THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES IN TRANSITION
Jordi Díez
Ian Nicholls
January 2006
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ISBN 1-58487-227-6
ii
FOREWORD
After the 9/11 attacks on the United States, homeland defense
became the primary issue in U.S. defense policy. At the same
time, it was clear that homeland defense would have to become a
trilateral continental issue, and, thus, would have to include Canada
and Mexico. Because the United States and Canada already had
developed a relatively close relationship during and after World
War II as a result of their common interests and efforts in NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and NORAD (North American
Air Defense), increased knowledge of and contact with the Mexican
armed forces became important.
Understanding the most recent component of the new continental
defense arrangement involves more than accessing the military
capabilities of the Mexican armed forces. Rather, the demands of
continental defense outside the usual NATO or NORAD contexts
require that U.S. and Canadian civilian and military decisionmakers, policymakers, and opinionmakers embark on a comprehensive investigation of the cultural, political, economic, and military
history of our Mexican neighbor—who also happens to be one of
our largest trading partners. This is the basis of policy that is at the
heart of international defense relations. This understanding and
appreciation define what might be possible when nations attempt to
change policy intentions into viable policy and strategy to achieve
mutual security interests.
This monograph is a significant step in that direction. The first of
the Strategic Studies Institute’s expanded series, “Security Issues in
the Western Hemisphere,” it comes from a series of Claxton Papers
produced by the Defense Management Studies Program at Queen’s
University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. The authors are wellacquainted with the Mexican armed forces, and have developed
a keen awareness of the Mexican defense establishment. Dr. Jordi
Diaz wrote on Mexican security and defense policy for his doctoral
dissertation at the University of Toronto, and continues to broaden
his understanding of Western Hemisphere defense issues. Colonel
(Retired) Ian Nicholls served as the Canadian Forces attaché in
Mexico from 1998 through 2001, and his continuing relationship
iii
with key military and civilian leaders in that country significantly
informs this research.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to join with the Defense
Management Studies Program at Queen’s University in offering this
monograph as part of our attempt to clarify the issues regarding
Western Hemisphere security, focus the relevant debate, and learn
from it. This security debate is critically important to the vital interests
of the United States, Canada, Mexico, the hemisphere, and the global
community.
DOUGLAS BLAND
Chair
Defense Management Studies Program
Queen’s University
iv
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHORS
JORDI DÍEZ is Research Associate with the Defence Management
Studies Program at Queen’s University, and Assistant Professor
of Political Science at the University of Guelph. He has also been
a Visiting Fellow at the Colegio de México and the Centro de
Investigación y Docencia Económicas in Mexico City. The holder
of numerous research grants and awards, among which are the
Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and
the International Development Research Council (IDRC), Dr. Díez
has focused his research on processes of democratization in Latin
America, environmental policymaking, and civil-military relations
in Mexico. He has taught courses in political science, international
development, and violent conflict at the University of Toronto,
Queen’s University, and the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris.
Dr. Díez received his B.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from the
University of Toronto, and his M.A. (with distinction) from the
University of Essex, England.
IAN NICHOLLS is a Research Associate with the Defence
Management Studies Program at Queen’s University. He recently
retired from the Canadian Forces after a distinguished military
career. From 1969 until 1989, Colonel Nicholls served in military
logistics and training establishments in Europe, the Middle East, the
United States, and Canada. He was Base Commander at Canadian
Forces Base, Borden, Ontario; and Military Attaché to Mexico and
to Central America. From 2001 until his recent retirement, he was
Executive Secretary at the Conference of American Armies (CAA), a
position in which he responded to military chiefs of 25 countries in
Latin America. Colonel Nicholls received his B.A. in Political Science
and Economics from Sir George Williams University in Montreal.
v
UNITED STATES
San Diego
Tijuana
Ciudad
Juarez
Dallas
New Orleans
Houston
Guaymas
Chihuahua
Monterrey
Gulf of Mexico
La Paz
Mazatlan
Tampico
Pacific
Ocean
Merida
Guadalajara
Mexico City
Veracruz
Acapulco
Mexico
Figure 1.
vi
Santa Cruz
SUMMARY
After the September 11, 2001 (9/11), attacks on the United States,
homeland defense became the primary issue in U.S. defense policy.
At the same time, it was clear that homeland defense would have
to become a trilateral continental issue, and, thus, would have to
include Canada and Mexico. Because the United States and Canada
already had developed a relatively close relationship during and
after World War II as a result of their common interests and efforts
in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and NORAD (North
American Air Defense), it became important to begin to understand
the Mexican armed forces and their capabilities. This monograph,
written from a Canadian prospective, is a significant step in that
direction.
Because interaction among the U.S., Mexican, Canadian, and
other hemispheric armed forces is likely to increase, within or
outside a continental economic and/or security architecture, better
mutual understanding of the structure and inner workings of the notwell-understood Mexican armed forces is indispensable. Thus, the
purpose of this monograph is to provide a long-overdue appraisal of
the Mexican armed forces, with the intention of acquainting those in
Canada and the United States—and other countries in the Western
Hemisphere—with the Mexican armed forces. This monograph
will demonstrate that the armed forces are professional and wellrespected in Mexico, and that many Mexicans depend on these forces
for medical services, physical and human development, and disaster
relief. Additionally, the authors expect that this monograph will
contribute to a more universal understanding of the history, structure,
and doctrine of the Mexican forces, and of the changing nature of
civil-military relations in Mexico. This is not only desirable, but likely
necessary, as we move further into 21st century interdependence.
vii
THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES IN TRANSITION
INTRODUCTION: NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY
AND THE MEXICAN MILITARY
Since coming to power in December 2000, Mexican President
Vicente Fox continually has expressed a willingness to pursue
further North American integration beyond the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). At the Quebec City Summit of
the Americas in 2001, for example, he declared his hope of moving
toward a “North American Union”—an arrangement similar to
the European Union (EU) that would involve a common currency,
a customs union, new political institutions, the harmonization of a
wide range of policies, and the establishment of a North American
Regional Development Bank. The then Canadian Prime Minister
Jean Chrétien received the proposal somewhat coolly, stating his
view that North American integration should be strictly economic.
U.S. President George W. Bush did not appear any more receptive
to the idea. Fox has continued, nonetheless, to express his interest in
further North American integration, but, despite having developed a
close personal relationship with Bush, his proposals have not gotten
far: Bush has indicated that cooperation may be limited only to an
immigration agreement.
The terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001
significantly changed the foreign policy priorities of the Bush
administration, to the extent that even an immigration agreement
between the United States and Mexico may not now be achievable.
Since September 2001, the United States has focused on issues
concerning security and terrorism, and other parts of the world such
as the Middle East have taken precedence over North American
issues. Fox’s desire for closer North American integration does not
appear to have abated, however, and he has, in fact, added a defense
component to his vision of a more integrated continental system.
Soon after the attacks of September 11, he declared:
[W]e consider that the struggle against terrorism forms part of a
commitment of Mexico to Canada and the United States, as a result of
the need to construct the framework of the North American Free Trade
1
Agreement within which we build a shared space for development, wellbeing, and integral security. At the hemispheric level, Mexico considers
that the current struggle against terrorism is a basic component of our
regional security that demands a redefinition of a doctrine of continental
security and a redesign of the legal and diplomatic instruments for our
1
legitimate defense.
More recently, at a meeting between Presidents Bush and Fox
in Crawford, Texas, in March 2004, Fox spoke about a “North
American Initiative”—a proposal to increase trade flow further and
coordinate policies more closely, especially in the energy sector, as
well as establishing a regional security framework that could protect
the three countries from terrorism.
It remains to be seen whether a security system such as envisioned
by Fox will ever be created. Formidable barriers—sensitivities in
both Mexico and Canada about sovereignty—would first have to
be overcome, and there has been little interest within the current
political leadership in Canada or in the United States. However,
even if a continental security structure is not created, it is possible
that cooperation among the three countries will increase. Indeed, at
the Monterrey Summit of the Americas, Prime Minister Paul Martin
declared that stronger relations with Mexico were a priority for his
government. In terms of security, there has already been increased
cooperation in areas such as the sharing of intelligence and the
establishment of “smart borders.” An example of such cooperation
has been the decision by the Fox administration in December 2004 to
allow FBI agents to operate freely at Mexico City’s airport inspecting
“suspicious” travellers—a development that would have been
unthinkable just a few years ago.
It also remains to be seen what role the armed forces of the
three countries might play in an eventual North American security
structure, should it become a reality. Cooperation among armed
forces of the three has indeed increased, especially between the
United States and Mexico. The training of Mexican troops by the
United States and the sharing of intelligence, especially in regard to
operations relating to the fight against drug trafficking, have grown
in recent years, and there are signs that Mexican and Canadian
military officials have increased interaction at last.
2
Whether the armed forces of Canada, Mexico, and the United
States take an active role in any continental security structure, or
cooperate in foreign peacekeeping missions, one aspect of the
relationship between Canada and Mexico that stands out is the
scant knowledge that exists about the Mexican armed forces within
the Canadian armed forces in particular, and the Canadian public
more generally. This, in part, has been because the Canadian Forces
for decades have worked mainly with the armed forces of NATO
members, as well as because of the “inward” orientation of the
Mexican forces. (Unlike other Latin American countries that have
taken part in foreign missions, such as Chile and Brazil, the Mexican
military has focused almost entirely on internal matters such as drug
trafficking and crime.) This has resulted in very little understanding
outside Mexico of the structure, doctrine, equipment, or professional
development of the Mexican armed forces.
Because of the possibility that the interaction between the Mexican
and Canadian armed forces might increase—within or outside a
continental security structure—or as a result of geographic proximity
and the growing economic interdependence of both countries, better
mutual understanding of the structure and inner workings of the
other country’s armed forces is not only desirable, but is also likely
to be necessary in the future.
The aim of this monograph is to provide a general overview of
the Mexican armed forces, with the intention of acquainting those in
Canada, both military and civilian, with the Mexican armed forces
and the changing nature of civil-military relations in Mexico. The
authors hope that this will contribute to a better understanding
in Canada of the history, structure, and doctrine of the Mexican
forces. We believe that this is long overdue, especially because of
widespread misperceptions about the Mexican military that have
been fuelled by allegations of human rights abuses and corruption
within the officer corps. Although in some instances abuses certainly
occurred, it should also be known that in Mexico the military is one
of the most respected of national institutions among the population,
and one on which many Mexicans depend, especially in rural areas,
for help such as the delivery of medical services and natural disaster
relief. The Mexican armed forces, we believe, are professional and
3
well-respected institutions that are little understood outside Mexico,
and the Canadian military ought to learn more about them.
This monograph is divided into five sections. The first places
the formation of the Mexican military in historical perspective. This
is important in that the distinctive characteristics of the Mexican
armed forces are the result of very specific historical circumstances.
