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ALFRED
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WORKING PAPER
SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
THE HYPERCUBE OF INNOVATION
Allan N. Afiiah
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
November 1992
Nik Bahram
Digital
Equipment Corporation
WP #3481-92 BPS
Revised July 1993
Forthcoming Research Policy
MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
50 MEMORIAL DRIVE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139
•
THE HYPERCUBE OF INNOVATION
Nik Bahram
Allan N. Afuah
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Digital
Equipment Corporation
WP #3481-92 BPS
November 1992
Revised July 1993
Forthcoming Research Policy
©
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of
Management
50 Memorial Dr.
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
M.U
SEP
LIBRARIES
9
1993
RECEIVE
The Hypercube of Innovation.
Abstract
Innovation has frequently been categorized
architectural,
modular or niche, based on the
effects
as either radical, incremental,
which
it
has on the competence, other
products, and investment decisions of the innovating entity. Often, however, an innovation
which
is,
say, architectural at the
innovator/manufacturer
to customers, incremental to suppliers of components
to suppliers of critical
many
may
turn out to be radical
and equipment, and something
complementary innovations. These various
different stages of the innovation value-adding chain are
innovation. For
level,
what we
faces
call
else
of one innovation
the hypercube of
high-technology products, a technology strategy that neglects these
various faces of an innovation and dwells only
innovator/manufacturer
level,
on the
can have disastrous
effects
effects.
of the innovation
This
is
at the
'
especially so for
innovations whose success depends on complementary innovations, whose use involves
learning and where positive network externalities exist at the customer level.
We describe the hypercube of innovation
model and use
it
to
examine RISC
(Reduced Instruction Set Computers) and CISC (Complex Instruction Set Computers)
semiconductor chips, and supercomputers, and suggest
how
firms can better
relationships along the innovation value-adding chain using the model.
manage the
The model
forces
innovation managers to think in terms of their customers, suppliers and complementary
innovators.
ii
at
Acknowledgments
The
authors wish to thank Rebecca Henderson, Lotte Bailyn, Eric Rebentish, and
two anonymous
referees for their valuable suggestions.
remain the responsibility of the authors.
iii
Any
errors or omissions,
however,
1.
Introduction
Ever since Schumpeter, scholars of innovation, in an
to
manage the
effort to better
understand
how
process of innovation, have tried to categorize innovations as a function of
what the innovations do
to the skills,
knowledge, investment
and
strategies,
existing
products of the innovating entity. But these categorizations of innovations have had one
main drawback By choosing
to concentrate or. the effects of the innovation
competence of the innovating
entity, they
on the
have neglected the effects of the innovations on
the competence and assets of suppliers of key components and equipment, customers, and
suppliers of complementary innovations.
innovation that
is,
say,
innovations;
faces
call
all
fact
else to suppliers
that,
more often than
of
critical
level,
not, an
may turn
out to be
complementary
of which have implications for the success of the innovation. These various
of one innovation
at different stages
of the innovation value-adding chain are what
we
the hypercube of innovation.
Schumpeter himself described innovation
the
is
incremental at the innovator/manufacturer
and something
radical to customers
But the
way of doing
things"
and
as "a historic
and
irreversible
"creative destruction" [Schumpeter, 1947].
change
in
Abernathy and
Utterback (1978) found that as a technology evolves, product innovation gives way to
process innovation
innovations; that
making
is,
it
difficult for the
innovating entity to revert to
the competence of the innovating entity
is
new product
effectively destroyed.
Using
the automobile industry, Abernathy and Clark(1986) grouped innovations into four
categories
depending on the impact of the innovation on the innovating
and knowledge of
its
firm's capabilities
technology or market. They didn't address the impact of each of the
innovations on the capabilities and assets of their suppliers of components, customers, and
suppliers of
industry,
complementary products. Using extensive data from the photolithography
Henderson and Clark (1990
)
classified
innovations according to whether the
innovation overturned the existing knowledge of core concepts and components, and the
& Bah ram
Afuah
They
linkages between them.
innovation as well
classified
as the linkages
an innovation
as radical if the core
concepts of the
between them overturned existing ones; architectural
and
the core concepts were being reinforced while the linkages between these core concepts
components of the product were changed; incremental
if
if
the core concepts were reinforced
while the linkages between them were unchanged; modular
if the
core concepts were
overturned while the linkages between the concepts were unchanged; radical
concepts and linkage^ between them are overturned. As was the case with the
if
the core
Abemathy and
Clark analysis of the automobile industry, the impact of the innovations on the capabilities
and
assets
of suppliers, customers and suppliers of complementary products was not
considered. In their study of the U.S. cement, and minicomputer industries,
Anderson (1986), and Anderson and Tushman (1990)
classified
Tushman and
innovations as "competence
destroying" or "competence enhancing" depending on what the innovation did to the
knowledge base of the innovating
entity.
Roberts and Berry (1985), prescribed
business depending
on
it's
how an
innovating entity can enter a
familiarity with the technology
new
and market, and the newness of
the market and technology to the innovating entity. These business entry options range
from acquiring other firms with the technology and market competence or performing the
R&D
internally for the familiar,
to venture capita]
/estments for the unfamiliar and
new. The familiarity of the technology to members of the innovation value-added chain
was not
investigated.
Given the nature of some of the
industries studied
by these authors, the conclusions
they arrived at vis-a-vis what the innovating entity should do, shouldn't differ
much from
the conclusions that would be arrived at from an analysis that uses the hypercube model.
However,
for industries
innovations are
customers
is
at least
critical to the diffusion
critical,
externalities at
where
one of the following
is
true:
complementary
and success of products; where learning by
expensive and often results in lock-in; where positive network
customers are
common and
where equipment and
critical
components
(that
Hypercube of Innovation
go into the innovation) from suppliers can be innovations
of the
effects
in their
own
right;
an examination
of an innovation cannot be limited to the impact on the capabilities,
competence and
of the innovating
assets
entity.
An
must
analysis
also look at the
impact of
the innovation on the capabilities of suppliers of components, customers, and
complementary innovators.
Stated differendy, studies that have categorized innovation, have the innovating
entity asking the question:
capabilities,
"What
is
the impact of this innovation
addition to probing what the innovation will do to
its
competence and products of my
suppliers,
we
are suggesting that in
competence and
innovating entity must also ask the question: "What will
my
assets,
the
innovation do to the
OEM customers, end-user customers, and
suppliers (some of which are competitors) of key
is
my organizational
competence, existing products, knowledge of components, key concepts and
linkages between them". In the hypercube of innovation approach
what
on
—
complementary innovations
that
is,
the impact of the innovation at the various stages of its value-added chain?"
The hypercube model
impact of their innovation
is
forces innovation
managers to think
in
terms of what the
going to be on customers, suppliers of critical components,
equipment, and complementary innovations. Since customers and users can
innovators (von Hippel, 1988), the hypercube
help the innovating entity track
and complementary innovators.
potential competitors
In this paper
may also
also be future
we
describe
and
illustrate
the innovation hypercube model using
anecdotal examples from different industries and then use
it
to examine the
RISC
(Reduced Instruction Set Computers), CISC (Complex Instruction Set Computers)
semiconductor microchips, and supercomputers
suggest
some measures
industries.
