Banking and Trading
Arnoud W.A. Boot
Lev Ratnovski
University of Amsterdam and CEPR
International Monetary Fund
February 18, 2012
Abstract
We study the interaction between relationship banking and short-term arm‘s length …nance that we call trading. Relationship banking is not scalable, pro…table (with high
franchise value), long-term oriented, and relatively not risky. Trading is transactions-based:
scalable, with lower margins (capital constrained), short-term, and prone to risk shifting.
When a bank engages in trading, it can use its ‘spare’ capital (the franchise value of traditional banking) to expand the scale of trading. However there are two ine¢ ciencies. A
bank may allocate too much capital to trading ex post, compromising the ability to build
relationships ex ante. And a bank may use trading for risk-shifting. We argue that …nancial
innovation made arm’s length …nance more short-term (i.e. pushed it into the realm of
trading) by improving the tradability of previously non-marketable assets. And, …nancial
development augmented the scalability of trading –the size of positions that banks can take.
This initially bene…ted conglomeration, but beyond some point ine¢ ciencies dominate. The
deepening of …nancial markets in recent decades has led trading by banks to become increasingly distortive, so that problems in managing and regulating trading by banks will persist
for the foreseeable future. The analysis has implications for the desirability of restricting
(prohibiting or ring-fencing) banks’trading activities.
Contact: a.w.a.boot@uva.nl, lratnovski@imf.org. We thank Stijn Claessens, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni
Favara, George Pennacchi, Joel Shapiro, and participants of the IDEI-TSE conference “Risk Management and
Financial Markets”, Oxford Financial Intermediation Conference, and Swiss Winter Conference on Financial
Intermediation, for helpful comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent those of the IMF.
1
1
Introduction
We study the interaction between relationship banking and (private) information extensive
arm‘s length …nance that we call trading. Relationship banking involves private information
and describes activities based on repeated and long-term interactions with clients. Trading does
not rely on repeated interactions, nor does it involve private information. This allows it to be
short term in nature as banks can move in and out of it via …nancial market transactions,
Our de…nition of trading thus highlights the absence of private information and the ability
to increase and decrease exposure via …nancial market transactions. It includes proprietary
trading, taking positions in all kinds of debt instruments (e.g. securitized credit), originating
standardized loans solely based on hard information (typically mortgages), and in general any
other activities that do not rely on relationship-speci…c private – soft – information. Financial innovation, driven in large part by developments in information technology, has pushed
arm‘s length …nance into the realm of trading, by improving the tradability of previously nonmarketable assets. Together with the deepening of …nancial markets, again an artifact of information technology, this made doing transactions and engaging in trading very prevalent for
banks.
The interaction between relationship banking and trading is a novel topic and is fundamentally di¤erent from the distinction between lending and underwriting that was the focus of much
existing literature. A key question in that literature was whether a bank‘s private information
about a borrower coming from the lending side compromises (or facilitates) its ability to o¤er
underwriting services for the same borrower (e.g. Puri, 1996). The pros and cons of such interaction are relatively well-understood, and were not at the forefront during the recent crisis. Our
paper downplays the distinction between lending and underwriting. For us both could represent
examples of long-term, relationship-based banking.1 We contrast relationship-based banking to
transactions-based activities and evaluate the frictions coming from the di¤erence in horizon:
long term versus short term.
1
Underwriting, insofar as it requires hard and codi…ed information that is to be transmitted to the markets,
may have a lower relationship intensity than commercial bank lending based on soft information. Nevertheless,
one could argue that at its core underwriting remains a relationship-based activity.
2
The shift towards trading is a very fundamental change a¤ecting the industry over the last
decades going back at least to the (now defunct) UK Barings Bank trading disasters in Singapore
around 1995. Some indicators of this process for the U.S. …nancial sector include an increase
in the share of trading assets and securities on bank balance sheets from around 20% in the
early 1990s to 30% in 2012, and an increase of non-interest income as a share of bank revenues
from 35% to 50% over the same period (NY Fed, 2012).2 The recent Liikanen report for the
EC (Liikanen, 2012) points at similar developments in Europe.
In Europe, some large universal banks have become distressed or failed during the crisis due
to exposures to collateralized debt. UBS in Switzerland is perhaps the most vivid example, see
UBS, 2008), but very similar patterns were present in banks in many other countries. In the
United States, investments in securitized debt have back…red particularly in investment banks
(e.g. Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch). But also, commercial banks have
used their franchise to expand in information-extensive (wholesale) mortgage origination and
holdings (e.g. Washington Mutual and Wachovia), exposing themselves to trading and …nancial
market risks. The sizable losses on trading activities, such as a 2012 loss related to the treasury
activities in JP Morgan is another example.
The focus on the risks of arm’s length activities by banks is supported by emerging empirical
evidence. De Jonghe (2010), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Brunnermeier et al (2012),
and DeYoung and Toma (2013) identify that banks’non-lending activities are more risky, and
within that De Jonghe (2010) and Brunnermeier et al (2012) show that trading is the most risky
activity. Fahlenbach et al. (2012) show that banks with more exposure to trading securities
were more likely to be distressed during the 1998 and 2008 crises. Loutskina and Strahan (2011)
show that arm’s length mortgages are riskier than informed ones.
While it is quite understandable that the public debate has focused on losses and risks coming
from trading, this paper highlights that trading activity may have undermined the relationshiporiented banking franchise in more subtle ways. Trading may have diverted resources away
from the more long term relationship banking activity. Notable here is the example of New
2
The two measures are proxies. For example, in balance sheet composition, some loans may be arm’s length,
while in income some non-interest earnings may come from relationships. But the trend is nevertheless clear.
3
York investment banks that, since the early 1980-s have turned the focus from traditional
underwriting to short-term market-making and proprietary investments. And there is evidence
of trading being a drain on commercial bank activities in newly created universal banks, such
as Bank of America-Merrill Lynch. We will highlight the fundamental friction in short-term
versus long-term orientation. The diversion of resources is not just a reassessment of priorities
in favor of trading, but, as we will argue, an ine¢ cient process that undermines the viability of
relationship-oriented activities to the detriment of overall pro…tability.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Key to our analysis is the observation that the relationship
business has information-based rents and hence generates implicit capital, yet is not readily
scalable. The trading activity on the other hand is scalable but can be capital constrained and
hence may bene…t from the spare capital available in the bank. Accordingly, relationship banks
might expand into trading in order to use their ‘spare’ capital. This funding (liability-side)
synergy is akin to the assertions of practitioners that one can take advantage of the balance
sheet of the bank.
Opening up banking to trading, however, creates frictions. We highlight two of them. One
friction is the misallocation of capital from the banking business to the trading activity. The
reason for the misallocation is time inconsistency: banks may be tempted to trade too much ex
post, which undermines ex ante investments in relationships by bank customers, and damages
the bank’s franchise. Another friction is risk-shifting: banks may use trading as a way to boost
risk to bene…t shareholders as residual claimants. As a result of these two frictions, a bank can
overexpose itself to trading: trade too much and in too risky a fashion, compared to what is
socially optimal, or ex ante optimal for its shareholders.
The time inconsistency problem that traditional banking is subjected to in the presence
of trading deserves some further elaboration. The type of relationship activity that we model
is one where banks provide their customers with funding insurance (i.e. guarantees for the
availability of funding), like credit lines and loan commitments. As Kashyap et. al. (2002)
show, borrowing under such funding insurance arrangements represents 70% of bank lending.
Time inconsistency may come about because the upfront fees paid for these guarantees lead to
‘front-loaded’income from banks. As we will discuss, the business of banking involves quite a
4
lot of such (implicit and/or explicit) commitments.
An important feature is that banks have considerable discretion in whether or not to honor
these lending commitments, which may invite time inconsistency problems. In particular, when
banks shift risk capital to the trading business they may undermine their ability to honor
commitments and the traditional relationship oriented banking business may su¤er. As we will
argue, the extant literature on relationship banking has largely overlooked the importance of
this commitment-oriented relationship banking business with its front-loaded income.
We also highlight that risk shifting in banks is linked to their arm’s length (trading) activities.
Such involvement is rather ‡uid, meaning it can be scaled up (or down) rather quickly and
opportunistically without information frictions. This does not mean that risk shifting cannot
happen with relationship banking, but the problem there is of a much more muted nature. It
is the short term focus of trading and its scalability that facilitate (opportunistic) risk taking.
Banking is not (or much less) scalable, much more dependent on an enduring presence and
interaction with customers which is at odds with opportunistic risk taking.
We show that the frictions associated with trading by banks become more acute when
…nancial markets are deeper, inducing larger trading positions. This not only increases the
potential misallocation of capital but also enables gambles of a scale necessary for risk-shifting.
The frictions also become more acute when returns on traditional banking activities are lower.