Mexico is, after all, the only Latin American country not to have
experienced a military coup during the 20th century. The second
section provides an overview of the structure and organization of
the Mexican armed forces, whose most notable feature is that there
are only two distinct components: the Army, which includes the Air
Force as a subordinate entity, and the Navy, which is smaller and
generally more poorly funded. Unlike what has been the practice in
most other Latin American countries, there has never been a single,
unified national headquarters that exercised command over both
components.
The third section deals primarily with four aspects of the
Mexican military: doctrine, missions, equipment, and professional
development. The fourth looks at the process of political change
in Mexico over the last few years, and the effects this has had on
civil-military relations. As will be seen, it appears that the process of
democratization the country is experiencing has altered some of the
fundamental conditions that characterized civil-military relations
since its revolution—the so-called “pact” between the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the military. Also there are some
areas in which progress needs to be made as the military still enjoys
a significant degree of autonomy and lack of oversight by the
civilian authority. The final section examines areas where military
cooperation between Canada and Mexico might be possible.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE MEXICAN MILITARY
UNDER THE “PERFECT DICTATORSHIP”
The political system that guaranteed more than 7 decades of
political stability in Mexico has been called the “Perfect Dictatorship”
2
by Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. The system that emerged
from the turmoil of the Mexican Revolution—which spanned the
period from 1910 to 1919—was a well-developed mechanism of
4
control and redistribution which depended on a delicate balance
among cooption, selective repression, and limited political freedom.
It became an authoritarian-corporatist structure in which adherents
were rewarded with material benefits, and opponents were either
co-opted or ultimately eliminated. It took the form of a hierarchical
structure in which the various branches of government and social
and political organizations (e.g., unions) were integrated vertically
3
into the system, the whole controlled by the President at the top.
One of the salient characteristics of the “perfect dictatorship” was
the absolute subservience of the Mexican armed forces to civilian
authority. Unlike their Latin American counterparts, the Mexican
forces never attempted to overthrow the government, nor did they
intervene in domestic politics; they dutifully obeyed orders given
by the President, to whom they gave unquestioned loyalty. The
relationship between the PRI and the military has been described as
4
a “pact,” under which the PRI allowed full autonomy to the military
in exchange for absolute respect for the civil authority. Because civilmilitary relations in today’s Mexico, as well as the structure and
functioning of the armed forces, can only be understood within the
historical context from which they emerged, this section presents an
historical overview of the armed forces in Mexico and its relationship
with the PRI.
The Pre-Revolutionary Mexican Armed Forces.
When Mexico gained independence from Spain in 1821, the 16,000
troops of the revolutionary army, called “The Army of the Three
Guarantees,” became Mexico’s standing army; it was subsequently
renamed the Mexican Imperial Army. The structure of Mexico’s first
army replicated the Spanish colonial militia in which officers were of
Spanish descent and the rank-and-file were generally poorly-trained
indigenous people who deserted frequently. As in most other Latin
American countries, the half-century following independence from
Spain was characterized by social and political instability as the
various factions and political forces vied for control and fended
off foreign intrusions. The new nation dealt with a civil war
between conservative and liberal factions, a war with the
United States (1846-48), and the French intervention of 1860.
5
During this time, 50 governments rose and fell, and 30 men
served as president.
The Army played an important role in the building of the country.
Again, similar to what occurred in the rest of the region—and to
what would later occur in other newly-independent developing
nations—the Mexican Army was instrumental in building the state
apparatus and providing social cohesion to the new political entity,
all while centralizing power in Mexico City. The importance of the
Army in the building of the country was such that for the first quarter
century, in 2 out of every 3 years, its budget exceeded government
revenues. After losing half of its territory to the United States in 1853
and after 50 years of instability, at the end of the 1860s, Mexico began
a process of state reconstruction, mostly carried out by the military.
In 1876, during this process of reconstruction, General Porfirio
Díaz ascended to the presidency. Having experienced the political
turmoil and violence of 19th century Mexico, once in office Díaz
decided to curb the influence of the armed forces. He believed that
the only way he could ensure that the military would not intervene
in political affairs was to take power away from the officer corps.
He thus embarked upon a process of providing significant material
benefits and very generous salaries to the senior leaders who were
loyal, and discharging and forcing into exile those who opposed him.
Díaz also co-opted potential opponents by promoting them to highranking positions, he established a personal constabulary (rurales)
to crush opposition, and, to prevent enlisted soldiers developing
strong personal loyalty to local commanders, he regularly shifted the
commanders from place to place in the country’s 11 military districts.
At the same time, Díaz embarked on a process of professionalizing
the armed forces, and he dramatically reduced the size of the Army.
By the end of his term, there were only 20,000 enlisted soldiers and
4,000 officers in a country of 14 million people.
While Díaz was successful in consolidating control over the
military, he failed to appease civilian opponents. The centralization of
power and flagrant contempt for democracy and political freedom—
which involved a highly exclusionary style of policymaking in the
hands of a coterie of technocrats and the suppression of opposition
among peasants, urban workers, and the middle class—antagonized
many elements within the country to such an extent that they took
6
up arms. Díaz was finally overthrown in 1911, and in what was
the bloodiest revolution in the hemisphere, more than one million
people died, a tenth of the Mexican population. The 10-year period
of the Mexican revolution was a time of extreme violence and
chaos, during which all sorts of armed groups and factions (peasant
movements, foreign troops and private militias) fought against one
another. During the revolution, the size of the Army grew to over
80,000 troops, but they were poorly trained and badly led.
The Military after the Revolution.
The leaders that emerged victorious from the revolution all came
from the Army, and they were to lead the state for several decades.
This group, also known as the “revolutionary family,” established
a political pact with other sectoral interests and began the arduous
process of rebuilding the state. They drafted a new constitution in 1917
and set about fulfilling the three ideological goals of the revolution:
“constitutionalism”—adherence to the liberal ideals guaranteeing
individual rights enshrined in the constitution; social justice through
improving living standards; and economic development. This
revolutionary family, composed mostly of generals, responded to
the population’s desire for the restoration of political order through
the establishment of a highly centralized political system that vested
considerable powers in the president.
While the size of the military increased during the revolution,
two general officers belonging to the revolutionary family became
president in succession, Alvaro Obregón (1920-24) and Plutarco
Elias Calles (1924-28). Both initiated a series of reforms intended to
reduce the size and budget of the forces as well as to make them
more professional. This was done in an attempt to depoliticize the
forces and bring them firmly under civilian control. First, as had been
done prior to the revolution, both purged the armed forces of rivals,
or perceived rivals, by retiring hundreds of generals, arranging
the mysterious disappearance of others, and bribing the rest. They
filled the vacancies thus created with promising young officers who
had graduated from the Colegio Militar at Chapultepec (created in
1917), dispatching some to areas where loyalty to the new regime
was tenuous; sending others for training to military schools in Spain,
7
Germany, France, and the United States; and enlisting young men
who had exhibited some loyalty to caudillos (regional strongmen).
Second, with the assistance of the French, the Commission of Military
Studies and the Superior War College were created in 1926 and 1932
respectively, with the intention of increasing both efficiency and
professionalization. Third, the budget of the armed forces was cut
almost in half.
While these reforms were successful in pacifying opposition, they
were not enough to eliminate it completely. General Calles therefore
decided to create a political party—the National Revolutionary
5
Party (PNR) —with the aim of assuaging the political rivalries that
remained among the various military caudillos. Controlled by the
President, the PNR became a centralized political institution that
forced military rivals to resolve their differences within the party
in exchange for personal security, material goods, and control over
their regional areas. The establishment of the PNR coincided with
the beginning of the Great Depression of the 1930s. As this global
economic downturn severely affected the commodity-dependent
Latin American countries, Mexico and the rest of Latin America
adopted measures such as high tariff barriers in an attempt to
protect their markets from foreign competition and spur internal
production and consumption. What ensued was a process of stateled urbanization and an increase of the size of labor and popular
organizations.
During this time of economic crisis (a third of the workforce
was unemployed by 1933) and enormous social change, a wellrespected general, Lázaro Cárdenas, was elected president. Cárdenas
introduced far-ranging changes to the political system that resulted
in the consolidation of the national party and the establishment of a
corporatist system with a populist veneer. These changes realigned
forces and created political institutions that would last for several
decades. Indeed, some of them, such as corporatist mechanisms of
mediation, are still present. In 1938, Cárdenas renamed the party and
integrated the labor movement, as well as the peasant and popular
organizations, into the party’s leadership. By this means, sectoral
leaders representing the various corporate groups (e.g., labor unions
and the peasantry) exchanged party loyalty for material benefits.
With remarkable political skill, Cárdenas managed to consolidate
8
power in the office of the presidency and garner popular support for
the new corporatist system through populist reforms that included
land redistribution, the protection of labor, and nationalization of
the petroleum industry. The new political pact guaranteed that
the official party could rely on the many corporate groups to win
elections in exchange for the provision of economic and political
benefits.
Cárdenas also introduced a number of fundamental changes to the
armed forces, some intended to reduce their power. For example, he
divided the Ministry of War and Navy into two autonomous defense
ministries, the Ministry of Defense, which included the Army and
6
the Air Force, and the Ministry of the Navy. He enacted legislation
barring serving officers from participating in any political activity.
And, continuing earlier efforts aimed at the professionalization of
the forces, he required all infantry officers below the rank of colonel
to take examinations in military science, and made these competitive
examinations a prerequisite for promotion. He passed the Law of
National Military Service which established compulsory basic military
training for 18-year-old males. He also very heavily emphasized the
military’s role in education and public works, rather than as the
guardian of national order. Thus, since the Cárdenas administration,
the Mexican military has had responsibility for implementing the
revolutionary ideals as part of its institutional culture. This, as we
will later see, has been one of the reasons why the Mexican citizenry
thinks very highly of the armed forces.
By the end of the Cárdenas administration, the Mexican armed
forces had been weakened and brought under the control of the
national party. During the 1940s, the military withdrew almost
completely from the political process and agreed to support the
civilian authority through the creation of what has been termed a
“civil-military pact.” That is, when the first civilian president, Miguel
Alemán, came into power in 1946, he accepted the authority that the
generals of the revolution had given him in return for his absolute
respect for the integrity of the military institution. For their part, the
armed forces would give unconditional backing of the revolutionary
elite and the revolutionary goals: unconditional loyalty, and
obedience to the civilian power. A fundamental component of
this “pact” was the significant level of internal autonomy that the
9
military retained in both legal and real terms with regard to internal
functioning, training, and promotions, along with a high level of
7
discretion in making expenditures. The pact was facilitated by a
generalized rejection of violence by the population in the wake of
the excessively violent period of the revolution, as well as by the
successful professionalization of the forces in which the values of
loyalty, discipline, and subordination were emphasized.