From
the examination,
we
that the innovating firm could take to avoid getting lost in the cube.
RISC, CISC and supercomputers
They depend on complementary
are particulariy interesting examples for various reasons:
innovations for market success, exhibit positive network
Afuah
externalities at customers, require
& Bahram
complex equipment and components from suppliers, and
their use often involves a lot of learning.
The Hypercube Model.
2.0
For
product
this
—the
equipment
model, we
final
will focus
on product innovation
output of the innovating enticy
some
to
it
subset of the following: 1)
and then
it
requires
knowledge to use or maintain which can be obtained by
product to the owner increases
network
as
critical to diffusion
As we stated
Kara and
of analysis. The
components or high tech
OEM
to an
to end-users.
some considerable
learning. 2)
The
i.e., it
Shapiro, 1985). 3)
(original
The product
skill
or
value of the
possesses positive
Complementary
and use of the innovation.
an innovation that
earlier,
resells it
more people own the product,
externalities (David, 1985;
innovations are
critical
and can be sold direcdy to an end-user or sold
as inputs
equipment manufacturer) who adds value
also possess
—needs
as the unit
is
architectural to the innovating entity
be radical to customers and suppliers, and incremental to complementary innovators.
hypercube of innovation model examines these different
at the different stages
suppliers, customers
of the innovation value-added chain
and complementary innovators
entity can best deal with them.
It
—and
complementary innovators.
hypercube
is
It
—
The
which an innovation assumes
the innovating entity,
suggests
how
the innovating
looks at the impact that an innovation has, not only at the
innovating entity, but also at suppliers of components,
particular, the
faces
may
OEM customers, end-users, and
depicts relationships that are multidimensional in nature. In
a 4-dimensional cube with each of the stages of the innovation
value-added chain representing a dimension, and the location of any innovation in
this
4-
dimensional space being determined by the "intensity" of the innovation along each of these
dimensions; where intensity
scale, say,
of incremental =
is
1,
a measure of h
modular =
radical the innovation
2, architectural = 3,
and
is,
using an ordinal
radical = 4,
with
Hypercube of Innovation
intensity increasing
from incremental
to radical.
Because of the
things in four dimensions, however,
we have transformed
the 3-dimensional cube of Figure
(
map). In Figure
(X and
section
capabilities,
which
1,
1
and
later, to
difficulties in visualizing
the 4-<iimensional hypercube to
the two dimensional
GREEN-RED
zone
the transformed hypercube (shown as a parallelepiped) has a cross-
Y axes)
that categorizes innovations according to their impact
competence,
assets,
and products of the actor
in question,
on the
and a length on
are located the different actors in the innovation value-adding chain, viz.: suppliers
of critical components that go into the innovation, customers
[OEM
(original
equipment
manufacturer), and end-user], and suppliers of complementary innovations. Figure 2 further
explodes these stages of the chain for better visualization.
innovating entity can use any
criteria for categorizing
Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 below
list
We emphasize the fact that the
innovations in the
X and Y axis.
the range of possible impact of an
innovation at the innovating entity, suppliers, customers, and complementary innovators,
and we
briefly describe
what
is
possible at each stage.
2.1 The Innovating Entity
The
focus of most innovation literature has been
the capabilities
and
assets
of its innovator. For the innovator, the primary concern has been
the impact of the innovation on
destroys
it
on the impact of an innovation on
its
organizational competence
[Abernathy and Utterback, 1978;
—whether
it
enhances or
Tushman and Anderson, 1986]
—on
the core
concepts and linkages between those core concepts of the product [Henderson and Clark,
1990], on existing innovations, and on the willingness of management to invest in the
innovation [Henderson, 1993; Reinganum, 1983, 1984]. For the hypercube model, any
categorization
framework can be used. For example, we could use the Henderson and
Clark [1990] model and
classify
an innovation
as radical, if the core
concepts of the
innovation as well as the linkages between them have overturned existing ones; architectural,
if the core
concepts are being reinforced while the linkages between these core concepts of
Afuah
& Bahram
the product are changed; incremental, if the core concepts are reinforced while the linkages
between them are unchanged; modular,
if
the core concepts are overturned while the
linkages between the concepts are unchanged. However, for simplicity,
dichotomy of incremental and
As detailed
in
Table
2.
we
will use the
radical innovations.
1
below, the innovating entity has to recognize and take the
necessary corrective action depending on whether the innovation makes obsolete or enhances
previous designs, destroys or enhances knowledge gained in previous design:, cannibalizes
older products, can be used with previous complementary products.
THE INNOVATING ENTITY
Hyperr.ube of Innovation
the knowledge that the customer has acquired, has a smaller chance of being adapted than
one that enhances
and
this
knowledge and
skills.
Thus we expect
a person
learns the computer's operating system, to be less willing to
who
buys a computer
buy another computer with
a different operating system than one with the same operating system; unless there
is
another program that can make the new operating system transparent to the old user.
2.2.2 Positive network
network externality has
telephone
friends
is
computer.
is
its
origins
to
An
that
skill is
said to possess positive
own
a
computer that
as
more people own
network
it.
from the telephone network where one's
more valuable the more people
you have
computer
product or
of the product to an owner increases
externalities if the value
Positive
A
externalities:
are connected to one's
is
network The more
compatible with yours, the more valuable your
you because you can share software and innovative ways of using the
innovation that destroys this positive network externality does not stand a
good chance of being adapted by customers.
2.2.3 Compatibility with complementary products: Using the computer example again, a
personal computer user
to a
new computer that
2.2.4 Built-up
assets:
who
invested in a Lotus
requires
An
him
to
1
23 spreadsheet would prefer not to switch
buy a new spreadsheet.
airline that has built
maintenance
facilities for
has to change to a fleet of Airbus A320s, will have problems with the
and maintenance procedures that must now
A user who has written
her
be easily convinced to switch to an
own
new
parts inventory
replace the old one.
applications programs to run a
IBM
Boeing 737s but
Macintosh
will
not
personal computer, if his Macintosh programs
cannot run on the new machine.
From
all
these,
it is
evident that the innovating entity must
and knowledge
make
sure that 1) the
customers learned with
innovation will not destroy the
skills
previous innovations, 2)
not destroy any positive network externalities that previous
innovations
still
may have
be used with the
it
will
that
its
created for customers, 3) customer's complementary products can
new
innovations, 4) built-up assets will not have to be destroyed.
Afuah
CUSTOMER
&
Bahrain
Hypercube of Innovation
2.4 Suppliers of components and equipment
Some
high technology product innovations
(e.g., aircraft
depend heavily on component and equipment innovations from
cannot move into supersonic
flight
and supercomputers)
their suppliers.