Both factors – deeper markets and less pro…table relationship banking – have been in play
in the last 10-20 years, both driven in large part by changes in information technology and
increased availability and role of hard information. Consequently, the economic costs of trading
by banks may have started to outweigh its bene…ts. Trading by banks, while possibly benign
and bene…cial historically, might have recently become destructive. And, the distortions are
likely to persist in the future, so a regulatory response might be necessary.
We include several policy recommendations, which we discuss in the context of recent legislative proposals. The Volcker Rule as contained in the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S., the Report
of the Independent Commission on Banking (the so-called Vickers Report) in the UK, and the
Liikanen Report to the European Commission all propose some prohibitions or segregation of
5
trading-like activities (see also Haldane, 2012). Interestingly, the three proposals are di¤erent
in many respects (types of activities targeted, and whether to segregate or prohibit). This
highlights the need for a framework to understand the underlying risks and market failures that
we seek to develop in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature. Section 3 outlines the
features of banking and trading, and sets up the model. Section 4 demonstrates the bene…ts
of combining banking and trading (conglomeration). Section 5 identi…es the …rst friction of
conglomeration – the misallocation of capital. Section 6 deals with the other friction of conglomeration –the risk-shifting problem, and the interaction between the two frictions. Section
7 discusses modeling features, including our characterization of relationship banking, and policy
implications. Section 8 concludes.
2
Related Literature
Our paper complements a number of strands in the literature on banking and internal capital
markets. There is a vast literature on the costs and bene…ts of combining commercial and
investment banking, in particular whether underwriting that follows prior lending relationships
has biased standards (see Puri, 1996, Krosner and Rajan, 1994, and Fang et al., 2010) or
bene…ts from synergies (Schenone, 2004). While this literature focuses on how borrower speci…c
information is used across lending and underwriting activities, our analysis focuses on combining
private information intensive banking activities (either lending or underwriting) with trading
activities that do not depend on private (borrower speci…c) information.
In studying the problems of conglomeration, we focus on shareholder incentives. An alternative approach would have been to consider the incentive problems of managers (e.g. as in
Acharya et al., 2011). While incentive issues in banks are undoubtedly important, banks are
subject to pressures from …nancial markets to maximize shareholder returns. So understanding
the distortions that can be caused by shareholder value maximization alone remains important,
particularly when such distortions may have worsened in the recent past because of external
factors, such as information technology linked increases in …nancial development. Some papers
6
have linked the distortions in bank trading activities to the abuse of the safety net, including deposit insurance (Hoenig and Morris, 2011). Our results are not driven by government
guarantees, o¤ering more general implications.
There is also a literature that studies how the expansion of markets a¤ects the nature of
bank relationships (Boot and Thakor, 2000), and how links with …nancial markets might make
banking more procyclical (Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). We do not consider such aspects. Instead
we analyze how the presence of relationship banking and trading within one organization may
su¤er from di¤erences in time frame: respectively their long term versus short term orientation.
More generally, our paper relates to the literature on internal capital markets (Williamson,
1975, Danielson, 1984). Conglomeration may help relax the …rm’s overall credit constraint
(Stein, 1997) but also impose costs, primarily related to divisional rent-seeking (Rajan et. al.,
2000). Our model is similar in describing the bene…ts of conglomeration as relaxing credit
constraints, but points to a di¤erent set of costs: headquarters may misallocate capital due to
time inconsistency and risk shifting problems, which arise in combining banking and trading.
By analyzing a particular case of the misallocation of resources, we can analyze the evolution
of bank business models and draw implications for the future.
3
Model
We model two activities. One is a relationship-based business that we call “banking”. Another
is a transaction-based (short-term and arm’s length) business that we call “trading”. Banking
relies on a …xed endowment of information about existing customers; trading does not. We
argue that this distinction alone su¢ ces to highlight a range of synergies and con‡icts between
the two.
The …xed endowment of information makes banking pro…table (hence, we assume, not credit
constrained), yet not easily scalable. High franchise value makes banking relatively safe. And
when securing the value of information requires non-contractible ex ante investments that pay
o¤ over time, banking becomes long-term in nature. In contrast, since it does not rely on
any endowment, trading is scalable, less pro…table per unit (and hence, we assume, credit
7
constrained), short-term oriented, and possibly risky.3
We use these observations to study the interaction between banking and trading in a universal bank. The synergies between the two activities are driven by di¤erences in pro…t and
scalability. Banking activity has extra borrowing capacity but is not scalable, while trading
is scalable but credit constrained. Through conglomeration, banks can “use” their borrowing
capacity to pro…tably expand the scale of trading.
The con‡icts between banking and trading are driven by di¤erences in horizon and risk.
The …rst con‡ict is capital misallocation. Banks may over-allocate capital to trading ex post,
because when considering short-term returns to trading they disregard the negative e¤ects
of such misallocation on ex ante investments in relationships. Put di¤erently, due to time
inconsistency, trading may drain funds from banking and hence destroy its pro…table long-term
relationship franchise. The second con‡ict is the use of trading for risk-shifting. Banks may
over-allocate capital to trading and choose risky trading strategies, because unlike relatively
safe banking, trading gives opportunities for risk-shifting. Overall, banks may trade too much
and in too risky a fashion, compared to what is socially optimal.
The analysis proceeds in steps. We start with a benchmark model of synergies abstracting
from the sources of con‡icts. We then introduce time-inconsistency in capital allocation by
making returns on banking dependent on ex ante decisions of customers. Subsequently we
introduce risk-shifting by considering risky trading. We also demonstrate the potential for
mutual ampli…cation between the capital misallocation and the risk-shifting problems.
3.1
Credit Constraints
A key feature of our model is the presence of credit constraints. We build on Holmstrom and
Tirole’s (1997) formulation that limits leverage based on the owner-manager’s incentives to
engage in moral hazard. Assume that the owner-manager can choose to run the bank normally,
3
One could characterize the banking activity as a high-margin-low-volume operation and trading as a lowmargin-high-volume operation. Carry trade is perhaps the most notable example of low-margin-high-volume
trading by banks. Some trading activities might have high margin (e.g. private equity investments), but these
are relatively scarce.
8
or engage in moral hazard. She will run the bank normally when:
bA,
where
(1)
is the shareholder return when assets are employed for normal business, and bA is the
shareholder return to moral hazard: initial investment A multiplied by the conversion factor
b > 0 of assets into private bene…ts. When the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint (1) is not
satis…ed, the bank’s owner-manager engages in moral hazard, and a bank becomes worthless
for creditors. Anticipating that, creditors would not provide funding. Thus, (1) can be seen as
describing a leverage-related credit constraint for a bank.4
We now describe the banking and trading businesses.
3.2
Banking
Relationship banking is based on an endowment of information about a …xed set of customers,
which allows the bank to obtain pro…ts from serving them. The key properties of banking are:
Not scalable. It is prohibitively costly to expand the customer base.
Pro…table and not credit constrained. The bank’s information on customers is valuable,
making pro…ts relatively high. Accordingly, we assume that the bank is not credit constrained.5
Long-term. The return to relationship banking is distributed over time and depends on
customers’ex ante investment in relationships. We capture this by assuming that a part
of the return is obtained in the form of ex ante credit line fees paid by customers. If
4
There are many ways to interpret the payo¤ to moral hazard bA. It can represent savings on exerting the
owner-manager’s e¤ort (without which the relationship banking projects do not repay, and trading strategies lose
money), limits on the pledgeability of revenues (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998), or the possibility of absconding
(Calomiris and Kahn, 2001). We let the form of moral hazard be identical for standalone banking, trading, and
the conglomerated bank.
We do not consider outside equity. For now assume that it is very costly. See Section 7.2 for more discussion.
5
The rents imply some informational monopoly on the part of the bank; it may be related to past investments
by the bank and its customers into their relationships, and/or to advantages of proximity or specialization in
local markets. Note that the time and proximity elements involved in building relationships provide a natural
explanation for the lack of scalability.
9
there are doubts about the bank’s ability to make good on funding commitments, the fees
that customers are willing to pay (their investment in relationships) decline. We abstract
from this intertemporal feature in the benchmark model of Section 4, and introduce it in
Section 5 as a source of con‡ict between banking and trading.
Relatively low risk. Traditional banking has relatively predictable returns and is not
prone to risk-shifting (in the model, certain returns and no risk-shifting). Risk-shifting
requires probabilistic returns. But a traditional bank that funds a portfolio of small loans
with independently distributed returns has minimal idiosyncratic risk thanks to the law
of large numbers. A bank could of course take on aggregate risk (for example, interest
rate risk), yet incentives to do so may be o¤set by a high franchise value. To put it
di¤erently, we think of a case when shareholders of a bank with high franchise value
and little idiosyncratic risk fully internalize the losses associated with choosing a low
monitoring e¤ort or excess aggregate risk. We contrast this with more risk-prone trading
activities in Section 6.
Setup The bank operates in a risk-neutral economy with no discounting. It has no explicit
equity and has to borrow in order to invest. Creditors require a zero expected return. In the
base model the bank is risk-free, so the interest rate on bank borrowing is zero. There are three
dates: 0, 1, 2.