This relationship between the PRI and the military became a
strong and harmonious one that lasted for several decades. Just as
in the case of the other corporate groups—labor, the peasantry, and
business—the armed forces were one of the pillars that sustained the
regime. Unlike the practice in most other Latin American countries,
the Mexican armed forces did not get involved in political matters,
accepting subordination to the President in accordance with his
constitutional mandate. This, some analysts believe, was one of the
sources of political stability of the Mexican political system under
8
the PRI. The armed forces, then, were the guardians not only of the
Revolution, but also of the revolutionary elite.
While retaining its internal autonomy, the military was indeed
called on by the PRI to assist in maintaining internal security. This
was the case in 1958 when they were tasked to suppress a railroad
workers’ strike, in 1968 when they were asked to intervene against
a student movement, and throughout the 1960s when they were
ordered to put down guerrilla uprisings, especially in the southern
state of Guerrero. But these interventions were all temporary affairs,
and the forces returned to their barracks once the situations were
stabilized. What is important to note in all these cases is that the
Army acted only at the behest of the civil authority. An observer has
referred to this as a “residual political role” of the armed forces, a
9
form of duty carried out only in exceptional circumstances.
As we will see in the fifth section, several developments within
the region, such as the Central American crises of the 1980s and the
emergence of drug trafficking as a threat to national security, changed
the role of the Mexican military as they acquired responsibilities well
beyond acting as guardians of the revolutionary family. In some
cases, these increased responsibilities put a severe strain on the
civil-military pact. But throughout the PRI’s “perfect dictatorship,”
and until the PRI lost the presidency in 2000, the Mexican military
10
acted as an armed branch of the state and adhered to the conditions
implicit in the civil-military pact.
II. STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION
OF THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the structure of the
Mexican forces is that there are two distinct components, instead of
the usual three found in most countries. The largest, best funded,
and most important is the Army, which includes the Air Force as
a subordinate entity. The second is the Navy. The two components
do not come under a single unified commander at any level below
the President. That is to say, there is no Minister of Defense as the
term is usually understood. Instead, a Minister who is a serving
officer—a four-star general in the case of the Army and an Admiral
in the case of the Navy—heads each of the component parts. Each
minister serves in a dual capacity: as a full cabinet member reporting
to the President, and as the operational commander of his force. (The
Presidential Guard is a separate entity.) The ministers are handpicked
by the President, and may or may not serve in that position for the
10
entire sexenio (period of office) of the incumbent president. In the
halcyon days of the PRI as ruling party, the selection of ministers was
generally a pro-forma exercise, with strict attention being paid to
seniority. In the past two sexenios, however, both Presidents Ernesto
Zedillo (1994–2000) and Vicente Fox (2000 to the present) strayed
from the norm and reached down into more junior levels to select
what some have described as “more progressive” officers to lead the
forces during times of change and, of course, support the President’s
agenda. It is certainly true that since 1995 the military as a whole has
come under much more intense public scrutiny, both domestically
and internationally, and the challenges to the leadership to permit
greater openness, better fiscal accountability to the public, and more
productivity in pursuing new missions will no doubt persist.
The current ministers, General Vega García and Admiral Peyrot,
are considered by most observers to be progressive and academic
in nature and background, although they have not strayed far from
the monolithic image usually associated with the Mexican military.
The public does not get much insight into whatever internal debates
11
and dialogue may be occurring within the institution, and both
services continue to be responsive instead of proactive in terms of
public relations. The armed forces indeed have developed public
access websites, but the content of these essentially is limited to basic
information.
Returning briefly to the matter of the subordination of the Air
Force to the Army, it must be pointed out that although there is a
defacto Air Force commander, he and his staff are embedded in the
Army headquarters, and an Air Force officer never has risen to the
most trusted senior positions within the hierarchy. This subordination
has allowed the Army to use the term “National Defense” (SEDENA)
for its organizational structure, and General Vega García and his
predecessors have held the title of Minister of Defense (much to the
annoyance of the Navy).
Organization.
Both the Army and Navy are organized on a regional dispersion
basis. There are centralized national headquarters in Mexico City
and many subordinate regional headquarters. Historically, this
has proven to be effective, as the military’s main employment has
been on domestic missions. Troops are stationed throughout the
country to serve as an ongoing presence of authority and to allow
for immediate response to crises. This regional dispersion also has
facilitated programs of local recruitment for noncommissioned
members, allowing them to stay near their families during their
service, an important cultural consideration. Officers, on the other
hand, are expected to be more mobile, moving between remote posts
and to the center in Mexico City with great frequency. This provides
experience and, from an historical context, prevents any senior officer
from staying too long in one location, developing local allegiances
and potentially becoming too powerful. The current strength of the
forces is about 241,000.
Enrollment is voluntary, although nominally a draft system
exists whereby a proportion of young men on their 18th birthday are
selected by lottery. Those so selected attend weekend training that
emphasizes education, history, physical fitness, and discipline. These
recruits also act as a labor pool for a variety of public works social
12
programs, such as tree trimming, clean-up of urban areas, painting
schools, etc. Officer candidates from all three services are trained
in a military college, in Mexico City for the Army, in Guadalajara
for the Air Force, and in Veracruz for the Navy. Officer candidates
generally are selected from the lower and middle classes, and this
therefore is seen as a mechanism for upward social mobility for
the less privileged and less educated sectors of the population. The
military colleges are not universities, but rather provide significant
technical training related to employment after graduation in the
various branches of the services. Great emphasis is also placed on
military ethos (patriotism, honor, and loyalty), history, discipline,
physical fitness, and perpetuating the institution. The Armed Forces,
among the most respected institutions in the country, enjoy a very
positive domestic image in the pueblo.
The Army and the Air Force.
There are three main components of the Army: a national
headquarters, territorial commands, and independent units. The
Minister of Defense commands the Army by means of a very
centralized system and a large number of general officers. The Army
uses a modified continental staff system in its headquarters (see
Figure 2).
At present there are 12 Military Regions (see Figure 3), which
are further broken down into 44 subordinate Military Zones. In both
cases, a numbering system is used for designation. There is no set
number of zones within a region, and these can therefore be tailored
to meet operational needs, with a corresponding increase or decrease
in troop strength.
Chief among the independent troops is an Army Corps consisting
of two mechanized infantry brigades located in Mexico City, with a
full complement of combat and support troops. In addition, there
are two brigades of the Corps of Military Police, Special Forces units,
Presidential Guards (another motorized brigade) and a parachute
brigade—all located in Mexico City where they act as a ready reserve
and as centers of excellence.
13
Minister
Inspector
General
Subheadquarters
Co-ordination
and Security
General
Staff
Legal Council
Bureau
Social
Communication
Assistant Secretary
Infantry
Direction General of
Administration
Special
Priviliges
Office
Air Force Chief
of Staff
Armour
Cavalry
Communications
Artillery
Health
Engineering
Supply
Territorial
Troops
Transportation
Military
Industries
Veterinarian
Services
Education
Firearms
and
Explosives
Control
Comptroller's
Office
Informalities
Justice
Archives
Personnel
National
Service
Mapping
Food
Services
Social
Security
Army and Air Force
Territorial Commands
Special Forces and Units
Military
Regions 1
7
Air Force Regions
1
1st Army
Corps
2
8
2
Military
Police
3
9
3
Special
Forces
4
10
4
Presidential
Guard
5
11
6
12
Paratroop
Brigade
Figure 2. Army Headquarters Structure.
14
Chief
of Staff
(Oficialia
Mayor)
Region
Location
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
Distrito Federal.
Mexicali, Baja California
Mazatlán, Sinaloa
Monterrey, Nuevo León
Guadalajara, Jalisco
LaBoticaria, Veracruz
Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas
Ixcotel, Oaxaca
Cumbres de Llano Largo, Guerrero
Mérida, Yucatán
Torreón, Coahuila
Irapuato, Guanajuato
Figure 3. Military Regions.
The Air Force.
As mentioned earlier, the Air Force national headquarters is
embedded in the Army headquarters in Mexico City. It also follows the
continental staff system, with the usual A1, A2, A3, and A4 sections.
The tactical forces form what is loosely called an Air Division, but
it is dispersed in four regions—Northeast, Northwest, Central, and
Southern. The Air Force maintains a total of 18 air bases, and has the
additional capability of opening temporary forward operating bases
in austere conditions for some of the rotary wing and light fixedwing assets.
The Navy.
The Ministry of the Navy, the Navy’s national headquarters, is
located in the southern part of the capital, Mexico City. It is a smaller
organization than the Army’s. Its main components are shown
in Figure 4. The “Junta (or Council) of Admirals” plays a unique
consultative and advisory role within the headquarters, an indication
of the institutional importance placed on seniority and “year groups”
that go back to the admirals’ days as cadets in the naval college.
They are a very tightly knit group, and great importance is placed
on consultation among the factions within year groups: the Navy
speaks with one voice.
15
Minister
Office of the
Comptroller
General
General
Staff
Headquarters
Council of
Admirals
Directorate
of
Strategic
Planning
Naval
Council
Legal
Office
Assistant
Minister
Director
General of
Naval
Construction
Director
General of
Services
Chief of
Staff
Director
General of
Research and
Development
Director
General of
Human
Resources
Director
General of
Administration
and Finance
Naval
Regions
and Zones
Figure 4. Ministry of the Navy Headquarters.
The Navy’s operational forces are organized as two independent
groups: the Gulf (East) Force and the Pacific (West) Force. Each
group has its own headquarters, a destroyer group, an auxiliary
vessel group, a Marine Infantry Group, and a Special Forces group.
The Gulf and Pacific Forces are not mirror images of each other, as
independence of organization is permitted. Both are subdivided into
regions, with Regions 1, 3, and 5 on the Gulf, and 2, 4, and 6 on
the Pacific. Each region is further divided into sectors and zones,
so a proliferation of headquarters and senior officers exists. The
Navy also has an air arm with troop transport, reconnaissance, and
surveillance aircraft.
Recently the Navy has ceded most of its riverine responsibilities
(formally handled by the Marines) to the Army, and has reduced
16
the size of the Marine force, putting them back aboard ships where
they play a vital role in drug interdiction and boarding of suspect
vessels in territorial waters. The Navy maintains some impressive
infrastructure, including naval dockyards that have the capability
of building ships, such as the Holzinger class gunboats. These
dockyards have a significant employment and economic impact in
country.
The Legal Framework.
The constitutional framework under which the Mexican armed
forces operate is established by the following articles of the Mexican
constitution.