The
without the right innovations in engine technology. In
supercomputers, most of the gains that we have seen in computer performance have
from innovations
SUPPLIERS
in the
aircraft
semiconductor chips that go into them.
of COMPONENTS and
EQUIPMENT
come
Afuah & Bahrain
happens, for example,
when
the physical limit of an older technological trajectory has been
reached and the only way to overcome this physical limitation
—
technological trajectory
move
a
that often
is
to
move
to a
new
means destruction of competence acquired
during the evolution along the older trajectory but substantial improvement in some key
parameter For example,
parallel
microprocessor technology. 2)
build any innovation-specific
issue.
computers as a
New
skills
result
of the physical limits reached by
markets where customers have not yet had time to
and knowledge, and competence destruction
For example, the adoption of DOS
in the
PC
is
not an
market. 3) Complementary
innovations, that allow customers to keep their competence and positive network
externalities, exist.
An
example of such a complementary innovation would be a software
package designed to allow
Macintosh and use
PC
users
who
are orly familiar with
DOS as they would on a PC,
other. 4)
innovation. Electric cars for
LA
When
through the
B
is
*; t
at a
not destroyed when a customer
institutional requirements
mandate the
are an example.
Referring again to Figure 3, Innovation
problems than Innovation
to be able to
making the Macintosh operating system
transparent to the user so that customers' competence
moves from one machine the
DOS
since A's
map
A may present the innovator with
more
along the innovation value-added chain passes
RED zone while B's doesn't.
2.5.1 Cost-benefit analysis
Assessing the cost and returns on investments (ROI) should not be limited to the
innovating entity. Innovation managers should explicitly quantify the costs and investment
requirements, carefully weighing them against the benefits at
customer
level,
the price/performance benefits
externality, additional investment in learning
the supplier level, costs include
all levels
must be weighed against the
and
idiosyncratic
loss in
complementary
new development and production
10
of the chain. At the
network
assets.
processes, retooling,
At
Hypercube of Innovation
learning,
make
and obsolescence of existing production
innovating entity should
complementary innovator
similar cost-benefit analysis for the
The hypercube of innovation concept
DSK
The
capacity.
is
level.
best illustrated with examples such as the
(Dvorak Simplified Keyboard) keyboard, the
electric car,
IBM's OS-2 operating
system and Microsoft's Windows.
2.6.1 The
DSK Keyboard
The
DSK
(Dvorak Simplified Keyboard)
is
an example of an innovation that was
architectural to the innovating entity, incremental to suppliers of components
complementary products but
4a shows the
radical to customers. Figure
and
GREEN-RED
zone
map of DSK.
DSK
20-40%
fester
been adapted by
Switching from
DSK
many
ir,
novation was being marketed, the
customers
learnt to type with the former: 1)
typing
skills
skills
more valuable
the
more
to
more people
To
to the
them
since
that have
and therefore
the innovators of
2)
potential employers
potential customers, adoption of the
externalities,
to type with
two things
it
[David 1985].
customer
how
He
who had
all
already
to type again effectively
or she would have a smaller
needed people with
to type at
realized that the
more people and more
places
QWERTY
QWERTY
of employment
This phenomenon where a product or
it, is
DSK
called positive
would destroy
have.
QWERTY keyboard had
He/she would have to learn
QWERTY keyboard arrangement.
network
how
Customers who didn't know how
would be more valuable
use the
learned
and knowledge of QWERTY.
for his/her skills since
skills.
who
QWERTY to DSK meant
abandoning the old
estimates allowed people to type
QWERTY arrangement that most of today's keyboards
than with the
But by the time the
market
many
a keyboard arrangement that by
is
network
their
skill is
externality. So, to
competence and/or positive
constitutes a radical innovation.
DSK this was an
architectural innovation since the core
concepts and components for the keyboard had not changed but the linkages between them
had changed since the keys were arranged
different.
11
& Bahram
Afuah
To
suppliers of components or
their skills,
DSK had
complementary products,
no impact on
and products.
DSK
There may be other reasons why the
keyboard
railed to displace
QWERTY
despite the former's superior performance, but the fact that this innovation was radical to
customers has to be a key one.
Figure 4a shows the
map through
the value-added chain for the
DSK keyboard.
2.6.2 The Electric Car
The
electric car
under development. But we can speculate, for
is still
purposes, on what the innovation's impact
is
on the innovation value-added chain. This
radical innovation to the car companies, to suppliers
train,
will
and to
suppliers of the key
we know
as the
power
train
motor
different.
is
it
What
in Figure 4b.
being replaced by the an electric motor, battery and
are the
key components and design concepts for the
car, the linkages
To
suppliers of the
power
train
electric car also runs
on
electricity,
also a radical innovation.
is
electric car
cars,
a
also a radical innovation to
them.
not gasoline, and so to gasoline companies, the
To
customers, however,
but get a car that emits
throw away that old container
is
for gasoline-powered cars,
it is
an incremental
innovation, since drivers of gasoline-powered cars can keep their driving
knowledge of operating
electric car
between them are also
components
the electric car destroys a lot of their competence, and
is
power
and exhaust system—of
For gasoline-powered car manufacturers, development of the
electric car
a
B'lt to customers,
shown
engine, transmission, fuel injection,
from those of the gasoline-powered
radical innovation.
The
is
like the
is
controller in the electric car [see for example, Pratt, 1992].
Thus, not only
different
GREEN-ZONE map
—
the gasoline-powered automobile
electric
of key components
complementary innovation—gasoline.
be an incremental innovation. The
illustrative
for gasoline.
12
less pollution.
skills,
and other
They may have
to
Hypercube of Innovation
2.6.3
OS-2 and Windows
When IBM
and Microsoft, two of the
compatible market, found out
how
of the
largest beneficiaries
popular the "look and
PC
PC
and
of the Apple Macintosh
feel"
personal computer was becoming, they decided to develop an operating system with a
similar "look
many
offer
and
advantages over
one applications program
core concepts
DOS
at
would have
for
IBM PCs
changed
to be
To
and
PC
both firms
this
was a
compatibles
who had
more than
radical innovation as
and other key
to support multitasking
also
factors.
To
already learned to use the
operating system and had seen the advantages of Icon- and windows-based user
interface
of the Apple Macintosh, OS-2 would be an incremental innovation. This was
particularly true since
all
DOS
applications
would run under OS-2.
Faced with the daunting challenge of a
parted ways with
IBM
and Microsoft favoring
creation of Microsoft
Although OS-2
Windows and
may
and PC-compatibles. OS-2 would
including multitasking (have the computer run
any one time).
IBM PC
most customers of the
DOS
OS-2
feel" called
is
radical innovation
advocating the investment in making the
a
Microsoft and
OS-2
more incremental innovation. Microsoft's
Windows
several years in
IBM
radical innovation
strategy led to the
advance of IBM's introduction of OS-2.
a technically better product, the revenues generated
by Microsoft
the ensuing increase in shareholder value suggests that Microsoft's approach
have been the more successful of the two. Microsoft has since put plans in place to
enhance Microsoft Windows
functionality as
Windows
NT which will
have similar
IBM's OS-2. Meanwhile, Microsoft Windows has a 10
OS-2
in installed base.
chain
is
shown
to Microsoft
The map of both
to
1
advantage over
innovations through the innovation value-added
in Figure 5.