Relationship franchise. At date 0 the bank is endowed with private information on a mass
R of customers. We let information produce a return for the bank in two ways.
First, it gives the bank an initial franchise value R0 , coming from existing loans that the
bank has outstanding at date 0 with a repayment at date 2.6
Second, the bank has an opportunity to serve its customers’future funding needs. Each
customer is expected to have a liquidity need of size 1 at date 1 (with certainty).7 When
6
For example, assume that at date 0 the bank has lent X to customers with a repayment of X (1 + b) + R0
at date 2, hence obtaining pro…ts Xb + R0 . Substituting this and the private bene…ts Xb into the IC constraint
(1) gives a “wedge” between pro…ts and private bene…ts of R0 . Since R0 plays a passive role in the model, we
can streamline the exposition by setting X = 0: implicit equity is produced from a minimal initial investment.
7
For simplicity, we set the probability that the credit line will be used equal to one. We could envision
10
covering it, the bank can collect informational rents r per customer, up to a total of rR,
from the repayment at date 2.
Spare borrowing capacity. We denote the amount that the bank borrows to cover the customers’ liquidity needs at date 1 as R
R. Then, the IC (leverage) constraint (1) takes the
form:
R0 + rR
bR,
(2)
where the left hand side is the bank’s market value of equity in normal operations: the franchise
value R0 and the information rent on covering its customers’liquidity needs rR. We assume that
this constraint is satis…ed, including at R = R, implying spare borrowing capacity in banking:
R0 + rR > bR.
3.3
(3)
Trading
The trading business is not based on an endowment of information. Consequently, it has
di¤erent properties:
Scalable, with decreasing returns to scale. We think of decreasing returns to scale in the
context of a Kyle (1985) framework where the average return of an informed trader falls
in the size of her trade because the price impact increases in size. The price impact is
smaller when the mass of liquidity traders is larger. Thus, trading is more scalable in
deeper …nancial markets (or, at higher …nancial development).
Less pro…table, credit constrained. The per-unit return to trading is lower than the return
to banking because trading does not bene…t from an endowment of private information.
Consequently, trading, while scalable, can be credit constrained.
Short-term. Unlike banking, trading is transactional in nature. Returns occur at one
point in time and do not rely on ex ante investments.
a probability less than one. For example, consider uncertainty about future market circumstances, with the
credit line only being used when external circumstances make it optimal because spot markets have become ‘too
expensive’(cf. Boot et al., 1993, Acharya et al., 2007).
11
Possibly risky. A bank can choose between two trading strategies. One generates safe but
low returns. Another generates somewhat higher returns most of the time, but can lead to
catastrophic losses with a small probability.8 We assume that the risky trading strategy
has a lower NPV, yet may be used by a bank as a means of risk-shifting. We introduce
risky trading in Section 6.
Setup All trading activity is short-term. For T units invested at date 1, trading produces at
date 2 net returns of tT for T
S and 0 for T > S. The parameter S captures the scalability
of trading. It is natural to relate it to …nancial development, i.e. S is increasing in the depth of
the market. Trading is less pro…table per unit than banking since it does not bene…t from the
informational endowment:
t < r.
(4)
And the low pro…tability of trading makes it credit constrained:
t < b,
(5)
implying that the IC constraint (1) does not hold when trading is a standalone activity. We
thus, for simplicity, assume that standalone trading is not possible due to credit constraints,
despite the opportunity to pro…tably invest up to S units.9
The timeline for the benchmark model is summarized in Figure 1. For now it abstracts from
the long-term nature of banking, which can lead to a misallocation of capital (Section 5) and
risk-shifting (introduced in Section 6).
8
This is reminiscent of banks taking on “tail risk” to generate “fake alpha” (see for example Acharya et al.,
2010).
9
The fact that, in our analysis, trading cannot exist as a stand-alone business should not be taken literally.
What is meant is that the viability of trading requires a substantial equity commitment. This is what we often
observe in practice, as many independent trading houses are partnerships with substantial recourse.
12
4
Bene…ts of Conglomeration
Our model implies a natural bene…t to the conglomeration of banking and trading: it links a
business with borrowing capacity but no investment opportunities (the relationship bank) with
a business that has investment opportunities but is subject to credit constraints (trading).
Under conglomeration, at date 1, the bank maximizes pro…t:
C
= R0 + rR + tT ,
(6)
subject to the joint leverage constraint (1):
R0 + rR + tT
where T
b(R + T ),
(7)
S. Comparing this to (3) and (5) shows that conglomeration allows using the
borrowing of the relationship bank to fund some trading.
The bank allocates the date 1 borrowing capacity between relationship banking R and
trading T . Since r > t, the bank will choose to serve all banking customers (R = R) before
allocating any remaining capacity to trading. The maximum amount of trading that a universal
bank can support, Tmax (assuming Tmax
Tmax =
S) is given by (7) set to equality, with R = R:
R0 + R(r
b t
b)
.
(8)
Since it is never optimal to trade at a scale that exceeds S, T = min fS; Tmax g. This
means that when S is low – the scalability of trading is small – the bank covers all pro…table
opportunities in trading. When S is high –trading is more scalable –the bank covers trading
opportunities Tmax < S and abstains from the rest.
Proposition 1 (Conglomeration without frictions) The conglomeration of banking and
trading enables expanding the scale of trading, which is otherwise credit-constrained. In equilibrium, the bank serves all relationship banking customers, R = R, and allocates the rest of its
borrowing capacity to trading, as long as trading is pro…table, T = min fS; Tmax g.
13
Proposition 1 is a benchmark that provides a rationale for why banks choose to engage in
trading, and speci…es the …rst-best allocation of borrowing capacity between the two activities.
Next we study ine¢ ciencies that may arise in combining banking and trading.
5
Capital Misallocation
5.1
The Long-Term Nature of Relationship Banking
The previous section has outlined the bene…t of combining banking and trading –the use of spare
capital of the relationship bank to expand trading. We now turn to the costs of conglomeration.
This section deals with the …rst ine¢ ciency: the misallocation of capital induced by the time
inconsistency problem between long-term banking and short-term trading.
Banking is long-term because it involves repeated interactions with customers, which produce returns that are distributed over time. We model the intertemporal nature by letting
a bank o¤er funding commitments to customers. The commitments take form of credit lines
that cover future funding needs in return for ex ante fees that customers pay to the bank. A
rationale for credit lines is that customers may be constrained in how much they can pay to the
bank ex post, due to moral hazard at the borrower level (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998; Boyd
and De Nicolo, 2005).
By making some payments ex ante, customers reduce the amount that they owe the bank ex
post. As a result, returns to banking, although higher than returns to trading, might ex post be
lower. This may distort ex post capital allocation: once credit line fees have been collected, a
bank might have incentives to allocate too much capital to trading, leaving itself with insu¢ cient
borrowing capacity to fully serve the credit lines. Anticipating that, customers may decide to
reduce the credit line fees that they are willing to pay ex ante, lowering the bank’s overall pro…t
and borrowing capacity.
While a bank can generate return r on covering customers’future funding needs, it can only
capture
r through interest rates charged on the actual lending between dates 1 and 2. The
remaining (r
) can be captured at date 0 as a credit line fee. Importantly, in our setup, a
14
bank cannot commit to cover the future liquidity needs of customers. That is, we let the bank
have discretion to refuse lending in the future if it has no borrowing capacity left to lend under
the credit line. (The lack of enforceability in our model is similar to the real-life contractual
features of credit lines.)
The emphasis on the uncommitted “funding insurance” role of relationship banks is a key
assumption of out model. It contrasts with another common view on relationship banking that
focuses on the informational capture e¤ects. See Section 7.1 for a full discussion of our approach,
and of why it captures an important feature of relationship banking. The timeline incorporating
the credit line arrangement is shown in Figure 2.
5.2
Time Inconsistency of Capital Allocation
At date 1, the bank chooses R and T to maximize its pro…t:
C
where Rex
)Rex
ante
ante
= R0 + (r
)Rex
ante
+ R + tT ,
(9)
is the borrowing that customers expect to get under a credit line and (r
is the total credit line fee. R is the actual borrowing under a credit line. The bank
maximizes (9) subject to the IC constraint:
R0 + (r
Note that in equilibrium, Rex
ante
)Rex
ante
+ R + tT
b (R + T ) .
(10)
= R: This follows since customers correctly anticipate the
bank’s ability and willingness to lend under the commitment.10
Recall that in the benchmark case in Section 4, the bank always covered the customers’
liquidity needs, because the return on the banking activity was higher than that on trading
(r > t). However when a part of return to banking is obtained ex ante to deal with potential
moral hazard at the borrower level, a time inconsistency problem may distort the allocation
10
As will become apparent, the bank will always charge the maximum possible amount ex-post. That is, is
set at the highest level such that the moral hazard problem at the borrower level is not triggered. This minimizes
the time inconsistency problem.