Article 29. In the event of invasion, serious disturbance of the
public peace, or any other event which may place society in
great danger or conflict, only the President of the Mexican
Republic, with the consent of the head officials of the State
Departments, the Administrative Departments, and the
Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and with
the approval of the Congress of the Union, and during the
adjournments of the latter, of the Permanent Committee, may
suspend throughout the country, or in a determined place,
the guarantees which present an obstacle to a rapid and ready
combating of the situation; but he must do so for a limited
time by means of general preventive measures, without such
suspension being limited to a specified individual. If the
suspension should occur while the Congress is in session, the
latter shall grant such authorization as it deems necessary to
enable the Executive to meet the situation. If the suspension
occurs during a period of adjournment, the Congress shall be
convoked without delay in order to grant them.
Article 34, Sec. IV. [Among] the rights of the citizens of the
Republic are to bear arms in the Army of National Guard
in the defense of the Republic and its institutions, under the
provisions prescribed by the law.
17
Article 36, Sec. II. [Among] the obligations of citizens of the
Republic are to enlist in the National Guard.
Article 55, Sec. IV. [Among] the following are the requirements
to be a deputy [or senator]: Not to be in active service in the
federal Army nor to hold command in the police or rural
gendarmería in the district where the election is held, within
the last 90 days prior to the election.
Articles 73, Sec. XII,XIII, XIV, XV. [Among] the duties of Congress are:
• To declare war, in the light of the information submitted
by the Executive;
• To enact laws pursuant to which the capture of enemy
forces on sea and land must be declared; and to enact
maritime laws applicable in peace and war;
• To raise and maintain the armed forces of the Union,
to wit; army, navy and air force, and to regulate their
organization and service; and,
• To prescribe regulations or the purpose of organizing,
arming, and disciplining the national guard, reserving
to the citizens who compose it the appointment of their
respective commanders and officers, and to the States
the power of training it in accordance with the discipline
prescribed by such regulations.
Article 76, Sec. II, III, IV, and VII. [Among] the executive
powers of the Senate are:
• To ratify the appointments made by the President of the
Republic as ministers, diplomatic agents, consuls general,
high-level employees of the Treasury, colonels, and other
high-ranking chiefs of the national army, navy, and air
force, in accordance with the provisions of the law;
• To authorize him [the President] also to permit the
deployment of national troops beyond the borders of the
country, the passage of foreign troops through the national
18
territory, and the visits of squadrons of other powers for
more than a month in Mexican waters; and,
• To give its consent for the President of the Republic to
order the national guard outside its respective States,
fixing the necessary force.
Article 82, Sec. V. In order to be President, it is required
[among other things] not to be in active service, in case of
belonging to the Army, within 6 months prior to the day of
the election.
Article 83, Sec. IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII. [Among] the exclusive
powers of the President are:
• To appoint, with the approval of the Senate, the colonels
and other high-ranking officers of the army, navy, and air
force, and high-level employees of the Treasury;
• To appoint the other officers of the army, navy, and air
force, as provided by law;
• To dispose of the national guard for the same purposes,
under the terms indicated in Section IV of Article 76;
and,
• To declare war in the name of the United Mexican States,
pursuant to a previous law of the Congress of the Union.
Article 118, Sec. II and III. Nor shall the States, without the
consent of the Congress of the Union:
• Have at any time permanent troops or ships of war; and,
• Make war themselves on any foreign power, except in
cases of invasions and of danger so imminent that it does
not admit of delay. In such cases, a report shall be made
immediately to the President of the Republic.
Article 129. No military authority may, in time of peace,
perform any functions other than those that are directly
connected with military affairs. There shall be fixed and
permanent military commands only in the castles, forts, and
19
warehouses immediately subordinate to the Government
of the Union; or in encampments, barracks, or arsenals
established for the quartering of troops outside towns.
Article 132. The forts, barracks, storage warehouses, and other
buildings used by the Government of the Union for pubic
service or for common use shall be subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Powers in accordance with provisions to be
established in a law enacted by the Congress of the Union;
but in order that property acquired in the future within
the territory of any State shall likewise be under federal
jurisdiction, the consent of the respective legislature shall be
necessary.
More specific laws include the Código de Justicia Militar (Code
of Military Justice), the Ley Orgánica del Ejercito y de la Fuerza Aérea
Mexicanos (General Law for the Army and Air Force), and the Ley
Orgánica de la Armada (General Law for the Navy).
III. DOCTRINE, MISSIONS, EQUIPMENT,
AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Doctrine.
Mexican defense policy has developed over time as a response
to the historical reality of events since independence. It has always
been extremely inward looking, although indications are that this
may be slowly changing so as to allow at least discussion, if not
adoption, of a more worldly view of defense and security consistent
with the country’s self-image as an emerging hemispheric leader.
Despite energetic public discussion about many aspects of society
and government under the current president, the military has
avoided engaging in the debate, at least in public. The development
of defense policy and doctrine has not been the result of a white
paper-type process that starts with a traditional threat analysis, out of
which missions and tasks for the military are identified, elaborated,
and prioritized, which sets the stage for decisions to be made about
equipment and organization needed to meet these government20
assigned priorities. That should not, however, be understood to
say that the military has not reacted appropriately to changing
circumstances. Since the Chiapas uprising of 1994, and in light of the
continual increase in drug trafficking, the armed forces have done
their best to contend with new requirements and missions, but they
have had to do so without any major adjustments in structure and
especially in equipment.
Missions.
It is fair to say that Mexico does not face any external military
threat. The Mexican military certainly could not defend the country
against an attack by a force of equal size armed with modern
weapons. However, given the de facto umbrella of U.S. protection
similar to that enjoyed by Canada, this is not a major consideration.
The Mexicans correctly are focused on internal defense. Should
Mexico decide to play a role on the wider world stage, there would
have to be significant changes. Currently, the Army/Air Force have
five general missions assigned.
1. Defense of the Integrity, Independence, and Sovereignty of the Nation.
In effect, this is defense against external threats, the classic mission
all national armed forces have as a result of the prime obligation
of governments to protect and defend their population. But, as
mentioned, this is not an important factor even though it plays well
in public debates, in that the definition of what constitutes an external
threat in today’s climate of asymmetric threats is a matter of debate.
2. Internal Security. This is the most important and highest
profile mission. It includes military actions against narcotrafficking,
assistance and support to public security agencies, and maintenance
of internal order. Certain of these tasks may be very controversial,
as questions often arise about the proper, perhaps intersecting, roles
of the military, the civil police, and security agencies in the essential
matter of preserving civil order.
3. Civic Action and Social Projects that Assist in the Development of
the Nation. This is an extremely important mission as it allows the
government to provide help to the populace, even if the civil bodies
one would normally associate with this type of work (and they all
exist in Mexico) are incapable of delivering the service. Examples
21
are reforestation, education through the National Military Service
mentioned earlier, and support to sporting activities. The Army does
not receive much external credit for undertaking this mission.
4. Assisting the Population in Case of Public Necessity. Similar to
the above, this encompasses a range of assistance to poorer areas—
feeding hot meals to entire villages; medical and dental consultations,
including treatments and dispensary services; haircuts; painting
residences; repair of domestic electrical appliances; and veterinary
services—all at no cost to the recipient. This work is a major reason
for the overall high approval rating the military has among the
population at large. Another vital service is the provision of on-site
potable water to rural locations.
5. Assistance to the Population in Natural Disasters. This form of
assistance, provided under terms of Plan DN-III-E, is also a vital
service to the nation. The geographical reality of Mexico, and most of
Central America, is that natural disasters occur frequently, with the
resulting negative effects on the population and the economy. The
regional territorial commands of the Mexican forces are the prime
responders in time of disasters, and they are leaders in subsequent
reconstruction. The forces train hard for this role, and are regularly
tested by devastating hurricanes, floods, mudslides, forest fires,
volcanic eruptions, droughts and outbreaks of disease. In recent
years, the Mexican forces have deployed some of this capability
and expertise to assist their neighbors in Guatemala, Honduras, El
Salvador, and even Venezuela.
The Mexican Navy has two main stated missions, both derived
from the Constitution—the use of naval power to ensure external
defense and to assist in internal security. The Navy further breaks this
down into 15 sub-missions, but, with the exception of such things as
oceanographic scientific investigation and maritime contamination,
their focus and use by the government is the same as the Army.
Naval Equipment.
Although rich in both natural and human resources, Mexico is
not a wealthy nation, and the equipment of its armed forces reflects
this reality. In general, they have a plethora of too many different
22
types of vehicles, weapons, and equipment, and many of those
are obsolete. This has resulted in units that are generally poorly
equipped to meet the threats and challenges the country faces, such
as small rural insurgencies and well-equipped drug traffickers. These
latter two problems are, however, being actively addressed. Most
notably, forming, training, equipping and deploying airmobile and
amphibious Special Forces units/groups (GAFES/GANFES) in the
war on drugs have been emphasized. These are serious soldiers who
do well in their internal mission, and compare favorably to foreign
counterparts. Strategically, increasing importance has been placed
within the Army/Air Force on acquiring airborne surveillance
platforms, light aircraft, rotary wing aircraft, and rapid troop
transport. The Navy has obtained fast patrol boats and launches to
interdict drug runners, it has built a fleet of fast gun boats, it has
acquired shipborne helicopters, and it is replacing engines in its
aging destroyers to make them more effective in fishery protection
and drug interdiction.
Army Equipment.
The Mexican Army, with a strength of some 144,000, has a wide
variety of weapons and equipment in its inventory, much of it is
procured off-shore but some manufactured by the military owned
and operated Fabrica Nacional organization. Among the Army’s
many and diverse types of equipment are 136 French-built AMX-13
light tanks acquired from Belgium; some 105 armored cars of various
makes; roughly 575 armored personnel carriers, mostly French-made,
but including a number manufactured locally; about 195 artillery
pieces and howitzers; over 1500 medium and heavy mortars, along
with limited numbers of anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft missiles;
and a wide variety of unarmored troop transporters and logistics
12
vehicles. Much of this equipment is obsolescent or obsolete. The
basic infantry weapon is the G3 rifle, made in Mexico.
Air Force Equipment.
The Mexican Air Force, with just under 12,000 members, has
a fleet of 107 combat aircraft (including 10 F-5s, 70 Pilatus PC-7s,
23
and 17 T-33s); 71 armed helicopters, mainly Bell Jet Ranger and Huey
variants, but including some Soviet Mi 8s; and another 90 transport
helicopters. It has a transport fleet of 35 aircraft, including one Boeing
13
757, 3 Boeing 727, and 7 C-130 Hercules. In all, the Mexican Air
Force maintains some 32 different types of aircraft.
In addition, the Air Force is obtaining Embraer surveillance and
command and control platforms. At first glance, this is an impressive
array. The reality, however, is that much of the equipment is
outdated and often unserviceable. The wide variety has caused a
tremendous logistics, maintenance, and training problem for the Air
Force. Spare parts are increasingly difficult to obtain, maintenance
personnel are lured away by the better paying private sector, and
flying hours are low for pilots. Procurement of Russian rotary wing
equipment at bargain basement prices recently has provided a boost
to troop transport and rapid reaction capability, but it has not solved
the longer-term requirement. The Air Force is overdue for a major
rationalization of its fleets, but senior Air Force officers do not have
much voice in the hierarchy.