Mapping Innovations
into the Hypercube
Figure 6 explodes the hypercube to show cross-sectional
stage of the innovation value-added chain.
It
slices
of the cube
shows where the innovation of the
13
at
DSK
each
&
Afuah
Bahrain
keyboard by Dvorak, a keyboard designer/ manufacturer, and of the
gasoline-powered car designer/manufacturer,
The
DSK innovation
is
architectural to
fit
innovator, incremental to suppliers of
its
hypercube or stage of the value added chain
perceived at that stage.
The
car manufacturers, suppliers,
customers of the
cars.
electric car
is
radical to customers.
shown
in figure
innovation
is
Each
face
6 with the kind of innovation
suppliers,
but incremental to
IBM, Microsoft Windows was incremental
radical to
Microsoft and both were architectural innovations to complementary innovators
and most importandy, incremental
of the
radical to the gasoline-powered
and complementary innovation
OS-2 was
by
on the innovation hypercube.
components and complementary innovations but
as
electric car
to
Lotus
like
to customers.
4
2. 7
Summary of the model
An
innovation that
customers, and something
components
is
incremental to the innovating entity
else to
for the innovation,
an innovation on the innovating
may be
radical to
complementary innovators and suppliers of critical
and a technology
entity,
may
strategy that dwells only
on the impact of
be in for disastrous consequences.
The
hypercube model forces managers of the innovating entity to examine the impact of their
innovation at
all
the stages of the innovation value-added chain.
The model
suggests that
innovations that reinforce core concepts and enhance competencies along the innovation
value-added chain should be pursued. Those that destroy competence, positive network
externalities,
and
assets at
any stage of the chain,
especially at customers,
unwary innovator problems. The map of such an innovation
figure 3).
passes
may
provide the
through the red zone
(see
Such innovations should be avoided except where there are obvious
price/performance advantages for the customer; the innovator
where customers have not yet had time
knowledge, and competence destruction
to build
is
is
entering
any innovation-specific
not an
issue;
new markets
skills
complementary innovations, that
allow customers to keep their competence and positive network externalities,
14
and
exist;
and
Hypercube of Innovation
when
institutional requirements
extremes
the yellow zone.
is
pursued with a
lot
mandate the innovation.
Any
map
innovation whose
Somewhere between
passes through this
of precaution. The innovator should monitor the
complementary innovations and the momentum of newer ones,
Finally, the innovating entity should
each
level
inertia
these
two
zone should be
of older
to take advantage
of them.
perform the relevant cost-benefit analysis for
of the innovation value-added chain, taking into consideration not only the cost
of learning, network
externalities, additional capital investments,
and cannibalization of
old products, but also of such additional expenses as marketing and advertising for the
new
technology.
We
are
now
ready to apply the model to RISC,
The Hypercube: The
cases of
supercomputers.
RISC, CISC, and Supercomputers.
RISC
& CISC Chips
CISC (Complex
Instruction Set
3.0
CISC and
Computer)
chips:
In 1970 Intel Corporation invented the
first
microprocessor, a microchip
implementation of the Central Processing Unit (CPU) of a computer. Subsequently,
and
its
Intel
competitors like Motorola introduced successive generations of 8-bit, 16-bit and
32-bit microprocessors that over time, got
higher functionality.
The
programmers use to
tell
faster,
consumed
less
instruction sets for these processors— the
the processors
what
to
do—grew
power, and delivered
commands which
to be very large, with each
instruction taking too long to execute, and earning these processors the
Instruction Set
These
name Complex
Computers (CISC).
relatively
complicated instructions required ever increasing chip
more, and placed a limit on
how
fast a
sizes, cost
given operation could be executed, limiting the
microprocessor's speed.
15
Afuah
&
Bahrain
Microprocessors differ from other chips in that they have instruction
development systems/software have to be written
to support the instruction sets.
require a host of compatible complementary chips to allow
like printers,
modems
them
and
sets,
They
also
interface with devices
or keyboard, and chips that control disk drives. These
complementary chips and development systems can
also be supplied
by complementary
innovators.
When
Intel designed
discovered that a lot of the
third generatior microprocessor (16-bit), the 8086,
its
less
expensive complementary chips in existence then were for
the previous generation of microprocessors,
choices: wait until the
i.e.
8-bit microprocessors. Intel
complementary chips catch up with
microprocessor or innovate again. Intel chose the
bit internal architecture
the
8088 could use the
allowed
Intel's
it
latter
it's
had two
third generation
and designed the 8088 with the 16-
of the 8086, and the external architecture of 8-bit processors so that
readily available
customers,
i.e.
and inexpensive
system builders
like
IBM,
8-bit
complementary
chips. This
to take advantage of the
advanced third generation features that the internal architecture provides while also using
the inexpensive,
more
When IBM
readily available second generation
complementary
chips.
decided to enter the Personal Computer (PC) market, and had to
choose a microprocessor for
its
PC,
it
chose the Intel 8088 although this processor
have been superior to other microprocessors, specifically the Motorola 68000.
8-bit interface that allowed
PC
complementary chips may have
RISC (Reduced
By
the
The
not
8088's
manufacturers to use readily available and inexpensive
tilted
the balance in Intel's favor.
Instruction Set Computers) Chips:
mid 1970s
efficiency of the
may
industry researchers and academics had begun to question the
CISC approach
cost disadvantages inherent in the
Thomas J. Watson
Alternative approaches to
CISC
remove the performance and
approach, were examined. In 1975, IBM's
Research Center's researchers began the development of the
16
IBM
801
Hypercube of Innovation
computer. Although not a microprocessor,
Reduced Instruction
IBM
researchers
Set
Computer (RISC) approach
moved away from
number of very simple
computer
this
a large
instructions. This
laid
out the foundations of the
to microprocessor design.
number of complicated
These
instructions to a small
change significandy enhanced the speed of the
processor without severely impacting the ease of use and flexibility that was advertised as
a key advantage of
The
CISC
processors.
simpler and fewer instructions meant smaller chip
processors. Successive generations of
generation
These
CISC
factors
generation
processors providing
would
CISC
By 1982,
Patterson et
processor and
a
same
Time-To-Market (TTM) advantage.
Berkeley, and Hennessey et al at Stanford
al at
in single
VLSI (Very Large
MIPS
MIPS
had
Scale Integrated) circuits.
processor at Stanford laid the foundation
in the industry today:
SUN
Microsystem's
Corporation's family of Rxxxx (R2000, R3000,
processors.