15
of capital. As long as the ex post return to banking is su¢ ciently high,
allocation persists. Yet when
> t, the …rst best
< t, the bank has an incentive to divert borrowing capacity.
In maximizing its ex post pro…t, the bank chooses to …rst allocate the borrowing capacity to
trading up to its maximum pro…table scale S, and only then to give the remainder to banking.
Whether this change in the allocation rule results in a misallocation of capital depends on the
scalability of trading. When the scalability is low, S
Tmax , the bank can cover all liquidity
needs of customers even after allocating S to trading. That is, the allocation fR; SjS
Tmax g
satis…es the leverage constraint (7). Hence, R = R and relationship banking does not su¤er.
However when scalability is high, S > Tmax , banking is credit constrained ex post: the allocation
fR; SjS>Tmax g no longer satis…es (7). The borrowing capacity that remains after the bank has
allocated S to trading is insu¢ cient to cover all liquidity needs of customers, hence R < R.
Anticipating that the relationship business will be credit constrained, bank customers will prorate the credit line fee which they are willing to pay ex ante: (r
)Rex
ante
< (r
)R.
The misallocation of borrowing capacity as a result of the time inconsistency problem thus
undermines the ability of a bank to maintain its relationship banking franchise. The bank loses
pro…table ex ante investments in relationships by customers (in this model, credit line fees).
5.3
The Consequences of Time Inconsistency
Under time inconsistency ( < t and S > Tmax ), the bank chooses to allocate its borrowing
capacity to trading even when this means that it cannot deliver on the more pro…table banking
activity. The severity of the consequences depends on the relationship between the pro…tability
of banking r and the private bene…ts b. Observe that cutting back on banking conserves capital
at a rate b (see IC constraint (1)) and undermines bank pro…tability at a rate r. There are two
cases.
Case 1: r < b. When r is small, such that r < b, cutting down on banking frees up
more capital than is lost in pro…ts (the leverage constraint becomes slack), hence trading can
be expanded. This is the case when some banking may be preserved under time inconsistency
16
under the intermediate scalability of trading. For:
R0
,
b t
Tmax < S
(11)
we solve (10) as equality to get the equilibrium allocation:
R =
T
R0
S(b
b r
t)
,
(12)
= S.
In this region of the intermediate scalability of trading, a diversion of borrowing capacity from
banking to trading is limited (the di¤erence between S and Tmax ). This misallocation is less
severe at higher levels of banking pro…tability r: in (12) R is increasing in r, thus R is closer
to the optimal allocation R for higher r. The reason is that a higher r increases the franchise
value of the banking unit and allows it to o¤er more spare capital to trading. We can see this
from (8); at higher r, more trading can be accommodated (Tmax is higher), and this reduces the
the ex post diversion to trading (i.e. the di¤erence between S and Tmax ).
A higher scalability of trading:
S>
R0
b t
(13)
leads to all resources being allocated to the trading activity, so that relationship banking is
wiped out. That is:
R = 0,
T
=
(14)
R0
.
b t
Banking cannot be maintained now because the highly scalable trading can now accommodate
all resources.
Case 2: r
b. When r is high, r
b, it follows immediately from (8) that Tmax > R0 =(b t).
Given that – as is assumed – the time inconsistency problem is present (S > Tmax ), we now,
contrary to Case 1, only have the higher range of scalability in trading, S > R0 =(b
17
t). From
Case 1 we know that trading will wipe out all banking activity in that range.
An alternative way to see this is to note that for r > b cutting down on banking leads to a
loss in pro…ts that is more than the capital freed up. This makes the leverage constraint (10)
more instead of less binding, reducing the capital available to trading. No smooth reduction
in the banking activity can help; in equilibrium, relationship banking totally disappears. The
time inconsistency problem is so severe that only trading remains at a modest scale, based on
the franchise value R0 :
R = 0,
T
=
R0
.
b t
To sum up. Highly pro…table relationship banking (r
activity (i.e. Tmax > R0 =(b
(15)
b) allows for a substantial trading
t), see (8)) without a detrimental e¤ect on the banking activity.
If nevertheless the scalability of trading exceeds this elevated level (S > Tmax ), the time inconsistency problem in combining trading and banking will very rapidly destroy the relationship
banking franchise fully. Hence we have a bang-bang solution. At lower levels of bank pro…tability (r < b), the trading volume Tmax that can be accommodated is smaller. Time inconsistency
sets in earlier, and from this point on smoothly starts reducing the level of the banking activity.
Note, however, that overall the banking activity su¤ers more from trading in the case r < b
than in the case r
b. Figure 3 summarizes the dynamics of relationship banking under time
inconsistency as a function of trading opportunities.
Figure 3 can help interpret some fundamental changes in the …nancial sector. Over the last
decades, the deepening of …nancial markets has expanded trading opportunities. With modest scalability of trading, banking did not su¤er: time inconsistency was not binding since the
implicit capital of relationship banks could accommodate all trading. Trading elevated overall
bank pro…tability. Yet more recently two developments may have undermined banks that engage
in trading. (i ) The scalability S of trading may have become too high, and (ii ) developments in
information technology (possibly the same that have made trading more scalable) and deregulation may have reduced the pro…tability r of relationship banking. So trading has become more
18
scalable, while banking became less pro…table and less able to support even the same levels of
trading without triggering detrimental time inconsistency. The former corresponds to the move
to the right on the axes of Figure 3, while the latter points to a shift from case 2 to case 1 in
the …gure (with lower Tmax ; note from (8) that Tmax shrinks for lower values of r).
This migration provides some important lessons for the industry structure of banking. With
limited trading opportunities and relatively pro…table banking activities, there is substantial
scope for combining banking and trading. However, more scalable trading coupled with less
pro…table banking can undermine banking severely. Combining the activities then becomes
very costly.
The dynamics of R and T for cases r < b and r
b, without (as in Section 4) and with time
inconsistency (this section), are summarized in Figure 4, panels A and B.
Proposition 2 (Time inconsistency of capital allocation) When t >
, then for S >
Tmax , the bank will allocate insu¢ cient capital to serving the future funding needs of its customers: R < R. Anticipating this, ex ante investments of customers in bank relationships su¤ er:
they pay lower credit line fees; and the bank’s relationship franchise deteriorates.
5.4
Costs of Conglomeration under Time Inconsistency
We can now derive bank pro…ts. Recall that the cumulative pro…t of banking and trading as
standalone activities is:
S
= R0 + rR + 0 = R0 + rR,
(16)
where R0 + rR is the pro…t of a standalone relationship bank (see (3)), and zero is the pro…t of
standalone trading (which is not viable).
The pro…t of a bank that engages in trading depends on the scalability of trading, S. For
S
Tmax , time inconsistency is not present, and the pro…t is increasing in S:
C
= R0 + rR + tS.
19
(17)
For higher S, S > Tmax ,
C
is decreasing in S as time inconsistency distorts capital al-
location. Following the two cases in Section 5.2: for r < b a bank substitutes trading for
banking, and its pro…t decreases smoothly (use (12)) until the maximum feasible scale of trading S = R0 =(r
For r
b) is reached:
rR0
C
= R0 +
C
= R0 + t
b
Sb(r
r
t)
, for Tmax < S
R0
, for S > R0 =(b
(b t)
R0 =(b
t),
(18)
t).
(19)
b, cutting down on banking does not create borrowing capacity for trading. Hence, the
banking activity collapses for S > Tmax , leading to a discrete drop in pro…t at S = Tmax , to the
level given in (19). The pro…ts of a conglomerated bank depending on the scalability of trading
are summarized in Figure 4, panels C and D.
Overall, from ((17)-(19)), we observe that, in comparison to stand-alone banking, trading
increases pro…tability initially (for low S) but can lead to a loss of pro…tability for higher
S. Speci…cally, when a bank fully substitutes trading for relationship banking (R = 0; T =
R0 =(b
t)) its pro…t
C
as given in (19) is less than the standalone pro…t
S
(see (16)) when
relationship banking rents rR are su¢ ciently high:
rR > t
R0
.
(b t)
(20)
The results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 (Pro…ts under time inconsistency) The e¤ ect of conglomeration on bank
pro…ts is inverse U-shaped in trading opportunities S. For low trading opportunities (S < Tmax ),
time inconsistency is not present, and pro…ts increase in trading opportunities as a bank can
better use its spare capital. For large opportunities (S > Tmax ), pro…ts fall with additional
trading as the time inconsistency problem intensi…es. There exist parameter values such that
beyond a certain scale of trading opportunities, banks that do not engage in trading generate
higher pro…ts than banks that combine relationship banking and trading.
20
6
Trading as Risk-Shifting
6.1
Risky Trading
The previous section has identi…ed an important ine¢ ciency that may arise when banks engage
in trading: a misallocation of capital due to time inconsistency, which can damage the relationship banking franchise. This section discusses a related ine¢ ciency: the use of trading for
risk-shifting. We also study how the two ine¢ ciencies interact.