Naval Equipment.
The Mexican Navy values its self-image as a blue-water navy,
but suffers from the same problem as the Air Force—a hodgepodge
of too many different types of vessels. Many of its larger ships are
obsolete ex-U.S. Navy vessels of World War II vintage. Among its
newer acquisitions are eight Holzinger class gunboats, the first two
coming into service in 1999. These were designed and constructed at
the Navy’s own shipyards, which are an important national strategic
infrastructure. In addition, Swedish fast launches have been procured
for interdictions close to the coastlines.
The Navy, with a strength of 37,000, has 11 principal surface
combatants (3 destroyers and 8 frigates), 109 patrol and coastal
combatants (44 offshore patrol, 41 coastal patrol, 6 inshore patrol,
and 18 riverine patrol), 3 amphibious tank landing ships (LSTs), 19
support vessels, and a host of auxiliary and training vessels. Naval
aviation consists of eight combat aircraft, several transport aircraft of
different sizes, and helicopters of at least seven different types and
14
ages.
24
The Marines are organized in 3 brigades, each of 3 battalions,
2 airborne battalions, 1 Presidential Guard battalion, 11 regional
battalions, and miscellaneous coastal defense units.
The Navy suffers from the same logistics and maintenance
challenges as the Air Force, but its network of naval shipyards
provides a significant in-house maintenance and construction
capability.
Notwithstanding the age and utility of some of this equipment, the
Mexican armed forces are the most significant in the region between
the Rio Grande border with the United States and the Panama
Canal. None of the three forces has come under the sort of rigorous
external fiscal scrutiny that might force a thorough rationalization
of organization and equipment leading to a major new procurement
program.
Professional Development.
The 1994 Zapatista uprising had two effects on the Mexican
military, principally the Army, that persist to this day. First, it served
as a wakeup call for a proud institution that found itself held at bay
by a group of lightly armed peasants, which brought international
scrutiny upon the country and its security policies and forces.
Second, it provided sound justification for additional funding for
modernization. This was quickly recognized and taken advantage
of by the military hierarchy. In addition to significant equipment
purchases, the institution embarked upon a thorough review of
its professional development of the officer corps, as well as of its
training and organization.
The senior leadership of the armed forces recognized that
perpetuation of the status quo was not enough to ensure the forces’
utility in the future, and that a far more focused approach was needed.
Over the period of 10 years, massive improvements to barracks and
training facilities have been made throughout the country, and new
courses for Special Forces and the Army in low intensity warfare
developed. The most significant changes have, however, been in the
field of professional development for officers. Schools and courses
were developed for all rank levels, with successful completion being
a prerequisite for advancement. There is a course for captains, a
25
course for majors and lieutenant colonels, and a senior course for
colonels and brigadiers, all based at least in part on the American
equivalents. These closely resemble the Canadian Army’s junior staff
course, the Canadian Forces Command and Staff Course, and the
defense colleges of most Western countries. The Mexicans enjoy an
active and productive exchange student program at the officer cadet
and field officer level with several Latin American countries (e.g.,
Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela), with Spain and France,
and with the United States. Recently an officer attended the National
Security Studies Course at the Canadian Forces College. The Mexican
forces have also introduced computer-based simulation equipment
and exercises. They have built a superb National Training Center
in Chihuahua where brigade-size all arms exercises are conducted
regularly. These exercises usually include practicing the road, rail,
and air deployment of the formations from their home location to the
training center. Language training has received increased emphasis,
especially in the Navy; and in the Army, selected officers are being
taught indigenous dialects to assist in communicating with the local
residents when the Army is deployed to provide social services in
remote locations. Of course, because of their long-standing but rarely
discussed relationship with the United States, hundreds of Mexican
officers and noncommissioned officers train in American military
schools every year.
However, perhaps the most noteworthy advancements have
come in human rights training and Rules of Engagement (ROEs)
formulation. Virtually every course, whether for privates or generals,
includes a human rights component. For example, many training
areas include mock-ups of villages where situational exercises assist
young soldiers in learning what is acceptable conduct and what is not.
Discussions with human rights organizations show that the number of
accusations of violations by the military has plummeted, and very few
of those are found to have substance. ROEs for a variety of situations
have been established, and it is believed that they have resulted in
remarkable restraint being shown by young officers and soldiers in
some very provocative situations, often with media cameras rolling,
hoping the military will overreact. These developments show a high
degree of maturation and professionalization.
26
IV. POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE CHANGING
NATURE OF THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES
The coming to power of President Vicente Fox in December 2000
was a momentous event in Mexican politics. After 71 years in power,
the PRI was defeated at the polls, receiving only 36.1 percent of the
popular vote. The election of Fox to the presidency can be regarded
as the culmination of a protracted and complex process of political
change that Mexico has undergone since the mid 1980s. This process,
as well as changing international circumstances, has affected the
relationship between the civil authority and the Mexican military,
as well as the roles the armed forces are asked to perform. In this
section, first is a brief overview of the process of political change in
Mexico, highlighting the most important developments. Second is
the changing role of the Mexican armed forces. The several Central
American crises of the 1980s, the emergence of drug trafficking as
a threat to national security, and the Chiapas rebellion of 1994 all
have contributed to growth in the size of Mexico’s standing army, as
well as expansion of its responsibilities, in what has been referred to
as a “remilitarization of Mexico.” The most important changes that
have occurred in the way the military interacts with government
are discussed. Both the process of democratization in Mexico and
the increased responsibilities of the armed forces have altered this
relationship.
Political Change in Mexico.
As was discussed earlier, by 1940 the structures had been put in
place to sustain the “perfect dictatorship” in Mexico; and between
1940 and the early 1980s the PRI dominated all aspects of national
life. Its authoritarian-corporatist structure allowed for the resolution
of conflict within the party, thus maintaining political stability.
15
Thirty years (1940-70) of high and sustained economic growth —the
so-called Mexican miracle—provided the regime with the financial
resources to distribute in the form of patronage and other forms of
pay off. One observer has described the PRI regime as a “gigantic,
pork-barrelling political machine, soaking the bulk of the population
16
and selectively rewarding its leaders and adherents.”
27
By the early 1970s, the system had begun to crack. On the
economic front, the corporatist-populist economic model, which
had been very successful in sustaining economic growth, began
to show signs of exhaustion. State-owned enterprises and tariffprotected private firms became highly uncompetitive, subsidies did
not follow any economic rationale, the balance of payments deficit
grew as agricultural production declined, and macro-economic
policy became highly politicized. On the political front, the regime’s
authoritarian structure came under strain as the PRI lost a great
deal of its legitimacy. President Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970–76)
attempted to rebuild support for the regime by allowing for greater
political expression through electoral reform that made it easier for
small opposition parties to gain seats in the lower house of Congress.
He also loosened government censorship over some media outlets,
and co-opted some leaders of groups opposed to the regime.
Echeverría began to introduce austerity measures soon after
coming to power, but shortly they were abandoned in favor
of an expansionist economic policy through which the state
acquired several hundred business enterprises and increased total
government expenditures. The discovery of oil in the southern states
of Chiapas and Tabasco in the mid-1970s allowed the government
to increase spending. Echeverría significantly expanded the size of
the government bureaucracy, attempting to use public employment
to foster economic growth, and thereby fuelling the gigantic
political-corporatist machine with state resources. He contributed
to improvements in higher education by building new facilities and
giving financial support, increasing subsidies to organized labor,
and expanding social programs such as housing, social security,
nutrition, and rural development.
With the help of high petroleum prices and heavy borrowing
from international financial markets awash in “petrodollars,” Mexico
enjoyed a brief period of economic boom from 1976 until 1981, when
the economy grew at an average of 8.5 percent each year. However,
when international petroleum prices fell in 1981-82 and the price of
borrowing from international lenders increased, Mexico was unable
to service its foreign debt or secure the foreign exchange necessary
to pay for essential imports, thus forcing a steep devaluation of the
peso. The Mexican economy consequently crashed, and the old
28
economic model crumbled. In 1982, the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) dropped by 1.5 percent, inflation reached 100 percent,
unemployment doubled to 8 percent, and the public deficit soared
to 18 percent of GDP. This economic meltdown—the worst since
the Great Depression—marked the onset of a new era of economic
reform and the beginning of the demise of the PRI’s hegemony.
Mexico experienced profound change in the 1980s, adopting a
new economic model based on neo-liberal tenets and beginning a
process of political transition. The administrations of presidents
Miguel de la Madrid (1982–88) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–
94) implemented structural adjustment policies and a fairly radical
series of market reforms that culminated in the country joining the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in January 1994.
The first years of the de la Madrid administration saw the adoption of
radical stabilization programs. In 1985 this became a comprehensive
program of structural adjustment reforms, which were accelerated
during the Salinas administration. These included an extensive
program of privatization of state-owned enterprises, as well as the
liberalization of trade, exchange rates, and industrial policy. By
1987, tariffs had been reduced to 20 percent from levels of 50 to 100
percent, and, with the accession of Mexico to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986, virtually all import licenses had
17
been eliminated by 1987. The government also lifted restrictions
on foreign direct investment, deregulated both commercial and
industrial activities, and eliminated numerous subsidies to targeted
groups of consumers and producers.
The crash of 1982 and the ensuing economic deterioration, along
with the series of economic reforms introduced during the 1980s,
had a severe impact on social conditions, resulting in increased
unemployment, lowered real wages, and generally declined standards
of living. This economic downturn had serious repercussions for the
regime. Within the PRI, the economic meltdown strained the party’s
heterogeneous coalition, as it could no longer afford to provide
resources to its various allies—the peasants, organized labor, the
federal bureaucracy, and the employees of state-owned enterprises.
This provoked party infighting over national economic policy. The
internal struggles culminated in 1987, when Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas
Solórzano (son of former president Lázaro Cárdenas) defected from
29
the PRI and launched an independent presidential bid in 1988—the
first real challenge to the PRI since its coming to power. The elections
of 1988 were marred by widespread allegations of fraud, further
eroding the PRI’s legitimacy. For the business community, the
economic downturn fractured its relationship with the regime and
exposed the necessity for fundamental economic structural change.
Perhaps more important, the economic crisis gave rise to largescale social mobilization, as citizens began to withdraw from the
corporatist structure of the party and place their demands directly
on the state. By the end of the 1980s, the PRI effectively had lost
legitimacy with the Mexican population, and the old regime was in
crisis.
Faced with the collapse of the party’s legitimacy, President
Salinas attempted a difficult balancing act—restructuring the
system through deepening economic reform and establishing new
18
institutions without ceding power to the opposition. Part of his
strategy was to achieve economic reform while still retaining power.