Despite pursuing the
relatively successful
Digital
RISC
VLSI RISC
developing the Power
series
of
principles
processor of
RISC
its
first,
its
IBM
has only recently developed a
own, the RS6000, and plans on co-
processors with Motorola
Equipment Corporation,
of processors to power
its
RISC
processors.
of the two most successful RISC architectures
R4000)
faster
price/performance ratio advantages over same
processor at Berkeley, and the
SPARC RISC
and
processors could be designed faster than
RISC with
RISC
lead to large
implemented the RISC concepts
The RISCl
RISC
sizes
at first
used
RISC
and Apple Computer.
chips from the
MIPS
family
DECStation workstation products, but has recendy introduced
64-bit Alpha microprocessor which will be used for Digital's products ranging from
Desktop
to
Data Center minis and mainframes.
Hewlett Packard has
well.
The PA-RISC
moved
also
architecture
is
now
into adopting
RISC
for
available across the range
platforms.
17
its
hardware platforms
of HP's hardware
as
& Bahram
Afuah
In the next two sections the hypercube of innovation
in
RISC and CISC
is
used to examine innovations
microporcessors. Figure 7 provides the context for
RISC and CISC
use.
The Hypercube model and CISC.
we have
In Figure 8
classified
whether they were incremental or
some of these innovations
Integrating the
was a
some CISC processor innovations according
radical innovations,
and below, we look
CPU of a computer on a single chip, the
The
radical.
To
The demands put on
OEM customers,
this
microprocessor, in 1970
design methodologies were not only different,
semiconductor fabrication capability had to be pushed to
were
the effects of
at the various stages of the innovation value-added chain.
radical innovation to Intel.
integration levels.
?.t
to
suppliers of critical
was
limits to achieve the desired
its
equipment
like
CAD
also a radical innovation since they
had
tools,
to learn
the instruction sets of these processors, etc. For complementary innovators, this was a
radical innovation since they
had to develop new compatible complementary chips for the
microprocessors while also learning the instruction
sets
of the processors. They had to
develop systems/software to support the microprocessor's instruction
Design and implementation of subsequent generations
family, for example Intel's 80xxx family of
CISC
in the
set.
same microprocessor
processors, are for the
most pan
incremental innovations to the various members of the innovation value-added chain, partly
as a result
of the
fact that microprocessors
were designed to be upward compatible with
previous generations, allowing programs that were written for old processors to
new
systems.
processors.
Thus programs
written for Intel's
Complementary innovators
like
1
6-bit microprocessors could run
Microsoft
who
wrote the
system used on 16-bit machines didn't have to worry about writing a
because
DOS could
be used for the 32-bit machines.
18
work on
DOS
on 32-bit
operating
new operating system
Hypercube of Innovation
The Hypercube Model and RISC
RISC
Figure 8 illustrates the hypercube applied to various
RISC
CISC
is
CISC
processors utilize the same building blocks as
these blocks are put together
to
processors from key innovators.
is
processors, but the
way
As such, RISC compared
different for each processor type.
an architectural innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990) for the innovating
entity.
For many complementary innovators, the
innovations in support of RISC were for the most
RISC
offers a
good example. Fundamental
sophisticated compiler technology that
such
as
FORTRAN
instructions that the
compilers
is
or
COBOL
RISC
to
musT
simplicity
generation of
and simplified
The
the
RISC
cases,
many
is
more
programming languages
translate "friendly"
why
many
microprocessors. Compilers used by
processor can understand.
first
radical since in
RISC hardware
into a reduced
often cited as one of the reasons
providers of compilers, the
pan
CISC
changes were required in products used with
generation of complementary
first
set
of microprocessor
availability
of such optimized
RISC dream was
realized.
To
chips was a radical innovation.
To
now
developers of Development Systems,
RISC was
had to learn the new instruction
of RISC, and also had to find ways to accommodate
sets
also a radical innovation since they
RISC's higher speeds and inherent parallelism. Complementary ICs were hard pressed to
keep up with the RISC microprocessor speed. Chips that decouple other slower parts of
the system from the faster microprocessors were developed.
on rearranging the
Most of these innovations
linkages between existing building blocks,
and
as such,
rely
most of the
innovations to date have been architectural in nature.
Once
again,
most of these innovations were adopted by CISC processors and have
become standard design
practice for microprocessor based system design.
For the most pan, the
provided
CISC makers
silicon fabrication
can be used by
been no radical or architectural changes
RISC
technology and
CAD tools
users too. This does not
in these fields.
19
mean
that suppliers
that there have
There have been many. The point
is
& Bahram
Afuah
that these innovations have been independent of RISC
and CISC
of these architectures has been to create incremental innovation
architectures.
The impact
in the supplier base.
For RISC end-users, the picture has been very different and varied. They have in
UNIX
general adopted the
who had
operating system, making
used other operating systems
like
DOS. But
RISC
a radical innovation for those
the advantages of a non-proprietary,
very low cost, high performance and portable operating system coupled with the superior
price/performance of
loss
RISC
microprocessors, has for most applications,
of competence in switching operating systems.
software from
For
non-UNIX
relatively
workstations or
like
is
also cosdy.
embedded
control,
were no entrencheJ operating systems and where price/performance
been accepted
like personal
is critical,
RISC
has
and writing
computers where end-users have not only invested heavily
own
their
applications software in
RISC
built-up positive network externalities,
the workstation or
dislodging CISC.
CISC
where there
relatively fast.
For markets
in learning,
for the
the end-user, porting applications
UNIX
operating systems to
new markets
To
made up
embedded
The weak
a lot
is
DOS-based
more of a
radical innovation than for
Thus RISC has had
control market.
appropriability (Teece, 1986) of
systems, but also
great difficulties
RISC
concepts has helped
designs to close the gap in price/performance.
Later generations of RISC, like
versions of
IBM's RS6000, have so
far
Corporation's R3000, and
all
Supercomputers:
as the
systems available at any given time. This would
installed base
or later
chain.
Supercomputers are generally described
dates back to Charles Babbage's
R4000
been mosdy incremental innovations for
members of the innovation value-added
4.0
MIPS
mid 1800s
mean
most powerful computational
that the
"analytical engine".
first
supercomputer
Most of today's
of supercomputers, however, can be attributed to Seymour Cray who, in
20
Hypercube of Innovati
1975.
left
Control Data Corporation
(CDC) where he had
own supercomputer company, Cray
start his
Research Inc..
CDC 7600 supercomputer, a so-called
designed the
scalar
designed supercomputers, to
At
CDC,
Cray had
supercomputer because
had
it
a scalar processor (the "engine" or brain of the computer). Scalar processors have to issue
an instruction for every single operation
vector data
would have
to be
each element of the vector.
architecture 1
first
.
addition of two numbers) so that even
(e.g.
broken down and an instruction issued
The 7600 was
of the traditional
also
In 1976, Cray Research shipped
its first
for operation
on
Von Neumann
supercomputer, the Cray-1, the
commercially available vector supercomputer. Vector computers, for the most
pan, need only one instruction to execute each operation on vectors, and
improves processing time
scalar processors.
since a lot of data
vectorized.
