An Experimental Study of a Common Property
Renewable Resource Game in Continuous Time∗
Hassan Benchekroun
McGill University
Jim Engle-Warnick
McGill University and CIRANO
Dina Tasneem
McGill University
Abstract: We experimentally test for the selection of equilibria in a renewable resource
extraction game. In the experiment, pairs of subjects competitively extract from a pool of
a renewable resource in real time. We find evidence for linear, non-linear and rule of thumb
extraction strategies. We find that play evolves over time into multiple steady states, with
a bi-modal distribution indicating two different levels of cooperation. In an experimental
manipulation that eliminates a set of non-linear strategies, we find increased cooperation
within the less cooperative pairs and an improvement in the non-linear strategies they employ.
Initital equilibrium paths do not affect behavior, but initial conditions on the stock levels
do. Our results have implication for the management of non-renewable resources.
Keywords: Renewable Resource; Dynamic Game; Experimental Economics; Markov
Strategies
JEL Codes: C90; C73; Q20.
∗ Acknowledgements:
We acknowledge The Centre for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on
Organizations and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council for funding. Corresponding
author: Dina Tasneem at dina.tasneem@mail.mcgill.ca.
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