He took several measures to weaken the influence of organized labor
on policy, such as creating new interlocutors in the labor movement
under the banner of “new unionism,” reconstructing the popular
bases of the PRI at its expense, and reducing its influence on social
policy. Although he appeared to have been partially successful in
regaining support for the PRI in the mid-term legislative elections
of 1991—the PRI received 61 percent of the vote—his attempts to
revive the party through economic reform and neo-authoritarianism
proved unsuccessful. A sluggish recovery exacerbated socioeconomic inequalities, popular mobilization accelerated throughout
the country, the media became increasingly critical, and opposition
parties became viable governments-in-waiting. Moreover, in 1994 a
guerrilla movement emerged in Chiapas, and the political infighting
that had began to brew in the party in the 1980s culminated with
the assassination of two prominent party officials. Political chaos
deepened in late 1994 when Mexico’s economy again was thrust
into crisis, prompting another precipitous devaluation of the peso.
By the end of 1995, the country was experiencing armed conflict,
an unprecedented increase in incidents of violence, and the worst
economic crisis in decades.
30
President Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) began his administration
against this backdrop of severe political and economic crises. While
Zedillo continued Salinas’ economic policies, he agreed to bring
about significant political reforms. In 1996, by negotiating with the
country’s main opposition parties, he secured agreement to a major
electoral reform (COFIPE) that granted the Federal Electoral Institute
(IFE) complete autonomy, and enhanced its power to oversee,
supervise, and administer elections. It also expanded the power
of the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE), levelled the finance and
media playing fields for all parties, and introduced restrictions on
individual contributions to party financing and to media coverage.
These reforms enabled opposition parties to make significant electoral
inroads at the subnational level as they elected increasing numbers
of municipal governments and state governorships—including the
mayor of Mexico City in 1997—as well as gaining control over the
Lower House of Congress in 1997, and, ultimately, the presidency in
2000.
Beyond the significant electoral reforms that Zedillo introduced,
under his administration other major changes took place, including
a weakening of the centralization of power as it began to “disperse”
through the system. In terms of intergovernmental relations, for
example, he introduced an important decentralization program
under the banner of “New Federalism” that devolved power to state
and municipal levels in areas involving education, health, poverty
alleviation, and development projects. It appears that Zedillo was
either unwilling or unable to exercise the same degree of power as
his predecessors. A good case in point was his refusal to intervene
in a contentious election in the state of Tabasco, during which the
PRI’s candidate was accused of having exceeded the spending limits
19
significantly (by almost 50 fold!). He also curbed the power of the
presidency in the selection of PRI candidates. Under the declared
need to establish a “healthy distance” between the state and the
party, he essentially annulled the president’s “right” to appoint his
successor (dedazo), and brought in a U.S.-primary style candidate
election process within the PRI in 1999. Zedillo in effect permitted a
significant reduction in the power of the president. It has been argued
that the reforms he undertook were the result of his reformist zeal.
Although there is no doubt that he did demonstrate a commitment
31
to some of the changes (i.e., decentralizing power), in other cases it
seems he had little choice. Given the severity of the economic and
political situation he inherited, the strong pressures from below, and
international pressure to democratize, it is difficult to see how the
president could have refused to bring about substantive electoral
reform without risking serious social unrest.
The “Remilitarization” of Mexico.
During the PRI’s hegemonic rule, Mexico’s foreign policy was
firmly grounded on the principle of nonintervention, and PRI leaders
consistently disavowed the use of military force to solve international
problems. In effect, the country did not have an international military
policy. This resulted, as has been shown, in a policy/doctrine in which
the armed forces focused on the preservation of internal order. From
the 1950s until the 1970s, they concentrated on maintaining order
by policing both urban and rural areas and by actively suppressing
dissident guerrilla activities. During the 1980s, Mexico started to
experience a process of remilitarization as international conditions
changed, and new internal threats emerged.
On the international front, Mexico’s isolationist position began
to change in the late 1970s as it attempted to prevent a spill-over
of numerous Central American insurgencies. In 1979, after having
withdrawn its support for the government of Nicaraguan dictator
Anastasio Somoza and soon after endorsing the Sandinista
revolution, Mexico established foreign policy goals of maintaining
stability and minimizing external influence in the region. In effect,
it became an active player by becoming an ally of France (through
the endorsement of Salvadorian insurgents as a political force) by
openly opposing American support for the political elites of El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and by applying pressure on
the Sandinista government not to change its economic policy. Most
notably, Mexico was in the forefront of forming a regional alliance
called Grupo Contadora that aimed at forming a common block with
other countries that supported Mexico’s position, such as Venezuela,
Panama, and Colombia. These actions affected the Mexican armed
forces in a number of ways, but, most important, they resulted in the
inclusion of generals in discussions about national security, about
32
the deployment of troops to southern states, especially Chiapas, and
about an increase in defense spending. The designation of a serving
general, Abaslón Castellanos Domínguez, as governor of Chiapas
from 1982 until 1988, was of special interest.
Domestically, the role of the armed forces began to change in
the late 1970s. As the flow of illegal drugs through national territory
increased, mostly from Central and South America to the United States,
the Mexican government began to rely on the military to fight this
new threat because of the notorious weakness and corruption-prone
nature of its police forces. To put this significant effort into context,
it is important to understand that the increase in the drug trade was
largely the result of a continued increase in American consumption
of drugs during this time. In 1977, the Mexican government instituted
Plan Condor, an operation that assigned significant military resources
to the anti-drug fight through direct action: it involved a force of close
to 16,500 troops. By 1985, the number of military personnel involved
had increased to 25,000, representing 18 percent of the active duty
Army, a number that increased to 25 percent by 2000. By 1985, 7
years after this struggle began, 315 military personnel had died in
the “war on drugs.”
The military’s role in the antinarcotics campaign accelerated in
the late 1980s under the Salinas administration, after he declared
20
drug trafficking to be an issue of national security. The armed forces
increased their interdiction efforts by establishing checkpoints along
all major roads and highways, seizing maritime vessels suspected of
carrying drugs, patrolling beaches, and increasing surveillance of the
21
maritime approaches. Under the Zedillo administration (1994-2000),
the role of the armed forces in counternarcotics activities continued
to grow. The Defense Ministry (SEDENA) issued what is known as
the “Azteca Directive” as a result of modification of the Constitution
and the Criminal Code. This established the military’s permanent
campaign against drug trafficking, with programs to eradicate drug
22
crops, confiscate illegal drugs, and combat organized crime. During
this time the “Plan to Combat Drug Trafficking” was established and
the Drug Control Planning Center (CENDRO) created. Zedillo sent
the first of several thousand young men to the United States to study
23
antinarcotic tactics and apply them at home.
33
The armed forces increased their role in the fight against drug
trafficking as successive presidents placed military officers in charge
of civil institutions with responsibilities for law enforcement, public
security, and intelligence gathering. Since the Zedillo administration,
for example, the Drug Control Planning Center (CENDRO), the
Federal Preventative Police (PFP) and the National Institute to
Combat Drugs have been headed by military officers, and the
Center for National Security and Intelligence—Mexico’s intelligence
agency—increasingly has been run by the military. Moreover, when
Zedillo established the PFP in 1999, he “borrowed” military personnel
while new civilian officials were selected and trained. The number
of soldiers within this institution has steadily increased, some of
whom have been drawn from the Federal Support Forces (FFA)—
which is made up of military police and members of the Navy. Eight
Army units were transferred to the FFA, and 1,600 members of naval
battalions were also added to the PFP.
Although President Vicente Fox pledged during his election
campaign that he would reduce the military involvement in the
fight against drug trafficking, it appears that quite the opposite has
occurred. The armed forces, in fact, have been given responsibility
for activities previously under the purview of civil institutions.
Since he came to power, Fox has used special battalions and military
intelligence in pursuing and arresting drug traffickers, and the Army
has been directly involved in dismantling and tracking cartels and
staging commando operations. Perhaps the clearest example of the
increased penetration of the armed forces into the civil branches
of government was the appointment in 2000 of Brigadier General
Rafael Macedo de la Concha to be Attorney General, the first time in
Mexico’s history that a military officer has ever served in that office.
Since that time, several other senior military officers have been
named to counternarcotics and intelligence positions within the
Attorney General’s Office (PGR). By late 2002 at least 227 military
officers were in the institution, 20 of whom headed up important
bureaus overseeing intelligence, eradication, interdiction, and seized
assets. Overall, 107 members of the military were assigned to the
Special Prosecutor for Drug Crimes (FEADS), 42 to the federal police,
24
8 to the CENDRO, and 70 others to various divisions and units. In
addition, both the PFP and the FFA are headed by general officers.
34
The Chiapas rebellion of 1994 also had a significant effect on the
armed forces. The administrations of both Salinas and Zedillo relied
on the Army to contain the uprising of Subcomandante Marcos and
his Zapatista rebels while peace negotiations took place. During the
Zedillo administration, troops were deployed to Chiapas province,
and numerous checkpoints were established on the highways that
surrounded the so-called “conflict zone.” It is important to note that
large numbers of the troops deployed to the region were used to
provide hot meals and medical services, and for transportation and
general base duties. During the 1990s, the armed forces also increased
their activities through implementation of Plan DN-III (referred to
earlier), which is intended to assist the population in times of natural
disasters by providing medicine, potable water, and other basic
necessities. For example, from 1997 until 1999, the military helped
to more than 115,000 victims of natural disasters. Also, from 1995
until 1999, Army and Air Force elements fought forest fires in a vast
25
area.
These changes in the role of the armed forces have resulted in an
increase in government spending on the forces, allowing the size of
the military to double from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. In 1990,
total government expenditure on the military (through the Ministries
of Defense and the Navy) was .48 percent of GDP (See Figure 5). This
increased to 0.57 percent in 1994, the year the Zapatista rebellion
broke out. Despite a small decrease in 1995 and 1996 (the years
following the Peso Crisis), the amount increased again, reaching
.60 percent in 1999. This is roughly in line with the Latin American
spending average, which is .542 percent, but it should be noted
that Mexico, unlike the other large countries in the region, does not
participate in expensive international operations. As a percentage of
total government spending, an exponential increase in the military
budgets occurred during the 1990s.
The size of the Mexican armed forces also increased as a result
of the expansion of their responsibilities and increased funding
(Figure 6). While in 1985 the total number of active personnel stood
at approximately 130,000, the number increased to close to 150,000
by 1990 and to some 240,000 by 2003.
35
Year
As a Percentage of Total
Government Expenditure (Budget)
As a Percentage of GDP
1990
1992
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
0.48
0.52
0.57
0.56
0.56
0.58
0.58
0.60
1.96
–
3.93
3.60
3.68
3.50
3.60
3.34
Based on figures from The Military Balance, London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, for the years cited.