The
(for applications that lend themselves to listi)
compared
to
Vector processing was a key innovation in supercomputers especially
on which supercomputers operate
first
are either vector-like or could be
vector supercomputer was actually the
commercially available until
One
this greatly
after the Cray-1
thing which the Cray-1,
supercomputers (vector or
scalar)
had
when
it
was released
CDC7600, Cyber
in
common was
CDC Star-100 but was
as the
not
Cyber 205.
205, and previous
that they each
had only one
processor that could be put on any one processing job at any one time. Cray Research
changed
all
that in
1982 when
it
introduced
its
multiprocessor Cray
X-MP,
the
first
commercially successful supercomputer to apply more than one processor to the same
problem
the
any one time (The ILLIAC IV, developed
first parallel
many
11
at
The
at the University
of
Illinois,
was
supercomputer). In the years that followed, Cray Research introduced
other multiprocessor supecomputers with the Cray
architecture used
in
Von Neumann's mid- 1940s
Y-MP C90
most of today's computers
architecture.
In
that
is
often
architecture,
its latest
with 16
attributed
the
to
John
Central
Processing Unit (CPU) of the computer fetches an instruction (data) from a central
store (main memory), operates on it (for example, add or subtract), and returns
the results into the main memory. Only one CPU is used, and that one CPU can do
only one thing at a time.
21
AfucA
processors in 1991 that delivers 16
&
Bahrain
GFLOPS
(gigaFLOPS =
operations per second) compared to the Cray-l's 100
operations per second). In 1992,
GFLOPS.
Table 10
lists
NEC
introduced
its
billion floating point
MFLOPS
(million floating point
4-processor
some of the key supercomputers
SX3
that gives
25
that have been introduced
over the years.
Most of the
gains in supercomputer performance have
come
of
as a result
innovations in semiconductor technology, from the transistor to very large scale
integrated (VLSI) circuits.
to deliver the
25
GFLOP
NEC's
four-processor supercomputer, for example, was able
primarily because of
its
advanced
ECL
(emitter-coupled
Logic) semiconductor technology and premier packaging techniques.
A
key goal of these traditional Cray supercomputer designs that use few (1-16)
processors
is
to
improvements
make each
in
processor as
fast as possible.
through the computer's
—
the speed of light.
electrical circuitry at the
much
these computers with 1-16 processors speed
attain
some of the speeds
limit
still
that
many
Computer
speed of light.
up each
signals travel
And no
matter
processor, they
how
would never
compute-intensive jobs need [for example,
cannot synthesize a protein from
imposed by the speed of
(MPC) come
the dramatic
all
microchip and packaging technology, these kinds of supercomputer
designs are reaching a physical limit
supercomputers
But despite
light.
This
is
its
gene] because of the physical
where massively
parallel
computers
in.
In massively parallel computers, hundreds or thousands of processors are put on
one job, with each processor simultaneously tackling an assigned
stage
—
the whole job done faster than one processor operating sequentially
job permitting. So rather than trying to speed
massively parallel computers
in parallel.
Now,
(MPCs) put
the speed of light
is
inherently parallel jobs can be speeded
the structure of the
up one or a few processors
very
many
processors
no longer the physical
up
of the job to get
considerably.
22
to
on the job
limit,
do the
to
job,
perform
and execution of
Thinking Machines'
CM5
uses
it
Hypercube of Innovation
hundreds of 32-bit
SPARC CMOS
GFLOPS
microprocessors and runs at 128
MPCs
will eventually be the ability
MPCs
less
use readily available
power than the
ECL
(Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor)
physical limit to the speed of
of the processors to communicate with each other.
CMOS
CMOS
(a
proven technology) chips that consume
chips don't have to be as fast as
not the speed of each one that matters
And
The
(Emitter Couple Logic) chips used in conventional (Cray-like)
supercomputers, and these
combination.
peak.
(at this stage
because they consume
less
ECL chips
of the technology) in
since
MPCj
it is
but their
power, they are air-cooled and don't need
the elaborate liquid cooling systems of ECL-based systems.
MPCs
can be divided into two groups: multiprocessors and multicomputers.
Multiprocessor
that share one
MPCs
Kendal Square Research's
like
memory
bank.
The KSR
same memory bank. Multicomputer
with
its
own memory,
Machines
CM5,
that
Intel's
KSR
1
have numerous processors
has 1088 64-bit microprocessors that share the
1
MPCs
communicate
are interconnected microprocessors, each
via message passing.
Paragon, and supercomputer
MPCs
Examples are Thinking
from Ncube, Ametek, and
Transputer.
Most of the manufacturers of traditional supercomputers
(
those with 16 or fewer
very fast processors, and elaborate cooling systems) like Cray Research Inc.,
have either already started
MPC programs or announced that they will do
quest to improve traditional supercomputers has not stopped.
Cray
left
Cray Research to
supercomputer was
start
Cray Computer,
to use gallium arsenide chips
conventional silicon chips and also consume a
relatively
new technology
technology that
now
that
is still
in
its
his
in
But
etc.
their
1989, Seymour
answer to getting a faster
which can be two and half times
lot less
power. Gallium arsenide
is
as fast as
a
infancy compared to the silicon semiconductor
provides chips for computers.
delayed primarily because of the
When,
so.
IBM,
The
difficulties in getting
23
introduction of the Cray-3 has been
GaAs
chips to work.
& Bahram
Afuah
Supercomputer Systems
Inc. (SSI),
difficulties delivering its first
Another
viable set of
another supercomputer start-up
supercomputer because
it
They
also
having
was banking on GaAs chips.
computers are the so-called minisupercomputers. They
the same vector processing of traditional supercomputers, but with
differences:
is
are cheaper, provide
supercomputers [Kelley 1988]
,
utilize
some important
25 to 35 percent the performance of traditional
offer lower price for the
performance provided and lend
themselves to those low-end applications that don't need the higher performance of higher
power supercomputers,
let
Metal Oxide Semiconductor) chips that are
power-demanding but
They
alone their prices.
faster
ECL
less
CMOS
use proven
(Complementary
consume
expensive and
less
power than the
chips used in traditional designs. This results in cheaper
systems that are air-cooled.
2.2
The Hypercube Model and Supercomputers
we
In this section
use the hypercube of innovation
supercomputer industry that we have
just described.
model
However,
to
this
examine the
not a comprehensive
is
treatment of innovations in supercomputers.
Table 12
capabilities
innovators
and
is
lists
key supercomputer innovations, while their impact on the
assets
shown
in
of their innovators, suppliers, customers, and complementary
Table 13 and figure
9.
Using the Henderson and Clark categorization
architectural innovation to
designed these systems.
I/O
—and
CDC (Star- 100)
criteria,
vector processing was an
and Cray Research (Cray-1) when they
—memory, CPU,
The main components of the supercomputer
core design concepts had not changed radically; the key change was the
provision of vector processing. But the linkages between these components and core
concepts were being altered.
however,
this
was a
To many
customers and suppliers of applications software,
radical innovation because they
had to learn how to program with
vector processors. Luckily, for the Cray, most users of supercomputers then were scientists
24
Hypercube of Innovation
who
wrote their
own
software and were
more
complete data processing solution. This a
would remain small
for this very reason.
interested in a
relatively small
More
a
segment of the market that
importantly, a complementary innovation,
the vectorizer was developed that could convert
machines to forms
number-crunching engine than
some of the old software written
for scalar
which vector machines could crunch. So the impact of the radicalness
in
of the innovation on customers was not that important. Cray Research's multiprocessor,
Cray X-MP, can
just listed above.
reasons since
For customers,
it still
The Cray-3 and
an architectural innovation for reasons similar to those
also be considered
its
impact was more incremental than radical for several
used the same Cray Operating System (COS).