Shareholders of a leveraged …rm have incentives for risk-shifting when the risk is not fully
priced at the margin in the …rm’s cost of funding (Jensen and Meckling, 1978). The latter is a
standard feature of corporate …nance, and arises when funds are attracted before an investment
decision is made, to which shareholders cannot commit. Such lack of commitment, and hence
risk not being priced at the margin, is present in banks.11
Yet, generating risk-shifting in traditional relationship banking is di¢ cult. Risk-shifting
requires probabilistic returns: an upside that accrues to shareholders and a downside that
exceeds the franchise value and imposes losses on creditors. But a traditional bank that funds
a portfolio of small loans with independently distributed returns has minimal idiosyncratic risk
thanks to the law of large numbers. A bank could of course take on aggregate risk (such as
interest rate risk). But when aggregate risk is relatively small, its negative realizations would be
fully internalized by shareholders if a bank has a high charter value. Therefore, opportunities
to generate risk-shifting in a traditional relationship bank with a high charter value may be
limited (in the model, absent). In contrast, trading allows the bank to generate highly skewed
returns, for example, from large undiversi…ed positions. Then, for a bank, trading becomes not
just a pro…t opportunity, but a means to perform risk-shifting.
11
The pricing of risk might be more distorted in banks than in non-…nancial companies. One reason is the
safety net (for insured deposits or “too big to fail” banks) that e¤ectively subsidizes risk taking. Another reason
are the e¤ects of seniority, when newly attracted funding is senior to existing debt due to the use of collateral
(Gorton and Metrick, 2011), short maturities (Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2011), or higher sophistication (Huang
and Ratnovski, 2011). Then, new funding is e¤ectively subsidized by existing creditors (although the latter may
anticipate such risk transfer and charge higher interest rates ex ante). In addition to these, a possibly higher
liquidity of bank assets compared to industrial …rms may make it easier for banks to opportunistically change
their risk pro…le (see Myers and Rajan, 1998). We do not need these additional e¤ects in our model. But if
present, they would strengthen our results. In particular, while we proceed to assume a positive NPV of risky
trading, having risk subsidized may give the bank incentives to engage in risky trading even if it has a negative
NPV.
21
To model risk-shifting, we introduce risky trading. Assume that a bank can choose between
the safe trading strategy considered before and a risky trading strategy, which for T units
invested generates a gross return (1 + t + ) T with probability p, and 0 with probability 1
p,
up to the maximum scale of trading S. The binary return is a simpli…cation, representing a
highly skewed trading strategy. The notion is that banks use trading to generate extra return
“alpha” by taking bets that are safe in most states of the world, but occasionally lead to
signi…cant losses. Such behavior is supported by anecdotal accounts of the strategies employed
in the run-up to the …nancial crisis (Acharya et al., 2010).
We assume that risky trading has an NPV that is lower than in safe trading, yet positive:
0 < p (1 + t + )
1 < t,
(21)
so that a bank would only choose risky trading for risk-shifting purposes and, as long as there is
spare borrowing capacity, would always choose to trade instead of leaving that capacity unused.
And, holding the cost of debt …xed, risky trading o¤ers a higher return to shareholders than
safe trading (creating incentives to use it for risk-shifting), yet not as high as to make the IC
constraint (1) not binding:
t < p(t + ) < b.
(22)
The choice of the trading strategy is not veri…able.
In the base model the bank was risk-free, so the interest rate on bank on bank borrowing was
zero. Now, under risky trading, a bank may be unable to repay its creditors in full. Shareholders
then surrender available cash ‡ows to creditors. Creditors ex ante set the interest rate i based
on their expectations of the bank’s future trading strategy to achieve zero expected return. For
simplicity, we assume that if multiple equilibria are possible, the creditors set the lower rate.
The bank chooses safe trading when indi¤erent. We focus on the richest case that combines
time inconsistency ( < t) and a smooth contraction of banking (b > r).
22
6.2
Risk-Shifting
We …rst derive conditions under which the bank would choose risky trading when charged a
low interest rate i = 0. This allows us to de…ne a threshold TRisky such that for T
TRisky the
bank chooses safe trading (because shareholders su¢ ciently internalize the lower NPV of risky
trading), while for T > TRisky the bank chooses risky trading. We then characterize the risky
trading equilibrium –interest rates, capital allocation, and pro…ts.
Assume that i = 0 and consider the payo¤ to risky trading. When a bank invests R in
relationship banking and T in risky trading, it obtains at date 2 from relationship banking
R0 + (1 + r)R; and from trading (1 + t + ) T with probability p and 0 otherwise. The bank has
to repay creditors R + T . It can do so in full when trading succeeds. Yet when trading produces
a zero return, the bank has su¢ cient income to repay in full only if R0 + (1 + r)R
R + T,
corresponding to an upper bound on the volume of trading:
T
R0 + rR.
(23)
When (23) holds, the bank’s debt is safe, and shareholders internalize the losses from risky
trading. Their payo¤ is:
Risky jT R0 +rR
= R0 + rR + p (1 + t + ) T
This is lower than the payo¤ with safe trading:
Risky jT R0 +rR
<
T.
C;
(24)
where
C
is given in
(6), since risky trading has a lower NPV than safe trading. Hence, bank shareholders will never
choose risky trading if they fully internalize possible losses.
We thus focus on the case T > R0 + rR, where a bank cannot repay creditors in full when
the risky trading strategy produces zero. Here, the shareholders’return when the bank engages
in risky trading is:
Risky
= p (R0 + rR + (t + ) T ) .
The bank chooses risky trading when
Risky
>
23
C.
(25)
From (6) and (25), this holds when the
scale of trading exceeds a threshold TRisky such that:
T > TRisky =
(R0 + rR) (1 p)
.
p(t + ) t
(26)
To express TRisky in exogenous variables, note that when a bank allocates T to trading, the
borrowing capacity left to banking (from (10)) is:
R=
R0
T (b
b r
t)
.
(27)
Substituting this into (26) gives:
TRisky =
R0 (1 p)
b(1 p)) =b + (p
r (p
t(1
p))
.
(28)
We can verify the following:
Lemma 1 (i) @TRisky =@ < 0 and @TRisky =@p < 0: when risky trading has a higher upside and
a lower risk, the switch to risky trading occurs at a lower scale;
(ii) @TRisky =@R0 > 0 and @TRisky =@r > 0: when the relationship franchise value is higher,
the switch to risky trading occurs at a higher scale.
Proof. All are obtained by di¤erentiation and considering that:
(i ) The denominator in (28) is positive:
r (p
b(1
p)) =b + (p
t(1
p)) = [(b
r)p + (1
p)b(r
t)] =b > 0,
since b > r and r > t:
(ii ) The expression (p
b(1
p)) in the denominator of (28) is positive. To see that, use
(22) to obtain:
p
b(1
p) > p
p(t + )(1
24
p) = p (p(t + )
t) > 0.
From the inequality (28) it follows that the bank will choose risky trading when trading
has a high scale (T > TRisky ), or when the value of the relationship banking franchise (R0
and/or r) is low. The reason is that risky trading has a …xed cost, the loss of the relationship
banking franchise value in bankruptcy that occurs with probability (1
p), while its bene…t,
the additional return , is proportional to the scale of trading. Hence the scale of trading has
to be high enough to compensate for putting the relationship banking franchise at risk.
We can now derive the allocation of borrowing capacity, interest rates, and pro…ts under
risky trading. To limit attention to the more insightful case, we focus on the case where:
Tmax < TRisky <
R0
(p(1 + t + )
b
1)
.
(29)
This implies that, (i ) risk-shifting only occurs when the time inconsistency problem in capital
allocation is already present, and (ii ) the scale of trading necessary for risk-shifting is feasible:
the IC constraint under risk-shifting
R0 + rR + p(1 + t + )T
b(R + T )
is not binding for T = TRisky even for R = 0.
Then, for S
TRisky the bank chooses the safe trading strategy with the allocation of the
borrowing capacity given by (12). For S > TRisky , the bank chooses risky trading. Note that
when there is a time inconsistency in the capital allocation under safe trading ( < t), it also
exists under risky trading because
< t < p(t + ), see (22), where p(t + ) is the ex post return
to risky trading. Therefore, under risky trading, the bank will also …rst allocate the maximum
possible borrowing capacity to trading before using the remainder for banking. The interest
rate i follows from the creditors’zero-pro…t condition:
(R + T ) = p (R + T ) (1 + i) + (1
p)(R0 + (1 + r)R),
(30)
where (R + T ) is the amount borrowed by the bank, p (R + T ) (1 + i) is the debt repayment
25
when risky trading succeeds, and (1 p)(R0 + (1 + r)R) is the value of bank assets transferred to
creditors in case of bankruptcy. The borrowing capacity R left for the banking activity follows
from the IC condition (when set at equality):
p(R0 + (r
i)R + (t +
i)T )
b(T + R),
(31)
where the left hand side is the expected payo¤ to bank shareholders in normal operations, and
the right hand side is the moral hazard payo¤.