Figure 5. Expenditure on the Armed Forces.
Year
Total Number of Active Personnel
1985
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
129,100
151,500
198,900
203,800
210,200
217,800
225,200
235,000
235,000
235,000
232,000
237,000
241,100
Sources: Compiled from Statesman’s Yearbook, New York: St. Martin’s Press; The
Military Balance, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies; The Europa World
Year Book, Vol. II, London: Europa Publications, 1995; Benítez Manaut, “Security and
Governance,” Op. Cit.; and Grayson, Mexico’s Armed Forces: A Factbook, p. 38.
Figure 6. Mexico’s Armed Forces.
36
Year
Change or Event
1977
Creation of the Airborne Special Forces Groups (GAFEs). There are
approximately 64 GAFE units across the country, 2 per military region
and one per military zone.
Plan Condor is established.
1988
President Salinas declares drug trafficking a threat to national security.
1994
Deployment of troops to the state of Chiapas.
President Zedillo declares drug trafficking “the most severe” threat to
national security.
Promulgation of the Azteca Directive.
1996
Creation of the Drug Control Planning Center (CENDRO).
Establishment of the Plan to Combat Drug Trafficking.
1997
The Special Antinarcotics Prosecutor (INCD) is disbanded and replaced by the Special Prosecutor for Drug Crimes (FEADS).
1999
Creation of the Federal Preventive Police (PFP).
2000
General Rafael Macedo de la Concha is appointed Attorney General.
2001
Reinforcement of Navy surveillance of oil installations in the Gulf of
Mexico against terrorist threats.
Federal Judicial Police (PFP) replaced by the Federal Investigation
Agency (AFI).
Creation of two schools for Special Forces training.
2002
Reorganization of GAFEs through the integration of three brigades
and nine special forces units.
Leader of the Tijuana Cartel, Benjamin Arellano Felix, is arrested.
2003
Establishment of “smart border” with the United States and increased
cooperation in intelligence gathering.
FBI and CIA agents are allowed to operate at Mexico City airport.
Figure 7. Important Institutional Changes and Events.
As can be seen in Figure 7, the changes that have taken place
within Mexico and internationally have altered and expanded the
traditional role of the Mexican armed forces, which, in turn, has
resulted in an increase in their size. The most salient aspects of their
changing roles are perhaps the increased responsibility they have
acquired in the fight against drug trafficking and in maintaining
37
public security, and the increased influence they have had in the
running of civilian institutions. This, in turn, also has affected the
civil-military relationship that has characterized the country for
several decades.
Since Vicente Fox came into power, he has instituted several
important changes to the structure and organization of the armed
26
forces. He created the Public Security and Justice Services Agency,
with cabinet-level status to oversee and coordinate the formulation
and implementation of security policies, and he increased the size of
the PFP by 25 percent by bringing in 826 recruits from the Navy and
the Army.
Changing Civil-Military Relations in Mexico.
As discussed earlier, civil-military relations under the “perfect
dictatorship” were characterized by a “pact” under which the armed
forces afforded complete loyalty to the president and withdrew from
the political and policymaking processes in return for autonomy in
the internal running of the forces. An important consequence of the
pact was that the civilian authority did not exercise much oversight
over the forces, especially in regard to equipment acquisition and the
promotions process. The pact remained stable until the mid-1980s.
The Central American crises of the 1980s and the increased
responsibilities assigned to the military, especially in the fight
against drug trafficking, affected the civil-military pact. Because
the new tasks demanded military planning, the senior leaders of
the armed forces began to be consulted about the formulation of
security and defense policy. This was accomplished primarily by
means of better communications between officials the Ministry
of the Interior (SEGOB) and the Navy and Defense Ministries,
as well as through the National Security Council. Although there
were serious differences of opinion between civilians and highranking officers—which became more pronounced after the Chiapas
uprising, which the military had warned of in advance—there was
also increased cooperation. Since President Fox came to power, he
actively has encouraged officials from all services to participate in
inter-institutional efforts to establish federal policies, similar to the
27
way interagency groups operate in the United States. Staff Sections 2
38
and 7 of SEDENA (Army Intelligence and Military Operations) have
taken over responsibility for investigating drug cartels’ leadership
structures, and President Fox has involved special forces battalions
28
in supporting regional commanders’ “high impact” operations.
The appointment of a general officer as Attorney General has meant
increased contact between that office and the armed forces (202
members of the armed forces were assigned to the PGR in 2003).
The Minister of Defense and the Minister of the Navy also have
encouraged a close relation with the civilian authorities as they have
attempted to establish continuous communication with the President.
This may have occurred partly as a result of their more “academic”
background and open-minded outlook.
Increased opposition to the PRI during the 1980s also affected
the civil-military pact. As the PRI began to lose its dominant place
and opposition parties acquired greater prominence, the traditional
neutrality of the armed forces was questioned as some generals were
openly critical of the regime, and in some instances even went so far
as to express sympathy for opposition parties. In 1990, for example,
General Alberto Quintanar declared that he would advise the leftleaning Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) on security
matters, and during the 1990s some others, most notably General
Luis Garfias, were elected to Congress on the PRD ticket. Further,
in an effort to ensure that the political elite of the PRI would not
be able to use the military to their advantage during the process of
political change, members of the opposition demanded publicly that
29
the armed forces declare their neutrality. Since Fox’s election in
2000, the Minister of National Defense repeatedly has declared that
armed forces will obey the orders of the President, regardless of his
political affiliation.
The growth of opposition parties also has led to some questioning
of the constitutional role of the armed forces. For example, in 1996
the opposition IRD argued that the increased role of the military in
policing and in the fight against organized crime violated Article
129 of the Constitution, and took its case to the Supreme Court. The
Court ruled, however, that “while the authorities require the support
of the army, and considering that the armed forces are at the order
of the President, its participation in assignments dealing with public
security are not in violation of constitutional provisions.”
39
The PRI’s loss of its majority in the lower house in 1997 meant
that members of Congress belonging to opposition parties have
become more interested in military affairs, and have demanded
more accountability from the military, especially regarding the
officer promotion process. This is perhaps one of the most significant
changes in civil-military relations that have accompanied the process
of democratization, and it has certainly altered the traditional civilmilitary pact. By law, Congress, through its standing committees (in
both houses) is responsible for oversight of all government agencies
and the procurement process. Members of Congress have become
more active in exercising this responsibility, and are more critical. In
1999, for example, the PRD openly questioned some practices of the
armed forces, such as the secrecy in which the promotion process
takes place, and demanded a reform of the legal framework. In 2000
the newly elected Congress demanded that both the Ministers of
Defense and Navy appear before congressional standing committees,
30
which they had never before been required to do. The Senate also
has become more active in reviewing the promotion process, as it
has the right to veto any recommendation for promotion, and it also
has become more active in oversight of the procurement process. The
increased interest in military affairs shown by opposition members of
Congress and their efforts to carry out their oversight responsibilities
have resulted in far better communication between the legislative
31
branch of government and top military officials. This, indeed, is a
positive, if rather novel, development in civil-military relations in
Mexico.
Improved oversight by members of Congress and the appointment
of reform-minded Ministers of Defense and of the Navy have resulted
in increased transparency and important structural changes, especially within the Navy. For example, a new generation of admirals has
reduced the size of its administrative structure and created a Council
of Admirals which advises the Minister of the Navy on policy and
strategy. It also designates assignments for officers above the rank of
Commander. As noted earlier, promotion of officers to senior rank,
a purely internal matter under the so-called “pact,” was always a
contentious issue; thus the creation of a promotions committee
made up of captains and admirals to decide on officer promotions
32
has been an important development. The Army has followed suit
40
and in October 2003 created its own pomotions committee. But the
decisions of both committees must now be ratified by the Senate.
As recently as the late 1990s, as part of the civil-military pact under
the PRI, the promotions process was conducted mostly within the
armed forces by the top brass without significant input from the
civilian authority. These changes point to a reduction in autonomy
in the internal running of the military, and a positive step toward a
better civil-military relationship.
The other salient aspect that characterized the civil-military pact
was the secrecy within which the forces tended to operate. In this
regard, there also appear to be important changes brought about by
the process of democratization: transparency is now demanded of
the armed forces. In 2003, President Fox enacted the Law of Access to
Information (similar to the Canadian Access to Information Act) which
requires that all federal government agencies disclose information to
the public upon request. This has forced the armed forces to release
information on, among other things, equipment procurement, the
selection of private contractors, and all expenditures, a practice
never before even considered. Both Ministers have been willing to
comply.
The changes described may not amount to a complete reformulation of the civil-military pact—a demand made by some social and
political circles soon after Fox’s election to the presidency—but they
constitute a significant alteration. There are, of course, other areas
where further changes would be beneficial. For example, although
members of Congress have become more interested in military
affairs, the fact that they are barred by the Constitution from running
for a second term has a negative effect on their ability to develop
expertise and thus be more effective in their oversight role. This is
particularly the case with regard to the promotion process, as the
lack of knowledge about military structures, the rank system, and
33
military life in general limits their ability to oversee the process.
Then, too, there is still little control by civilian authorities over the
internal allocation of resources. Finally, contrary to what some
34
observers have suggested, an informed and engaged “defense
community”—made up of civilians inside and outside government,
academics, and military officials—has yet to emerge. Such a
community would facilitate the interaction and communication
41
between civilian authority and the military. Regrettably, in Mexico
only a handful of academics and journalists are interested in military
affairs, and rarely do they interact actively and openly with military
officials.
Several points need to be made about the changing nature of the
35
civil-military pact. First, some observers are critical of the increased
responsibilities the armed forces have been given, especially those
relating to public security which in other countries fall under the
36
jurisdiction of civil institutions. This may be regarded as especially
risky in a part of the world where the military has been active
politically. What is important to note in the Mexican case, however,
is that the civilian authority has asked the armed forces to take on
these new roles; this has not been a military initiative. Because of
the weakness of civil institutions such as the police forces, the
military was directed by the government to broaden its political
responsibilities. Clearly the Mexican armed forces are firmly under
civilian control, despite some shortcomings in oversight mentioned
earlier, and there is absolutely no evidence of any diminished loyalty
to the President. It is true that the Minister of Defense has become
more outspoken and has begun to comment in public on matters of
national political concern (such as the inability of Fox to cooperate
with other political parties, and the failure to reduce poverty), but
this can be seen as a part of changing and dynamic political relations
between civilian and military forces described by Douglas Bland in
37
his theory of “shared responsibilities.” The more active role can be
considered a positive step toward healthier civil-military relations,
as there has been an increased flow of ideas between the two.