SSI's
machine are examples of machines that are
facing problems because of it. Both machines are multiprocessor but with
processors
and not
radically different
and
radical to suppliers
from previous designs. They
are,
no more than 16
however,
depending on GaAs chips to make major contributions to the planned speed
improvements. But GaAs technology
is still
technology that other computers use and
Computer's solution
its
machine may not be
still
infancy compared to the proven silicon
thus a radical innovation to any computer. Cray
to reducing this uncertainty
chip manufacturer. That has
SSI's
is
in
was to acquire Gigabit Logic, a GaAs
not worked. While the problems with the Cray-3 and
entirely
due
to
GaAs
chips,
it is
true that
GaAs, a
radical
innovation to most suppliers of chips, has contributed to the problems of the two machines.
Massively parallel computers (MPCs) are a radical innovation for
the innovation value-added chain except suppliers. Their design
different
even
is
members of
conceptually very
from that of traditional supercomputer designs. Writing software
trickier.
all
for
them
is
Users of the installed base of traditional Cray-type designs would prefer
machines that allow them to keep some of the
skills
and knowledge acquired with the
Cray-like machines, and especially any applications programs that they
may have
written.
Their operating systems are also different Applications, as well as systems programmers
25
Afuah
for the
new machines
& Bahram
are also not easy to find.
academics) can write their
own
software.
But
Hardcore supercomputer users
for
MPCs
(scientists
to diffuse into general
and
purpose
applications that will greatly increase their success, they need lots of software. In
particular,
MPCs
FORTRAN, C
Section IV:
and
C ++
.
the impact of
programming languages
innovation on
we have shown
its
DSK
mistake. Dvorak's
IBM
in speed.
competence and existing products, and does not
keyboard
capabilities
of
its
and complementary innovators, may be making a
failed to diffuse
innovation to Dvorak but a radical innovation to
innovation to
change
that an innovating entity that only looks at
examine the impact of thrt innovation on the competence and
suppliers, customers, competitors
because
its
but an incremental innovation to
it
was an architectural
customers.
DOS
OS-2 was
a radical
users versus Microsoft
which
is
DOS.
This allowed Microsoft to enter the market early and so
Windows
an incremental innovation to Microsoft and an incremental innovation to users of
winning. Similarly, Lotus, that didn't pay attention to the
software, lost
of the
sees the
like
Implications of the Hypercube.
several examples,
its
in existing
This would mean that the end-user only
Summary and
Using
critically
need to be programmable
some ground
—which
electric car
in
is
its
far,
Microsoft
momentum
Windows
is
of Windows
The
spreadsheet market share to Microsoft's Excel.
case
a radical innovation to the innovating firms, suppliers of
components and complementary products, but an incremental innovation
to users
—was
also
discussed.
The model
forces innovation
managers to look
at their innovations
not only in
terms of what the impact of the innovation will be on the innovating entity's capabilities
and
assets,
but also those of suppliers, customers, and complementary innovators.
suggest that innovators should think twice about innovations that destroy
and
positive
network
externalities at
any of the
26
stages
skills,
We
knowledge
of the value-added chain, especially
Hypercube o< Innovation
at the
customer
level.
They should avoid
Red Zone
the
mapping of innovations
(of the
along the innovation value-added chain) and go with innovations that reinforce key concept
and linkages
along the value-added chain (innovations that
all
fall
in the green or yellow
zone).
We also
suggest that the
The
note some criteria for innovating in the
Red Zone should be avoided
Red Zone.
unless a subset
of the following
price/performance ratio of the innovation, as viewed by
added chain
especially the customer, outweighs
competence or
positive
any
Specifically,
all
is
we
true:
1)
the levels of the value-
of
losses incurred as a result
network externality destruction. This happens
for
example when
the physical limit of an older technological trajectory has been reached and the only
to
overcome
that often
this physical limitation
is
to
move
to a
new
way
—
move
a
technological trajectory
means destruction of competence acquired during the evolution along the older
trajectory but great
improvement
in
some key parameter.
2)
New
customers have not yet had time to build any innovation-specific
and competence destruction
is
not an
markets where
skills
and knowledge,
Complementary innovations,
issue. 3)
that allow
customers (or other members of the innovation value added chain) to keep their
competence and
positive
network
externalities, exist.
4)
When
institutional requirements
mandate the innovation.
We analyzed
particular,
we
Computers)
on the
RISC and CISC
chips,
and supercomputers using the model. In
analyzed the impact of key innovations in
chips,
capabilities
RISC (Reduced
CISC (Complex
Instruction Set Computers) chips,
Instruction Set
and supercomputers
of suppliers, customers, and complementary innovators. In CISC, we
suggested that Intel's foresight in designing the 8088 microprocessor in response to the
inertia
of complementary 8-bit chips,
may
have contributed to
its
being chosen by
over competitors to provide the microprocessor architecture for the
PC
and
PC
compatibles. This
may have been
Intel's
27
now very
IBM
popular
most important decision
ever.
IBM
&
Afuah
We also found that although RISC
chipmakers
customers
users.
is
chips.
written their
CISC
OEMs
a radical innovation to
it is
have to learn
who
applications programs,
CISC-based machines, RISC
is
how
positive
a radical innovation since in
its
OEM
to
sell
languages,
DOS,
network
acquired or
externalities
present form,
it
is
not enough to dislodge
computer systems under $25,000, annual
million units while
all
RISC
Week, March,
30, 1992) 2
CISC
RISC
vis-a-vis
could change
allows
RISC
all
if a
DOS
.
that
We also
made
suggest that
firms like
users to preserve their skills
NT
is
it
(e.g.
chips alone exceed
network
externalities
In the
embedded
CISC
as in the
may
be the realization of the inertia of
pull out of
ACE
consortium. All that
software) could be developed that
and old applications software when they use
intended to be
this innovation.
have not been well-established yet,
control market where speed
PC
market,
RISC
also
is
20
of only 339,000 units (Business
In newer markets like Workstations where the capabilities, competencies,
positive
For
in this particular market.
CISC
The
sales
Compaq
complementary innovation
machines. Microsoft
of Intel's
sales
combined had
chips
CISC
on
destroys
the competence, capabilities and positive network externalities of these customers.
promise of speed alone
end
design systems with the
have learned to use
and established
and
new assembly
systems, retrain their engineers on
personal computer end-users
own
as far as
chips to design personal computers
because with RISC, these
To
an architectural innovation
is
Intel are concerned,
have been using
new development
establish
RISC
who
This
Motorola and
like
Bahrain
is
doing
critical
RISC
and the end-user
is
and
doing very
is
well.
not locked into
well.