R0
b (p(1+t+ ) 1) ,
As in (12) through (14), for TRisky < S
we obtain the allocation of
borrowing capacity:
R =
T
And for S >
R0
S ((1
p) + b
b r
p(t + ))
,
(32)
= S.
R0
b (p(1+t+ ) 1) :
R = 0,
T
=
b
(33)
R0
(p (1 + t + )
1)
.
Similarly to (18) and (19), bank pro…ts are:
Risky
Risky
(p(1 + t + ) 1))
, for TRisky < S
b r
(p(1 + t + ) 1)R0
R0
= p R0 +
, for S >
b (p (1 + t + ) 1)
b (p (1 + t + )
= p R0 +
rR0
R0
(34)
(p (1 + t + ) 1)
Sb(r
b
1)
.
(35)
Note that the shift to risky trading has two negative e¤ects. First, it has a direct negative
e¤ect on bank pro…ts because risky trading has a lower NPV than safe trading. Although
shareholders do not internalize this ex post, they internalize it ex ante through higher interest
rates on bank borrowing. Second, lower bank pro…ts reduce bank borrowing capacity, and thus
further undermine bank pro…tability. As a consequence,
Risky
<
C
(compare (34) and (35)
to (18) and (19)). The dynamics of R and T and the evolution of bank pro…ts when the bank
26
can use trading for risk-shifting are demonstrated in Figure 5.
Proposition 4 (Risk-shifting) The bank may engage in risky trading as a form of riskshifting, when the pro…tability of banking (r and R0 ) is low and trading is su¢ ciently scalable (S > TRisky ). This is detrimental to bank pro…ts, as the bank internalizes the costs of
risk-shifting through higher borrowing costs.
6.3
The Interaction of Time Inconsistency and Risk Shifting
Finally, we study the interaction between time inconsistency of capital allocation and risk
shifting ine¢ ciencies in banks that engage in trading. There are three e¤ects, by which the two
ine¢ ciencies can amplify each other, so that the presence of one distortion makes the presence
of the other more likely.
E¤ect 1. Risk-shifting makes time inconsistency in capital allocation more likely by increasing the ex post return on risky trading. Recall that t < p(t + ). Thus the ex post return to
shareholders from trading is higher with risky trading. This creates the region:
t<
< p(t + )
where the time inconsistency problem arises only under risk-shifting. That is, there was no
time inconsistency in the absence of risky trading (t < ), but it is present under risky trading
(
< p(t + )). Under such parameter values, there is no risk-shifting and hence no time
inconsistency for Tmax < S < TRisky . Yet for S > TRisky a bank chooses risky trading, which
also triggers time inconsistency. See Figure 6.
E¤ect 2. Time inconsistency makes risk-shifting more likely by increasing the equilibrium
volume of trading. When the time inconsistency problem is not present,
maximum volume of bank trading is Tmax (see (8)). When TRisky
> p(t + ), the
Tmax , the bank will never
engage in risk shifting since –independently of the value of S –the equilibrium scale of trading
(at most Tmax ) is too low to make risk-shifting worthwhile. Yet when the time inconsistency
problem is present,
< t; the equilibrium scale of trading can exceed Tmax and TRisky for high
27
enough S. Then, for S > TRisky , the bank will start engaging in risk-shifting. Risk-shifting
arises because of a higher equilibrium scale of trading, which in turn is a consequence of the
time inconsistency problem. See Figure 7.
E¤ect 3. Time inconsistency makes risk-shifting more likely by reducing the relationship
bank’s franchise value. The incentives for risk-shifting are limited by the cost of a loss of the
bank’s franchise value with probability (1
p). The time inconsistency reduces that franchise
value. To show this interaction, we need to enrich the model, to isolate the e¤ect of time
inconsistency on franchise value holding the rest of parameters …xed. For that, assume that the
presence of the time inconsistency problem is uncertain at date 0. Speci…cally, at date 0 let
there be a probability
a probability 1
that at date 1, t = tLow < , so there is no time inconsistency; and
that t = tHigh > , and hence time inconsistency is present. We can now
show how the di¤erent expectations of the presence of time inconsistency
a¤ect the bank’s
franchise value, and through it the threshold value TRisky (see (28)).
Consider the realization t = tLow at date 1, so that time inconsistency is present. Then, at
date 1, the payo¤ to bank shareholders from safe trading is:
C
The expression
C
= R0 + (r
is similar to
)
C
R + (1
)Rex
ante
+ R + tT
(36)
in (9), except for the second term: customers are willing to
pay higher credit line fees at date 0. Time inconsistency now arises with probability 1
rather
than with probability 1, hence compared to (9) credit line fees (and bank franchise value) are
higher by (r
)
R
Rex
ante
.
Similarly, the payo¤ from risky trading is:
R
Setting R = Rex
= p R0 + (r
ante
and equating
)
C
R + (1
)Rex
(36) and
R
28
ante
+ R + (t + ) T
(37)
(37) provides the threshold for a switch to
risk-shifting (similar to (26)):
TRisky =
Observe that a higher
R0 + (r
) R R + rR (1
p (t + ) t
p))
(38)
– meaning less time inconsistency – increases the bank’s franchise
value, borrowing capacity, and credit line fees. Therefore,
dTRisky
d
> 0: risk-shifting becomes
less likely.
Proposition 5 (Interaction of time inconsistency and risk-shifting) The problems of time
inconsistency and risk shifting amplify each other. Time inconsistency increases the scale of
trading and reduces the franchise value of the relationship bank, increasing incentives for riskshifting. Risk-shifting increases the bank shareholders’ ex post return from trading, which may
trigger time inconsistency in capital allocation.
7
Discussion
At this stage it is useful to summarize the distortions in banks that engage in trading and
how the distortions may have changed over time. There are two distortions. One is the time
inconsistency in the capital allocation decision: a bank may choose to trade on a scale that is
too high and undermines its relationship banking franchise. Another is the use of trading for
risk-shifting. Both distortions are more likely when the pro…tability of banking is low and the
scalability of trading is high. These factors may have come into play in recent decades due
to developments in information technology, facilitating easier access to information bene…ting
trading (increasing S) and reducing the grip that banks have over their relationship borrowers.
The latter would reduce the pro…tability of banking (reduce R0 and r).
Moreover, our analysis points to several reinforcing e¤ects. First, as we show in Propositions
2 and 4, the e¤ects of higher scalability of trading and lower pro…tability of banking work in
the same direction and reinforce each other. Second, time inconsistency and risk-shifting arise
simultaneously, and amplify each other as well (Proposition 5). Overall, this implies that trading
(i.e. arm’s length private information extensive) activities in banking, while possibly benign and
29
bene…cial historically, might recently have become destructive by undermining the viability of
relationship banking and putting banks at risk. These implications appear consistent with the
evidence from the recent crisis.
We will now discuss some modeling features, in particular, the way we have modeled relationship banking and commitment problems in capital allocation (including the inability to
commit not to trade, limits to returning capital to shareholders, and limits to raising external
equity). We conclude the section with some key policy implications.
7.1
Front-loaded Income in Relationship Banking
Relationship banking points at repeated interactions over time, i.e. it is an intertemporal
arrangement. We have modeled the time dimension of relationship banking returns through
a credit line contract with ex ante fees. Our formulation thus focuses on the front-loaded
income from relationships, where a bank obtains upfront fees but needs to be able to honor
future commitments. In particular, the credit line implies that bank customers expect to have
insured access to future credit. There is ample evidence that banks indeed play a large role in
providing liquidity insurance (or, more generally, funding insurance) to customers. Kashyap et
al. (2002) show that funding insurance arrangements (credit lines and other loan commitments)
are responsible for up to 70% of bank lending, and this high share is unique to banks among
other …nancial intermediaries. Berger and Bouwman (2009) con…rm these …ndings, showing
that credit lines represent about a half of banks’liquidity exposures.
We will comment on two aspects of the way we have used credit lines in our analysis. First,
the formal credit line that we have modeled is just one example of the funding commitments
that are typical in banking. Commitments are much more prevalent. Second, we will expand
on the discretion that we have included as feature in the credit line arrangement.
Credit lines are the most formal type of bank funding commitments. The banking business is
characterized by multiple forms of implicit commitments. For example, in syndicated lending,
banks have a mutual understanding to accommodate requests to participate in each others’
syndicates (reciprocity), and hence join forces in providing funding. Another important part of
30
the business of banks is the implicit commitment banks have to funding local markets based
on the knowledge of customers. Such local market presence gives banks a distinct competitive
advantage. This facilitates the funding of customers, especially in times of economic stress
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994, Bae et al., 2002). The way in which we have modeled relationship
banking, i.e. via the credit line contracting feature, thus can be seen as capturing a variety of
circumstances where relationship banking involves future funding commitments.
