveness of the U.S. manufacturing sector.
35
new
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Innovation
in
Appendix
Aggregate Scales
1
of Technological
Change
NUMBER OF
VARIABLES
CRONBACH
ALPHA
SCALE NAME
DEFINITION
Technology
Newness
Newness
of technical features
relative to technology
previously available
.86
New To
Familiarity of technical
features relative to equipment
existing in the plant at the
time of the introduction
.83
The degree to which the new
technology is based on
technical or operating
77
Plant
New Base
principles
new
to the plant
or the company
Ongoing
Development
The degree
technology
to
is
a
which the new
prototype
.65
change
,64
installation
New Product
The degree
of
in
product
specifications introduced with
the new equipment
Required
Performance
The stringency
of performance
requirements (cost and quality)
relative to existing standards
39
.65
.
Appendix 2
Contribution of Scales to
Technical Complexity and Systemic Shift Factors
Contribution
Contribution
to Factor
to Factor 2:
1
:
Technical
Complexitv
Systemic
Shift
Aaqreaate Scale:
1
New Technology
.84
.12
2.
New
.54
.57
3.
New Base
.07
.99
4.
Ongoing Development
.52
.31
5.
New Product
.34
.17
6.
Performance
.44
.02
Variance
Explained by Factor:
.27
.26
to Plant
total=.53
Factor analysis used principal analysis and varimax rotation.
rotations were also tried but did not improve results significantly.
inclusion of a third factor does not improve explanatory power.
Note
:
40
Oblique
Similarly,
Appendix 3
Derivation of Organizational Response Variables
1.
Preparatory Search
role did technical support and production personnel play in the
following activities before the equipment arrived at the factory?
What
1.
2.
Propose purchase of the new equipment.
Developing new technological concepts.
(1-5 scale: 1 = not involved; 2 = were informed; 3 = gave advice; 4
support; 5 = fully responsible.)
=
major
Describe any studies undertaken by plant personnel prior to delivery of
the new equipment. (Interview item, with questionnaire commentary.)
3.
(1 = no studies; 3 = some study, but not unusual amount; engineering personnel
performed some analyses; 5 = intensive study; we made a major tool life project,
and several people were assigned; we made a large effort to resolve problems in
the systems choice before we even ordered the equipment...)
Describe the process of pretesting the equipment at the vendor (or,
in the plant) prior to delivery (or to startup). (Interview
item, with questionnaire commentary.)
4.
where applicable,
We had
runoff test, but it was perfunctory; the vendor had everything set
and we were not allowed to change the conditions; the people we
sent to the qualifying test did not know what to look for; 5 = We did extensive
runoff testing at the vendor's, and we refused to accept the equipment until it
worked to our standards; once we received the equipment, we set it up off-line
and did extensive testing or routines and tooling.)
(1
=
up just
a
right,
Scale alpha = .67
2.
Joint Search
1.
How
helpful
were people from the following groups during
this
Introduction?
a.
Equipment vendor or in-house development center?
Personnel from sister plants?
Outside advisors?
d. Technical experts from division technical center?
b.
c.
(1-5 scale:
Made
critical
contributions
no real contribution.)
Where did people get the know-how to accomplish the introduction
new equipment -- how true are the following statements?
2.
41
of the
)
a.
Outside experts provided guidance.
b. Training by the vendor provided essential know-how.
Not at all true.)
(1-5 scale: True for this introduction
3. Describe the role of outside experts in the startup process.
(Interview item, with questionnaire commentary)
Not a partner in the problem solving process; sold the equipment and the
normal services (such as initial installation help, replacement parts but was not
really part of the project team;
5 = Part of the problem solving team; the
vendor gave us lots of important ideas, we discussed many of our problems with
learned a lot about this technology by working with the supplier; the
him;
expert from the head office came to this plant and worked closely with me and
my colleagues, he was an important partner in the introduction project.)
=
(1
I
Scale alpha = .79
Functional Overlap
3.
Primary information came from:
1.
Participants' sketches of the "people and project structure" and their
commentary
of the sketch;
Participants' descriptions of the problem solving process:
involved and the modes of communication and contribution;
2.
who was
Information was coded for mechanisms listed below:
Mechanisms for Mutual Adiustment and Feedback
Individuals from different functions
solve problems in the new process.
-
A manager who
work together directly
(1
to identify
and
not directly involved with the introduction plays a
linking role between functions.
-
is
-
A
-
The introduction
project manager(2) has ongoing responsibility for both technical and
production activities in the plant or department.
is
organized as
The introduction is one of
multi-functional task team.
-
many
a
special interfunctional task team.
activities
performed by
a multi-level,
One or more individuals act as liaisons between functions (e.g. an engineer
participates directly on the production line; a production operator participates
-
in
-
an engineering study).
Permanent or temporary transfer of personnel across functional areas links
42
the production area with the locus of technological decision-making. (3)
-
The introduction takes place within
a semi -autonomous,
multi-functional
unit within the plant.
Descriptions adapted from Galbraith [13].
Formal or informal designation; multiple managers possible.
Only transfers directly related to the introduction are considered.
Previous transfers undertaken as a general policy are not included.
(1)
(2)
(3)
43
The International Center for Research on the Management of Technology
Working Paper
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Number
Date
1-89
11/89
2-90
8/89
3-90
1/90
4-90
Title
Author(s)
Netgraphs: A Graphic Representation of Adjacency Tool for
Matrices as a Network Analysis
George
Allen
Strategic Information
and the Success
of
High Technology
Roberts
Companies
Evaluating the Use of
CAD
Mechanical Design
Engineering
Robertson
Allen
The Personality and Motivations of Technological Entrepreneurs
Roberts
Systems
in
1/90
5-90
4/90
6-90
6/90
7-90
7/90
8-90
Current Status and Future of Structural Panels in the
Products Industry
Do Nominated Boundary Spanners Become
Wood
Utterback
Allen
Effective
Nochur
Technological Gatekeepers?
The Treble Laddei
in the Dual Ladde
Revisited:
•
as
Why Do
Engineers Lose Interest
They Grow Older?
Technological Discontinuities: The Emergence of Fiber Optics
8/90
10-90
Allen
Katz
McCormack
Utterback
8/90
9-90
Montrey
Work Environment,
Organizational Relationships and
A Ten Year
Longitudinal Study in One Organization
Basa
Allen
Katz
People and Technology Transfer
Allen
Advancement
of Technical Professionals:
8/90
11-90
Exploring the Dynamics of Dual Ladders:
A
Longitudinal Study
Katz
Tushman
8/90
Allen
12-90
8/90
13-90
8/90
Managing
the Introduction of
New
Network
Task Characteristics and Organizational Problem Solving
Technological Process Change
Tyre
Process Technology:
International Differences in a Multi-Plant
in
Tyre
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