In the Minicomputer and Mainframe markets the price/performance advantages of
RISC have been
sufficiendy compelling that manufacturers
of computers have adopted
RISC/UNIX
and customers of these
technology instead of the mostly
CISC/proprietary operating system solutions of the
past.
There are
manufacturers of proprietary systems.
2
Our thanks
to
an anonymous referee
who
classes
suggested
28
this
example.
still,
however,
many
Hypercube of Innovation
In supercomputers, Cray
introducing their
GaAs
new
Computer Corp. and SSI
are having difficulties
gallium arsenide (GaAs) chip-based supercomputers partly because
a radical innovation to chip suppliers relative to the mature silicon technology.
is
Earlier versions of supercomputer innovations that were radical innovations at
customers didn't have the disastrous consequences predicted by the hypercube model
many of those
because
early users
were
scientists
and academics who wrote
their
own
programs, and could trade the program writing for a more powerful computing engine.
Massively parallel computers, despite being faster than the traditional Cray-like
supercomputers
may
not be diffusing
as fast as
one would expect because they are a
radical
innovation not only to the innovating entities but also to customers and suppliers of
complementary innovations
suppliers of hardware
The
real
like software. It
components
like
is,
however, an incremental inncation for
microchips and disk drives.
breakthrough in supercomputer diffusion will come
when
the parallel
machines penetrate the general purpose business applications that could use their compute
power. This will come only
if
if
the software
the current parallel machines can be
FORTRAN,
C,
C ++
,
is
there,
which
programmed with
in turn, can
only be developed
existing languages such as
etc.
Conclusion
The common
the innovation
markets
is
on the innovating
levels
network
entity's capabilities vis-a-vis
its
existing technology
not adequate for high technology products that require
and equipment from
high
practice of classifying innovations only according to the impact
suppliers,
critical
depend on complementary innovations
of
and
input components
for success, require
of learning by customers before use, and that lend themselves to positive
externalities.
For such products, the impact of the innovation on the
of suppliers, customers and complementary innovators may be
and
assets
that
on the innovating
entity's
competence and
29
assets.
capabilities
just as critical as
Afuah
The hypercube model
forces
& Bahram
managers at the innovating entity to evaluate their
innovations in terms of the impact of those innovations on the competence and assets of all
the
members of the innovation value-added
and supercomputer
chain.
Our
examination of the CISC,
RISC
industries suggests that the innovator should pursue innovations that
reinforce core concepts
and competence along the innovation value-added chain, while
being more cautious with those that don't.
The innovator should watch out
older complementary innovations and the
momentum
for the inertia
of
of newer ones, and take advantage of
them.
Areas offuture research:
We
research
have developed the hypercube model using qualitative data.
would be
area of further
the collection of quantitative data to further gain insights to this concept.
The second and
hypercube
An
equally important area of research
would be the extension of the
to include multi-innovator/competitor scenarios.
Such an expanded model
could then be applied to innovation-based international competition.
30
Hypercube of Innovation
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32
Hypercube of Innovation
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in Technology
von Hippel,
E.,
The Sources ofInnovation (New York, Oxford University
33
Press,
1988)
Afuah
&
Bahrain
5"
§
'§
"
*
|
eg
Incremental
unchanged
Innovation
(ft
wr
\\
8
!
s
I5
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Architectural
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Reinforced
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Core Concepts
C^
vn
wati° n
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'
"
\ooo
The Hypercube of Innovation. The X and Y axes are the innovation-classifying
The Z-axis is the innovation value-adding chain of supplier of key components, innovator,
Customer and supplier of complementary innovators
Figure
1
:
factors.
34
Hypercube of Innovation
Incremental
unchanged
Changed
Innovation
Architectural
Innovation
Reinforced
Overturned
Core Concepts
8 ~E
51
*e 90
unchanged
l!
Changed
Afuah
Bahrain
&.
FIGURE 3): The GREEN-RED zone map
B
4
-
£
3
"
X
1
RED ZONE
YELLOW ZONE
-
o
GREEN ZONE
t
"
1
I
Supplier
'
1
1
Innovator
Customer
A
-B1
Comp.
B
Inn.
Innovation Value-Added Chain
FIGURE
4a):
The
GREEN-RED zone map
for the
DSK
keyboard.
5
I
RED ZONE
4-
I
B
B
YELLOW
5
2-
1
1
-
GREEN ZONE
I
I
Supplier
Innovator
Customer
Innovation Value-Added Chain
36
Comp.
Inn.
DSK
Hypercube of Innovation
FIGURE 4b): The GREEN-RED zone map for the Electric Car.
5
RED ZONE
4
£
-
3-
YELLOW ZONE
2-
J
•9
m
1
-
GREEN ZONE
"8
I
1
1
I
1
«
<
Customer
Innovator
Supplier
1
1
Comp.
Inn.
Electric
Car
Innovation Value-added Chain
FIGURE 5): The GREEN-RED zone map for D3Ms OS-2
and Microsoft's Windows
5
1
'
Supplier
I
Innovator
•
I
•
Customer
Innovation Value-Added Chain
37
OS-2
I
Comp.
Inn.
Windows
Afuah
&.
Bahrain
unchanged
Changed
Incremental
unchanged
g
Changed
Innovation
Radtai,
Architectural
Innovation^
-~
*
"
Innovation"^
—
Reinforced
Overturned
Core Concepts
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unchanged
Hypercube of Innovation
End User Customer
User/Software Developer
n
Hardware Package
Application Software
Is
%
Si
E i
Operating System
5"
D
2 3
3
9
< "D
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System Architecture
Compilers
3
rf
01
Board
Instruction Set Design
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level
Design
Complementary
-5
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V)
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(J
o o
Q. ro
>
o
*- o
c
Chip
Top
level Architecture
.y
Z £
Logic Design
Semiconductor Fabrication Process
CO
c
T3
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Semiconductor Physics & Device Models
Figure 7.
Computer System knowledge Areas and
39
their providers
Afuah & Bahram
8
E
If
unchanged
unchanged
•uVAX,u370L_
•
"
I
s
•
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s 6
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Hypercube of Innovation
Table
2:
The Hypercube
in
Afuah
Tabic 10: Some
!
&.
Bahrain
Hypercube of Innovation
Table 12a: Key innovations in supercomputers
Afuah
Table 13: The Hypercube
in
&
Bahrain
Hypercube of Innovation
Table 14: The Hvpercube
in
Afuah
&.
Bahrain
unchanged •Cray
X-MP
•Cray-3
unchanged
•
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—
n
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(•Stai'TtX)"
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Reinforced
Core Concepts
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unchanged Innovation
Changed
Architectural
Innovation,.
RadfcjL«•»
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•MS Windows <M-2
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X-MP
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e
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•Star-100
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•
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Figure 9 rSupercoraputers and the Hypercube
?93S
46
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Date Due
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