Now the discretion feature. Banks typically have discretion whether to honor lending commitments. Discretion serves two purposes. First, the ability of a bank to call a loan (or refuse
to lend under a credit line) could improve incentives of borrowers to behave prudently (Bolton
and Scharfstein, 1990). Second, the discretion o¤ers protection to a bank in case it becomes
…nancially constrained (Boot et al., 1993). There are multiple ways for banks to exercise discretion even for formal, precommitted lines of credit. Credit lines typically include a material
adverse change (MAC) clause. While formally linked to a deterioration of the borrower’s credit
quality, MAC clauses are usually de…ned so broadly as to give banks a signi…cant option to renege. Credit lines also have …nancial covenants and collateral (“borrowing base”) requirements,
often set deliberately tight, so that their breaches give banks an opportunity to renegotiate
(Demiroglu and James, 2011).12 Evidence from the recent …nancial crisis (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Huang, 2009) con…rms that banks’own …nancial conditions were a factor a¤ecting
the extension of credit within formal, precommitted lines of credit. Clearly, other commitments,
such as those of banks to their local market clientele, or of syndicated lenders to their syndicate
partners, are informal, and are straightforward to renege on.
The funding insurance function business model leads to front-loaded income in relationship
banking. Customers pay in advance credit line fees, or –more generally –are willing to pay for
services a slight premium over market prices to their relationship bank in return for knowing
that the relationship might be valuable in the future, particularly in stressful times. Yet since
the bank has discretion, such a business model is only sustainable when a relationship bank
has incentives and the ability to honor commitments. Yet, as we highlight in this paper, under
front-loaded income, banks’incentives might be compromised by time-inconsistency problems.
12
Chava and Roberts, 2008, estimate that a third of borrowers are on violation at some point during a ten-year
period.
31
In particular, banks may shift capital to the trading business ex post, undermining their ability
to honor funding commitments. Anticipating this, bank borrowers reduce ex ante fees which
render the funding insurance business less valuable for banks.
Our funding insurance as critical feature of relationship banking contrasts with the commonly postulated approach to describing the long-term relationships between banks and customers based on information capture. Borrowers are subsidized initially, while hold-up problems
allow the bank to recoup the subsidies later (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). This leads to backloaded income, making relationship banking highly attractive ex post. This is clearly di¤erent
from the funding insurance approach central to our analysis. Observe that the ex post rents in
banking have been reduced in the recent past due to higher competition and more easily available
borrower information that eroded the informational advantage of banks (Keeley, 1990). Hence
the informational capture aspect of relationship banking may have become less important.
7.2
External Equity and Internal Capital Allocation
Our analysis assumes that there are di¢ culties in accessing external equity. The frictions may
explain why trading activities might have to be undertaken in conjunction with a relationship
bank: if attracting external capital is costly, using the implicit capital of the relationship bank
could o¤er convenient access to capital. Costly outside equity also explains why the time
inconsistency problem is bad for the relationship banking franchise: the capital that is diverted
to trading cannot be easily replaced.
Another issue is whether the potential distortion in the internal allocation of capital, i.e.
the time inconsistency problem, could be mitigated by preventing the overallocation of capital
to trading. While it is optimal for a bank to allocate some of its capital to trading, a bank
is tempted to allocate ex post too much. A natural question is whether the bank could have
preempted the diversion of risk-bearing capacity to trading by returning its capital back to
shareholders (e.g. via dividends or share buybacks). The answer is no. To understand this,
note that in the normal course of business a bank always maintains unused capital (spare
borrowing capacity) in order to cover future funding needs of customers. The model highlights
32
that such capital can be misallocated to trading, making the bank unable to ful…ll its relationship
commitments. Even if this unused capital was returned to shareholders, the bank would still be
unable to make good on its commitments. Hence, the relationship franchise would be destroyed
in either case; returning capital to shareholders cannot resolve the problem of time inconsistency.
In the policy discussion of Section 7.3 we will argue that for this reason there may be a need
for structural remedies such as risk-fencing or prohibiting certain activities of banks.
The problem of time inconsistency between short- and long-term activities that we focus on
in this paper is reminiscent of the literature that shows how trading at an intermediate moment
in dynamic models of …nancial intermediation might undermine commitment. For example,
Jacklin (1987) shows that trading possibilities could undermine the intertemporal smoothing
between early and late consumers in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) analysis. Bhide (1993)
points to at a lack of shareholder discipline under unstable and di¤used ownership. Myers and
Rajan (1998) show how the presence of tradable, liquid assets may induce asset transformation
moral hazard. Shleifer and Vishny (2010) demonstrate that trading by banks can lead to
increased sensitivity of decisions to short term …nancial market pressures.
7.3
Policy Implications
The paper o¤ers two contributions to the policy debate. The …rst contribution is a set of
predictions that are useful for understanding the dynamics of banks that engage in trading.
Relationship banks are tempted to use their balance sheet’(i.e. implicit capital) for scalable
trading opportunities. While limited trading can enhance bank pro…tability and franchise value,
excess trading can reduce pro…ts and destroy the relationship banking franchise.
Financial development has undermined banking through two channels: more scalable trading
and less pro…table relationship banking (possibly due to higher competition and better available
customer information). Both increase incentives to over-allocate capital to trading (the time
inconsistency problem) and engage in risk-shifting.
Relationship banking activities that involve funding commitments su¤er most from such
over-allocation of capital to trading. These include credit lines, syndicated lending, and in
33
general commitments to the local market to o¤er funding in periods of economic stress based on
local knowledge (see Section 7.1). In the presence of time inconsistency such contracts become
less valuable and may no longer be viable. Banking as a whole then becomes more transactional.
A broad implication from the increased severity of the time inconsistency and risk shifting
problems is that combining banking and trading (the traditional European universal bank model
shared by some U.S. conglomerates) might have become less sustainable. Universal banks have
historically combined a sizable relationship banking activity with a much smaller transactionsbased activity. Now banks might allocate too many resources to the transactional activity,
leading to lower pro…t and higher risk. The friction between short term transactional (trading,
arm’s length) activities and long term relationship banking activities has thus become more and
more acute.
Anticipating a bank’s ability to be able to honor commitments has become more important.
Credit ratings may in part re‡ect the risk bearing (or, lending) capacity that is not …lled up
opportunistically. Hence, borrowers may anticipate that banks bene…tting from a higher rating
are better able to deliver on (implicit) promises or guarantees about future funding availability.
This could explain why ratings are of such importance in the …nancial services industry.
The second contribution is to the debate on restricting the scope of banking. Broadly speaking, the policy debate has focused on two (possibly complementary) approaches: prohibiting
trading in banks (speci…cally proprietary trading, e.g. the Volcker rule) or segregating trading
and other market-based activities (including underwriting) from relationship based activities via
…rewalled subsidiaries (the approach taken by the Vickers and Liikanen reports). Our analysis,
based on identifying two underlying market failures – the time inconsistency and risk-shifting
problems –allows us to make the following observations:
Scope of restrictions. The market failures identi…ed in our model are driven by banks engaging in trading: transactional (short-term, scalable) activities. Observe that Vickers separates
from banks more than trading: not all market-based activities are transactional in nature; some
–notably underwriting –are commonly relationship-based. The rationale for segregating them
from banking is unclear. At the same time, Volcker might be too narrow in focusing solely on
34
proprietary trading and not on other transactional bank activities (e.g. investing in structured
assets).
Segregating vs. prohibiting. Segregating trading into a separate subsidiary (Vickers, Liikanen) might help alleviate the risk-shifting problem. It can reduce risk spillovers from trading to
the relationship bank, and o¤er transparency and a more risk-sensitive pricing of the funding
for trading. However, at least two problems remain. One is that segregation may not be able to
prevent reputation-based recourse: the the relationship bank may voluntarily choose to cover
losses in trading (as was the case in the number of episodes in the recent crisis). And second,
segregating trading cannot resolve the time inconsistency problem in capital allocation. If some
trading activities were segregated into a separate subsidiary, a bank would still have incentives
to misallocate to trading the capital that it maintains for future funding needs of relationship
bank customers. Put di¤erently, even with segregated trading, a bank might trade too much.
A prohibition of proprietary trading (Volcker) – and more broadly of other transaction-based
activities – in banks and banking groups might thus be essential to prevent the misallocation
of capital.
Trading-like activities that are part of the lending process. A key implementation challenge
to Volcker or Vickers is that a restriction on trading might a¤ect market activities that are
inherent to relationship lending, such as taking positions for hedging purposes. Our analysis
o¤ers a “middle ground” approach (similar to the one in Liikanen): banks could be allowed to
undertake market operations but on a limited scale. Trading in low volumes (below Tmax (20)
and TRisky (28)) does not undermine relationship banking (the allowed scale of trading is not
larger than …rst-best optimal), nor does it induce risk-shifting (bank shareholders su¢ ciently
internalize the costs of risky trading at such low volume). Trading on a limited scale would
thus not create distortions but will give banks space to undertake market operations that are
necessary to support the lending process. While appealing, we would still be concerned about
misallocation of capital to trading ex post. Hence, we only feel comfortable with this Liikanen
approach if strict, measurable and non-discretionary limits can be imposed.