Second, we must remember that the military is trusted by the
Mexican people more than any other national institution. Polling
consistently shows that Mexicans have more confidence in the armed
38
forces than in the police or the justice system, despite negative
media coverage during the Chiapas uprising and allegations of
corruption. Because of the high levels of trust Mexicans have for the
military, it is likely that the armed forces will continue to be tasked
to carry out jobs that in other countries would be police or judicial
responsibilities, simply to get things done. The real challenge for
Mexico as it consolidates its democratization is the strengthening of
its civil institutions so this is no longer necessary. Finally, a commonly
42
held perception among foreign observers is that widespread
corruption in the Mexican armed forces exists. While it is true that
the military’s involvement in the fight against drug trafficking has
given its members opportunities to engage in corrupt practices,
successive administrations have been diligent in addressing the
problem. Between 1995 and 2000, several military officers have
39
been tried on corruption charges, and, to limit the temptations that
might arise if an individual were to develop intimate links in any one
location, officers are rotated from one garrison to another regularly.
Very likely the problem has been exaggerated, given the high levels
of trust the citizenry continue to express for the armed forces.
V. TOWARD CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE CANADIAN AND THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES
This monograph has been written to dispel many of the common
misconceptions about the Mexican armed forces that have resulted
from its long-standing inward-oriented focus, from negative
international press coverage, and because of the lack of knowledge
outside Mexico about its structure and roles. In Canada, this is, in
part, because, for the past half-century, the Canadian Forces’ external
focus was on interoperability with the armed forces of other NATO
member countries in Europe, or, to some extent, on foreign forces
with which it worked in UN peacekeeping missions.
Despite problems and challenges of the past, the Mexican armed
forces of today have made significant strides toward becoming vital
and professional institutions within a country that is now taking its
place alongside other democracies. The Army, Navy, and Air Force
are well-trained and dynamic organizations that are well-respected
by a significant number of Mexicans, and they are adapting well to
changing political circumstances. No doubt there are areas in which
the Mexican forces could show further evidence of liberalization,
perhaps especially in regard to the excessive secretiveness that
continues to prevail. But, even here change is happening because
of a new generation of senior officers who have a more open and
outward-looking view of the world.
Having examined the Mexican military and the changing nature
of civil-military relations in the Canadian context, two questions
43
immediately come to mind: What has been the relationship between
the Mexican and Canadian armed forces in the past? and, Is greater
cooperation possible? It is a fact, regrettable perhaps, that direct
military-to-military relations between the Canadian and Mexican
forces have been of a relatively minor nature. Perhaps the most
important recent step in that relationship was the exchange of
military attachés in the early 1990s, so the groundwork to facilitate
future initiatives does exist. Unlike the Mexican military attaché
in Ottawa, the Canadian attaché in Mexico is also cross-accredited
to seven other Central American and Caribbean countries, but his
priority clearly is focused on the bilateral dynamic with Mexico.
To date, the few successful contact initiatives have been limited
to a small number of Mexican officers participating in exercises at
the Peace Support Training Center in Kingston and at the Pearson
Peacekeeping Center in Nova Scotia, and the attendance of a Mexican
officer at the year-long staff college course in Toronto. Also, port visits
by Canadian vessels on the West Coast of Mexico have occurred,
and a member of the Canadian Forces participated in a cruise on
the Mexican Navy’s sail-training vessel. Of course, opportunities for
greater Canadian Forces’ involvement are hampered by the lack of
Spanish-speaking personnel, and that is likely to remain a serious
limitation for reciprocal exchanges. The Mexicans, of course, have
many English-speaking personnel.
If we look at what type of cooperative ventures would benefit
both armed forces in the future, the area that immediately comes to
mind is Mexican interest in peacekeeping, and the Canadian Forces’
interest and experience in employing its troops in austere locations
with geographical conditions very different from Canada. Increased
contact and cooperation between the two armed forces might be
possible in the following areas:
• Include more Mexican officers in courses at the Pearson
Peacekeeping Center and the Peace Support Training Center,
especially the UN Observer course;
• Invite Mexican officers to observe predeployment training of
Canadian units preparing to go on UN missions;
• Invite Mexican officers to visit Canadian units deployed on
UN missions;
44
• Invite Mexico to provide junior staff officers to serve in a
deployed Canadian headquarters;
• Invite the Pearson Peacekeeping Center to deliver courses,
in Spanish, on site in Mexico and propose that Mexico, in
turn, invite officers from other Central American countries to
participate;
• Host reciprocal seminars on disaster relief operations;
• Organize small unit exchanges where, for example, Canadian
troops participate in training in Mexico in mountain, riverine,
anti-drug, desert, and jungle warfare;
• Invite the Mexican Navy to conduct port visits in Canada;
• Organize reciprocal language training in both countries;
• Consider the exchange of intelligence on mutually agreed
threats;
• Consider ways in which the Canadian “defense community,”
especially the academic centers and NGOs that focus on
security and defense issues, might help foster the development
of a similar community in Mexico. This might be done through
the organization of seminars, workshops, and symposia at
which information can be exchanged between civilians and
military personnel;
• Encourage the exchange of officer cadets and academic
faculty between the two countries’ military educational
establishments so as to encourage an exchange of ideas and
the growth of personal friendships; and,
• Consider cooperation in natural disaster relief in areas (i.e.,
Central America and the Caribbean) where the Mexican
military has experience and expertise.
This list certainly is not exhaustive and may be slightly cavalier,
as it does not consider the administrative, diplomatic, and funding
implications inherent in the possible initiatives. However, these and
similar types of activities demonstrate that room for mutual benefit
exists within our own continent for enhanced military cooperation.
Canada and Mexico share much in common in the areas of defense
45
and security. Both are huge countries with diverse and challenging
geography, immense wealth in natural resources, long and vulnerable
coastlines, and shared borders with the United States, to list just a few
common characteristics. We should look to our neighbors. Indeed,
in recent months President Fox has declared his desire to integrate
the Mexican armed forces within U.S. Northern Command, despite
original reservations. As the Martin administration implements the
terms of its defense policy review, perhaps a closer look to the south
might be in order.
ENDNOTES
1. Declaration made by President Fox at the Meeting for the Evaluation of
Coordinated Action for Border and National Security, Tijuana, Mexico, October 3,
2001.
2. Mario Vargas Llosa, “Mexico: The Perfect Dictatorship,” New Perspectives
Quarterly, Winter 1991, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 23-25.
3. For one of the best descriptions of the Mexican political system during the
20th century, see Roderic Camp, Politics in Mexico; The Democratic Transformation,
London: Oxford University Press, 2003.
4. See Raúl Benítez Manaut, “Security and Governance: The Urgent Need for
State Reform,” in Joseph S. Tulchin and Andrew D. Selle, eds., Mexico’s Politics and
Society in Transition, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003.
5. The PNR was renamed the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) in 1938
and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 1946.
6. The terms Minister and Secretary and Ministry and Secretariat are used
interchangeably.
7. Manaut.
8. Roderic Camp, Generals in the Palacio, London: Oxford University Press,
1992.
9. David Rondfelt, “The Mexican Military and Political Order since 1940,”
in David Rondfelt, ed., The Modern Mexican Military, La Jolla, CA: University of
California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1984.
10. Presidential terms last 6 years, and presidents are constitutionally barred
from seeking reelection.
11. George Grayson, Mexico’s Armed Forces: A Fact Book, Washington, DC:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Americas Program, 1999, pp. 6-8.
12. Numbers and types are from The Military Balance 2001, London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2001.
46
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. The Mexican economy grew at an average rate of 6.5 percent a year from
1940 to 1960.
16. Chappel Lawson, Building the Forth Estate: Democratization and the Rise of the
Free Press in Mexico, Berkley: University of California Press, 2002, p. 16.
17. Kevin J. Middlebrook and Eduardo Zepeda, “On the Political Economy
of Mexican Development Policy,” in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Eduardo Zepeda,
eds., Confronting Development: Assessing Mexico’s Economic and Political Challenges,
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 8.
18. Salinas repeatedly stated that his administration favored economic over
political reform.
19. Governor of Tabasco and President of the PRI since 2002, Roberto Madrazo
refused to resign despite having publicly admitted that he had broken electoral
rules and spent $U.S.70 million, far beyond the $1.5 million limit.
20. Camp, Generals in the Palacio, p. 91.
21. José Luis Sierra Guzmán, “Mexico’s Military in the War on Drugs,”
Washington Office for Latin America Briefing Series, Washington, DC: Washington
Office for Latin America, April 2003, p. 2.
22. Ibid., p. 9.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 5.
25. Guillermo Garduño Valero, “The Organizational Transition of the Mexican
Armed Forces in the New Millenium,” in Always Near, Always Far: The Armed Forces
in Mexico, San Francisco: Global Exchange, 2000.
26. Upon assuming office, there were plans to create a new institutional
structure for the Air Force outside SEDENA, and have all three forces under one
command (Estado Mayor Conjunto). The plan, however, was never executed.
Fox’s former security advisor, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, also proposed the creation
of a security council at which the Estado Mayor Conjunto would be given a seat.
His proposal also was rejected (interview with Mr. Zinser, Mexico City, July 30,
2004). In terms of institutional organization, Fox restructured the 2nd, 3rd, and
7th military regions, as well as the 30th, 31st, 36th, and 38th military zones. Fox
also has withdrawn troops from the state of Chiapas and reduced the number of
checkpoints. Here it is important to note that the reorganization of military zones
is a common practice to meet changing threat levels and population/recruiting
demographics. Both Salinas and Zedillo undertook reorganizations themselves.
27. Roderic Camp, Challenges to Civil-Military Relations in the 21st Century,
forthcoming.
28. Guzman, p. 3.
47
29. Monica Serrano, “The Armed Branch of the State: Civil-Military Relations
in Mexico,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 27, May 1987, pp. 423-426.
30. Roderic Camp, Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Transformation, London:
Oxford University Press, 2004.
31. As stated by the Minister of National Defense in an interview with Camp
in February 2004 (Camp, forthcoming) and by several members of Congress in
interviews in July 2004.
32. Camp, Challenges to Civil-Military Relations.
33. Interview with Senator Castañeda, PAN, Mexico City, July 20, 2004.
34. Manaut.
35. The best work on civil-military relations in Mexico, especially after Fox
became president, is Camp’s forthcoming book, Challenges to Civil-Military Relations
in the 21st Century.
36. See Guzmán.
37. Douglas Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” Armed
Forces and Society, Vol. 26, No. 1, Fall 1999, pp. 7-19.
38. Several polls show this to be true. See, for example, the poll cited by
Grayson in Mexico’s Armed Forces, p. 72, which shows that 71 percent of the
population expressed a great deal or a fair amount of confidence in the armed
forces, compared with 44 percent for the federal police, 40 percent for the justice
system, and 36 percent for the local police.
39. Most notably, in 2001 General Jesús Gutierrez Rebollo, the officer in
charge of the government’s antinarcotics campaign, was tried on a charge of illicit
enrichment and sentenced to 15 years in jail.
48