Shadow banking. Another concern in the implementation of restrictions on bank activities is
that trading activities may move to the unregulated sector and become even riskier. Our analysis
35
suggests that this may not be as likely as it appears. Trading by banks is particularly risky
because available implicit bank capital (i.e. rents coming from activities other than trading)
enables and induces trading at large scale. If trading is removed from banks, it will become
capital constrained with a lower threat to …nancial stability.
Crisis management. The crisis has highlighted the instability of the standalone investment
banks. Our analysis suggests that this is because they had become largely trading operations
and had managed to do this at a scale (through leverage) which was not compatible with the
capital constraints that trading should face. It might be that (implicit) perceived government
guarantees allowed them to surpass their natural more limited scale, or that the market had
overlooked their transition from more relationship oriented investment banks (with implicit
capital) to trading operations.
The authorities adopted two approaches for dealing with standalone investment banks when
markets (belatedly) started doubting their viability. One was to merge them with commercial
banks (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch). Another was to issue them commercial bank licenses
that enabled access to discount window and other central bank facilities (Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley). In both cases, explicit government guarantees (and in the …rst case also
implicit capital from the banking operation they were merged into) seemed to restore stability.
Our analysis suggests that the latter (stand-alone) option might be generally preferable as a
…rst step. While a merger with a bank may be a way to quickly inject implicit equity and
stabilize the trading operation, in the medium term such conglomeration may be detrimental
to the franchise and the stability of the merging commercial bank. The stand-alone option
would be de…nitely less detrimental if it involves as next step an orderly unwinding of trading
positions.
Justi…cation for intervention. In our analysis, the economic rationale for restricting the
trading activities of banks is twofold: i. to maintain the supply of credit to the real economy
by preventing a misallocation of capital, and ii. to prevent …nancial instability by limiting riskshifting. An additional argument might be to prevent the ‘misuse’by banks of funds covered
by deposit insurance. However, our model does not rely on the presence of (not risk priced)
deposit insurance; its presence would strengthen our results that banks have incentives to use
36
trading to boost risk.
Capital regulation. Our study suggests that restricting trading by banks will free up capital,
limit its opportunistic and (undoubtedly) highly pro-cyclical use, and thus mitigate also the
pro-cyclical e¤ects of capital regulation. So restrictions on trading should be complimentary
to the Basel III initiatives. Also, trading by banks, when not fully restricted, can be charged
punitive capital to discourage it, or to have banks better internalize its risk. The ability of pure
capital-based measures to contain the risks of trading should not, however, be overestimated.
Financial innovation and …nancial development has pushed much of arm’s length …nance into
the realm of trading, and thus have enormously expanded the scope of trading. It is doubtful
whether capital charges can su¢ ciently deal with this expanded scope.
8
Conclusion
The paper studies incentive problems in universal banks that combine relationship banking and
short-term arm’s length trading operations. Banks have incentives to engage in trading since
that allows them to use the risk bearing capacity of the relationship bank to pro…tably expand
the scale of trading. However it generates two ine¢ ciencies. First, banks may allocate too
much capital to trading ex post, compromising the incentives to build relationships ex ante.
And banks may use trading for risk-shifting, compromising bank stability.
Modern …nancial development – driven in large part by developments in information technology – has expanded trading by pushing arm‘s length …nance into the realm of trading.
Information has become more widely accessible and …nancial innovations improved the tradability of previously non-marketable assets. Together with the deepening of …nancial markets,
this made doing transactions and engaging in trading very prevalent for banks. Financial development augments the scalability of trading, which could initially bene…t conglomeration,
but beyond some point ine¢ ciencies dominate. The proliferation of …nancial markets in recent decades suggests that conglomeration faces severe head winds. Problems in managing and
regulating trading by banks will persist for the foreseeable future. Our results highlight the
dynamic problems in universal banks and sheds light on the desirability of restrictions on bank
37
trading activities, such as ones that were recently proposed by the Volcker rule in the U.S. and
the Vickers and Liikanen Reports in the UK and EU.
Our analysis casts doubts on any weak separation between banking and trading, like ringfencing. One concern is that segregation may not be able to prevent reputation-based recourse: the
the relationship bank may voluntarily choose to cover losses in trading (as was the case in the
number of episodes in the recent crisis). But more fundamentally, segregating trading cannot
resolve the time inconsistency problem in capital allocation. If some trading activities were
segregated into a separate subsidiary, a bank would still have incentives to misallocate to trading the capital that it maintains for future funding needs of relationship bank customers. Put
di¤erently, even with segregated trading, a bank might trade too much.
We would also warn against ‘feel good’solutions like charging trading with punitive capital
requirements to discourage it, or to have banks better internalize its risk. While theoretically
logical and potentially e¤ective, their viability should not be overestimated. Financial development has pushed much of arm‘s length …nance into the realm of trading, and thus enormously
expanded the scope of trading. We doubt that capital charges can su¢ ciently deal with this
expanded scope.
38
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Figure 1. The timeline.
Date 0
 Bank lends to customers (repaid at date 2), obtains implicit equity R0
Date 1
 Bank customers have liquidity needs R
 A conglomerated bank chooses the allocation of borrowing capacity between
banking (covering liquidity needs) R (earns r) and trading T (earns t)
 After borrowing, a bank has the ability to “abscond” with b(R+T)
 Bank lends to customers and engages in trading
Date 2
 Returns realized, everyone repaid
Figure 2. The timeline with time inconsistency.
Date 0
 Bank lends to customers (repaid at date 2), obtains implicit equity R0
 Bank collects credit line fees (r – ρ) Rex-ante for covering funding needs at date 1
Date 1
 Bank customers have liquidity needs R
 A conglomerated bank chooses the allocation of borrowing capacity between
banking (covering liquidity needs) R (earns ρ) and trading T (earns t)
 After borrowing, a bank has the ability to “abscond” with b(R+T)
 Bank lends to customers and engages in trading
Date 2
 Returns realized, everyone repaid
Figure 3. Relationship banking allocation R as a function of trading opportunities S.
Case 1, r < b
Optimal banking:
R = R.
Reduced banking:
R <..R
Tmax(r)
Case 2, r ≥ b
No banking:
R=0
S
R0/(b-t)
Optimal banking:
R = R.
No banking:
R=0
R0/(b-t)
Tmax(r)
S
Figure 4. The volumes of banking (R) and trading (T), and profits (Π) under
conglomerated banking.
R, T
R, T
R
R
R
R0/(b-t)
R
R0/(b-t)
T
Tmax
T
T
R
S
Tmax
R0/(b-t)
R0/(b-t)
Panel A: R and T for r<b
S
Tmax
Panel B: R and T for r≥b
Π
Π
R0+r R +tTmax
R0+r R +tTmax
R0+r R
R0+r R
R0+t R0/(b-t)
R0+t R0/(b-t)
S
Tmax
R0/(b-t)
R0/(b-t)
Panel C: Π for r<b
Panel D: Π for r≥b
No time inconsistency
With time inconsistency (ρ<t)
Tmax
S
Figure 5. The volumes of banking (R) and trading (T), and profits (Π) with riskshifting.
R, T
R
R
R0/(b-t)
T
R0/(b-(p(1+t+α)-1)
TRisky
Tmax
T
R
S
Tmax
R0/(b-t)
TRisky
R0/(b-(p(1+t+α)-1)
Panel A: R and T
Π
R0+r R +tTmax
R0+r R
R0+t R0/(b-t)
S
Tmax
TRisky
R0/(b-t)
R0/(b-(p(1+t+α)-1)
Panel B: Π
No time inconsistency or risk shifting
With time inconsistency, but no risk-shifting
With time inconsistency and risk-shifting
Risky trading
Risky trading for T>TRisky
Figure 6. Time inconsistency arises due to a higher return to trading under risk-shifting
(“Effect 1”).
T, R
R
R0/(b-(p(1+t+α)-1)
R
T
TRisky
S
Tmax
T
R
Tmax
TRisky
S
R0/(b-(p(1+t+α)-1)
The case t<ρ<p(t+α)): there is no time inconsistency when the
bank chooses safe trading (for T≤ TRisky); time inconsistency
arises once the bank prefers risky trading (T> TRisky)
Risky trading, for T>TRisky
Risky trading for T>TRisky
Figure 7. Risk-shifting arises due to a higher volume of trading, driven by time
inconsistency (“Effect 2”).
T
R0/(b-(p(1+t+α)-1)
TRisky
Tmax
S
Tmax
TRisky
R0/(b-(p(1+t+α)-1)
The volume of trading in the case ρ>p(t+α)): there is no time
inconsistency, T is bounded by T≤Tmax<TRisky and there is no
risk-shifting
The volume of trading in the case ρ<t: time inconsistency arises
for S>Tmax; T can increase beyond Tmax and exceed TRisky.
Risky trading arises in the latter case, for T>TRisky